Swastika Over Acropolis

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Swastika over the Acropolis


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History of Warfare

Editors

Kelly DeVries

Loyola University Maryland

John France

University of Wales, Swansea

Michael S. Neiberg

United States Army War College, Pennsylvania

Frederick Schneid

High Point University, North Carolina

VOLUME

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/hw


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LEIDEN BOSTON2013

Swastika over the Acropolis

Re-interpreting the Nazi Invasion of Greece in

World War II

By

Craig Stockings and Eleanor Hancock


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Cover illustration: Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, centre, visits the Acropolis in Athens duringthe German occupation of Greece in 1941.

Source: ullstein bild/The Granger Collection, New York: 0084444

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual Brill typeface. With over 5,100 characterscovering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities.For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN -ISBN ---- (hardback)ISBN ---- (e-book)

Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing,IDC Publishers and Martinus Nijhof Publishers.

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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stockings, Craig A. J., author. Swastika over the Acropolis : re-interpreting the Nazi invasion of Greece in World War Two / byCraig Stockings and Eleanor Hancock. pages cm. -- (History of warfare ; volume 92)

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-25457-2 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-25459-6 (e-book) 1. World War,1939-1945--Campaigns--Greece. 2. Greece--History--Occupation, 1941-1944. I. Hancock, Eleanor,author. II. Title.

D766.3.S76 2013 940.542195--dc23

2013019451


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For Emma, Georgia, Charlotte and Thomas Stockings

and

in loving memory of

Eva Maria Jutta Hancock (1921-2008)

and

William Frederick Hancock (1922-2008)


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Twas just a month agonot moreWe sailed to Greece to win the war

We marched and groaned beneath our load,While bombers bombed us of the road,

They chased us here, they chased us thereThe blighters chased us everywhere

And while they dropped their loads of death,We cursed the bloody R.A.F.

Yet the R.A.F. were there in forceThey left a few at home of courseWe saw the entire squad one day

When a Spitre spat the other way

And when we heard the wireless newsWhen portly Winston gave his views,

The R.A.F. he said, in GreeceAre ghting hard to bring us peace!

And so we scratched our heads and thought,This smells distinctly like a rort,For if in Greece the air force be,

Then where the amin hell are we?

And then at last we met the HunAt odds of thirty-three to oneAnd tho he made it pretty hot

We gave the bugger all wed got.

The bullets whizzed, the big guns roared,We howled for ships to get aboardAt length they came and on we gotAnd hurried from that cursed spot.

Extract from The Isle of Doom by Bouf

Extract from The Isle of Doom, draft synopsis of the 2/1st Battalion unit history, AWMMSS0958.


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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixList of Maps and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiConventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvxviiiIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PART ONESETTING THE SCENE

. Axis Ambitions in Europe and Greece -: Greece isassigned to the mercy of Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. The Italo-Greek War, the Powers and the Balkans: My friendMussolini is a very sensitive gentleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Albania, the Bulgarian Frontier & Greek Defensive Schemes . . . . The Die is Cast: German and British Planning in Early March

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Gathering Storm: Mid-March and Early April . . . . . . . .

PART TWOTHE DRAMA UNFOLDS

. Opening Moves (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Fall of Northeastern Greece (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Battle Lines (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Battle of Vevi (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pressure on the Passes (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Allied Withdrawal Planning & Operations (- April) . . . . . . . . The Battle of Pinios Gorge (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Across the Plains of Thessaly (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The End in Epirus (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Brallos and the Thermopylae Pass (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Corinth and the Peloponnese (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Final Evacuations (- April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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PART THREEEVALUATION

. The Outcome Explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Justications, Vindications and Unnecessary Debates . . . . . . . . . . MaritaandBarbarossa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

CONTENTS vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix

LISTOFMAPSAND FIGURES xi

CONVENTIONS xvii

Introduction

PARTONE

SETTINGTHE SCENE

Chapter One

Axis Ambitions in Europeand Greece-: Greeceis assignedto themercy of Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter Two

TheItalo-GreekWar, thepowers andtheBalkans: My friend Mussoliniis avery sensitivegentleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter Three

Albania, theBulgarian frontier & Greek defensiveschemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter Four

Thedieis cast: German and British planning in early March . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter Five

Thegathering storm: mid-March and early-April, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PARTTWO

THE DRAMA UNFOLDS

Chapter Six

Opening moves (- April)

Chapter Seven

Thefallof Northeastern Greece(-April)

Chapter Eight

NewBattleLines ( - A pr il )

Chapter Nine

TheBattleof Vevi(-April)

Chapter Ten

Pressureon thePasses ( - A p ri l )

Chapter Eleven

AlliedWithdrawalPlanning & Operations (-April). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter Twelve

TheBattleof Pini os Gor g e( - A p r il )

Chapter Thirteen

Across theplainsof Thessaly (-April)

Chapter Fourteen

TheEndin Epirus (-April)

Chapter Fifteen

Brallos andtheThermopylaePass (-April) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter Sixteen

Corinth andthe Peloponnese(-April)

Chapter Seventeen

TheFinalEvacuati ons ( - A p ri l )

PARTTHREE

EVALUATION

Chapter Eighteen

TheOutcomeExplained

Chapter Nineteen

Justications, Vindications andUnnecessary Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter Twenty

Maritaand Barbarossa

Epilogue

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

One pleasant aspect of completing a book is that it brings with it the op-portunity to give proper thanks to all the individuals and institutions thathelped to make it possible. We would rst to acknowledge the generoussupport provided to this endeavour by the Australian Research Counciland the Australian Army History Unit. Mr Roger Lee and his team at the

AHU remain a key institution in promoting the study and understandingof Australian military history. Thanks also to the University of New SouthWales, and our Faculty, UNSW Canberra, for their generous support.

At a personal level we would like to thank a number of our colleagueswithin the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at UNSW@ADFA fortheir wise counsel and their patience with the ideas we raised in our tearoom discussions. We are particularly indebted to Emeritus Professor PeterDennis, Professor Jefrey Grey, Dr John Connor, and Professor Robin Prior

for their advice, and Emeritus Professor Peter Dennis, Dr Elizabeth Green-halgh, and Ms Miesje de Vogel for their invaluable editorial assistance. Weare grateful to Dr David Stahel for his stimulating advice and editorial sug-gestions, as well as his initial research assistance and troubleshooting inGermany. We also wish to thank Mr Keith Mitchell for his provision of suchhigh quality maps.

Throughout the process of research and writing the helpfulness of ar-chivists from various state oces of the National Archives and the Austra-lian War Memorial was greatly appreciated, as was the cheerful supportofered from various state public record oces across Australia. For theirexpert assistance while researching in Britain and Germany, we thank thestaf at the Cadbury Research Library at the University of Birmingham,Churchill Archives Centre, the Imperial War Museum, the Liddell HartCentre for Military Archives, Kings College, London, the National Archivesof the United Kingdom, the Bundesarchiv Militrarchiv in Freiburg, theBundesarchiv Reich at Lichterfelde and the Politisches Archiv of the Aus-wrtiges Amt in Berlin, and the library of the Militrgeschichtliches Forsc-hungsamt in Potsdam.

Craig Stockings:For me, as always, the most important factor in the comple-tion of this book has been the unremitting support of my family. My wife,


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Emma, is a true partner. Let me also thank my children, Georgia, Charlotteand Thomas, who never cease to lighten my heart.

Eleanor Hancock:I thank my friends, Christopher Difey, Michael Fuery,Philippa Horner, Susan Jones and Edward Wilson; for their friendship andpatience during the writing of the book. Christopher Difey and EdwardWilson let me use their home as a base during my research in London whichI appreciated very much. Above all, I thank Adamu Abbas for his supportand encouragement.


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LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

Maps

P. The Mediterranean Theatre, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviiP. GreeceShowing various Allied defensive lines of critical

signicance during the campaign, - April . . . . . . . . . . . xviii. The German Plan of Attack and Allied Positions, April

. The Battles of the Doiran-Nestos Line, - April . . . -. Planned Allied Positions, - April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The course of the Battle of Vevi, April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The th NZ Brigade at Servia, April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The planned withdrawal from Thermopylae, - April . The withdrawal of the th and th Australian Brigades, -

April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The attack on the st NZ Battalion by elements of the German

nd Armoured Divisions Battle Group , - April . . . . The Pinios Gorge Action, - April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The th NZ Brigade holding the Olympus Pass, - April

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The withdrawal of the st (UK) Armoured Brigade - April

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The withdrawal of the WMFAS (rd Greek Corps), - April

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. The th NZ Brigade rearguard action at Elasson, April . W Force withdrawal through Larissa, - April . . . . . . . . The withdrawal of the EFAS, - April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The German approach to the Thermopylae Line, - April

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The W Force Evacuation Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Action at the Brallos and Thermopylae Passes, April . . . W Force Corinth Canal Positions, April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The situation in southern Greece on April after the

German paratroop landings at Corinth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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Figures

. Satirical cartoon on the professed disinterest of both GermanChancellor Adolf Hitler and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin inthe Balkan Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. A German anti-aircraft position deployed to protect oil tanksat Ploesti in Romania in early . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. January , the Anglo-Greek war council in session . . . . . . . . . Anthony Eden greeted by cheering crowds when he visited

Athens in March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Italian dictator Benito Mussolini assesses the terrain through

a telescope behind the front lines during Italys campaignagainst Greece, March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Greek troops engaging an Italian position in Albania in early . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. A schematic representation of Fort Istibei in the ThylakasSector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Four unidentied German soldiers walk along a Bulgarianroad towards their concentration area in preparation for thecoming invasion of Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Alexandria, March , W Force troops embarking for Greece . Members of the /st Australian Field Regiment, Athens,

gamble at two-up before boarding a train to Larissa in April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. A group of German soldiers march down a Bulgarian streetlined with military and civilians towards the Greek frontier . . .

. Damage sustained at Piraeus from German bombing on the

night of April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Luftwafe Stukas in ight in . These aircraft failed to have

the impact expected by the Germans against the forts of theDoiran-Nestos Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Narrow mountain roads over which British and Dominiontroops travelled north to reinforce the Vermion-Olympus Lineon April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. W Force troops approaching the town of Kozani en route to

Major General Mackays blocking position at Kleidi Pass, April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. The bridge across the Aliakmon River, north of Servia, one ofthe most vital keys in the defence system of northern Greece . .


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. German air attack was a constant concern for W Force. Whenpossible, all vehicles carried a man on the running board as

a lookout, and the heavier transports mounted light machineguns in an anti-aircraft role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Lieutenant Colonel I. N. Dougherty, Commanding Ocer ofthe /th Australian Battalion, standing in the snow with thecommander of his neighbouring Greek battalion on GoodFriday, April, the day before the German assault at KleidiPass began . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Soldiers of the th Australian Brigade after crossing the

Aliakmon River by ferry after withdrawing from the Veria Pass . German prisoners captured after the action fought at Servia

Pass on April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A section of the town of Elasson, not far from the th NZ

Brigades rearguard position, under heavy bomb attack byGerman aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Survivors from the /nd Australian Battalion after theengagement at Pinios photographed on Euboea Island on the

eve of their escape from Greece to Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Field Marshal List congratulating German mountain troops

following the Battle of Pinios Gorge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W Force transport withdrawing southwards. Note the lack of

vehicle dispersal which tended to encourage Luftwafe strang . A view of Brallos Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . This photograph was taken from the site of the New Zealand

positions near Thermopylae, looking south from Lamia road

over the Sperkhios River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Navplion, from which allied troops were evacuated . . . . . . . . . . . . Australian troops resting under the trees in the Kalamata area,

April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W Force troops being taken ashore at Suda Bay, Crete, in a

small coastal steamer after being evacuated from southernGreece on April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. A convoy of troops from Greece arriving at Alexandria, Egypt,

April . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Greek forces in retreat during the campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . German bombs bursting on the Domokos-Lamia Road in an

unsuccessful attempt to disrupt the ow of W Force tracsouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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. German aircraft and supplies on a captured Greek aireld. Theimpact of the Luftwafe throughout the Greek campaign has

traditionally been overstated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An unidentied group of German soldiers travelling down the

road in Greece. These troops, typical of the vanguard armouredand reconnaissance units which usually engaged W Forcerearguards in Greece, are riding motorcycles and bicyclesnot driving tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. A photograph taken during the visit to the Middle and NearEast of the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Eden was

a key gure in shaping the original British decision to deployW Force to Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Lieutenant General Thomas Blamey; Lieutenant GeneralHenry Maitland Wilson; and Major General B.C. Freyberg.Both Blamey and Freyberg faced the challenges in Greece ofacting as both Wilsons operational subordinates and nationalcontingent commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Blamey, commanding the nd

AIF, and Mr. Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister,meeting in February in Egypt. Mr. F. Shedden was theSecretary of the Australian Department of Defence. TheAustralian acceptance of the decision to deploy to Greece wascomplicated by a lack of efective communication betweenMenzies and Blamey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. German troops move along a road on bicycles, motor bikes,and in trucks and tanks, during Operation Barbarossa in the

Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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CONVENTIONS

As the Greek campaign of 1941 involved combatants from many diferentnations, and was fought in a part of the world both rich and diverse inethnicity, culture, spoken and written languages, a degree of standardisa-tion is necessary for ease of reading. Within this book, therefore, all placeand geographic namesvillages, towns, cities, rivers, mountains, and so

forthhave predominantly been taken from British military maps in usein 1941. The primary source in this regard is the 1:1,000,000 scale map (TV2758, J34Athens) compiled by the British War Oce and printed by the512th (A. Fd. Svy.) Company, R.E. This map, and those adjoining it, mostnotably to the north (K34Soa) are available for viewing in the mapreading room of the Australian War Memorial. The tendency within thebook, therefore, is generally towards an anglicised version of the Greekname in common usage in 1941. The largest and longest river which ows

through Macedonia, for example, which is commonly referred to, depend-ing on the location or nationality of the speaker, as the (Macedo-nian), Vardari (Albanian), Axisor Vardrs (Greek), isreferred to as the Axiosan anglicised version of the Greek name in useby the British military in Greece in 1941.

Similarly, given the multiple nationalities of the belligerent troops in-volved in Greece in April 1941 a common approach to military ranks hasbeen taken. In this case, again for ease of reading for an English-languageaudience, all ranks are referred to by the British World War II equivalent.Again, for example, a Greek , a German Army Oberst-leutnant, a German SS Obersturmbannfhrer, and an Italian TenenteColonnello, are all referred to as a Lieutenant Colonelthe British (andDominion) equivalent.

By convention, given often multiple archival references to incidents,arguments and ideas, single footnotes have been used to cover each para-graph. The sources informing the paragraph in question are listed withineach of these notes. The exceptions in this regard are quotations, whereindividual references have been used at the point at which the quotationis used. Where a quotation falls at the end of a paragraph then the rstreference within the footnote refers to the quotation used.


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Map

P.1

:The

Me

diterrane

an

Theatre

,1941

Adriatic

Se

a

Ionian

Sea

MEDITERRANEAN

SEA

Aegean

Sea

R

ed

Sea

Bayof

B

iscay

BlackSea

MEDITER

RANEAN

SEA

StraitofGibraltar

ITALY

SPAIN

F

R

A

N

C

E

PORTUGAL

RUM

ANIA

BULGARIA

TU

RK

EY

USSR

GREECE

CYPRUS

LEBA

NON

ALBANIA

YUGOSLAVIA

E

G

Y

P

T

LIBYA

Tripolitania

TUNISIA

M

O

RO

CCO

A

LG

E

R

IA

TRANS

JORDA

NSYRIA

MALTA

Suez

Canal

SICILY

SARDINIA

Cape

Matapan

Dodecanese

Islands

PALESTINE

Taranto

Bizerta

Derna

Bardia

Tirana

Sofia

Gibraltar

Athe

ns

Rome

Tripoli

Buc

harest

Madrid

Tunis

Ankara

Algiers

Cagliari

Cairo

Jerusalem

Lisbon

Genoa

Marseilles

Barcelona

Milan

Belgrade

Istanbul

Alexandria

Napl

es

Palermo

Tangier

Rabat

Casablanca

Oran

PortSaid

Catania

Homs

Benghazi

Sirte

ElAgheila

Agedabia

Dam

ascus

Cyrenaica

Qattara

Depression

Nile


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DOIRANNESTOS LINE

VERMION-OLYMPUS

LINE

OLYMPUS-ALIAKMON

LINE

ALBANIANFRONT

THERMOPYLAE LINE

ALBANIA

BULGARIAYUGOSLAVIA

IO NIA N

S EA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

A E GE A N

S EAPini

os

Tirana

Athens

Kozani

Larissa

Salonika

YanninaCorfu

Tripolis

Lamia

Patras

Agrinion

Katerini

Trikkala

KarditsaVolos

Drama

Khalkis

SerraiKavalla

Sparta

Monemvasia

Corinth

Pyrgos

Koritza

Argyrokastron

Valona

Kilkis

EdessaFlorina

Kastoria

Durazzo

Elbasan

Grevena

Tirnavos

Thebes

Levadia

Kalamata

Yithion

Yiannitsa

NavplionArgos

Mt Olympus 2917

PIN

DU

Aliakm

on

Aoos

RupelPass

LakeDorian

Monastir

Platamon

Siatista

Ptolemais

Kalabaka

PiniosGorge

Almiros

Brallos Pass

Porto Rafti

Megara

Molos

0 80 kilometres

0 40 miles

KITHIRA

KEA

MILO

EUBOEA

M

OUNTAIN

S

Map P.2: GreeceShowing various Allied defensive lines of critical signicance duringthe campaign, 6-28 April 1941


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INTRODUCTION

On 6 April 1941, Germany launched simultaneous invasions of Greece andYugoslavia. Yugoslavia was defeated in a matter of days. The ensuing cam-paign in Greece (code-named OperationMarita), lasted just over threeweeks and ended in a complete Allied defeat.

Initially neutral, Greece had become involved in World War II on 28

October 1940 when Italy invaded the country from its Albanian territory.In April 1939 Britain and France had issued a guarantee of military supportto the Greeks, should they be attacked by a foreign power, but Greece didnot need, ask for, or require any substantial British ground deployment torepel the Italian incursion. The Greeks quickly drove Mussolinis troopsback across the Albanian frontier and held them there. As prospects of aGerman intervention became greater in early 1941, however, the Greekgovernment reversed its earlier position and invited Britain to send what

ground forces could be spared. As a consequence, an imperial commitment(W Force), based on a British armoured brigade and infantry divisions fromAustralia and New Zealand, began landing in Athens in early March 1941.By 20 April, when it was clear that W Force could do little more to slow thecontinuing German advance, the Greek Government agreed that this ex-peditionary force should be evacuated. Between 24 and 29 April more than50,000 British and Dominion troops left the Greek mainland. On 25 Aprilthe Greek government ed to Crete, which subsequently fell to German

forces on 30 May.

During the negotiations for its deployment the British and Dominion Force to be sentto Greece was known as Lustreforce, after OperationLustre, the codename for British navalefort to ship it from Egypt. While in Greece, the headquarters of the force referred to itself,in its operational and administrative instructions, as BTGBritish Troops Greece. Forease of reference, throughout this book the name W Force will be used to represent theforce. The term W Force was initially given to the Imperial troops and the Central Mace-

donian Field Army Section (CMFAS) under Wilsons command from 12.00 p.m., 5 April.This name was derived from the fact that troops were under the command of LieutenantGeneral Henry Maitland Wilson. The use of the name W Force was common at the time,has been used in ocial and general histories of the campaign ever since, and remainsrecognisable todaymuch more so, for example, than BTG.

M. Mazower,Inside Hitlers Greece: The Experience of Occupation, Yale University Press,New Haven, 1993, p. 2.


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For Greeks defeat meant the beginning of a harsh occupation and bitterresistance. For New Zealand and Australia the manpower losses sufered

on the mainland (and immediately afterwards in Crete) signicantly re-duced the immediate military capability of both nations expeditionaryforces. In Britain the loss of mainland Greece represented another in aseries of serious military setbacks. For the Axis powers, although the falland subsequent occupation of most of Greece ended a costly and embar-rassing stalemate in Albania for Italy, the subordination to Germany thatfollowed efectively meant the end of Mussolinis ability to conduct anindependent policy. For Germany, on the other hand, the success of the

invasion was important for its future plans against the Soviet Unionaclash which was to be the decisive campaign of the war in Europe.

Despite the clear importance of the German invasion of Greece withinthe international history of World War II, limited scholarly research has asyet been conducted into the operational aspects of the mainland campaign,apart from the generally narrative approach of the ocial histories. Often,particularly in Australasia, those works that do take a battleeld focustend to limit themselves to traditional, non-academic narratives of events,

which are generally uncritical, unreective and often subject to nationalistand partisan agendas. The body of research conducted into the mainlandGreek campaign might thus be described as thinespecially when weighedup against that which exists for the Battle for Crete which followed, or recentinvestigations into the operational aspects of the fall of France, for example,or the campaigns in North Africa. The battle for mainland Greece in April

Some examples of works that do devote signicant attention to operational eventsinclude: J. Bitzes, Greece in World War II: To April 1941, Sunower University Press, Manhat-tan, 1989; A. Terzakis and D. Connolly, The Greek Epic, 1940-1941, Greek Army Press, Athens,1990; C. Polyzious, The Allied Campaign Corps in Greece (March May 1941), Hellenic ArmyGeneral Staf History Directorate, Athens, 1991; Anon., An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, 1940-1941, Hellenic Army General Staf History Directorate,Athens, 1997; R. Higham,Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece, 1940-1941, University Pressof Kentucky, Lexington, 1986; M. Willingham, Perilous Commitments: The Battle for Greeceand Crete 1940-1941, Spellmount, Staplehurst, 2005; K.H. Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941,

Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg, 2007. Some of the more analytical articles in questioninclude: R. Hobson, The Episode in Greece,Army Quarterly & Defence Journal, Vol. 120, No.2, 1990, pp. 152-66; J. Sadkovich, Italian Morale During the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941,

War & Society, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1994, pp. 97-123; J. Sadkovich, Anglo-American Bias and theItalo-Greek War of 1940-1941,Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 4, 1994, pp. 617-42. See, for example, W. Phillips, The Middle East Campaigns of 1940-1942: Greece and Crete,

Phillips Publications, Cofs Harbour, 2000; P. Ewer, The Forgotten Anzacs: The campaign inGreece, 1941, Scribe, Melbourne, 2008.

For Crete see, for example, A. Beevor, Crete, Hodder, London, 2005; J. Forty,Battle forCrete, Ian Allen Publishing, London, 2009; J.H. Spencer, Battle for Crete, Pen and Sword,


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1941 has been neglected to some extent, andwhere it has been studiedoften misunderstood. This study aims to begin its re-examination. It is a

critical operational history, with operations dened as being the manage-ment of campaigns and specic theatres of war. Operational history, inRobert Citinos denition of the concept, is about explaining what actu-ally happened in the course of a campaign, and why. It is also a modernstudy in that it seeks to place the operation in its political, strategic andeconomic context.

Within this context this book is an attempt to provide a modern, multi-national account of the mainland Greek campaign. Although the ghting

which followed the German invasion was in many ways a continuation ofthe ongoing Greco-Italian War, and the subsequent invasion of Crete aconsequence of the mainland campaign, our focus is on the crucial three-week period, from 6 to 27 April, which decided Greeces wartime fate. It isbased on research on ocial records held by archives in Australia, Ger-many, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Some German records onthe mainland Greek campaign were damaged and others destroyed duringa re in the army historical section in Potsdam during the war. Those Ger-

man records that survive are not as comprehensive as their Allied equiva-lents, and the memoir literature by private soldiers is less extensive. Bothof these factors have meant that it has not been possible to give equal weightto the experience of both sides. In addition, at least some of the Germanreports were prepared weeks after the events they record, with resultinginaccuracies in the times and dates of their accounts.

Limited resources meant that we were unable to undertake research inGreek and Italian archives and that the information on Greek and Italian

forces and policies has therefore had to come from sources available

Barnsley, 2008; J. Sadler, Operation Mercury: & The Battle for Crete, 1941, Stackpole Books,Mechanicsburg, 2008. See also (for France) K. Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: the 1940 cam-paign in the West, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2005; J. Jackson, The Fall of France: theNazi invasion of 1940, OUP, Oxford, 2003; and (for North Africa and the Mediterranean as awhole) M. Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of19401943, CUP, Cambridge, 2000; D. Porch,Hitlers Mediterranean Gamble: the North Africanand the Mediterranean Campaigns in World War II, Cassell, London, 2005.

R.M. Citino,Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942, University Press

of Kansas, Lawrence, 2007, p. 12. On operational history more generally: Bernd Wegner,Wozu Operationsgeschichte?, in T. Khne, and B. Ziemann (eds), Was ist Militrgeschichte?,Krieg in der Geschichte Band 6, Ferdinand Schningh, Paderborn, 2000, pp. 112-13; SnkeNeitzel, Des Forschens noch wert? Anmerkungen zur Operationsgeschichte der Wafen-SS,Militrgeschichtliche Zeitschrift, 61/2 (2002), pp. 403-5, 427-9.

5. Panzer-Division, Ib, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 5 u. 6. 1.1.1941-17.6.1941., BundesarchivMilitrarchiv (BA MA), Series RH 27, Item 5/121.


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in English and German. We are, at present, working on a separate projectconcerning the Italo-Greek War from October 1940, which will make use

of Italian and Greek primary and secondary sources.As a consequence of our archival ndings and subsequent analysis, this

book will argue that the currently accepted English-language interpreta-tions of the campaign are in many ways based on a misreading and mis-understanding of the evidence and of the campaign. Over the last seventyyears an accepted, yet imbalanced interpretation of the Greek campaignhas developed. Though there are variations in emphasis and detail, theoverall argument is generally consistent in that it attributes British dicul-

ties in Greece to a range of factors beyond the control of W Force. There islittle blame attached to British and Dominion troops. The expeditionaryforce was let down by its governments and, many authors have contended,by its Greek allies. Even then W Force faced a set of military disadvantagesso severe that they both explain and excuse its withdrawals and eventualignominious evacuation from Greece.

Within this overall interpretation there are a range of diferent empha-ses. Some have argued that Imperial troops should never have gone to

Greece in the rst place because political, rather than military factors,convinced British policy-makers to mount the deployment. An extensionof this line of thinking is that W Force should not have been despatched toGreece because the chances of military success were small and British andDominion soldiers were thus sacriced for political ends. An Australasianvariation on the theme is that the Australians and New Zealanders weresomehow tricked into agreeing to go to Greece and risking a signicantproportion of their national military power to a lost cause. At the very leastthey were denied important information by the British government. At astrategic level others have sought vindication for the campaign, arguingthat, even if the deployment was made for the wrong reasons, and eventhough it ended in an evacuation, it was crucial from an Allied perspectivebecause the campaign delayed the invasion of the USSR. This delay in turn,it has been argued, led to Germanys defeat because it meant the campaignin the Soviet Union lasted into the winter of 1941. The Greek intervention,therefore, was justied because it was a crucial component of eventualAllied victory in the east, and thus in Europe.

For an example of the use of such themes as underlying assumptions in a discussionregarding the use of Dominion troops in Greece, see I. Chapman, Iven G. Mackay: Citizenand Soldier, Melway Publishing, Melbourne, 1975, pp. 215-16.

For a classic and inuential example of this line of argument see W. Churchill, TheSecond World War, Vol. 5, Cassell, London, 1964, p. 321. The notion has been repeated often


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When authors have turned to the actual conduct of the campaign, theyhave tended to stress, with diferent degrees of emphasis, Greek failure and

German material superiority. The Greek-W Force plan to defend the coun-try, it has often been asserted, was fatally awed as a consequence of Greekintransigence and national pride, particularly concerning the location ofthe defensive line to be held in Albania and eastern Thrace. Moreover, oncethe German invasion was underway, a consistent series of Greek collapseson the western ank of the line rendered British positions untenable, thusnecessitating reluctant withdrawals (only at the last minute, when all op-tions had been exhausted) and eventually an evacuation. Simultaneously,it is widely contended that it was the enormous numerical advantage ofGerman formations which forced Imperial troops from their defensivepositions, always after a heroic and stoic defence. After all, no force, nomatter its skill or bravery, could stand against such odds. In addition, ahuge disparity in airpower, particularly of dive-bombers, made it impos-sible to hold the German advance. It was the Royal Air Force, according tomany, that let W Force down. Other authors have pointed to the massedtanks of multiple German armoured divisions for which the Greeks had nodefence and against which British troops could never hold without sub-stantial armour of their own.

Much of this now standardised interpretation originated in Allied war-time propaganda, which has never been adequately or critically scrutinised.Christopher Buckleys monograph, published not long after the war in 1952by the British government, for example, described how W Force was toothin on the ground and how much it was overmatched by better equipped,and far more numerous German adversaries. Nor was the situation helped,according to Buckley, by the fact that the power of the Luftwafegrew day

including, for example, in the New Zealand ocial history of the campaign. See W.G.McClymont, To Greece, War History Branch, Department of Internal Afairs, Wellington,1959, p. 484.

This idea was particularly popular in the contemporary Australian press. In everybattle in the 300 mile retreat, claimed the Sydney Morning Heraldon 1 May 1941, our menfought against odds of three, four or ve to one. Ordeal of Anzacs, Sydney Morning Herald,

1 May 1941, AWM, Series PR 88, Item 72. For examples in the secondary literature seeA. Heckstall-Smith, and H.T. Baillie-Grohman, Greek tragedy, 1941, W.W. Norton, NewYork, 1961, p. 225; J. Connell, Wavell, Soldier and Scholar, Collins, London, 1964, pp. 411,420.

For a recent account that encapsulates most of these themes, especially the mismatchin armour and airpower, see Ewer, Forgotten Anzacs.

C. Buckley, Greece and Crete 1941, HMSO, London, 1952, pp. 138, 140-1.


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by day. The Allied force could not compete with our adversary in the airand this, in turn, had much to do with their defeat. That is, of course, not

counting how ill-equipped for modern warfare the Greeks proved to be,how regrettable their decision to defend the Bulgarian border rather thanto reinforce the W Force position to the south prior to 6 April was, and how,in the end, when Greek resistance weakened and collapsed, withdrawaland evacuation became our only course.

Other myths arose from the self-serving after-action reports and mem-oirs from senior Allied ocers from the late 1940s onwards, conscious ofthe need to protect their professional reputations. Lieutenant General

Henry Maitland Wilson, the ocer in command of W Force, published anaccount of Greece which, unsurprisingly, reinforced all of the argumentsdescribed thus far. In his own inuential history-cum-memoir of the war,Winston Churchill wrote of poor Greek strategic planning with respect todeployments in Albania and Thrace, how the Greek divisions under Wilsonscommand began to disintegrate, and could no longer play an efective partand, in fact, how the Imperial and British forces received no efective mil-itary assistance from their Greek alliesalthough the British Prime Min-

ister was gracious enough to add that there were no recriminations. Nordid Churchill stop with the Greeks for it was, of course, also German ten-fold superiority in the air that explained for W Forces reversals.

Subsequent memoirs, like those of Vice-Admiral Harold Tom Baillie-Grohman, the British naval ocer in charge of the landward side of theeventual W Force evacuation from Greece, published in 1961, reinforcedsuch views. For Baillie-Grohman British and Dominion troops were beat-en, not through lack of courage or skill, but because they did not possess

the quality and quantity of arms with which to win. With respect to thedecisive role of theLuftwafehe lamented that Allied planners had failedto emulate the German support of ground troops from the air. Furthermore,for Baillie-Grohman, the British fatally overestimated the ghting endur-ance of the Greeks. In his 1964 biography of Field Marshal Sir ArchibaldWavell, the overall British commander in the Middle East in 1941, John

Ibid., p. 142.

Ibid., p. 140. Ibid., pp. 141-2. H. Wilson,Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947, Hutchinson & Co., London, 1949. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 5, pp. 198-9, 201, 209-10. Ibid., p. 204. Heckstall-Smith and Baillie-Grohman, Greek tragedy, 1941, p. 225. Ibid., p. 228


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Connell also described defeat in Greece as inevitable in ... the face of im-mense numerical superiority and in the context of how the Greek army

... disintegrated so rapidly ... More specically, British and Dominiontroops were forced to retreat down the Greek peninsula due to an initialand awed change in plan by the Greek Commander-in-Chief ..., and sub-sequently the collapse of the Yugoslavs and the Greeks. This was not tomention being pressed out of key defensive localities like Pinios Gorge bywaves of German armour.

These explanations of the causes of defeat in Greece were also reinforcedby the Allied ocial histories of the campaign published in the same pe-

riod. In 1956, I.S.O. Playfairs volume on Britains war in the Middle Eastaccepted the argument of German numerical superiority. Playfair alsocontended that as early as 13 April the Greeks had little capacity left foropposing the Germans, and that overall they lacked the cohesion andtraining to cope rapidly with the diculties. W.G. McClymonts ocialhistory of New Zealands participation in the campaign, published in 1959,described the weakness of the Greek army, and the small Imperial forceavailable, the strength of the German army, and the lack of air support

on hand for the Allies. McClymont quotes W Forces commander, Lieuten-ant GeneralWilson, by no means an impartial source, in describing theoverall Imperial efort in Greece as an outstanding defensive battle. GavinLongs ocial history of Australian involvement, published three yearsafter McClymont, recognised that a lack of condence in the Greeks byW Force strongly inuenced the conduct of the campaign. AlthoughLong was less inclined to blame W Forces allies, he was equally unwillingto take issue openly with those other ocial historians who had done so.

Again, Long reected the growing orthodoxy in maintaining that the defeatsufered by the [Anzac] corps was the result of an enemy force strongerin both armour and infantry.

Connell, Wavell, Soldier and Scholar, pp. 411, 420. Ibid., pp. 418, 420. Ibid., p. 417. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 2, HMSO, London, 1956,

pp. 88, 90, 99.

Ibid., pp. 87, 89. McClymont, To Greece, pp. 471, 478. Ibid., p. 472. G. Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1962, p. 194. Long thought it regrettable that eforts were made to place responsibility for failure

on the Greeks, ibid., p. 195. Ibid., p. 196.


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In the absence of many detailed operational studies from which towork, subsequent studies, especially biographies of other key W Force

commanders, have continued this pattern of interpretation. Ivan Chap-mans 1975 biography of Major General Iven Mackay, the commander ofthe 6th Australian Division in Greece, for example, depicted W Force asfacing hopeless odds numerically. He quoted Mackay in that no generalin his right mind would tackle them [the Germans] in open battle withoutguaranteed superiorityin the number of divisions but especially tanks.Unstoppable German armour and airpower in Greece were decisive.Similarly, the failure of the Greeks is rearmed as a key cause of W Forces

diculties: they were already showing signs of becoming a rabble. Ofcourse, Chapman is careful not to forget the Luftwafe which was cut loosein Greece, exposing the nakedness of the British in the air and placingW Force at a terric disadvantage. Similar arguments are reproducedin the most recent biographies of Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyberg,in command of the New Zealand division in Greece, and Lieutenant Gen-eral Thomas Blamey, Freybergs superior and the commander of the AnzacCorps. Unsurprisingly, both more general works on World War II that

deal with the Greek campaign, and more recent popular accounts, followthe interpretation developed in earlier memoirs, ocial histories andbiographies.

The most recent examples of the limited English-language academicliterature on the Greek campaign are still inclined to avoid detailed opera-tional analysis and therefore also adopt the established explanation. In thisregard, particularly with respect to the alleged failure of the Greeks to sup-port W Force adequately, Maria Hills 2010 study,Diggers and Greeks, is in

Chapman,Iven G. Mackay, pp. 217-18. Ibid., p. 234. Ibid., p. 235. Ibid., p. 220. See also p. 224. Ibid., pp. 224, 227. P. Freyberg,Bernard Freyberg, VC: soldier of two nations, Hodder & Stoughton, Lon-

don, 1991, p. 252; D.M. Horner, Blamey: the Commander-in-Chief, Allen & Unwin, Sydney,1998, p. 181; see also pp. 195, 197, 201, 205.

General histories: see, for example, A.J.P. Taylor, The Second World War: an illustrated

history, Penguin, London, 1975, pp. 89-90; J. Keegan, The Second World War, Viking, NewYork, 1990, pp. 157-8; Porch,Hitlers Mediterranean Gamble, pp. 141, 147, 154; E. Mawdsley,World War II: a new history, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 140; GerhardL. Weinberg,A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, second edition, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 217, 222. Popular histories: Ewer,Forgotten Anzacs,pp. 3-4, 171, 206-7; M. Johnston, The Proud 6th, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2008, p. 83.


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some ways the harshest indictment of the Greeks yet seen. Hill concludesthat W Forces defeat was based on the fact that the most senior Greek

commanders obstructed the Allied campaign in Greece. For Hill it wasthe collaboration of senior Greek ocers that determined the actions ofthe Greek military ..., for they wanted the British out of Greece as soon aspossible in order to facilitate a truce with Germany. She further claimsthat, as a result of a decision taken by the senior Greek commanders, noserious attempt was ever made by the Greeks to engage the Germansacharge that, as the following chapters will show, might instead have beenlevelled at W Force.

Greek military historiography has failed to inuence wider English-language studies of the campaign. The major reason is probably most Eng-lish speaking historians lack of knowledge of modern Greek. Greekhistorians appear to have been far more interested (at least in terms ofpublished output) in the period of military success against the Italians fromOctober 1940 until the beginning of April 1941 than they have been abouta period that included defeat, accusations of betrayal and collaboration.So too, from the perspective of Greek historiography, it appears that the

tragic period of occupation and the Civil War that followed have largelyovershadowed the events of April 1941. Studies of the war by Americanhistorians of Greek extraction, while thorough, for example, are heavilyinuenced by the politics of the period and the Civil War.

Similarly, those few operational military histories and other studies ofthe campaign that have been written and published in Germany and Italyhave also not inuenced the wider international historiography of the cam-paign. Operational military history for the period 1939-45 has not been an

M. Hill, Diggers and Greeks: the Australian campaigns in Greece and Crete, UNSWPress, Sydney, 2010, p. 119.

Ibid., pp. 119-20. Ibid., pp. 120, 123. See M. Hill, The Australians in Greece and Crete: a study of an intimate wartime

relationship, PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2008, pp. 13-16; G.C. Blytas, TheFirst Victory: Greece in the Second World War, Cosmos Publishing, River Vale, N.J., 2009; Bitzes,Greece in World War II. On Greek historiography for this period in general see A. Kitroef,

Continuity and Change in Contemporary Greek Historiography,European History Quarterly,No. 19, 1989, pp. 282-4, 286; M. Mazower, Historians at War: Greece, 1940-1950 (reviewarticle), The Historical Journal, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1995, pp. 499-506; N. Marantzidis and G. Anto-niou, The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941-2002,Journal of Peace Research, 41/2 (2004), pp. 223-321. On the survival of Greek militaryrecords, see Hill, The Australians in Greece and Crete, pp. 15-16, and J. Koliopoulos, Greeceand the British Connection 19351941, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, p. 265 footnote 1.


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area of much scholarly endeavour in either Italy or Germany. Furthermore,the relatively small numbers of historians in each country with opera-

tional expertise that have examined the ghting in Greece have had littleinternational impact. For the Italians the campaign in April 1941 was initself nothing to commemoratea pyrrhic victory that represented a fur-ther step in the subordination of Italian wartime policy-making to Berlin.Perhaps for this reason most Italian studies have focused on the earlierItalo-Greek campaign. Even at the strategic and political levels, historicalstudy of fascist Italy is both thin and politicised, and remains in many waysunder-developed compared, for example, with the historiography of NaziGermany.

Since World War II there has been relatively little German operationalresearch into the campaign in mainland Greece. After all, for the Germanwar Greece was a minor operation within a much wider context. DetlevVogels analysis of the German campaigns in Greece and Yugoslavia in vol-ume three of the German ocial history of World War II, Das DeutscheReich und das Zweite Weltkrieg, rst published in 1984, gives a compara-tively short eighteen-page account of the Greek campaign. Vogel empha-sises the strength of Greek and other Allied resistance in delaying theGerman advance, and suggests that Wilsons troops were in danger of

In English M. Cervi,Hollow Legions, Doubleday, New York, 1971, is a solid, if uncriti-cal, narrative. On Italian plans and strategies see M. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941,CUP, Cambridge, 1982. In Italian see the ocial history: Ministero della Difesa,La Campagnadi Grecia, Ucio Storico SMC, Rome, 1980 and M. Lazzarini, Ottobre 1940: La Campagna diGrecia, Italia Editrice, Campobasso, 1995. For comment on the ocial history see L. Ceva,La Guerra Italo-greco del 1940-1941 nella narrazione dellucio storico,Risorgimento, No.33, pp. 180-86. For the higher direction of the war see F. Rossi,Mussolini e lo stato maggiore.Avvenimenti del 1940, Regionale, Rome 1951; F. Jacomoni, La politica dellItalia in Albania,Capelli, Bologna, 1965; S.V. Prasca, Io o aggredito la Grecia, Rizzoli, Milan, 1946. For anaccount of the front line see F. Balistreri, Coi bersaglieri nella campagna di Grecia, Baldini& Castoldi, Milan, 1942. For further Italian studies, see James Sadkovich, Anglo-AmericanBias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941, The Journal of Military History, 58/4 (1994), notes88 and 89 on pages 641-2. On the historiography of Italian fascism more generally, see R.J.B.Bosworth, The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mus-solini and Fascism, Arnold, London, 1998, Introduction.

For an early account see A. Buchner,Der Deutsche Griechenland-Feldzug: Operationender 12. Armee 1941, Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, Heidelberg, 1957. On the overall German abandon-ment of operational history: W. Wette, Militrgeschichte zwischen Wissenschaft undPolitik,Was ist Militrgeschichte?, pp.59-62; Wegner, Wozu Operationsgeschichte?, ibid.,pp. 105-12; D. Showalter, Militrgeschichte als Operationsgeschichte: Deutsche und ameri-kanische Paradigmen, ibid., p. 116. D. Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germanys Defeatin the East, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 28-9.


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being annihilated by theLuftwafeduring their withdrawal to the south.

In part Vogel reproduces the conventional Allied interpretations because

his account of the W Force side of the campaign is based on the works ofearlier historians like Gavin Long. His conclusions may also reect a po-litically correct desire to play down the efectiveness of the German attackin Greece by emphasizing the strength of Greek and W Force resistance.Vogel contends, for example, that:

The numerically inferior ... Empire troops took advantage of every oppor-tunity to inict losses on the attackers and were able to extricate themselvesrepeatedly from threatening encirclements ... The course of the ghting

showed that highly mobile defenders with good morale in a mountainouscountry could be pushed back only step by step and with considerableforces.

For their part more recent German studies have not yet inuenced widerwriting on the topic. Heinz Richters Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg1939-1941, rst published in 1997, provides a narrative account of the cam-paign from the Greek and Allied side, using published sources only. Mostrecently, inDer Fall Griechenlands 1941, published in 2007, Karl-Heinz Golla

has produced an operational study from the German side. While Golla hasclearly made extensive use of the German archival sources, he provides noreferences for them. In his treatment of the Allied side of the campaign,he relies on the Commonwealth ocial histories and digitised documents,rather than on archival research in Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

In Part 1: Setting the scene, the books early chapters address a numberof fundamental issues relevant to the period leading up to the Germaninvasion. Why did Hitler decide to attack Greece? How important was the

ongoing Italo-Greek conict in Albania to the outcome in April? How wasit that the United Kingdom (and the Dominions) came to be involved?What plans and preparations were in train on both sides in the lead up to

D. Vogel, Part III German Intervention in the Balkans III. The German Attack onYugoslavia and Greece, Militrgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA), Germany and theSecond World War, Volume III, The Mediterranean, Southeast Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 501, 504, 509-10.

G. Schreiber and D. Vogel, Conclusion, Germany and the Second World War III,p. 764. Heinz A. Richter, Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941: Contingenza Grecia

Operationen Barbarity, Lustre und Marita, Peleus Studien zur Archologie und GeschichteGriechenlands und Zyperns, Band 2, zweite erweiterte Auage, Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen,Mainz, 2010; Karl-Heinz Golla,Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, Ham-burg, 2007, p. 377.


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6 April? Subsequent chapters of Part Two: The Drama Unfolds, which dealwith the three weeks of combat on the Greek peninsula involving W Force,

provide a detailed account and analysis of a victorious German advanceand a beleaguered Greek and Allied defence. The nal three chapters,within Part Three: Evaluations, will draw many of the conclusions of thisstudy together. Why, for example, were the Germans so successful so quick-ly in Greece? Why was the Allied decision to deploy in Greece so immedi-ately controversial? What also of the role of Greece in inuencing theconductand even outcomein the ensuing German invasion of theUSSR?

Outwardly, operational military historians are usually methodologi-cally, and epistemologically, unselfconscious, rarely commenting on theassumptions and particular demands of their eld. This reticence exists,paradoxically, side by side with an acute private awareness of these dicul-ties as they afect their research. Historians who seek to analyse operationsare highly conscious that any single engagement, let alone a campaign, isa complex, multi-facetted phenomenon that can never be represented inits entirety. In practice they use interpretive rules of thumb (heuristics)

such as Alfred Burnes inherent military probability. Yet they are oftenuncomfortable with setting out openly the principles of source evaluationand phenomenology that they use in practice. It is not at all easy to describeor analyse battles in detail or with much degree of accuracy. To do so is toimpart an order and sequence to events which contradict the experienceof battle with the inevitable fog and friction of combat. Below the overviewprovided by the historian is the reality of battleeld chaos involving thesimultaneous interaction of skill, planning, courage, and simple luck.

In developing an overall narrative and analysis of the Greek campaignwe have used a top-down perspective from senior ocers and headquartersstaf, bearing in mind that what was known at that level was often a bestguess, an assumption or even a hope that events are unfolding as prescribed.So too, we have used views from the bottom up where available to broadenunderstanding of what occurred from 6 to 28 April 1941, with the full rec-ognition that such perceptions are usually fragmented, personal, and dis-torted by the limits of each individuals experience. The authors fully

recognise and accept the inherent diculties and challenges they face inattempting an operational investigation.

M. Howard, The Use and Abuse of Military History, Journal of the Royal UnitedServices Institute, No. 107, February 1962, p. 7.


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The best place to begin tracing the saga of the Greek campaign is not,as one might think, on Greeces northern borders in April 1941 but rather

in interwar political, diplomatic and strategic scheming in the period beforeOctober 1940 throughout the Balkans and in London, Berlin and Rome.


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PART ONE

SETTING THE SCENE


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CHAPTER ONE

AXIS AMBITIONS IN EUROPE AND GREECE : GREECE ISASSIGNED TO THE MERCY OF ITALY

In the late 1930s Greece was a poor and politically divided country underan unpopular authoritarian regimea royalist dictatorship led by Gen-

eral Ioannis Metaxas, serving under King George II. Its entry into WorldWar II arose from the territorial ambitions of fascist Italy. During the 1930sGreece had faced a continuing and latent threat to its independence fromthis quarter. The consequences of the fall of France in mid-1940 convertedthis menace into the reality of an Italian attack on 28 October 1940. Theorigins of the Italian threat to Greek independence, however, predated the1930s and can only be understood against the unravelling of the post-WorldWar I peace settlements. The outline that follows will trace those aspects

of the diplomatic and military history of Europes descent into war in 1939,and the strategic ambitions and calculations of Italy and Germany in par-ticular, which led to the invasion of Greece in 1940. All these issues havebeen the subject of extensive research and considerable interpretativedisputes.

In the 1930s Britain and France, the powers that maintained the post-World War I peace settlements, faced increasing challenges to that systemin Europe and Asia. In the Mediterranean in the 1930s this challenge came

from fascist Italy, which aimed to dominate the region as the basis of arevived and extended Italian empire.Italys ambitions directly threatenedboth French and British interests and colonies. British and French policymakers favoured compromise with Italy, as a consequence of their owndicult strategic positions in Europe by the mid-1930s. The British Chiefsof Staf considered that Britain could not meet simultaneous challenges to

Mussolinis view as reported to the German Foreign Ministry by Italian ambassadorAttolico: Weizscker, Berlin, 14 April 1939, note St.S. Nr. 337, Das Politisches Archiv desAuswrtigen Amts [henceforth PA AA] R 29611.

See the overviews by D. C. Watt,How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the SecondWorld War, 1938-1939, Pantheon Books, New York, 1989; Z. Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark:European International History 1933-1939, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, part II,pas-sim; G. Weinberg,A World at Arms.


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its empire and interests from Japan, Italy and Germany. Of these powersItaly was judged to pose the least threat and to be the most likely to be

satised at relatively minor cost. This evaluation was probably accurate sofar as many in the Italian armed forces and civil service were concerned,but it failed to take into account the greater opportunities that simultane-ous German pressure on the international system ofered Italy, and howquickly these opportunities would be grasped by Italys dictator, BenitoMussolini.

Until the mid-1930s Italian foreign policy had been driven by a varietyof motivesan aspiration to maintain a position as the determining swingpower in the European system, a desire to compete with Nazi Germany,and to cooperate with it. While Mussolinis attitude to the junior regimeand its dictator, Adolf Hitler, was more ambivalent than appeared to be thecase in public, and than Hitlers attitude to him, ultimately Mussolini couldnot resist the opportunities Nazi policy ofered Italy. In November 1936 thetwo countries proclaimed the Rome-Berlin Axis, and in November 1937Italy joined the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern pact. Such interactionwith Nazi Germany helped radicalise Italian foreign policy by the late 1930s.

Meanwhile, the Nazi regime planned a bid for world power based onthe conquest of Europe. Hitler was willing to accommodate Italy as an allyin this process for a variety of reasons, including his assessment from the1920s onwards that alliance with Italy did not run counter to his ultimatestrategic aims, ideological anities between the two regimes, and his per-sonal friendship with Mussolini. Links between the two leaders, and there-fore the two countries, grew stronger when Mussolini relinquished his

Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, pp. 7-9, 10, 12; A. Kallis, Fascist Ideology: Territory andExpansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 12, 50-2, 97, 123,126, 150, 172; Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941, pp. 32-3, 34; D. Reynolds,Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century, second edition,Longman, London, 2000, pp. 124-5; R. Salerno, Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins ofthe Second World War, 1935-1940, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002,passim; L. Pratt,Eastof Malta, West of Suez: Britains Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1975,passim.

Kallis, Fascist Ideology, Ch. 5 passim;Knox, Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 3; R. DiNardo,

Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse, University Press of Kansas, Law-rence, 2005, pp. 25-7; P. Hehn, A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe,and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930-1941, Continuum, New York, 2002, Ch. 2;B. Sullivan, Where one man, and only one man, led. Italys path from non-alignment tonon-belligerency to war, 1937-1940, in N. Wyllie (ed.),European Neutrals and Non-Belliger-ents during the Second World War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 119-30[henceforth cited as Sullivan, Italy]; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 157, 240.


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previous role of the protector of Austrian independence and supported theforced union (Anschluss) of Austria and Germany in March 1938.

As Germany increased its destabilization of central Europe in late 1938by making territorial demands on Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland,Mussolini used the situation to advance his own plans for expansion. Byearly 1939 Italy raised claims to the territories that had been ceded to Francein 1860 as part of the process of Italian unication. At the same time Hitleragreed that the Mediterranean should be Italys sphere of inuence, andGerman foreign policy showed little interest in the region throughout the1930s. In keeping with its stated ambitions and this division of spheres of

inuence, fascist Italy had played the major role in intervention on the sideof Francos Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War, seriously weakening itsown armed forces in the process.In addition, Mussolini had ambitions toexpand in the Balkans and even to invade Turkey. Further, Italy secretlysupported Croatian separatists against Yugoslavia and had exercised a defacto protectorate over Albania.

At the same time, the German-Italian partnership strengthened. By May1939 Germany and Italy had concluded an alliance, the Pact of Steel, whichbound the two countries to ght as allies if either was involved in warlikecomplications though Mussolini subsequently indicated to Hitler thatItaly would not be ready for war until 1943.

Germany and Italy were not the only nations interested in a revision ofthe peace settlement of 1919. Smaller European powers such as Hungaryand Bulgaria had their own national grievances. The long-term efects ofthe two Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and 1913, compounded by the post-WorldWar I peace settlement, meant there were unresolved territorial disputesbetween the various neighbours. Hungary had territorial demands against

Yugoslavia, and Romania; Yugoslavia had latent territorial claims on Greeceand Italy; Greece had latent territorial demands on Albania and Italy, whileBulgaria had similar claims against Greece and Romania. In the 1920s Francehad made treaties with the countries of the so-called Little Entente, Yugo-slavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania, to guard against a German resurgence,

Kallis,Fascist Ideology, p. 157; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, pp. 24-6. Knox,Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 15; M. Knox,Mussolini Unleashed1939-1941: Politics and

Strategy in Fascist Italys Last War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 38-9;Kallis,Fascist Ideology, pp. 67-9, 72, 76-7, 110, 118, 122-9, 132-3, 134, 146-9, 169; Sullivan, Italy,European Neutrals, pp. 133-8.

Quoted in Knox,Hitlers Italian Allies, p. 15. M. Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel,second edition, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1967, passim; Knox, MussoliniUnleashed 1939-1941, pp. 41-2; Sullivan, Italy,European Neutrals, p. 132; Steiner, Triumph ofthe Dark, pp. 847-50.


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but by the mid-1930s these treaty obligations were dicult to full. Mostsignicantly, the Soviet Union did not support the Versailles order, and

retained its own interests in the Balkans.Incontrast, Britain and France sought to protect the status quo in the

Mediterranean and North Africa. Both countries had oscillated betweenunsuccessful attempts to coax Italy over to their side and adoption of rm-er policies towards the fascist regime. As late as January 1939 British PrimeMinister Neville Chamberlain visited Italy in an unsuccessful attempt toentice it away from Nazi Germany. Both Britain and France rightly fearedItalian designs on the formers de facto protectorate of Egypt and their

North and East African colonies. Neither country had any intention of re-linquishing any of its empire to satisfy Italian ambitions.

With control of the exit points from the Mediterranean by means ofGibraltar and the Suez Canal, if war broke out the British eet planned tocontain the Italian navy in the Mediterranean in an unfavourable strategicposition. While the combined British and French naval forces in the areawere more powerful than the Italian eet, and their ground forces in NorthAfrica were stronger than the Italian forces then in Libya, the expectation

that in the event of war the main military efort would be in Europe ensuredthat the planned Allied strategy in the Middle East and Mediterranean wasdefensive.An over-estimation of the Italian military threat and the hopethat Italy might remain neutral meant that French military plans to reac-tivate a Balkan front as in World War I remained hypothetical both beforeand after the outbreak of war in 1939. The so-called Salonika option or front,considerations of which inuenced both sides in 1940 and 1941, was envis-aged as a repeat of the World War I theatre established by Britain and France

from late 1915 on, directed against the Central Powers. Both sides in1940 held inated ideas of the efectiveness of the Salonika front in theprevious war.

G, U.S.S.R. E., 4 June 1941, TNA FO 371/29782,pp. 1-25; Z. Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933, OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 270, 289, 395, 793; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, Ch. 7; K.Hitchins,Rumania 1866-1947, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 427-8; Weinberg,A Worldat Arms, pp. 25, 162; E. Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1933-1941:

Interessengegenstze an der Peripherie Europas, Mathiesen Verlag, Husum, 2002, p. 165. S. Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt 1935-1940: Conlict and crisis in the easternMediterranean, Frank Cass, London, 2005, passim; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 741-3;Kallis,Fascist Ideology, pp. 153, 169.

See the papers on Anglo-French contacts with the Greek General Staf in 1939-40 onTNA FO 371/24909. Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt 1935-1940, pp. 116, 115-17, 125-9,136-7;G. Rendel, The Sword and the Olive: Recollections of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service


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What did this mean for Greece? Intermittently in the interwar period,Italy had threatened Greek independence and territorial integrity. Since

1912 Italy had ruled the ethnically Greek islands of the Dodecanese. Already,in the August 1923 Corfu Incident, Italy had briey occupied the Greekisland of Corfu as a response to the assassination of an Italian general innorthern Greece. In a speech to the fascist Grand Council in February 1939Mussolini observed that Greece and Egypt were enemies of the Italianexpansion.

In part as a competitive response to the German occupation of Czechlands in March 1939, Italy annexed Albania over Easter (April 7-8) 1939.

Italys Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolinis son-in-law, wasthe driving force behind this conquest. Such action alarmed Balkan andMediterranean states and drove them closer to Britain and France. It alsomeant that Greece shared a land border with Italy from then on. Italy fol-lowed this invasion on 10 April 1939 by assuring the Greek government thatit would respect its territorial integrity. Nonetheless, after Albania was se-cured, Mussolini ordered the beginning of a road building programme inits southan essential prerequisite for an attack on Greece.

As war neared, Metaxas approached the Italian regime for joint troopreductions on the border. This was agreed to in September 1939 but it didnot lead to a broader dtente. Indeed Greece had begun fortifying its bor-der with Albania the month after Italy occupied the country. As war

1913-1954, John Murray, London, 1957, pp. 165-7; Zacharioudakis, Die deutsch-griechischenBeziehungen 1933-1941, pp. 148-54, 158-9; J. Piekalkiewicz, Krieg auf dem Balkan 1940-1945,Bechtermnzverlag, Eltville, 1989, p. 28;Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection1935-1941, p. 133;Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, pp. 951-3, 963-5; V. Dimitrov, Bulgarian Neu-trality: domestic and international perspectives,European Neutrals, pp. 203-4 [henceforthcited as Dimitrov, Bulgaria]; E. Barker,British Policy in Southeast Europe in the Second WorldWar, Macmillan, London, 1976, pp. 13-19.

Kallis, Fascist Ideology, pp. 67-9, 72, 110, 132-3, 169; Sullivan, Italy, pp. 133-8; N.Doumanis,Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean: remembering Fascisms Empire,Macmil-lan, Basingstoke, 1997, Chs. 1 and 2; A. Cassels, Mussolinis Early Diplomacy, PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970, Chs 4, 16.

Quoted in Kallis,Fascist Ideology, p. 169. Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, p. 242; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, p. 41; A.

Papagos, The Battle of Greece 1940-1941, J.M. Scazikis Alpha Editions, Athens, 1949, pp. 31,

53; Kallis,Fascist Ideology, pp. 153-4; Zacharioudakis,Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen1933-1941, pp. 118-22. On Italo-Greek relations in this period, see also Richter, Griechenlandim Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1941, pp. 12-15.

Schnberg, Salonika to the Auswrtiges Amt, Berlin, 26 May 1939, Nr. 335

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