first of all, by the important work by Roth (1977a,b; Roth 1996; Oakes 1997) but also by
other scholars (e.g., Cohen et al. 1975; Eliaeson 1982,2002; Hinkle 1986; Baehr& Wells2002).
In what amounts to Roth‟s (1977a,b) most detailed attempt in this regard, he argues
that it is possible to distinguish between three different stages in the reception of Weber in
the United States. During the first of these periods (1930 to the late 1950s) Parsons‟s
interpretation and translation of The Protestant Ethic were dominant (Weber [1904/1905]
1930). Bendix‟s (1960) important study of Weber‟s comparative historical sociology was
added to the secondary literature during the next period (the late 1950s to the mid-1960s).
During the third period (the mid- 1960s to the early 1970s) a stream of new works
appeared —“so large that the individual reader no longer can keep track of it” (Roth
1977a, p. xx). Nonetheless, important studies of Weber‟s work on bureaucracy and
methodology, as well as on his political opinions, were produced during these years.
Many of the individual contributions to what may be called the traditional picture of Max Weber are still valid. Weber, for example, did produce an outstanding comparative
historical sociology in which such concepts as domination and legitimation play a key
role. The verstehen approach and the typology of social action are central to Weber‟s
theoretical sociology, and so on. The overall Gestalt of the picture of Weber‟s contribution
to sociology has, however, begun to change, and the reason for this is that a number of
new facts and interpretations have been presented during the past ten or so years. A
special mention must also be made of the more than dozen volumes of Weber‟s collected
works that have started to become available since the mid-1980s, through the giant efforts
of Mommsen, Schluchter, Ay, and many other excellent scholars (see, e.g., Poggi 1986,
Roth 1996).
From all of this new material we have learned, for example, that Weber participated in
an important fashion in the debate about the stock exchange in the 1890s in Germany. Hisvarious writings and interventions in this debate have recently been published in two
volumes of more than 1100 pages (Weber 1999a; for comments, see Borchardt 2002,
Borchardt & Meyer-Stoll 1999, Hennis 2000, Roth 2002; for recent translations of
Weber‟s pamphlets on the stock exchange, see Weber [1894]
2000, [1896] 2000; for comments on these translations, see Lestition 2000). During the
1890s Weber was also an advocate of a broad concept of economics — what he called
Sozialbkonomik — which included not only conventional economics but also economic
history and economic sociology (Swedberg 1998; but see Nau 1997). It has been noted
that when Weber presented himself officially, throughout his life, it was as an economist
and not as a sociologist (e.g., Dahrendorf 1987, p. 574). The accuracy of Marianne
Weber‟s portrayal of her husband as a fervent nationalist has been challenged, and her
general description of Weber‟s family background has been complemented and revised onseveral points (e.g., Roth 2001, Palonen 2001; but see Marianne Weber [1926] 1975). It
has also been suggested that instead of constantly em phasizing Weber‟s views on
rationality and the iron cage, it would be interesting to look at his analysis of different
types of capitalism and his defense of capitalism against its various critics.
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The most radical challenge to the traditional picture of Weber, however, has come
from the advocates of rational choice sociology (e.g., Kiser & Hechter 1998; E. Kiser,unpublished paper; Elster 2000; Norkus 2000, 2001, 2002; but see S. Turner, unpublished
manuscript). These advocates argue that Weber‟s work has more in common with the
analytical camp of neoclassical economics than with the nontheoretical camp of
mainstream sociology and that his ideas on rationality, methodological individualism, and
the importance of models in historical research have all been misunderstood or neglected.
Weber can be seen as an advocate of rational choice sociology or as one of its
predecessors. In any case, Weber‟s work is of much interest to rational choice sociology.
Where does this leave us today? The answer to this question is not immediately clear.
On the one hand the challenge to the traditional picture of Weber is real enough: There
are a number of facts about Weber, as well as texts by his hand and interpretations of his
work, that simply do not fit the picture of Parsons (1937), Bendix (1960), and others. The
old vision, it would seem, cannot hold. On the other hand it is not clear what the new picture of Weber is. There are bits and pieces that point to something new, but exactly
what the new picture will look like is by no means obvious.
In the following pages I try to bring some clarity to this situation, and I proceed as
follows. First of all, I present some of the most important texts, facts, and interpretations
that diverge from the traditional picture of Weber. The two themes I have chosen to focus
on are (a) new information about Weber‟s life and (b) the role that analytical models from
economics play in Weber‟s sociology. Others could have been selected— what Weber has
to say on gender, emotions, and evolution, for example — but these latter show more of a
continuity with the traditional picture (e.g., Bologh 1990, Barbalet 2000, Runciman
2001). I then try to add to the changing picture of Weber‟s sociology through a discussion
of some new aspects of Weber‟s work in theoretical sociology and economic sociology.
NEW INFORMATION ON WEBER‟S LIFE
A student of Weber‟s work in the mid-1970s may well have thought that the information
that was available at that point in time on Weber‟s life was quite sufficient. There was,
first of all, the detailed portrait of Weber in his wife‟s biography (Marianne Weber [1926]
1975; for a recent evaluation of this work, see Roth 1988). There was also a fine little
volume with letters that Weber had written as a young man, and various portraits and
reminiscences by contemporaries (Weber 1936; e.g., Jaspers [1920-1962] 1989,
Honigsheim [1946-1963] 2000, Baumgarten 1964). For Weber‟s political opinions, the
reader could consult Mommsen‟s huge study as well as the debate it inspired (Mommsen
[1959] 1984, Stammer 1971). Many other items existed as well (for a bibliography of
items in German, see Seyfarth & Schmidt 1977, and for ones in English, see Kivisto &
Swatos 1988, Sica 2003).
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Roth notes that the Weber family was not only well connected in economic circles
but also in political circles. How the economic and political links mixed with one another in the Weber network can be illustrated with the following quote from Roth‟s work:
Max jun. [that is, Max Weber] realized early that his Heidelberg grandmother, Frau
Geheime Finanzrat (Privy Councilor) Emilie Souchay Fallenstein was the daughter
of the Anglo-German business founder Carl Cornelius Souchay; the sister of the
Frankfurt senator and mayor Eduard Souchay and of the two English „patrician
merchants‟ ( Handelsherren) Charles and John Souchay in Manchester; the sister-in-
law of Friedrich Wilhelm Benecke, head of Benecke, Souchay & Co. in London; and
the mother-in-law of the Baden prime minister Julius Jolly, the political writer and
historian Adolph Hausrath, the Alsatian geologist Ernst Wilhelm Benecke, the
leading Antwerp businessman Karl Gustav Bunge, as well as of his own father, the
Berlin city councilor in charge of public construction and member of the Reichstag
and Prussian diet. (Roth 2002, p. 511)
Roth argues that Weber‟s family background influenced his career as well as his
thinking in various ways. In his youth, for example, Weber tried for several years to go
into business “to learn the practise of the import/export trade” (Weber 1936, p. 326, as
cited in Roth 2002, p. 511). In his academic studies Weber decided to specialize in
commercial law, which he also taught for some time in Berlin. When he left this position
it was to accept a chair in economics at the University of Freiburg. Weber then continued
to teach economics until his nervous breakdown at the end of the 1890s. Roth also
emphasizes that the portrait of Weber as a fervent nationalist and imperialist needs to be
revised in the light of Weber‟s cosmopolitan leanings. During World War I, for example,
Weber argued strongly against the anticapitalist propaganda of the right-wing nationalists,
and he was always an advocate of free trade in the international arena.
Weber emerges as strongly procapitalist in Roth‟s account. From early on in his
academic career Weber criticized the economic policy of the agrarian interests and backed
the alternative vision of Germany as a modem industrial nation, on a sound capitalist
foundation. He fought hard against the Junkers‟ attempt to stop the German stock
exchanges from trading in grain and thereby protecting their economic interests.
Germany‟s problem, he noted, was not that it had too much capitalism, as the right wing
and the intellectuals charged, but that there wasn‟t enough. “Let us stop the railing against
capital and bourgeoisie! We don‟t have too much but too little capital and too few big
entrepreneurs!” (Weber 1984, p. 668, as cited in Roth 2002, p. 517). Weber was
especially irritated at the German intellectuals, whose critique of capitalism he felt was
immature and childish (“the stupid outcries of the literati against capitalism”) (Weber
1984, p. 212). During World War I Weber warned against nationalizations after the war
and against creating a strong welfare state. These type of measures, he argued, would sap
the strength of capitalism.
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There is one argument especially that distinguishes the current discussion of Weber‟s
sociology from the one that was dominant before the mid-1970s. This is the argument that
an important strength in Weber‟s sociology comes from the fact that he borrowed several
key ingredients from the economists‟ model of analysis. Most sociologists know of this
argument only in the form of rational choice sociology, which they tend to be critical of
(see, e.g., Kalberg 1994 and Schluchter 2000 for critiques of the attempt to interpret
Weber‟s sociology in terms of rational choice). As I try to show, however, the discussion
of the role of economic models in Weber‟s sociology encompasses at least two different
conceptions of what these models are like in the first place. There also exists different
opinions among rational choice sociologists about the usefulness of various parts of
Weber‟s work. Some find the core of Weber‟s sociology helpful, whereas others only find bits and pieces of interest (for the former, see, e.g., Kiser & Hechter 1998; for the latter,
see, e.g., Coleman 1990, Goldthorpe 1998).
The first sociologist to argue that Weber‟s sociology had gained considerably in
sharpness and originality by borrowing models from economics is Bourdieu. The hostility
of Bourdieu to neoclassical economics is well known, so it hardly needs to be mentioned
that the models that Weber had borrowed from economics, according to Bourdieu, were
not neoclassical (homo economicus, rational choice, and so on). Bourdieu based his
argument on this point primarily on a reading of Weber‟s sociology of religion (Bourdieu
[1971] 1987). The two notions in Weber‟s work that Bourdieu highlights are interests and
competition — in this specific case, religious interests, and competition for religious
legitimacy and for lay followers. In a later work Bourdieu sums up his argument about
Weber‟s use of economic models in the following way: Economics is one of the major reference points for sociology. First and foremost
economics is already a part of sociology, largely due to the work of Max Weber,
who transferred numerous models of thought [schèmes de pensée] borrowed from
economics into the area of religion among others. (Bourdieu [1987] 1990, p. 46; see
also 1987, p. 61)
The approach to Weber that can be found among the advocates of rational choice
sociology differs from that of Bourdieu, even if it is more in degree than in kind, as I try to
show in this review. Two of the earliest attempts to approach Weber‟s work from a
rational choice perspective can be found in the writings of Coleman and Elster. Coleman
was sympathetic to Weber‟s version of methodological individualism and used the key
argument in The Protestant Ethic to illustrate his famous micro-to-macro model, which
was to become something of a symbol for rational choice sociology (see also the debate
about Coleman‟s interpretation of The Protestant Ethic in Hemes 1989a,b, Coleman
1989). A few other aspects of Weber‟s work are also discussed in Foundations of Social
Theory (e.g., Coleman 1990, pp. 422-25,612-13).
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Elster , in contrast, argues that although Weber‟s work on rational action deserves an
honorable place in the history of rational choice, it falls short in comparison with theconcept of rational action that has been developed in game theory. Although Weber
correctly understood that the social actor makes a rational choice among existing
alternatives (“ parametric rationality” in Elster‟s terminology), he did not realize that the
choice of the actor also depends on what other actors do [“strategic rationality” (see, e.g.,
Elster 1979, p. 68)]. More recently, Elster has argued that Weber‟s attempt to introduce
emotions into his analysis of action and rationality is “stunning” (Elster 2000, p. 39; for
the traditional interpretation of Weber‟s concept of rationality, see the literature cited in
Schroeder 1992, pp. 34-42, Scaff 2000, pp. 49-51).
Today there also exist many other attempts to draw on Weber for rational choice
sociology and see how well Weber fits the paradigm of rational choice sociology. For
example, several attempts have been made to develop a broad concept of rationality by
explicitly drawing on or referring to Weber. In a programmatic text by Nee, we read, for example, that “he [Weber] pioneered the context-bound rationality approach in
sociology” (Nee 1998, p. 6, see also Hechter & Kanazawa 1997, p. 194). Another
example is Boudon (1996,1997,2001), who draws strongly on Weber in his attempt to
develop a “cognitivist model” in sociology. Boudon‟s argument is that Weber‟s concept
of value rationality can help us to better understand how beliefs can be integrated into a
rational choice type of analysis. More precisely, Weber‟s concept of Wertrationalitat
(translated by Boudon as “axiolog- ical rationality”) can be of assistance in showing how
one can analyze situations where the actor does not base his or her decision on some kind
of cost- benefit calculation but on an argument of the following type: “I do this because it
is good, fair, legitimate, and so on.” Finally, a scholar who has carefully gone through the
whole debate about Weber and rational choice concludes that Weber‟s work can best be
described as “an anticipation of RCA [that is, Rational Choice Analysis]” (Norkus 2000, p. 268; see also Norkus 2001, 2002; Voss 2000).
Two new expressions that sometimes appear in discussions of Weber and rational
choice are “analytical Weberianism” and “neoclassical sociology.” The former was
launched in a heated debate about the use of rational choice models in comparative
historical sociology in The American Journal of Sociology in 1998 (for the various texts,
see Gould 2002). According to Kiser & Hechter, who initiated this debate, it is important
to develop an analytical Weberianism, just as there already exists an “analytical
Marxism.” The rationale for this is that “the core of Weber‟s approach to historical
analysis corresponds to emerging developments in sociological versions of rational choice
theory” (Kiser & Hechter 1998, p. 798).
A concrete example of what analytical Weberianism may look like can be found in a
few recent articles by Kiser on bureaucracy. In a creative manner, Kiser recasts Weber‟sanalysis of bureaucracy and legitimation in terms of agency theory (e.g., Kiser &
Schneider 1994, Kiser 1999, Kiser & Baer 2001). The principal, Kiser and his coauthor
argue, wants the agent to carry out some task, and the extent to which the agent conceives
of this task as legitimate is of great importance. The authors conclude that “future work
[in analytical Weberianism] should address other key
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substantive themes in Weber‟s work, such as types of legitimacy, forms of religion, and
the relationship between religion and politics or economics” (Kiser & Baer 2001, pp. 27-28).
Also the expression neoclassical sociology is embroiled in discussion and refers to
Weber‟s work on an important point. In a recent issue of The American Journal o
Sociology Burawoy (2001, p. 1100) accuses several well-known analysts of Eastern
Europe of sacrificing their earlier critical stance for a watered down and sociological
version of neoclassical economics. “The use of „neoclassical‟ to describe the new research
program [of these authors],” Burawoy charges, “suggests parallels with neoclassical
economics, and indeed parallels there are.” Szel6nyi, Stark and some other sociologists
are then severely criticized along these lines.
Burawoy, however, seems to have been tricked by the similarity between the terms
neoclassical economics and neoclassical sociology because these two approaches have
next to nothing in common. According to Szel6nyi, who often uses the term neoclassicalsociology, this expression basically means that a reinterpretation of the classics has
become possible after the fall of Communism. Weber‟s idea that capitalism should not be
seen in unitary terms is of special importance in the following reinterpretation:
The neo-classical turn in sociology does not imply at all a neo-classical convergence
of economics and sociology. The opposite is the case: the neo-classical turn in
sociology helps sociology to engage economics at the very core of its project (as it
was the case in the “classical” epoch). The key difference is that economics operate
with a single concept of capitalism (or market), while sociology sees it as a
multiplicity of forms. (Szelenyi 2001, see also Nee 2002)
ADDING TO THE PICTURE OF WEBER
As earlier mentioned, it would not be correct to say that a new picture of Weber‟s
sociology has emerged and that the old one has vanished. A more accurate charac-
terization of the current situation is that traits from the old and the new picture mix and
blend with one another. It should also be noted that even if a few parts of the new picture
can be discerned with some clarity, its overall gestalt is not clear. This is also true for the
new parts that I have chosen to focus on so far in this review, which all have to do with the
economy: how Weber analyzed the economy, how he used models from economics in his
sociology, and so on. Here as elsewhere, the dots can be connected in different ways.
Instead of spending more time in this review on recent secondary literature, however,
I now proceed to suggest two areas where I think it is possible to push ahead and advance
our understanding of Weber‟s work so that we can make better use of it. The ones I have
chosen are key concepts in Weber‟s theoretical sociology and his economic sociology.Both of these topics, I argue, are currently underdeveloped and can be improved by being
analyzed from a perspective that sets Weber‟s view of the economy and how to analyze
the economy at the center. Once this has been done, I suggest a way to connect the dots.
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Over the years considerable work has been carried out on Weber‟s theoretical sociology,
which is mainly to be found in Chapter 1 of Economy and Society and in the essay Some
Categories of Interpretive Sociology (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 3-62, [1913] 1981). Topics
that have been analyzed include the following: ideal type, the notion of verstehen, the
concept of rationality, the four types of social action, and Weber‟s theory of causality. A
number of important topics nevertheless remain to be researched, and the ones that I
discuss here are Weber‟s concepts of interest, institution, and orientation to others.
The concept of interest, I argue, constitutes one of the most important concepts in
Weber‟s sociology, even if little attention has been devoted to it. Not only is it a key
concept in its own right, but many other concepts in Weber‟s sociology— social action,
institution, and so on — can only be fully understood if they are related to it. The concept
of interest is also strongly related to the economy, to the concept of rational action, and to
the whole problematic of rational choice — in brief, to many of the issues that are at the
heart of the changing picture of Weber‟s sociology. To better understand the role that
interest plays in Weber‟s thought therefore becomes an imperative task.
At first it may seem surprising that Weber assigns such a central role in his work to the
concept of interest. Given the crucial role that the concept of interest has played in
Western social, political, and economic thought, however; and given the role that they
played in Weber‟s own time, it would actually be more peculiar if it did not appear in a
prominent place in Weber‟s work. Although there is no definitive study of the role of
interest in Western thought, the general importance of this concept has been well
established by Hirschman, Holmes, and other scholars (see especially Orth & Koselleck
1982, Hirschman 1986, Holmes 1990, Heilbron 2001). All of these show that from the
1500s onward practically every major social thinker assigned a central place to the
concept of interest in his or her analysis. A plethora of different interests have beendiscussed: political interests, economic interests, self-interest, class interests, the public
interest, and so on. The concept of interest in particular plays a key role in the works of
Hume, Smith, Tocqueville, Mill, and Marx.
Although Hirschman and the other historians of the concept of interest discuss in great
detail the role that interest has played in the works of philosophers, political thinkers, and
economists, they have nothing to say about the use that sociologists have made of this
concept. It is at this point that Weber comes into the picture because he tried to introduce
a sociological concept of interest (Swedberg 2003). By sociological in this context it is
meant, on the one hand, that the concept of interest is used as part of a sociological
analysis, and on the other hand, that interest is not seen as something given or biological,
but as something that comes into being as part of society.
By assigning such a central role to the notion of interest, it can be added, Weber wasnot alone among sociologists of his generation. Simmel and several others did the same
(e.g., Simmel [1908] 1971, see also Ratzenhofer 1898, Small 1905,
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Bentley [1908] 1949). Among contemporary sociologists, especially Coleman and
Bourdieu have used the concept of interest prominently in their works. The maintheoretical concept in Coleman‟s rational choice sociology is precisely interest, defined as
control over resources that actors want (Coleman 1990, pp. 27-44). For Bourdieu, interest
is one of a handful of key concepts that the sociologist needs to use, next to habitus, field,
and different types of capital (e.g., Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, pp. 115-40). According to
Bourdieu (1998), a disinterested act is not possible, and acts that appear to be disinterested
typically mask some interest. Furthermore, interests are always shaped by society, and just
about anything can be turned into an interest by the force of society (Bourdieu &
Wacquant 1992, p. 117).
In order to get a better sense of the way that Weber viewed the concept of interest, and
the role that it plays in his analysis more generally, one may begin with the following
famous quote:
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men‟s conduct. Yet very
frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like
switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the
dynamic of interest. (Weber [1915] 1946, p. 280)
Although often cited, little sustained attention has been devoted to this passage (see,
however, Kalberg 1985; see also Blau 1996). What first of all should be noted about this
passage is that Weber breaks with the tendency in mainstream economics to equate
interest exclusively with one type of interest (self-interest), and he does this by speaking
about different types of interests. By doing so, he is much closer to people such as Smith,
Tocqueville, and Mill than to contemporary economists. What should also be pointed out
is that although the interests are portrayed by Weber as the driving forces, it is the social
element (in the form of world images or religious world views) that channels and steersthe actions. The stronger these driving forces are, we may conclude, the more energy
people will invest in their actions, the stronger the clashes are likely to be between actors,
and so on. Although Weber does not mention from where the interests come, and
although we would naturally tend to identify the world images with what is social, a
moment of reflection tells us that the interests themselves must be socially shaped (from
Weber‟s perspective)— if nothing else simply to qualify as either ideal or material
interests.
Even if one grants a certain centrality to the famous passage about ideal and material
interests, which can be found in a prominent place in Weber‟s Collected Essays in the
Sociology of Religion (Weber [1920/1921] 1988), it is legitimate to ask what role interests
play elsewhere in Weber‟s work, especially in his theoretical sociology. No answer to this
question can be found in the secondary literature, even if one student has pointed out thatthe concept of interest can be found in nearly 800 sentences in Economy and Society and
on roughly every third page (Peillon 1990, p. 55; see also Sprondel 1973). To this can be
added that Weber uses a large number of different types of interests in Economy and
Society, including sexual
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interests, speculative interests, class interests and emotional and affective interests (Weber
[1922] 1978, pp. 41, 345, 928; for a complete listing of all the places in Weber‟s work where he uses the term Interesse, see the index in Weber 1999b). Weber also speaks of
interest struggles and the well-known phrase material and ideal interests turns up in
Economy and Society as well (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 202; [1922] 1976, p. 209).
To give a sense of the centrality of the concept of interest in Weber‟s work, I use his
sociology of law as a brief example. In one of the well-known passages of Economy and
Society, Weber outlines the general relationships that exist between law and the economy
(Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 333-37). There are six such relationships, and interest plays a
key role in three of these. We are told, for example, that law does not only protect
economic interests, but also “the most diverse interests ranging from the most elementary
one of protection of personal security to such purely ideal goods as personal honor or the
honor of the divine powers” (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 333). When economic interests stand
against “interests promoting conformance to the rules of law,” Weber continues,everything hinges on “the relative proportion of strength” (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 335).
He also states that even if the law in many cases does not appear to have been shaped by
economic interests, this is nonetheless often the case. In explaining why this is so, Weber
states that legal power usually depends on support from the major social groups, and “the
formation of [major] social groups depends, to a large extent, upon constellations of
material interests” (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 334).
Weber‟s concept of institution has also been neglected in the secondary literature, even
if there exist some exceptions. An institution has its beginning, Weber says, in the
interaction of a few actors, which after some time acquires a certain independence in their
eyes. This order (Ordnung ) is seen as “obligatory or exemplary” to the actors (Weber
[1922] 1978, p. 31). An institution is typically supported by habit as well as by
legitimation. What completes the needed requirements for there to be a full-scaleinstitution are as follows: Significant interests must be involved, and (in modem society)
coercion will be applied by a staff when there are threats to the institution (Weber [1922]
1978, pp. 34,48-56).
To Weber, the number of institutions in society are relatively few. There is what he
terms the legal order, the economic order, the household, and so on. What is especially
important in Weber‟s notion of institution is that these are conceived as constellations of
interests that have been locked into specific configurations through social relations
(including world images and the capitalist spirit). What this means is that institutions are
hard to change; they are deeply rooted in interests, something that gives them
considerable strength and survival capacity. That the basic institutions of society may
nevertheless change under certain conditions is clear from The Protestant Ethic and other
studies by Weber. However, the force that challenges an institution has to be strong andfirmly grounded in competing interests.
One reason for emphasizing the role of interests and enforcement in Weber‟s view of
institutions is that there is little discussion of these in what constitutes
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the most popular account of Weber‟s ideas on this specific topic, namely The Social
Construction of Reality by Berger & Luckmann (1967; see also Powell & DiMaggio1991 for the use of these ideas in the area of organizations). This work, which draws
heavily on Alfred Schutz‟s phenomenological interpretation of Weber, is an important
source in contemporary sociology for the widespread notion that everything is socially
constructed. Although this may be true on a high level of abstraction, this proposition can
also easily lead wrong if the role of interests and the enforcement of challenges to these
interests are not explicitly taken into account — which they rarely are in the work by
Berger & Luckmann (but see Berger & Luckmann 1967, pp. 22,45,48,51-67). If people
try to socially construct something that goes against the existing institutions of society,
they run the risk of being hit by a force similar to that of a train rushing ahead (to use
Weber‟s railroad metaphor).
The last theoretical concept I discuss is orientation to others, which has been generally
ignored in the secondary literature on Weber. Why this is the case is not clear, but it maywell have to do with the fact that it is closely linked to Weber‟s concept of methodological
individualism. Weber was a strong defender of methodological individualism in
sociology — a topic that for rather obvious reasons has not attracted much attention in the
conventional picture of Weber with its advocacy of social systems and other forms of
holism (for Weber‟s ideas on methodological individualism, see, e.g., Udehn 2001, pp.
95-103).
The concept of orientation to others appears in a prominent place in Weber‟s
sociology, namely in the first paragraph of Economy and Society, where the task of
sociology is outlined (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 4; see also [1913] 1981, p. 152). Sociology,
Weber states, is the science that deals with social action. You have action when there is
behavior to which the actor attaches a subjective meaning, and this action becomes social
if it “takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented [orientiert] in itscourse.”
Elsewhere in Chapter 1 of Economy and Society Weber states that an action can be
oriented to the past, the present, or the future — that it can be oriented to an order, and that
it can be oriented to several orders simultaneously. To this it should be added that the only
actor who can carry out and orient an action is the individual, and this is consequently
where methodological individualism comes into the picture. The orientation of an actor is
in principle driven by his or her interests, and the course that the action will take will be
shaped by existing world images (or their equivalents).
Topic # 2: Weber's Economic Sociology
Economic sociology is a topic that is close to the current Zeitgeist , and it would therefore
seem suitable to further explore Weber‟s work in this respect. Some advances in this fieldhave already been made (e.g., Collins 1986, pp. 19-142; Holton & Turner 1989b; Bruhns
1996; Engerman 2000). It has, for example, been increasingly realized that Economy and
Society is not so much a work in general
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sociology, with independent sections on law, religion, and so on, as was earlier believed.
Economy and Society should rather be understood as a study that explores the relationship between, on the one hand, the economy, and on the other hand, politics, law, and religion
(e.g., Stinchcombe 1960; for the coming into being and structure of Economy and
Society, see especially Mommsen 2000, Orihara 1999, 2002).
Weber‟s Wirtschaftssoziologie has also attracted some direct attention during the past
few years, as opposed to the earlier literature. Its general structure and main areas have,
for example, been outlined (Swedberg 1998). A text with Weber‟s key texts in economic
sociology has also been published (Weber 1999c; see also the recent translations of
Weber‟s study of the stock exchange and of his dissertation on the lexmercatoria in
Weber [1889] 2003, [1894] 2000, [1896] 2000). Added to this should be single studies of
Weber‟s analysis of the firm, the market, the business community, patrimonialism,
entrepreneurial opportunities, and the relationship of sociology to marginal utility theory
(Segre 1998; Makler 2000; Engelen 2001; Zafirovski 2001a,b; Jagd 2003, Kaelber 2003b). There is also what we have recently learned about Weber‟s relationship to the
work of single economists, from Smith to the Austrians (see Hennis 1987; Mitzman 1987;
Osterhammel 1987; Schon 1987; Holton & Turner 1989a; Sica 1992, pp. 225-48;
Zafirovski 2000).
Even if a few first steps have been taken along the path of a better understanding of
Weber‟s economic sociology, many topics still remain to be analyzed or have not been
sufficiently explored. Little is known, for example, about the giant handbook on
economics that Weber edited and of which Economy and Society is a part, Grundriss der
Sozialdkonomik. We also need to better understand the following topics: Weber‟s view of
economic theory, the general structure of his theoretical economic sociology (in Chapter 2
in Economy and Society), his view of the firm, and his view of capitalism. Although all of
these topics represent worthwhile enterprises in their own right, I focus on the latter two because these best illustrate that we are indeed witnessing a change in the general picture
of Weber‟s sociology.
Weber‟s analysis of the capitalist firm was little discussed during the early period of
Weberian studies. What instead fascinated and even spellbound American sociologists
was Weber‟s analysis of bureaucracy. The text on bureaucracy that was cited over and
over again originally appeared in Gerth & Mills‟s best-selling anthology From Max
Weber (1946, pp. 196-204; for this work, see Oakes 1999, Oakes & Vidich 1999). A
vivid debate soon broke out over whether Weber‟s theory of bureaucracy was correct.
Several of the most creative sociologists in the postWorld War II generation, such as
Merton and Gouldner, took part in this debate, usually suggesting that Weber was wrong
on some point, but that this could be amended with the help of the author‟s own revisions
(for reviews of the relevant literature, see, e.g., Albrow 1970, Scott 1998, pp. 42-49).Two aspects of Weber‟s work on bureaucracy were, however, not explored during the
earlier period: Weber‟s general theory of organization, of which his ideas on bureaucracy
are an integral part, and his view of the modem firm. In Chapter
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1 of Economy and Society Weber carefully develops the concept of organization, starting
out (as always) with the social action of the individual (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 48-52).Two actors who interact with one another create a social relationship, and these
relationships can be either open or closed. An organization is defined by Weber as a
closed social relationship, with a person or staff in charge of enforcing its rules.
Weber discusses three broad classes of organizations in his theoretical sociology:
political, economic, and religious organizations (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 52-56, 74-75).
These are distinguished from each other on several accounts, such as the way that
authority is maintained and what type of interests are involved. Economic organizations,
for example, can be exclusively devoted to economic tasks (such as the modem firm);
they can be partly devoted to economic tasks (such as the modem state); they can have as
their task the regulation of economic activities (such as a trade union); and they can
protect the economic order from interference (such as the laissez-faire state) (Weber
[1922] 1978, pp. 74-75).Three types of actors can be found in the modem firm, according to Weber:
entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and workers. The bureaucrats run the corporation on an
everyday basis, by virtue of their knowledge and dedication. The workers execute the
orders given to them by the bureaucrats, in a disciplined manner. The entrepreneur
represents the capitalist spirit, and is the only one who is able to successfully challenge the
bureaucrats. What the entrepreneur lacks in detailed knowledge, compared to the
bureaucrats, he or she makes up for through independence and economic power. In each
firm, as in capitalism as a whole, there is a constant struggle between the aggressive profit
seeking of the entrepreneur, on the one hand, and the correct behavior and the defense of
the status quo of the bureaucrats, on the other. The bureaucrats value competence, skill,
and honor more than profit making. They actually “abhor” profit making, according to
Weber, who says that “every bureaucracy” tends to “stifle the private economic initiative”(Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 1108-9; 1988, p. 277).
Another aspect of Weber‟s work on the modem firm that has been ignored in the
traditional view of his work has to do with the history and the development of the firm. In
Economy and Society as well as in several other works, we find an interesting attempt to
sketch the history of the firm, starting with the commenda and the family firm in
Antiquity (see, e.g., Weber [1889] 2003, [1923] 1981; but see Kaelber 2003a). Weber
also highlights the emergence of limited liability in the firm and the notion of the firm as a
legal personality, two key innovations that occurred in the Middle Ages. Weber notes
further the emergence of the shareholding corporation, and he devotes considerable
energy to describing the kind of giant corporations that emerged around 1900, and which
not only Weber but also Chandler has held up as the apex of efficiency (e.g., Chandler
1977).
Weber‟s analysis of the modem firm is not only part of his general theory of
organization but also of his general analysis of capitalism —the second topic in Weber‟s
economic sociology that I have selected to discuss in this review as part
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Weber broke with Marx‟s idea that there only exists one type of capitalism, which
emerged in the West in the modem period. He also tried to recast capitalism in socialaction terms in order to avoid the notion of capitalism as a system independent of the
individual. According to the main theoretical passage on capitalism in Economy and
Society, Weber distinguishes between six different types of “principal modes of
capitalistic orientation of profit- making.” Only two of these main modes of
capitalistic orientation of profit making are typical of modem times and the West; the
other four can be found far back in history all over the world. The former two Weber
terms are rational capitalism, and the remaining four are political capitalism and
traditional-commercial capitalism.
CONCLUSION
During the course of this review I have made references to three different interpretations
of Weber that can be described in ideal-typical terms (see Table 1). There is first of all
what I have referred to as the traditional viewpoint, which represents the early
interpretation of Weber in American sociology. The work of such scholars as Parsons and
Bendix are central here, but this interpretation is still strong and can be found in a number
of contemporary works as well. The individual actor is primarily seen as driven by norms
and values, and authority is crucial to the structuring of society. Weber‟s comparative
work on religion and domination is at the center of this interpretation.
TABLE 1 What drives the actor, according to Weber? Three ideal-typical answers
Traditional iewpoint
Rational Choice viewpoint
Interest iewpoint
Cause of action Values, norms Rational choice Interests
View of verstehen Incorporated Downplayed Incorporated
View of methodological
individualism
Downplayed Context-bound Social
Paradigmatic text by Weber Sociology of authority and
More recently this view has been challenged by interpretations that argue the
individual actor in Weber‟s sociology is driven by other forces than norms and values,such as interests and rational choice. Bourdieu exemplifies the interest view, and Hechter
and Kiser the rational choice view. These three interpretations also differ on several other
accounts, as Table 1 indicates. They have different views on how to understand Weber‟s
notion of verstehen and his view of methodological individualism.
Is it possible to arbitrate between these different interpretations and assert that one is
preferable to the others, in the sense of leading to better sociology? It is difficult to give an
affirmative answer to this question. Nonetheless, it is also clear that the reader who wants
to know something about Weber‟s view of various economic topics, including Weber‟s
use of the models of the economists, will find little material in the secondary literature
before the mid-1970s. Similarly, the great majority of the issues that have concerned
Parsons, Bendix, and other advocates of what has here been called the traditional
interpretation of Weber have not been much discussed by the representatives of the other two approaches, which have a long way to go before they are fully developed. As things
stand today, the various views of Weber‟s work complement each other, and the serious
student of Weber may want to consult them all.
Earlier in this review I mentioned that several new pieces of information about
Weber‟s life and work have recently become available that in one way or another deal
with the economy and that there may also be a way of understanding their general
significance or gestalt — to connect the dots, so to speak. Before giving my own answer to
how this may be done, it should be noted that both the rational choice interpretation and
the interest interpretation of Weber‟s sociology, as I see it, pick up on something that is
absolutely central in Weber‟s work and which has been neglected.
What they pick up on is Weber‟s use, in his sociology, of models of thought from
economics (as Bourdieu puts it). The rational choice approach, however, suggests aradical recasting of Weber‟s work from a viewpoint that, to a large extent, has been
created after Weber‟s death, namely modem rational choice analysis. Game theory, for
example, did not exist in Weber‟s days. One can also use Posner‟s (1995) critique of
Weber to illustrate the distance that exists between modem rational choice theory and
Weberian sociology as a whole. According to Posner, Weber is interested in describing
broad themes in human history, not in developing mathematical models for predicting the
behavior of rational actors. Modem rational choice theory also differs on several accounts
from the type of analytical economics with which Weber was familiar, and which he also
was influenced by, namely the type of analysis that can be found in the works of
economists such as Menger and Mill (e.g., Weber [1898] 1900; see also Udehn 2001, pp.
95-103).
Interest analysis, in contrast, picks up on several elements that are already present in
Weber‟s work. Weber speaks, for example, to a large extent in interest terms, as I have
tried to show, and when he does not do so explicitly, he many times does so implicitly.
The interest model, as opposed to the modem rational choice
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model, is also better at capturing the fact that although Weber borrowed much from
economics, he did not borrow everything. There are parts of theoretical economics, Weber argues in Economy and Society and elsewhere, that are simply not useful in sociology.
Weber‟s relationship to the models he found in economics can be summed up in the
following way: Weber borrowed quite a bit from economics, as he did from the other
social sciences, but he did not simply reproduce what he had borrowed in his sociology.
Instead he turned it into something new and exciting — and profoundly sociological.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
For comments and/or information I thank Raymond Boudon, Sven Eliaeson, Michael
Hechter, Stephen Kalberg, Edgar Kiser, Harry Makler, Heino Nau, Zenonans Norkus,
Guenther Roth, Dick Scott, Ralph Schroeder, Alan Sica, Ivan Szelenyi, and Stephen
Turner. This review was written while I was at the Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences, and I am grateful for financial support from Center General Funds
and the William and Flora Hewlitt Foundation Grant #2000-5633.
The Annual Review of Sociology is online at http://soc.annualreviews.org
