Casey 1 of 13

Megan Casey4/23/2007

Eric LaRock, Ph.D.PHL 465

Swinburne, Ross, and the Cosmological Argument

Casey 2 of 13

One of the oldest and most common arguments for the

existence of god is the cosmological argument, and thus I will

review and critique the modern cosmological arguments posited by

Christian apologetic think-tank president Hugh Ross and the very

well qualified former Oxford University Professor Richard

Swinburne, as well as examine counter-arguments Swinburne’s long-

time rival by J.L. Mackie, biologist Richard Dawkins, and

universal theories by Stephen Hawking and Carl Sagan.

All cosmological arguments for the existence of God, since

St. Thomas Aquinas, follow the same basic structure: the universe

exists, thus something had to cause it to exist. Something cannot

be self-caused, nor can there be an infinite chain of causation

(infinite regress) so there had to be a first cause, an “uncaused

cause,” and this, to quote Aquinas is “what we call god.” There

are modern innovations concerning probability and chance, but

these do nothing to refute the basic structural problems with the

argument, namely that postulating a “god of the gaps” has the

same original problems. What caused god to come in to existence?

It would seem that this god, like the universe, would be neither

self-caused nor eternal (given the premises of the original

argument). Would this not require there to be an infinite regress

of gods?

Hugh Ross is President and Director of Research of “Reasons

to Believe,” the Christian apologetic think tank which he

Casey 3 of 13

founded. This organization tries to reconcile science not only

with a concept of the divine, but with the exceedingly narrow

idea of the Christian god. It seems that if one’s method is

scientific, it would be logically inconsistent to present a

hypothesis and then try to make the evidence fit. It would be

more scientific to first gather evidence and then attempt to

divine (no pun intended) the most plausible explanation.

Superficially, Ross’s argument appears to do this. Upon further

examination, it fails.

Ross’s primary apologetic method in his book The Creator

and the Cosmos is evidentialist in nature; he attempts to show

that probability of the universe forming in such a way as to

allow life (as we know it) to exist is too vastly small to be due

to random chance, which he cites as the atheist argument. This

model, he argues, necessitates a creator who exists outside of

the space-time continuum, purposefully directing and guiding the

creation and evolution of the universe within a finely-tuned

range that would allow the creation of life. This appears to be

closer to the Deist concept of a creator-god, the divine

architect of the universe, a far cry from the Christian god with

all its omni-predicates. Even this “architect of the universe” is

unnecessary, however. The thing about evolution and natural

selection (not just biological), as Richard Dawkins points out in

The God Delusion, is that is requires no deity. “Guided

Casey 4 of 13

evolution/natural selection” is an oxymoron. Given Ockham’s

Razor, why appeal to an extra component in ones hypothesis if it

is not necessary?

It seems to be true, under our current cosmology, that the

universe does have certain (perhaps finely-tuned) parameters

which, under the anthropic principle, cannot be significantly

altered without destroying the probability of life (wikipedia).

However, this far from proves the existence of a personal,

intervening deity. Upon further abstraction even the Deist

architect of the universe can be seen as allegorical of the

universe itself and those laws (even those unbeknownst to man)

which govern it.

It would be far more persuasive if physical laws did not

account for atoms being held together or planets remaining in

orbit or for the “fine tuning” of our universe. If our existence

was in defiance of observable natural phenomena then it would

require a binding supernatural force. However, even then the

“supernatural” force would no longer be supernatural, it would be

natural as well as the deity would be natural. Our universe,

however, is not one which necessitates a natural deity, or any

other kind besides the loose, allegorical gods which make complex

natural phenomena understandable by the laity.

The probabilities Ross uses in his argument depend on a

finite universe, or even a finite number of multiple universes.

Casey 5 of 13

Either way, space-time must be finite, and thus all the physical

mass-energy existing in space time must be finite. This

contradicts one of the most basic physical laws, that mass-energy

can be neither created nor destroyed. To argue “scientifically”

by positing the notion of a being who necessarily defies

scientific law seems to be a shaky foundation upon which to build

an argument.

Ross cites the findings of NASA’s COBE Satellite in an

attempt to bolster his argument. He claims that COBE proves the

existence of a finite universe, and thus an important premise of

his argument. In reality, the COBE satellite did, in fact,

contribute greatly to our understanding of the cosmos, but it

does not by any stretch prove even a remote lean towards Theism,

though Ross claims that Theists everywhere have reason to

celebrate. The COBE satellite proved an expanding universe, and

thus disproved the Steady State Model, which was neither

explicitly theist nor atheist. It only stated that our universe

was static. By extrapolation, an expanding universe would have

started out very very small, expanding into the very very large.

The Big Bang Theory, which did in fact receive more support

after the COBE Satellite findings, does not favor a god, as Ross

purports. He sees god as that which made the Big Bang occur. The

COBE Satellite, Ross’s perceived Holy Grail, does not rule out,

or even decrease the possibility of the (perpetually) oscillating

Casey 6 of 13

universe model, which is adhered to by Stephen Hawking as well as

the late Carl Sagan. Ross cites certain thermodynamic principles,

in his “Cosmic Oven” example, to explain why, though multiple

oscillations may be possible, infinite oscillations are not. He

explains that as the universe expands, it cools, and “runs out”

of energy. It appears he missed when Einstein combined the

principles of constant mass and constant energy into the

principle of the constant of mass-energy, which are really the

same at certain states.

It seems that a certain critical point would have to be

reached in order for the universe to either expand in a “Big

Bang” or condense in a “Big Crunch.” Presumably, the laws of

physics which dictate at which point this would happen remain

constant, and the mass-energy present in the universe would

remain constant. Imagine a teapot, heating on a stove. The

boiling point is always the same. Certain other factors, like the

heat of the burner, the amount of water in the pot, the

temperature of the water before being placed on the burner, among

others, could affect at which spatial-temporal point the water

actually begins to boil, yet the boiling point of water remains

constant, as do the “Big Bang” and “Big Crunch” points of our

universe. Moreover, the nature of everything within our universe

appears to be cyclical, rather than linear, from the life cycle

to the seasons to the rotations and orbits of the tiniest moons

Casey 7 of 13

to the largest galaxies. It would only make sense that the

universe as a whole mimics this structure rather than adopting

the opposite (linear) nature.

Even discounting the very feasible perpetually oscillating

universe, the emergence of our universe from an infinitely, or

near infinitely small singularity via the Big Bang still does not

prove, or even support the notion of a supernatural deity. This

postulation merely transfers the original “problems” of the

origins of our universe to the origins of this deity. If god

causes itself, why can’t the universe cause itself? Ross’s

arguments against the concept of an actual infinite appear to be

closer to sophistry than logic. Mathematically, he argues, an

actual infinite is impossible to comprehend. Yet, isn’t his god

purported to be eternal?

Mathematically, we cannot even measure the curvature of the

circular rim of a coffee cup without appealing to infinity,

though we can see with our eyes the apparent finite nature of the

rim of the coffee cup. Our mathematics are clearly flawed,

especially with regards to the very large or very small. They are

based on human scale and are useful and operative on that scale.

Thus, to understand the very large and very small, geometry and

thus a system of proportions must be employed. That finite human

beings find it easier to comprehend finite measurements is not

surprising. However, we must refrain from the arrogance that

Casey 8 of 13

leads us to believe that our scales and measurements are

applicable outside the environment in which they evolved.

Richard Swinburne presents a slightly more advanced argument

than Ross, though it still retains the same problems common to

all forms of the cosmological argument. In his essay,

“Justification of Theism,” Swinburne argues:

“Some phenomenon E, which we can all observe, is considered.

It is claimed that E is puzzling, strange, not to be expected in

the ordinary course of things; But that E is to be expected if

there is a God; for God has the power to bring about E and He

might well choose to do so. Hence the occurrence of E is reason

for supposing that there is a God…

That there is a Universe and that there are laws of nature

are phenomena so general and pervasive that we tend to ignore

them. But there might so easily not have been a universe at all,

ever. Or the Universe might so easily have been a chaotic mess.

That there is an orderly Universe is something very striking, yet

beyond the capacity of science ever to explain” (3).

J.L. Mackie, Swinburne’s long-time intellectual rival,

provides counter-arguments. The existence of the universe as the

said E in Swinburne’s argument is to be expected in an atheist

universe as well as in a theistic one. Swinburne’s logic appears

Casey 9 of 13

to be as circular and ad hoc as Ross’s. Who is to say that the

Universe is not a chaotic mess? Yes, it is ruled by certain laws,

but the term “chaotic mess” is subjective. Surely the massive

hurricane on Jupiter appears to be a chaotic mess, as do

phenomena more familiar like war and suicide and the busied lives

of overworked college students, as well as the less familiar

phenomena like black holes. The existence of natural law does not

prove, or even support the theistic hypothesis; in fact, it

appears in some cases to argue against the theistic hypothesis

which requires defiance of natural law. Swinburne makes the

mistake of equating naturalism with chaos and random chance.

In The Miracle of Theism, Mackie points out that Swinburne’s

new take on the old cosmological argument does not get rid of the

original problems of an uncaused cause (i.e. a personal deity

outside of space-time. “What is common to the many versions of

this argument is that they start from the very fact that there is

a world or from such general features of it as change or motion

or causation… and argue to God as the uncaused cause of the world

or of those general features, or as its creator, or as the reason

for its existence” (81).

Swinburne presents a strong counter-argument, however, to

opponents of this “god of the gaps.” Though he concedes that a

god is postulated to fill in the gaps in cosmology (which seem to

have become smaller with the advancement of human science), “we

Casey 10 of 13

postulate electrons and protons, neutrons and quarks to explain

the miscellaneous data of physics and chemistry” (“Mackie,

Induction, and God” pg3). However, it is easy to counter this

argument by stating that electrons, protons, neutrons and quarks

are necessary to explain certain phenomena. Again, given Ockham’s

Razor, if the Universe could (as Carl Sagan, Stephen Hawking, and

J.L. Mackie, among others, contend) be explained without

postulating a supernatural deity, the concept of this deity, as

well as Swinburne’s aforementioned example, would be erroneous

and irrelevant; electrons, etcetera, fitting the criteria

Ockham’s razor while Swinburne’s definition of god would not.

It appears that despite any modern interpretations of the

cosmological argument, the most credible and advanced of which I

have described in the preceding paragraphs, the same key problems

arise. Namely, that the universe could likely be eternal (or any

of the other attributes ascribed to it’s theoretical creator),

that “scientifically” postulating a deity that exists outside of

space-time is vastly unscientific, that the argument itself

appears to be circular (the only possible entity to fit the

presented criteria being god, the original hypothesis), that the

postulated god fails when held to the same standard as the

universe it is postulated to explain, that Stephen Hawking’s

Quantum Cosmology as well as the existence of dark matter (which,

according to NASA, could account for an overwhelming majority of

Casey 11 of 13

mass in our universe) refutes many of the modern premises, and

that even if the premises are true, god (especially the Christian

god or any god other than a deist creator) does not necessarily

follow from these premises.

To me, admittedly less educated (thus far) then Swinburne

and Ross (both Ph.D.s), and especially less qualified then

Swinburne, and atop my mountainous eighteen years of existence

and observation, it appears that there is a far more likely

conclusion.

Atheist reductionism seems at least as arrogant as theism,

though it does seem to have slightly more credible (scientific)

methods. Given the small amount of knowledge I have of

psychology, history, and anthropology, I am not surprised at the

evolution of religion to explain what cannot be explained

otherwise. This does, to an extent, refute some of religion’s

“scientific” claims. However, I am not so arrogant in my humanism

to believe that our current science can explain everything.

Chaotic or not, the universe and its components exist in some

form or another, and presumably what mass-energy exists now

always has in some form or another, whether in a perpetually

oscillating universe (which, as I previously stated, would

inductively make sense given what is known about the nature of

the components of the universe) or in an infinitely, or near

infinitely, small singularity that at some point burst forth into

Casey 12 of 13

creation as we know it. A god that exists outside of space-time

doesn’t seem to be logically consistent with the methods used to

postulate the said god. Science deals with the natural, so it

does not make sense to use “scientific” methods to prove the

possibility of the existence of a supernatural being. I do not

believe this sort of apologeticism should be taken seriously in

an academic environment.

What makes supernaturalism so much more “divine” than

naturalism? Could there not exist some sort of binding force in

full compliance with natural law? When we die, our mass-energy is

recycled and reused just the same as any mass-energy in the

universe. The most ancient gods were merely representative of

human psychological archetypes. Perhaps the human concept of

“god” is in fact a natural manifestation of the laws of the

universe, not a distinct and personal being outside of it.

Casey 13 of 13

Works Cited:

The Creator and the Cosmos, Hugh Ross, NavPress, Colorado Springs, 1993

The Existence of God, Richard Swinburne, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004

“Mackie, Induction, and God,” Richard Swinburne, Religious Studies 19, 1983: p.385-391

The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins

Cosmos, Carl Sagan

The Existence of God, J.L. Mackie

The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God, J.L. Mackie, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982

http://www.wikipedia.com

Encyclopedia Britannica Online

http:://www.reasonstobelieve.org