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B8299 SEC. 6: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SPRING 2014
Professor Jonas Hjort
Uris 622
212-‐854-‐5957
TA: Sheila Lalani, [email protected]
REQUIRED PREREQUISITES AND CONNECTION TO THE CORE
The learning in this course will utilize, build on and extend concepts covered in the following core courses:
Core Course Connection with Core Strategy Formulation 1. Determinants of firm performance
2. Trade-‐offs, efficiencies 3. Diversification and scope
Managerial Economics 1. Hold-‐up 2. Strategic interaction among firms and Nash equilibrium 3. Market competition
Managerial Statistics 1. Linear regression 2. Causal analysis
Global Economic Environment I
1. Economic growth and development 2. Relationship between government policies and private-‐sector
performance 3. Global imbalances
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COURSE DESCRIPTION
This course provides a framework for studying the role of the private sector in international development, and risks, challenges and opportunities that loom large in developing countries for private sector actors. As the globalization of firms continues apace, BRICS countries account for a steadily increasing share of the world economy and the business climate improves also in poorer developing countries – including, for example, parts of Africa in recent years – the value of such a framework for ambitious future managers becomes apparent.
Our focus will be on the non-‐market factors that influence private sector behavior in the developing world. Non-‐market factors are relevant for the behavior of firms anywhere but particularly important in poor countries. To succeed in developing countries – whether seeking new markets for its own products, new suppliers in its production process or high-‐yield local investment opportunities – a firm must be able to assess factors such as the risks posed by weak legal systems that limit the enforceability of contracts, corruption and political instability.
Our goal in this course is not to become experts on particular countries or regions but rather to train ourselves in the use of a framework and principles that can be applied across many countries, markets and sectors. The framework derives primarily from the field of economics, and we will not completely jettison its traditional assumption of efficient markets. But developing countries’ economies are characterized in part by significant market-‐ and contracting failures, the analysis of which will play a large role in our analysis. In doing so we will integrate specific examples with the latest research in economics and other relevant fields.
We will consider solutions to specific problems posed by weak institutional systems, where the “rules of the game” may be vague, opaque, or under threat of change. In the process, we will also touch on deep issues in international development, and we will see that firms can have significant impacts – both positive and negative – in the places they operate. The opportunity to affect the local environment raises the possibility of ancillary social benefits on the one hand and possible ethical concerns on the other
CLASS PREPARATION
Readings:
A course packet, which includes nearly all of the readings and cases, is required. There is no textbook for this course. For each topic, there will be a set of assigned readings, sometimes including cases, which will help develop the underlying concepts and/or provide examples. It is essential that you read these materials prior to class.
Extra Readings:
This course provides a broad survey of many issues, and at times you may want to read further about issues of personal interest. The reading list will therefore also point to resources where you may find more extensive (and technical) analysis. These readings are entirely optional, and are meant simply to provide a reference for you now or in the future.
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ASSIGNMENTS AND EVALUATION
The grade is made up of four components: a group analysis and presentation; an essay; a final test; and class participation.
1. Group analysis and presentation (25%, assignment type A). Each class will begin with a 15-‐minute presentation applying the framework and concepts from the previous week’s class to a specific question or challenge facing a firm, investor, policymaker, social enterprise or NGO in a poor country. There will be 10 of these presentations, beginning in class #3. If you would like to get a group of approx. (# of students in class / 10) students together and pick a specific week’s material to focus/present on, feel free to do so (if you would e.g. like to present on the material from class 3 in class 4, let me know at least two days before class 3. First come, first served). If no group has picked a week one day before class, I will pick names at random from the class list and inform you of this by email. The group can then discuss possible questions to focus on before or after class with each other and me (be sure to get your question approved by me by the end of the day of class), giving you a week to work on the analysis and prepare a short presentation.
2. Essay (25%, due April 23, assignment type C). Use this essay as an opportunity to take a deeper dive into any of the topics we discuss in the course, elaborating on an idea that is triggered by, and making reference to, course materials. These should be short “think pieces” of perhaps 5-‐10 pages of text (single-‐spaced, normal margins). It is a good idea to mention your proposed question/idea to me ahead of time and get my reaction (in/after class or by email, or come to office hours if you’d like to discuss in more detail). There are many potential directions. A few examples:
• Provide an analysis of how your company or organization has dealt with the vagaries of bribe demands or contracting difficulties.
• What – if anything – could Honduras do to attract foreign investors in 2011? • What are the considerations that a “double bottom-‐line” social enterprise should take into account in a situation
in which its profit and social goals are not aligned? • Why, in your opinion, have some large companies extracting natural resources in poor countries failed while
others have succeeded? • Why did a particular technology fail to spread while another similar one was widely adopted?
For both the group analysis/presentation and the essay, factors that will influence your grade include: clearly defining the issue to be addressed, drawing on course materials, drawing on materials/data from outside of the reading list, justifying your reasoning, etc.
3. Final Test (30%, closed book): There will be a 90-‐minute test on the final day that will focus on comprehension of core course concepts and materials. Many of these will be fact-‐based questions, but at the same time you should be able to intuit the answers to most of these if you’ve grasped the main concepts of the course.
4. Class Participation (20%): Attendance, preparation, and participation are essential. I will assume that you come to class prepared and may call on people at random on occasion. Please do not hesitate to point out anything in the material we go though in need of clarification (if something is not clear to you it is likely also not clear to your classmates).
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CLASS SCHEDULE Date Topic Jan 29 Welcome and overview of the course: Why are emerging markets still emerging? Part 1. The Rules of the Game 1: Property rights Feb 5 Contractual problems and investor protection Feb 12 Intellectual property issues Part 2. The Technology of Production Feb 19 The organization of the private sector Feb 26 The organization of firms Mar 5 Technology adoption Part 3. The Resources of Production Mar 26 Exploiting natural resources in developing countries Apr 2 Low wages and labor issues Part 4. The Rules of the Game 2: Politics, corruption and cooperate social
responsibility (CSR) Apr 9 Politics and the private sector Apr 16 Corruption Apr 23 Social enterprise and CSR Apr 30 Test READINGS Jan 29: Welcome and overview of the course: Why are emerging markets still emerging? Readings: 1. “The African Exception,” The Economist, March 30, 2002 2. Easterly, “The Ideology of Development,” Foreign Policy July/August 2007 3. Mallaby, “The politically incorrect guide to ending poverty,” The Atlantic 2010
(http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-‐politically-‐incorrect-‐guide-‐to-‐ending-‐poverty/8134/) 4. Pritchett, “Divergence, Big Time” in Meier & Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development 5. Anand, Khanna, and Rivkin, “Market Failures”, Harvard Business School: Note, April 2000 [read pp. 1-‐7 only] 6. Prahalad and Hart, “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid”, Strategy and Business Issue 26,
http://www.csrwire.com/pdf/Prahalad-‐excerpt-‐001-‐022.pdf 7. “Bulging in the Middle”, The Economist, October 20 2012 Optional Readings: 1. Miguel, “Africa Unleashed”, Foreign Policy, November/December 2011 2. Jones, review of “The Next Convergence: The Future of Economics Growth in a Multispeed World” by Spence,
http://www.stanford.edu/~chadj/ScienceBookReview2011.pdf 3. DeLong, “Review of Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel”, 1999, http://www.j-‐bradford-‐
delong.net/Econ_Articles/Reviews/diamond_guns.html 4. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-‐Run Growth”, Handbook of
Economic Growth (ch. 6), 2005 5. Sachs, J.D. and Warner, A. (1997) ‘Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies’, Journal of African Economies 6:
335–76. 6. Spence Commission Report -‐
http://www.growthcommission.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=96&Itemid=169 7. Rodrik, “Second Best Institutions,” NBER Working Paper 14050
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Part 1. The Rules of the Game 1: Property rights
Feb 5: Contractual problems and investor protection
Readings: 1. Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer, Economics of Strategy, 3rd Edition, 2004, p. 127-‐136 2. “Thais make a mess of their muddling,” Financial Times, June 22, 1993 3. Wells, Louis and Eric Gleason, “Is Foreign Infrastructure Investment Still Risky?” Harvard Business Review Sept-‐Oct
1995, Reprint 95511 4. “An Investment Gets Trapped in Kremlin’s Vise,” The New York Times, July 23, 2008 5. Case: “Gazprom and Hermitage Capital: Shareholder Activism in Russia” Optional Readings: 1. Video of William Browder talk at Columbia in relation to Hermitage case:
http://www.harrimaninstitute.org/events/event_videos.html 2. “A Local Firm’s Baffling Trip Through China’s Arbitration System”, Los Angeles Times, December 26, 2003 3. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-‐de-‐Silanes, and Shleifer, “Courts”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2002. 4. Nunn, “Relationship-‐Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 122(2) 5. Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, “Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, February 2002 6. Alexander Dyck & Natalya Volchkova & Luigi Zingales, 2008. "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence
from Russia," Journal of Finance, vol. 63(3), pages 1093-‐1135, 06. 7. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, “Property Rights and Finance”, American Economic Review, 92(5), 2002
Feb 12: Intellectual property issues
Readings: 1. “A gathering storm”, The Economist, June 9, 2007 2. “India Stands Firm Against Coca-‐Cola,” The New York Times, September 5, 1977 3. “Chinese Exporters Stumble over IP,” Financial Times, July 25, 2003 4. “Protecting intellectual property in China”, The McKinsey Quarterly, August 2005 5. Fisman, “The Highest Form of Flattery”, Slate, May 30, 2011 6. “Fake and poor quality malaria drugs risk crisis in Africa, warn scientists”, The Guardian, January 16, 2012 7. “New Africa: Ghanaian tech innovator who led counterfeit drugs crackdown”, The Guardian, August 25, 2012 8. “Low-‐Cost Drugs in Poor Nations Get a Lift in Indian Court”, New York Times, April 1 2013 Optional Readings: 1. Barron, “International Trade Agreements”, in Business and Its Environment, 4th ed., pp. 595-‐602 2. Qian, “Impacts of Entry by Counterfeiters”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 2008 3. “Inside Pfizer’s fight against counterfeit drugs”, Bloomberg Businessweek, January 17, 2013 4. Bjorkman-‐Nyqvist, Svensson and Yanagizawa-‐Drott, “Can Good Products Drive Out Bad? Evidence from Local
Markets for (Fake?) Antimalarial Medicine in Uganda” (http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/dyanagi/Research/FakeDrugs.pdf)
5. Zhao, “Doing R&D in Countries with Weak IPR Protection: Can Corporate Management Substitute for Legal Institutions?”, Management Science, 2008.
6. Branstetter, Fisman and Foley. "Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence From U.S. Firm-‐Level Panel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006, v121(1,Feb), 321-‐349.
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7. UNDP 2001. Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development, Oxford University Press. New York. Pages 102-‐ 108
8. Michael Kremer, Rachel Glennerster and Heidi Williams, "Creating Markets for Vaccines," Innovations, 2006, 1(1): 67 – 79 (http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/files/innovationsFinal.pdf)
9. Maskus, “Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations”, mimeo UC Boulder, 2002
Part 2. The Technology of Production
Feb 19: The organization of the private sector
Readings: 1. Sargent, “Getting to Know the Neighbors: Grupos in Mexico”, Business Horizons, 2001. 2. Khanna and Yafeh (2007), “Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?” Journal of Economic
Literature XLV: 331-‐372 (June), sections 1 – 3 3. “Transforming Indonesia’s Business Groups”, The Jakarta Post, January 18, 2008 4. “Beyond Microfinance: Getting Capital to Small and Medium Enterprises to Fuel Faster Development”, Brookings
Institution Policy Brief Series #159, March 2007 5. “The masala Mittelstand”, The Economist, August 11, 2012 6. “Parallel players”, The Economist, June 23, 2012 7. “Many Wall Street Banks Woo Children of Chinese Leaders”, New York Times, August 20, 2013 8. “India’s Woes Reflected in Bid to Restart Old Plant”, New York Times, March 22, 2010 Optional readings: 1. McKenzie, de Mel and Woodruff, “Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(4), 2008 2. Tybout, “Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do they Do, and Why”, Journal of Economic
Literature, 38(1), 2000 3. Hsieh and Klenow, “Misallocation and Manufactoring TFP in China and India”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
November 2009 4. Khwaja and Mian, “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent provision in an Emerging Financial Market”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 2005. 5. Fisman et al., “Social Proximity and Loan Outcomes: Evidence from an Indian Bank”, mimeo Columbia Business
School 2012 6. “What microloans miss”, The New Yorker, March 17, 2008 7. Almeida et al., “The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols”, Journal of
Financial Economics, 2011
Feb 26: The organization of firms
Readings: 1. Bloom, Genakos, van Reenen and Sadun, “Management practices across firms and countries”, Academy of
Management Perspectives, 2012 2. “Where’s the Boss? Trapped in a Meeting”, Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2012 3. “How fairness helped America grow”, The Boston Globe, May 20, 2012 4. “Give Sam Walton the Nobel Prize”, Foreign Policy, May/June 2013 5. “Cultivating Genius in the 21st Century”, Wired Magazine, February 28, 2012
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6. Bertrand and Schoar, "Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies.", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003, 118(4), pp. 1169-‐208, sections I, II and VII
Optional readings: 1. Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie and Roberts, “Does management matter: evidence from India”, forthcoming in
Quarterly Journal of Economics (http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/DMM.pdf) 2. Bloom, van Reenen and Sadun, “The organization of firms across countries”, forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of
Economics (http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/org_2012.pdf) 3. Bloom and van Reenen, “Why do management practices differ across firms and countries?”, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 2010 4. Bandiera, Guiso and Prat, “What Do CEOs Do?”, EUI working paper
(http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/15647/ECO_2011_06.pdf?sequence=1) 5. Caselli and Gennaioli, “Dynastic Management”, Economic Inquiry, May 2012 6. Hsieh et al., “The Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth”, mimeo Stanford, 2012 7. Karlan et al. (2012), “Hoping to Win, Expecting to Lose: Theory and Lessons on Micro Enterprise Development”,
mimeo Yale (http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2/pdf/ghanatailors.pdf) 8. Syverson, “What determines productivity”, Journal of Economic Literature, June 2011, section 3
March 5: Technology adoption
Readings: 1. “Warning: Habits May be Good for You”, New York Times, July 13 2008 2. Jack, Stoker and Suri, “Documenting the birth of a financial economy”, Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 109(26), 2012 3. “Africa’s mobile economic revolution”, The Guardian, July 23, 2011 4. “Mobile Banking for the Unbanked”, HBS case 5. “Upwardly mobile: Kenya’s technology start-‐up scene is about to take off”, The Economist, August 25, 2012 6. “Pakistan Defends Its Soccer Industry”, Wall Street Journal, April 26 2010 7. “Conservation Pays Off for Bangladeshi Factories”, New York Times, March 21 2013 Optional readings: 1. Foster and Rosenzweig, “Microeconomics of Technology Adoption”,
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp984.pdf) 2. Jack and Suri, “Mobile Money: The Economics of M-‐Pesa” (http://www.mit.edu/~tavneet/M-‐PESA-‐Final2.pdf) 3. Aker and Mbiti, “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(3),
2010 4. Boston Review forum “Can Technology End Poverty?”, various articles
(http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.6/ndf_technology.php) 5. “The Allure of Low Technology,” The Economist, December 20, 2003 6. Fafchamps and Quinn, “Networks an Manufacturing firms in Africa: Initial Results from a Randomised Experiment”,
(http://www.dartmouth.edu/~neudc2012/docs/paper_241.pdf) 7. “A Guide in Africa”, The Economist, February 23 2013 8. “Is it a phone, is it a bank?”, The Economist, March 30 2013
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Part 3: The Resources of Production
March 26: Exploiting Natural resources
Readings: 1. “The Paradox of Plenty”, The Economist, December 24, 2005 2. Note on Conflict Diamonds: “Why Are Civil Wars, Like Diamonds, Forever?” HBS 9-‐702-‐027 3. “China, Filling a Void, Drills for Riches in Chad,” The New York Times, Aug 13, 2007. 4. “A Global Rush for Africa’s Land: Risks and Opportunities”, African Development Bank blog post, October 17, 2012
(http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-‐championing-‐inclusive-‐growth-‐across-‐africa/post/a-‐global-‐rush-‐for-‐africas-‐land-‐risks-‐and-‐opportunities-‐9844/)
5. “Zimbabwe farmers turn to Nigeria”, Reuters, November 20 2009 6. Fisman, “Diamonds Are a Guerilla’s Best Friend”, Slate, August 17, 2007 7. “More than Minerals”, The Economist, March 23 2013 Optional Readings: 8. “China, Africa, and Oil”, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, June 6, 2008 9. “Tackling the Oil Curse,” The Economist, September 25, 2004 10. La Ferrara and Guidolin, “Diamonds are Forever, Wars are Not. Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?”, American
Economic Review, 97(5), 2007 11. Le Billion, “Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975 – 2000”, African Affairs, vol. 100,
2001 12. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse”, Economic Journal, 2006 13. Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford University Press, 2011 14. “Profiteers’ war that goes on forever”, The Guardian, June 30 1999 15. Meyersson et al., “The Rise of China and the Natural Resource Curse in Africa”, 2008, mimeo LSE
(http://personal.lse.ac.uk/padro/meyersonpadroqian_20080407_all.pdf) 16. Collier, “Angola: Options for Prosperity”, 2006, mimeo Oxford
(http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/Angola-‐OptionsforProsperity.pdf)
April 2: Low wages and labor issues
Readings: 1. “Chinese Girls’ Toil Brings Pain, Not Riches,” The New York Times, October 2, 2003 2. “Garment Factories, Changing Women’s Roles in Poor Countries,” The New York Times, July 21, 2010 3. “Grinding the Poor,” The Economist, September 27, 2001 4. “Hitting the Wall: Nike and International Labor Practices”, HBS case 5. “Public Outrage Over Factory Conditions Spurs Labor Deal”, New York Times, May 19, 2013 Optional Readings: 1. Brown, Deardorff, and Stern, “The Effects of Multinational Production on Wages and Working Conditions in
Developing Countries,” NBER Working Paper #9669, 2003 2. Verhoogen et al., “Fairness and Freight-‐Handlers: Local Labor Market Conditions and Wage Fairness Perceptions in a
Trucking Firm.”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 477-‐498, July 2007. 3. Harrison and Scorse, “Multinationals and Anti-‐Sweatshop Activism”, American Economics Review, 2010, 100(1): 247-‐
73. 4. Martins and Esteves, "Foreign Ownership, Employment and Wages in Brazil: Evidence from Acquisitions,
Divestments and Job Movers," 2008, IZA Discussion Papers 3542, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 5. Kaur, “Nominal wage rigidity in village labor markets”, 2012, mimeo Columbia
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Part 4. The Rules of the Game 2: Politics, corruption and corporate social responsibility
April 9: Politics and the private sector
Readings: 1. “The Most Hated Bangladeshi, Toppled From a Shady Empire”, The New York Times, April 30, 2013 2. “A High-‐Tech Fix for One Corner of India,” The New York Times, December 27, 2002 3. “Smelling of Moses,” The Economist, January 13, 1996 4. “Rwanda and other aid darlings: Efficiency vs freedom,” The Economist, August 5, 2010 5. “Billionaires’ Rise Aids India, and the Favor is Returned,” The New York Times July 26, 2011 6. Przeworksi & Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1993 Optional Readings: 1. Jones and Olken, “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2005 2. Fisman, “Estimating the Value of Political Connections,” American Economic Review, September 2001 3. Fisman, Vig and Schulz, “Private Returns to Public Office”, CBS working paper
(http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/rfisman/papers/privatereturns.pdf)
April 16: Corruption
Readings: 7. “Ex-‐Leader Stole $100 Million From Liberia,” The New York Times, September 18, 2003” 2. Easterly, “Corruption and Growth” in The Elusive Quest for Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, Ch. 12 3. Olken and Pande, “Corruption in Developing Countries”, forthcoming in Annual Review of Economics, section 2 (pp.
13 – 21). (http://economics.mit.edu/files/7589) 4. “India’s Corruption Blues,” The Economist, March 24, 2001 5. “The Road to Hell is Unpaved,” The Economist, December 19, 2002 6. “Corruption in International Business (B)” (HBS) Optional Readings: 1. Fisman and Miguel, Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations, 2008 2. Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005, vol. 19 (5): 19-‐42. 3. Shleifer and Vishny, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1993 4. Olken, Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,
Journal of Political Economy 115 (2), pp. 200-‐249, April 2007. (http://econ-‐www.mit.edu/files/2913)
April 23: Social enterprise and cooperate social responsibility (CSR)
Readings: 1. Friedman, M. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits," N.Y. Times Magazine, Sept. 13, 1970 2. “Good Business; nice beaches”, The Economist, May 19, 2012 3. Porter and Kramer, “Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social
Responsibility,” HBR, 2006 4. Fisman, “Virtue for Sale,” Slate, 2007 (http://www.slate.com/id/2175923/) 5. “Why ‘Social Enterprise’ Rarely Works”, Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2007
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Optional Readings: 1. Hiscox & Smyth, “Is there Consumer Demand for Improved Labor Standards? Evidence from Field Experiments in
Social Product Labeling,” 2008 (http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/SocialLabeling.pdf) 2. Forbes report: http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/16/corporate-‐social-‐responsibility-‐corprespons08-‐lead-‐
cx_mn_de_tw_1016csr_land.html 3. “Sustainability Nears a Tipping Point”, report on CSR by BCG and the MIT Sloan Management Review, 2012
(https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/sustainability_vision_mission_sustainability_nears_a_tipping_point/)
4. Elfenbein, Fisman and McManus, “Charity as a Substitute for Reputation: Evidence from an Online Marketplace”, forthcoming in the Review of Economic Studies (http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/rfisman/papers/old/CharitySubstitutesForReputation_07052011_final.pdf)
April 30: Test