WESTERN PATTERNS AND LOCAL
CONFLICTS: FRAMING COLLECTIVE ACTION
IN THE HUNGARIAN GREEN MOVEMENT
PAPER BY
SZABINA KERENYI
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
MASARYK UNIVERSITY, BRNO
INTRODUCTION
In an essay in literarary theory, Alexandar Kiossev refers to small nations of the age of
modernisation – based on the creation of a nation and a nation-state of Bulgaria – as “self-
colonising nations” - these nations did not wait for an external colonisation in a cultural sense
but themselves chose to follow foreign cultural streams like verdicts. This metaphor seems
suitable to express the relationship between the developed green movements in the West (in
Western Europe and North America) and the attitude towards them shared by the young
environmental movements in post-communist Europe, which takes issues articulated by the
counterrevolutions of the sixties-seventies in Western Europe as a pattern, but has not been
successful in planting the into the domestic discourses. Are these movements able to create a
discourse and bring along changes in their societies or are they simply expressing problems
that cannot be interpreted in their own cultural-political environments? What kind of
strategies do they choose to express the problems they identify in the domestic society?
The issue of New Social Movements (NSM) is well explored in the academic literature,
especially in the area of Political Science, however, all theories on social movements were
based on case studies in Western Europe or North America, dating from the late sixties, from
the time of the countercultural revolution(s). When talking about the global environmental
movement as such, the academic discourse tends to overlook the region of post-communist
Europe – not accidentally, the literature on the movements of the region is quite poor, and the
movement itself is in a developing stage. On the other hand, the green movement in Eastern
and Central Europe would not fit into the category of developing countries’ movements either
– it is neither in the frontlines of discourses nor exotic enough to catch attention.
Social movements in the region of Central Europe is a relatively ignored field area,
which can be explained by the circumstances of their appearance. There is a strong linkage
between the character of the movements and their social-political context, not at last because
they arose paralelly with the fall of the communist dictatorships, and the new democratic
states established the frames for civil movements. In a way, as contrary to the Western
revolutionary movements, the post-communist ones were encouraged from above, and the
civil organisations founded after the velvet revolution were using the opportunities offered by
the state. For these reasons, Central European movements did not have a common, cathartic
deriving point, and their further development was also constrained by the state funding on the
one hand, and were strongly affected by Western patterns and influences on the other.
Consequently, social movements in Central Europe produced a very diverse network of
groups and actors, without however a common focus or joint strategies. This paper is giving a
general picture of the Hungarian environmental movement society and will investigate the
Western influences on the local protest patters. As I will claim, Western influences were very
strongly present at the beginning of the movement, and have impacts on the urban green
subcultures.
The case study, a successful protest against the construction of a NATO locator in a
nature protection area is examining the process of framing, and is examining it regard to
framing theories, but will connect it with literature on communities in symbolic anthropology.
The approach presented is stressing the cultural characteristics of the movement than on
opportunities and constrained offered by the system in which they appear. The study on the
Zengo case is analysing framing collective action through the process of constructing cultural
symbols, where Western pattern appear in the strategic toolkit of the movement.
I.green map
I.1. Historical perspective
The Hungarian transition period in the end of 80s brought new opportunities for social
movements. Kitschelt’s model for open structure (Kitschelt, 1986) of regimes seems to fail
for transitory systems, as two criteria cannot be applied for late 80s Hungary – the plural party
system was not formed yet and the legislative system was also transformed exactly due to the
changes. Nevertheless the system can be considered as opened since the political elite was
unstable, the solidarity of the opponent groups and their political power increased; the elite
was flexible towards the changes and the inner grievances within the challengers did not
appear yet1.
When talking about the Hungarian environmental scene one cannot neglect the Danube
protest action series. The Danube-movement was one of the first organised, large social
movements that started during communist times, in the late 80s and became a symbolic issue
1 The opponent movement was divided into two major directions, the urbanists and the nationals, but they acted
of the opponent movement. The plans to build a dam on the Danube at the Nagymaros –
Gabcikovo part of the river evoked strong counter reactions, as a result of which a strong civil
movement started to build up its network or “catnet” with Charles Tilly’s expression (as
category networks of advocacy in movements, Tilly 1978) of environmental experts,
intellectuals, volunteer activists, citizen groups, targeting the communist regime. The Danube
Circle was one of the most significant environmental groups2 that used various mobilisation
tools – collected ten thousand signatures, published materials and organized huge
demonstrations with tens of thousands of participants (Szabó, 1994). After the democratic
changes however, the problem was reduced to a “foreign affair”3 issue – the target shifted
from the Hungarian communist leadership to the government of Slovakia, and was about to be
solved in an international treaty, which lead to a loss of its mobilisation capacities. It was
practically the master frame (to be discussed later) that shifted from a united protest
movement against the communist system to a pure foreign policy problem, just like the target
changed from the authoritarian state to the executors of an international treaty.
Szabó’s argumentation that the failure of the environmental movement to form a
significant political force should be the lack of a central nuclear issue (Szabó, 1994: 292)
seems considerable – the Danube turned into a huge public discourse but did not survive the
democratic transformation. From the oppositionists’ burning issue, the environment became a
marginal issue behind economy and democracy, instead of being part of it. In Hungary, after
the regime change and after the “resolution” of the Danube-problem the environmental issue
became of minor importance and was not on the political agenda anymore, environmental
topics were no matter of discussion at the Roundtable Talks4 and were not able to create
cleavages in the political forces.
The Danube movement5 however was important as a departure point for the Hungarian
environmental movement – even though a large number or probably even the majority of
recent groups and actors did not participate in the action, they still consider it as an initiation
unified against the elite until the end of the Roundtable Nagotiations in September 1989. 2 The Danube Circle became a registered NGO after the new association law in 1990. 3 The construction of the plant was suspended in the summer of 1989 as a result of the Hague Treaty. 4The Roundtable Negotiations were lead between the communist elite and the cores of the new opposition
parties, and was aiming to agree upon the transition and the principals of a democratic system. 5The Danube Circle, formed during the years of protest, still exists and is a registered NGO – one of the
thousands in the field, though it managed to „strike” again during the election period of 1998. The topic was the still unresolved problem of the Danube dam, the organisers consisted of the „survival” team of the golden ages of the Danube movement, however the conflict issue was taken up by the conservative party Fidesz, then in opposition, and was directed against the governing socialists. The mass protest action in front of the parliament turned the results at the election polls, and according to some analysts it was to a large part this
point of the movement. Also because for a very long time afterwards, the green groups
nationwide were not able to find a similarly large and important issue that would mobilise the
masses and would aim at social-political changes, the Danube movement is the historical
origo of the recent environmental sphere, the point where the common history starts being
constructed (Assmann).
I.2. The movement – actors and cleavages
The categorisation of the green movement can be and has been done in various ways.
Political science literature tends to divide social movements into structures according to the
type of their activities and their strategies. Hanspeter Kriesi for instance divides formal groups
into 4 main categories: service (no direct involvement in mobilisation), self-help (voluntary
associations, clubs), political representation (parties and interest groups), and political
mobilisation (social movement sector) (Kriesi, 1996). While this categorisation is not a
prototype, I would only like to stress that these patterns are of less use in the contemporary
post-communist environment, where the structures were created in an “artificial” way
following Western patterns, and the basic cleavage can be found between authorities and the
rest, which tends to be called the “civil society”. Authorities cover centralised power
structures (decision-making), and the civil society consists of organised groups (like NGOs),
semi-formal networks, and individuals.
It seems to be a challenge to place precisely the environmental movement in this
map, where there are strong overlaps between the normally differentiated interest groups and
actors. Following the Danube movement – and according to new law that enabled them to do
so – the different environmental groups went through the process of institutionalisation and
turned into registered NGOs. This process was assisted by international organisations who
trained them and taught them the basic know-how of surviving in the civil arena, such as how
to solve funding, how to run a project and maintain an organisation6.
A basic distinction can be drawn between two major groups among civil
environmental actors: policy-oriented and culturally oriented groups. To the first type the
formal and rather institutionalised groups and networks could be placed: they are registered
NGOs who work on professional environmental issues, and their goal is to prepare and push
action that assisted Fidesz to government afterwards.
6Most of the information about the morphology of the broad green movement stems from interviews made during “Mapping the Greens” project, 2002-2003 under the supervision of Laszlo Bruszt.
for changes in the policy. Their strategies go through the institutional structures and they
target the decision-makers. The second group is closer to the term “grassroots”: though might
also contain NGOs, but not necessarily; these would be typically informal networks, and as
contrary to the first group, they emphasise social and cultural values. In their activities they
aim to target the wide public by promoting alternative/ parallel social and cultural patterns.
Being “green” for them means the “package” inherited by the Western countercultural
revolutions, and sharing this common cultural knowledge gives rise to subcultures in the a
social movement. The term “subculture” is used in the sense of the Turnerian-Cohenian
concept of a “symbolic community” (Turner 1969, Cohen 1995), which refers to the common
set of cultural knowledge, the rituals, the language, lifestyle and the shared identity stemming
from the counterposition to the “mainstream mass culture”.
The basic cleavage line also corresponds to the “urban” – “rural” relationships, which
in Hungarian relations could be reduced to a line between the capital Budapest and everything
else. The paradox in the identities lies in the opposition of these urban “mass” values, while
the movement itself is defined in the frames of the city, the urban environment, especially that
Budapest also offers the best opportunities and infrastructure for the movement, and is
addressing the urban public. The subcultural groups can be found in Budapest, just like a
couple of informal networks, which are connected to certain topics (e.g. Recycling or
squatting), temporary events (e.g. organising festivals), or to bigger, international
organisations – the most worthy of mentioning is the Another World is Possible Network,
which was established following the first European Social Forums7. This network, even
though it can show relatively few concrete results, has an important impact on the urban
subcultures in forming the identities of the actors and providing them with uptodate
knowledge about the international green and globalisation critical movements. The
international organisations have a unique status in the movement map – even though there
have been some groups with connections outside the country (for instance MTVSZ, the local
member of Friends of the Earth), this aspect never got a particular emphasis. A decisive
moment this point of view was the appearance of Greenpeace in Hungary: GP opened offices
in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia parallelly in 2001, managed by the Austrian branch of the
network, and even though the co-co-ordinators made all efforts to involve domestic NGOs
actors as much as possible8, up to recently they remained isolated and everything but welcome
72002 Florence, followed by 2003 Paris, and most recently 2004 London 8Already before opening offices the GP organised activist trainings on different levels for participants of
by the other groups. As some actors themselves admitted, they have all reasons to be jealous –
they have been struggling to make their own way and living in the system, as well as fighting
for each and every drop of publicity, when the GP is establishing a local group from the West,
with Western capital incomparable to the average budget of a Hungarian NGO, and moreover
they “steal” all media attention9. Even though the influence of Western capital is more than
obvious, there has been little co-operation between Hungarian and foreign organisations.
II. frames and culture
Protection of environment does not appear in public discourses, and is generally not a
heated topic for power structures. On the level of decision making, the protection of
environment appears only in specific topics, such as international treaties (which get very
little publicity if at all), and belongs to the relatively new and quite marginal institution:
Ministry of Environment. The minister of environment has no significant influence on the
central budget, is usually ignored by the governmental institutions, and, simultaneously,
heavily criticised by actors of the environmental movement. As professional environmental
NGOs fail to exercise successful pressure on the ministries, their attempts and initiatives to
change policy remain on a relatively marginal and highly professional level. Partly as a
consequence of the polarised political atmosphere, environment protection has not managed
to get too much into the public awareness, even thought some polls have shown that on an
individual level, people are interested in protecting the environment but do not hold it to be an
explicitly political – and thus, important – issue. It is on the grassroots level only where
environment protection can hence mobilise capital and makes in into discourse. At the same
time, being green and protecting the environment bears different meanings on different levels.
To get closer to these principals it is necessary to introduce the concept of framing.
There is one basic distinction made by scholars on framing that needs to be emphasised:
it is the difference between framing collective action and master frames of movements. Doug
McAdam– according to whom “(...) the principal weapon available to he movement is its
strategic use of framing processes” (McAdam, 1996: 340) – argues that most of the academic
environmental organisations, and were teaching basic techniques of protesting, and other methods the organisation had been implementing successfully for decades.
9This was indeed the case couple of times, like on a demonstration against an incinerator in a district in Budapest, or on an action in Paks at the nuclear power plant, where afterwards couple of foreign GP activists
work on framing concentrates on the system (the institutionalised structures as environment in
which the movement arises) instead of “the concerns of the activists.” Despite of this, he
himself devides movement framing into categories from the viewpoint of the system – its
stability and threats to it, and institutional responses to the threats. The four possibilities of a
movement are: revolutionary goals with non-institutional vs. institutional tactics, and reform-
goals with institutionalised tactics (342). Unfortunately, the model can hardly be applied for
democratic systems, where revolution-aiming movements are far from usual, and also, those
movements who struggle for reform are typically using combined methods of institutional and
non-institutional paths.
Nevertheless, framing is a crucial concept as part of movement tactics and strategies.
This particularly applies to temporary, one-issue movements or collective actions, much more
than to the social movement society as a whole. Based on the definition by Snow and
Benford, the concept of framing for social movements “refers to an interpretative schemata
that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding
objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past
environment.” (Snow – Benford, 1992: 137) Framing bears importance in the mobilisation
process of a collective action, and serves as a “label”, a naming or reference to the
movement's goals and character, defined in reference to the actual social-political
environment. Collective action frames “serve as accenting devices that either underscore and
embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral
that was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable... activists employ collective
action frames to punctuate or single out some existing social condition or aspect of life and
define it as unjust, intolarable, and deserving of collective action.” (ibid) Framing thus
becomes an act of self-expression of the environmental movement, a process through which it
identifies a grievance in society, choses a target and positions itself against it: it can be
articulated in various means, and can be expressed through different ways.
According to Elisabeth Clemens, the organisational form of the movement can serve as
a master frame of expressing identity. “In this talk about 'how', organizational form appears as
a movement frame which both informs collective identity and orients groups toward other
actors and institutions. Understood as a movement frame, organizational form defines groups
as 'people who act together in a particular way' and portrays problems as amenable to a
particular type of action.” (Clemens, 1996: 205) This aproach thus presupposes a strategy-
were arrested, while there was not a word about other participants of the action.
oriented attitude of the movement, in which actors are conscious in defining their own identity
according to the opportunity structures. Clemens applies this theoretical frame on American
labour movement, but it would be difficult to identify organisational form as a frame for the
green movement as a whole, which, as we saw above, is not united under one particular
structure. There is one form that is more or less conscious and structured in this aspect: the
urban movement subcultures could be considered to be aligned along the cleavage of urban
masses vs. community, which works as a frame, but this case is more connected to the
concept of identity.
Indeed, the culture-oriented stream of the green movement is based on cultural
identities, which also has its place in the literature. Sydney Tarrow belongs to the approach
that emphasises the role of culture in the process of framing. The authore too stresses the role
of framing as naming the grievances and identifying “enemies”, as well as the communication
of the message, which is not purely symbolic but already points to the strategy chosen to
realise the goals. „Social movements are deeply involved in the work of 'naming' grievances,
connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning that will
resonate with a population's cultural redispositions and communicate a uniform message to
power holders and others“. (Tarrow 1998: 110)
About the point on culture, he claims that it gains importance in giving basis for the
actors' identities and uniting them under a label, or in fact, framing and culture cannot be
separated, since culture is the context in which the messages are articulated and the movement
symbols make sense.
Tarrow directly touches upon the dilemma of the Hungarian environmental movement,
which is facing the dilemma of how to mobilise and reach masses and at the same time remain
'true' to its own agenda and identity. The process of framing, as I will claim, is intentional in
single collective actions, but what concerns the movement as such and the involvement of the
actors, framing, or the master frame is not influenced by the opportunity structures but is
given and set by the cultural character and contents of the movement groups. Framing
according to his view is a twofold process “between developing dynamic symbols that will
create new identities and bring about change, and proffering symbols that are familiar to
people who are rooted in their own cultures... The major symbolic dilemma of social
movements is to mediate between inherited symbols that are familiar, but lead to passivity,
and the new ones that are electrifying, but may be too unfamiliar to lead to action.” (1998:
107) The key point in framing collective action is the capability of the actors to articulate a
problem and mediate it with symbols that are embedded in the cultural environment of their
social context. The rather unclear point in his analysis lies, however, exactly in defining the
concept of culture, which Tarrow borrows from Marc Howard Ross: “first, culture is a system
of meaning which people use to manage their daily worlds...; second, culture is the basis of
social and political identity which affects how people line up and how they act on a wide
range of matters. (quoted according to : 119; original from 1998: 42) The first approach is
close to Clifford Geertz's broad, almost philosophical definition of culture as a complex
system of symbols and meanings (1993), which is - for the same reasons - difficult to apply
on social movements. In fact, culture in this sense is not more than the general social-cultural-
political context. The second part of the statement is less problematic, but does not serve as a
definition, and similarly treats culture as a background of an entity, not a concept worth of
dealing with in itself. Moreover, Tarrow then switches and refers to social identities as if they
were a synonym for culture. There are four main points Tarrow stresses in reference to social
identity: 1) “identities are often basis of aggregation in social movements”; 2) “social
movements require solidarity to act collectively and consistently”; 3) “solidarity... is often
based on more intimate and specialized communities”; 4) “building a movement around
strong ties of collective identity... does much of the work that would normally fall to
organization; but it cannot do the work of mobilization, which depends on framing identities
so that they will lead to action, alliances, interaction” (119).
To sum up, framing is based on conflicts; social identity plays an important role in the
involvement of the actors, sets their relationships based on solidarity inside the movement,
and is defined in counterposition to the target in the conflict. Collective action frames thus are
more than a label of contention: they mediate or channel messages between actors and
recepient cultures. “[S]ymbolism of a movement are neither derived directly from culture nor
woven out of the whole cloth of ideology, but are the result of its strategic interaction in its
various and changing settings.” (109) There is hence a strong linkage between frames, culture
and identities, which concepts however remain a bit blurred in Tarrow's explanation. In the
case study analysis in the last chapter, I make try to clearly distinguish these concepts and
apply them on the environmenal movement in Hungary, with an emphasis on the cultural. For
this, it is necessary to introduce the concept of community which tends to be overlooked in
political literature. I treat the term “community” as a basis for collective identity – community
is the space where culture is being produced and reproduced. This interpretation of culture is
borrowed from symbolic anthropology, where community is a frame of culturally defined
groups.
The breakthrough in the concept of community in social sciences was brought about by
Victor Turner who – based on an analytical frame borrowed by Arnold Van Gennep on
liminality (Gennep 1992) – defines communities as symbolically defined groups, or in other
words antistructures or “communitas” as opposed to fixed structures in society (1969). The
term was later developed by the Anthony Cohen, who stresses that communities are
awareness groups, who differentiate themselves from society by constructing symbolic
boundaries, which are the reference points for defining the difference between “us” and
“them” (1995). Culture is thus constantly being produced and reproduced by the members of
the community; every collective action is a symbolic act of creating and strenghtening the
borderlines and turns into aset of common knowledge shared by members of a community,
into a set of values, codes of behaviour. It defines acceptable norms while rejects others, that
remain outside those boundaries.
The master frame of movements is thus based on identities produced by and in the
movement community, while collective actions are not purely strategy-based and do not have
only political goals but are a means of symbolic expression of identity and marking borders.
The green movement as such does not have one single or central master frame. The only
common point that can be found for the various types of organisations is the rejection of
pollution, but they rarely use it to unite the whole movement under it. The urban green
subcultures however have adopted the master frame of a parallel society, which could be
expressed in the dichotomy between them and the consumerist masses.
pollution cleanness
consumerism sustainability
competition solidarity
material goods ideological values
preference for standards diversity
short-term profit-making preservation of natural and cultural resources
The master frame is shaped by the ideologies of these communities, which contain a set
of values practically adopted from the Western environmental movements, while their
strategies are borrowed from anti-globalisation streams. The main discourse is set by
„classical” environmental topics (nature protection and anti-pollution) and includes feminism,
pacifism, sustainable solidarity, green technologies, which most correspond to basic
principles of ESF and other “conventions” of international green forums. The topics of
discussion are dominated by the Western discourses, and there is little reference to the
domestic public.
The ideological set or the frame of the movement subcultures as an alternative society is
does not contain a clear message and does not touch upon a social conflict, mostly because the
public expects them to handle with environmental issues and most of the topics are out of the
domestic discourses, srtongly dominated by polarised political atmosphere, traditionally
present since the democratic changes.
III. producing symbols in collective action: the case of Zengo
The environmental movement has been the most active of all civil sectors in political
participation since the regime change. Starting with the Danube protest actions, there have
been loads of demonstrations and actions, but most of them hardly make it to the news. The
urban subcultural movements have been very active in the recent years in organising cultural
events, like festivals or alternative art exhibitions10, and promoting values that belong to
alternative or parallel urban lifestyle. The actions are important since they gather activists
together and strengthen the activist identities, moreover they build co-operation between
greens and activists from other areas11. These actions however are not explicitly strategic
from the point of view of framing: they are strengthening the cultural belonging and the
boundaries between the urban masses and the subcultural lifestyle, but for example they do
not aim to mobilise or recruit new members. Similarly, they are not articulating grievances
and do not name a target except the neoliberal system, which is however not a message that is
easy to communicate to the public. Squatting as a Western example for spreading parallel
culture was quite popular, but following the Guerilla Project (see footnote 10), the idea of
realisation started to spread among activists, and in late 2004 urban greens managed to squat a
cellar in the city centre; it still functions as a club, where greens, feminists, pacifists and
artists meet. The culture shared by the urban subculture activists is very similar to the value-
set of the Western countercultural revolutions or some recent globalisation-critical movement,
however it does not contain a message that would strike the public, or to formulate it with
10An important example is the Guerilla Project realised for the first time in the autumn of 2003, in the frames of
which alternative street artists exhibitions, alternative music concerts, club discussions about activism took place in a squatted cellar. The action bounded together underground artists and green activists, moreover for the first time in Hungary, came up with the idea of popularising squatting culture. The project is about to be repeated during the spring of 2005.
11The Food Not Bombs! Action series for instance is a project in which volunteers cook and distribute food for homeless people in the capital. The project started running in 2003, and is a successful consequence of the Another World is Possible network co-operation.
Tarrow's words, they movement have difficulties with finding symbols that would be both
“revolutionary” and at the same time possible to interpret in the actual discourses.
Some other attempts on the other hand, even though they address domestic issues (like
some demonstrations against road constructions or against decisions of the Ministry of
Environment), they contain no reference to cultural contents of value systems, and do not
have the potential of building collective identities along them.
A recent event however seems to have changed the existing patterns and managed to be
at the same time strategic and cultural, it targeted decision-making and similarly did build a
community, while at the same time attracted masses and created a public debate. In this
chapter I will analyse the case of a protest series on the Zengo, which, for exactly these
reasons several analysists place into parallel with the Danube movement.
The plans over constructing a NATO locator in Zengo, a nature protection area on
Mecsek hill (which counts for mountain in Hungarian geographic relations) started in 1997.
Since then consecutive leftist and rightist governments approved the proposal, without
however properly involving the locals. The inhabitants of the surrounding villages started
collecting signatures and tried to initiate counter-measurements, without particular
consequences. In February 2004 the actual – socialist – government was about to start the
constructions on the hill: this decision was also the starting point of a series of huge, nation-
wide protests, and involved various green groups into the fights.
The worries of the protesters were multiple – people were afraid of harmful health
affects if the military enterprise, the territory moreover is a nature protection area, mostly
because 90% of the flower Banatian peony populations can be found on this place. Above all,
the locals have dozens of myths and legends connected to the place, the peak of the hill: even
the name Zengő stems from the special sound of the mountain that can be heard when the
wind is blowing. To sum up, the authorities touched upon a sensitive issue. The locals'
protests remained without reaction for years, but as soon as the constructions were about to be
realised, the locals were very soon supported by groups spontaneously joining from all around
the country, and developed into a movement for the protection of the Zengo, formed a strong,
professionally functioning network, in which everyone had an own task and responsibility.
The case also found backing among public intellectuals, politicians and artists. Eventually,
after one year of fighting, the government announced to be considering to move the locator to
a different place. This has been celebrated as a huge success of the grassroots, or as it
developed throughout the one year of intensive struggling broadcasted regularly by the media,
to a “war of the civilians against the authorities”. The achievements are result of the co-
operation between the committed locals and the professional urban green groups, but the case
has been much more complex and can be observed as a paradigm for the urban grassroots
greens.
The analysis is focusing on the one year of organised protests. The research is done
mostly based on secondary, written sources, and is concentrating on the “censored”, “edited”
statements and opinions meant to address the public. In fact, through a discourse analysis I am
trying to present the attitudes of the actors, as expressed through the “canonised” language of
the events. Among this literature I cover articles by journalists in different dailies and
magazines, Internet sources used by the activists, opened letters, declarations, and online
discussions. The case study will focus on the process of framing – how during the different
phases of protest the frames of collective action were developing, and thus “reframed” the
issue from a local environmental problem, and as such not very attractive for the public
opinion to an organised movement of civil disobedience, eventually supported by various
kinds of groups and individuals. During the last year of intensive clashes between the
protesters and the authorities, the frame of the conflict has been shifting more and more from
an enthusiastic, spontaneous series of actions to a professionally organised protest with a
proper “PR”. The protest is important not only because it could mobilise a large amount of
actors or because it could put pressure on the authorities, but also functions as an exceptional
pattern of articulating an important domestic conflict and using “Western” strategies, or in
any case techniques that were not explored before in the Hungarian protest culture. It is also a
case of co-operation between local inhabitants of the villages around Zengo and activists of
the urban subcultural environment, who symbolically and literally left behind the terrain of
the urban space and formed alliance group with the rural protesters. Another dimension in the
conflict was the co-operation between Hungarian green NGOs and organisations on European
level: in fact, the case is very much touching upon a Hungarian national issue (as it will be
explained later on), but interestingly the solution to the conflict to a large extend came from
outside. The conflict itself has been articulated on different levels through several labels, of
which the most clearly identifiable are the following ones: nature protection, nationalist
stream, pacifism, and civilian disobedience action. In the last part of my paper I will analyse
these possible action frames and discuss the potentials of each of them.
Pacifism: Surprisingly, even though a number of the groups involved are explicitly
pacifist, and the locals were against the construction of a military object in their
neighbourhood, this argument was the least emphasised. Some of the public statements and
petitions where questioning the necessity of building 3 NATO locators to Hungary out of the
existing 40 altogether in Europe, eventually the movement did not oppose the idea as such12.
This could be observed especially in the riper phase of the protest, when the goals where
claims were “rationalised”: the only goal was to protect the Zengo hill from a military
enterprise, and therefore demonstrating that the movement is opened for negotiations and
compromises.
Nationalism: The nationalist attitude of the movement is not an ethnocentric of radical
stream, even though the movement included even such elements – some openly right-wing
public figures and groups were supporting the movement, and even the right-wing
conservative leader and former minister Orban Viktor was trying to claim the success as the
victory of the right-wing13, this did not change or harm the profile of the movement, on the
contrary: the activists could demonstrate how colourful the movement is and that it is widely
supported in the society14. The cleavage line here is seen as the opposition of a Hungarian
national heritage – the hill, the legends, the old castle ruins, and of course, the special local
flower, the Banatian peony – against the NATO, a gigantic transnational organisation that is
only calculating profits and ignores the cultural and botanic values. Also there is a rather a
sweet romantic stream, mostly represented by the locals, indeed connected to the rather
patriarchal and Christian traditions of the inhabitants in the surrounding villages. There are
numerous (mostly Christian) traditions that are connected to the Zengo: for example, men
have been climbing to the peak at Easter to the cross – known as the Easter Zengo pilgrimage.
This custom stems from WW2, when the returned was hostages made a pilgrimage to the
peak. After 1996, when the locals knew about the treat of the constructions, they revived all
traditions and customs connected to the place – one of them is New Year's Eve hiking to the
peak. Similarly, this year the local activists went for a trip to the hill, accompanied by the the
12This argument was mentioned once in a public statement, in the early phase of the battle, in an open letter
dated in February 2004, addressed to the authorities. Later on some voices could be heard suggesting the construction in a neighbouring country or doubting the goals of the investment as such. The following petitions and public statements however, particularly those written to the NATO headquarters or to foreign organisations, did not argue about the necessity of building another locator. This also shows that the movement in a later stage became much more conscious and strategic and dismissed all arguments that could have weakened the „leitmotif”.
13Orban indeed caused some harm to the movement by concluding the results as the „success” of the so-called „circles”, which are mostly virtual national-conservative movements, initiated by Orban after his electoral defeat in 2002. In the left-wing media this aspect was frequently referred to by journalists not supporting the protest.
14Since the nearly violent electoral campaign in 2002, which further emphasised the „demarkation line” between the leftist and rightist parts of the already polarised country, there was no other extra-parliementary issue that would have gained this much publicity.
priest of a surrounding village, who ceremonially blessed the Hungarian national flag they
were carrying and placed it on the peak, “symbolizing that we are not giving the mountain”.
Afterwards they sang together the national anthem and another national poem, after which the
poem “Being Hungarian” was recited. Another inhabitant said about their pilgrimage-action:
“these are well-known symbols for those who know the Bible but is also part of our ancient
Hungarian culture” (Vay, 2005: 196). The nationalist frame remained to some extend even till
the latest development, but never managed to become a master frame of the movement. In this
reading, the Banatian peony turns into a symbol among others of the Hungarian culture that
needs to be protected from foreign, aggressive intruders. The nationalist stream is rather
connected to the locals and in a later stage of the struggle was reframed into the romantic-
cultural background of the conflict.
Nature protection:This element seems the most evident of all, but eventually this level
brought the “breakthrough” in the history of the urban green movements. As I mentioned
above, the urban environmentalists have to face the dichotomy of fighting for anti-urban
values in the urban environment. For these reasons they can not be very successful in the
cities as they are pointing out issues that would force urban inhabitants into inconvenience:
they would have to use public transport instead of a car, they would have to travel by train
instead of plain, and cut off some of their favourite hobbies like shopping and consuming. For
the same reasons, there is a tension between the countryside activists and urban activists
(mostly those in Budapest) – the environmentalists outside the cities do not take their urban
colleagues too seriously, moreover they are in a much better positions since all facilities,
ministries, actions, government, happenings are taking place in the capital. With this
movement, the urban greens could prove their commitment, moreover, the countryside
activists realised that they indeed need the capacities and the experience of the urban greens.
In this conflict, nature indeed appeared as a symbolic space, as the counter-pole of the
polluted and morally damaged city, where a military object is prioratised to cultural and
natural values like thousand year old traditions and unique natural resources. Many activists
were talking about the peak as a place where one raises above the world “down there” and
leaves problems behind, and also quite commonly, the actors are speaking about a “spiritual”
connectedness to the hill. The movement therefore is often referred to in metaphoric
structures, most commonly as parallels with the nature. One of the actors was expressing the
conflict with poetic pictures, which in the context was eventually not outrageous: “... during
this period something interesting happened to me. In a special, relaxed state of mind I had a
vision, and I understood why I am fighting for the Banatian Peony. I saw in front of my eyes
this soft, pink-red-purple, inside bit yellow, airlight flower, I felt how fragile its lamellas and
the stalk are. I felt its whole being and I understood, that it has the colour of hope.” The
organisation of the movement also attracted some natural parallels, as it is about a “naturally
developed”, instinctively organised movement. As one of the actors formulated: “Not a
centrally coordinated organisation but a movement, backed by a lot of small and some
national organisations. It is organised from below, which gives it credibility. The goal is, both
on a symbolic and a real level: clean air and untouched nature and communal space.” (28) The
dichotomy between the cleanness of the nature and polluted of the city is expressed in further
symbols of relationships among the actors: while the urban social relationships are
characterised by competition and exclusion, the Zengo-movement is based on solidary
relations among the people, which was also emphasised more and more consciously. As a
journalist concluded during a TV-interview with the local activists, “... solidarity is missing
from this country as much as wild nature is missing in Holland...(56)” he continues: “Cancer
is a disease when the solidarity between the cells ceases. If people are the cells and society is
the body, the body becomes ill once there is no harmony.”(62). Consequently, fighting for
natural spaces is interpreted as promoting solidarity in the society. This has a very strong
message in the country since, as in most post-industrial societies, Hungarians often complain
of lack of solidarity and alienation. “Lack of solidarity is obviously weakening and damaging
communities, while cooperation is strengthening them. Scientific researches prove that
Hungarians' ability to form communities is weaker compared to their Western neighbours. We
have to start the cure.” (62)
Civilian disobedience: Eventually, as negotiations were promising less and less results,
the movement started tending towards the dimension of civil disobedience, which contributed
most to its popularity. One of the first actions was when a small number of activists managed
to physically prevent chopping the trees: they walked in front of the trees, hugged them, and
the security guards – completely unprepared for such a scenario – realised that pushing people
away from a tree is not very fruitful in the long run, after which workers were unable to
execute the task. The whole action lasted for half an hour only and was relatively non-violent
according to the main actors themselves – the most aggressive act was when one guy fell on
his face when being pushed away and injured himself15. Nevertheless, the case immediately
15The the injured activist was compared to Jesus Christ.
attracted public attention, the media was there and since that moment started regularly
covering and updating with sympathy towards the activists. The methods of physical struggle
are clearly identifiable Greenpeace-techniques: the GP members, who were present from the
beginning of the year-lasting battles trained activists how to behave in a possible conflict. The
main point of the tactics is to demonstrate non-violence and to utilize goals in a fight against
security guards for instance: the scenario was to hug a tree and thus make the workers unable
to chop them. This hug also turned into a symbolic message of the fighters.
Besides the physical battles, the activists also mobilised potentials through the EU
system. This is the technique called “boomerang pattern” described in details by Keck and
Sikkink: “When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the
boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur: domestic
NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on
their states from outside” (1998: 12). This is exactly what happened in the Zengo-case: as
soon as negotiations and protests inside the country seemed insufficient, the movement
mobilised its own capital through an important link of the Hungarian environmental scene.
MTVSZ, the Hungarian member of Friends of the Earth started lobbying on the international
arena by contacting the NATO office first, then the Environmental Office of the EU (also in
the name of Friends of the Earth International), and eventually the movement turned to the
Green Group in the European Parliament. Bringing in this aspect immediately changed the
relations of the movement to the EU and the international structures and ceased to see the
enemy in them. Instead, the emphasis was put on democracy which is priority issue of
Hungary's accession to EU, and that starting the constructions would be contrary to the
constitution16. The attitude to the NATO also shifted from the foreign intruders to an
international power that is supposed to have respect to democracy (as opposed to the
Hungarian Ministry of Defense).
Parallelly to the construction of the civilian disobedience as a collective action frame, a
conscious process of community building started to take place. Similarly to the Danube
movement, activists formed “catnets”, in which all of them could realise themselves
according to their abilities. Residents of the surrounding villages were regularly cooking for
the activists, and supplying them with accommodation when necessary; participants were
using group-building methods like organising common meditation and other activities. An
16Zengo is under the protection of Natura 2000 Project. Since the Laszlo Solyom, former president of the
Constitutional Court and well-known environmentalist in Hungary declared that the constructions are contrary to the constitution, the argument has been stressed in all petitions. In fact, it is an interpretation of
alarm-chain was organised through mobile phones, which assumes that there were all the time
people on duty up on the peak, even in the heaviest winter nights. Sleeping over on the peak
under the sky in February bonded the participants very strongly: this can be put into analogy
with Turner's terms of communitas members, who have to go through a certain process, a
“trial period” in order to be accepted in the community (1969). The protest turned into more
than a simple action of confronting authorities: it demonstrated a belonging together of the
“civilian actors”, and connected the protesters together in symbolic ties.
The civilian disobedience opened new dimensions to the whole “battle”, and changed
the frame of the originally nature protection movement. This message became much more
attractive to the media and the public, and heated debates started all around the country: from
that moment it was not anymore the cleavage between those who want to protect a flower in
prior to national security interest, but those citizens who are brave enough to raise their voices
against the authorities, and can even be successful, moreover in a completely peaceful manner
and a positive message. As the target shifted from the NATO to a domestic enemy, so did the
identities of the participants change from Hungarian nature protectors to civilian actors in a
conflict against power.
CONCLUSIONS
The Hungarian environmental scene has been strongly affected by Western European
and North American resources from the very beginning on: since the state budget for these
purposes is quite limited, organisations have to rely on foreign sources, which however also
means shaping their agenda according to the resources. Beyond this, countercultural
revolutions and the environmental movement in the West in the sixties and seventies have left
strong cultural impacts on the Hungarian green movement, which has developed almost
together with the democratic state.
The movement arena is far not united, partly due to the strong competition for the
limited resources, and partly because – apart from the Danube movement – it has not gone
through a joint struggle with the authorities. The basic cleavage line in the movement society
can be found between urban and rural greens, and from another viewpoint between the
culturally oriented and the policy-oriented groups. The latter type consists of NGOs dealing
with professional environmental issues, while the first category is created mostly by the urban
the Constitution, according to which the status of nature protection areas shall not be changed.
movement groups for environmentalism is much more a lifestyle.
The strategies in conflicts can be analysed through the process of framing in collective
action: in the last chapter I analyse the framing of a successful protest action on Zengo, a
nature protection area, where the government was planning to construct a military enterprise.
Civilian disobedience turned out to be a successful new strategy on the domestic protest
arena, and at the same time an action frame suitable to align protesters from different
backgrounds against the authorities, and involve international actors and techniques into the
domestic conflict.
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