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T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah...

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THE ROLE OF TIME PREFERENCES AND EXPONENTIAL-GROWTH BIAS IN RETIREMENT SAVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London School of Economics Colleen Flaherty Manchester, Univ. of Minnesota Aaron Sojourner, Univ. of Minnesota & IZA Joshua Tasoff, Claremont McKenna Graduate School Financial support provided by TIAA-CREF Institute, Pension Research Council- Boettner Center, U.S. Social Security Administration via the NBER Retirement Research Consortium, and National Institutes of Health.
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Page 1: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

THE ROLE OF TIME PREFERENCES AND EXPONENTIAL-GROWTH BIAS IN RETIREMENT SAVINGS

Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER

Matthew R. Levy, London School of Economics

Colleen Flaherty Manchester, Univ. of Minnesota

Aaron Sojourner, Univ. of Minnesota & IZA

Joshua Tasoff, Claremont McKenna Graduate School

Financial support provided by TIAA-CREF Institute, Pension Research Council-Boettner Center, U.S. Social Security Administration via the NBER Retirement

Research Consortium, and National Institutes of Health.

Page 2: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

OVERVIEW

90% of Americans display decision-making biases relevant to retirement saving Inconsistency favoring immediate gratification Inaccurate view the power of compound interest

Those with bias have far less retirement savings Tested against many competing explanations

Nudges to counteract biases affect choices, especially among the most biased.

Page 3: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

CHALLENGES IN MAKING APPROPRIATE RETIREMENT PLANNING DECISIONS

Motivational barrier

Cognitive barrier

Page 4: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

BARRIER 1: PRESENT BIAS (PB)

Time-inconsistent privileging of the present. Beyond time-consistent preference for sooner over

later. Can produce procrastination in enrolling or saving.

Example: tomorrow (Saturday), will you prefer:$100 on Saturday or $101 on Sunday?

Decision when asked today

Decision when asked tomorrow

Present

biased?

1 $101 on Sunday $101 on Sunday No

2 $101 on Sunday $100 on Saturday Yes

Page 5: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

BARRIER 2: EXPONENTIAL-GROWTH BIAS (EGB), A FACET OF FINANCIAL LITERACY

Note: The figure shows the perceived asset value with a starting value of $1 at time zero growing at an annual interest rate of 10 percent for savers with varying levels of linearized exponential growth bias.

0 5 10 15 20 250

2

4

6

8

10

12

Years

Perc

eiv

ed

Asset

Valu

e

($)

Linear

Accurate

Below EG

Above EG

Page 6: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

To what extent are these biases present among U.S. households? How much overlap is there?

Do these biases explain variation in retirement savings among U.S. households?

How can the effect of these biases on saving behavior be mitigated? Would that affect savings, especially among the most biased?

Page 7: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

RESEARCH DESIGN Survey large, broad sample of U.S. households

(N=2,317) using the American Life Panel & the Understanding America Survey. Directly measure each individual’s:

Outcome: Retirement-savings level

Bias levels: present bias & exponential-growth bias Awareness: sophistication & overconfidence

Other factors that may influence retirement savings: long-run discount rate, income, age, IQ, broad financial literacy, education, race/ethnicity, family structure, state of residence, risk aversion…

Page 8: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

NEW RESULT: 90% OF AMERICANS DISPLAY SOME BIAS

Neither bias

Page 9: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

To what extent are these biases present among U.S. households? How much overlap is there?

Do these biases explain variation in retirement savings among U.S. households?

How can the effect of these biases on saving behavior be mitigated? Would that affect savings, especially among the most biased?

Page 10: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

NEW RESULT: LESS BIASED SAVED MORE (MUCH MORE)

Estimated difference in retirement savings for a 1 standard deviation difference in each variable. From regression controlling also for 10-year age bin, household income category (17), age-income interactions, highest-level of education, gender, marital status, number of household members, number of children, race, ethnicity, state of residence, and risk aversion.

Time preferences

Page 11: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

NEW RESULT: BIASES SHOW UP AS BIGGER FACTORS FOR OLDER AMERICANS

EG BiasPresent

Bias

Broad Financial Literacy IQ

Notes: N=2,317. Estimated difference in retirement savings for a 1 standard deviation difference in each variable using regression with quadratic age interactions. From regression controlling for 10-year age bin, household income category (17), age-income interactions, highest-level of education, gender, marital status, number of household members, number of children, race, ethnicity, state of residence, and risk aversion.

Page 12: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

RESULT:AWARENESS OF BIAS MATTERS

First to measure (un)awareness of biases directly and relate to economic outcome. Awareness can lead individuals to get help. Unawareness can lead to mistakes.

Overconfident in EGB save less: believe you are more accurate with respect to EG than you are.

Naive about PB save less (weaker evidence): believe you will act patiently in future.

Page 13: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

To what extent are these biases present among U.S. households? How much overlap is there?

Do these biases explain variation in retirement savings among U.S. households?

How can the effect of these biases on saving behavior be mitigated? Would that affect savings, especially among the most biased?

Page 14: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

INTERVENTION TO COUNTERACT EG BIAS

Informed that employer just added a match for every dollar contributed (hypothetical)

Control: Show Annual Value of match

EGB Balance Treatment: Show projected Balance of match at retirement

EGB Income Treatment: Show projected Annual Income supported by match in retirement

Page 15: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

RESULT: EGB-CORRECTING TREATMENTS RAISE HYPOTHETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Height of bars represent the average effect of Balance and Income treatment relative to the control treatment for our sample.

Page 16: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

INTERVENTION TO COUNTERACT PRESENT BIAS

Informed that paperwork for changing contribution takes 60 minutes

Control: No employer incentive

PB No Deadline Treatment: $50 for completing paperwork

PB Deadline Treatment: $50 for completing paperwork within one week

Page 17: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

EFFECT OF PB TREATMENTS ON TIMING RESPONSE TO NEW EMPLOYER MATCH

Height of bars represent the average effect of Deadline and No Deadline treatment relative to the control treatment for our sample.

Page 18: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

CONCLUSIONS

Both exponential-growth bias and present bias are prevalent and both appear important in retirement-saving decisions.

Extrapolation: no bias implies at least 12% more retirement savings, maybe much more.

Choice architecture can help counteract biases Targeted supports delivered just-in-time for

decisions

Page 19: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

THANK YOU!

[email protected]

Page 20: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

MEASURING TIME PREFERENCES

Present-Future staircase: Would you rather receive $100 today or $[X] in 12 months?

Future-Future staircase: Would you rather receive $120 in 12 months or $[Y] in 24 months?

Prediction staircase: Suppose that 12 months from now, you are going to be given the choice between the following: receiving a payment on that day (that is, 12 months from today) or a payment 12 months later (that is, 24 months from today). Do you think you would rather choose to receive $110 on that day or $[Z] 12 months later?

Page 21: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

MEASURING EXPONENTIAL-GROWTH BIAS: THIS IS 3RD OF 5 QUESTIONS

Page 22: T HE R OLE OF T IME P REFERENCES AND E XPONENTIAL -G ROWTH B IAS IN R ETIREMENT S AVINGS Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University & NBER Matthew R. Levy, London.

RESULT: BIASES MAY ACTUALLY HAVE STRONGER RELATIONSHIPS TO SAVINGS

Measure of bias contain noise. Test-retest reliability: EG bias: 0.27 Present bias: 0.14

Corrections imply that true effects are 3-6x bigger.


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