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New Extremist Group in Pakistan and Afghanistan Linked to Al-Qa'ida and Taliban

Former al Qa'ida -linked Talibanofficials recently formed an organization known as Purkaniin Peshawar, accordingto reporting. The group's goalssimilar to those of ai-Qa'ida an dthe former Taliban governmentinclude decreasing US and westerninfluence. SeniorPurkani leadersincluding former Taliban police chief MaulawaiNuruddin and formerTaliban intelligence officersare allegedly attempting to enlist membersthroughinflammatory statements claiming that foreignersare attacking Islam. Afghan members ofPurkani reportedly reside in the provinces of Ghazni, Khow st, andZabol.

Accordingto reporting, former Talibanand al-Qa'ida personnel were forminganew anti-coalition jihad movementby the name of Kkadgrn aJ-Furqan.Purkanimay be a garbled reference to this group. (S//REL) -

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Captives Deny Qaeda Worked W ith Baghdad Page 1 of 2

PRINTER ifftlENBlY FORMAT STARBUCKS.CQW

June 9,2003

Captives Deny Qaeda W orked W ith BaghdadBy JAMES RISEN

W ASH INGT ON , June 8 Two of the highest-ranking leaders of Al Qaeda in Am erican custodyhave told theC.I. A. in separate interrogations that the terrorist organization did not w ork jointlywith the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, according to several intelligenceofficials.

Abu Zub aydah, a Qaeda planner and recruiter until his capture in M arch2002, told his questioners lastyear that the idea of working w ith Mr. Hussein's government hadbeen discussed am ong Qaeda leaders,but that Osama bin Laden had rejected such proposals, according to anofficial who has read the C entralIntelligence Agency's classified report on the interrogation.

In his debriefing, Mr. Zub aydah said Mr. bin Laden had vetoed the idea because he did not wa nt to bebeholden to Mr. H ussein, theofficial said.

Separately, Khalid Sheikh M ohamm ed, the Qaeda chief of operations until his capture on M arch 1 inPakistan, has also told interrogators that the group did not w ork w ith Mr. Hu ssein,officials said.

The Bus h administration has not made these statements public, thou gh itfrequently highlightedintelligence reports that supported its assertions of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda as it made itscasefor war against Iraq.

Since the war ended, and because the ad ministration has yet to uncover evidence of prohibited w eaponsin Iraq, the quality of Am erican intelligence has come und er scrutiny amid c ontentions that theadministration selectively disclosed only those intelligence reports that supported itscase for war.

Bill Harlow, a spokesmanfor the Central Intelligence Age ncy, declinedto comment on what the twoQaeda leaders had told their questioners.A senior intelligenceofficial played downthe significanceoftheir debriefings, explaining that everything Qaeda detainees say must be regarded wi th greatskepticism.

Other intelligence and militaryofficials added that evidence of possible links between Mr. Hussein'sgovernmentand Al Qaeda had been discovered both befo re the war and since and that Am ericanforces were searching Iraqfor more in Iraq.

Still, no conclusive evidence of join t terrorist op erations by Iraq and A l Qaeda has beenfound, severalintelligenceofficials acknowledged, nor have ties been discovered betw een B aghdad and the Sept.11,2001, attackson Washington and New York.

Between the time of the attacks and the start of the war inIraq in March, senior Bush administrationofficials spoke frequently about intelligenceon two fronts the possibilityof links between IraqandAl Qaeda, and Baghdad's drive to develop prohibited we apons. President B ush described the war

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/09/international/worldspecial/09INTE.html?pagewanted=p...6/10/03

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June 3 , 2003

To: General Counsel Daniel MarcusAssistant General Counsel Steven/DunneTeam Leader Douglas MacEachin I /

Fm: SSA Quinn John Tamm, Jr .

Subj: Investigation in Boston, MA

On 06/24/2003 through 06/26/2003 I will be in Boston, MA fortwo separate hearings in the U.S. District Court for the Districtof Massachusetts. The hearings are on consecutive days, the 24thand the 25th. This travel will paid for by the FBI, and is partof my previous assignment. I will have some time to conductinvestigation, on the behalf of the Commission, related to thehijacking of American Airlines Flight 11 and United AirlinesFlight 175.

I respectfully recommend that the Commission requestpermission for me to meet with Assistant Special Agent in Charge(ASAC) Thomas Powers, FBI, and SSA Teresa Lang, FBI, of the

Boston Field Division. These meetings would not be considered aformal interview, but for the purpose of determining whatinformation about the 9/11/2001 hijacking of Flights 11 andFlight 175 is available. ASAC Powers supervised the pro-activeterrorism investigations in the Boston area, both before andafter 09/11/2001. SSA Lang's squad has conducted the follow-upinvestigation since 9/11.

I would also request permission to review the complete setof volumes of the Boston case file for 265A-NY-280350. Thisreview would assist us in determining what additionalinvestigation may be necessary in the Boston area. The fileswould contain the interviews of all security personnel, both inBoston and Portland, ME, law enforcement officials , airlinepersonnel, Massachusetts Port Authority personnel, and variousprivate citizens who may have had contact with the ten hijackersin the Boston area. A list of potential interviews could then becompiled for use by the Commission.

I would need to have an answer on this request by 06/16/2003so that the meetings could be scheduled around my hearing

schedule. Thank you.

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Unclassified Commission Use Only

Date: June 11,2003To: Philip ZelikowFrom: Mike Hurley and Dan BymanRe: Assessing Iraq's Links to al-Qa'idaCC: Chris Kojm, Doug MacEachin, and Kevin Scheid

The relationship between Iraq an d al-Qa'ida, an d more broadly the one between Iraq an dterrorism, raises several issues for the Commission's work.1 As this issue is politicallysensitive an d analytically muddy, it may be best to start from a common sheet of paper.This is especially important in that the inquiry into this relationship could quicklybecome resource an d labor intensive. Therefore, it is advisable to determine how far wewish to delve into it .

For many years before the September 11 attacks, several outside commentators (mostnotably Laurie Mylroie, whose work was endorsed by former DCI Woolsey an dinfluential advisors such as Richard Perle), claimed that Iraq was responsible fo r severalterrorist attacks commonly attributed to al-Qa'ida. Mylroie focuses her charges on the1993 World Trade Center attack, but also raises questions about the Oklahoma Citybombing, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and other incidents. Immediately after theSeptember 11 attack, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz an d others argued for a waragainst Iraq as part of the first salvo in the war against terrorism. In the build up to thesecond Gulf war, President Bush and his senior advisors contended that Iraq had links toal-Qa'ida, though they did not claim that Saddam's regime had a specific connection withthe September 11 attacks.

These claims raise several related questions fo r Teams One, Two, an d Three:

For Team One:

Was Iraq behind any attacks commonly attributed to al-Qa'ida?

To what extent did Iraq support, direct, facilitate, or otherwise help al-Qa'ida,both before an d after September 11?

For Team Two:

If there were strong links before September 11, why did the IntelligenceCommunity miss these connections or not convey them to senior Clintonadministration officials, several of whom have said publicly they sa w littleevidence of any link?

Conversely, if there were strong links before September 11 that were widelyknown, did policy makers politicize intelligence or otherwise try to minimizethese links?

The Congressional Joint 9-11 Inquiry did notexamine Iraq's relationship with al-Qa'ida in anydetail.

UnclassifiedCommission Use Only

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UnclassifiedCommissionUse Only

If there werenot strong linksafter September 11, was intelligence politicizedbypolicy makers tryingto build a case fo r war?

Fo r Team Three:

Did thefailureto remove Saddam's regime before September11 help al-Qa'idadirectlyor indirectly?

Did therecent focus on Iraq hinderthe effort againstal-Qa'ida? If there werenostrong links between Iraq and terrorism, did theeffort to join the two issues hinderthe pursui tof either one?

We have several options when we conduct our research:

First, we cansimply address this issuein passing. If we believe theintelligencelinking Iraq and al-Qa'ida is weak, and webelievethe policy implications werelimited to rather harmless"overselling,"then we canmove on. This optionisespecially attractive given that each team alreadyhas considerable workto do.

Second,we canassess th e intelligence aspectsof this questionbut leave thepolicyimplications for ano ther day. The w ork involved w ould bemore l imited, and we'davoid making judgm ents on extremely contentious issues.

Third,we canengage in a comprehensive review thataddresses thevariousintelligenceand policy issue s. It may be best for this to be a classified app end ixor otherwise distinctfrom the larger bodyof work.

To end with the obvious,the political sensitivitiesof this issueare considerable. Eventhe fact thatwe are investigating this connection m ay prove contentious. The claims thatIraq had strong links toal-Qa'idaafter September 11 in particular represents a politicalfootball if we or any otherofficial voice contend that this issue was overblown by policymakersjustifyinggoing to war, evenif this was done in good faith.

UnclassifiedCommissionUse Only