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Question fo r Steinberg

One criticism of the concept of a Director of National Intelligence is that whoeverheld the position would end up a "czar" without power. You endorse the creation of aDNI. How w ould you ensure the DNI ha d sufficient authorities to carry out theresponsibilities of the office?

You argue that the country needs "a single individual with responsibility (andaccountability) for all intelligence related to the counter-terrorism mission." Are yousuggesting that the DNI should "own" all of the Department of Defense intelligenceassets and all of the Department of Hom eland Security intelligence assets? W hatwould this mean for the personnel of the military and of the entities such as the SecretService or Coast Guard within DHS ? How would disputes between the DNI and theSecretary of Defense or the Secretary of Homeland Security be resolved? Would you give the DNIbudget authority over all intelligence agencies? Would yougive the DNI the authority to consolidate and standardize the personnel systemsinvolving intelligence personnel? You suggest a number of changes in the architecture of the intelligence community,the FBI, and the Exe cutive Office of the President in order to meet the challenges ofthe terrorist threat. Which of your recomm endations do you consider to be essential?Can essential reform s be achieved without creating a DNI?

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PANE L: W arning of Transnational Threats What are the essential methods or principles that have been developed over the yearsfor analyzing and preparing w arnings of a surprise attack? Before 9/11, were these methods or principles properly applied to the danger of acatastrophic terrorist attack? What is right and wrong with the current system of warning? What isand shouldbe the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries o f State andDefense, and the National Security Adviser?

sWhmsjn^harge qfwarning of terrorist attacks against theJLJnited

/"National Intelligence Council? The Directorate of Intelligence in the CIA? Thei Department of Defense? The CIA Counterterrorism Center? The Directorate ofi Inform ation Analysis & Infrastructu re Protection in the Department of HomelandV,Security? Or the jecently established Terrorism Threat Integration Center? rWKcTshould be in charge? ~ " Has the Congress met its responsibility in establishing priorities, providing resourcesand providing oversight of the Intelligence Comm unity? What changes in its role doyo u recommend?*-

v What needs to be done to improve our ability as a government to provide betterwarning?Wliu shuuld be in s t-

.e past that '"/'.. * ' - o you believe Some officials outside the intelligence comm unity have complainthere is'too low a threshold,for warning of.p'ossible.tefforist attacksthis is a problem an&-ifso, how should ifbe^sorved? /.,-

What entities or mechanism s currently exist w ithin the federal government that allowwarning to be connected to timely and effective responses to the warning? How canthese be strengthened?g that "the likelihood of a cataclysmics. McCarthy wrote in?1998 p i p r r n m n r

warning failure is growing." Do you believe that the attacks of 9/11 were "acataclysmic warning f ailure?"

- - X

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More warning questions

How many entities within the intelligence comm unity should have some responsibility fo r warning ofterrorist attacks? What is the appropriate role w ith respect to warning of the Terrorist ThreatIntegration Center? The C ounterterrorist Center? The National Intelligence Council? Concern has been expressed by some in the past that there is too low a threshold fo r warning of

possible terrorist attacks, especially when the warning does not contain specific or actionableintelligence. How can the intelligence com mun ity ensure that those who receive warnings do not sufferwarning fatigue?

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Intelligence and N ational Security Policy What is your assessment of how well the government is coordinating the conduct ofefforts against terrorism and the relevant work of the intelligence community? Are the attacks of September 11 evidence of systemic problems with the leadership,organization, performance or funding of the Intelligence Community? What changesin the Intelligence C omm unity do you recommend? The Congressional Joint Inquiry recommended the establishment of a Director ofNational Intelligence with direct authority over the national intelligence agencies ofthe government. W hat are the strengths an d weaknesses of this proposal? Do yousupport it or not?

Should the Director of Central Intelligence have the same management authorities asthe heads of all other large government departments and agencies: i.e., hire and fireauthority, the authority to execute an appropriation, and the authority to reallocatefunds to higher priorities among intelligence capabilities?

Can the DCI fulfill his role as the President's principal advisor on intelligence ifagencies with lead responsibility for imagery intelligence, signals intelligence,foreign weapons intelligence, and collection system acquisition capabilities (NIMA ,NSA, DIA and NRO respectively) are part of the Department of Defense? What is the impact of such an organizational structure on national, strategic prioritiessuch as global terrorism? What is the impact of such an organizationa l structure on the provision of intelligenceto a major ne w customer, the Department of Homeland Security? Has the Congress met its responsibility in establishing priorities, providing resourcesand providing oversight of the Intelligence Com munity? W hat changes in its role doyou recommend? Considerable a ttention has been paid over the last decade to the relationship betweenthe Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. W hat in your viewis the optimum relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense? The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security creates a new important

customer for intelligence. W hat should be the relationship betw een the head of theU.S. intelligence com mu nity and the Secretary of Hom eland Security? In the past, we have drawn lines between foreign and domestic intelligence. It isno w recognized that the gap between foreign an d domestic intelligence must beclosed in order to prevent international terrorist attack s. Is the creation of a directorof nationa l intelligence the best way to close that gap? Should there be one individual

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with responsibility for all foreign and domestic intelligence related tocounterterrorism? What are the strengths an d weaknesses of this proposal?At any given time, the resources that can be devoted to the collection, analysis anddissemination of intelligence are finite. What are the current mechanisms by which adirector of central intelligence can max imize the resources devoted to a top priorityissue, such as the war on terrorism? A re these tools sufficient?

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UNCLASSIFIED / COMMISSION SENSBackground Information Concerning A Director6xThe question of whether to strengthen the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) -

including whether to create a DNI - is intertwined with tw issues that have perpetually facedtheJntelligence Com mun ity (1C):SOIaouZiS- J ^ ' -T-he-DCI simultaneously serves as the CIA director, btttdoco ouch "dual-hatting" inecoaoc \ e IC's effectiven2. The 1C has two main customers: (1) "national,"^.^ythe President and the NationalSecurity Council; and (2) the Department of Defense (DoD), to support military*^-L&cuj *

operations. How m uch control should D oD have over the 1C?The National Security Act of 1947 sets forth the DCI 's authority and responsibility.Th e CIA is the only agency over which the DC I has authority that resembles plenary con trol.The National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)are part of Do D. Som e of the DCI's authorities include:

The DCIdevelops the budgets for CIA, NSA , andNIMA. However, the budgets areappropriated to DoD, not the DC I. Moreover, the DCI lacks control over "execution,"meaning how NSA and NIMA actually use their appropriations. The DCI may reprogram funds appropriated to NSA and NIMA only if the Secretary ofDefense (SecDef) does not object.

The SecDef consults with the DCI on appointments to head NSA and NIMA, but theDCI's consent is not required for the SecDef to make recommendations to the President.The DCI has a Deputy DCI (DDCI) responsible for the CIA. The DCI also has aDDCI for Com munity Management, an Assistant DCI (ADCI) for Collection, and an ADCI

for Analysis & Production to manage the ir^TT^fe' i '" W Q ^ - -PC-t io n s fo r Strenthening the DC I

L^,

1 . Without creating a DM, thus keeping the DCI as director of the 1C and of CIA:a) Appoint an individual as DCI who takes an expansive view of the DC I's authority overNSA and NIMA.b) Buttress the DCI's prestige by giving the IC's budget appropriation directly to the DCIrather than to DoD.c) Give the D CI "budget-execution" authority over NSA and NIMA.

2. Creating a DNI by separating the position of DNI from CIA director, but keeping N SAand NIMA within DoD:a) Give the DNI only the same power that the DCI currently has over the 1C.b) Give the IC 's budget approp riation directly to the DN I rather than to Do D.c) Give the DN I "budget-execution" authority over NSA and NIMA.

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Additional questions for D eutch and Schlesinger

Considerable attention ha s been paid over the last decade to the relationship between the Director ofCentral Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. What in your view is the optimum relationshipbetween the DCI and the Secretary of Defense? The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security creates a new important customer forintelligence. What should be the relationship between the head of the U.S. intelligence com munity andthe Secretary of Homeland Security? In the past, we have drawn lines between foreign an d domestic intelligence. It is now recognized thatthe gap between foreign and domestic intelligence must be closed in order to prevent internationalterrorist attacks. Is the creation of a director of national intelligence the best way to close that gap?Should there be one individual with responsibility for all foreign and domestic intelligence related tocounterterrorism? Wh at are the strengths and weaknesses of this proposal? At any given time, the resources that can be devoted to the collection, analysis and dissemination ofintelligence are finite. W hat are the current mechanisms by w hich a director of central intelligence canmaximize the resources devoted to a top priority issue, such as the war on terrorism? Are these toolssufficient?