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COMM ISSION SENSITIVEThe Threats and Opp ortunities: 9/11, al Qa'ida and other 21st Century Challenges

The Good the Bad and the Ugly: Collection, Analysis, an d Warning,Goal: Retaking the Strategic Initiative: Focus and Fusion.

Methodology: Review JI findings and capitalize on the NSPD -5 research andfindings/recommendations. Incorporate documents, briefings, interviews of T2 andothers from 9/11 Commission. JI focused on "the what" and we want to focus on the"why" and answer the "so what" what do we need to do for the future. JI did a lot - wehave to pay attention to that.1. FOCUS ON THEMISSION OF THE21st C - What do you want your intelligencecommunity to do? (Collection, Analysis, andWarning (and CA - T3). Whatcharacteristics capabilities should it have? This is one nexus of policy and intelligenc e.2. OPTIMIZE THE STRUCTURE OF THE 1C FOR THE MISSION OF THE 21STCENTURY - Who is in the community and who is out? (Management) Think big fusedomestic intelligence and foreign intelligence ; integrate state/local, federal, andinternational.3. HIRE THE RIGHT PERSON/PEOPLE FOR THE JOB (MISSION ANDSTRUCTURE) - Train them andretain them, give them authority comm ensurate withresponsibility and hold them accountable at their level. (Managem ent)4. GIVE THE1C THERIGHT TOOLS - RESOURCE THEM PROPERLY,INSTITUTE THE RIGHT RESOURCE M ANAGEMENT, AND ESTABLISH AVIABLE PROCESS. Integrate and balance between parts of the mission. Invest in thefuture. (Resources) Rationalize R& D and strategic acquisition; collection; TPE D(processing an d analysis). Foster a national/international talent pool.5. GET RIGHT WITH OV ERSIGHT! Constructive is the key word! (Oversight)Division of efforts - Congress, Wh ite House - OMB and NSCandPFIAB etc etc etc,DoJ and the Judiciary. Get serious about leaks - change the culture of impunity. Thesecond n exus of po licy and intelligence.

W e need focus and fusion. Despite a lot of hard working and smart civil servants, aweak CEO (lacking strategic vision and leadership) compoun ded a problematic, outdatedand ad hoc structure (that hindered the CEO's ability to manage the enterprise even if hewanted to). These both resulted in'a dearth of strategic analysis, a focus on what theCE O could do (CA ) rather than the big pictu re (capabilities of the 1C writ large), andunconstructive oversight - micromanagement by the Congress andcompeting or AWOLExecutive branch power centers (W H, NSC, O MB , PFIAB , etc., etc.) - missing theintegration of all agencies' efforts and all the tools of national power. This situationspelled disaster on 9/11 and w ill again.

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THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY:COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND WARNING

(AndCA-T3)FOCUS ON THE MISSION!WHAT DO YOU WANT US INTELLIGENCE TO DO?

WHAT CHARACTERISTICS DOES IT NEED TO DO THIS?I. THE THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- The problem of narrow focus (UBL/al Qa'ida) or overbroad focus(GWOT)

- Current threats and opportunitiesBeing prepared for future unknowns: Whatever it is, it's going to betransnational!

II. MISSION OF US INTELLIGENCE:Advise the President (and policy makers) on threats and opportunities inthe mid-long term?Warn policy makers of imminent threats?Steal secrets from adversaries (and others?) at home and abroad

- Conduct strategic4"0flaroh with secrets and open source information (toaugments secrets and provide context)?Provide strategic analysis on threats and opportunities

- Targeting support - use real-time collection and current analysis fornational warning and to assist warfighters (CA and military) and lawenforcement with targeting for arrest, disruption, destruction.

- CA (T3)III. CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES

A. Gordon'sB. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS:- Over the last decade as time was compressed by globalization and theinformation revolution th e policy maker and warfighter demanded that intelligenceprovide real-time current intelligence fo r warning and targeting on everything fromeconomic summits to force protection and precision weapons acquisition and use.- CNN reporting and fast food analysis. Beyond targeting - Current intelligence

devolved to reporting because of time constraints and a change in analyst hiring/training.- We had to but didn't hire and train our analysts properly and didn't set asidestrategic resources like we would a percentage of investment fo r R&D.

- We did not invest in TPED or the tools required to do it - tasking, processing,exploitation (analysis) and dissemination. We needed advanced and integrated IT.

- We failed to understand that strategic insights require fusion of contextualmaterial as well as secrets and that we had to integrate domestic and foreign intelligence.

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In our democracy that mean t integrating law enforcement information an d intelligence,federal and local. It also mean t integrating secret sources and the glut of informationavailable on the global net (information revolution). And it meant integrating ourrelationships with foreign partners (globalization).- We mistakenly assumed that OSINT meant easily available m ater ial;, that itwas just information (rather than having to be processed and analyzed - metadata andtradecraft - to create intelligence - what does it mean when combined with ourFI). Wethought that the policy maker themselves or the analyst could integrate "knowledge"from open sources without increased training, effort or resources.

- We did not miss the "fact of, but we missed the importance of global, non -state, lethal Islamic extremism because of the above. Because of the crush of currentintelligence requirements and the momentum toward targeting (and CA - what we coulddo in the 1C and CIA alone), we focused narrowly first on a financier, then on UBL, andnow on HVT/al Qa'ida senior leadership and senior leadership of affiliates. We onlyused strategic warnings to us including WTC 93, Khobar, East Africa and Cole to domore of the same - focus overseas, on terrorism as a tactic, and on a few terrorist leaders.Our military conduct (defensive an d centered on force protection mostly overseas) an dforeign relations (containment, driving key terrorist leaders from place and to place, an dtrying to get information an d help from foreign governments an d other sources to findand arrest them). Both are cond ucive to mo re current intelligen ce.- We did not warn the policy makers of strategic and m id-term threats andopportunities. So the government did not construct a long term strategy to deal with thereal threat of an ideology and a violent and lethal group of groups. To the USG, strategicthreat meant WM D or significant cyber attacks.- We did not warn sufficiently or clearly of an impen ding attack ON THE H OM EFRONT with massed effects suicide attackers with high explosives (without WMD orcyber weapons).

- The domestic part of US intelligence focused on the tactic of terrorism as acrime and sought to investigate for gaining evidence that would enable arrest andprosecution rather than collecting information to learn strategically about the threat(intentions an d capabilities) an d add to the IC's and USG's collective knowledge in orderto warn effectively, and as a result take preventive measures.- The foreign part of counter-terrorism did not include an adequate or appropriatesynergy of law enforcement and US domestic an d foreign intelligence with thecapabilities o f foreign partners and o ther sources to optimize and m aximize our collectionand analysis.

- Strategic Analysis did not drive strategic collection.- Strategic A nalysis did not provide a solid foun dation for current intelligencecollection, analysis, and warning.- The out-dated structure hurt: The CTC was not a community body really. C TCwas CIA and ops focused; CIA/DI did not pick up the need for strategic and alternativeanalysis partly because there was a CTC, partly because it is still CIA-centric, and partlybecause CIA/DO does not even like to share with them; the NIOs and NIC did not pickup strategic analysis because of the way the focus was defined an d partly because of theCTC; the ADCI/A&P did not help; the DDC I/CM and the ADC I/A did not help (withfocus or tools (IT) or personnel programs). Other multi-source an d all-source analysts

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were discouraged by structure and focus from contributing what they could (FBIS, DIA,FBI, INK, NSA, NIMA).C. STRATEGIC COLLECTION:

- Technical - mostly foreign collection (some FISA in US or against USpersons), primarily SIGINT (mostly NSA); IMINT (mostly NIMA); and someOSINT.

- Human - mostly foreign (CIA and FBI and a little DHS); andOSINTThe largest part of these capabilities was focused on traditional big/state adversariesparticularly those with global reach and WMD (China and Russia) and rogue/unstablestates with potential WMD (Iraq, Iran, N Korea, India and Pakistan). Smaller effortswere poorly focused and poorly integrated on transnational issues other thanproliferation. This was due to lack of strategic direction from strategic analysts andpolicy makers either because they were AWOL, did not understand the threats andopportunities of a post Cold War world, or focused on current activities.Th e SIGINT managers were trying to move away from FORN SAT and SCS (HF andFORNSAT mostly) because they were trying to put more money on modern IT/global netand high tech threats WMD and cyberwar. IMINT helped in domestic situations/eventsbut it is not the ideal tool fo r terrorist camps or finding/targeting individuals particularlyin caves orurban settings. NTM/Overhead was not really focused on CT as it's focusedon WMD and near-peers. Even advances such as geo-location by the integrating thecapabilities of NSA and NIMA real time is focused on tactical and currentintelligence/targeting.The ADCI/C, with considerable personal power, focused on day-to-day management oftactical collection to find and target UBL and al Qa'ida senior leadership (get Arabcommunications in Afghanistan and HUM INT collection on major players there. For thebig collectors this was a niche mission and capability and did not necessitate a largeintegrated strategic effort by the whole SIGINT o r IMINT enterprise, the integration o fforeign capabilities, or more energetic partnering with domestic intelligence or lawenforcement.UCAO attempted a comprehensive architecture, but it was limited to only some SIGINTand to the US. There was a lack of DDCI/CM direction on R&D and other support.C. Current intelligence analysis and reporting suffered from the CNN, fast foodsyndrome because it lacked a strategic, true all-source foundation.D. Tactical Collection both technical and human worked relatively well fo r targeting, bu tsuffered from lack of integration between agencies (both foreign and domestic) andsynergy, and was not based on a strategic and more international (with federated partners)foundation so it lacked optimum coherence. ADC I/C did maximize efforts under theselimiting conditions.

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INTELLIGENCE STRATEGIES AND THE FAILURE OF WARNING ON 9/11

The DCI has to actually formulate two set of strategies that match the two elements of hisresponsibilities. On the one hand, the 1C is required to respond to executive branchpolicy makers and operational requirements. On the other hand, the DCI is also thePresident's intelligence advisor and must communicate to the President what emergingthreats and opportunities should be addressed by the USG. In other words, hisresponsibilities include anticipating what the customer needs as well as responding tostated needs.The first of these tw o responsibilities ca n only be m et if the government has acomprehensive and coherent strategy that the 1C can support with a strategy of its own.The latter, though, must pre-figure the government strategy. Although the tactical,operational, and strategic levels of government action have been compressed byglobalization and the information revolution, one can generally say that this latter isstrategic in nature (except for imminent threat warning), while the support to decisionmakers' requirements and operators (except for support to acquisition) are moreoperational and tactical.The intelligence that prefigures a USG strategy is usually communicated via a NationalIntelligence Estimate (NIE) through the National Intelligence Council (NIC) or NationalIntelligence Officer (NIO), bu t could also arrive through the PFIAB, directly from theDCI, or from the CIA's all-source Directorate of Intelligence. This intelligence woulddefine an emerging threat (intention and capability) to US national interests or anopportunity to advance US interests. The USG would combine this intelligence withvulnerability information and a sense for the level of priority of the national interestinvolved (US homeland and citizens; US significant interests overseas; allies and friends;or humanitarian interests). If the threat is more operational or imminent the President canbe told directly or through the President's Daily Intelligence Briefing (PDB) or, now, thePTTR (President's Terrorism Threat Report).A strategic or operational intelligence warning should be communicated appropriately tospur the decision maker to action. Action should take the form of a government-widestrategy and associated policies (an interagency response to be marshaled by the NSC).As a USG strategy is formed, each executive agency and the intelligence communitywould devise strategies to support the USG strategy. In addition, the 1C should alsodevelop a collection and analysis strategy to support departmental requirements (wheretheir own departmental intelligence arms are not equipped). For most significant threats,all the tools of national power would be engaged by such strategies, which makes theIC's strategizing very complex. National tools including classic diplomacy (includingbuilding bi-lateral an d multi-lateral approaches), public diplomacy, information,education, economic incentives and punishments, etc. would all be involved. And whilethe use offeree might be a last resort, considerations of violence must be included in allplanning; anticipating the use offerees and the military tool short of violence would bepart of any comprehensive strategy. Finally, the 1C would also devise and support a

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special activities strategy to support the national strategy. While intelligence wouldsupport each of the tools, there would be an on-going effort to advise the President andpolicy makers, and the DCI would implement special activities as directed.The DCI and 1C have a four-fold mission then defining long-term threats (andopportunities) that require USG strategies now to prevent them f rom becoming imminent;supporting all elements of the national strategy with actionable intelligence; devising astrategy for and implementing special activities; and warning of imminent threats. Ineach mission area it is also imperative that the DCI insure that the President and policymakers understand the limits of what the 1C can provide - what is impossible, what theyneed more resources in order to do, and what must be done by others in the USG orelsewhere.Application to Counter-terrorismThere was no effective strategic warning f rom the DCI or 1C to the President or seniordecision-makers. Although papers were written, speeches were given, and discussionsengaged, no official document/NIE specifically and clearly addressed the issue of non-state terrorism with global reach that aimed to attack not just US targets, but domestictargets - no one specifically named UBL, al Qa'ida and affiliates as a significant threat tothe homeland. Such a warning or an NIE should have generated a government-widestrategy to combat the emerging threat with all the tools of national power.Instead a lower level of warning resulted in a DCI plan that was not fully coordinatedeither across the 1C or across the government with the plans of other departments. Otherdepartments' plans were then also limited. For instance, the DoD concentrated on ForceProtection in a defensive stance, as did the State Department with measures to betterprotect embassies and diplomats. The DCFs plan, formulated after the East AfricaEmbassy bombings in 1998, focused on covert action to find and render "high valuetargets" or the most senior, specifically al Qa'ida leadership or to prevent specific attacks.The plan only included a limited approach to intelligence collection and analysis tosupport this effort . All other CT collection and analysis efforts went to support the otherUSG departments' ad hoc approaches to terrorism which were mostly defensive in natureor aimed at containment. An attempt to discover lower level terrorist-associated personsand investigate whether they may have in fact committed a crime would have been adistant third priority even in the CT realm. Since resources were limited, this third orderrequirement would mostly be neglected or approached on a sporadic basis (i.e., followingthose like Midhar and Hazmi).It appears that the DCI or 1C warned the President and senior policy makers that theability of the 1C to issue specific warnings of imminent attacks was very limited. It doesno t appear that the DCI or 1C made it clear that special activities were limited by aHUMINT-centric approach, when it was very difficult if not impossible to penetrateleadership levels of al Qa'ida. In other words, it was negligent of the DC I and CT C notto ask for USG-wide help an d collaboration in the longer term struggle against al Qa'ida.

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