Terrorism and U Page 1 of 23 Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy Paul Pillar Paul R . Pillar, Terrorism a nd U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). 1: Introduction -Clinton 1998 to UNGA: "terrorism is at the top of the of the American agenda—and should be at the to p of the world agenda." 1 -successes: • frequency o f attacks worldwide halved from mid-1980s to 1990s [but th e attacks were deadlier]; • speed of solving big attacks such as Oklahoma City, WTC 1993, 1998 embassies; • cooperation bw. law enforcement and intell; • disrupted terrorist operations, such as FBI 1993 success in stopping Sudanese terrorists' plot to blow up NYC landmarks -1995-98: U.S. intell focus on UBL helps make 1998 case -narrow focus on body count ignores other costs of terrorism -mistake to focus on CBRN attacks; sensationalism -Clinton read a novel about terror attack on NYC w. bioengineered virus and asked U.S. experts to evaluate th e real risk p. 4 -"If counterterrorism is conceived as a war, it is a small step to conclude that in this war there is no substitute fo r victory an d thus n o room fo r compromise." p . 5 -but still need finesse, accomod ation, creativity; avoid absolutism -caricature of conventional school: "confrontational, fight-don't-finesse stream of American thinking about terrorism" p. 8 -esp. on state sponsors, engagement may be shrewder over long haul, however easy to slam as soft -June 2000 National Commission on Terrorism: • rising danger to U.S., so step up efforts, esp. in intell and law enf. • "firmly target" state sponsors • direct "full force an d sweep" of law to terror financing • prepare for WMD ttacks http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/view.php ?thismailbox=INBO X&index=376&id=3... 6/6/03
Transcript
8/14/2019 T3 B16 DOS-DOD Statements on Terrorism 2 of 2 Fdr- Notes and Sound Bites From Terrorism and US Foreign Policy- Paul Pillar
bu t ignored foreign com plications o f counterterror policy
-official U .S. coun terterror policy shows con tinuity:
• no deals, no concessions
• brin g terrorists "tojustice"
• isolate andpressure state spon sors
• help co unterterrorist capabilities of U .S. partners
-but how do you apply these?
-"...what may seem to be the stron gest (that is, the most determined, more hard-hitting, or mostinclusive) coun terterrorist po licies are not always the best ones." p. 10
".. .the aspect of coun terterrorism that has had the greatest a nalytic shortfalls—a nd where additionalanalysis could mo st help to make wha t has been a largely successful counterterrorist policy evenbetter—is the fitting of coun terterrorism into the larger con text of U.S. fo reign policy. Terrorism isprimarily a foreign policy issue, as well as a national security issue." p. 9
-except dom estic d efense, all counterterror steps have fo reign elements
2: The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism
& -tend to conceive terrorism too broadly and see counterterrorism too narrowly p. 12
-in 1970s, U .N. and o ther forum s tried to d ilute def n of terrorism and excuse a ttacks in n ame of n ationa lliberation
-o r define it by wa ys that set the policy respon se: call it a crime if you w an t to use law enforcemen t, warif yo u wan t to use military
-U.S. statutory definition: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated againstnoncombatant targets by subnationa l groups or cland estine a gents, usually intended to influence anaudience." p. 13
• premeditation—so excludes rage, accident
• political motivation— so excludes crime, greed, or personal revenge; terrorists focus on grandconcerns and claim to serve greater good
•civilian targets
— so excludes military targets (unless off duty , as in Ma rine barracks in Beirut orKhobar To wers) [dod gy, that last bit]
• subna tional perpetrators or clandestine agents— so excludes n ormal wa rfare, although shouldprobably be broadened to include lone ind ividuals, rather than just groups
-statute echoes consensus, however anguished , of academ ic specialists
but U .S. force will inevitably get called terrorism (as in U.S.S. Vincennes' 1998 accidental strike onIranian airliners, as sharply contrasted to 1998 Libyan deliberate downing of Pan Am 103)
- b u t Adm iral William Crowe's panel on 1998 emb assy att acks estimated $14 billion over a decade toboost security at U.S. missions abroad
Elements of cou nterterrorist policy:
• Root causes
• terrorism doesn't arise randomly
• touches on vast range of U.S. policymakers
• need a grudge
• also need co nditions of privation to get recruits fo r u gly, risky work
• most terrorists are you ng men, underemployed, with poor prospects an d limited social support p.31
• have had some su ccesses getting terrorists to change by giving aid to get ajob, aincentives to settle dow n with family; have also had some lu ck wit h peace, reform, economic
development
b u t it's tricky: al-Qaeda came from wealthy Saudi Arabia, not from poor Mu slim societies like
• there will alw ays be incorrigibles [like Zawahiri] who we fear most
• no point tackling UBL's "root causes"; his root is hatred of America
• Groups' capabilities
• degrading capacities can be dramatic, as in Peru's 1997 raid on Tu pac Amaru goons holdingJapanese embassy, which crippled the group
• b u t , per McVeigh, onejerk with limited means can be devastating
• big grou ps like Hizb allah can't b e crippled as easily as Tupac Amaru
• Groups'intentions
• Hizb allah hasn't targeted U.S. since 1996; H amas and Tamil Tigers never have, althou gh theyclearly could do serious damage
• try to get terrorists not to use what they have in the can
• punishment, prosecution, and strikes can deter some groups
• to avoid giving terrorists motive to attack U.S., Washington doesn't make concessionsTwkhterrorists—although it surely did during Iran-contra, and Israelis have cut dealsjspeatedty
U.S. has held nicely firm in hostage-takings and prisoner swaps, althou gh those are more raretoday than ju st immediate m urder
• gave terror-related skills to many non-Afghan militants, esp. Arabs
• helped forge "the ultimate extremist networking opportunity" p. 46
• learned from drubbing USSR that Islamist violence can beat anyone
-new easier movement across borders lets groups set up far-flung cells (eg. Hizballah in Argentina)
-new rise of ad hoc groups like 1993 WTC cell
-Ramzi Yousef shows transnational reach: Pain heritage, raised in K uw ait, trained in Afghanistan,educated in Britain, plotted in U.S. and Philippines, caught in Pakistan p. 49
-today's terrorism doesn't boost a rival, like 1970s attacks boosted Soviets
-closest th ing to a big power backing terrorism is India over Kashmir
-but is Islamist terrorism aun itary entity that could challenge U.S.? _
-Bernard Lewis coined phrase "clash of civilizations" popularized by Huntington, who argues thattrue problem "is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of th£
and are obsessed with the inferipjity-of theif-pow^r/' p. 53 _ ^
-but Islam is hardly unified: split bw . Sunni/Shiite, ethnicity, states
-and Islamism is hardly Islam
-still, UBL surely sees himself as engaged in a clash of civilization svs . West
-UBL plays unique role in bringing together disparate Islamist extremists
• but has little following among Shiites, despite large Sunni following
• and has more sym pathizers than direct control
• network runs on back-scratching, not direct orders from to p•*^_^ _ _ _ _ . , _ ^ ^
• "This network is something like the Internet: it is a significant transnational phenom enon that hasgrown in recent years an d that some determined people have used to their advantage, bu t nobodyowns it or controls it." p. 55
-as sole superpower, U.S. will remain leading target of terrorists
• terrorism is tactic of weak against the strong
• exposure of far-flung U.S. interests and targets, as well as open society
• power breeds resentments
-do terrorists hate U.S. fo r what it is or for what it does?
-al-Qaeda really did hate Somalia intervention, hun t fo r Aidid
-support for repressive regimes doesn't help
-also resent U.S. cultural and economic reach
-"Being at the top of the terrorists' hit list is an unavoidable price of superpowerdom." p. 66
-Islamists often hate U.S. for w hat they think it does, not its real policies
-also, you can't win; U.S. was blamed fo r noninvolvement in Bosnia an d involvement in Somalia p. 68
-effective counterterrorism often requires foreign com mitments, so mistake to think hauling updrawbridge would end terrorist threat
^Treasury Dept orders U.S. finan cial inst'ns to freeze relevant accounts
-most of assets seized [pre-9/11] were from state sponsors ($1.5 billion from Iraq, about $1 billion fromLibya), bu t jus t go t chum p change from FTOs (eg. $104,000 from Hamas and PIJ) p. 96
-January 2000 convention requires g ovts to crim inalize terror fundraising and to seize terror funds p. 93
-m ore m odest benefits to financial controls:
1. blocked assets of state sponsors can be bargaining chips
2. every bit helps whe n lim iting terrorist capabilities
3. makes it harder for group to operate if it fears interdiction of funds
4. crim inalizing support of the grou p may deter som e backers
5. sym bolic: lets U.S. dem onstrate its resolve
Military force
-still the least-used instrument, despite ever-smarter bombs p. 97
-haven't tried to rescue hostages since Desert One debacle
-only launched three retaliatory strikes throu gh 2000
-the paucity of use of force rightly reflects serious difficulties
-after failed 1972 German mission to rescue Munich Olympic hostages, several West European govtsdeveloped com m ando u nits to free hostages
-U.S. developed Joint Special Operations Com m and (JSOC) to apply force in ongoing terrorist incidentafter failed 1980 Iran hostage rescue
-but such raids are very risky , despite dazzling success of Entebbe in 1976
• a 1985 Egyptian raid on hijacked EgyptAir jet in Malta left 60 of 96 passengers dead p. 98
• even Israel screws up, as in Ma'alot in 1974, when IDF commandos stormed DFLP cell, whichkilled 16 teens and wounded 70 p. 99
-rely on luck; had Tupac Am aru had more w arning in 1997, disaster
-all these difficulties are seriously com pounded for preem ptive strikes, which states have s hunne d inm odern tim es (except Israel in Lebanon) be. such strikes lack justification of response to attack
-"For those reasons, the overt preem ptive use of m ilitary force aga inst terrorists is unlikely and u nwise."p. 97
-most important counterterror use of U.S. force is retaliation
• first used against Libya in 1986, after bombing of Berlin disco killed 2
• Reagan sent 100combat jets to strike military targets, SAM sites
• second retaliatory strike was 1993 strike on Iraqi mukhabarat HQ with 23 Tomahawks fo r Apri l1993 attempt to kill ex-Pres. Bush in Kuwai t
• third retaliatory strike was Aug. 20, 1998 strikes on UBL targets in Afghanistan and Sudan after
East Africa embassy bombings
• [presumably most mass ive case is post-9/11 invasion ofAfghanistan]
-using cruise missiles in 1993 and 1998 strikes avoided civilian casualties of 1986 strike, which killed36 civilians p. 100
-in first an d third strikes, attempting to kill leaders (Qaddafi, UBL)
-all three were unilateral (minus B rit cooperation in Libya strike)
-all three were based on ironclad proof of responsibility for attacks
-such strikes may deter future attacks, bu t surely satisfy public desire to "do something" after an attackp. 101
-revenge is an unwor thy mot ive
-still, strikes do help buck up national resolve (as in Israel)
-"A punitive strike is chiefly a message-sending exercise..." p. 101
-retaliation may help reduce terroris m:
1. may encourage other govts to follow U.S. lead on counterterror
2. may hurt th e group targeted
3. implicit threat of future retaliation could deter future attacks
4. other groups may also be deterred
-retaliation helped goad European action against Libya and UNSC sanctions on Taliban in 1999 (thoughRussian anger at Taliban for backing Chechens helped swing Council more) p. 102
-first three strikes have done little to erode capacity of terror groups
-these three strikes did less to deter terror ists from attacking again, esp. UB L, who survived a good hi tfrom U.S. military and now hides better
-nor did Qaddafi quit terrorism after 1986 (viz. Pan Am 103, 1988)
• most dangerous terrorists have least obvious targets to hit (such as rudimentary targets in TalibanAfghanistan, or making rubble bounce at Hizballah training camps oft-hit by IDF)
• being the target of U.S. wrath may suit terrorists fine, as with Qaddafi (who had Libyan peoplerally behind him) or UBL (who liked the publicity of 1998 strikes, hoped to provoke a U.S.reaction, and used strikes to call U.S. cowards who only understand force) p. 105
• terrorists may retaliate rather than being cowed, as in endless Israeli-Palestinian cycle of action
and reaction
-other problems with retaliation:
• hard to do, since ordnance is hard to move and overflight's a headache
• global resentment of superpower throwing weight around, as in European distaste for 1986 Libyastrike, Arab sulking in 1993, or cynicism about hitting Sudan's al-Shifa plant (though intell stillholds, the strike hurt overall po rtrait of U.S. coun terterror efforts, an d U.S. sho uldn't have loweredits evidentiary standards) p. 109
• "Wag the Dog" cynicism about 1998 UBL strikes really plays abroad
-doing nothing after an outrage isn't an option, but keep up high standards of proof and high levels ofskepticism about how much retaliation does
Intelligence and covert action
-the least open of the instruments, and often the most substantial
-intell on terrorist threats is usually too vague to stop attacks
-sometimes get it right and nab bad guys or cancel the flight
-but often ge t hijack threat that names country, no t city...
-often have good strategic intell on overall threat bu t lack the tactical intell to prevent the immediateattack
-few sources can give good specific intell on pending attacks
• groups are small (Yousef cell) or compartmentalized (Hamas)
• leaders who know most abo ut pending attacks are least likely to blab
• hard to get access to terrorists and cultivate relationships with them, esp. with Islamists
-the sources who know most tend to carry lots of baggage
-2000 Nat'l Commission on Terrorism said CIA guidelines on
recruiting terrorist informants had made agency "risk averse"
U.S. objectives and sees that counterterror perspective is injected into policymaking [not a prob now. . . ]
-Crowe panel warned that this State office doesn't always mesh well with INR, which assesses intell,and Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which guards embassies
-better to have more folks at the table than fewer—good to have the AG or JCS chair there even ifneither prosecution no r airstrikes are likely
5: Groups
-start by asking:
1. what is the group's objective?
• leverage, stopping a peace process, ethnic cleansing, provocation, proving they're still alive,imposing costs, deterrence, revenge, hatred, eschatology
2. does the group represent something larger than itself?
• embodiment of a political or religious movement, such as Hamas, IRA, PKK, Tamil Tigers,
FARC, Hizballah
-groups that represent something larger tend to use terrorism in more calibrated ways [he meansnationalism, but al-Qaeda sees itself as the voice of all Islam] p. 132
-worst recent threats to U.S. from visceral, unrepresentative haters, such as 1993 WTC plot or McVeigh
-Hizballah has killed more U.S. citizens than any group [pre-9/11], but knocked it off in the 1990s onceU.S. was driven out of Lebanon
-PKK, LTTE, FARC have all launched big waves of terrorism
-but must see PKK as more than just a terrorism problem
-capturing group leader can help
• 1999 arrest of Abdallah Ocalan in Kenya devastated PKK
• Peru's 1992 capture of Abimael Guzman sped decline of Shining Path
• similar cult of personality around LTTE's Velupillai Prabhakaran
-what makes a group decide to attack America?
• groups out for acceptance may be leery of alienating U.S., which may be why groups like Hamasor PKK haven't hit U.S.
• groups reliant on funders inside U.S. less likely to cross Washington (IRA, but also Hamas,Hizballah, Jamaat Islamiyya)
• groups in regional conflicts may not want to lose U.S. sympathy
-Iraq is smaller beer—just backing A bu Nidal, M EK — so focus of policy is Saddam's aggression andW MD
-Libya is seen mostly as a terrorism problem for U.S., esp. re Pan Am 103
-Sudan is also seen m ostly as a terrorism issue, hosting Islam ist groups
-Syria's role in terrorism is less important to U .S. than role in peace process
-with North Korea and Cub a, terrorism is hardly dom inant U.S. concern
-label has gotten in the way of U.S. engagement
-why is Cuba on the list but Pakistan isn't? p. 163
-state sponsors unlikely to pass WMD to terrorists: losing control of the materiel, getting dragged intoshowdown by group's hotheads, an d higher likelihood of tracing W MD than other less dramaticassistance
-sanctions don't lend themselves to cookie-cutter approach
-depends on target's reliance on trade, breadth of suppo rt, etc.
-haven't split Iran from Hizballah (though weakened by Europe)
-haven't m oved Iraq be. Saddam 's too determ ined and tyrannical
-didn't even get Taliban to surrender UBL p. 166
-best sanctions case is Libya, where multilateral ones helped prod surrender of Pan Am 103 suspects,although key m ay have been general pariah status rather than jus t the sting of sanctions
-general lim itations to use of sanctions:
1. often unclear ho w state m eets standards fo r lifting
-tough to insist that not on e cell rem ain w hen cells exist in Florida...
2. sanctions don 't really degrade s tate's a bility to spon sor terror
-can stop its ability to get W M D , but terrorism is cheap
-State Cou nterterrorism Coordinator M ichael Sheehan on the Hill: "if you have a problem with Cut;mman rights, ge t your own sanctions, don't use mine." p. 172__̂ ==== , = ~ =- =̂===-we're letting terrorism get in way of engaging a reforming Iran"~- —~̂__U.S. should try to help other state~feduce suppofTTor terrorism
1. objective isn't to pin label "terrorist" on the state; that's a means...
-point isn't to get confession of past sin, it's to reduce current danger
2. lay out clear goals and standards expected
-key failing of Europeans' dealings with Iran is vagueness
3. expect only incremental improvem ent, an d reward the increments
-cold turkey isn't gonna hap pen; reward the progress
4. ask for feasible steps
-easier to keep a g roup on a short leash than to expel it outrigh t
5. exploit natural linkages bw . state's demands and U.S. goals
-so go after MEK; they're bad actors, consistency is a virtue, and
it gets you mileage in Tehran, despite Congress' odd yen for MEK
Enablers
-gray area; no t only fail to stop terrorism but do things to help it happen
