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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDEvent: Follow-up interview of Jack S J I former FA A liaison to the FBIType: InterviewDate: June 14, 2004Special Access Issues: SSIPrepared by: JohnRaidtTeam: 7 \s (non-Commission): Jack 3 I FBI: Bob Sinton, FBI

office.Participants (Commission): John Raidt, Lisa Sullivan, and Bill JohnstoneLocation: FBI Headquarters, Washington, DCBackground ,--"""//9/11 Law Enforcement PrivacySe e memorandum for the record of first interview of JackFBI's Civil Aviation program[U] fl inote'd that Bev Wright who served as manager of the FBI's Civil AviationProgram was very conversant with FAA operations. If there!were anything alarmingregarding civil aviation security she would share the information with him. He stated thatshe had an "open door" policy and was always calling him V/ith information. She hadgood relations with the field offices and the agents who served as liaisons with localairports. He said that he did riot recall Ms. Wright expressing any concern that she mightnot be receiving information from the field pertinent to civil javiation.Ressam \ ] Mr. a Iwas told by Mr. Raidt that the FAA r

(who was seeking to attack Los Angeles Airport) as an example of where the FBI failedto share with FA A threat information of direct interest to H a s agency. In previousinterviews, FAA officials told the Commission they learned from news reports, not theFBI, that Ressam was seeking to attack civil aviation. SI Jsaid he was aware the FAAthought that the FBI was holding back informationbut he said the charge was absolutelyuntrue. He recalled that FBI did find a map in Ressam's possession that had a circlearound Los Angeles, but there was no way to discern that his target was the airport.

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9 Isaid that Ressam's plan to attack LAX came out during the prosecution andeveryone (including the press, the FBI and the FAA) learned about the plot at the sametime.Libyan threat to slam a plane into the WTC[U] 9 Isaid he recalled the Libyan threat to slam a plane into the WTC and that heofficially assessed it as unrealistic. He said the threat information was that the Libyanswere considering frying a Libyan plane into the WTC. There was an embargo on Libyaat the time and the Libyan's were riot allowed to fly outside of certain airspace. He didn'tbelieve that they had the aircraft that had the range to get to the U.S. or the ability tocarry-out the threat since they were restricted to certain airspace. When asked whether atthe time he considered the possibility that the Libyans might hijack an airplane to conductthe attack, Mr. SI Iresponded that there was nothing in the intelligence reporting tosuggest that wa s what they had in mind. ..UBL flight training in the U.S. ; ; ,

,.'9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy[U] Mr. SI tsaid that he started looking at UBL when he fyas assigned to the StateDepartment in 1992. He has always been aware that UBL d^rjended on pilots so that hecould engage in extensive private air travel. He was also aw^re ih a general sense thatbecause the U.S. trained so many of the world's pilots, UBLfmight have associatestraining in U.S. flight schools. He said.it was simply a matte^ of common sense.However, he was not aware of any particular individual whope FBI knew to be affiliatedwith UBL or al Qaeda in flight training, but whom the BureaU let alone because theywere training fo r transportation purposes rather than terrorist Attacks.Phoenix EC \] Mr. 3 Isaid that he remembers receiving a

asking if the FAA had a database of Arab students enrolled in flight training. SI I toldher they did not have such a database, but asked if they were interested in any particularperson or if there was some specific concern. Th e agent told a Ithat their seemed tobe a lot of Arab students in flight training in the Phoenix area. ^ i told us that in thepre 9/11 environment it would not have occurred to anyone to keep track 6f such things.He believes doing so would have been a violation of the privacy act. Mr. S i I renal ledthat "profiling" was considered a dirty word. This was the reason the name of CAPS(computer assisted profiling system) was changed to CAPPS (computer assistedpassenger prescreening system) in 1998.[U] Because he received the call prior to the issuance of the Phoenix EC, he believes itwas a precursor to the memo. He reiterated that he did not see the Phoenix EC until after9/11. He agreed that it had been received by individuals within the FBI's RadicalFundamentalist Unit where he worked, and that he should have been given theinformation. He's not sure why he didn't.

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FBI's 1998 tasking of field offices to examine flight schools(U] S| Istated that he does hot remember being informed of the tasking, but that sucha tasking would be the kind of information that either he or Bev Wright should havereceived. The interviewers told Mr. Si I that agenift "~ jwho worked on thetasking stated that he had run the information past him. Mr. S\ aid it is possible thathe saw it, but hie just doesn't recall.Moussaoui[U] Mr\I beiterated what he previously told the commission that he saw a draft andthe distributed copy of the sC from the FBI Minneapolis Field Office regarding theMoussaoui case. He said that the EC did not include any analysis about the extent of theterrorist threat that Moussaoui might pose; He said that EC'sconvey facts not conjecture.The communication laid out the facts of the case and said nothing about the possibilitythat Moussaoui Wight be working with others in a terrorist plot.[U] He recalled that he orally briefed ClaudioManno and Pat Durgin of FAA'sintelligence bureau at FAA's office the Thursday or Friday following the 18th of August.Hb told them that Moussaoui was engaged in advanced flight training and had raised

\. The subject was in custody on immigration charges. There were nos. And the FBI needed a few days to find out what was going on.

[y] < j bald he did not tell Manno or Durgin about the specifics of why Mdussaouiraised suspicions such as his lack of interest in learning to take-off and land, etc, a Istated to the Commission that he was instructed by the FBI (possibleC t ) not totell them too much. Mr.^ Xhe^BI did not want information to get out that mightcomplicate the inyestigation!~3l_]said that if the FAA sent out a warning to airportsabo t the arrest, it could interfere or damage the investigation. S I I never sent anythingin wiiting to the FAA about the case. He then went on a family vacation and returned theTuesday af ter Labor pay. He was not aware that a Minneapolis field agent had urgedheadquarters to warn the Secret Service because of the threat Moussaoui might pose toWashington DC, nor was he aware of the "brainstorming" sessions held in Minneapoliswhere 6ne of the agents opined that Moussaoui might be training to slam an airplane intothe WTC. \]Mr.3 |was asked abput the CIAproduct regarding Moussaoui including the

memo that went to CIA Director Tennant titled "Islamic Extremist Learns How toFly,"and the CIA cable to stations overseas calling Moussaoui a possible hijacker who mightbe plotting to attack the U.S. 3 Idid not see this information. However he said thatwe need to asld I who was the FAA liaison to the CIA whether he saw theinformation and whyhe didn't pass it onto FAA Intelligence. _ |said he did learnabout information provided by the French that Moussaoui had terrorist connections, butonly after he got back from vacation on the 4th. He added that it would be interesting to

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aw Enforcement Privacy - * n / i i T ^ ^ j . ^ _ - , , , _ . . . 7 '9/11 Law Enforcement PrivacyClosed by Statute J

know if! I passed alone t6 FAA intelligence this infbrination as well as theC IR from C IA aboutalHazmi arid Mihdar..that came in on August 23 rd .[U] 9 Isaid that in the midst of the Moussaoui issue the FAAifFBj was also dealingwith six Pakistani's in Bolivia who \Vere subjecte of great concern to aviation security.[U] SI [stated that FAA did receive tbi Sept. 4 th teletype sent out by the FBI toagencies including the FAA giving details about the Moussaoui arrest. SI I stated thatneither he nor the FBI were tasked by the FAA to provide any additional information orconduct any particular follow-up.Workload / \] M r. SI feaid that he was caught be

detailee. He was trying to serve tw o fnasters who had very different expectations of him.Mr. said that he didn't have written job description but that having one might have helpedclarify his role and expectations for everyone. He stated that he was grossly overworked.His phone never stopped ringing at home and at work. He said the watch officers at FAAwould send volumes of question^ to him because it was easy for them to do. They didno t appreciate the difficulties and constraints of living hi the operational wofld. Part ofthe problem is that the ClintonVGore administration downsized the intelligencecommunity wlu^h put too miich stress on the system. \i Flights

[U] SI tsaid that the Saudi Embassy arranged for charter transport of certain peoplefrom the country in the, afterm ath of 9/11 because of security concerns fo r their people.He remembered that he was working in FBI Headquarter's Operations Center in theaftermath of 9/11. He received a call from a desk officer at the State Department'^counter-terrorism unit (SCT). They wanted to be sure that the FBI was in the loop \g the request from the Saudiwhatever action >vas necessary to ensure that people were cleared before they wereallowed to depart. This information was fed up the food chain to Director Mueller. Sisaid that the FBI wanted everyone checked out and to his knowledge this was done. Hestated that the State Department did not press the FBI to take any shortcuts in checkingthese people but.[U] SI tsaid that the effort to assure that passengers were cleared wa s well coordinatedamong customs/INS/etc. He remembered that he lashed up the FBI with FAA Air trafficcontrol. He stated that air traffic management would not clear any flights to depart untilthe FBI gave the clearance.

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SEIBSSi Isaid that the Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs mirrored the President'sDaily Brief and it would be interesting to see what the SEIB's on those days had to say

about the threat and the information about hijacking that the president received.April 2001 Request for Information from FAA Intelligence Watch[SSI] Mr. SI I was shown a watch log entry indicating that he/FBI had been askedsome questions regarding alQaeda's knowledge of technical aviation information,including piloting skills(stemming from an al Qaeda threat to attack planes in Egypt withsurface to air missiles (SAM's). According to FAA intelligence officials the FBI neverresponded to their questions. Mr. SI Isaid that he didn't remember the tasking but hewas sure that he would have passed it along. He allowed as perhaps the FBI didn'tanswer the questions. He said FAA wrote lots of questions for FBI to answer.