T8 B6 FAA HQ Jeff Griffith 3-31-04 MFR

8/14/2019 T8 B6 FAA HQ Jeff Griffith 3-31-04 MFR

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ME MO R A N D U M FOR THE RECORDEvent: Jef f Gr i f f i th , Former FAA Assistant Director of Air Traff ic ControlType: InterviewDate: March 31,2004Special Access Issues: NonePrepared B y: Lisa Sull ivanTeam: 8Participants (non-Commiss ion) : NoneParticipants (Comm ission): Lisa Sull ivan, M iles Kara, John Farmer, Dana H yde, andJohn AzzarelloLocation: G SA Conference RoomBackgroundGrif f i th spent 36 years in the FAA. He ret ired from the FAA in November 2002,Current ly , he is consul t ing on air t raff ic management in foreign countries inclu din g Ch inaan d C ol um b i a . He enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in 1966 and was trained as air trafficcontroller. He spent a year in Vietnam. In January of 1970 he was discharged an d wentto the FAA as controller. He as stat ioned in Georgia; then in 1976 he went intomanagement; in 1990, he became th e manager at Indianapolis Center; he managedChicago O'Hare for several years; he w ent to G reat Lakes Region; in 1999 or 2000, hew as selected as deputy director of air traffic (AT-2) - that was his posit ion on 9-11.Th e operations budg et was 3.5 bi l l ion dollars to operate all the A TC facil it ies on day today basis (500 plus). The director of Air Traff ic (his boss) w as Bil l Peacock. PeterChallen was the associate; then Steve Brow n; then M onte Belger; then Jane Garvey.15 people reported dir ectly to Grif f i th inc luding nine regional div ision managers and acouple of staff people.On a day to day basis, h e reviewed th e pre vio us day's operations. They experienced onaverage ten break downs and problems in the system. He also received daily br ief ingsfrom th e Command Center on delays and congestion, runway incurs ions-anything thataffected safety.He had meet ings to go to on budget/modernization of the air traffic system - strategymeetings - meet ings with the N T SB on closing out cer tain recom mendat ions - t hey were

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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEconstantly loo king at more efficient use of m o n ey , and they were always answering to theCongress on this. There was a lot of IG activity.Primary radar capabilitiesThe FAA had issued a paper a decision docum ent to decommission them. How evermany there were they are very expensive to maintain. Some were 30 to 40 years old AS R1 and 2 radar systems. The qu ali ty wa sn' t that great.On top of the radar dish is a secondary radar. It is getting similar information as theprimary radar. Secondary radar does not pick up "skin paint;" it takes all thedata/electronically transmitted information on the aircrafts. The secondary radar is muchcheaper for this reason. The decision w as made the primary radar was no longer neededin some environments.Primary was needed in the terminal environment - a range of 60 miles from the airport -there are about 200 of them. The l ikelihood of a coll ision below 20,000 feet was greaterthat vicinity.Griffi th thought el im inat ing primary radar outside of the terminal environment would notcompromise safety.The actual decommissioning of ASR 1 and 2 models was to be enacted by turning off thehi-voltage at selected si tes. The decom missioning of the mo dels me ant that the supplyparts and personnel required to maintain th e systems could be sent elsewhere. It wasn' t aphase out - secondary radar wo uld still be at the sites. The date of decommission had notbeen set as of September 11 .NTSB had issues with the FAA's plan. "The NTSB was obsessed with notion that anaircraft withou t transponder wou ld coll ide with a plane full of people." A plane as aweapon, or a purpo sefu l turn ing off of the transponder, was not though t of; i t was only amechanical malfunct ion they were concerned about.In th e last 15 years, Griffi th doesn' t recall an aircraft losing transponder capabil i ty above15,000 feet. If radar capab il i ty is lost, th e controller's response is to protect th e routefrom point to poin t and the al t i tude. It was very typical to lose radio for a period of t ime.The loss of transponder w as "unusual, but it happened". When it occurred, it was neverfo r an extended period of t ime.If an aircraft lost a t ransponder for the durat ion of a transcontinental f l ight , that would bevery unu sua l and i t wou ld be reported up to HDQTs. Each facility keeps a log daily thatis reported up to Comm and Center.Relationship with the Mil i tary



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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEA Joint Military and Civilian Group looked at the uses of the common operating facilityand w as led by General Eberhardt from the mi litary side and Jim Washington from FA Aside (Director of Requirements). There were a lot of people working on that.The mili tary wanted a 3-D display and a one-second upda te rate on the newest radar theyinvested in. Griffith's opinion is that the FAA di dn ' t need that level of definit ion toseparate airplanes. "You don ' t want to put this in operational environment because of theservicing issues." He w asn ' t on the team that was discussing these issues with themilitary (through th e Joint Mili tary and Civilian Group).Lack of Radar CoverageWe had coverage charts we know all the gaps. M ountainou s terrain causes loss ofprimary and secondary radar. In the eastern US there were some gaps, including PA.Griffith thoug ht that gaps in radar coverage were comm only kno wn in form ation, and hefelt certain that th e controller in the geographic region would have received training at thecenter on any gaps in coverage that existed.Regional offices maintain the coverage charts. The idea was to provide the informationto the facility in non-technical format. W e didn ' t want them interpret ing th e informationat the centers themselves.AAL77The co ntro ller was traine d to separate everythin g in front of that aircraft. The aircraft ha salways continued to a destination or a planned route of flight. That was the scenario theytrained for. If the controller knew a lost target was in the system, th e controller wouldlook ahead. Meanwhile , th e plane turned aroun d and went th e other way .The AA L 77 co ntroller did not see any thing to the front or to the right of the track afterthe hijacker turned the transponder off. There was no primary radar coverage, so he wasunable to see it. Griffith doesn' t know that to be true.Every gap should be memor ia l ized and made clear to the controller . He recalls a generalknowledge that some of these planes were not seen on primary radar, but he cannotverify.Controllers were not trained - there was no t ra ining for radar environment w ith bothprimary and secondary radars in use.The controllers ar e able to track it at both ZBW (Boston Center) an d ZNY (New YorkCenter).The controllers in Indy working AAL 77 had the same equipm ent as ZBW and ZNY. Heknows how the system works.



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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEIt is d i f f i c u l t for Griffi th to accept that the controller in Indy Center that handled AAL 77c ou l d not "see"th e prima ry target.In the Event of Aviation AccidentsWhen there is a crash in the system, Griff i th wil l learn about it wi t h i n a few minutes . Th enotif ication process i s very disc ip l ined . Text pagers were with th em at a l l t imes . Th epage was sent to ma n y , i n c l u d i n g B i l l Peacock and h i m. It was their job to get al l th einformat ion and begin briefing th e Admin is t r a tor .Peacock, Chal len, Brown and he were a team to work issues together. Th e data forreconstructing th e acc iden t wou ld be sent to the evaluations department. A team w asus u ally put together to go to the site in sup port of NTSB . It was stand ard proced ure toreview the equ ipme nt, the tapes, interviews of con trollers in order to root out causes andmistakes that might gave lead to the crash.Protocol fo r H ijack ingHijack-people w ou ld convene in the WOC. FBI has the lead so they w o u l d beimm ed iately brough t on board. Keep airplane s out of the way. Bring it to some sort ofresolut ion.W hat ab out enlisting the m ilitary?Noti f ica t ion capab i l i ty i nc l uded DOD. In his group, senior m il officers were at theb u i l d i n g and they reported to h i m. If a plan was in the works that involved th e mil i t a ry , itwas done at a h igh leve l t h rough th e people in the W OC .FA A History - Mili tary backgroundThe FAA was set up to support the mil i tary. A series of agreements abou t diff erentcom mand s set up protocol and put processes and procedures in p lace for joint u se of theai r space.| |was a mil i t a ry l iaison stationed attheFAA. She reported tohimand Bi l l

/ Peacock. People tha t reserved ai r space for military exercises were at a lower level. It. w o u l d be brought to her attention only if there was a prob lem.

Mil i tary liaisons for the FAA were also located at Tynda l l , Gr i f f i ths , NEADs, SEADs. West A ir Defense Sector, Cheyenne Mtn - they were required to report back to FAA.

W OC (Washington Operations Center) people asked about getting DOD on the line. Th eperson in charge was Eberhardt at Cheyenne Mtn. Belger or the Ad minis t rator wo ul dhave had to call him and giv e the coordinates and the status of the hi jacking in progress.He wou ld orde r the fighters to launc h. It was a high level dec ision. That is the way it

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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEshould have been done "by the book". Tabletop exercises were practiced annually at anundisclosed location.FAA supervisors and managers followed rule "7210.3" on hijackings. "7110.65" is thehijack protocol fo r controllers.In the ev ent of a hijac kin g, all the centers call the regional operations center. The regionsets up a bridge and tells th e Washington Operations Center. They also call the local FB Iand local la w enforcement and the airport manager. Centers notified th e CommandCenter in Herndon, V A .On 9 -11He was in the office on the tenth floor. Peacock was away. The first thing he recalls isDave C anoles on the phone saying "we had an aircraft that hit the Wo rld Trade Center."N ot long after that, he showed up in the office (he was the manager of evaluat ion staff).The assumption w as i t was as small aircraft . They w ere pul l ing th e tapes, etc. He can' tremember a lot of detail after that.He turned the TV in the office to CNN . He saw that people were saying it was anairliner. He headed dow n th e hall a few min utes later. He went into the ACC room(Aviation Crisis Center),He was nex t to Lee Long mire and he had the Command Center on the phone. He startedth e dialogue : "what do we know what are we doing?"Lee was setting up the SVTs and pu ll ing the security people together. The W hite Housewanted information.When he walked in the Crisis Center he was still hearing "crash," not "hijack". It mayhave been after th e second one hit the tower that he went into th e room.Early into this, he was primari ly with Belger and Jane Garvey.He doesn' t remem ber anyth ing about a page or receiving notif ication in the staff meetingabout a transponder being turned off (this was in Shirley Miller's statement). Hedistinctly remembers being in his office when he first learned about it. He remembers tel l ing Canoles to set up a situation l ine before leaving his office for theAviation Crisis Center: "Get peop le together colle cting data". He knew a lot of peop lewould want to know what happened. He wanted Canoles to get EVER YBO DY on thel ine. In his m i n d , that was going to be his vehicle for getting inform ation. It ended up,he sent runners down to the ACC to get updates.When did ZBW call th e region to report a second plane?

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/ - - V , \ ' . H e does n ot k n o w ., W h o sh o u ld h a v e t h e y b e e n c a l l i n g ? W h o should th e r e g io n h a v e t a l k e d to at the W O C ?

T h e d u t y of f ice r on d u t y t h a t d a y .He does h ot r e m e m b e r w h e n he f i rst heard a p l a n e w as hi jacked. Firs t , h e l earned anaircraft hi t the t r a d e c e n t e r . T h e n , h e l e a r n e d it was a commercial a i rcraf t . Then, th e

, second aircraf t , h i t . A t t h i s t im e , h e goes to ACC and t a lks to J o h n W h i t e on the p h o n e at, the Comm and Cen ter . "W e w ere ge t t in g ready to ge t on the SVTs to br ie f up the chain of. c o m m a n d , "

Gri f f i th w as hear ing false reports ( that early?). Someone says, "Hey an airplane just h itth e Pentagon."! f e o t o n t h e p h o n e . H e w a s g e t t i n g reports of people c losingdown A T C c e n t e r s , h te h a d t p be able to t a lk t o L e e a n d L y n n O s m u s i n t h e c o m e r i n t h e. front of the room. It got b u s y ; | fchowed up.

People were s a y i n g , "Monte we have to s h u t this t h i n g down," m e a n i n g the air space.I I said that C o m m a n d Center w as saying, " W e l l, w e a l r e a d y di d that."SVTs \h was on the S V T S c a l ls . W h e n e v e r t h e y w a n t e d to know operat ional th ings h e

w a s g i v in g i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e J u s t i c e D e p a r t m e n t , FBI, t h e A d m i n i s t r a t or w e r e o n t h eS V T s. H e d o. e sn ' t re m e m b e r w h e n o r f or h o w l o n g th e W h i t e H o u se w a s on t h e S V T s.Gri f f i ths w a s o n t h e r e q u i t e a b i t.T h e g r ou p u p t h e r e i n t h e c o r n e r (L e e L o n g m i r e a n d L yn n O sm u s p r i m a r i l y ) w a s t h esou r c e o f h i s i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t h e r e l a y e d o n t h e S V T s.D e l t a 1989H e w a s w r i t i n g a ll th e plan es repor ted suspic ious on h is pad. H e repor ted on the SV Tsabout the De l ta po te n t ial h i jack in g . That w as before we f igured out i t was n o t a problem .A A L 11 as st i l l a i r b o r n e -G rif f i th d o e sn ' t r e m e m b e J [ a n n o u n c i n g to the aviat ion crisis c e n t e r t h at A A L1 1 w as still airborne an d he ading to DC. H e doesn ' t r ecal l the par t icu lar p iece ofi n f o r m a t i o n .The purpose of Canoles se t t ing up the t e lcon from t h e A T C S u i t e w a s to g e t i nforma t ionou t to the AT Division managers and the 500s ( that is the reg ional l eve l) . That wasimpor tant to h im . H e en ded up wi th the ce n te rs and some of the t racons on the re and thatwas real ly to ge t the system back up.

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE. ^ After the two crashes, he needed to know what was out there, so he had John White fromComm and Center stay on the phone and told him not to hang up.

He recalled that the Wh ite House w anted to know w hat the si tuation was at the time.John W hite told him the call signs, point of arrival and departures, times, etc. H e wrote itdown an d went in to the SVTs it was already video an d speaking to t hem,He was on there for 5, 10 , 7 min utes. Periodically he went in and briefed. It wasn ' t th iscontinuous t h ing . It wasn ' t up the w h o l e t ime.D id you hear a conversation about scrambling military aircraft?Yes. That conversation came up later in the day outside th e SVTs.D o y ou remember a mil i t a ry aircraft being discussed in the SVTs?

\.A t some point, he reported on the SVTs about grounding th e planes.

\L 77He d idn 't think he reported on AAL 77 to the SVTs. We had determined by this timethat the trade centers were hit by UAL 17 5 and AAL 11. The moderator of the SVTSw as "squished." DOD was on there - the JCswere on - he didn't recognize them at thet ime.

| j t o l d Griffi th abou t AAL77 around 9:30 a.m.. Th at was thefirstknowledgehe had of it.Com mission staff told Griffi th that th e real-time count dow n of AAL 77 plowing in to thePentagon was reported on Canoles telcon. The call was actually serving as a center forinformation.There was a fast-mover 30 m iles west of D ulles mo ving east b ound - he did not know itwas AAL 77 at the t ime. Griffith said he got the information on flight 77. He recalls th athe had this inform ation and he shared i t with the people in the ACC. He doesn ' t knowwhere the inform ation came from. He recalls that there is a requirem ent at WashingtonNational Airport to report all unusual aircraft situations to Secret Service. Someone toldhim we did contact th e Secret Service, so he was satisfied. [Miles Kara thought that th ereport: "Fast mov er west of D ulles 30 miles out" may have been reported earl ier than9:30, an d could have been in reference to UAL 93. D an D iggins thought it was UA L 93.]Then Griffi th heard about th e C-130 reporting th e crash at the Pentagon, so he associatedth e fast mover wi th th e Pentagon h i t .

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There was confusion fo r hours about which plane hit the Pentagon. He had no report it. was AAL 77 that went into th e Pentagon. His list of missing planes at that t ime includedAA L 11 and UAL 175 and Delta, Continental . . .

He was, getting ai r traffic information fromj )and Dave Canoles.UAL 93 and Shoot Down OrderH e didn' t have much information about it .Griffiths thought the Secretary of Defense was the one that should have decided to shootdown an airplane. This con versation was tak ing place in a corner of the ACC. It was adiscussion about autho rity. In his mind, there were fighters in the air and they wereresponding to the situation and there wasn 't anything specific about shooting down UA L93. Part of that idea of defending themselves was sh utting down the system,Griffith thought it was not his place to give th e shoot down order.Military Liaisons to the FA AThe military liaisons in the building were doing things. H e knows that because he sawthem. He never directed them to do anything. He told] | the military liaisonwhatever information he had. H e does not recall seeking her out to convey an yinformation. He knew that she was reporting back to her people at the Pentagon."Shooting down an airplane requires Rules of Engagement," Griffith said. They d idn 'texist at that point. His main concern: Civilian controllers did not know how to vectorfighters to intercept a plane.

If they ar e talkin g about shooting dow n aircrafts in a civil system, then th e fighters weretalking to the centers and they were in and they were talking to NORAD as well.He doesn't r emember at what t ime, but he called General Eberhardt to tell him they were"shutting this thing down." Griffith thought that at the t ime he placed th e call , they didn 'thave a strong link with th e military at this point.Griffith said that his "focal point" was General Larry Arnold from CONR fo r 24-hours aday, for a couple of days after that.U A L 93He did not notify th e military about UAL 93 . NEADS knew what was going on at thispoint. His assumption is that the reps at Griffi ths AFB/NEADS (Steve Culbertson)would be talking to Cleveland Center. H e thinks this because he knows that Culbertsonis up there doing thei r job. On any other day of the week, if NEADS sees something andthey decide to scramble; then it 's Culbertson's job to coordinate wi th FAA .



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.. COMMISSION SENSITIVE^_ Grif f i th did not do anything to ensure tha t UAL 93 in fo rma t ion w as given to anyone. H edoes not remember who pulled him away to talk about UAL 93 (as noted in an FAAtranscript of a recording from tha t day) . He th ink s that[ Tbroadcast this report to the

room and other people were aware of the hi jacking of UAL 93 .John Azzarello Recap:On A A L 11, th e Boston Center reached out direc t ly to mi litary assets. 6-8 minu tesbefore th e crash;On UAL 175, there is hot a realization at ZBW tha t it is hijacked unt i l 10 minutes beforethe crash. Th ey get not i f ica t ion on i t though, too.On AAL 77, ZDC reports to NBADS that i t is lost a few m inut es before the crash.O n U A L 93, Z O B told NEADS roughly 4- 5 minutes before th e crash that UAL 93 washijacked "bomb on board." But otherwise, ZO B to ld th e Region at 9:39 AM. As early as9:34 AM, the Command Center had the inform at ion about "bomb on board" and so didHDQTs.Grif f i th does not disagree wi th this assessment. Th e procedures should have allowed formil i ta ry not i f ica t io n. I f you go back to the o ther three aircrafts and apply the wri t tenprocedures , then i f people had n ' t taken thei r own in i t ia t ive , s imi la r th ings would havehappened w i th those a i rc ra f t as d id wi th UAL 93.Are we to assume tha t HDQTs t h o u g h t th e Center w as contacting the mil i ta ry? TheCenters d id n ' t have a procedure to contac t the mil i ta r y.H e does not recall being on the Air Threat Conference Call that day.I t was an assumpt ion of his tha t th e mil i t a ry was in the loop; he was satisfied that| \s broadcasting inform

F A A a n d D O D C o m m u n i c a t i o n sTh e primary net should have inc luded th e N M C C . The Air Threat Conference call ,conversely, should have had FA A on i t .Were you aware that ei ther of those nets was inef fec t ive on 9 -11?"No, not un t i l later," said Grif f i th .The FAA posi t ions a t NEADS and SEADS w ere both vacant before 9 - 1 1 . D anSchmeckel at NORAD w as re t i r ing. Gri f f i th felt they were important posit ions tomainta in, so went outs ide h is orders to put the guys out there .



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Canoles' line was adrniiHstrative and thetac netwas more operat ional^ |was t rying to be .a hero b.ut he closed.his air space, which wasn ' t th e th ing to do.Azzarello told Griffith th"at| " ' " - - . . . . ~lfrom Boston Center told the Commissionthat .after the f irst crash, he thou ght tha t the appearance of a new code squawking on thei rradar f r equency migh t poss ib ly be UAL 175. Grif f i th can ' t believe that! 1

I I from Traf f ic Management cou ld have known tha t in real t ime. Griff i th wasfrustrated because the opera tional e lement i s where the money goes and inform at ionshou ld be piped in there, "John Whi te at the .Comm and Center is the guy that shouldknow everything." Dave Canoles wanted toget| Ion the telcoh:|should have not relayed operat ional information on an administrat ive l ine."What ca n people in conference rooms with speaker phones do about stopping aircrafts?Nothing!"There shou ld a CARF or a mili tary l iaison to the center a t every center. Due to staffingcuts , the posi t ion was e l imina t ed . ] berformed the role of m i l i t a ry l ia isonat ZBW and he did a good jo b that day. Usu ally, controllers at the centers have the MOSresponsibil i ties as an add i t ional du ty with in th e T M U .H e does not remember seeing John Flaherty that day (Secretary M in e t a ' s Chief of Staff).He did not interact with him.He does no t know i f the Adm inis t ra tor or the Depu ty Adminis t ra tor was mad e aware ofUAL 93 before it crashed.Jane Garvey and Mo nte Belger looked to both him a nd the securi ty people forin formation tha t day .

H is focus was the opera t iona l e l ement so i t was f rus t ra t ing to him to find out otherin formation was shared throu gh other avenues .Post 9-11 Afte r -Act ion"It was l ike pulling teeth" to get information after 9-11. The Centers weren't cooperative.Tony Ferrente worked nigh t and day for weeks to pu l l the informa t ion together . Fina l ly ,they got i t together to the poin t they cou ld brief the FBI and the Secret Service. DickClark was present at the meet ing, as were D O D people.He w ent to a br ief ing a t the Wh ite Hou se abou t a week la ter associa ted wi th protect ingth e national capital region. Primarily, i t was a Secret Service briefing. FAA had a part .Mike Canavan briefed on security issues, and Griff i th briefed on ATC issues. They wereconcerned about a plane taking of f f rom W ashington N at ional on ru nwa y 3-6 and hi t t ingthe W hite House. They briefed on the exercise missile sights ready to shoot dow nairplanes a round D C.



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11 Working -level Employee\D\NSENSITVEJ\e Canoles briefedG r i f f i t h on the "9-11 Hijackings Summary of Events". He got tonsof b r ief i ngs - di f ferent i terati ons of i t . Th ere were also internal meetings at the FAA onw h a t t h e F A A knew and w h e n ; and w h a t d id t h e y d o w i t h th e informat ion.

Coordination with th e mil i tary?"Larry Arnold (CONR) made sure we got whatever w e needed," Gri f f i t h said. H e gaveArnold whatever they wanted .Gri f f i t h remembers t ha t G eneral Arnold, also an Alaskan General, and General E b e r h a r d treceived shoot dow n author i ty . ROEs w ere comm unica ted to the FAA as well .|\s tasked tocome upwith a review of coordination between the FAAand the mil i ta ry .He is hot aware of the W h ite House ask ing to be br iefed on mil i ta ry and FAAcommunica t ions f rom 9 - 1 1 .General Wayne D owning had m eet ings by SVTs with the FAA and the W hi te House.Contents of discussion on the SVTs:- \ lot of intelligence issues- any issues reg ard ing the AT systemAgencies that participated in the SVTs sessions included : Secret Service, JCS, FBI, andCIA. Dick C lark was not on all the meetings (he delegated th e staff) . Any meetingsbetween FAA and Dick Clark were attended by G eneral Mi ke Canavan pr ior to 9 - 1 1 .Homeland Security's color coded system - F AA pu t together a scheme of what actionswere required at each level.Dave Canoles and Tony Ferrente were the principle people involved in the Aft er A c t io nreview. They br iefed th e Deputy and the Adm inis t ra tor by on his summ ary of 9-11events.John Azzarello spent some t im e compar ing the inform ation in the br ie f ing m a te r ia l s"summary on 9-11" tha t d i f fers from one of the original NEADS logs with Gri f f i t hs .Azzarello pointed out the unl ikel ihood that one of the NEA DS logs lists the tail numberof the f irs t hi jacked p lanes . Gri f f i t h aff i rmed t ha t ha v in g a plane by ta i l number is odd,so soon after th e event.Gri f f i t h doesn ' t know wh at happened to| |s af ter -ac t ion work. S h e pu tthe report togeth er. I t was a topic of hot debate among FAA employees. He knew peoplewere saying that FAA and military notif ication tim es were inconsistent. "Everyone waspoint ing f ingers." Larry and he approached i t pragmatica l ly . Get t ing th e people andacned it pra"I 1wett ing the logs was the f i rs t step; theri| |was asked to go f ind out on the FAA side.



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The NEADS logs were given to F A A v j jscreened the logs provided by NEADS.Azzarello pointed out to Griff i ths that notif ication t imes for the other flights ar e listed asunknown, according to the log. Griffiths assured staff tha t the milita ry got theinformation; he said he is confident about that.Larry and lie had a lot of heated conversations. "Larry and I agreed we wanted the truthon the issue." ["" ~|from CONR also coordinated with F A A .The DOD tes t imony to Congress was wrong. Griff i th conf i rmed this . He and LarryArnold did not talk in great detail about the times. They talked about the bosses fightingover head. The DEN addressed these concerns.Griffith didn ' t have an y information on the FA A press release that addressed th e issue ofnotifications to the military on 9-11 . They probab ly asked him about it. It is a t imel ine ofF A A events on 9-11 .


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T8 B6 FAA HQ Jeff Griffith 3-31-04 MFR

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