1 

 

Table of Contents

Abuse of power ...................................................................................................................... 5 

Altering the Constitution ........................................................................................................ 6 

Appointment of officers ......................................................................................................... 7 

Arms ....................................................................................................................................... 8 

Bill of rights ......................................................................................................................... 12 

Checks and balances ........................................................................................................... 14 

Constitution is not alterable by government ...................................................................... 25 

Constitution is recommended not imposed ....................................................................... 26 

Constitutional Convention .................................................................................................. 27 

Corruption ........................................................................................................................... 28 

Defense ............................................................................................................................... 30 

Democracy .......................................................................................................................... 31 

Due process ......................................................................................................................... 33 

Economics ........................................................................................................................... 34 

Electoral college .................................................................................................................. 35 

Emergency powers .............................................................................................................. 36 

Equality / inequality ............................................................................................................ 38 

Eternal vigilance against usurpation ................................................................................... 39 

Ex post facto laws ................................................................................................................ 43 

Example for world ............................................................................................................... 44 

Executive Branch, the nature of .......................................................................................... 45 

Faction ................................................................................................................................. 49 

Federal/national nature of U. S. government ..................................................................... 53 

Federations/federal governments; nature of ..................................................................... 61 

Foreign intrusions ............................................................................................................... 62 

Future taken into consideration ......................................................................................... 63 

 

 2 

 

General Welfare' not blank check ....................................................................................... 65 

Government for the benefit of those who govern ............................................................. 67 

Gridlock desirable ............................................................................................................... 69 

Human nature ..................................................................................................................... 71 

Impeachment ...................................................................................................................... 76 

Judiciary; nature of the ....................................................................................................... 78 

Jurisdiction of  federal/national government limited to certain enumerated objects ...... 84 

Law and equity .................................................................................................................... 92 

Laws must be executed ....................................................................................................... 94 

Laws must be few, understandable, and stable ................................................................. 95 

Laws; various types of ......................................................................................................... 97 

Legislature; Nature of the ................................................................................................. 101 

Legislature not to accord themselves privileges ............................................................... 105 

Limited jurisdiction of the federal/national government ................................................. 107 

Maxims .............................................................................................................................. 115 

Militia ................................................................................................................................ 122 

Minority rights ................................................................................................................... 132 

Miscellaneous.................................................................................................................... 134 

Monetary system .............................................................................................................. 145 

National concerns sacrificed to local interests (pork barreling) ....................................... 146 

Novelty of the Constitution ............................................................................................... 147 

Paper money ..................................................................................................................... 148 

Parchment barriers insufficient ........................................................................................ 150 

Part‐time legislature ......................................................................................................... 151 

People ‐ the ultimate source of authority......................................................................... 152 

People must protect themselves from the government .................................................. 157 

Policy changes ................................................................................................................... 163 

Property............................................................................................................................. 165 

Purpose of government .................................................................................................... 167 

 

 3 

 

Qualifications for office ..................................................................................................... 169 

Ratification; Method and significance of .......................................................................... 170 

Rebellion ........................................................................................................................... 171 

Representatives to control purse strings .......................................................................... 173 

Representatives to know the will of constituents ............................................................ 174 

Republican form; ingredients of ....................................................................................... 175 

Republics require enlightened citizenry ........................................................................... 180 

Respectability abroad ....................................................................................................... 182 

Rights given up upon joining society ................................................................................ 183 

Seat of government ‐ exclusive legislation over ............................................................... 184 

Senate; Nature of the ........................................................................................................ 186 

Slavery ............................................................................................................................... 187 

Standing armies ................................................................................................................. 188 

State governments need voice in federal/national government ..................................... 201 

States' rights ...................................................................................................................... 202 

States to guard against encroachments of federal/national government ....................... 205 

Suffrage; voters qualifications .......................................................................................... 212 

Suing a sovereign .............................................................................................................. 213 

Taxes .................................................................................................................................. 214 

Term limits ........................................................................................................................ 218 

Titles of nobility ................................................................................................................. 219 

Treaties .............................................................................................................................. 220 

Usurpation ......................................................................................................................... 222 

Veto power ........................................................................................................................ 233 

War .................................................................................................................................... 235 

Appendix 1‐ The Constitution ........................................................................................... 238 

Appendix 2 ‐ The Federalist Papers – Links ....................................................................... 253 

Appendix 3 ‐ Chronology of the Federalist Papers ........................................................... 259 

 

 4 

 

 

 

 5 

 

Abuse of power

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will

make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, that absolute

monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes

and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal

affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or

partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the

sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and

interests of his people.

John John Jay, Federalist # 4

Willful abuses of a public authority, to the oppression of the subject, and every species of

official extortion, are offenses against the government, for which the persons who commit

them may be indicted and punished according to the circumstances of the case. Hamilton,

Alexander Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83

 

 

Alte

The m

by the

conve

James

That u

requis

prefer

It guar

mutab

moreo

amend

other.

James

ering th

most that the

e past experi

enient mode

s Madison,

useful alterat

site, therefor

rred by the c

rds equally a

ble; and that

over, equally

dment of err

s Madison,

e Consti

convention

ence of othe

of rectifying

Federalist #

tions will be

re, that a mod

onvention se

against that e

extreme diff

y enables the

rors, as they

Federalist #

itution

could do in

er countries,

g their own e

# 37

e suggested b

de for introd

eems to be s

extreme faci

ficulty, whic

e general and

may be poin

# 43

6 

such a situat

as well as of

errors, as fut

by experienc

ducing them

tamped with

ility, which w

ch might per

d the State go

nted out by th

tion was to a

f our own; a

ture experien

ce could not

should be pr

h every mark

would rende

rpetuate its d

overnments

he experienc

avoid the err

and to provid

nce may unfo

but be fores

rovided. The

k of propriety

er the Consti

discovered fa

to originate

ce on one sid

rors suggeste

de a

fold them.

seen, It was

e mode

y.

itution too

aults. It,

the

de, or on the

 

ed

e

 

 

App

A thir

are to

judges

The pr

State g

of ren

appoin

With e

would

contra

those

their c

affairs

their c

Alexa

He wo

lucrati

State t

to him

obseq

Alexa

pointme

rd objection t

have in the

s of the cond

rinciple of th

governments

ndering those

nt them.

equal plausib

d always be a

adiction to th

who appoint

choice, and t

s, will inspir

conduct, may

ander Hami

ould be both

ive stations,

to which he

m, or of posse

quious instrum

ander Hami

ent of off

to the Senate

appointment

duct of men,

his objection

s, if not in al

e who hold o

bility might

an asylum fo

his principle,

t, for the fitn

the interest th

re a sufficien

y have prove

lton, Federa

h ashamed an

candidates w

particularly

essing the ne

ments of his

lton, Federa

ficers

e as a court o

ts to office.

in whose of

n would cond

ll the govern

office during

it be alleged

or the misbeh

, proceeds up

ness and com

hey have in

nt disposition

ed themselve

alist # 66

nd afraid to b

who had no

belonged, o

ecessary insi

s pleasure.

alist # 76

7 

of impeachm

It is imagine

fficial creatio

demn a prac

nments with

g pleasure de

d in this case

havior of the

pon the pres

mpetency of

the respecta

n to dismiss

es unworthy

bring forwar

other merit t

or of being in

ignificance a

ments is draw

ed that they w

on they had

ctice which i

which we ar

ependent on

e that the fav

e former. Bu

sumption tha

the persons

able and pros

from a share

y of the confi

rd, for the m

than that of

n some way

and pliancy t

wn from the

would be too

participated

s to be seen

re acquainte

the pleasure

voritism of th

ut that practi

at the respon

on whom th

sperous adm

e in it all suc

idence repos

ost distingui

coming from

or other pers

to render the

agency they

o indulgent

d.

in all the

d: I mean th

e of those wh

he latter

ce, in

nsibility of

hey bestow

ministration o

ch who, by

sed in them.

ished or

m the same

sonally allie

em the

 

y

hat

ho

of

d

 

 

Arm

Little

them p

necess

"But t

misch

digest

militia

The at

select

need.

well-t

it.

This w

any tim

formid

inferio

rights

This a

best p

Alexa

The ex

James

ms

more can re

properly arm

sary to assem

though the sc

hievous or im

ted plan shou

a.

ttention of th

corps of mo

By thus circ

trained militi

will not only

me oblige th

dable to the

or to them in

and those o

appears to m

ossible secu

ander Hami

xistence of a

s Madison,

easonably be

med and equi

mble them on

cheme of dis

mpracticable;

uld, as soon

he governme

oderate size,

cumscribing

ia ready to ta

y lessen the c

he governme

liberties of t

n discipline a

f their fellow

me the only s

urity against

lton, Federa

a right to inte

Federalist #

aimed at wi

ipped; and in

nce or twice

sciplining th

; yet it is a m

as possible,

ent ought par

upon such p

the plan, it w

ake the field

call for milita

ent to form an

the people w

and the use o

w-citizens.

substitute tha

it, if it shoul

alist # 29

erpose will g

# 43

8 

ith respect to

n order to se

e in the cours

he whole nati

matter of the

be adopted

rticularly to

principles as

will be possi

d whenever th

ary establish

n army of an

while there is

of arms, who

at can be dev

ld exist."

generally pre

o the people

ee that this be

se of a year.

ion must be

utmost impo

for the prop

be directed

will really f

ible to have

he defense o

hments, but i

ny magnitud

s a large bod

o stand ready

vised for a st

event the nec

at large than

e not neglec

abandoned a

ortance that

er establishm

to the forma

fit it for serv

an excellent

of the State s

if circumstan

de that army

dy of citizens

y to defend t

tanding army

cessity of ex

n to have

cted, it will b

as

a well-

ment of the

ation of a

vice in case o

t body of

shall require

nces should

can never be

s, little if at a

their own

y, and the

xerting it.

 

be

of

at

e

all

 

 

Beside

almos

are att

enterp

form c

Notwi

carried

people

And it

But w

thems

appoin

militia

Europ

Let us

be les

debase

oppre

James

It has

betwe

reserv

It is ev

applic

execu

es the advan

st every othe

tached and b

prises of amb

can admit of

ithstanding t

d as far as th

e with arms.

t is not certa

were the peop

selves, who c

nted out of th

a, it may be

pe would be

s not insult th

s able to def

ed subjects o

ssors.

s Madison,

been severa

een kings and

vations of rig

vident, there

cation to con

uted by their

ntage of bein

r nation, the

by which the

bition, more

f.

the military e

he public res

ain that with

ple to posses

could collect

he militia by

affirmed wit

speedily ove

he free and g

fend the righ

of arbitrary p

Federalist #

al times truly

d their subje

ghts not surre

efore, that, ac

nstitutions, pr

immediate r

ng armed, wh

e existence o

e militia offic

insurmounta

establishmen

sources will b

this aid alon

ss the additio

t the nationa

y these gove

th the greate

erturned in s

gallant citize

hts of which

power would

# 46

y remarked th

cts, abridgm

endered to th

ccording to t

rofessedly fo

representativ

9 

hich the Ame

f subordinat

cers are appo

able than an

nts in the sev

bear, the gov

ne they woul

onal advanta

al will and di

rnments and

est assurance

pite of the le

ens of Ameri

they would b

d be to rescu

hat bills of ri

ments of prer

he prince.

their primitiv

ounded upon

ves and serva

ericans poss

te governmen

ointed, form

ny which a si

veral kingdo

vernments a

ld not be abl

ages of local

irect the nati

d attached bo

e that the thro

egions which

ica with the

be in actual

ue theirs from

rights are, in

rogative in fa

ve significat

n the power

ants.

sess over the

nts, to which

ms a barrier a

imple govern

oms of Europ

are afraid to t

le to shake o

government

ional force, a

oth to them a

one of every

h surround it

suspicion th

possession t

m the hands

their origin,

avour of priv

tion, they ha

of the peopl

e people of

h the people

gainst the

nment of any

pe, which ar

trust the

off their yoke

ts chosen by

and of office

and to the

y tyranny in

t.

hat they wou

than the

of their

, stipulations

vilege,

ave no

le and

 

y

re

es.

y

ers

uld

s

 

 10 

 

Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no

need of particular reservations, "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the

blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution

for the United States of America."

Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make

the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights and which would sound much

better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.

But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like

that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests

of the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal

and private concerns.

If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well

founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. But

the truth is that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to

be desired.

I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are

contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would even be

dangerous.

They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very

account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why

declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?

Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained,

when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that

such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to

men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power.

They might urge with a semblance of reason that the Constitution ought not to be charged

with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and

 

 

that th

that a

nation

Alexa

he provision

power to pre

nal governme

ander Hami

against restr

escribe prop

ent.

lton, Federa

raining the li

per regulation

alist # 84

11 

iberty of the

ns concernin

e press afford

ng it was inte

ded a clear im

ended to be

mplication

vested in the

 

e

 

 12 

 

Bill of rights

It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations

between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favour of privilege,

reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince.

It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no

application to constitutions, professedly founded upon the power of the people and

executed by their immediate representatives and servants.

Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no

need of particular reservations, "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the

blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution

for the United States of America."

Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make

the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights and which would sound much

better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.

But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like

that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests

of the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal

and private concerns.

If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well

founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. But

the truth is that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to

be desired.

I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are

contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would even be

dangerous.

 

 13 

 

They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very

account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why

declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?

Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained,

when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that

such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to

men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power.

They might urge with a semblance of reason that the Constitution ought not to be charged

with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and

that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication

that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the

national government.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 84

 

 

Che

The re

balanc

during

their o

toward

excell

avoide

Alexa

[Quot

length

contri

togeth

REPU

"This

memb

that co

arrive

"A rep

intern

"If a s

suppo

have t

which

had us

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egular distrib

ces and chec

g good behav

own election

ds perfection

lencies of rep

ed.

ander Hami

ing Montesq

h to live cons

ved a kind o

her with the e

UBLIC.

form of gov

bers of a larg

onstitute a n

to such a de

public of this

al corruption

single memb

osed to have

too great infl

h would still

surped, and o

d balanc

bution of pow

cks; the instit

vior; the rep

n: these are w

n in modern

publican gov

lton, Federa

quieu]: "It is

stantly under

of constitutio

external forc

vernment is a

ger one, whic

ew one, capa

egree of pow

s kind, able

ns. The form

ber should att

an equal aut

fluence over

remain free

overpower h

ces

wer into dist

tution of cou

resentation o

wholly new d

times. They

vernment ma

alist # 9

s very proba

r the govern

on that has al

ce of a mona

a convention

ch they inten

able of incre

wer as to be a

to withstand

m of this soci

tempt to usu

thority and c

one, this wo

might oppo

him before h

14 

tinct departm

urts compose

of the people

discoveries,

y are means,

ay be retaine

able that man

nment of a SI

ll the interna

archical, gov

n by which s

nd to form. I

easing, by m

able to provi

d an external

iety prevents

urp the supre

credit in all th

ould alarm th

se him with

he could be s

ments; the in

ed of judges

e in the legis

or have mad

and powerfu

ed and its im

nkind would

INGLE PER

al advantage

vernment. I m

everal small

It is a kind of

means of new

ide for the se

l force, may

s all manner

eme authority

the confedera

he rest. Were

forces indep

settled in his

ntroduction o

s holding the

slature by de

de their princ

ful means, by

mperfections

d have been o

RSON, had th

es of a repub

mean a CON

ler states agr

f assemblag

w association

ecurity of the

support itse

of inconven

y, he could n

ate states. W

e he to subdu

pendent of th

usurpation.

of legislative

eir offices

eputies of

cipal progres

y which the

lessened or

obliged at

hey not

lican,

NFEDERATE

ree to becom

e of societie

ns, till they

e united bod

lf without an

niences.

not be

Were he to

ue a part, tha

hose which h

 

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ss

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me

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dy.

ny

at

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each;

of all

Alexa

In eve

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power

to the

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severa

conve

differe

1. Sec

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3. Ma

4. Cer

5. Res

6. Pro

James

uld a popular

ell it. Should

d. The state m

solved, and

his governme

and with res

the advantag

ander Hami

ery political

h may be mis

r is to be con

public good

ually as poss

we may form

al powers co

eniently done

ent objects:

curity agains

gulation of th

aintenance of

rtain miscell

straint of the

ovisions for g

s Madison,

r insurrection

d abuses cree

may be destr

the confeder

ent is compo

spect to its ex

ges of large m

lton, Federa

institution, a

sapplied and

nferred, the p

d; as the next

sible against

m a correct ju

onferred on th

e they may b

t foreign dan

he intercours

f harmony an

aneous objec

e States from

giving due e

Federalist #

n happen in

ep into one p

royed on one

rates preserv

osed of smal

xternal situa

monarchies.

alist # 9

a power to ad

d abused. The

point first to

t will be, in c

t a perversio

udgment on

he governme

be reduced in

nger;

se with forei

nd proper int

cts of genera

m certain inju

fficacy to all

# 41

15 

one of the c

part, they are

e side, and no

ve their sove

ll republics, i

ation, it is po

"

dvance the p

ey will see, t

be decided

case of an af

n of the pow

this subject,

ent of the Un

nto different

ign nations;

tercourse am

al utility;

urious acts;

l these powe

onfederate s

e reformed b

ot on the oth

ereignty.

it enjoys the

ossessed, by

public happin

therefore, th

is whether s

ffirmative de

wer to the pu

, it will be pr

nion; and tha

t classes as th

mong the Sta

ers.

states, the oth

y those that

her; the conf

e internal hap

means of th

ness involve

hat in all case

such a power

ecision, to gu

ublic detrime

roper to revi

at this may b

hey relate to

ates;

hers are able

remain

federacy may

ppiness of

e association

es a discretio

es where

r be necessar

uard as

ent.

iew the

be the more

o the followin

 

e

y

n,

on

ry

ng

 

 

A stan

provis

conseq

precau

A wis

itself f

pruden

be ina

James

Were

the St

the ad

If an a

popula

execu

alone.

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but in

preven

resorte

On the

unpop

warran

it are p

nding force,

sion. On the

quences may

ution.

e nation wil

from any res

nce in dimin

auspicious to

s Madison,

it admitted,

ate governm

dvantage in th

act of a parti

ar in that Sta

uted immedia

.

pposition of

flame the ze

nted or repai

ed to with re

e other hand

pular in parti

ntable measu

powerful an

therefore, is

smallest sca

y be fatal. O

l combine al

source which

nishing both

o its liberties

Federalist #

however, th

ments to exten

he means of

icular State,

ate, and shou

ately and, of

f the federal

eal of all part

ired, if at all

eluctance and

d, should an u

icular States,

ure be so, wh

d at hand.

s a dangerou

ale it has its i

On any scale i

ll these cons

h may becom

the necessit

.

# 41

hat the federa

nd its power

f defeating su

though unfri

uld not too g

f course, by m

government

ties on the si

, without the

d difficulty.

unwarrantab

, which wou

hich may so

16 

s, at the sam

inconvenien

it is an objec

siderations; a

me essential

y and the da

al governme

r beyond the

uch encroach

iendly to the

grossly violat

means on the

, or the inter

ide of the St

e employmen

ble measure o

uld seldom fa

ometimes be

me time that i

nces. On an e

ct of laudabl

and, whilst it

to its safety

anger of reso

nt may feel

e due limits,

hments.

e national go

ate the oaths

e spot and de

rposition of f

tate, and the

nt of means

of the federa

ail to be the

the case, the

it may be a n

extensive sca

le circumspe

t does not ra

, will exert a

orting to one

an equal dis

the latter wo

overnment, b

of the State

epending on

federal offic

evil could n

which must

al governme

case, or even

e means of o

necessary,

ale its

ection and

ashly preclud

all its

which may

sposition wit

ould still hav

be generally

officers, it i

n the State

cers, would

not be

t always be

ent be

n a

opposition to

 

de

th

ve

s

o

 

 

The d

the of

embar

occasi

large

State,

happe

hardly

But am

govern

They w

Every

Plans

The sa

produ

volunt

was m

But w

James

The p

depart

place,

each a

requir

It is ag

not to

isquietude o

fficers of the

rrassments c

ions, would

very serious

ened to be in

y be willing t

mbitious enc

nments wou

would be sig

y governmen

of resistance

ame combin

uced by the d

tarily renoun

made in the o

what degree o

s Madison,

olitical apoth

tments shoul

to show tha

a constitution

res, as essent

greed on all

be directly a

of the people

Union; the

created by leg

oppose, in a

s impedimen

unison, wou

to encounter

croachments

uld not excite

gnals of gene

nt would espo

e would be c

ations, in sh

dread of a for

nced, the sam

other.

of madness c

Federalist #

hegm does n

ld be wholly

at unless thes

nal control o

tial to a free

sides that th

and complet

; their repug

frowns of th

gislative dev

any State, dif

nts; and whe

uld present o

r.

of the feder

e the opposit

eral alarm.

ouse the com

concerted. O

hort, would r

reign, yoke;

me appeal to

could ever dr

# 46

not require th

y unconnecte

se departmen

over the othe

government

he powers pr

tely administ

17 

gnance and, p

he executive

vices, which

fficulties not

re the sentim

obstructions

ral governme

tion of a sing

mmon cause.

One spirit wo

esult from an

and unless t

o a trial of fo

rive the fede

hat the legisl

ed with each

nts be so far

ers, the degre

t, can never

operly belon

tered by eith

perhaps, refu

magistracy

would often

t to be despi

ments of seve

which the fe

ent on the au

gle State, or

. A correspo

ould animate

an apprehens

the projected

orce would b

eral governm

lative, execu

h other. I sha

connected a

ee of separat

in practice b

nging to one

her of the oth

usal to co-op

of the State;

n be added o

sed; would f

eral adjoinin

ederal gover

uthority of th

of a few Sta

ondence wou

and conduc

sion of the fe

d innovation

e made in th

ment to such

utive, and jud

all undertake

and blended

tion which th

be duly main

of the depar

her departme

perate with

; the

on such

form, in a

ng States

rnment woul

he State

ates only.

uld be opened

ct the whole.

ederal, as wa

ns should be

he one case a

an extremity

diciary

, in the next

as to give to

he maxim

ntained.

rtments ough

ents. It is

 

ld

d.

as

as

y?

o

ht

 

 

equall

influe

denied

from p

James

TO W

necess

Const

The on

inadeq

govern

means

James

In ord

power

the pr

and co

agenc

James

It is eq

possib

James

ly evident th

nce over the

d that power

passing the l

s Madison,

WHAT exped

sary partition

titution?

nly answer t

quate the def

nment as tha

s of keeping

s Madison,

der to lay a d

rs of governm

eservation o

onsequently

y as possible

s Madison,

qually evide

ble on those

s Madison,

hat none of th

e others in th

r is of an enc

limits assign

Federalist #

dient, then, sh

n of power a

that can be g

fect must be

at its several

each other i

Federalist #

due foundatio

ment, which

of liberty, it i

should be so

e in the appo

Federalist #

ent that the m

of the others

Federalist #

hem ought to

he administra

croaching na

ned to it.

# 48

hall we final

among the se

given is that

supplied, by

constituent

in their prop

# 51

on for that se

h to a certain

is evident tha

o constituted

ointment of t

# 51

members of e

s for the emo

# 51

18 

o possess, di

ation of their

ature and tha

lly resort, fo

everal depart

as all these e

y so contrivi

parts may, b

er places.

eparate and d

extent is ad

at each depa

d that the me

the members

each departm

oluments ann

irectly or ind

r respective

at it ought to

or maintainin

tments as lai

exterior prov

ing the interi

by their mutu

distinct exer

dmitted on al

artment shou

embers of ea

s of the othe

ment should b

nexed to the

directly, an o

powers. It w

be effectual

ng in practice

id down in th

visions are fo

ior structure

ual relations

rcise of the d

ll hands to be

uld have a wi

ach should ha

ers.

be as little d

eir offices.

overruling

will not be

lly restrained

e the

he

found to be

e of the

s, be the

different

e essential to

ill of its own

ave as little

dependent as

 

d

o

n;

s

 

 

But th

depart

consti

The pr

dange

must b

human

But w

were a

extern

In fram

lies in

place

A dep

experi

James

In the

betwe

distinc

Hence

contro

James

he great secu

tment consis

itutional mea

rovision for

er of attack. A

be connected

n nature that

what is govern

angels, no go

nal nor intern

ming a gove

n this: you m

oblige it to c

pendence on

ience has tau

s Madison,

compound r

een two distin

ct and separa

e a double se

ol each other

s Madison,

urity against

sts in giving

ans and pers

defense mus

Ambition mu

d with the co

t such device

nment itself

overnment w

nal controls o

rnment whic

must first enab

control itself

the people i

ught mankin

Federalist #

republic of A

nct governm

ate departme

ecurity arises

r, at the same

Federalist #

a gradual co

to those wh

onal motive

st in this, as

ust be made

onstitutional

es should be

f but the grea

would be nec

on governm

ch is to be ad

ble the gove

f.

s, no doubt,

nd the necess

# 51

America, the

ments, and th

ents.

s to the right

e time that e

# 51

19 

oncentration

o administer

s to resist en

in all other

to counterac

rights of the

necessary to

atest of all re

cessary. If an

ent would be

dministered

ernment to co

the primary

sity of auxili

e power surre

hen the portio

ts of the peo

each will be c

of the sever

r each depar

ncroachment

cases, be ma

ct ambition.

e place. It m

o control the

eflections on

ngels were to

e necessary.

by men over

ontrol the go

y control on t

iary precauti

endered by t

on allotted to

ople. The diff

controlled by

ral powers in

rtment the ne

ts of the othe

ade commen

The interest

may be a refle

e abuses of g

n human natu

o govern me

r men, the g

overned; and

the governm

ions.

the people is

o each subdi

fferent gover

y itself.

n the same

ecessary

ers.

nsurate to the

t of the man

ection on

government,

ure? If men

en, neither

great difficult

d in the next

ment; but

s first divide

ivided amon

rnments will

 

e

ty

ed

ng

 

 

The ai

posses

societ

virtuo

The el

The m

numer

appoin

James

a cons

will b

canno

govern

They,

history

gradua

it seem

govern

This p

weapo

for ob

saluta

James

im of every

ss most wisd

ty; and in the

ous whilst the

lective mode

means relied

rous and var

ntments as w

s Madison,

stitutional an

e able at all

ot only refuse

nment.

in a word, h

y of the Brit

ally enlargin

ms to have w

nment.

power over th

on with whic

btaining a red

ary measure.

s Madison,

political con

dom to disce

e next place,

ey continue

e of obtainin

on in this fo

rious. The m

will maintain

Federalist #

nd infallible

times to acc

e, but they al

hold the purs

tish Constitu

ng the sphere

wished, all th

he purse ma

ch any const

dress of ever

Federalist #

nstitution is,

ern, and most

to take the m

to hold their

ng rulers is th

orm of gover

most effectual

n a proper re

# 57

resource stil

complish thei

lone can pro

se --- that po

ution, an infa

e of its activi

he overgrown

ay, in fact, be

titution can a

ry grievance

# 58

20 

or ought to

t virtue to pu

most effectu

r public trust

he characteri

rnment for pr

l one is such

sponsibility

ll remains w

ir just purpo

opose the sup

owerful instru

ant and humb

ity and impo

n prerogativ

e regarded as

arm the imm

, and for car

be, first to o

ursue, the co

ual precautio

t.

istic policy o

reventing th

h a limitation

to the peopl

with the large

oses. The Ho

pplies requis

rument by wh

ble represent

ortance, and

ves of the oth

s the most co

mediate repre

rrying into ef

obtain for rul

ommon good

ons for keepi

of republican

eir degenera

n of the term

le.

er States by w

ouse of Repr

site for the su

hich we beh

tation of the

finally redu

her branches

omplete and

esentatives o

ffect every j

lers men wh

d of the

ing them

n governmen

acy are

m of

which they

esentatives

upport of

hold, in the

e people

ucing, as far a

of the

d effectual

f the people

ust and

 

o

nt.

as

,

 

 

It is a

govern

and pr

In this

and di

govern

It dou

schem

be suf

James

The p

betray

where

concu

James

An ab

admitt

encroa

conten

check

Alexa

misfortune i

nments, that

rove unfaithf

s point of vie

ividing the p

nment.

ubles the secu

mes of usurpa

fficient.

s Madison,

eople can ne

yed by the re

e the whole l

urrence of sep

s Madison,

bsolute or qu

ted, by the a

achments of

nded that the

k in the hands

ander Hami

incident to r

t those who a

ful to their im

ew a senate,

power with a

urity to the p

ation or perf

Federalist #

ever wilfully

epresentative

legislative tru

parate and d

Federalist #

ualified negat

ablest adepts

f the latter up

e powers rela

s of that bod

lton, Federa

republican go

administer it

mportant tru

as a second

a first, must b

people by req

fidy, where t

# 62

y betray their

es of the peo

ust is lodged

dissimilar bo

# 63

tive in the ex

in political

pon the form

ating to impe

dy upon the e

alist # 66

21 

overnment, t

t may forget

ust.

branch of th

be in all case

quiring the c

he ambition

r own interes

ple; and the

d in the hand

dies is requi

xecutive upo

science, to b

mer. And it m

eachments a

encroachmen

though in a l

t their obliga

he legislative

es a salutary

concurrence

n or corruptio

sts; but they

danger will

ds of one bod

ired in every

on the acts o

be an indispe

may, perhaps

are, as before

nts of the ex

less degree t

ations to thei

e assembly d

y check on th

of two distin

on of one wo

y may possib

be evidently

dy of men th

y public act.

of the legislat

ensable barri

, with no les

e intimated,

xecutive.

than to other

ir constituent

distinct from

he

nct bodies in

ould otherwi

bly be

y greater

han where th

tive body is

ier against th

ss reason, be

an essential

 

r

ts

m

n

ise

he

he

e

 

 

The sa

power

indepe

Alexa

The pr

virtue

that th

rights

its del

which

The pr

enable

comm

Alexa

It is im

expou

corrup

Alexa

The co

Const

excep

attaind

ame rule wh

r teaches like

endent of the

ander Hami

ropriety of th

in the execu

he love of po

of other me

liberations; t

h itself, on m

rimary induc

e him to defe

munity agains

ander Hami

mpossible to

unding the la

pted or influe

ander Hami

omplete inde

titution. By a

tions to the l

der, no ex po

hich teaches t

ewise that th

e other.

lton, Federa

he thing [vet

utive, but up

ower may so

mbers of the

that impressi

maturer reflec

cement to co

end himself;

st the passin

lton, Federa

o keep the jud

aws. It is pec

enced by the

lton, Federa

ependence o

a limited Con

legislative au

ost facto law

the propriety

his partition

alist # 71

to] does not

pon the suppo

metimes bet

e governmen

ions of the m

ction, would

onferring the

the seconda

g of bad law

alist # 73

dges too dist

culiarly dang

e executive.

alist # 73

of the courts

nstitution, I

uthority; suc

ws, and the li

22 

y of a partitio

ought to be s

turn upon th

osition that t

tray it into a

nt; that a spir

moment may

condemn.

e power in qu

ary one is to

ws, through h

tinct from ev

gerous to pla

of justice is

understand o

ch, for instan

ke.

on between

so contrived

he suppositio

the legislatur

disposition

rit of faction

y sometimes

uestion upon

increase the

haste, inadve

very other av

ace them in a

peculiarly e

one which c

nce, as that i

the various b

d as to render

on of superio

ure will not b

to encroach

n may somet

hurry it into

n the executi

e chances in

ertence, or de

vocation tha

a situation to

essential in a

ontains certa

it shall pass n

branches of

r the one

or wisdom o

be infallible;

upon the

times pervert

o measures

ive is to

favor of the

esign.

an that of

o be either

a limited

ain specified

no bills of

 

or

t

e

d

 

 

Limita

mediu

manif

rights

Alexa

From

expec

had op

could

legisla

Alexa

The im

part o

body u

This i

delibe

resent

punish

Alexa

The tr

imped

court

ations of this

um of courts

fest tenor of t

or privilege

ander Hami

a body whic

t a dispositio

perated in m

it be expect

ators would

ander Hami

mportant con

f the legislat

upon the me

s alone a com

erate usurpat

tment of the

hing their pr

ander Hami

rial by jury m

diments to its

and jury; for

s kind can be

of justice, w

the Constitu

es would amo

lton, Federa

ch had had e

on to temper

making them

ed that men

be disposed

lton, Federa

nstitutional c

tive body, an

embers of the

mplete secur

tions of the a

body intrust

resumption b

lton, Federa

must still be

s success. A

r where the j

e preserved

whose duty it

ution void. W

ount to nothi

alist # 78

ven a partial

r and modera

would be to

who had inf

to repair the

alist # 81

check which

nd of determ

e judicial dep

rity. There n

authority of t

ted with it, w

by degrading

alist # 81

a valuable c

s matters no

jury have go

23 

in practice n

t must be to

Without this,

ing.

l agency in p

ate them in t

o apt to oper

fringed the C

e breach in th

h the power o

mining upon t

partment.

never can be

the legislatu

while this bo

g them from

check upon c

ow stand, it w

one evidently

no other way

declare all a

all the reser

passing bad

the applicatio

rate in interp

Constitution

he character

of instituting

them in the o

danger that

ure, would ha

ody was poss

their station

corruption. It

would be nec

y wrong, the

y than throug

acts contrary

rvations of p

laws we cou

on. The sam

preting them

in the chara

r of judges.

g impeachme

other, would

the judges, b

azard the uni

sessed of the

ns.

t greatly mu

cessary to co

e court will g

gh the

y to the

articular

uld rarely

me spirit whic

m; still less

acter of

ents in one

d give to that

by a series o

ited

e means of

ultiplies the

orrupt both

generally gra

 

ch

t

of

ant

 

 

a new

court

Here t

tends

discou

The te

much

thems

Alexa

w trial, and it

could be like

then is a dou

to preserve t

urages attem

emptations to

fewer, while

selves the ex

ander Hami

would be in

ewise gained

uble security

the purity of

mpts to seduc

o prostitutio

e the co-ope

clusive deter

lton, Federa

n most cases

d.

y; and it will

f both institu

ce the integri

n which the

eration of a ju

rmination of

alist # 83

24 

of little use

readily be p

utions. By in

ity of either.

judges migh

ury is necess

f all causes.

to practice u

perceived tha

ncreasing the

ht have to su

sary, than th

upon the jury

at this compl

e obstacles to

urmount mus

hey might be

y unless the

licated agenc

o success, it

st certainly b

if they had

 

cy

be

 

 

Con

It has

had a

severa

validit

right o

Owing

might

mainta

had re

The p

our na

fabric

PEOP

origin

Alexa

The im

establ

govern

observ

James

nstitutio

not a little c

ratification b

al legislature

ty of its pow

of legislative

g its ratificat

repeal the la

ain that a pa

espectable ad

ossibility of

ational gover

of America

PLE. The stre

nal fountain o

ander Hami

mportant dis

ished by the

nment and a

ved in any ot

s Madison,

on is not

contributed t

by the PEOP

es, it has bee

wers, and has

e repeal.

tion to the la

aw by which

arty to a com

dvocates.

f a question o

rnment deep

n empire ou

eams of nati

of all legitim

lton, Federa

tinction so w

e people and

alterable by t

ther country

Federalist #

alterab

o the infirmi

PLE. Resting

en exposed to

s in some ins

aw of a State

h it was ratif

mpact has a ri

of this nature

per than in th

ught to rest o

onal power o

mate authorit

alist # 22

well understo

unalterable

the governm

y.

# 53

25 

ble by go

ities of the e

g on no bette

o frequent an

stances given

e, it has been

fied. Howeve

ight to revok

e proves the

he mere sanc

n the solid b

ought to flow

y.

ood in Amer

by the gover

ment, seems to

overnme

existing fede

er foundation

nd intricate q

n birth to the

n contended

er gross a he

ke that comp

necessity of

ction of deleg

basis of THE

w immediate

rica between

rnment, and

o have been

ent

eral system th

n than the co

questions co

e enormous

that the sam

eresy it may

pact, the doct

f laying the f

gated author

E CONSENT

ely from tha

n a Constitut

d a law establ

n little unders

hat it never

onsent of the

oncerning the

doctrine of a

me authority

be to

trine itself h

foundations

rity. The

T OF THE

at pure,

ion

lished by the

stood and les

 

e

e

a

as

of

e

ss

 

 

Con

Admit

remem

but to

subjec

John

It is ti

they w

have a

conseq

approb

James

nstitutio

t, for so is th

mbered that i

that sedate

ct demand, a

John Jay, F

me now to r

were so mean

accordingly

quence than

bation of tho

s Madison,

on is reco

he fact, that t

it is neither r

and candid c

and which it

Federalist #

recollect that

nt by the Sta

planned and

the paper on

ose to whom

Federalist #

ommend

this plan is o

recommende

consideration

certainly ou

2

t the powers

ates and so u

d proposed a

n which it is

m it is address

# 40

26 

ded not

only recomm

ed to blind a

n which the

ught to receiv

were merely

understood by

Constitution

s written, unl

sed.

impose

mended, not i

approbation,

magnitude a

ve.

y advisory a

y the conven

n which is to

less it be stam

ed

imposed, yet

nor to blind

and importan

and recomme

ntion; and th

o be of no m

amped with t

t let it be

d reprobation

nce of the

endatory; tha

hat the latter

more

the

 

n;

at

 

 27 

 

Constitutional Convention

It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory; that

they were so meant by the States and so understood by the convention; and that the latter

have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more

consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the

approbation of those to whom it is addressed.

James Madison, Federalist # 40

 

 

Cor

One o

too ea

sacrifi

in the

equiva

Alexa

In rep

fellow

betray

exceed

obliga

Alexa

The tr

imped

court

a new

court

Here t

tends

discou

rruption

of the weak s

asy an inlet to

ice his subje

external glo

alent for wha

ander Hami

ublics, perso

w-citizens to

ying their tru

d the propor

ations of duty

ander Hami

rial by jury m

diments to its

and jury; for

w trial, and it

could be like

then is a dou

to preserve t

urages attem

n

sides of repu

o foreign co

ects to his am

ory of the nat

at he would

lton, Federa

ons elevated

stations of g

ust, which, to

rtion of inter

y.

lton, Federa

must still be

s success. A

r where the j

would be in

ewise gained

uble security

the purity of

mpts to seduc

ublics, among

rruption. An

mbition, has

tion, that it i

sacrifice by

alist # 22

d from the ma

great pre-em

o any but min

rest they hav

alist # 22

a valuable c

s matters no

jury have go

n most cases

d.

y; and it will

f both institu

ce the integri

28 

g their nume

n hereditary m

so great a pe

is not easy fo

treachery to

ass of the co

minence and p

nds actuated

ve in the com

check upon c

ow stand, it w

one evidently

of little use

readily be p

utions. By in

ity of either.

erous advant

monarch, th

ersonal inter

or a foreign

o the state.

ommunity by

power may f

d by superior

mmon stock,

corruption. It

would be nec

y wrong, the

to practice u

perceived tha

ncreasing the

tages, is that

hough often d

rest in the go

power to giv

y the suffrag

find compen

r virtue may

and to overb

t greatly mu

cessary to co

e court will g

upon the jury

at this compl

e obstacles to

t they afford

disposed to

overnment an

ve him an

ges of their

nsations for

y appear to

balance the

ultiplies the

orrupt both

generally gra

y unless the

licated agenc

o success, it

 

nd

ant

cy

 

 29 

 

The temptations to prostitution which the judges might have to surmount must certainly be

much fewer, while the co-operation of a jury is necessary, than they might be if they had

themselves the exclusive determination of all causes.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83

 

 30 

 

Defense

The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate

power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 11

 

 

Dem

It may

small

admit

every

James

Demo

incom

short i

Theor

suppo

at the

and th

James

In a de

assem

must b

James

mocracy

y be conclud

number of c

of no cure f

case, be felt

s Madison,

ocracies have

mpatible with

in their lives

retic politicia

osed that by r

same time b

heir passions

s Madison,

emocracy th

mble and adm

be confined

s Madison,

y

ded that a pur

citizens, who

for the misch

t by a majori

Federalist #

e ever been s

h personal se

s as they hav

ans, who hav

reducing ma

be perfectly e

s.

Federalist #

he people me

minister it by

to a small sp

Federalist #

re democrac

o assemble a

hiefs of facti

ity of the wh

# 10

spectacles of

ecurity or the

ve been viole

ve patronized

ankind to a p

equalized an

# 10

eet and exerc

y their repres

pot. A repub

# 14

31 

cy, by which

and administ

on. A comm

hole;

f turbulence

e rights of pr

ent in their d

d this specie

perfect equal

nd assimilate

cise the gove

entatives an

blic may be e

h I mean a so

er the gover

mon passion

and content

roperty; and

deaths.

es of governm

ity in their p

ed in their po

ernment in p

nd agents. A

extended ove

ociety consis

rnment in per

or interest w

tion; have ev

have in gen

ment, have e

political righ

ossessions, th

person; in a r

democracy,

er a large reg

sting of a

rson, can

will, in almos

ver been foun

neral been as

erroneously

hts, they wou

heir opinion

republic they

consequentl

gion.

 

st

nd

uld

ns,

y

ly,

 

 

As the

permi

will in

republ

people

James

In a de

and ar

measu

appreh

James

e natural lim

t the most re

nclude no gr

lic is that dis

e to meet as

s Madison,

emocracy, w

re continuall

ures, to the a

hended, on s

s Madison,

mit of a demo

emote citizen

eater numbe

stance from

often as may

Federalist #

where a mult

ly exposed, b

ambitious int

some favorab

Federalist #

ocracy is that

ns to assemb

er than can jo

the center w

y be necessa

# 14

titude of peo

by their inca

trigues of the

ble emergen

# 48

32 

t distance fro

ble as often a

oin in those

which will ba

ary for the ad

ple exercise

apacity for re

eir executive

ncy, to start u

om the centr

as their publ

functions, so

arely allow th

dministration

e in person th

egular delibe

e magistrates

up in the sam

ral point whi

ic functions

o the natural

he represent

n of public a

he legislative

eration and c

s, tyranny m

me quarter.

ich will just

demand, an

l limit of a

tatives of the

affairs.

e functions

concerted

may well be

 

nd

e

 

 33 

 

Due process

The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or in other words, the subjecting of

men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law, and

the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most

formidable instruments of tyranny.

The observations of the judicious Blackstone, in reference to the latter, are well worthy of

recital: "To bereave a man of life [says he] or by violence to confiscate his estate, without

accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once

convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person,

by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less

public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government."

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 84

 

 

Eco

It is a

nature

withou

When

two an

the co

confin

Alexa

Exorb

which

to ren

manuf

somet

less ad

Alexa

It mig

alway

Alexa

onomics

signal advan

e a security a

ut defeating

n applied to t

nd two do no

ollection is el

ned within pr

ander Hami

bitant duties

h is always p

der other cla

facturing cla

times force i

dvantage

ander Hami

ght be demon

ys be the leas

ander Hami

ntage of taxe

against exces

the end prop

this object, th

ot always ma

luded; and th

roper and m

lton, Federa

on imported

rejudicial to

asses of the c

asses, to who

ndustry out

lton, Federa

nstrated that

st burdensom

lton, Federa

es on articles

ss. They pre

posed -- that

he saying is

ake four." If

he product to

moderate boun

alist # 21

d articles wou

o the fair trad

community t

om they give

of its more n

alist # 35

the most pro

me.

alist # 35

34 

s of consump

scribe their o

t is, an exten

as just as it

f duties are to

o the treasur

nds.

uld serve to

der, and even

tributary in a

e a prematur

natural chann

oductive sys

ption that th

own limit, w

nsion of the r

is witty that

oo high, they

ry is not so g

beget a gene

ntually to the

an improper

e monopoly

nels into oth

stem of [gov

hey contain i

which cannot

revenue.

t, "in politica

y lessen the

great as when

eral spirit of

e revenue its

degree to th

of the mark

hers in which

vernment] fin

n their own

t be exceede

al arithmetic

consumption

n they are

f smuggling;

self: they ten

he

kets; they

h it flows wi

nance will

 

ed

,

n;

nd

ith

 

 35 

 

Electoral college

It was equally desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most capable

of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable

to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which

were proper to govern their choice.

A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be

most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicated an

investigation.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 68

 

 

Eme

A wea

or the

once b

depen

Tyran

exigen

consti

James

There

things

the po

Alexa

It is in

than in

every

James

There

author

legisla

ergency

ak constitutio

usurpation o

begun, will s

nd on the con

nny has perha

ncies, by a d

itutional auth

s Madison,

are certain e

s ought to be

ossibility of s

ander Hami

n vain to opp

n vain; becau

precedent o

s Madison,

is no positio

rity, contrary

ative act, the

y powers

on must nec

of powers re

stop at the sa

ntingencies o

aps oftener g

defective con

horities.

Federalist #

emergencies

e forborne be

such emerge

lton, Federa

pose constitu

use it plants

f which is a

Federalist #

on which dep

y to the teno

erefore, contr

s

essarily term

equisite for t

alutary point

of the mome

grown out of

nstitution, tha

# 20

s of nations i

ecome essen

encies, ought

alist # 36

utional barrie

in the Cons

germ of unn

# 41

pends on cle

or of the com

rary to the C

36 

minate in dis

he public sa

t, or go forw

nt.

f the assump

an out of the

in which exp

ntial to the pu

t ever to hav

ers to the im

titution itsel

necessary an

earer princip

mmission und

Constitution,

solution for

afety. Wheth

ward to the da

ptions of pow

e full exercis

pedients that

ublic weal. A

ve the option

mpulse of self

lf necessary

nd multiplied

ples than that

der which it

can be valid

want of pro

her the usurp

angerous ext

wer called fo

se of the larg

t in the ordin

And the gove

n of making u

f-preservatio

usurpations

d repetitions.

t every act o

is exercised

d.

per powers,

ation, when

treme, must

or, on pressin

gest

nary state of

ernment, fro

use of them.

on. It is wors

of power,

.

of a delegated

, is void. No

 

ng

om

.

se

d

o

 

 37 

 

To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the

servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people

themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not

authorize, but what they forbid.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 78

 

 

 38 

 

Equality / inequality

Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found

incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as

short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.

Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously

supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would

at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions,

and their passions.

James Madison, Federalist # 10

 

 

Eter

Safety

ardent

life an

contin

securi

be mo

Alexa

Where

preten

natura

of men

Alexa

Every

liberty

attach

preser

James

Were

the St

the ad

rnal vig

y from extern

t love of libe

nd property i

nual danger,

ity to institut

ore safe, they

ander Hami

e the whole p

nse for the us

al cure for an

n.

ander Hami

y man who lo

y ought to ha

hment to the

rving it.

s Madison,

it admitted,

ate governm

dvantage in th

ilance a

nal danger is

erty will, afte

incident to w

will compel

tions which h

y at length be

lton, Federa

power of the

se of violent

n ill administ

lton, Federa

oves peace, e

ave it ever b

Union of Am

Federalist #

however, th

ments to exten

he means of

against u

s the most po

er a time, giv

war, the conti

l nations the

have a tende

ecome willin

alist # 8

e governmen

t remedies in

tration in a p

alist # 21

every man w

efore his eye

merica and b

# 41

hat the federa

nd its power

f defeating su

39 

usurpati

owerful dire

ve way to its

inual effort a

most attach

ency to destr

ng to run the

nt is in the ha

n partial or o

popular or re

who loves his

es that he ma

be able to set

al governme

r beyond the

uch encroach

ion

ector of natio

s dictates. Th

and alarm at

ed to liberty

roy their civi

e risk of bein

ands of the p

occasional di

epresentative

s country, ev

ay cherish in

t a due value

nt may feel

e due limits,

hments.

onal conduct

he violent de

ttendant on a

y to resort for

il and politic

ng less free.

people, there

istempers of

e constitutio

very man wh

n his heart a

e on the mea

an equal dis

the latter wo

t. Even the

estruction of

a state of

r repose and

cal rights. To

e is the less

f the State. T

n is a chang

ho loves

due

ans of

sposition wit

ould still hav

 

f

d

o

he

e

th

ve

 

 40 

 

If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally

popular in that State, and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is

executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State

alone.

The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would

but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be

prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be

resorted to with reluctance and difficulty.

On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be

unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a

warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to

it are powerful and at hand.

The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with

the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the

embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such

occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a

large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States

happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would

hardly be willing to encounter.

But ambitious encroachments of the federal government on the authority of the State

governments would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only.

They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common

cause.

A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit

would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from

an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless

the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of

force would be made in the one case as was made in the other.

 

 

But w

James

In a go

heredi

dange

In a de

and ar

measu

appreh

But in

the ex

assem

confid

which

of its p

this de

precau

James

The H

recolle

minds

compe

is to b

there f

title to

what degree o

s Madison,

overnment w

itary monarc

er, and watch

emocracy, w

re continuall

ures, to the a

hended, on s

n a represent

xtent and the

mbly, which i

dence in its o

h actuate a m

passions by

epartment th

utions.

s Madison,

House of Rep

ection of the

s by the mod

elled to antic

be reviewed,

forever to re

o a renewal o

of madness c

Federalist #

where numer

ch, the execu

hed with all t

where a mult

ly exposed, b

ambitious int

some favorab

ative republi

duration of

is inspired by

own strength

multitude, yet

means whic

hat the peopl

Federalist #

presentatives

eir dependen

de of their ele

cipate the mo

and when th

emain unless

of it.

could ever dr

# 46

rous and ext

utive departm

the jealousy

titude of peo

by their inca

trigues of the

ble emergen

ic where the

its power; a

y a supposed

h; which is su

t not so num

ch reason pre

e ought to in

# 48

s is so consti

nce on the pe

evation can b

oment when

hey must des

s a faithful di

41 

rive the fede

ensive prero

ment is very

which a zea

ple exercise

apacity for re

eir executive

ncy, to start u

e executive m

and where th

d influence o

ufficiently n

merous as to b

escribes; it is

ndulge all th

ituted as to s

eople. Before

be effaced b

n their power

scend to the

ischarge of t

eral governm

ogatives are p

justly regard

al for liberty

e in person th

egular delibe

e magistrates

up in the sam

magistracy is

e legislative

over the peop

numerous to

be incapable

s against the

heir jealousy

support in th

e the sentime

by the exerci

r is to cease,

level from w

their trust sh

ment to such

placed in the

ded as the so

ought to ins

he legislative

eration and c

s, tyranny m

me quarter.

s carefully li

e power is ex

ple with an i

feel all the p

e of pursuing

enterprising

and exhaust

he members a

ents impress

ise of power,

, when their

which they w

hall have esta

an extremity

e hands of an

ource of

spire.

e functions

concerted

may well be

imited, both

xercised by a

intrepid

passions

g the objects

g ambition o

t all their

an habitual

sed on their

, they will be

exercise of i

were raised;

ablished thei

 

y?

n

in

an

of

e

it

ir

 

 42 

 

I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives,

restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which will not have

its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the

society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy

can connect the rulers and the people together.

It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments of which

few governments have furnished examples; but without which every government

degenerates into tyranny. If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives

from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the

society?

I answer: the genius of the whole system; the nature of just and constitutional laws; and,

above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America -- a spirit

which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it.

If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the

legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but

liberty.

James Madison, Federalist # 57

 

 43 

 

Ex post facto laws

The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or in other words, the subjecting of

men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law, and

the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most

formidable instruments of tyranny.

The observations of the judicious Blackstone, in reference to the latter, are well worthy of

recital: "To bereave a man of life [says he] or by violence to confiscate his estate, without

accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once

convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person,

by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less

public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government."

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 84

 

 44 

 

Example for world

But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected merely because it may

comprise what is new?

Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to

the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration

for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good

sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?

To this manly spirit posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the

example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theater in favor of

private rights and public happiness.

Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent

could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model did not

present itself, the people of the United States might at this moment have been numbered

among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring

under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of

mankind.

Happily for America, happily we trust for the whole human race, they pursued a new and

more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of

human society.

They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe.

They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors

to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness

of them.

James Madison, Federalist # 14

 

 

Exe

The ai

posses

societ

virtuo

The el

The m

numer

appoin

James

A feeb

anothe

theory

Alexa

The in

provis

Alexa

But on

agains

Alexa

ecutive B

im of every

ss most wisd

ty; and in the

ous whilst the

lective mode

means relied

rous and var

ntments as w

s Madison,

ble executive

er phrase for

y, must be, in

ander Hami

ngredients w

sion for its su

ander Hami

ne of the we

st the last as

ander Hamilt

Branch,

political con

dom to disce

e next place,

ey continue

e of obtainin

on in this fo

rious. The m

will maintain

Federalist #

e implies a f

r a bad execu

n practice, a

lton, Federa

which constitu

upport; and

lton, Federa

ightiest obje

the first plan

ton, Federali

the natu

nstitution is,

ern, and most

to take the m

to hold their

ng rulers is th

orm of gover

most effectual

n a proper re

# 57

feeble execu

ution; and a

bad governm

alist # 70

ute energy in

competent p

alist # 70

ections to a p

n is that it te

ist # 70

45 

ure of

or ought to

t virtue to pu

most effectu

r public trust

he characteri

rnment for pr

l one is such

sponsibility

ution of the g

government

ment.

n the execut

powers.

plurality in th

ends to conce

be, first to o

ursue, the co

ual precautio

t.

istic policy o

reventing th

h a limitation

to the peopl

government.

t ill executed

tive are unity

he executive

eal faults an

obtain for rul

ommon good

ons for keepi

of republican

eir degenera

n of the term

le.

A feeble ex

d, whatever i

y; duration; a

e, and which

nd destroy re

lers men wh

d of the

ing them

n governmen

acy are

m of

xecution is bu

it may be in

an adequate

h lies as muc

sponsibility.

 

o

nt.

ut

ch

.

 

 

It is ev

the pe

delega

accou

accou

discov

either

Alexa

With a

eligibi

resolu

tenden

The la

to con

secure

Alexa

There

were c

relinq

obtain

it is ad

or that

their d

Alexa

vident from

eople of the t

ated power,

unt of the div

unt of the unc

vering with f

to their rem

ander Hami

a positive du

ility. The fir

ution to act h

ncy of his m

ast is necessa

ntinue him in

e to the gove

ander Hami

are few men

conscious th

quished at a d

ning, by mer

dmitted that

t the best sec

duty.

ander Hami

these consid

two greatest

first, the rest

vision of the

certainty on

facility and c

moval from o

lton, Federa

uration of co

rst is necessa

his part well,

measures, and

ary to enable

n the station

ernment the a

lton, Federa

n who would

hat the advan

determinate p

iting, a conti

the desire o

curity for the

lton, Federa

derations tha

securities th

traints of pu

censure atte

whom it oug

clearness the

ffice or to th

alist # 70

onsiderable e

ary to give th

and to the c

d thence to fo

e the people,

in order to p

advantage o

alist # 72

d not feel mu

ntage of the s

period, than

inuance of th

f reward is o

e fidelity of

alist # 72

46 

at the pluralit

hey can have

ublic opinion

endant on bad

ght to fall; an

e misconduc

heir actual pu

extent, I conn

he officer him

community t

orm an expe

, when they

prolong the u

f permanenc

uch less zeal

station with

when they w

hem. This po

one of the str

mankind is t

ty of the exe

e for the faith

n, which lose

d measures a

nd, second, t

ct of the pers

unishment in

nect the circ

mself the inc

time and leis

erimental est

see reason to

utility of his

cy in a wise

l in the disch

which it was

were permitt

osition will n

rongest incen

to make thei

ecutive tends

hful exercise

e their effica

among a num

the opportun

sons they tru

n cases whic

cumstances o

clination and

sure to obser

timate of the

o approve of

talents and v

system of ad

harge of a du

s connected

ted to enterta

not be dispu

ntives of hum

ir interest co

s to deprive

e of any

cy, as well o

mber as on

nity of

ust, in order

ch admit of i

of re-

d the

rve the

ir merits.

f his conduc

virtues, and

dministration

uty when the

must be

ain a hope o

uted so long a

man conduc

oincide with

 

on

t.

ct,

to

n.

ey

of

as

ct;

 

 

An av

must a

be res

might

abund

before

even b

His av

or amb

good c

But w

would

Alexa

The pr

virtue

that th

rights

its del

which

The pr

enable

comm

Alexa

The es

rules f

varicious man

at all events

isted by such

not scruple

dant as it was

e him, might

be unwilling

varice might

bitious, as w

conduct, he

with the prosp

d be likely to

ander Hami

ropriety of th

in the execu

he love of po

of other me

liberations; t

h itself, on m

rimary induc

e him to defe

munity agains

ander Hami

ssence of the

for the regul

n who might

yield up the

h a man to m

to have reco

s transitory;

t content him

g to risk the c

be a guard u

well as avaric

might hesita

pect before h

o get the vict

lton, Federa

he thing [vet

utive, but up

ower may so

mbers of the

that impressi

maturer reflec

cement to co

end himself;

st the passin

lton, Federa

e legislative

lation of the

t happen to f

e advantages

make the bes

ourse to the m

though the s

mself with th

consequence

upon his ava

cious. And if

ate to sacrific

him of appro

tory over his

alist # 72

to] does not

pon the suppo

metimes bet

e governmen

ions of the m

ction, would

onferring the

the seconda

g of bad law

alist # 73

authority is

society; whi

47 

fill the office

he enjoyed,

st use of his o

most corrupt

same man, p

he regular pe

es of an abus

arice. Add to

f he could ex

ce his appeti

oaching and

s caution, his

turn upon th

osition that t

tray it into a

nt; that a spir

moment may

condemn.

e power in qu

ary one is to

ws, through h

to enact law

ile the execu

e, looking fo

, would feel

opportunitie

t expedients

probably, wit

erquisites of h

se of his opp

o this that the

xpect to prol

ite for them

inevitable an

s vanity, or h

he suppositio

the legislatur

disposition

rit of faction

y sometimes

uestion upon

increase the

haste, inadve

ws, or, in oth

ution of the l

orward to a t

a propensity

es while they

s to make the

th a differen

his situation

portunities.

e same man

long his hon

to his appeti

nnihilation, h

his ambition

on of superio

ure will not b

to encroach

n may somet

hurry it into

n the executi

e chances in

ertence, or de

her words, to

laws and the

time when h

y not easy to

y lasted, and

e harvest as

nt prospect

n, and might

might be va

nors by his

ite for gain.

his avarice

.

or wisdom o

be infallible;

upon the

times pervert

o measures

ive is to

favor of the

esign.

prescribe

e employmen

 

e

o

ain

or

t

e

nt

 

 48 

 

of the common strength, either for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to

comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 75

 

 

Fac

The pu

often

the su

James

By a f

minor

or of i

intere

James

There

liberty

opinio

It cou

Libert

could

nouris

anima

The se

reason

be for

opinio

will b

tion

ublic good i

decided, not

uperior force

s Madison,

faction I und

rity of the wh

interest, adve

sts of the com

s Madison,

are again tw

y which is es

ons, the same

ld never be m

ty is to factio

not be a less

shes faction

al life, becau

econd exped

n of man con

rmed. As lon

ons and his p

e objects to

s disregarde

t according t

of an intere

Federalist #

derstand a nu

hole, who ar

erse to the ri

mmunity.

Federalist #

wo methods

ssential to its

e passions, a

more truly s

on what air i

s folly to abo

than it woul

use it imparts

dient is as im

ntinues fallib

ng as the con

passions will

which the la

d in the conf

to the rules o

sted and ove

# 10

umber of citi

re united and

ights of othe

# 10

of removing

s existence;

and the same

aid than of t

is to fire, an

olish liberty,

d be to wish

s to fire its d

mpracticable

ble, and he is

nnection subs

l have a recip

atter will atta

49 

flicts of riva

of justice and

erbearing ma

izens, wheth

d actuated by

er citizens, or

g the causes o

the other, by

e interests.

he first reme

aliment with

, which is es

h the annihila

destructive ag

as the first w

s at liberty to

sists between

procal influe

ach themselv

al parties, and

d the rights o

ajority.

her amountin

y some comm

r to the perm

of faction: th

y giving to e

edy that it w

hout which i

ssential to po

ation of air, w

gency.

would be unw

o exercise it,

n his reason

ence on each

ves. The dive

d that measu

of the minor

ng to a major

mon impulse

manent and a

he one, by d

every citizen

was worse tha

it instantly e

olitical life, b

which is ess

wise. As lon

, different op

and his self

h other; and

ersity in the

ures are too

r party, but b

rity or

e of passion,

aggregate

destroying th

the same

an the diseas

xpires. But i

because it

sential to

ng as the

pinions will

f-love, his

the former

faculties of

 

by

,

e

se.

it

 

 50 

 

men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a

uniformity of interests.

The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of

different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees

and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the

sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensues a division of the society into

different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them

everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different

circumstances of civil society.

A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other

points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously

contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes

have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,

inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and

oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.

So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities that where no

substantial occasion presents itself the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been

sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the

most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution

of property.

Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in

society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like

discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a

moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and

divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.

 

 

The re

legisla

operat

James

The in

that re

If a fa

which

admin

violen

When

hand,

rights

James

The sp

Alexa

new-f

the na

each o

James

egulation of

ation and inv

tions of gove

s Madison,

nference to w

elief is only t

action consis

h enables the

nistration, it m

nce under the

n a majority i

enables it to

of other citi

s Madison,

pirit of party

ander Hami

fangled and a

atural offspri

other

s Madison,

these variou

volves the sp

ernment.

Federalist #

which we are

to be sought

ts of less tha

e majority to

may convuls

e forms of th

is included in

o sacrifice to

izens.

Federalist #

y in different

lton, Federa

artificial trea

ing of free go

Federalist #

us and interfe

pirit of party

# 10

e brought is

t in the mean

an a majority

defeat its si

se the societ

he Constituti

n a faction, t

o its ruling pa

# 10

t degrees mu

alist # 26

asons have b

overnment, h

# 43

51 

fering interes

y and faction

that the caus

ns of control

y, relief is su

nister views

ty; but it will

ion.

the form of p

assion or int

ust be expect

been the grea

have usually

sts forms the

n in the neces

ses of faction

lling its effec

upplied by th

s by regular v

l be unable t

popular gov

terest both th

ted to infect

at engines by

y wreaked th

e principal ta

ssary and ord

n cannot be

cts.

he republican

vote. It may

to execute an

ernment, on

he public goo

all political

y which viol

heir alternate

ask of moder

dinary

removed an

n principle,

clog the

nd mask its

n the other

od and the

bodies

lent factions,

e malignity o

 

rn

d

,

on

 

 

The d

of men

Alexa

The pr

virtue

that th

rights

its del

which

The pr

enable

comm

Alexa

emon of fact

n.

ander Hamilt

ropriety of th

in the execu

he love of po

of other me

liberations; t

h itself, on m

rimary induc

e him to defe

munity agains

ander Hamilt

tion will, at

ton, Federali

he thing [vet

utive, but up

ower may so

mbers of the

that impressi

maturer reflec

cement to co

end himself;

st the passin

ton, Federali

certain seaso

ist # 65

to] does not

pon the suppo

metimes bet

e governmen

ions of the m

ction, would

onferring the

the seconda

g of bad law

ist # 73

52 

ons, extend h

turn upon th

osition that t

tray it into a

nt; that a spir

moment may

condemn.

e power in qu

ary one is to

ws, through h

his scepter o

he suppositio

the legislatur

disposition

rit of faction

y sometimes

uestion upon

increase the

haste, inadve

over all num

on of superio

ure will not b

to encroach

n may somet

hurry it into

n the executi

e chances in

ertence, or de

merous bodies

or wisdom o

be infallible;

upon the

times pervert

o measures

ive is to

favor of the

esign.

 

s

or

t

e

 

 53 

 

Federal/national nature of U. S. government

[Quoting Montesquieu]: "It is very probable" (says he *) "that mankind would have been

obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they

not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican,

together with the external force of a monarchical, government. I mean a CONFEDERATE

REPUBLIC.

"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to

become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of

societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations,

till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the

united body.

"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without

any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be

supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to

have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that

which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he

had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are

able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain

sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may

be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of

each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association,

of all the advantages of large monarchies."

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 9

 

 

But if

design

under

those

betwe

person

Alexa

It seem

Const

contin

yet thi

extend

Alexa

Ff it b

comm

person

be em

The m

of just

Alexa

The fi

govern

with th

f we are unw

n of a nation

the direction

ingredients w

een a league

ns of the citi

ander Hamilt

ms to require

titution whic

nually on foo

is is the plain

ding its oper

ander Hamilt

be possible a

mon concerns

ns of the citi

mpowered to

majesty of the

tice.

ander Hamilt

irst question

nment be str

he genius of

willing to be p

nal governme

n of a comm

which may b

and a govern

izens -- the o

ton, Federali

e no pains to

ch could only

ot to execute

n alternative

rations to ind

ton, Federali

at any rate to

s and preserv

izens. It mus

employ the

e national au

ton, Federali

that offers i

rictly republi

f the people o

placed in thi

ent, or, whic

mon council,

be considere

nment; we m

only proper o

ist # 15

o prove that t

y be kept in m

e the ordinary

e involved by

dividuals.

ist # 16

construct a

ving the gen

st stand in ne

arm of the o

uthority mus

ist # 16

itself is whet

ican. It is ev

of America;

54 

is perilous si

h is the sam

we must res

ed as forming

must extend t

objects of go

the States ou

motion by th

y requisition

y those who

federal gove

eral tranquil

eed of no int

ordinary mag

st be manifes

ther the gene

vident that no

with the fun

ituation; if w

me thing, of a

solve to inco

g the charact

the authority

overnment.

ught not to p

he instrumen

ns or decrees

wish to den

ernment cap

llity It must

termediate le

gistrate to ex

sted through

eral form and

o other form

ndamental pr

we still will a

a superintend

orporate into

teristic diffe

y of the Unio

prefer a natio

ntality of a la

s of the gove

ny it the pow

able of regu

carry its age

egislations, b

xecute its ow

h the medium

d aspect of t

m would be re

rinciples of

adhere to the

ding power

our plan

erence

on to the

onal

arge army

ernment. And

wer of

ulating the

ency to the

but must itse

wn resolution

m of the cour

the

econcilable

the

 

e

d

elf

ns.

rts

 

 55 

 

Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom

to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the

plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its

advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.

What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this

question to be sought, not by recurring to principles but in the application of the term by

political writers to the constitutions of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be

found. ...

If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of

government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that

name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great

body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for

a limited period, or during good behavior.

It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society,

not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of

tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might

aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their government the honorable title of

republic. ...

Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the

most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under

the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to

each of the latter.

"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the

convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought with equal care to have preserved

the federal form, which regards the Union as a Confederacy of sovereign states; instead of

which they have framed a national government, which regards the Union as a consolidation

of the States." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was

 

 56 

 

undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be

examined with some precision.

Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded,

it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the

government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized to

propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could

supply any defect of regular authority.

First. -- In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered

in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its

ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them;

and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be

founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected

for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by

the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct

and independent States to which they respectively belong.

It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme

authority in each State the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore,

establishing the Constitution will not be a national but a federal act.

That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the

objectors -- the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming

one aggregate nation -- is obvious from this single consideration: that it is to result neither

from the decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor from that of a majority of

the States.

It must result from the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing

no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative

authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this

transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the

 

 57 

 

United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State

must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a

comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States

as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States.

Neither of these rules has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is

considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own

voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a federal

and not a national constitution.

The next relation is to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to

be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of

America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion and on the same

principle as they are in the legislature of a particular State.

So far the government is national, not federal. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its

powers from the States as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on

the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the

government is federal, not national.

The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. ... From this aspect of

the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as

national features.

The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the operation

of the government, is by the adversaries of the plan of the convention supposed to consist

in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the

Confederacy in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing

the nation in their individual capacities. ...

But if the government be national with regard to the operation of its powers, it changes

its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its powers. The idea of a

national government involves in it not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an

indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful

 

 58 

 

government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely

vested in the national legislature.

Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and

partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate

to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure.

In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of

the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority

than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then,

the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to

certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable

sovereignty over all other objects. ...

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are

to be made, we find it neither wholly national nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national,

the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union;

and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national

society to alter or abolish its established government.

Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union

would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by

the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more

than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it

departs from the national and advances towards the federal character; in rendering the

concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the federal

and partakes of the national character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its

antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition

of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary

powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the

operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is

 

 

federa

is neit

It is ce

may d

the po

could

wholly

If this

the fed

absolu

Alexa

It is eq

Amon

the go

conge

It is re

to the

must s

system

. . . Th

result

does n

If inde

distric

al, not nation

ther wholly f

ertainly true

destroy the n

ossibility of i

not have be

y from a pla

had been do

deral princip

ute safeguard

ander Hamilt

qually unnec

ng the variou

overnment, th

enial with the

ecommended

State govern

secure the au

ms.

he equality o

of comprom

not call for m

eed it be righ

ct ought to h

nal; and, fina

federal nor w

that the Stat

national gove

injury from t

en avoided w

ace in the org

one it would

ple, and wou

d which they

ton, Federali

cessary to di

us modes wh

hat which ha

e public opin

d by the dou

nments such

uthority of th

of representa

mise between

much discuss

ht that amon

ave a propor

ally in the au

wholly nation

te legislature

ernment. So

the State leg

without excl

ganization of

d doubtless h

uld certainly

y will enjoy

ist # 59

ilate on the a

hich might ha

as been prop

nion.

uble advantag

h an agency i

he former, an

ation in the S

n the opposit

sion.

ng a people th

rtional share

59 

uthoritative m

nal. James M

es, by forbea

far as that co

gislatures, it

luding the St

f the nationa

have been int

have depriv

under this pr

appointment

ave been dev

posed by the

ge of favorin

in the forma

nd may form

Senate is ano

te pretension

horoughly in

e in the gove

mode of intr

Madison, Fe

aring the app

onstruction m

is an evil; bu

tates, in their

al governmen

terpreted int

ved the State

rovision.

of senators

vised for con

convention

ng a select ap

ation of the fe

m a convenie

other point w

ns of the larg

ncorporated

rnment and

oducing ame

ederalist # 39

pointment of

may expose

ut it is an ev

r political ca

nt.

to an entire d

government

by the State

nstituting thi

is probably

ppointment,

federal gover

ent link betw

which, being

ge and the sm

into one nat

that among

endments, it

9

f senators,

the Union to

vil which

apacities,

dereliction o

ts of that

legislatures

is branch of

the most

and of givin

rnment as

ween the two

evidently th

mall States,

tion every

independent

 

t

o

f

s.

ng

he

t

 

 60 

 

and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in

size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without

some reason that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal

character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of

proportional and equal representation.

James Madison, Federalist # 62

 

 61 

 

Federations/federal governments; nature of

[Quoting Montesquieu]: "It is very probable" (says he *) "that mankind would have been

obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they

not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican,

together with the external force of a monarchical, government. I mean a CONFEDERATE

REPUBLIC.

"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to

become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of

societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations,

till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the

united body.

"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without

any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be

supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to

have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that

which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he

had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are

able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain

sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may

be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of

each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association,

of all the advantages of large monarchies."

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 9

 

 62 

 

Foreign intrusions

Let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and

foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many

conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations

did they under the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they

pretended to protect.

John John Jay, Federalist # 5

 

 

Futu

In pur

presen

are no

these w

human

Nothin

be lod

ought

Alexa

At pre

have m

compl

These

requir

has ac

proper

James

The p

define

The fo

and fo

conne

ure take

rsuing this in

nt period, bu

ot to be fram

with the pro

n affairs.

ng, therefore

dged in the n

to be a CAP

ander Hamilt

esent some o

made much p

lexity to the

e, however, w

re, on the par

ccordingly ta

r increase of

s Madison, F

owers deleg

ed. Those wh

ormer will b

oreign comm

ected.

en into c

nquiry, we m

ut to look for

med upon a ca

bable exigen

e, can be mo

national gove

PACITY to p

ton, Federali

of the States

progress in t

affairs of a n

will in all of

rt of each St

aken care tha

f the represen

Federalist # 5

ated by the p

hich are to re

e exercised p

merce; with w

consider

must bear in m

rward to rem

alculation of

ncies of ages

ore fallacious

ernment from

provide for f

ist # 34

are little mo

those branch

nation.

them be the

ate, a fuller

at the progre

ntative branc

56

proposed Co

emain in the

principally o

which last th

63 

ration

mind that we

mote futurity.

f existing exi

s, according

s than to infe

m an estimat

future contin

ore than a soc

hes of industr

fruits of a m

representatio

ess of popula

ch of the gov

onstitution to

State gover

on external o

he power of t

e are not to c

. Constitutio

igencies, but

to the natur

er the extent

te of its imm

ngencies as t

ciety of husb

try which giv

more advanc

on. The fore

ation may be

vernment.

o the federal

rnments are n

objects, as w

taxation will

confine our v

ons of civil g

t upon a com

ral and tried

t of any pow

mediate neces

they may hap

bandmen. Fe

ve a variety

ced populatio

esight of the

e accompani

government

numerous an

war, peace, ne

l, for the mo

view to the

government

mbination of

course of

wer proper to

ssities. There

ppen

ew of them

and

on; and will

convention

ed with a

t are few and

nd indefinite

egotiation,

st part, be

 

f

e

d

e.

 

 64 

 

The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the

ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the

internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.

The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of

war and danger; those of the State governments in times of peace and security. As the

former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments

will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government.

The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense,

the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over

the governments of the particular States.

If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the

change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the

Union than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce,

it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose and from

which no apprehensions are entertained.

James Madison, Federalist # 45

 

 65 

 

General Welfare' not blank check

It has been urged and echoed that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and

excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the

United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may

be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof

could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their

stooping to such a misconstruction.

Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the

Constitution than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have

had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a

form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the

freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the

forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for

the general welfare."

But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by

these general terms immediately follows and is not even separated by a longer pause than a

semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded as to

give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be

excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite

terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any

signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be

inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power?

Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain

and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars

which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to

confound and mislead, is an absurdity

James Madison, Federalist # 41

 

 66 

 

From these observations this conclusion results: that the trial by jury in civil cases would

not be abolished; and that the use attempted to be made of the maxims which have been

quoted is contrary to reason and common sense, and therefore not admissible.

Even if these maxims had a precise technical sense, corresponding with the ideas of those

who employ them upon the present occasion, which, however, is not the case, they would

still be inapplicable to a constitution of government. In relation to such a subject, the

natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical rules, is the true

criterion of construction.

Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will not bear the use made of them, let us

endeavor to ascertain their proper use and true meaning. This will be best done by

examples. The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress, or, in other

words, of the national legislature, shall extend to certain enumerated cases.

This specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative

authority, because an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd as well as

useless if a general authority was intended.

In like manner the judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared by the

Constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The expression of those

cases marks the precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot extend their

jurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification

would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83

 

 

Gov

It is to

make

monar

and ob

affron

partisa

sovere

intere

John J

Was, t

the pr

not th

govern

a certa

sovere

We ha

kings,

shape

institu

It is t

welfar

form o

attainm

James

vernmen

oo true, how

war whenev

rchs will oft

bjects merely

nts, ambition

ans. These a

eign, often le

sts of his peo

John Jay, Fe

then, the Am

ecious blood

at the people

nments of th

ain extent of

eignty?

ave heard of

, not kings fo

that the soli

utions of a di

oo early for

re of the gre

of governme

ment of this

s Madison, F

nt for th

ever disgrac

ver they have

en make war

y personal, s

n, or private c

and a variety

ead him to e

ople.

deralist # 4

merican Revo

d of thousand

e of America

he individual

f power and

f the impious

or the people

id happiness

ifferent form

politicians t

at body of th

ent whatever

object.

Federalist # 4

he benef

ceful it may b

e a prospect

r when their

such as a thir

compacts to

of other mo

ngage in wa

olution effec

ds spilt, and

a should enjo

l States, that

be arrayed w

s doctrine in

e. Is the sam

of the peop

m?

to presume o

he people, is

r has any oth

45

67 

fit of tho

be to human

of getting an

r nations are

rst for milita

aggrandize

otives, which

ars not sancti

cted, was the

the hard-ear

oy peace, lib

t particular m

with certain d

the old worl

me doctrine to

le is to be sa

on our forget

s the supreme

her value tha

ose who

n nature, that

nything by it

to get nothin

ary glory, rev

or support th

h affect only

ified by justi

e American C

rned substan

berty, and sa

municipal est

dignities and

rld, that the p

o be revived

acrificed to t

tting that the

e object to b

an as it may b

govern

t nations in g

t; nay, that a

ng by it, but

venge for pe

heir particul

y the mind of

ice or the vo

Confederacy

nce of millio

afety, but tha

tablishments

d attributes o

people were

d in the new,

the views of

e public good

be pursued; a

be fitted for

general will

absolute

t for purpose

ersonal

lar families o

f the

oice and

y formed, wa

ons lavished,

at the

s, might enjo

of

made for

in another

f political

d, the real

and that no

the

 

es

or

as

,

oy

 

 68 

 

the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual

recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their

minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be

compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it

is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised;

there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their

title to a renewal of it.

I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives,

restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which will not have

its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the

society.

This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can

connect the rulers and the people together. It creates between them that communion of

interests and sympathy of sentiments of which few governments have furnished examples;

but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.

If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal

discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer: the

genius of the whole system; the nature of just and constitutional laws; and, above all, the

vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America -- a spirit which nourishes

freedom, and in return is nourished by it.

If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the

legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but

liberty.

James Madison, Federalist # 57

 

 

 

Grid

In this

consti

and an

no les

guard

one si

Ano

additio

resolu

and th

James

the fac

most l

James

In the

of opi

may s

and se

Alexa

dlock de

s spirit it ma

itutional reco

n instrument

s acceptable

, by every po

imple republ

other advanta

onal impedim

ution can now

hen of a majo

s Madison, F

cility and ex

liable

s Madison, F

legislature,

inion, and th

ometimes ob

erve to check

ander Hamilt

esirable

ay be remark

ognition of th

t for preservi

e to the large

ossible expe

lic.

age accruing

ment it must

w be passed

ority of the S

Federalist # 6

xcess of lawm

Federalist # 6

promptitude

e jarring of p

bstruct salut

k excesses in

ton, Federali

e

ked that the e

he portion o

ing that resid

e than to the

edient, agains

g from this in

t prove again

without the

States.

62

making seem

62

e of decision

parties in tha

ary plans, ye

n the majorit

ist # 70

69 

equal vote al

of sovereignt

duary sovere

small States

st an improp

ngredient in

nst improper

concurrence

m to be the d

n is oftener a

at departmen

et often prom

ty.

llowed to eac

ty remaining

eignty. So fa

s; since they

per consolida

the constitut

r acts of legi

e, first, of a m

diseases to w

an evil than a

nt of the gov

mote deliber

ch State is at

g in the indiv

ar the equalit

are not less

ation of the S

ution of the S

islation. No l

majority of t

which our gov

a benefit. Th

vernment, tho

ration and cir

t once a

vidual States

ty ought to b

solicitous to

States into

Senate is the

law or

the people,

vernments ar

he difference

ough they

rcumspectio

 

s

be

o

re

es

on,

 

 

The pr

virtue

that th

rights

its del

which

The pr

enable

comm

Alexa

[Rega

institu

state i

harm;

which

the ad

ropriety of th

in the execu

he love of po

of other me

liberations; t

h itself, on m

rimary induc

e him to defe

munity agains

ander Hamilt

arding those

ution calcula

in which they

because it i

h may possib

dvantage of p

he thing [vet

utive, but up

ower may so

mbers of the

that impressi

maturer reflec

cement to co

end himself;

st the passin

ton, Federali

who consid

ated to restra

y happen to

s favorable t

bly be done b

preventing a

to] does not

pon the suppo

metimes bet

e governmen

ions of the m

ction, would

onferring the

the seconda

g of bad law

ist # 73

der the propri

in the excess

be at any giv

to greater sta

by defeating

number of b

70 

turn upon th

osition that t

tray it into a

nt; that a spir

moment may

condemn.

e power in qu

ary one is to

ws, through h

iety of veto

s of lawmak

ven period a

ability in the

a few good

bad ones. Al

he suppositio

the legislatur

disposition

rit of faction

y sometimes

uestion upon

increase the

haste, inadve

power] The

king, and to k

as much mor

e system of l

laws will be

lexander Ham

on of superio

ure will not b

to encroach

n may somet

hurry it into

n the executi

e chances in

ertence, or de

ey will consi

keep things i

re likely to d

legislation. T

e amply com

milton, Fede

or wisdom o

be infallible;

upon the

times pervert

o measures

ive is to

favor of the

esign.

ider every

in the same

do good than

The injury

mpensated by

eralist # 73

 

or

t

e

n

y

 

 71 

 

Human nature

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the

liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same

opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy that it was worse than the

disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly

expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life,

because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is

essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the

reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will

be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his

opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former

will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.

The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not

less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is

the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of

acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately

results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective

proprietors ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them

everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different

circumstances of civil society.

A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other

points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously

contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes

 

 

have b

inflam

oppre

So str

substa

suffici

most c

of pro

Those

societ

discrim

A lan

many

differe

variou

the sp

James

Why h

to the

men a

The co

and th

influe

to fall

Alexa

been interest

med them wit

ss each othe

ong is this p

antial occasio

ient to kindl

common and

operty.

e who hold a

ty. Those wh

mination.

nded interest

lesser intere

ent classes, a

us and interfe

irit of party

s Madison, F

has governm

dictates of r

act with more

ontrary of th

he inference

nce when th

l singly upon

ander Hamilt

ting to the hu

th mutual an

r than to co-

propensity of

on presents i

e their unfrie

d durable sou

and those wh

ho are credito

, a manufact

ests, grow up

actuated by d

fering interes

and faction

Federalist # 1

ment been ins

reason and ju

e rectitude o

his has been

is founded u

he infamy of

n one.

ton, Federali

uman passio

nimosity, and

-operate for t

f mankind to

itself the mo

endly passio

urce of factio

ho are withou

ors, and thos

turing intere

p of necessit

different sen

sts forms the

in the neces

10

stituted at all

ustice withou

or greater dis

inferred by a

upon obviou

a bad action

ist # 15

72 

ons, have, in

d rendered th

their commo

o fall into mu

ost frivolous

ons and excit

ons has been

ut property h

se who are d

st, a mercan

y in civilized

ntiments and

e principal ta

sary and ord

l? Because t

ut constraint

sinterestedne

all accurate

s reasons. R

n is to be div

turn, divide

hem much m

on good.

utual animos

and fanciful

te their most

n the various

have ever for

debtors, fall u

ntile interest,

d nations, an

d views. The

ask of moder

dinary operat

the passions

t. Has it been

ess than indiv

observers of

Regard to rep

vided among

d mankind i

more dispose

sities that wh

l distinction

t violent con

s and unequa

rmed distinc

under a like

a moneyed

nd divide the

regulation o

rn legislation

tions of gov

of men will

n found that

viduals?

f the conduc

putation has a

g a number th

into parties,

ed to vex and

here no

s have been

nflicts. But th

al distributio

ct interests in

interest, wit

em into

of these

n and involv

ernment.

not conform

bodies of

t of mankind

a less active

han when it

 

d

he

on

n

th

ves

m

d;

is

 

 

Power

it is co

to exp

memb

unbias

author

Alexa

Nation

to the

govern

of the

ought

forms

or is le

Alexa

The h

propo

Alexa

As the

circum

certain

existe

James

r controlled

ontrolled or

pect that the

bers of a con

sed regard to

rity. The rev

ander Hamilt

ns pay little

necessities o

nment with r

fundamenta

to be mainta

a precedent

ess urgent an

ander Hamilt

ope of impu

rtionately str

ander Hamilt

ere is a degre

mspection an

n portion of

nce of these

s Madison, F

or abridged

abridged. Th

persons intru

nfederacy wil

o the public w

verse of this r

ton, Federali

regard to rul

of society. W

restrictions t

al laws, thou

ained in the

t for other br

nd palpable.

ton, Federali

unity is a stro

rong discour

ton, Federali

ee of deprav

nd distrust, s

esteem and

qualities in

Federalist # 5

is almost alw

his simple pr

usted with th

ll at all time

weal to exec

results from

ist # 15

les and maxi

Wise politicia

that cannot b

ugh dictated b

breast of rul

reaches wher

ist # 25

ong inciteme

ragement to

ist # 27

vity in manki

o there are o

confidence.

a higher deg

55

73 

ways the riv

roposition w

he administr

s be ready w

cute the reso

the constitu

ims calculat

ans will be c

be observed,

by necessity

lers towards

re the same p

ent to seditio

it.

ind which re

other qualitie

Republican

gree than any

al and enem

will teach us

ration of the

with perfect g

olutions or de

ution of man

ted in their v

cautious abo

, because the

y, impairs tha

the constitu

plea of nece

on; the dread

equires a cert

es in human

government

y other form

my of that pow

how little re

affairs of th

good humor

ecrees of the

.

very nature to

out fettering t

ey know that

at sacred rev

ution of a cou

essity does no

d of punishm

tain degree o

nature whic

t presuppose

m.

wer by whic

eason there i

he particular

and an

e general

o run counte

the

t every breac

verence whic

untry, and

ot exist at al

ment, a

of

ch justify a

es the

 

ch

s

er

ch

ch

ll,

 

 

in all l

be the

any as

ascend

In the

limite

descri

In the

orator

scepte

On the

the mo

Ignora

The p

beyon

Exper

numbe

whole

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anima

the mo

James

An ind

affairs

to his

legislative a

e men who w

ssembly may

dancy of pas

next place,

d informatio

iption that th

ancient repu

r, or an artful

er had been p

e same princ

ore it will pa

ance will be

eople can ne

nd a certain l

rience will fo

er for the pu

e society, the

sentatives.

ountenance o

ates it will be

ore secret, w

s Madison, F

dividual who

s without any

own unstead

ssemblies th

will in fact di

y be, of what

ssion over re

the larger th

on and of we

he eloquence

ublics, wher

l statesman,

placed in his

ciple, the mo

artake of the

the dupe of

ever err more

limit they str

orever admo

urposes of sa

ey will count

of the gover

e more oliga

will be the sp

Federalist # 5

o is observed

y plan at all,

diness and fo

he greater the

irect their pr

tever charac

eason.

he number, th

eak capacitie

e and address

e the whole

was general

s single hand

ore multitudi

infirmities i

cunning, an

e than in sup

rengthen the

nish them th

afety, of loca

teract their o

rnment may b

archic. The m

prings by wh

58

d to be incon

, is marked a

olly. His mo

74 

e number co

oceedings. I

cters compos

he greater w

es. Now, it is

s of the few

body of the

lly seen to ru

d.

inous a repre

incident to c

nd passion th

pposing that

barrier agai

hat, on the co

al informatio

own views by

become mor

machine will

hich its motio

nstant to his

at once by al

ore friendly n

omposing the

In the first pl

sed, the great

will be the pro

s precisely o

are known t

people assem

ule with as c

esentative as

collective me

he slave of so

by multiply

inst the gove

ontrary, after

on, and of dif

y every addi

re democrati

l be enlarged

ons are direc

plans, or pe

ll prudent pe

neighbors m

em may be, t

lace, the mo

ater is known

oportion of m

n characters

to act with al

mbled in per

complete a sw

ssembly may

eetings of th

ophistry and

ying their rep

ernment of a

r securing a

ffusive symp

ition to their

ic, but the so

d, but the few

cted.

erhaps to carr

eople as a sp

ay pity him,

the fewer wi

re numerous

n to be the

members of

s of this

ll their force

rson, a singl

way as if a

y be rendered

he people.

d declamation

presentatives

few.

sufficient

pathy with th

r

oul that

wer, and ofte

ry on his

eedy victim

but all will

 

ill

s

e.

le

d,

n.

s

he

en

 

 

declin

makin

One n

distinc

are un

other.

Every

calcul

neighb

James

They w

are tid

found

John J

There

this st

over th

Alexa

In the

power

Alexa

ne to connect

ng their fortu

nation is to an

ction, perhap

nder fewer re

y nation, con

late on every

bors.

s Madison, F

who have tu

des in them;

d to run twice

Jay, Federali

are men wh

tern virtue is

he man's sup

ander Hamilt

general cou

r over his wi

ander Hamilt

t their fortun

unes out of h

nother what

ps, that the f

estraints also

sequently, w

y loss which

Federalist # 6

urned their at

tides very ir

e exactly in t

ist # 64

ho could neit

s the growth

pport is a po

ton, Federali

urse of huma

ill.

ton, Federali

nes with his;

his.

one individu

former, with

o from taking

whose affairs

can be susta

62

ttention to th

rregular in th

the same ma

ther be distre

of few soils

wer over his

ist # 73

an nature, a p

ist # 79

75 

and not a fe

ual is to ano

fewer of the

g undue adv

s betray a wa

ained from th

he affairs of

heir duration

anner or mea

essed nor wo

; and in the m

s will.

power over a

ew will seize

other; with th

e benevolent

antage of the

ant of wisdom

he more syst

men must ha

n, strength, a

asure.

on into a sac

main it will

a man's subs

e the opportu

his melancho

t emotions th

e indiscretio

m and stabil

tematic polic

ave perceive

and direction

crifice of the

be found tha

istence amou

unity of

oly

han the latter

ons of each

lity, may

cy of its wis

ed that there

n, and seldom

ir duty; but

at a power

unts to a

 

r,

ser

m

 

 

Imp

In sev

chief m

Presid

James

the pu

termin

ostrac

will st

Alexa

The re

sense

has be

deduc

person

to imp

forfeit

Alexa

. . . the

part o

body u

peachme

veral of the S

magistrate. A

dent of the U

s Madison, F

unishment w

nate the chas

cism from the

till be liable

ander Hamilt

emaining inq

-- due depen

een anticipat

cible from th

ns immediat

peachment, t

ture of life a

ander Hamilt

e important

f the legislat

upon the me

ent

States, howev

And in Delaw

United States

Federalist # 3

hich may be

stisement of

e esteem and

to prosecuti

ton, Federali

quiry is: Doe

ndence on th

ted in the inv

ese circumst

ely chosen b

trial, dismiss

and estate by

ton, Federali

constitution

tive body, an

embers of the

ver, no expli

ware and Vi

is impeacha

39

e the consequ

the offender

d confidence

ion and puni

ist # 65

es it also com

he people, a d

vestigation o

tances; the e

by the people

sion from off

y subsequent

ist # 77

al check whi

nd of determ

e judicial dep

76 

icit provision

irginia he is n

able at any ti

uence of con

r. After havi

e and honors

shment in th

mbine the req

due responsi

of its other ch

election of th

e for that pur

ffice, incapac

prosecution

ich the powe

mining upon t

partment. Th

n is made fo

not impeach

ime during h

nviction upon

ing been sen

s and emolum

he ordinary c

quisites to sa

ibility? The

haracteristic

he President

urpose, and h

city to serve

n in the comm

er of institut

them in the o

his is alone a

or the impeac

hable till out

his continuan

n impeachm

ntenced to a p

ments of his

course of law

afety, in the

answer to th

cs, and is sati

once in four

his being at a

in any other

mon course

ting impeach

other, would

a complete s

chment of th

of office. Th

nce in office

ment is not to

perpetual

country, he

w.

republican

his question

isfactorily

r years by

all times liab

r, and to the

of law.

hments in on

d give to that

security.

 

he

he

e.

o

ble

ne

t

 

 77 

 

There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations of the

authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with

it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption by

degrading them from their stations.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 81

 

 

Jud

Laws

operat

part o

other

determ

TRIBU

And th

thems

final j

there a

There

but th

would

judica

rest, p

resort

Alexa

The co

Const

excep

attaind

Limita

mediu

diciary; n

are a dead le

tion. The tre

f the law of

laws, be asc

minations, th

UNAL.

his tribunal o

selves. These

urisdiction,

are courts.

are endless

e judges of t

d unavoidabl

atories, all na

possessing a

a uniform ru

ander Hamilt

omplete inde

titution. By a

tions to the l

der, no ex po

ations of this

um of courts

nature o

etter without

eaties of the U

the land. Th

ertained by j

hey ought to

ought to be i

e ingredients

there may b

diversities i

the same cou

ly result from

ations have f

general supe

ule of civil j

ton, Federali

ependence o

a limited Con

legislative au

ost facto law

s kind can be

of justice, w

of the

t courts to ex

United State

heir true impo

judicial dete

be submitte

instituted un

s are both ind

e as many di

n the opinio

urt differing

m the contrad

found it nece

erintendence

ustice.

ist # 22

of the courts

nstitution, I

uthority; suc

ws, and the li

e preserved

whose duty it

78 

xpound and

es, to have an

ort, as far as

erminations.

d, in the last

nder the same

dispensable.

ifferent final

ns of men. W

from each o

dictory decis

essary to esta

e and authori

of justice is

understand o

ch, for instan

ke.

in practice n

t must be to

define their

ny force at a

s respects ind

To produce

t resort, to on

e authority w

. If there is in

l determinat

We often see

other. To avo

sions of a nu

ablish one c

ized to settle

peculiarly e

one which c

nce, as that i

no other way

declare all a

true meanin

all, must be c

dividuals, m

uniformity

ne SUPREM

which forms

n each State

tions on the s

e not only di

oid the confu

umber of ind

ourt paramo

e and declare

essential in a

ontains certa

it shall pass n

y than throug

acts contrary

ng and

considered a

must, like all

in these

ME

s the treaties

a court of

same point a

fferent court

usion which

dependent

ount to the

e in the last

a limited

ain specified

no bills of

gh the

y to the

 

as

as

ts

d

 

 

manif

rights

Alexa

It is no

repres

more r

the pe

limits

The in

consti

theref

act pro

If the

superi

Const

of the

Nor

legisla

where

people

than th

by tho

This

exemp

existin

contai

fest tenor of t

or privilege

ander Hamilt

ot otherwise

sentatives of

rational to su

eople and the

assigned to

nterpretation

itution is, in

fore belongs

oceeding fro

ere should ha

ior obligation

titution ough

ir agents.

does this co

ative power.

e the will of t

e, declared in

he former. T

ose which ar

s exercise of

plified in a f

ng at one tim

ining any rep

the Constitu

es would amo

ton, Federali

e to be suppo

f the people t

uppose that t

e legislature

their author

n of the laws

fact, and mu

to them to a

om the legisl

appen to be a

n and validit

ht to be prefe

onclusion by

It only supp

the legislatu

n the Consti

They ought to

e not fundam

f judicial disc

familiar insta

me, clashing

pealing claus

ution void. W

ount to nothi

ist # 78

osed that the

to substitute

the courts w

in order, am

rity.

is the prope

ust be regard

ascertain its m

lative body.

an irreconcil

ty ought, of

erred to the s

y any means

poses that th

ure, declared

itution, the ju

o regulate th

mental.

cretion in de

ance. It not u

in whole or

se or express

79 

Without this,

ing.

Constitution

their will to

were designed

mong other th

er and peculi

ded by the ju

meaning as w

lable varianc

course, to be

statute, the in

suppose a su

e power of t

in its statute

udges ought

heir decision

etermining b

uncommonly

in part with

sion. In such

all the reser

n could inten

o that of their

d to be an in

hings, to kee

iar province

udges as, a fu

well as the m

ce between th

e preferred;

ntention of th

uperiority of

the people is

es, stands in

to be govern

ns by the fund

between two

y happens th

each other a

h a case, it is

rvations of p

nd to enable

r constituent

ntermediate b

ep the latter w

of the court

undamental l

meaning of a

the two, that

or, in other w

he people to

f the judicial

s superior to

opposition t

ned by the la

damental law

contradictor

hat there are t

and neither o

s the provinc

articular

the

ts. It is far

body betwee

within the

s. A

law. It

any particula

which has th

words, the

o the intentio

l to the

both, and th

to that of the

atter rather

ws rather tha

ry laws is

two statutes

of them

ce of the

 

en

ar

he

on

hat

e

an

 

 

courts

constr

should

to one

The ru

last in

not de

not en

conso

law. T

which

But

and de

as pro

They

an inf

contra

latter

Alexa

The co

WILL

pleasu

Alexa

s to liquidate

ruction, be re

d be done; w

e in exclusio

ule which ha

n order of tim

erived from a

njoined upon

nant to truth

They thought

h was the last

in regard to

erivative pow

oper to be fol

teach us tha

ferior and sub

avenes the C

and disregar

ander Hamilt

ourts must d

L instead of J

ure for that o

ander Hamilt

e and fix thei

econciled to

where this is

n of the othe

as obtained in

me shall be p

any positive

n the courts b

h and proprie

t it reasonab

t indication

the interferi

wer, the natu

llowed.

at the prior a

bordinate au

Constitution,

rd the former

ton, Federali

declare the se

JUDGMENT

of the legisla

ton, Federali

ir meaning a

each other,

impracticabl

er.

n the courts

preferred to t

law but from

by legislative

ety, for the d

ble that betwe

of its will sh

ing acts of a

ure and reaso

act of a super

uthority; and

it will be the

r.

ist # 78

ense of the la

T, the conseq

ative body.

ist # 78

80 

and operation

reason and l

le, it become

for determin

the first. But

m the nature

e provision b

direction of th

een the inter

hould have th

superior and

on of the thin

rior ought to

that accordi

e duty of the

aw; and if th

quence woul

n. So far as t

law conspire

es a matter o

ning their re

t this is a me

e and reason

but adopted

heir conduct

rfering acts o

he preferenc

d subordinat

ng indicate t

o be preferred

ingly, whene

e judicial trib

hey should b

ld equally be

they can, by

e to dictate th

of necessity t

lative validit

ere rule of co

of the thing

by themselv

t as interpret

of an equal a

ce.

te authority o

the converse

d to the subs

ever a partic

bunals to adh

be disposed t

e the substitu

fair

hat this

to give effec

ty is that the

onstruction,

. It is a rule

ves, as

ters of the

authority tha

of an origina

e of that rule

sequent act o

cular statute

here to the

to exercise

ution of thei

 

ct

e

at

al

of

ir

 

 

the co

legisla

Alexa

Thoug

in que

of the

incons

repres

major

would

Until t

establ

presum

depart

But it

do the

been i

Alexa

But it

judges

societ

particu

Here a

severi

ourts of justic

ative encroac

ander Hamilt

gh I trust the

estioning tha

people to al

sistent with t

sentatives of

rity of their c

d, on that acc

the people h

ished form,

mption, or ev

ture from it p

is easy to se

eir duty as fa

instigated by

ander Hamilt

is not with a

s may be an

ty. These som

ular classes

also the firm

ity and confi

ce are to be c

chments

ton, Federali

e friends of th

at fundament

lter or abolis

their happin

f the people,

constituents i

count, be jus

have, by som

it is binding

ven knowled

prior to such

ee that it wou

aithful guard

y the major v

ton, Federali

a view to inf

essential saf

metimes exte

of citizens, b

mness of the j

ining the ope

considered a

ist # 78

he proposed

tal principle

sh the establi

ess; yet it is

whenever a

incompatibl

stifiable in a

me solemn an

g upon thems

dge, of their

h an act.

uld require a

dians of the C

voice of the c

ist # 78

fractions of t

feguard agai

end no farthe

by unjust an

judicial mag

eration of su

81 

as the bulwar

d Constitution

of republica

ished Consti

not to be inf

momentary

e with the pr

violation of

nd authoritati

selves collec

sentiment ca

an uncommo

Constitution,

community.

the Constitut

inst the effec

er than to the

d partial law

gistracy is of

uch laws. It n

arks of a limi

n will never

an governme

itution when

ferred from

inclination h

rovisions in

f those provi

ive act, annu

ctively, as we

an warrant th

on portion of

, where legis

tion only tha

cts of occasio

e injury of th

ws.

f vast import

not only serv

ited Constitu

r concur with

ent which ad

never they fin

this principl

happens to l

the existing

sions.

ulled or chan

ell as individ

their represen

f fortitude in

slative invas

at the indepe

onal ill hum

he private ri

tance in miti

ves to moder

ution against

h its enemies

dmits the righ

nd it

le that the

lay hold of a

Constitution

nged the

dually; and n

ntatives in a

n the judges t

sions of it ha

endence of th

mors in the

ghts of

gating the

rate the

 

t

s

ht

a

n,

no

a

to

ad

he

 

 

immed

the leg

iniqui

compe

Alexa

a volu

advan

indisp

define

Alexa

there i

courts

any gr

admit

and th

Const

Alexa

The th

judicia

more t

the im

obstac

diate mischi

gislative bod

tous intentio

elled, by the

ander Hamilt

uminous cod

ntages of a fr

pensable that

e and point o

ander Hamilt

is not a sylla

s to construe

reater latitud

, however, th

hat wherever

titution.

ander Hamilt

heory, neithe

al sentence b

than in eithe

mpropriety of

cle.

iefs of those

dy in passing

on are to be e

e very motive

ton, Federali

de of laws is

ree governme

t they should

out their duty

ton, Federali

able in the pl

the laws acc

de in this resp

hat the Cons

r there is an e

ton, Federali

er of the Brit

by a legislati

er of them, b

f the thing, o

which may

g them; who

expected fro

es of the inju

ist # 78

one of the in

ent. To avoi

d be bound d

y in every pa

ist # 78

lan under co

cording to th

pect than ma

stitution oug

evident oppo

ist # 81

tish, nor the

ive act. Nor

y which it is

on the genera

82 

have been p

, perceiving

om the scrup

ustice they m

nconvenienc

d an arbitrar

down by stric

articular case

onsideration w

he spirit of th

ay be claime

ht to be the

osition, the l

State constit

is there anyt

s forbidden.

al principles

passed but it

that obstacl

les of the co

meditate, to q

ces necessari

ry discretion

ct rules and p

e that comes

which direct

he Constitut

ed by the cou

standard of c

laws ought to

tutions, auth

thing in the p

In the forme

of law and r

operates as

les to the suc

ourts, are in a

qualify their

ily connected

n in the court

precedents w

s before them

tly empower

tion, or whic

urts of every

construction

o give place

horizes the re

proposed Co

er, as well as

reason, is th

a check upon

ccess of an

a manner

r attempts.

d with the

ts, it is

which serve

m

rs the nation

ch gives them

y State. I

n for the law

to the

evisal of a

onstitution,

s in the latter

he sole

 

n

to

nal

m

s,

r,

 

 

A legi

a parti

and it

govern

Alexa

. . . the

part o

body u

There

author

it, whi

degrad

Alexa

The ru

constr

confor

Alexa

A pow

Alexa

 

islature, with

icular case; t

applies in al

nments, as to

ander Hamilt

e important

f the legislat

upon the me

never can b

rity of the le

ile this body

ding them fr

ander Hamilt

ules of legal

ruction of the

rmity to the

ander Hamilt

wer to consti

ander Hamilt

hout exceedi

though it ma

ll its consequ

o the nationa

ton, Federali

constitution

tive body, an

embers of the

be danger tha

egislature, wo

y was posses

rom their sta

ton, Federali

interpretatio

e laws. The

source from

ton, Federali

itute courts i

ton, Federali

ing its provin

ay prescribe

uences, exac

al governme

ist # 81

al check whi

nd of determ

e judicial dep

at the judges

ould hazard

sed of the m

ations.

ist # 81

on are rules o

true test, the

m which they

ist # 83

s a power to

ist # 83

83 

nce, cannot r

a new rule f

ctly in the sa

ent now unde

ich the powe

mining upon t

partment. Th

s, by a series

the united re

means of pun

of common

erefore, of a j

y are derived

o prescribe th

reverse a det

for future ca

ame manner

er considerat

er of institut

them in the o

his is alone a

of deliberat

esentment o

nishing their

sense, adopt

just applicat

d.

he mode of t

termination

ses. This is t

and extent,

tion.

ting impeach

other, would

a complete s

te usurpation

f the body in

presumption

ted by the co

tion of them

trial

once made i

the principle

to the State

hments in on

d give to that

security.

ns of the

ntrusted with

n by

ourts in the

m is its

 

in

e

ne

t

h

 

 

Juricert

In the

with th

certain

not to

can ex

retain

James

AN O

last ad

indivi

It may

to ena

with th

any re

person

divest

The re

allurem

the ob

necess

depos

The ad

superv

isdictiontain enu

first place it

he whole po

n enumerate

be attained

xtend their c

their due au

s Madison, F

OBJECTION

ddress may p

dual citizens

y be said tha

able it to abso

he States for

easonable ma

ns intrusted w

t the States o

egulation of

ments to am

bjects which

sary to those

itory.

dministration

vision of agr

n of fedeumerated

t is to be rem

ower of maki

d objects, w

by the separ

are to all tho

uthority and

Federalist # 1

N of a nature

perhaps be li

s of America

at it would te

orb those res

r local purpo

an can requi

with the adm

of the author

the mere do

mbition. Com

have charm

e objects oug

n of private j

riculture and

eral/natd object

membered th

ing and adm

which concern

rate provisio

ose other obj

activity.

14

different fro

ikewise urge

a.

end to render

siduary auth

oses. Allowin

re, I confess

ministration o

ities of that

omestic polic

mmerce, finan

ms for minds

ght in the firs

justice betw

d of other con

84 

tional gots

hat the gener

ministering la

n all the mem

ons of any. T

jects which c

om that whic

ed against th

r the governm

horities, whic

ng the utmos

s I am at a lo

of the genera

description.

ce of a State

nce, negotiat

governed by

st instance to

ween the citiz

ncerns of a s

overnme

ral governme

aws. Its jurisd

mbers of the

The subordin

can be separ

ch has been s

e principle o

ment of the U

ch it might b

st latitude to

oss to discov

al governme

appears to m

tion, and wa

y that passion

o be lodged

zens of the sa

similar natur

ent limit

ent is not to b

diction is lim

e republic, bu

nate governm

rately provid

stated and an

of legislation

Union too po

be judged pro

o the love of

ver what temp

ent could eve

me to hold ou

ar seem to co

n; and all th

in the nation

ame State, th

re, all those t

ted to

be charged

mited to

ut which are

ments, which

ded for, will

nswered in m

n for the

owerful, and

oper to leave

f power whic

ptation the

er feel to

ut slender

omprehend a

e powers

nal

he

things, in

 

e

h

my

d

e

ch

all

 

 

short,

of a ge

the fed

attemp

posses

impor

Alexa

Do the

limite

sovere

the ge

enjoym

James

In eve

which

power

to the

effectu

That w

severa

conve

differe

1. Sec

2. Reg

which are p

eneral jurisd

deral counci

pt to exercis

ssion of them

rtance, or to

ander Hamilt

ese principle

d, and that, b

eignty and in

eneral power

ment of their

s Madison, F

ery political

h may be mis

r is to be con

public good

ually as poss

we may form

al powers co

eniently done

ent objects:

curity agains

gulation of th

proper to be p

diction. It is t

ils to usurp th

e those pow

m, for that re

the splendor

ton, Federali

es, in fine, re

beyond this

ndependence

rs are limited

r sovereign a

Federalist # 4

institution, a

sapplied and

nferred, the p

d; as the next

sible against

m a correct ju

onferred on th

e they may b

t foreign dan

he intercours

provided for

therefore im

he powers w

wers would be

eason, would

r of the natio

ist # 17

equire that th

limit, the St

e? We have s

d; and that th

and indepen

40

a power to ad

d abused. The

point first to

t will be, in c

t a perversio

udgment on

he governme

be reduced in

nger;

se with forei

85 

r by local leg

mprobable tha

with which th

e as troubles

d contribute

onal governm

he powers of

ates should b

seen that in t

he States, in

dent jurisdic

dvance the p

ey will see, t

be decided

case of an af

n of the pow

this subject,

ent of the Un

nto different

ign nations;

gislation, can

at there shou

hey are conn

some as it w

nothing to th

ment.

f the general

be left in po

the new gov

all unenume

ction.

public happin

therefore, th

is whether s

ffirmative de

wer to the pu

, it will be pr

nion; and tha

t classes as th

n never be d

uld exist a di

nected; becau

would be nug

he dignity, to

l governmen

ssession of t

vernment, as

erated cases,

ness involve

hat in all case

such a power

ecision, to gu

ublic detrime

roper to revi

at this may b

hey relate to

desirable care

isposition in

use the

atory; and th

o the

nt should be

their

in the old,

, are left in th

es a discretio

es where

r be necessar

uard as

ent.

iew the

be the more

o the followin

 

es

he

he

on

ry

ng

 

 

3. Ma

4. Cer

5. Res

6. Pro

James

It has

excise

United

allege

could

stoopi

Had n

Const

had so

form o

freedo

forms

the ge

But w

these

semic

give m

exclud

terms

signifi

aintenance of

rtain miscell

straint of the

ovisions for

s Madison, F

been urged

es, to pay the

d States, am

ed to be nece

be given of

ing to such a

no other enum

titution than

ome color fo

of describing

om of the pre

of conveyan

eneral welfar

what color can

general term

olon? If the

meaning to e

ded altogeth

be retained

fication what

f harmony an

aneous objec

e States from

giving due e

Federalist # 4

and echoed

e debts, and

mounts to an

essary for the

the distress

a misconstru

meration or d

the general e

or it; though

g an authorit

ess, the trial

nces, must b

re."

n the objecti

ms immediate

different par

every part wh

er from a sh

in their full

tsoever?

nd proper int

cts of genera

m certain inju

efficacy to al

41

that the pow

provide for t

unlimited co

e common d

under which

uction.

definition of

expressions

it would hav

ty to legislat

by jury, or e

be very singu

ion have, wh

ely follows a

rts of the sam

hich will bea

hare in the m

extent, and t

86 

tercourse am

al utility;

urious acts;

ll these pow

wer "to lay an

the common

ommission t

efense or ge

h these write

f the powers

just cited, th

ve been diffi

te in all poss

even to regu

ularly expres

hen a specifi

and is not ev

me instrume

ar it, shall on

eaning; and

the clear and

mong the Sta

wers.

nd collect tax

n defense and

to exercise ev

eneral welfar

ers labor for

of the Cong

he authors of

icult to find a

sible cases. A

ulate the cour

ssed by the t

ication of the

ven separated

ent ought to b

ne part of the

shall the mo

d precise exp

ates;

xes, duties, i

d general we

very power

re. No strong

objections, t

gress been fo

f the objectio

a reason for

A power to d

rse of descen

terms "to rais

e objects allu

d by a longe

be so expoun

e same sente

ore doubtful

pressions be

imposts, and

elfare of the

which may b

ger proof

than their

ound in the

on might hav

so awkward

destroy the

nts, or the

se money fo

uded to by

er pause than

nded as to

ence be

and indefini

denied any

 

d

be

ve

d a

or

n a

ite

 

 

For w

others

nor co

recital

nor qu

mislea

James

the mo

the pr

Congr

of the

the su

which

strikin

James

[Rega

into ex

govern

. . . Th

subjec

would

attemp

"neces

specif

what purpose

s were meant

ommon than

l of particula

ualify the gen

ad, is an absu

s Madison, F

ost minute p

etext for gra

ress have bee

ir chartered

ubject; and w

h seems to ha

ng defects of

s Madison, F

arding the] "

xecution the

nment of the

here are four

ct. They mig

d have prohib

pted a positi

ssary and pr

fying the pow

could the en

t to be includ

first to use a

ars. But the i

neral meanin

urdity

Federalist # 4

provisions be

adual and un

en betrayed,

authorities w

would be no i

ave provided

f the old.

Federalist # 4

"power to ma

e foregoing p

e United Stat

r other possib

ght have copi

bited the exe

ve enumerat

oper"; they m

wers excepte

numeration o

ded in the pr

a general ph

idea of an en

ng, and can h

41

ecome impor

observed usu

, or forced by

would not a l

inconsiderab

d no less stud

42

ake all laws

powers, and

tes, or in any

ble methods

ied the secon

ercise of any

tion of the po

might have a

ed from the g

87 

of particular

receding gen

hrase, and the

numeration o

have no othe

rtant when th

urpations of

y the defects

little surpris

ble argument

diously for t

which shall

all other pow

y departmen

s which the C

nd article of

y power not e

owers comp

attempted a n

general defin

powers be i

neral power?

en to explain

of particulars

er effect than

hey tend to o

f power. A li

s of the Conf

e those who

t in favor of

the lesser tha

be necessar

wers vested b

nt or office th

Convention m

f the existing

expressly de

prehended un

negative enu

nition; they m

inserted, if th

? Nothing is

n and qualify

s which neit

n to confoun

obviate the n

ist of the cas

federation, i

have paid n

f the new Con

an the more

ry and proper

by this Cons

hereof."

might have t

g Confederat

elegated; the

nder the gene

umeration of

might have b

hese and all

more natura

y it by a

ther explain

nd and

necessity or

ses in which

into violation

no attention t

nstitution,

obvious and

r for carryin

stitution in th

taken on this

tion, which

ey might hav

eral terms

f them by

been

 

al

ns

to

d

ng

he

s

ve

 

 88 

 

altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction

and inference.

. . . As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the government

which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of

betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by

exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not expressly

granted.

. . . for in every new application of a general power, the particular powers, which are the

means of attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that

object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.

Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper

for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less

chimerical; and would have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the

enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority.

. . . No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is

required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every

particular power necessary for doing it is included.

. . . If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this

part of the Constitution and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning. I answer

the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the

general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated;

the same, in short, as if the State legislatures should violate their respective constitutional

authorities.

In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and

judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in

the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can, by the election of

more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is that this ultimate

redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal than of the

 

 

State l

invasi

the ala

repres

There

intere

more

James

The p

define

The fo

and fo

conne

The p

ordina

intern

The op

war an

forme

will h

The m

the les

the go

If the

chang

Union

legislatures,

ion of the rig

arm to the pe

sentatives.

being no su

sted in watch

likely to rem

s Madison, F

owers deleg

ed. Those wh

ormer will b

oreign comm

ected.

owers reserv

ary course of

al order, imp

perations of

nd danger; th

er periods wi

ere enjoy an

more adequat

ss frequent w

overnments o

new Constit

ge which it pr

n than in the

for this plai

ghts of the la

eople, and to

uch intermed

hing the con

main unnotic

Federalist # 4

ated by the p

hich are to re

e exercised p

merce; with w

ved to the se

f affairs, con

provement, a

f the federal g

hose of the S

ill probably b

nother advan

te, indeed, th

will be those

of the particu

tution be exa

roposes con

invigoration

in reason tha

atter, these w

o exert their

diate body be

nduct of the f

ed and unred

44

proposed Co

emain in the

principally o

which last th

everal States

ncern the live

and prosperi

government

State govern

bear a small

ntage over th

he federal po

e scenes of da

ular States.

amined with

sists much le

n of its ORIG

89 

at as every su

will be ever r

local influen

etween the S

former, viola

dressed.

onstitution to

State gover

on external o

he power of t

will extend

es, liberties,

ity of the Sta

will be mos

ments in tim

proportion t

e federal gov

owers may b

anger which

accuracy an

ess in the ad

GINAL POW

uch act of th

ready to mar

nce in effect

State legislatu

ations of the

o the federal

rnments are n

objects, as w

taxation will

to all the ob

and propert

ate.

st extensive a

mes of peace

to the latter,

vernment.

be rendered t

h might favor

nd candor, it

ddition of NE

WERS. The r

he former wil

rk the innova

ting a change

ures and the

e State consti

government

numerous an

war, peace, ne

l, for the mo

bjects which,

ties of the pe

and importan

and security

the State go

to the nation

r their ascen

t will be foun

EW POWER

regulation o

ll be an

ation, to soun

e of federal

people

itutions are

t are few and

nd indefinite

egotiation,

st part, be

, in the

eople, and th

nt in times o

y. As the

overnments

al defense,

ndancy over

nd that the

RS to the

f commerce

 

nd

d

e.

he

of

,

 

 

it is tr

which

James

It is a

intere

to tho

relate.

James

There

author

legisla

to affi

that th

by vir

forbid

Alexa

From

not be

quoted

maxim

them u

inappl

rue, is a new

h no apprehe

s Madison, F

sound and im

sts and circu

se circumsta

.

s Madison, F

is no positio

rity, contrary

ative act, the

irm that the d

he representa

rtue of power

d.

ander Hamilt

these observ

e abolished;

d is contrary

ms had a pre

upon the pre

licable to a c

power; but

nsions are en

Federalist # 4

mportant pri

umstance of

ances and int

Federalist # 5

on which dep

y to the teno

erefore, contr

deputy is gre

atives of the

rs may do no

ton, Federali

vations this c

and that the

y to reason an

cise technica

esent occasio

constitution o

that seems to

ntertained.

45

inciple that t

his constitue

terests to wh

56

pends on cle

or of the com

rary to the C

eater than hi

people are s

ot only what

ist # 78

conclusion r

use attempte

nd common

al sense, cor

on, which, ho

of governme

90 

o be an addi

the represent

ents. But this

hich the auth

earer princip

mmission und

Constitution,

s principal; t

superior to th

t their power

esults: that t

ed to be mad

sense, and t

rresponding w

owever, is n

ent. In relatio

ition which f

tative ought

s principle c

hority and ca

ples than that

der which it

can be valid

that the serv

he people th

rs do not aut

the trial by ju

de of the ma

therefore not

with the idea

not the case, t

on to such a

few oppose a

to be acqua

can extend no

are of the rep

t every act o

is exercised

d. To deny th

vant is above

emselves; th

thorize, but w

ury in civil c

axims which

t admissible

as of those w

they would

a subject, the

and from

ainted with th

o further tha

presentative

of a delegated

, is void. No

his would be

e his master;

hat men actin

what they

cases would

have been

. Even if the

who employ

still be

e natural and

 

he

an

d

o

e

ng

ese

d

 

 91 

 

obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical rules, is the true criterion of

construction.

Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will not bear the use made of them, let us

endeavor to ascertain their proper use and true meaning. This will be best done by

examples. The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress, or, in other

words, of the national legislature, shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This

specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative

authority, because an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd as well as

useless if a general authority was intended.

In like manner the judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared by the

Constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The expression of those

cases marks the precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot extend their

jurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification

would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83

 

 

Law

It has

out of

betwe

hardsh

jurisdi

peculi

bargai

deceit

and un

which

In suc

the fed

Agree

anothe

reason

betwe

every

Alexa

My co

equity

impro

relief

w and eq

also been as

f the Constitu

een individua

hip, which w

iction, as the

iar province,

ins: these are

t sufficient to

nconscionab

h a court of e

ch cases, whe

deral judicat

ements to con

er example o

ning may no

een LAW and

day's practic

ander Hamilt

onvictions ar

y from the la

operly comm

in extraordin

quity

sked, what n

ution and law

als which ma

would render

e distinction

, for instance

e contracts in

o invalidate

ble advantage

equity would

ere foreigner

tories to do j

nvey lands c

of the necess

t be so palpa

d EQUITY i

ce.

ton, Federali

re equally str

aw jurisdictio

mitted to jurie

nary cases, w

need of the w

ws of the Un

ay not involv

r the matter a

is known an

e, of a court

n which, tho

them in a co

e taken of th

d not tolerate

rs were conc

justice witho

claimed unde

sity of an equ

able in those

is not mainta

ist # 80

rong that gre

on, and that t

es. The great

which are ex

92 

word "equity"

nited States?

ve those ingr

an object of

nd establishe

of equity to

ough there m

ourt of law, y

he necessities

e.

cerned on eit

out an equita

er the grants

uitable jurisd

e States wher

ained as in th

eat advantag

the causes w

t and primary

xceptions* to

"? What equ

There is har

redients of f

equitable rat

ed in several

relieve agai

may have bee

yet there may

s or misfortu

ther side, it w

able as well a

s of different

diction in th

re the forma

his State, wh

ges result fro

which belong

ry use of a co

o general rul

uitable cause

rdly a subjec

fraud, accide

ather than of

l of the State

inst what are

en no direct f

y have been

unes of one o

would be im

as legal juris

t States may

he federal cou

al and technic

here it is exe

om the separ

g to the form

ourt of equit

les.

es can grow

ct of litigatio

ent, trust, or

legal

es. It is the

e called hard

fraud or

n some undue

of the partie

mpossible for

sdiction.

afford

urts. This

cal distinctio

emplified by

ation of the

mer would be

y is to give

 

on

d

e

s

r

on

y

e

 

 

*It i

system

circum

Alexa

It is tr

Englis

the St

Alexa

The n

matter

jurisdi

advan

are est

law, a

decisi

Alexa

It is ob

as a ge

and eq

Alexa

is true that th

m; but it is no

mstances, wh

ander Hamilt

rue that the s

sh system of

ates.

ander Hamilt

ature of a co

rs of law; bu

iction of the

ntages which

tablished in

and to underm

on in that m

ander Hamilt

bvious there

eneral regula

quitable juris

ander Hamilt

he principles

ot the less tr

hich form ex

ton, Federali

separation of

f jurispruden

ton, Federali

ourt of equity

ut it is not a l

courts of law

h may be deri

this State, b

mine the tria

mode.

ton, Federali

efore, that th

ation until so

sdictions, sh

ton, Federali

s by which th

rue that they

xceptions to g

ist # 83

f the equity f

nce, which is

ist # 83

y will readily

little to be su

w to matters

ived from co

ut will tend

al by jury, by

ist # 83

e Massachus

ome uniform

hall be adopt

ist # 83

93 

hat relief is g

are in the m

general rules

from the lega

s the model t

y permit the

uspected that

s of equity w

ourts of chan

gradually to

y introducing

setts proposi

m plan, with

ed by the dif

governed are

main applicab

s.

al jurisdictio

that has been

extension o

at the attempt

will not only

ncery, on the

o change the

g questions t

ition upon th

respect to th

fferent State

e now reduc

ble to SPECI

on is peculia

n followed in

of its jurisdic

t to extend th

be unproduc

e plan upon w

nature of th

too complica

his subject ca

he limits of c

es.

ed to a regul

IAL

ar to the

n several of

ction to

he

ctive of the

which they

he courts of

ated for a

annot operat

common-law

 

lar

te

w

 

 94 

 

Laws must be executed

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law that it be

attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If

there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend

to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 15

 

 

Law

The in

of libe

own c

they c

underg

what i

which

Ano

sagaci

mass o

Every

value

chang

and ca

This i

few, n

James

What

knows

James

ws must

nternal effec

erty itself. It

choice if the

cannot be un

go such ince

it will be tom

h is little kno

other effect o

ious, the ent

of the people

y new regulat

of the differ

ge, and can tr

ares of the gr

s a state of th

not for the m

s Madison, F

prudent mer

s not but tha

s Madison, F

be few,

ts of a mutab

will be of li

laws be so v

derstood; if

essant chang

morrow. Law

own, and less

of public inst

erprising, an

e.

tion concern

rent species o

race its cons

reat body of

hings in whi

many.

Federalist # 6

rchant will h

at his plans m

Federalist # 6

unders

ble policy ar

ittle avail to

voluminous t

they be repe

ges that no m

w is defined

s fixed?

tability is the

nd the money

ning commer

of property,

equences; a

f their fellow

ich it may be

62

hazard his fo

may be rende

62

95 

tandabl

re still more

the people th

that they can

ealed or revis

man, who kno

to be a rule o

e unreasonab

yed few ove

rce or revenu

presents a n

harvest, rear

w-citizens.

e said with s

rtunes in any

ered unlawfu

le, and s

calamitous.

hat the laws

nnot be read

sed before th

ows what the

of action; bu

ble advantag

r the industr

ue, or in any

new harvest t

ared not by th

some truth th

y branch of

ul before the

stable

It poisons th

are made by

, or so incoh

hey are prom

e law is toda

ut how can th

ge it gives to

rious and uni

y manner aff

to those who

hemselves, b

hat laws are m

commerce w

ey can be exe

he blessings

y men of the

herent that

mulgated, or

ay, can guess

hat be a rule

o the

informed

fecting the

o watch the

but by the to

made for the

when he

ecuted?

 

s

eir

s

e,

ils

e

 

 96 

 

No government, any more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly

respectable; nor be truly respectable without possessing a certain portion of order and

stability.

James Madison, Federalist # 62

 

 

Law

The ex

legisla

limits

The pr

eccles

to be c

been m

severa

freque

they a

James

Felony

impor

James

It has

out of

betwe

hardsh

jurisdi

It is th

called

fraud

ws; vario

xperience of

ators and jur

of different

recise extent

siastical law,

clearly and f

more industr

al courts, gen

ent and intric

are respective

s Madison, F

y is a term o

rt in the statu

s Madison, F

also been as

f the Constitu

een individua

hip, which w

iction, as the

he peculiar p

d hard bargai

or deceit suf

ous type

f ages, with t

rists, has bee

codes of law

t of the comm

, the law of c

finally establ

riously pursu

neral and loc

cate discussi

ely circumsc

Federalist # 3

of loose signi

ute law of tha

Federalist # 4

sked, what n

ution and law

als which ma

would render

e distinction

province, for

ins: these are

fficient to in

es of

the continue

en equally un

ws and differ

mon law, an

corporations

lished in Gre

ued than in a

cal, of law, o

ions, sufficie

cribed.

37

ification eve

at kingdom.

42

need of the w

ws of the Un

ay not involv

r the matter a

is known an

r instance, o

e contracts in

nvalidate them

97 

ed and combi

nsuccessful i

rent tribunal

nd the statute

s, and other l

eat Britain, w

any other par

of equity, of

ently denotin

en in the com

word "equity"

nited States?

ve those ingr

an object of

nd establishe

f a court of e

n which, tho

m in a court

ined labors o

in delineatin

ls of justice.

e law, the ma

local laws an

where accura

rt of the wor

f admiralty, e

ng the indete

mmon law of

"? What equ

There is har

redients of f

equitable rat

ed in several

equity to rel

ough there m

of law, yet t

of the most e

ng the severa

aritime law,

nd customs,

acy in such s

rld. The juris

etc., is not le

erminate lim

f England; a

uitable cause

rdly a subjec

fraud, accide

ather than of

l of the State

lieve against

may have bee

there may ha

enlightened

al objects and

the

remains still

subjects has

sdiction of h

ess a source o

mits by which

nd of variou

es can grow

ct of litigatio

ent, trust, or

legal

es.

t what are

en no direct

ave been

 

d

l

her

of

h

us

on

 

 

some

of the

were c

justice

Agree

anothe

reason

betwe

every

Alexa

The pr

matter

Some

forms

supers

our co

Alexa

The fo

relatio

may h

course

revisio

Court

Alexa

undue and u

parties whic

concerned on

e without an

ements to con

er example o

ning may no

een LAW and

day's practic

ander Hamilt

ropriety of th

rs of law; bu

well-intenti

which obtai

sedure of the

ourts of adm

ander Hamilt

ollowing trai

on to this par

have been arg

e of the COM

on of the law

ander Hamilt

unconscionab

ch a court of

n either side

n equitable as

nvey lands c

of the necess

t be so palpa

d EQUITY i

ce.

ton, Federali

his appellate

ut the clamor

ioned men in

in in our cou

e trial by jury

iralty, proba

ton, Federali

in of ideas m

rticular prov

gued) will ex

MMON LAW

w only will b

ton, Federali

ble advantag

f equity wou

e, it would be

s well as leg

claimed unde

sity of an equ

able in those

is not mainta

ist # 80

e jurisdiction

rs have been

n this State, d

urts, have be

y, in favor o

ate, and chan

ist # 81

may well be i

vision. The ap

xtend to cau

W, others in

be, generally

ist # 81

98 

ge taken of th

uld not tolera

e impossible

al jurisdictio

er the grants

uitable jurisd

e States wher

ained as in th

n has been sc

n loud agains

deriving thei

en induced t

of the civil-la

ncery.

imagined to

ppellate juri

uses determin

the course o

y speaking, th

he necessitie

ate. In such c

e for the fede

on.

s of different

diction in th

re the forma

his State, wh

carcely calle

st it as applie

ir notions fro

to consider i

aw mode of t

have influen

isdiction of t

nable in diffe

of the CIVIL

he proper pr

es or misfort

cases, where

eral judicato

t States may

he federal cou

al and technic

here it is exe

ed in questio

ed to matters

om the langu

it as an impli

trial, which

nced the con

the Supreme

ferent modes

L LAW. In th

rovince of th

tunes of one

e foreigners

ries to do

afford

urts. This

cal distinctio

emplified by

on in regard t

s of fact.

uage and

ied

prevails in

nvention in

e Court (it

s, some in th

he former, th

he Supreme

 

on

y

to

e

he

 

 

The le

appea

been t

but if,

qualif

mode

Alexa

In this

Great

matter

the co

all the

of the

In New

admir

State t

determ

more

more t

have e

plan o

Alexa

I belie

causes

egislature of

als to the Sup

tried in the o

, for the reas

fied with a lim

of trial.

ander Hamilt

s State, our j

Britain. We

rs to the spir

ourts of comm

e others a sin

canon or civ

w Jersey, the

ralty nor of p

the courts of

minable in th

extensive in

the case, for

equity jurisd

of ours.

ander Hamilt

eve, however

s depending

f the United S

preme Court

original caus

on already in

mitation to s

ton, Federali

udicial estab

have courts

ritual courts

mon law onl

ngle judge pr

vil law, with

ere is a court

probates, in t

f common la

he courts of t

n New Jersey

r there is no c

diction. It has

ton, Federali

r, that in som

in them are

States would

there should

es by juries.

ntimated, it

such causes

ist # 81

blishments re

s of common

in England)

ly, the trial b

resides, and

hout the aid o

t of chancery

the sense in w

aw have the c

the admiralty

y than in New

court of chan

s a court of a

ist # 83

me of those S

triable by ju

99 

d certainly h

d be no re-ex

This would

should be th

only as are d

esemble, mo

n law, courts

, a court of a

by jury preva

proceeds in

of a jury.

y which proc

which these

cognizance o

y and of prob

w York. In P

ncery in that

admiralty, bu

States which

uries. In Geo

have full pow

xamination o

d certainly be

hought too ex

determinable

ore nearly th

s of probates

admiralty, an

ails, and this

general eith

ceeds like ou

last are esta

of those cau

bates, and o

Pennsylvania

t State, and i

ut none of pr

h have distin

orgia there ar

wer to provid

of facts wher

e an authoriz

xtensive, it m

e at common

han in any oth

s (analogous

nd a court of

s with some e

her according

urs, but neith

ablished with

uses which w

f course the

a, this is perh

its common-

robates, at le

nct courts of

re none but c

de that in

re they had

zed exceptio

might be

n law in that

her, those of

in certain

f chancery. I

exceptions.

g to the cour

her courts of

h us. In that

with us are

jury trial is

haps still

-law courts

east on the

admiralty, th

common-law

 

on;

f

In

In

rse

f

he

w

 

 

courts

a spec

Conne

courts

and, to

Alexa

Massa

jurisdi

only s

peculi

one ju

Alexa

s, and an app

cial jury, and

ecticut, they

s of probates

o a certain e

ander Hamilt

achusetts and

ictions, are i

stands upon a

iarity unknow

ury to anothe

ander Hamilt

peal of cours

d for which a

have no dist

s have no jur

xtent, equity

ton, Federali

d New Hamp

in a similar p

a broader fou

wn, in its ful

er, till there h

ton, Federali

se lies from t

a particular m

tinct courts e

risdiction of

y jurisdiction

ist # 83

pshire, in reg

predicament

undation tha

ll extent, to a

have been tw

ist # 83

100 

the verdict o

mode of app

either of cha

causes. Thei

n.

gard to the b

. In the four

an in the othe

any of them

wo verdicts o

of one jury to

ointment is m

ancery or of

ir common-l

blending of l

Eastern Stat

er States, bu

. There is an

out of three o

o another, wh

marked out.

admiralty, a

law courts h

law, equity,

tes, the trial

ut it is attend

n appeal of c

on one side.

hich is calle

In

and their

have admiralt

and admiralt

by jury not

ded with a

course from

 

d

ty

ty

 

 

Leg

the ten

expen

James

one br

James

a cons

will b

canno

govern

They,

history

gradua

it seem

govern

This p

weapo

for ob

saluta

James

gislature

ndency of re

nse of the oth

s Madison, F

ranch of the

s Madison, F

stitutional an

e able at all

ot only refuse

nment.

in a word, h

y of the Brit

ally enlargin

ms to have w

nment.

power over th

on with whic

btaining a red

ary measure.

s Madison, F

e; Natur

epublican go

her departme

Federalist # 4

legislature i

Federalist # 5

nd infallible

times to acc

e, but they al

hold the purs

tish Constitu

ng the sphere

wished, all th

he purse ma

ch any const

dress of ever

Federalist # 5

re of the

vernments is

ents.

49

is a represen

58

resource stil

complish thei

lone can pro

se --- that po

ution, an infa

e of its activi

he overgrown

ay, in fact, be

titution can a

ry grievance

58

101 

s to an aggra

tation of citi

ll remains w

ir just purpo

opose the sup

owerful instru

ant and humb

ity and impo

n prerogativ

e regarded as

arm the imm

, and for car

andizement o

izens, the oth

with the large

oses. The Ho

pplies requis

rument by wh

ble represent

ortance, and

ves of the oth

s the most co

mediate repre

rrying into ef

of the legisla

her of the St

er States by w

ouse of Repr

site for the su

hich we beh

tation of the

finally redu

her branches

omplete and

esentatives o

ffect every j

ative at the

tates

which they

esentatives

upport of

hold, in the

e people

ucing, as far a

of the

d effectual

f the people

ust and

 

as

,

 

 

in all l

be the

any as

ascend

In the

limite

descri

In the

orator

scepte

a repr

incide

Ignora

The p

beyon

Exper

numbe

whole

repres

The co

anima

the mo

Jame

The re

govern

does n

every

legislative a

e men who w

ssembly may

dancy of pas

next place,

d informatio

iption that th

ancient repu

r, or an artful

er had been p

esentative as

ent to collect

ance will be

eople can ne

nd a certain l

rience will fo

er for the pu

e society, the

sentatives.

ountenance o

ates it will be

ore secret, w

s Madison, F

epublican pr

n the conduc

not require a

transient im

ssemblies th

will in fact di

y be, of what

ssion over re

the larger th

on and of we

he eloquence

ublics, wher

l statesman,

placed in his

ssembly may

tive meeting

the dupe of

ever err more

limit they str

orever admo

urposes of sa

ey will count

of the gover

e more oliga

will be the sp

Federalist #

rinciple dema

ct of those to

an unqualifie

mpulse which

he greater the

irect their pr

tever charac

eason.

he number, th

eak capacitie

e and address

e the whole

was general

s single hand

y be rendere

s of the peop

cunning, an

e than in sup

rengthen the

nish them th

afety, of loca

teract their o

rnment may b

archic. The m

prings by wh

58

ands that the

o whom they

ed complaisa

h the people

102 

e number co

oceedings. I

cters compos

he greater w

es. Now, it is

s of the few

body of the

lly seen to ru

d. On the sam

ed, the more

ple.

nd passion th

pposing that

barrier agai

hat, on the co

al informatio

own views by

become mor

machine will

hich its motio

e deliberate s

y intrust the m

ance to every

may receive

omposing the

In the first pl

sed, the great

will be the pro

s precisely o

are known t

people assem

ule with as c

me principle

it will partak

he slave of so

by multiply

inst the gove

ontrary, after

on, and of dif

y every addi

re democrati

l be enlarged

ons are direc

sense of the

managemen

y sudden bre

e from the ar

em may be, t

lace, the mo

ater is known

oportion of m

n characters

to act with al

mbled in per

complete a sw

, the more m

ke of the inf

ophistry and

ying their rep

ernment of a

r securing a

ffusive symp

ition to their

ic, but the so

d, but the few

cted.

community

nt of their aff

eeze of passi

rts of men, w

the fewer wi

re numerous

n to be the

members of

s of this

ll their force

rson, a singl

way as if a

multitudinous

firmities

d declamation

presentatives

few.

sufficient

pathy with th

r

oul that

wer, and ofte

should

fairs; but it

on, or to

who flatter

 

ill

s

e.

le

s

n.

s

he

en

 

 

their p

intend

This o

should

from e

do, be

the am

confid

deserv

When

with th

guardi

and op

condu

mistak

courag

Alexa

The es

rules f

of the

compr

Alexa

. . . the

part o

body u

prejudices to

d the PUBLI

often applies

d pretend tha

experience th

eset as they c

mbitious, the

dence more t

ve it.

n occasions p

heir inclinat

ians of those

pportunity fo

uct of this kin

kes, and has

ge and magn

ander Hamilt

ssence of the

for the regul

common str

rise all the fu

ander Hamilt

e important

f the legislat

upon the me

o betray their

C GOOD.

s to their very

at they alway

hat they som

continually a

e avaricious,

than they de

present them

tions, it is the

e interests to

or more cool

nd has saved

procured las

nanimity eno

ton, Federali

e legislative

lation of the

rength, eithe

unctions of t

ton, Federali

constitution

tive body, an

embers of the

r interests. It

y errors. But

ys reason rig

metimes err;

are by the wi

the desperat

serve it, and

mselves in wh

e duty of the

o withstand th

l and sedate

d the people

sting monum

ough to serve

ist # 71

authority is

society; whi

er for this pu

the executive

ist # 75

al check whi

nd of determ

e judicial dep

103 

t is a just obs

t their good

ght about the

and the won

iles of parasi

te, by the art

d of those wh

hich the inter

e persons wh

he temporar

reflection. I

from very fa

ments of thei

e them at the

to enact law

ile the execu

urpose or for

e magistrate

ich the powe

mining upon t

partment. Th

servation tha

sense would

e means of p

nder is that th

ites and syco

tifices of me

ho seek to po

rests of the p

hom they hav

ry delusion in

Instances mig

atal consequ

ir gratitude t

e peril of the

ws, or, in oth

ution of the l

the common

e.

er of institut

them in the o

his is alone a

at the people

d despise the

promoting it.

hey so seldo

ophants, by

en who posse

ossess rather

people are at

ve appointed

n order to gi

ght be cited

uences of the

to the men w

eir displeasur

her words, to

laws and the

n defense, se

ting impeach

other, would

a complete s

e commonly

e adulator wh

. They know

om err as the

the snares of

ess their

r than to

t variance

d to be the

ive them tim

in which a

eir own

who had

re.

prescribe

e employmen

eem to

hments in on

d give to that

security.

 

ho

w

y

f

me

nt

ne

t

 

 104 

 

There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations of the

authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with

it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption by

degrading them from their stations.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 81

 

 

Leg

Is it no

depen

should

willin

and th

his ass

and th

Alexa

it is es

the pe

James

the Ho

recolle

minds

compe

is to b

there f

title to

I wi

restrai

its ful

societ

gislature

ot natural th

ndent on the

d take care to

ng to allow th

he necessity

sent are the t

he constituen

ander Hamilt

ssential to lib

eople

s Madison, F

ouse of Repr

ection of the

s by the mod

elled to antic

be reviewed,

forever to re

o a renewal o

ll add, as a f

ining them f

l operation o

ty. This has a

e not to a

at a man wh

suffrages of

o inform him

hem their pro

of being bou

true and they

nt.

ton, Federali

berty that th

Federalist # 5

resentatives

eir dependen

de of their ele

cipate the mo

and when th

emain unless

of it.

fifth circums

from oppress

on themselve

always been

accord t

ho is a candid

f his fellow-c

mself of their

oper degree

und, himself

y are the stro

ist # 35

e governmen

52

is so constit

nce on the pe

evation can b

oment when

hey must des

s a faithful di

stance in the

sive measure

es and their f

deemed one

105 

themselv

date for the f

citizens for th

r disposition

of influence

f and his post

ong cords of

nt in general

tuted as to su

eople. Before

be effaced b

n their power

scend to the

ischarge of t

situation of

es, that they

friends, as w

e of the stron

ves priv

favor of the

the continuan

ns and inclin

e upon his co

terity, by the

f sympathy b

l should hav

upport in the

e the sentime

by the exerci

r is to cease,

level from w

their trust sh

f the House o

can make no

well as on the

ngest bonds

vileges

people, and

nce of his pu

nations and sh

onduct? This

e laws to wh

between the

e a common

e members an

ents impress

ise of power,

, when their

which they w

hall have esta

of Represent

o law which

e great mass

by which hu

who is

ublic honors

hould be

s dependence

hich he gives

representativ

n interest wit

n habitual

sed on their

, they will be

exercise of i

were raised;

ablished thei

tatives,

will not hav

s of the

uman policy

 

,

e,

s

ve

th

e

it

ir

ve

 

 106 

 

can connect the rulers and the people together. It creates between them that communion of

interests and sympathy of sentiments of which few governments have furnished examples;

but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.

If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal

discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer: the

genius of the whole system; the nature of just and constitutional laws; and, above all, the

vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America -- a spirit which nourishes

freedom, and in return is nourished by it.

If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the

legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but

liberty.

James Madison, Federalist # 57

 

 

Lim

In the

with th

certain

not to

can ex

retain

James

AN O

last ad

indivi

of the

might

Allow

confes

admin

author

appea

Comm

charm

ought

privat

other

provid

theref

mited jur

first place it

he whole po

n enumerate

be attained

xtend their c

their due au

s Madison, F

OBJECTION

ddress may p

dual citizens

Union too p

be judged p

wing the utmo

ss I am at a l

nistration of

rities of that

ars to me to h

merce, financ

ms for minds

in the first i

te justice bet

concerns of

ded for by lo

fore improba

risdictio

t is to be rem

ower of maki

d objects, w

by the separ

are to all tho

uthority and

Federalist # 1

N of a nature

perhaps be li

s of America

powerful, an

proper to leav

ost latitude t

loss to disco

the general g

description.

hold out slen

ce, negotiatio

governed by

instance to b

tween the cit

a similar nat

ocal legislatio

able that ther

on of the

membered th

ing and adm

which concern

rate provisio

ose other obj

activity.

14

different fro

ikewise urge

a. It may be

nd to enable i

ve with the S

to the love o

over what tem

government

. The regulat

nder allureme

on, and war

y that passio

be lodged in

tizens of the

ture, all thos

on, can neve

re should exi

107 

e federal

hat the gener

ministering la

n all the mem

ons of any. T

jects which c

om that whic

ed against th

said that it w

it to absorb t

States for loc

of power whi

mptation the

could ever f

tion of the m

ents to ambi

seem to com

on; and all th

the national

same State,

se things, in

er be desirab

ist a disposit

l/nation

ral governme

aws. Its jurisd

mbers of the

The subordin

can be separ

ch has been s

e principle o

would tend to

those residua

cal purposes

ich any reaso

persons intr

feel to divest

mere domesti

ition.

mprehend all

he powers ne

depository.

the supervis

short, which

ble cares of a

tion in the fe

nal gover

ent is not to b

diction is lim

e republic, bu

nate governm

rately provid

stated and an

of legislation

o render the

ary authoriti

s.

onable man

rusted with t

t the States o

ic police of a

l the objects

ecessary to th

The admini

sion of agric

h are proper

a general jur

ederal counc

rnment

be charged

mited to

ut which are

ments, which

ded for, will

nswered in m

n for the

government

ies, which it

can require,

the

of the

a State

which have

hose objects

stration of

culture and o

to be

isdiction. It

cils to usurp

 

e

h

my

t

I

e

of

is

 

 

the po

would

reason

nation

Alexa

Do the

limite

sovere

the ge

enjoym

James

in eve

which

power

to the

effectu

That w

severa

conve

differe

foreig

Certai

injurio

James

owers with w

d be as troub

n, would con

nal governme

ander Hamilt

ese principle

d, and that, b

eignty and in

eneral power

ment of their

s Madison, F

ery political i

h may be mis

r is to be con

public good

ually as poss

we may form

al powers co

eniently done

ent objects:

gn nations; 3

in miscellane

ous acts; 6. P

s Madison, F

which they ar

lesome as it

ntribute noth

ent.

ton, Federali

es, in fine, re

beyond this

ndependence

rs are limited

r sovereign a

Federalist # 4

institution, a

sapplied and

nferred, the p

d; as the next

sible against

m a correct ju

onferred on th

e they may b

1. Security a

. Maintenanc

eous objects

Provisions fo

Federalist # 4

re connected

would be nu

hing to the di

ist # 17

equire that th

limit, the St

e? We have s

d; and that th

and indepen

40

a power to ad

d abused. The

point first to

t will be, in c

t a perversio

udgment on

he governme

be reduced in

against foreig

ce of harmon

s of general u

or giving due

41

108 

d; because th

ugatory; and

ignity, to the

he powers of

ates should b

seen that in t

he States, in

dent jurisdic

dvance the p

ey will see, t

be decided

case of an af

n of the pow

this subject,

ent of the Un

nto different

gn danger; 2

ny and prop

utility; 5. Re

e efficacy to

he attempt to

d the possess

e importance

f the general

be left in po

the new gov

all unenume

ction.

public happin

therefore, th

is whether s

ffirmative de

wer to the pu

, it will be pr

nion; and tha

t classes as th

2. Regulation

er intercours

estraint of the

o all these po

o exercise tho

sion of them

e, or to the sp

l governmen

ssession of t

vernment, as

erated cases,

ness involve

hat in all case

such a power

ecision, to gu

ublic detrime

roper to revi

at this may b

hey relate to

n of the inter

se among the

e States from

owers.

ose powers

m, for that

plendor of th

nt should be

their

in the old,

, are left in th

es a discretio

es where

r be necessar

uard as

ent.

iew the

be the more

o the followin

rcourse with

e States; 4.

m certain

 

he

he

on

ry

ng

h

 

 

It has

excise

United

be alle

could

stoopi

Had n

Const

had so

form o

freedo

forms

the ge

But w

these

semic

give m

exclud

terms

signifi

For w

others

nor co

recital

nor qu

mislea

Jame

been urged

es, to pay the

d States," am

eged to be ne

be given of

ing to such a

no other enum

titution than

ome color fo

of describing

om of the pre

of conveyan

eneral welfar

what color can

general term

olon? If the

meaning to e

ded altogeth

be retained

fication what

what purpose

s were meant

ommon than

l of particula

ualify the gen

ad, is an absu

s Madison, F

and echoed

e debts, and

mounts to an

ecessary for

the distress

a misconstru

meration or d

the general e

or it; though

g an authorit

ess, the trial

nces, must b

re."

n the objecti

ms immediate

different par

every part wh

er from a sh

in their full

tsoever?

could the en

t to be includ

first to use a

ars. But the i

neral meanin

urdity

Federalist #

that the pow

provide for t

unlimited c

the common

under which

uction.

definition of

expressions

it would hav

ty to legislat

by jury, or e

be very singu

ion have, wh

ely follows a

rts of the sam

hich will bea

hare in the m

extent, and t

numeration o

ded in the pr

a general ph

idea of an en

ng, and can h

41

109 

wer "to lay an

the common

ommission t

n defense or

h these write

f the powers

just cited, th

ve been diffi

te in all poss

even to regu

ularly expres

hen a specifi

and is not ev

me instrume

ar it, shall on

eaning; and

the clear and

of particular

receding gen

hrase, and the

numeration o

have no othe

nd collect tax

n defense and

to exercise e

r general wel

ers labor for

of the Cong

he authors of

icult to find a

sible cases. A

ulate the cour

ssed by the t

ication of the

ven separated

ent ought to b

ne part of the

shall the mo

d precise exp

powers be i

neral power?

en to explain

of particulars

er effect than

xes, duties, i

d general we

every power

lfare. No str

objections, t

gress been fo

f the objectio

a reason for

A power to d

rse of descen

terms "to rais

e objects allu

d by a longe

be so expoun

e same sente

ore doubtful

pressions be

inserted, if th

? Nothing is

n and qualify

s which neit

n to confoun

imposts, and

elfare of the

which may

onger proof

than their

ound in the

on might hav

so awkward

destroy the

nts, or the

se money fo

uded to by

er pause than

nded as to

ence be

and indefini

denied any

hese and all

more natura

y it by a

ther explain

nd and

 

d

f

ve

d a

or

n a

ite

al

 

 

the mo

the pr

Congr

of the

the su

which

strikin

Jame

[Rega

into ex

govern

. . . Th

subjec

would

attemp

"neces

specif

altoge

and in

. . . As

which

betray

exerci

grante

ost minute p

etext for gra

ress have bee

ir chartered

ubject; and w

h seems to ha

ng defects of

s Madison, F

arding the] "

xecution the

nment of the

here are four

ct. They mig

d have prohib

pted a positi

ssary and pr

fying the pow

ether silent o

nference.

s the powers

h is to admin

ying the publ

ising powers

ed.

provisions be

adual and un

en betrayed,

authorities w

would be no i

ave provided

f the old.

Federalist #

"power to ma

e foregoing p

e United Stat

r other possib

ght have copi

bited the exe

ve enumerat

oper"; they m

wers excepte

on the subjec

s delegated u

nister it woul

lic interests b

s indispensab

ecome impor

observed usu

, or forced by

would not a l

inconsiderab

d no less stud

42

ake all laws

powers, and

tes, or in any

ble methods

ied the secon

ercise of any

tion of the po

might have a

ed from the g

ct, leaving th

under the new

ld find itself

by doing not

bly necessar

110 

rtant when th

urpations of

y the defects

little surpris

ble argument

diously for t

which shall

all other pow

y departmen

s which the C

nd article of

y power not e

owers comp

attempted a n

general defin

hese necessar

w system are

still more di

thing, or of v

y and proper

hey tend to o

f power. A li

s of the Conf

e those who

t in favor of

the lesser tha

be necessar

wers vested b

nt or office th

Convention m

f the existing

expressly de

prehended un

negative enu

nition; they m

ry and prope

e more exten

istressed wit

violating the

r, but, at the

obviate the n

ist of the cas

federation, i

have paid n

f the new Con

an the more

ry and proper

by this Cons

hereof."

might have t

g Confederat

elegated; the

nder the gene

umeration of

might have b

er powers to

nsive, the go

th the alterna

e Constitutio

e same time,

necessity or

ses in which

into violation

no attention t

nstitution,

obvious and

r for carryin

stitution in th

taken on this

tion, which

ey might hav

eral terms

f them by

been

construction

overnment

ative of

on by

not expressl

 

ns

to

d

ng

he

s

ve

n

ly

 

 

. . . fo

means

object

Had th

for car

chime

enume

. . . No

requir

particu

. . . If

part o

the sam

genera

the sam

author

and ju

in the

more

redres

State l

invasi

the ala

repres

the pe

consti

James

r in every ne

s of attaining

t, and be ofte

hey attempte

rrying the ge

erical; and w

eration woul

o axiom is m

red, the mean

ular power n

it be asked w

f the Constit

me as if they

al power had

me, in short

rities. In the

udiciary depa

last resort a

faithful repr

ss may be mo

legislatures,

ion of the rig

arm to the pe

sentatives. T

eople interest

itutions are m

s Madison, F

ew applicatio

g the object o

en properly v

ed to enumer

eneral power

would have be

ld have been

more clearly

ns are author

necessary for

what is to be

tution and ex

y should mis

d been reduc

, as if the Sta

first instanc

artments, wh

a remedy mu

resentatives,

ore confided

for this plai

ghts of the la

eople, and to

here being n

ted in watch

more likely t

Federalist # 4

on of a gene

of the genera

varied whils

rate the parti

rs into execu

een liable to

n equivalent

established i

rized; where

r doing it is

e the consequ

xercise powe

sconstrue or

ced to particu

ate legislatur

ce, the succe

hich are to ex

ust be obtaine

annul the ac

d in against u

in reason tha

atter, these w

o exert their

no such inter

hing the cond

to remain un

44

111 

eral power, th

al power, mu

st the object r

icular power

ution, the tas

o this further

to a positive

in law, or in

ever a genera

included.

uence, in cas

ers not warra

enlarge any

ulars, and an

res should v

ss of the usu

xpound and

ed from the p

cts of the usu

unconstitutio

at as every su

will be ever r

local influen

rmediate bod

duct of the fo

nnoticed and

he particular

ust always n

remains the

rs or means n

sk would hav

r objection, th

e grant of au

n reason, than

al power to d

se the Congr

anted by its t

y other power

ny one of the

violate their r

urpation will

give effect t

people, who

urpers. The t

onal acts of t

uch act of th

ready to mar

nce in effect

dy between t

ormer, violat

unredressed

r powers, wh

necessarily v

same.

not necessar

ve been no l

that every de

uthority.

n that where

do a thing is

ress shall mi

true meanin

r vested in th

ese were to b

respective co

l depend on t

to the legisla

o can, by the

truth is that t

the federal th

he former wil

rk the innova

ting a change

the State leg

ations of the

d.

hich are the

vary with tha

ry or proper

ess

efect in the

ever the end

given, every

isconstrue th

g. I answer

hem; as if th

be violated;

onstitutional

the executiv

ative acts; an

election of

this ultimate

han of the

ll be an

ation, to soun

e of federal

gislatures and

State

 

at

is

y

his

he

l

ve

nd

e

nd

d

 

 

The p

define

The fo

and fo

conne

in the

and th

The op

war an

forme

will h

indeed

be tho

particu

If th

chang

Union

it is tr

which

James

It is a

intere

to tho

relate.

James

owers deleg

ed. Those wh

ormer will b

oreign comm

ected. The po

ordinary cou

he internal or

perations of

nd danger; th

er periods wi

ere enjoy an

d, the federa

ose scenes of

ular States.

he new Cons

ge which it pr

n than in the

rue, is a new

h no apprehe

s Madison, F

sound and im

sts and circu

se circumsta

.

s Madison, F

ated by the p

hich are to re

e exercised p

merce; with w

owers reserv

urse of affai

rder, improv

f the federal g

hose of the S

ill probably b

nother advan

al powers ma

f danger whi

titution be e

roposes con

invigoration

power; but

nsions are en

Federalist # 4

mportant pri

umstance of

ances and int

Federalist # 5

proposed Co

emain in the

principally o

which last th

ved to the sev

irs, concern t

vement, and p

government

State govern

bear a small

ntage over th

ay be rendere

ich might fav

xamined wit

sists much le

n of its ORIG

that seems to

ntertained.

45

inciple that t

his constitue

terests to wh

56

112 

onstitution to

State gover

on external o

he power of t

veral States w

the lives, lib

prosperity o

will be mos

ments in tim

proportion t

e federal gov

ed to the nat

vor their asc

th accuracy

ess in the ad

GINAL POW

o be an addi

the represent

ents. But this

hich the auth

o the federal

rnments are n

objects, as w

taxation will

will extend t

berties, and p

of the State.

st extensive a

mes of peace

to the latter,

vernment. T

tional defens

cendancy ove

and candor,

ddition of NE

WERS. The r

ition which f

tative ought

s principle c

hority and ca

government

numerous an

war, peace, ne

l, for the mo

to all the obj

properties of

and importan

and security

the State go

The more ade

se, the less fr

er the govern

it will be fo

EW POWER

regulation o

few oppose a

to be acqua

can extend no

are of the rep

t are few and

nd indefinite

egotiation,

st part, be

jects which,

f the people,

nt in times o

y. As the

overnments

equate,

frequent will

nments of th

ound that the

RS to the

f commerce

and from

ainted with th

o further tha

presentative

 

d

e.

of

he

e

,

he

an

 

 

There

author

legisla

to affi

that th

by vir

forbid

Alexa

From

not be

quoted

maxim

them u

inappl

obviou

constr

Hav

endea

examp

words

specif

author

useles

In li

Const

cases

is no positio

rity, contrary

ative act, the

irm that the d

he representa

rtue of power

d.

ander Hamilt

these observ

e abolished;

d is contrary

ms had a pre

upon the pre

licable to a c

us sense of i

ruction.

ving now see

avor to ascert

ples. The pla

s, of the natio

fication of pa

rity, because

ss if a genera

ike manner t

titution to co

marks the pr

on which dep

y to the teno

erefore, contr

deputy is gre

atives of the

rs may do no

ton, Federali

vations this c

and that the

y to reason an

cise technica

esent occasio

constitution o

its provision

en that the m

tain their pro

an of the con

onal legislatu

articulars ev

e an affirmat

al authority w

the judicial a

omprehend c

recise limits

pends on cle

or of the com

rary to the C

eater than hi

people are s

ot only what

ist # 78

conclusion r

use attempte

nd common

al sense, cor

on, which, ho

of governme

ns, apart from

maxims relied

oper use and

nvention dec

ure, shall ex

idently exclu

tive grant of

was intended

authority of t

ertain cases

beyond whi

113 

earer princip

mmission und

Constitution,

s principal; t

superior to th

t their power

esults: that t

ed to be mad

sense, and t

rresponding w

owever, is n

ent. In relatio

m any technic

d upon will n

d true meanin

clares that the

xtend to certa

udes all pret

f special pow

d.

the federal ju

particularly

ich the feder

ples than that

der which it

can be valid

that the serv

he people th

rs do not aut

the trial by ju

de of the ma

therefore not

with the idea

not the case, t

on to such a

cal rules, is

not bear the u

ng. This will

e power of C

ain enumerat

tension to a g

wers would b

udicatures is

specified. T

ral courts can

t every act o

is exercised

d. To deny th

vant is above

emselves; th

thorize, but w

ury in civil c

axims which

t admissible

as of those w

they would

a subject, the

the true crite

use made of

l be best don

Congress, or

ted cases. Th

general legis

be absurd as

s declared by

The expressio

nnot extend

of a delegated

, is void. No

his would be

e his master;

hat men actin

what they

cases would

have been

. Even if the

who employ

still be

e natural and

erion of

f them, let us

ne by

r, in other

his

slative

well as

y the

on of those

their

 

d

o

e

ng

ese

d

s

 

 114 

 

jurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification

would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83

 

 

Max

There

bound

coinci

Alexa

Safety

Alexa

When

Alexa

... a vi

James

the pe

means

Alexa

For it

most i

whom

xims

is, perhaps,

d to mutual c

ident benefit

ander Hamilt

y from extern

ander Hamilt

n the sword i

ander Hamilt

ictorious and

s Madison, F

ersons from w

s by which it

ander Hamilt

is a truth, w

in danger wh

m they enterta

nothing mo

contributions

t.

ton, Federali

nal danger is

ton, Federali

s once drawn

ton, Federali

d powerful a

Federalist # 1

whose agenc

t is to be atta

ton, Federali

which the exp

hen the mean

ain the least

ore likely to d

s for any com

ist # 7

s the most po

ist # 8

n, the passio

ist # 16

ally is but an

18

cy the attainm

ained.

ist # 23

perience of a

ns of injurin

suspicion.

115 

disturb the tr

mmon object

owerful dire

ons of men o

other name f

ment of any

all ages has a

g their rights

ranquillity o

t that does n

ector of natio

observe no b

for a master

end is expec

attested, that

s are in the p

of nations tha

not yield an e

onal conduct

ounds of mo

r.

cted ought to

t the people a

possession o

an their bein

equal and

t.

oderation.

o possess the

are common

of those of

 

ng

e

nly

 

 

Alexa

every

revere

countr

not ex

Alexa

I belie

govern

admin

Alexa

It may

will, i

liberty

Alexa

every

30

Neces

system

Alexa

ander Hamilt

breach of th

ence which o

ry, and form

xist at all, or

ander Hamilt

eve it may be

nment will c

nistration.

ander Hamilt

y safely be re

n all possibl

y by the nati

ander Hamilt

POWER ou

ssity, especia

m of measure

ander Hamilt

ton, Federali

he fundamen

ought to be m

ms a preceden

is less urgen

ton, Federali

e laid down

commonly b

ton, Federali

eceived as an

le contingenc

onal authori

ton, Federali

ught to be pro

ally in politic

es correspon

ton, Federali

ist # 25

ntal laws, tho

maintained in

nt for other b

nt and palpab

ist # 25

as a general

e proportion

ist # 27

n axiom in o

cies, afford c

ty.

ist # 28

oportionate t

cs, often occ

ndingly erron

ist # 35

116 

ough dictated

n the breast

breaches whe

ble.

rule that the

ned to the go

our political

complete sec

to its OBJEC

casions false

neous.

d by necessit

of rulers tow

ere the same

eir confidenc

oodness or ba

system that

curity agains

CT Alexand

e hopes, false

ty, impairs t

wards the con

e plea of nec

ce in and ob

adness of its

the State go

st invasions

der Hamilton

e reasonings

that sacred

nstitution of

cessity does

edience to a

s

overnments

of the public

n, Federalist

s, and a

 

f a

a

c

#

 

 

There

axiom

meani

severa

impor

James

The pr

comes

Jame

a right

James

But th

practic

James

The ex

James

A com

author

an est

are two rule

ms. The one i

ing, and be m

al parts cann

rtant part; the

s Madison, F

rudent inqui

s, as whether

s Madison, F

t implies a r

s Madison, F

heoretic reaso

ce.

s Madison, F

xistence of a

s Madison, F

mpact betwee

rity, can pret

ablished doc

es of constru

is that every

made to cons

not be made t

e means sho

Federalist # 4

iry, in all cas

r the advice

Federalist #

emedy

Federalist # 4

oning, in thi

Federalist # 4

a right to inte

Federalist # 4

en independ

tend to no hi

ctrine on the

uction, dictat

part of the e

spire to some

to coincide,

uld be sacrif

40

ses, ought su

be good.

40

43

is as in most

43

erpose will g

43

ent sovereig

igher validit

subject of tr

117 

ted by plain

expression o

e common e

the less imp

ficed to the e

urely to be no

other cases,

generally pre

gns, founded

y than a leag

reaties that a

reason as we

ught, if poss

end, The othe

portant shoul

end, rather th

ot so much f

, must be qu

event the nec

d on ordinary

gue or treaty

all the article

ell as founde

sible, to be a

er is that wh

ld give way t

han the end

from whom

ualified by th

cessity of ex

y acts of legi

y between th

es are mutua

ed on legal

allowed som

here the

to the more

to the means

the advice

he lessons of

xerting it.

islative

e parties. It i

ally condition

 

e

s.

f

is

ns

 

 

of eac

breach

please

James

an ext

an abs

James

it is es

the pe

James

It is a

the gr

the po

James

In all

wrest

Jame

It is a

intere

ch other; that

h, committed

e, to pronoun

s Madison, F

tinction of pa

solute extinc

s Madison, F

ssential to lib

eople

s Madison, F

received and

eater the pow

ower, the mo

s Madison, F

very numero

the scepter f

s Madison, F

sound and im

sts and circu

t a breach of

d by either o

nce the comp

Federalist # 4

arties necess

ction of liber

Federalist # 5

berty that th

Federalist # 5

d well-found

wer is, the sh

ore safely ma

Federalist # 5

ous assembli

from reason.

Federalist #

mportant pri

umstance of

f any one art

of the parties

pact violated

43

sarily implie

rty.

50

e governmen

52

ded maxim t

horter ought

ay its duratio

52

ies, of whate

.

55

inciple that t

his constitue

118 

icle is a brea

s, absolves th

d and void.

es either a un

nt in general

that where no

t to be its dur

on be protrac

ever characte

the represent

ents.

ach of the wh

he others, an

niversal alarm

l should hav

o other circu

ration; and,

cted.

ers compose

tative ought

hole treaty;

nd authorizes

m for the pub

e a common

umstances af

conversely,

ed, passion n

to be acqua

and that a

s them, if the

blic safety, o

n interest wit

ffect the case

the smaller

never fails to

ainted with th

 

ey

or

th

e,

o

he

 

 

Jame

every

Alexa

the fac

most l

James

A goo

the ha

be bes

James

An ind

affairs

to his

declin

makin

with th

emotio

indisc

wisdo

system

James

s Madison, F

government

ander Hamilt

cility and ex

liable

s Madison, F

od governme

appiness of th

st attained.

s Madison, F

dividual who

s without any

own unstead

ne to connect

ng their fortu

his melanch

ons than the

cretions of ea

om and stabil

matic policy

s Madison, F

Federalist #

t ought to co

ton, Federali

xcess of lawm

Federalist # 6

ent implies tw

he people; se

Federalist # 6

o is observed

y plan at all,

diness and fo

t their fortun

unes out of h

holy distincti

latter, are u

ach other. Ev

lity, may cal

of its wiser

Federalist # 6

56

ontain in itse

ist # 59

making seem

62

wo things: fi

econdly, a k

62

d to be incon

, is marked a

olly. His mo

nes with his;

his. One natio

on, perhaps,

under fewer r

very nation,

lculate on ev

neighbors.

62

119 

lf the means

m to be the d

irst, fidelity

knowledge of

nstant to his

at once by al

ore friendly n

and not a fe

on is to anot

, that the form

restraints als

consequentl

very loss whi

s of its own p

diseases to w

to the object

f the means

plans, or pe

ll prudent pe

neighbors m

ew will seize

ther what on

mer, with fe

so from takin

ly, whose aff

ich can be su

preservation

which our gov

t of governm

by which th

erhaps to carr

eople as a sp

ay pity him,

e the opportu

ne individual

ewer of the b

ng undue adv

ffairs betray a

ustained from

n.

vernments ar

ment, which

at object can

ry on his

eedy victim

but all will

unity of

l is to anothe

benevolent

vantage of th

a want of

m the more

 

re

is

n

er;

he

 

 

No go

respec

James

liberty

James

the de

of men

Alexa

in the

Alexa

When

quarte

oppos

imped

Alexa

the sen

Alexa

overnment, a

ctable

s Madison, F

y may be end

s Madison, F

emon of facti

n.

ander Hamilt

main it will

ander Hamilt

n men, engag

er which they

sition from d

diments were

ander Hamilt

nse of respo

ander Hamilt

any more tha

Federalist # 6

dangered by

Federalist # 6

ion will, at c

ton, Federali

be found th

ton, Federali

ged in unjust

y cannot con

doing what th

e to be feared

ton, Federali

nsibility is a

ton, Federali

an an individ

62

y the abuses o

63

certain seaso

ist # 65

hat a power o

ist # 73

tifiable pursu

ntrol, they w

hey would w

d.

ist # 73

always stron

ist # 74

120 

dual, will lon

of liberty as

ons, extend h

over the man

uits, are awa

will often be r

with eagernes

gest in propo

ng be respect

well as by th

his scepter ov

n's support is

are that obstr

restrained by

ss rush into i

ortion as it i

ted without b

the abuses of

ver all nume

s a power ov

ructions may

y the bare ap

if no such ex

s undivided

being truly

f power

erous bodies

ver his will.

y come from

pprehension

xternal

 

m a

of

 

 

There

author

Alexa

In the

power

Alexa

there o

provis

Alexa

is no positio

rity, contrary

ander Hamilt

general cou

r over his wi

ander Hamilt

ought alway

sions.

ander Hamilt

on which dep

y to the teno

ton, Federali

urse of huma

ill.

ton, Federali

ys to be a con

ton, Federali

pends on cle

or of the com

ist # 78

an nature, a p

ist # 79

nstitutional m

ist # 80

121 

earer princip

mmission und

power over a

method of gi

ples than that

der which it

a man's subs

iving efficac

t every act o

is exercised

istence amou

cy to constitu

of a delegated

, is void.

unts to a

utional

 

d

 

 

Mili

The sm

it; and

submi

jealou

suppo

The

faction

encroa

Alexa

The im

render

Alexa

If, to o

of arm

specta

to prep

As the

presen

govern

blow b

itia

mallness of t

d the citizens

it to its oppre

us acquiescen

ose may be e

army under

n, or an occa

achments ag

ander Hamilt

mprovement

red distant n

ander Hamilt

obviate this

mies in time o

acle which th

pare for defe

e ceremony o

nce of an ene

nment to beg

before we co

the army ren

s, not habitu

essions, neit

nce in a nece

xerted to the

r such circum

asional mob,

gainst the uni

ton, Federali

ts in the art o

nations, in a g

ton, Federali

consequence

of peace, the

he world has

ense before i

of a formal d

emy within o

gin its levies

ould even pr

nders the nat

ated to look

ther love nor

essary evil a

e prejudice o

mstances may

, or insurrect

ited efforts o

ist # 8

of navigation

great measur

ist # 24

e, it should b

e United Stat

s yet seen --

it was actual

denunciation

our territorie

s of men for

repare to retu

122 

tural strength

up to the mi

r fear the sol

and stand rea

of their rights

y usefully ai

tion; but it w

of the great b

n have, as to

re, neighbor

be resolved t

tes would th

that of a nat

lly invaded.

n of war has

es must be w

the protectio

urn it.

h of the com

ilitary power

ldiery; they v

ady to resist

s.

id the magis

will be unabl

body of the p

the facility

rs.

to extend the

hen exhibit th

tion incapaci

of late fallen

waited for as

on of the Sta

mmunity an o

r for protect

view them w

a power whi

strate to supp

le to enforce

people.

of communi

e prohibition

he most extr

itated by its

n into disuse

the legal wa

ate. We mus

overmatch fo

tion, or to

with a spirit o

ich they

press a small

e

ication,

n to the raisin

raordinary

Constitution

e, the

arrant to the

t receive the

 

or

of

l

ng

n

e

 

 

All th

storm

We m

by our

create

the me

Here

would

have l

saved

recent

The st

succes

than o

late w

fame;

been e

most o

by tim

Alexa

the St

guardi

will co

ready

to be t

Sche

execu

at kind of po

must be abs

must expose o

r weakness t

ed by our cho

eans necessa

e I expect w

d be at all tim

lost us our in

. The facts w

t to permit u

teady operat

ssfully condu

of stability an

war, have, by

but the brav

established b

other things,

me, and by pr

ander Hamilt

ate legislatu

ians of the ri

onstantly ha

enough, if a

the VOICE,

emes to subv

ution. An arm

olicy by whi

stained from

our property

to seize the n

oice, depend

ary to its pre

e shall be to

mes equal to

ndependence

which from o

s to be the d

tions of war

ucted by a fo

nd vigor, con

their valor o

vest of them

by their effor

, is a science

ractice.

ton, Federali

ures, who wil

ights of the c

ave their atten

anything imp

but, if neces

vert the liber

my, so large a

ch nations a

m, as contrary

and liberty

naked and de

dent on our w

eservation.

old that the m

the national

e. It cost mill

our own exp

dupes of such

against a reg

force of the s

nfirm this po

on numerous

feel and kno

rts alone, ho

e to be acqui

ist # 25

ll always be

citizens agai

ntion awake

proper appea

ssary, the AR

rties of a gre

as seriously

123 

anticipate dis

y to the genu

to the mercy

efenseless pr

will, might en

militia of the

l defense. Th

lions to the U

erience forb

h a suggestio

gular and dis

same kind. C

osition. The

s occasions,

ow that the l

owever great

red and perf

not only vig

inst encroach

e to the condu

ars, to sound

RM of their

eat communi

to menace th

stant danger

uine maxims

y of foreign i

rey, because

ndanger that

country is it

his doctrine,

United State

id a reliance

on.

sciplined arm

Consideration

American m

erected eter

liberty of the

t and valuabl

fected by dil

gilant but sus

hments from

duct of the na

d the alarm to

discontent.

ity require ti

hose libertie

and meet th

of a free go

invaders and

e we are afra

t liberty by a

ts natural bu

in substance

es that might

e of this kind

my can only

ns of econom

militia, in the

rnal monume

eir country c

le they were

igence, by p

spicious and

m the federal

ational rulers

o the people,

ime to matur

es, could onl

he gathering

overnment.

d invite them

aid that ruler

an abuse of

ulwark, and

e, had like to

t have been

d are too

be

my, not less

e course of th

ents to their

ould not hav

. War, like

perseverance

d jealous

government

s, and will b

, and not onl

re them for

ly be formed

 

m

s,

o

he

ve

e,

t,

e

ly

d

 

 

by pro

betwe

Alexa

It is no

Union

especi

alway

Alexa

there m

the mi

laws a

Inde

requir

say th

repres

securi

If th

but in

forms

exerte

indivi

In a si

differe

govern

ogressive aug

een the legisl

ander Hamilt

ot easy to co

n as to deman

ially if we ta

ys to be coun

ander Hamilt

might somet

ilitia to prese

against those

ependent of a

re a more per

hat the whole

sentatives of

ity for the rig

he representa

the exertion

of governm

ed with infin

dual State.

ingle State, i

ent parcels, s

nment in eac

gmentations

lature and ex

ton, Federali

onceive a po

nd a force co

ake into our v

nted upon as

ton, Federali

times be a ne

erve the pea

e violent inv

all other reas

remptory pro

e power of th

f the people.

ghts and priv

atives of the

n of that orig

ment, and wh

itely better p

if the person

subdivisions

ch, can take

s; which wou

xecutive, but

ist # 26

ssibility that

onsiderable e

view the aid

a valuable a

ist # 26

ecessity to m

ce of the com

asions of the

sonings upon

ovision agai

he proposed

This is the e

vileges of the

people betra

ginal right of

ich against t

prospect of s

ns intrusted w

s, or districts

no regular m

124 

uld suppose n

t a continued

t dangers so

enough to pl

d to be derive

and powerful

make use of a

mmunity and

em which am

n the subject

nst military

government

essential, and

e people wh

ay their cons

f self-defense

the usurpatio

success than

with supreme

s of which it

measures for

not merely a

d conspiracy

formidable

lace our libe

ed from the m

l auxiliary.

a force const

d to maintain

mount to insu

t, it is a full

establishme

t is to be in t

d, after all, th

hich is attaina

stituents, the

e which is p

ons of the na

against thos

e power beco

consists, ha

r defense. Th

a temporary

y for a series

can assail th

erties in the l

militia, whic

tituted differ

n the just au

urrections an

answer to th

ents in time o

the hands of

the only effic

able in civil

ere is then no

aramount to

ational rulers

se of the rule

ome usurper

aving no dist

he citizens m

combination

of time.

he whole

least jeopard

ch ought

rently from

uthority of th

nd rebellions

hose who

of peace to

f the

cacious

society.

o resource le

o all positive

s may be

ers of an

rs, the

tinct

must rush

 

n

dy,

he

s.

eft

 

 125 

 

tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their

courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often

crush the opposition in embryo.

The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a

regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early

efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements,

and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed

against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar

coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.

The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased

extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend

them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the

artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more

competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny.

But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the

masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general

government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments,

and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by

throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.

If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of

redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an

advantage which can never be too highly prized!

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State governments

will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public

liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses

so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The

legislatures will have better means of information.

 

 

They

and th

which

comm

protec

The

utility

agains

should

head w

The ad

others

efforts

We

by the

a large

of the

When

capab

who a

for the

The ap

the res

Alexa

If a w

to be u

can discover

he confidenc

h they can co

municate with

ction of their

great extent

y against the

st the enterpr

d be able to q

with fresh fo

dvantages ob

s; and the mo

s would be r

should recol

e resources o

e army; and

community

n will the tim

le of erectin

are in a situat

eir own defe

pprehension

sources of ar

ander Hamilt

ell-regulated

under the reg

r the danger

e of the peop

ombine all th

h each other

r common lib

t of the coun

attacks of a

rises of amb

quell the res

orces.

btained in on

oment the pa

renewed, and

llect that the

of the countr

as the mean

y will proport

me arrive that

g a despotism

tion, through

ense, with all

n may be con

rgument and

ton, Federali

d militia be t

gulation and

at a distance

ple, they can

he resources

in the differ

berty.

ntry is a furth

foreign pow

bitious rulers

sistance of on

ne place mus

art which had

d its resistan

e extent of th

y. For a long

ns of doing th

tionably incr

t the federal

m over the g

h the medium

l the celerity

nsidered as a

d reasoning.

ist # 28

the most natu

d at the dispo

126 

e; and posse

n at once ado

of the comm

rent States, a

her security.

wer. And it w

s in the natio

ne State, the

st be abando

d been reduc

ce revive.

he military fo

g time to com

his increase,

rease.

government

great body of

m of their St

y, regularity,

a disease, for

ural defense

osal of that b

ssing all the

opt a regular

munity. They

and unite the

We have alr

would have p

onal councils

e distant Stat

oned to subd

ced to submi

orce must, at

me it will no

the populat

t can raise an

f the people

tate governm

and system

r which there

e of a free co

body which i

e organs of c

r plan of opp

y can readily

eir common

ready experi

precisely the

s. If the feder

tes would be

due the oppos

ission was le

t all events,

ot be possibl

tion and natu

nd maintain

of an immen

ments, to take

m of independ

e can be foun

ountry, it oug

is constituted

ivil power

position, in

y

forces for th

ienced its

same effect

ral army

e able to mak

sition in

eft to itself, i

be regulated

e to maintain

ural strength

an army

nse empire,

e measures

dent nations?

nd no cure in

ght certainly

d the guardia

 

he

t

ke

its

d

n

?

n

y

an

 

 

of the

over th

and th

If the

call fo

the em

oblige

of pre

In o

of the

Const

the ex

his on

Alexa

The sa

be des

call ou

the for

It wou

its dec

office

that a

would

or of a

It bein

POSS

national sec

he militia in

he pretext to

federal gove

or the militar

mployment o

ed to recur to

venting its e

rder to cast a

Union, it ha

titution for re

xecution of h

nly auxiliary.

ander Hamilt

ame persons

spotic and un

ut the POSS

rmer exceed

uld be as abs

clared power

rs who may

right to enac

d involve tha

abolishing th

ng therefore

SE COMITA

curity. If stan

n the same bo

such unfrien

ernment can

ry arm in sup

of a different

o the latter. T

existence tha

an odium up

as been rema

equiring the

his duty; whe

.

ton, Federali

s who tell us

nlimited info

E COMITA

ds it.

surd to doubt

rs would inc

be intrusted

ct laws nece

at of varying

he trial by ju

evident that

ATUS is entir

nding armies

ody ought, a

ndly instituti

command th

pport of the

t kind of forc

To render an

an a thousand

pon the powe

arked that th

aid of the PO

ence it has b

ist # 29

in one breat

orm us in the

ATUS. The la

t that a right

clude that of

d with the ex

ssary and pr

the rules of

ury in cases r

t the supposi

rely destitute

127 

s are dangero

s far as poss

ions.

he aid of the

civil magistr

ce. If it cann

n army unnec

d prohibition

er of calling

ere is nowhe

OSSE COM

een inferred

th that the po

e next that it

atter, fortuna

t to pass all l

requiring th

ecution of th

roper for the

f descent and

relating to it.

tion of a wa

e of color, it

ous to libert

sible, to take

e militia in th

rate, it can th

not avail itsel

cessary will

ns upon pape

forth the mi

ere any prov

MITATUS to

d that military

owers of the

t has not auth

ately, is as m

laws necessa

he assistance

hose laws as

imposition

d of the alien

.

ant of power

t will follow

ty, an efficac

e away the in

hose emerge

he better dis

lf of the form

be a more c

er.

ilitia to exec

vision in the

assist the m

y force was

e federal gov

hority suffic

much short of

ary and prop

of the citize

s it would be

and collectio

nation of lan

to require th

that the con

cious power

nducement

encies which

spense with

mer, it will b

ertain metho

cute the laws

proposed

magistrate in

intended to

vernment wil

cient even to

f the truth as

per to execute

ens to the

e to believe

on of taxes

ded property

he aid of the

nclusion whic

 

h

be

od

s

be

ll

s

e

y,

ch

 

 

has be

the mi

was in

make

Alexa

"The p

injurio

milita

nor ev

To ob

under

might

charac

public

labor

people

To att

an ext

would

people

this be

year.

"Bu

misch

digest

militia

een drawn fr

ilitia, is as un

ntended to be

use of it wh

ander Hamilt

project of di

ous if it were

ary movemen

ven a month,

lige the grea

arms for the

be necessar

cter of a wel

c inconvenie

of the countr

e, would not

tempt a thing

tent would b

d not long be

e at large tha

e not neglect

t though the

hievous or im

ted plan shou

a.

rom it, in its

ncandid as i

e the sole in

en necessary

ton, Federali

sciplining al

e capable of

nts is a busin

, that will su

at body of th

e purpose of

ry to acquire

ll-regulated m

ence and loss

ry to an amo

t fall far shor

g which wou

e unwise: an

e endured. Li

an to have th

ted, it will b

scheme of d

mpracticable;

uld, as soon

application

t is illogical

strument of

y?

ist # 29

ll the militia

f being carrie

ness that requ

uffice for the

he yeomanry

f going throu

the degree o

militia, woul

s. It would fo

ount which, c

rt of a millio

uld abridge th

nd the experi

ittle more ca

hem properly

e necessary

disciplining

; yet it is a m

as possible,

128 

to the author

. What reaso

authority, m

of the Unite

ed into execu

uires time an

attainment o

and of the o

ugh military

of perfection

ld be a real g

orm an annu

calculating u

on pounds.

he mass of l

iment, if ma

an reasonabl

y armed and

to assemble

the whole na

matter of the

be adopted

rity of the fe

on could ther

merely becau

ed States is a

ution. A tole

nd practice.

of it.

other classes

exercises an

n which wou

grievance to

ual deduction

upon the pre

abor and ind

ade, could no

ly be aimed a

equipped; a

them once o

ation must b

utmost impo

for the prop

ederal govern

re be to infer

use there is a

as futile as it

erable expert

It is not a da

s of the citize

nd evolutions

uld entitle th

the people a

n from the pr

esent number

dustry to so c

ot succeed, b

at with respe

and in order

or twice in th

be abandoned

ortance that

er establishm

nment over

r that force

power to

t would be

tness in

ay, nor a wee

ens to be

s, as often as

em to the

and a serious

roductive

rs of the

considerable

because it

ect to the

to see that

he course of

d as

a well-

ment of the

 

ek

s

s

e

f a

 

 

The at

select

need.

well-t

it.

This w

any tim

formid

inferio

rights

devise

Alexa

There

the mi

the na

our ne

daily m

feeling

Alexa

If ther

militia

undert

slaver

who h

ttention of th

corps of mo

By thus circ

trained militi

will not only

me oblige th

dable to the

or to them in

and those o

ed for a stand

ander Hamilt

is somethin

ilitia that on

ame of comm

eighbors, our

mingling wi

gs, sentimen

ander Hamilt

re should be

a? If there sh

take a distan

ry upon a par

had meditate

he governme

oderate size,

cumscribing

ia ready to ta

y lessen the c

he governme

liberties of t

n discipline a

f their fellow

ding army, a

ton, Federali

ng so far-fetc

e is at a loss

mon sense ar

r fellow-citiz

th the rest of

nts, habits, a

ton, Federali

an army to b

hould be no

nt and distres

rt of their co

d so foolish

ent ought par

upon such p

the plan, it w

ake the field

call for milita

ent to form an

the people w

and the use o

w-citizens. T

and the best p

ist # 29

ched and so e

s whether to

re our fears t

zens? What

f their count

and interests

ist # 29

be made use

army, whith

ssing expedi

ountrymen, d

as well as so

129 

rticularly to

principles as

will be possi

d whenever th

ary establish

n army of an

while there is

of arms, who

This appears

possible sec

extravagant

treat it with

to end if we m

shadow of d

trymen and w

?

e of as the en

her would the

ition for the p

direct their c

o wicked a p

be directed

will really f

ible to have

he defense o

hments, but i

ny magnitud

s a large bod

o stand ready

to me the on

curity agains

in the idea o

gravity or w

may not trus

danger can th

who particip

ngine of desp

e militia, irri

purpose of r

ourse, but to

project to cru

to the forma

fit it for serv

an excellent

of the State s

if circumstan

de that army

dy of citizens

y to defend t

nly substitut

t it, if it shou

of danger to

with raillery

st our sons, o

here be from

pate with them

potism, what

itated at bein

riveting the c

o the seat of

ush them in

ation of a

vice in case o

t body of

shall require

nces should

can never be

s, little if at a

their own

te that can be

uld exist."

liberty from

... Where in

our brothers

m men who a

m in the sam

t need of the

ng required t

chains of

the tyrants,

their

 

of

at

e

all

e

m

,

are

me

e

to

 

 

imagin

an abu

Alexa

The on

vision

force

been e

of this

That t

succes

unifor

establ

patien

prepar

dream

like th

Extrav

to the

federa

with th

The h

carried

one tw

the Un

To the

in thei

ned intrench

used and inc

ander Hamilt

nly refuge le

nary supposit

for the proje

employed to

s danger.

the people an

ssion of men

rmly and sys

ishment; tha

ntly behold th

red to burst o

ms of a delirio

he sober appr

vagant as the

resources of

al governmen

he people on

ighest numb

d in any cou

wenty-fifth p

nited States,

ese would be

ir hands, off

hments of po

censed peopl

ton, Federali

eft for those

tion that the

ects of ambit

little purpos

nd the States

n ready to be

stematically

at the govern

he gathering

on their own

ous jealousy

rehensions o

e supposition

f the country

nt: still it wo

n their side w

ber to which,

untry does no

part of the nu

an army of

e opposed a

ficered by me

ower, and to

e?

ist # 29

who prophe

federal gove

tion. The rea

se indeed, if

s should, for

etray both; th

pursue some

nments and t

g storm and c

n heads must

y, or the misj

of genuine p

n is, let it, ho

y, be formed

ould not be g

would be abl

, according t

ot exceed on

umber able to

more than tw

militia amou

en chosen fr

130 

make them a

esy the down

ernment may

asonings con

f it could be n

a sufficient

hat the traito

e fixed plan

he people of

continue to s

t appear to e

judged exagg

atriotism.

owever, be m

d; and let it b

going too far

le to repel th

to the best co

ne hundredth

o bear arms.

wenty-five o

unting to nea

rom among t

an example

nfall of the S

y previously

ntained in the

necessary no

period of tim

ors should, th

for the exten

f the States s

supply the m

everyone mo

gerations of

made. Let a r

be entirely at

r to say that

he danger.

omputation,

h part of the w

. This propor

or thirty thou

ar half a mill

themselves,

of the just v

State governm

y accumulate

ese papers m

ow to dispro

me, elect an

hroughout th

nsion of the

should silent

materials unti

ore like the in

f a counterfei

regular army

t the devotio

the State gov

a standing a

whole numb

rtion would

usand men.

lion of citize

fighting for

vengeance of

ments is the

e a military

must have

ove the realit

uninterrupte

his period,

military

tly and

il it should b

ncoherent

it zeal, than

y, fully equa

on of the

vernments

army can be

ber of souls;

not yield, in

ens with arm

their commo

 

f

ty

ed

be

al

or

n

ms

on

 

 131 

 

liberties and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and

confidence. It may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be

conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the

late successful resistance of this country against the British arms will be most inclined to

deny the possibility of it.

Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of

almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people

are attached and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the

enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any

form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of

Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are

afraid to trust the people with arms.

And it is not certain that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes.

But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by

themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers

appointed out of the militia by these governments and attached both to them and to the

militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance that the throne of every tyranny in

Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it.

Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion that they would

be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession than the

debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their

oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever

reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment by a blind and tame

submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.

James Madison, Federalist # 46

 

 

Min

... the

often

the su

James

No ma

his jud

reason

many

indeed

citizen

James

The in

that re

If a

which

admin

violen

form o

or inte

James

nority ri

public good

decided, not

uperior force

s Madison, F

an is allowed

dgment, and

n, a body of

of the most

d concerning

ns?

s Madison, F

nference to w

elief is only t

faction cons

h enables the

nistration, it m

nce under the

of popular g

erest both th

s Madison, F

ights

d is disregard

t according t

of an intere

Federalist # 1

d to be a jud

d, not improb

men are unf

important ac

g the rights o

Federalist # 1

which we are

to be sought

sists of less t

e majority to

may convuls

e forms of th

overnment,

e public goo

Federalist # 1

ded in the co

to the rules o

sted and ove

10

dge in his ow

bably, corrup

fit to be both

cts of legisla

of single per

10

e brought is

t in the mean

than a major

defeat its si

se the societ

he Constituti

on the other

od and the rig

10

132 

onflicts of riv

of justice and

erbearing ma

wn cause, bec

pt his integri

h judges and

ation but so m

sons, but con

that the caus

ns of control

ity, relief is

nister views

ty; but it will

ion. When a

hand, enabl

ghts of other

val parties, a

d the rights o

ajority.

cause his int

ity. With equ

parties at th

many judicia

ncerning the

ses of faction

lling its effec

supplied by

s by regular v

l be unable t

majority is i

les it to sacri

r citizens.

and that mea

of the minor

terest would

ual, nay with

he same time

al determina

e rights of la

n cannot be

cts.

the republic

vote. It may

to execute an

included in a

ifice to its ru

asures are too

r party, but b

certainly bia

h greater

e; yet what ar

ations, not

arge bodies o

removed an

can principle

clog the

nd mask its

a faction, the

uling passion

 

o

by

as

re

of

d

e,

e

n

 

 

Exten

probab

other

it to d

Jame

It is o

of its r

Differ

by a c

There

comm

compr

unjust

first m

author

societ

minor

The se

all aut

be bro

or of t

James

 

d the sphere

ble that a ma

citizens; or i

discover their

s Madison, F

f great impo

rulers, but to

rent interests

common inte

are but two

munity indepe

rehending in

t combinatio

method preva

rity. This, at

ty may as we

r party, and m

econd metho

thority in it w

oken into so

the minority

s Madison, F

e and you tak

ajority of the

if such a com

r own streng

Federalist #

ortance in a r

o guard one p

s necessarily

erest, the righ

methods of

endent of the

n the society

on of a major

ails in all gov

t best, is but

ell espouse th

may possibly

od will be ex

will be deriv

many parts,

, will be in l

Federalist # 5

ke in a greate

e whole will

mmon motiv

gth and to act

10

republic not

part of the so

y exist in diff

hts of the mi

f providing a

e majority --

so many sep

rity of the w

vernments p

a precarious

he unjust vie

y be turned a

xemplified in

ved from and

interests an

ittle danger

51

133 

er variety of

have a com

ve exists, it w

t in unison w

only to guar

ociety again

ferent classe

inority will b

gainst this e

- that is, of th

parate descri

hole very im

possessing an

s security; be

ews of the m

against both

n the federal

d dependent

d classes of

from interes

f parties and

mmon motive

will be more

with each oth

rd the society

nst the injusti

es of citizens

be insecure.

vil: the one

he society it

iptions of cit

mprobable, if

n hereditary

ecause a pow

major as the r

parties.

republic of

on the socie

citizens, tha

sted combina

interests; yo

e to invade th

difficult for

her.

y against the

ice of the oth

s. If a majori

by creating

tself; the oth

tizens as wil

f not impract

or self-appo

wer independ

rightful inter

the United S

ety, the socie

at the rights o

ations of the

ou make it le

he rights of

r all who feel

e oppression

her part.

ity be united

a will in the

er, by

ll render an

ticable. The

ointed

dent of the

rests of the

States. Whils

ety itself will

of individua

e majority.

 

ess

l

n

d

st

l

ls,

 

 

Mis

It has

countr

of men

choice

accide

Alexa

Let Am

bound

system

terms

Alexa

Civil p

great e

judicio

Alexa

there i

are inv

restrai

Alexa

scellaneo

been freque

ry, by their c

n are really c

e, or whether

ent and force

ander Alexan

mericans dis

d together in

m superior to

of the conne

ander Hamilt

power, prop

extent, and c

ous arrangem

ander Hamilt

is in the natu

vested with t

in or direct i

ander Hamilt

ous

ently remarke

conduct and

capable or n

r they are fo

e.

nder Hamilto

sdain to be th

a strict and

o the control

ection betwe

ton, Federali

erly organiz

can in a man

ment of subo

ton, Federali

ure of sovere

the exercise

its operation

ton, Federali

ed that it see

example, to

not of establi

orever destin

on, Federalis

he instrumen

indissoluble

of all transa

een the old a

ist # 11

ed and exert

nner reproduc

ordinate insti

ist # 13

eign power a

of it to look

s.

ist # 15

134 

ems to have b

decide the i

shing good g

ed to depend

st # 1

nts of Europ

e Union, con

atlantic force

and the new w

ted, is capab

ce itself in e

itutions.

an impatienc

k with an evi

been reserve

important qu

government

d for their po

pean greatnes

ncur in erecti

e or influenc

world!

ble of diffusin

every part of

ce of control

il eye upon a

ed to the peo

uestion, whe

from reflect

olitical const

ss! Let the th

ing one grea

ce and able to

ng its force

f a great emp

that dispose

all external a

ople of this

ether societie

tion and

titutions on

hirteen State

at American

o dictate the

to a very

pire by a

es those who

attempts to

 

es

es,

e

o

 

 

the ex

the dis

Alexa

If the

Union

defeat

Alexa

[spea

institu

James

... a so

comm

practic

place

James

To for

that w

Alexa

xecution of th

scretion of th

ander Hamilt

interposition

n, they have

ted.

ander Hamilt

aking of poor

uted to remed

s Madison, F

overeignty o

munities, as c

ce it is subve

of the mild a

s Madison, F

rm a safe and

we should be

ander Hamilt

he plans, fra

he ill-inform

ton, Federali

n of the State

only NOT T

ton, Federali

rly instituted

dy.

Federalist # 1

ver sovereig

contradisting

ersive of the

and salutary

Federalist #

d satisfactor

well acquain

ton, Federali

amed by the c

med and preju

ist # 15

e legislature

TO ACT, or

ist # 16

d governmen

19

gns, a govern

guished from

e order and e

coercion of

20

ry judgment

nted with th

ist # 21

135 

councils of t

udiced opini

s be necessa

TO ACT EV

nts] they incr

nment over g

m individuals

ends of civil

f the magistra

of the prope

e extent and

the whole, w

ion of every

ary to give ef

VASIVELY,

rease the mis

governments

s, as it is a so

polity, by su

acy.

er remedy, it

d malignity o

will always fl

part.

ffect to a me

, and the me

schief which

s, a legislatio

olecism in th

ubstituting v

t is absolutel

of the disease

fluctuate on

easure of the

easure is

h they were

on for

heory, so in

violence in

ly necessary

e.

 

e

 

 

To giv

a majo

numbe

Alexa

The im

render

Alexa

IT WA

stop a

PRIVI

failure

experi

attemp

anothe

chang

Alexa

The ci

Alexa

ve a minority

ority is requi

er to that of

ander Hamilt

mprovement

red distant n

ander Hamilt

AS a thing h

at that happy

ILEGE, and

e in this deli

ience, and if

pts to rectify

er; we may t

ge for the bet

ander Hamilt

itizens of Am

ander Hamilt

y a negative

isite to a dec

the lesser nu

ton, Federali

ts in the art o

nations, in a g

ton, Federali

hardly to be e

mean which

d combines th

cate and imp

f we are not c

y and amelio

try change af

tter.

ton, Federali

merica have

ton, Federali

upon the ma

cision) is, in

umber.

ist # 22

of navigation

great measur

ist # 24

expected tha

h marks the

he energy of

portant point

cautious to a

orate our syst

fter change;

ist # 26

too much di

ist # 26

136 

ajority (whic

its tendency

n have, as to

re, neighbor

at in a popula

salutary bou

f governmen

t is the great

avoid a repet

tem we may

but we shall

iscernment t

ch is always

y, to subject

the facility

rs.

ar revolution

undary betwe

nt with the se

t source of th

tition of the

y travel from

l never be lik

to be argued

the case wh

the sense of

of communi

n the minds o

een POWER

ecurity of pri

he inconveni

error in our

m one chimer

kely to make

into anarchy

here more tha

f the greater

ication,

of men shou

R and

ivate rights.

iences we

future

ical project t

e any materi

y.

 

an

uld

A

to

ial

 

 

the law

will b

legisla

Thus t

incorp

consti

laws.

Alexa

A gov

of the

is resp

sense

Alexa

There

situati

which

Alexa

Happy

and vi

Alexa

ws of the Co

ecome the S

ative, execut

the legislatu

porated into

itutional auth

ander Hamilt

vernment oug

objects com

ponsible, fre

of the peopl

ander Hamilt

are strong m

ion and will

h they particu

ander Hamilt

y will it be fo

irtue enough

ander Hamilt

onfederacy a

SUPREME L

tive, and jud

ures, courts, a

the operation

hority extend

ton, Federali

ght to contai

mmitted to its

e from every

le.

ton, Federali

minds in eve

command th

ularly belong

ton, Federali

for ourselves

h to set so glo

ton, Federali

as to the enum

LAW of the l

dicial in each

and magistra

ns of the nat

ds; and will b

ist # 27

in in itself ev

s care, and to

y other contr

ist # 31

ery walk of li

he tribute du

g, but from t

ist # 36

s, and most h

orious an ex

ist # 36

137 

merated and

land; to the o

h State will b

ates, of the re

tional govern

be rendered

very power r

o the comple

rol but a rega

ife that will

ue to their me

the society in

honorable for

xample to ma

d legitimate o

observance o

be bound by

espective me

nment as far

auxiliary to

requisite to t

ete execution

ard to the pu

rise superior

erit, not only

n general.

r human nat

ankind!

objects of its

of which all

the sanctity

embers will

r as its just a

the enforcem

the full acco

n of the trust

ublic good an

r to the disad

y from the cl

ture, if we ha

s jurisdiction

officers,

of an oath.

be

and

ment of its

mplishment

ts for which

nd to the

dvantages of

lasses to

ave wisdom

 

n

it

f

 

 

Person

conve

propri

make

conve

are bu

others

James

Energ

to that

good g

advan

people

legisla

James

The ex

legisla

limits

The pr

eccles

to be c

been m

The ju

etc., is

indete

ns of this ch

ention, not on

iety of reflec

allowances

ention, as a b

ut men and o

s.

s Madison, F

gy in governm

t prompt and

government.

ntages annex

e, which are

ation is not m

s Madison, F

xperience of

ators and jur

of different

recise extent

siastical law,

clearly and f

more industr

urisdiction o

s not less a s

erminate lim

aracter will p

nly without a

cting that a f

for the error

body of men,

ought not to a

Federalist # 3

ment is essen

d salutary ex

. Stability in

ed to it, as w

among the c

more an evil

Federalist # 3

f ages, with t

rists, has bee

codes of law

t of the comm

, the law of c

finally establ

riously pursu

f her several

source of fre

its by which

proceed to a

a disposition

faultless plan

rs which may

, were liable

assume an in

37

ntial to that s

xecution of th

n governmen

well as to tha

chief blessin

in itself than

37

the continue

en equally un

ws and differ

mon law, an

corporations

lished in Gre

ued than in a

l courts, gen

quent and in

h they are res

138 

an examinati

n to find or t

n was not to

y be chargea

e; but will ke

nfallibility in

security aga

he laws whic

nt is essential

at repose and

ngs of civil s

n it is odious

ed and combi

nsuccessful i

rent tribunal

nd the statute

s, and other l

eat Britain, w

any other par

neral and loca

ntricate discu

spectively ci

ion of the pla

to magnify fa

be expected

able on the fa

eep in mind t

n rejudging t

ainst external

ch enter into

l to national

d confidence

society. An ir

s to the peop

ined labors o

in delineatin

ls of justice.

e law, the ma

local laws an

where accura

rt of the wor

al, of law, of

ussions, suff

ircumscribed

an submitted

faults; but wi

d. Nor will th

fallibility to w

that they the

the fallible o

l and interna

o the very de

character an

e in the mind

rregular and

ple

of the most e

ng the severa

aritime law,

nd customs,

acy in such s

rld.

f equity, of a

ficiently deno

d.

d by the

ill see the

hey barely

which the

emselves also

opinions of

al danger and

efinition of

nd to the

ds of the

d mutable

enlightened

al objects and

the

remains still

subjects has

admiralty,

oting the

 

o

d

d

l

 

 

James

Exper

discrim

execu

James

It cou

citizen

their d

James

How d

James

But th

but to

impati

James

And h

legisla

on the

James

s Madison, F

rience has in

minate and d

utive, and jud

s Madison, F

ld not be unk

ns, througho

deliberations

s Madison, F

difficult it is

s Madison, F

he mild voice

o often drow

ient avidity

s Madison, F

how the trade

ative jurisdic

e internal rig

s Madison, F

Federalist # 3

structed us t

define, with

diciary

Federalist # 3

known to th

out this great

s.

Federalist # 4

s for error to

Federalist # 4

e of reason, p

wned, before

for immedia

Federalist # 4

e with Indian

ction can be

ghts of legisla

Federalist # 4

37

that no skill

sufficient ce

37

em that the h

t empire, wer

40

escape its o

41

pleading the

e public bodi

ate and immo

42

ns, though n

regulated by

ation, is abso

42

139 

in the scienc

ertainty, its t

hopes and ex

re turned wi

wn condemn

e cause of an

ies as well as

oderate gain

not members

y an external

olutely incom

ce of govern

three great pr

xpectations o

th the keene

nation.

n enlarged an

s individuals

.

of a State, y

l authority, w

mprehensibl

nment has ye

rovinces -- t

of the great b

est anxiety to

nd permanen

s, by the clam

yet residing w

without so fa

le.

et been able t

the legislativ

body of

o the event o

nt interest, is

mors of an

within its

ar intruding

 

to

ve,

of

s

 

 

there a

Const

wound

James

I take

during

tempe

superi

James

[Rega

before

under

This c

among

canno

societ

James

The fe

people

James

are certain p

titution that a

d to the othe

s Madison, F

no notice of

g the calm of

estuous scene

iority of stre

s Madison, F

arding the de

e the adoptio

this Constit

can only be c

g other reaso

ot be stranger

ty has the ma

s Madison, F

ederal and St

e, constituted

s Madison, F

parts of the S

a violent blo

er.

Federalist # 4

f an unhappy

f regular gov

es of civil vi

ngth to any p

Federalist # 4

ecision to] "c

on of this Co

tution than u

considered a

ons, for the s

rs to the pret

agical effect

Federalist # 4

tate governm

d with differ

Federalist # 4

State constitu

ow cannot be

43

y species of p

vernment, ar

iolence, may

party with w

43

consider all

onstitution as

under the Con

as a declarato

satisfaction o

tended doctr

of dissolvin

43

ments are in

rent powers

46

140 

utions which

e given to the

population a

re sunk below

y emerge into

which they m

debts contra

s being no le

nfederation.

ory propositi

of the foreig

rine that a ch

ng its moral o

fact but diff

and designe

h are so inter

e one withou

abounding in

w the level o

o the human

may associate

acted and en

ess valid aga

"

ion; and may

gn creditors o

hange in the

obligations.

ferent agents

ed for differe

rwoven with

ut communic

n some of th

of men; but w

n character a

e themselves

gagements e

ainst the Unit

y have been

of the United

political for

s and trustees

ent purposes

the federal

cating the

e States, wh

who, in the

nd give a

s.

entered into

ted States

inserted,

d States, who

rm of civil

s of the

.

 

ho,

o

 

 

it is on

advan

James

If it be

opinio

numbe

man h

in pro

Jame

We ar

which

confid

opinio

produ

whilst

reform

expec

is app

James

Let us

found

nly within a

ntageously ad

s Madison, F

e true that al

on in each in

er which he

himself, is tim

portion to th

s Madison, F

re to recollec

h repressed th

dence of the

ons on great

uced by a uni

t no spirit of

med, could m

t to be usual

rehended.

s Madison, F

s consult exp

d.

certain sphe

dministered.

Federalist # 4

ll governmen

ndividual, an

supposes to

mid and caut

he number w

Federalist #

ct that all the

he passions m

people in th

national que

iversal resen

f party conne

mingle its lea

lly placed do

Federalist # 4

perience, the

ere that the f

46

nts rest on op

nd its practica

have enterta

tious when l

with which it

49

e existing co

most unfrien

heir patriotic

estions; of a

ntment and in

ected with th

aven in the o

o not present

49

e guide that o

141 

federal powe

pinion, it is n

al influence

ained the sam

left alone, an

is associated

nstitutions w

ndly to order

leaders, whi

universal ar

ndignation a

he changes to

operation, Th

t any equival

ought always

er can, in the

no less true

on his condu

me opinion.

nd acquires f

d.

were formed

r and concor

ich stifled th

rdor for new

against the an

o be made, o

he future situ

lent security

s to be follow

e nature of th

that the stren

duct, depend

The reason

firmness and

d in the midst

rd: of an enth

he ordinary d

and opposit

ncient gover

or the abuses

uations in wh

y against the

wed whenev

hings, be

ngth of

much on the

of man, like

d confidence

t of a danger

husiastic

diversity of

te forms,

rnment; and

s to be

hich we mus

danger whic

ver it can be

 

e

e

e

r

st

ch

 

 

James

It is no

nature

devote

compr

variety

James

In pro

the go

be a w

by adv

John J

If man

had be

genera

Alexa

the tru

admin

Alexa

s Madison, F

ot possible t

e, continued

e the interva

rehensive int

y of importa

s Madison, F

oportion as th

ood of the wh

weak one ind

vancing the

Jay, Federali

nkind were t

een adjusted

al scene of a

ander Hamilt

ue test of a g

nistration.

ander Hamilt

Federalist # 5

that an assem

in appointm

als of public

terests of the

ant errors in t

Federalist # 6

he United St

hole be more

deed if it sho

good of each

ist # 64

to resolve to

d to the most

anarchy, and

ton, Federali

good governm

ton, Federali

52

mbly of men

ment for a sho

occupation t

eir country,

the exercise

62

tates assume

e and more a

ould forget th

h of the part

agree in no

exact standa

the world a

ist # 65

ment is its ap

ist # 68

142 

called for th

ort time and

to a study of

should, if lef

of their legi

a national f

an object of

hat the good

s or member

institution o

ard of perfec

desert.

ptitude and t

he most part

led by no pe

f the laws, th

ft wholly to

islative trust

form and a n

attention, an

of the whole

rs which com

of governmen

ction, society

tendency to p

from pursui

ermanent mo

he affairs, an

themselves,

t.

national char

nd the govern

e can only b

mpose the w

nt, until eve

y would soo

produce a go

its of a priva

otive to

nd the

, escape a

acter, so wil

nment must

be promoted

whole.

ry part of it

on become a

ood

 

ate

ll

 

 

But th

Magis

when

the co

afterw

Alexa

No ad

system

best th

as pro

Alexa

I neve

all col

as of t

Alexa

[Quot

a large

work

mere d

work;

FEEL

their f

Alexa

he principal a

strate is this:

a well-timed

ommonwealt

wards to reca

ander Hamilt

dvocate of th

m, though it

hat the prese

omises every

ander Hamilt

er expect to s

llective bodi

the good sen

ander Hamilt

ting Hume's

e state or soc

of so great d

dint of reaso

EXPERIEN

LING of inco

first trials an

ander Hamilt

argument for

in seasons o

d offer of pa

th; and which

all.

ton, Federali

he measure c

may not be p

ent views and

y species of s

ton, Federali

see a perfect

ies must nece

nse and wisd

ton, Federali

Essays, Vol

ciety [says h

difficulty tha

on and reflec

NCE must gu

onveniences

nd experimen

ton, Federali

r reposing th

of insurrecti

ardon to the i

h, if suffered

ist # 74

an be found

perfect in ev

d circumstan

security whic

ist # 85

t work from

essarily be a

dom of the in

ist # 85

l. I, page 128

he], whether

at no human

ction, to effec

uide their lab

must correct

nts."

ist # 85

143 

he power of p

on or rebelli

insurgents or

d to pass uni

who will no

very part, is,

nces of the c

ch a reasona

imperfect m

a compound,

ndividuals of

8: "The Rise

monarchica

genius, how

ct it. The jud

bor; TIME m

t the mistake

pardoning in

ion, there are

r rebels may

improved, it

ot declare as

upon the wh

ountry will p

able people c

man. The resu

, as well of t

f whom they

e of Arts and

al or republic

wever compre

dgments of m

must bring it

es which the

n this case in

e often critic

y restore the

may never b

his sentimen

hole, a good

permit; and

can desire.

ult of the del

the errors an

y are compos

d Sciences."]

can, on gene

ehensive, is

many must u

to perfectio

ey inevitably

n the Chief

cal moments

tranquillity

be possible

nt that the

d one; is the

is such a one

liberations o

d prejudices

sed.

] "To balanc

ral laws, is a

able, by the

unite in the

n, and the

y fall into in

 

s

of

e

of

s

ce

a

 

 

A NA

The es

a who

anxiet

Alexa

ATION witho

stablishment

ole people, is

ty.

ander Hamilt

out a NATIO

t of a Consti

s a PRODIG

ton, Federali

ONAL GOV

itution, in tim

Y, to the com

ist # 85

144 

ERNMENT

me of profou

mpletion of

T is, in my vi

und peace, by

which I look

iew, an awfu

y the volunt

k forward w

ul spectacle.

tary consent

ith trembling

 

of

g

 

 145 

 

Monetary system

The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to every citizen in

proportion to his love of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of public prosperity.

The loss which America has sustained since the peace, from the pestilent effects of paper

money on the necessary confidence between man and man, on the necessary confidence in

the public councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the character of

republican government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with

this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of

guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of

justice of the power which has been the instrument of it.

In addition to these persuasive considerations, it may be observed that the same reasons

which show the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin prove with

equal force that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of

coin. Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many

different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse among them would be impeded;

retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be

injured, and animosities be kindled among the States themselves.

The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the Union be

discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of these

mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper money than to coin gold or

silver. The power to make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts is

withdrawn from the States on the same principle with that of issuing a paper currency.

James Madison, Federalist # 44

 

 

Nat

barr

Every

procee

perma

distric

And if

their p

of the

affecti

legisla

memb

object

The S

too of

happin

the ind

James

the me

rather

intere

James

ional co

reling)

yone knows t

eds from the

anent interes

cts in which

f they do not

particular Sta

Union, and

ions and con

atures will b

bers of the fe

ts.

tates will be

ften be decid

ness, but on

dividual Stat

s Madison, F

embers [of th

r of partisans

st

s Madison, F

oncerns

that a great p

e disposition

st of the State

they reside.

t sufficiently

ate, how can

the dignity a

nsultations?

e unlikely to

ederal legisla

e to the latter

ded according

the prejudic

tes.

Federalist # 4

he Continen

s of their resp

Federalist # 4

sacrifice

proportion o

of the mem

e to the parti

y enlarge the

n it be imagin

and respecta

For the same

o attach them

ature will be

r what count

g to their pro

ces, interests

46

ntal Congress

pective State

46

146 

ed to loc

f the errors c

mbers to sacri

icular and se

eir policy to

ned that they

ability of its

e reason that

mselves suffi

likely to att

ties and town

obable effec

, and pursuit

s] have but t

es than of im

cal inter

committed b

ifice the com

eparate view

embrace the

y will make

government

t the membe

iciently to na

tach themsel

ns are to the

ct, not on the

ts of the gov

too frequentl

mpartial guar

rests (po

by the State l

mprehensive

ws of the coun

e collective w

the aggregat

t, the objects

ers of the Sta

ational objec

lves too muc

former. Me

e national pro

vernments an

ly displayed

rdians of a co

ork

legislatures

and

nties or

welfare of

te prosperity

s of their

ate

cts, the

ch to local

asures will

osperity and

nd people of

d the characte

ommon

 

y

d

f

er

 

 147 

 

Novelty of the Constitution

But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected merely because it may

comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst they have

paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not

suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the

suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons

of their own experience?

To this manly spirit posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the

example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theater in favor of

private rights and public happiness.

Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent

could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model did not

present itself, the people of the United States might at this moment have been numbered

among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring

under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of

mankind.

Happily for America, happily we trust for the whole human race, they pursued a new and

more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of

human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of

the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their

successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at

the fewness of them.

James Madison, Federalist # 14

 

 

Pap

A rage

any ot

Union

likely

In the

for the

James

The ex

propo

The lo

money

the pu

republ

this un

guilt,

justice

In add

which

equal

coin. H

differe

retrosp

injure

per mon

e for paper m

ther imprope

n than a parti

to taint a pa

extent and p

e diseases m

s Madison, F

xtension of t

rtion to his l

oss which Am

y on the nec

ublic council

lican govern

nadvised me

which can b

e of the pow

dition to thes

h show the ne

force that th

Had every S

ent currencie

pective alter

d, and animo

ey

money, for a

er or wicked

icular memb

articular coun

proper struct

most incident

Federalist # 1

the prohibiti

love of justic

merica has s

essary confi

ls, on the ind

nment, const

easure, which

be expiated n

wer which has

se persuasive

ecessity of d

hey ought no

State a right t

es as States,

rations in its

osities be kin

an abolition o

d project, wil

ber of it, in th

nty or distric

ture of the U

to republica

10

on to bills o

ce and his kn

sustained sin

dence betwe

dustry and m

itutes an eno

h must long

no otherwise

s been the in

e considerati

denying to th

ot to be at lib

to regulate th

and thus the

value might

ndled among

148 

of debts, for

ll be less apt

he same prop

ct than an en

Union, theref

an governme

f credit mus

nowledge of

nce the peace

een man and

morals of the

ormous debt

remain unsa

than by a vo

nstrument of

ions, it may

he States the

berty to subst

he value of i

e intercourse

t be made, an

g the States t

an equal div

t to pervade t

portion as su

ntire State.

fore, we beho

ent.

t give pleasu

f the true spr

e, from the p

d man, on the

people, and

t against the

atisfied; or ra

oluntary sac

f it.

be observed

power of re

titute a pape

its coin, ther

e among them

nd thus the c

themselves.

vision of pro

the whole bo

uch a malady

old a republi

ure to every

rings of publ

pestilent effe

e necessary c

d on the chara

States charg

ather an accu

rifice on the

d that the sam

egulating coi

er medium in

re might be a

m would be

citizens of ot

operty, or for

ody of the

y is more

ican remedy

citizen in

lic prosperity

ects of paper

confidence i

acter of

geable with

umulation o

e altar of

me reasons

in prove with

n the place o

as many

impeded;

ther States b

 

r

y

y.

in

f

h

of

be

 

 

The su

discre

misch

silver.

withdr

James

It has

contra

has be

furnis

They

Const

money

under

of the

Alexa

ubjects of fo

edited and em

hiefs is less in

. The power

rawn from th

s Madison, F

been asked

adistinction f

een already e

h examples

are not, for i

titution and w

y, notwithsta

the Constitu

terms.

ander Hamilt

oreign power

mbroiled by

ncident to a

to make any

he States on

Federalist # 4

what is mea

from those "

explained. A

of it.

instance, to e

will have no

anding, be em

ution and no

ton, Federali

rs might suff

the indiscret

power in the

ything but go

the same pr

44

ant by "cases

arising unde

All the restric

emit paper m

connection

mitted, the c

t the laws of

ist # 80

149 

fer from the

tion of a sing

e States to em

old and silve

rinciple with

s arising und

er the laws o

ctions upon t

money; but th

with any law

controversies

f the United

same cause,

gle member.

mit paper m

er a tender in

h that of issui

der the Const

of the United

the authority

he interdicti

w of the Uni

s concerning

States, in th

, and hence t

. No one of t

money than to

n payment o

ing a paper c

titution," in

d States"? Th

y of the State

on results fr

ited States. S

g it would be

he ordinary s

the Union be

these

o coin gold o

f debts is

currency.

he difference

e legislatures

rom the

Should paper

e cases arisin

ignification

 

e

or

e

s

r

ng

 

 

Par

Will it

consti

encroa

But ex

that so

more p

extend

James

a mere

not a s

of all

James

chment

t be sufficien

itution of the

aching spirit

xperience as

ome more ad

powerful me

ding the sphe

s Madison, F

e demarcatio

sufficient gu

the powers o

s Madison, F

barrier

nt to mark, w

e governmen

t of power?

sures us that

dequate defe

embers of th

ere of its act

Federalist # 4

on on parchm

uard against t

of governme

Federalist # 4

rs insuff

with precisio

nt, and to tru

t the efficacy

ense is indisp

he governmen

tivity and dra

48

ment of the c

those encroa

ent in the sam

48

150 

ficient

on, the bound

st to these p

y of the prov

pensably nec

nt. The legis

awing all po

constitutiona

achments wh

me hands.

daries of the

archment ba

vision has be

cessary for th

slative depar

ower into its

al limits of th

hich lead to a

ese departme

arriers agains

een greatly o

he more feeb

rtment is eve

impetuous v

he several de

a tyrannical

ents in the

st the

overrated; an

ble against th

erywhere

vortex.

epartments i

concentratio

 

nd

he

is

on

 

 151 

 

Part-time legislature

The representatives of each State will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge

of its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases

have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State legislature

James Madison, Federalist # 56

 

 

Peo

It has

had a

severa

validit

right o

Owing

might

mainta

had re

The p

our na

fabric

PEOP

origin

Alexa

If the

but in

forms

Alexa

The g

should

depen

ple - the

not a little c

ratification b

al legislature

ty of its pow

of legislative

g its ratificat

repeal the la

ain that a pa

espectable ad

ossibility of

ational gover

of America

PLE. The stre

nal fountain o

ander Hamilt

representativ

the exertion

of governm

ander Hamilt

enius of repu

d be derived

ndence on the

e ultima

contributed t

by the PEOP

es, it has bee

wers, and has

e repeal.

tion to the la

aw by which

arty to a com

dvocates.

f a question o

rnment deep

n empire ou

eams of nati

of all legitim

ton, Federali

ves of the pe

n of that orig

ment

ton, Federali

ublican liber

d from the pe

e people by

ate sourc

o the infirmi

PLE. Resting

en exposed to

s in some ins

aw of a State

h it was ratif

mpact has a ri

of this nature

per than in th

ught to rest o

onal power o

mate authorit

ist # 22

eople betray

ginal right of

ist # 28

rty seems to

eople, but tha

a short durat

152 

ce of aut

ities of the e

g on no bette

o frequent an

stances given

e, it has been

fied. Howeve

ight to revok

e proves the

he mere sanc

n the solid b

ought to flow

y.

their constit

f self-defense

demand on

at those intru

tion of their

thority

existing fede

er foundation

nd intricate q

n birth to the

n contended

er gross a he

ke that comp

necessity of

ction of deleg

basis of THE

w immediate

tuents, there

e which is p

one side not

usted with it

appointmen

eral system th

n than the co

questions co

e enormous

that the sam

eresy it may

pact, the doct

f laying the f

gated author

E CONSENT

ely from tha

e is then no r

aramount to

t only that al

t should be k

nts; and that

hat it never

onsent of the

oncerning the

doctrine of a

me authority

be to

trine itself h

foundations

rity. The

T OF THE

at pure,

resource left

o all positive

ll power

kept in

even during

 

e

e

a

as

of

g

 

 

this sh

on the

length

electio

in gov

single

James

If we

govern

name

body o

a limit

It is es

not fro

tyrann

aspire

republ

James

In ord

to the

power

author

On ex

found

for the

hort period th

e contrary, re

h of time the

ons; and a fr

vernment req

e hand.

s Madison, F

resort for a c

nment are es

on, a govern

of the people

ted period, o

ssential to su

om an incon

nical nobles,

e to the rank

lic.

s Madison, F

der to ascerta

foundation

rs are to be d

rity by which

xamining the

ded on the as

e special pur

he trust shou

equires that t

same. A fre

requent chan

quires not on

Federalist # 3

criterion to t

stablished, w

nment which

e, and is adm

or during goo

uch a govern

nsiderable pro

exercising t

of republica

Federalist # 3

ain the real c

on which it i

drawn; to the

h future chan

e first relation

sent and rati

rpose; but, o

uld be placed

the hands in

equent chang

nge of measu

nly a certain

37

the different

we may defin

h derives all

ministered by

od behavior.

nment that it

oportion or a

their oppress

ans and claim

39

character of t

is to be estab

e operation o

nges in the g

n, it appears

ification of th

n the other,

153 

d not in a few

which powe

ge of men wi

ures from a fr

duration of p

principles o

ne a republic

its powers d

y persons ho

.

be derived f

a favored cla

sions by a de

m for their go

the governm

blished; to th

of those pow

government

s, on one han

he people of

that this asse

w, but a num

er is lodged

ill result from

frequent chan

power, but t

on which diff

c to be, or at

directly or in

olding their o

from the gre

ass of it; oth

elegation of

overnment th

ment, it may b

he sources fr

wers; to the e

are to be int

nd, that the C

f America, g

ent and ratif

mber of hand

should conti

m a frequent

nge of men:

the execution

fferent forms

least may b

ndirectly from

offices durin

eat body of th

herwise a han

their powers

he honorable

be considere

rom which it

extent of them

troduced.

Constitution

given by dep

fication is to

ds. Stability,

inue for a

t return of

whilst energ

n of it by a

s of

estow that

m the great

ng pleasure f

he society,

ndful of

s, might

e title of

ed in relation

ts ordinary

m; and to the

is to be

puties elected

be given by

 

gy

for

n

e

d

y

 

 

the pe

and in

ratific

author

not be

James

They m

to giv

nomin

their g

since

toward

inform

numbe

James

Truth,

depen

James

Whils

itself w

indivi

major

James

eople, not as

ndependent S

cation of the

rity of the pe

e a national b

s Madison, F

must have re

e way to sub

nal and nuga

governments

it is impossi

ds their obje

mal and unau

er of citizen

s Madison, F

, no less than

nd on the sen

s Madison, F

st all authorit

will be brok

duals, or of

rity.

s Madison, F

individuals

States to whi

several State

eople themse

but a federal

Federalist # 3

eflected that

bstance; that

atory the tran

s as to them

ible for the p

ect; and it is

uthorized pro

s.

Federalist # 4

n decency, re

ntiments and

Federalist # 4

ty in it will b

en into so m

the minority

Federalist # 5

composing o

ich they resp

es, derived f

elves. The ac

act.

39

t in all great

a rigid adhe

nscendent an

shall seem m

people sponta

therefore ess

opositions, m

40

equires that

sanction of

46

be derived fr

many parts, in

y, will be in l

51

154 

one entire na

pectively bel

from the sup

ct, therefore,

changes of e

erence in suc

nd precious r

most likely to

aneously and

sential that s

made by som

the event in

their commo

rom and dep

nterests and

little danger

ation, but as

long. It is to

preme author

, establishin

established g

ch cases to th

right of the p

o effect their

d universally

such change

me patriotic a

every case s

on constitue

pendent on th

classes of ci

from interes

composing

be the assen

rity in each S

ng the Consti

governments

he former w

people to "ab

r safety and

y to move in

s be institute

and respectab

should be su

ents.

he society, th

itizens, that t

sted combin

the distinct

nt and

State the

itution will

s forms ough

would render

bolish or alte

happiness,"

n concert

ed by some

ble citizen o

upposed to

he society

the rights of

nations of the

 

ht

er

or

f

e

 

 

There

author

legisla

to affi

that th

by vir

forbid

Alexa

It is no

repres

more r

the pe

limits

provin

A con

theref

act pro

varian

course

statute

Nor

legisla

where

people

than th

by tho

is no positio

rity, contrary

ative act, the

irm that the d

he representa

rtue of power

d.

ander Hamilt

ot otherwise

sentatives of

rational to su

eople and the

assigned to

nce of the co

nstitution is,

fore belongs

oceeding fro

nce between

e, to be prefe

e, the intenti

does this co

ative power.

e the will of t

e, declared in

he former. T

ose which ar

on which dep

y to the teno

erefore, contr

deputy is gre

atives of the

rs may do no

ton, Federali

e to be suppo

f the people t

uppose that t

e legislature

their author

ourts.

in fact, and m

to them to a

om the legisl

the two, tha

erred; or, in

ion of the pe

onclusion by

It only supp

the legislatu

n the Consti

They ought to

e not fundam

pends on cle

or of the com

rary to the C

eater than hi

people are s

ot only what

ist # 78

osed that the

to substitute

the courts w

in order, am

rity. The inte

must be rega

ascertain its m

lative body.

at which has

other words

ople to the i

y any means

poses that th

ure, declared

itution, the ju

o regulate th

mental.

155 

earer princip

mmission und

Constitution,

s principal; t

superior to th

t their power

Constitution

their will to

were designed

mong other th

erpretation o

arded by the

meaning as w

If there shou

the superior

, the Constit

ntention of t

suppose a su

e power of t

in its statute

udges ought

heir decision

ples than that

der which it

can be valid

that the serv

he people th

rs do not aut

n could inten

o that of their

d to be an in

hings, to kee

f the laws is

e judges as, a

well as the m

uld happen t

r obligation a

tution ought

their agents.

uperiority of

the people is

es, stands in

to be govern

ns by the fund

t every act o

is exercised

d. To deny th

vant is above

emselves; th

thorize, but w

nd to enable

r constituent

ntermediate b

ep the latter w

s the proper a

a fundament

meaning of a

to be an irrec

and validity

to be prefer

f the judicial

s superior to

opposition t

ned by the la

damental law

of a delegated

, is void. No

his would be

e his master;

hat men actin

what they

the

ts. It is far

body betwee

within the

and peculiar

al law. It

any particula

concilable

ought, of

rred to the

l to the

both, and th

to that of the

atter rather

ws rather tha

 

d

o

e

ng

en

r

ar

hat

e

an

 

 156 

 

This exercise of judicial discretion in determining between two contradictory laws is

exemplified in a familiar instance. It not uncommonly happens that there are two statutes

existing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other and neither of them

containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a case, it is the province of the

courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation. So far as they can, by fair

construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that this

should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect

to one in exclusion of the other.

The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their relative validity is that the

last in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of construction,

not derived from any positive law but from the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule

not enjoined upon the courts by legislative provision but adopted by themselves, as

consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the

law. They thought it reasonable that between the interfering acts of an equal authority that

which was the last indication of its will should have the preference.

But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority of an original

and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule

as proper to be followed. They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred

to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that accordingly,

whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial

tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 78

 

 

Peo

The sm

it; and

submi

jealou

suppo

The

faction

encroa

Alexa

If the

but in

forms

Alexa

Were

the St

the ad

though

should

and, o

The op

but in

preven

ple mus

mallness of t

d the citizens

it to its oppre

us acquiescen

ose may be e

e army under

n, or an occa

achments ag

ander Hamilt

representativ

the exertion

of governm

ander Hamilt

it admitted,

ate governm

dvantage in th

h unfriendly

d not too gro

of course, by

pposition of

flame the ze

nted or repai

st protec

the army ren

s, not habitu

essions, neit

nce in a nece

xerted to the

r such circum

asional mob,

gainst the uni

ton, Federali

ves of the pe

n of that orig

ment

ton, Federali

however, th

ments to exten

he means of

y to the natio

ossly violate

y means on th

f the federal

eal of all part

ired, if at all

ct thems

nders the nat

ated to look

ther love nor

essary evil a

e prejudice o

mstances ma

, or insurrect

ited efforts o

ist # 8

eople betray

ginal right of

ist # 28

hat the federa

nd its power

f defeating su

onal governm

the oaths of

he spot and d

government

ties on the si

, without the

157 

selves fr

tural strength

up to the mi

r fear the sol

and stand rea

of their rights

ay usefully a

tion; but it w

of the great b

their constit

f self-defense

al governme

r beyond the

uch encroach

ment, be gene

f the State of

depending o

, or the inter

ide of the St

e employmen

rom the

h of the com

ilitary power

ldiery; they v

ady to resist

s.

aid the magis

will be unabl

body of the p

tuents, there

e which is p

nt may feel

e due limits,

hments. If an

erally popul

fficers, it is e

on the State a

rposition of f

tate, and the

nt of means

governm

mmunity an o

r for protect

view them w

a power whi

strate to supp

le to enforce

people.

e is then no r

aramount to

an equal dis

the latter wo

n act of a pa

ar in that Sta

executed imm

alone.

federal offic

evil could n

which must

ment

overmatch fo

tion, or to

with a spirit o

ich they

press a smal

e

resource left

o all positive

sposition wit

ould still hav

articular Stat

ate, and

mediately

cers, would

not be

t always be

 

or

of

ll

th

ve

te,

 

 

resorte

measu

fail to

the me

The d

the of

embar

occasi

large S

happe

hardly

But

govern

They w

cause.

Plans

The sa

produ

volunt

was m

govern

James

The on

vision

force

been e

of this

ed to with re

ure of the fed

be the case,

eans of oppo

isquietude o

fficers of the

rrassments c

ions, would

State, very s

ened to be in

y be willing t

ambitious en

nments wou

would be sig

. A correspo

of resistance

ame combin

uced by the d

tarily renoun

made in the o

nment to suc

s Madison, F

nly refuge le

nary supposit

for the proje

employed to

s danger. Th

eluctance and

deral govern

, or even a w

osition to it a

of the people

Union; the

created by leg

oppose, in a

serious impe

unison, wou

to encounter

ncroachmen

uld not excite

gnals of gene

ndence wou

e would be c

ations, in sh

dread of a for

nced, the sam

other. But wh

ch an extrem

Federalist # 4

eft for those

tion that the

ects of ambit

little purpos

at the people

d difficulty.

nment be unp

warrantable m

are powerful

; their repug

frowns of th

gislative dev

any State, dif

diments; and

uld present o

r.

nts of the fed

e the opposit

eral alarm. E

uld be opened

concerted. O

hort, would r

reign, yoke;

me appeal to

hat degree of

mity?

46

who prophe

federal gove

tion. The rea

se indeed, if

e and the Sta

158 

On the othe

popular in pa

measure be s

l and at hand

gnance and, p

he executive

vices, which

fficulties not

d where the

obstructions

deral governm

tion of a sing

Every govern

d.

One spirit wo

esult from an

and unless t

o a trial of fo

f madness co

esy the down

ernment may

asonings con

f it could be n

ates should,

er hand, shou

articular Stat

so, which ma

d.

perhaps, refu

magistracy

would often

t to be despi

sentiments o

which the fe

ment on the

gle State, or

nment would

ould animate

an apprehens

the projected

orce would b

ould ever dr

nfall of the S

y previously

ntained in the

necessary no

for a sufficie

uld an unwar

tes, which w

ay sometime

usal to co-op

of the State;

n be added o

sed; would f

of several ad

ederal gover

authority of

of a few Sta

d espouse th

and conduc

sion of the fe

d innovation

e made in th

rive the feder

State governm

y accumulate

ese papers m

ow to dispro

ent period o

rrantable

would seldom

es be the cas

perate with

; the

on such

form, in a

djoining Stat

rnment woul

f the State

ates only.

he common

ct the whole.

ederal, as wa

ns should be

he one case a

ral

ments is the

e a military

must have

ove the realit

f time, elect

 

m

e,

tes

ld

as

as

ty

 

 159 

 

an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should,

throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the

extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States

should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm and continue to supply the

materials until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads must appear to everyone

more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of

a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism.

Extravagant as the supposition is, let it, however, be made. Let a regular army, fully equal

to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the

federal government: still it would not be going too far to say that the State governments

with the people on their side would be able to repel the danger.

The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be

carried in any country does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or

one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in

the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these

would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their

hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common

liberties and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and

confidence. It may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be

conquered by such a proportion of regular troops.

Those who are best acquainted with the late successful resistance of this country against

the British arms will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of

being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation,

the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached and by which

the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more

insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of.

Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are

carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the

people with arms. And it is not certain that with this aid alone they would not be able to

 

 

shake

govern

nation

attach

the thr

which

Let us

be les

debase

oppre

reduce

submi

James

The tr

tempo

few ye

and w

give a

have r

actuat

charac

I am u

circum

choice

schem

I am u

watch

off their yok

nments chos

nal force, and

hed both to th

rone of every

h surround it

s not insult th

s able to def

ed subjects o

ssors. Let us

e themselves

ission to the

s Madison, F

rue question

orary regulat

ears, and a h

well-guarded

a negative an

received with

tes the State

cter of every

unable to con

mstances wh

e of, sixty-fiv

me of tyranny

unable to con

h and which p

kes. But wer

sen by thems

d of officers

hem and to t

y tyranny in

.

he free and g

fend the righ

of arbitrary p

s rather no lo

s to the nece

long train o

Federalist # 4

to be decide

tion, be dang

hundred or tw

power of leg

nswer to this

h regard to t

legislatures,

y class of citi

nceive that th

hich can spee

ve or a hund

y or treacher

nceive that th

possess so m

re the people

selves, who c

appointed o

the militia, it

n Europe wou

gallant citize

hts of which

power would

onger insult t

essity of mak

f insidious m

46

ed, then, is w

gerous to the

wo hundred

gislating for

question, w

the present g

, and the prin

izens.

he people of

edily happen

dred men wh

ry.

he State legi

many means

160 

e to possess

could collec

out of the mi

t may be affi

uld be speed

ens of Ameri

they would b

d be to rescu

them with th

king the expe

measures wh

whether the s

e public liber

for a few mo

the United S

without first o

genius of the

nciples whic

f America, in

n, will choose

ho would be

islatures, wh

of counterac

the addition

ct the nationa

ilitia by these

irmed with t

dily overturn

ica with the

be in actual

ue theirs from

he suppositio

eriment by a

hich must pre

smallness of

rty? Whether

ore, be a safe

States? I mu

obliterating e

people of A

ch are incorp

n their prese

e, and every

disposed to

hich must fee

cting the fed

nal advantage

al will and d

e governmen

the greatest a

ned in spite o

suspicion th

possession t

m the hands

on that they

a blind and ta

ecede and pr

f the number

r sixty-five m

fe depositary

ust own that

every impres

America, the

porated with

ent temper, o

y second year

form and pu

el so many m

deral legislatu

es of local

direct the

nts and

assurance th

of the legion

hat they wou

than the

of their

can ever

ame

roduce it.

r, as a

members for

y for a limite

I could not

ssion which

spirit which

the political

or under any

r repeat the

ursue a

motives to

ure, would

 

at

s

uld

r a

d

I

h

l

 

 

fail eit

comm

in any

recom

dare, w

What

requir

from t

moder

the nu

James

the Ho

recolle

minds

compe

is to b

there f

title to

I wi

restrai

its ful

societ

can co

It crea

few go

degen

from m

ther to detec

mon constitue

y short time,

mmending the

within the sh

change of ci

res a prophet

the circumst

rate period o

umber of han

s Madison, F

ouse of Repr

ection of the

s by the mod

elled to antic

be reviewed,

forever to re

o a renewal o

ll add, as a f

ining them f

l operation o

ty. This has a

onnect the ru

ates between

overnments

nerates into ty

making lega

ct or to defea

ents. I am eq

in the Unite

emselves to

hort space of

ircumstance

tic spirit to d

ances now b

of time, I mu

nds proposed

Federalist # 5

resentatives

eir dependen

de of their ele

cipate the mo

and when th

emain unless

of it.

fifth circums

from oppress

on themselve

always been

ulers and the

n them that c

have furnish

yranny. If it

al discriminat

at a conspira

qually unable

ed States, any

the choice o

f two years,

s time, and a

declare, whic

before us, an

ust pronounc

d by the fede

55

is so constit

nce on the pe

evation can b

oment when

hey must des

s a faithful di

stance in the

sive measure

es and their f

deemed one

e people toge

communion o

hed example

be asked, w

tions in favo

161 

acy of the lat

e to conceive

y sixty-five

of the people

to betray the

a fuller popu

ch makes no

nd from the p

ce that the lib

eral Constitu

tuted as to su

eople. Before

be effaced b

n their power

scend to the

ischarge of t

situation of

es, that they

friends, as w

e of the stron

ether.

of interests a

es; but witho

what is to rest

or of themsel

tter against th

e that there a

or a hundred

e at large, wh

e solemn tru

ulation of ou

part of my p

probable stat

berties of Am

ution.

upport in the

e the sentime

by the exerci

r is to cease,

level from w

their trust sh

f the House o

can make no

well as on the

ngest bonds

and sympath

out which eve

train the Hou

lves and a pa

he liberties o

are at this tim

d men capab

ho would eit

ust committed

ur country ma

pretensions.

te of them w

merica canno

e members an

ents impress

ise of power,

, when their

which they w

hall have esta

of Represent

o law which

e great mass

by which hu

hy of sentime

ery governm

use of Repre

articular cla

of their

me, or can b

ble of

ther desire or

d to them.

ay produce

But judging

within a

ot be unsafe

n habitual

sed on their

, they will be

exercise of i

were raised;

ablished thei

tatives,

will not hav

s of the

uman policy

ents of which

ment

esentatives

ss of the

 

e

r

g

in

e

it

ir

ve

h

 

 

societ

laws;

a spiri

If this

legisla

liberty

James

WE H

could

would

regula

emplo

exclus

it imp

. . . T

reflect

body o

conce

season

but th

invade

govern

incred

Alexa

ty? I answer:

and, above a

it which nou

spirit shall e

ature, as wel

y.

s Madison, F

HAVE seen t

not, without

d be the dang

ating its own

oyed in such

sion of other

racticable to

The improbab

tion, that it c

of the people

ive that this

ns, be violate

at so fundam

ed to the pre

nment witho

dible.

ander Hamilt

: the genius o

all, the vigila

urishes freedo

ever be so fa

ll as on the p

Federalist # 5

that an uncon

t hazard, be

ger on the ot

n elections to

a manner as

rs by confini

o the citizens

bility of the a

could never b

e, headed an

characterist

ed, in respec

mental a priv

ejudice of the

out occasioni

ton, Federali

of the whole

ant and man

om, and in r

ar debased a

people, the p

57

ntrollable po

committed t

ther side; tha

o the Union i

s to promote

ing the place

s at large to p

attempt may

be made wit

nd directed b

ic right of fr

ct to a particu

vilege, in a co

e great mass

ing a popula

ist # 60

162 

e system; the

ly spirit whi

return is nour

s to tolerate

eople will b

ower over th

to the State l

at is, from co

itself. . . . B

e the election

es of election

partake in th

y be satisfact

thout causing

by the State g

reedom may,

ular class of

ountry so sit

s of the peop

ar revolution

e nature of ju

ich actuates

urished by it.

a law not ob

e prepared to

e elections t

legislatures.

onfiding the

But it is alleg

n of some fav

n to particula

he choice.

torily inferre

g an immedi

governments

, in certain tu

f citizens, by

tuated and en

ple by the del

n, is altogethe

ust and const

the people o

bligatory on

o tolerate an

to the federa

Let us now

ultimate righ

ed that it mi

vorite class o

ar districts an

ed from this

iate revolt of

s. It is not di

turbulent and

y a victorious

nlightened, s

liberate poli

er inconceiv

titutional

of America -

the

nything but

l governmen

see what

ht of

ight be

of men in

nd rendering

single

f the great

ifficult to

d factious

s majority;

should be

cy of the

vable and

 

-

nt

g

 

 

Poli

The so

public

legisla

enterp

inform

They h

repetit

preced

James

The in

of libe

own c

they c

underg

what i

which

Ano

sagaci

mass o

manne

those

thems

state o

for the

icy chan

ober people

c councils. T

ative interfer

prising and in

med part of th

have seen, to

tions, every

ding.

s Madison, F

nternal effec

erty itself. It

choice if the

cannot be un

go such ince

it will be tom

h is little kno

other effect o

ious, the ent

of the people

er affecting t

who watch t

selves, but by

of things in w

e many.

nges

of America

They have se

rences, in ca

nfluential sp

he communi

oo, that one

subsequent

Federalist # 4

ts of a mutab

will be of li

laws be so v

derstood; if

essant chang

morrow. Law

own, and less

of public inst

erprising, an

e. Every new

the value of

the change, a

y the toils an

which it may

are weary of

en with regr

ases affecting

peculators, an

ity.

legislative in

interference

44

ble policy ar

ittle avail to

voluminous t

they be repe

ges that no m

w is defined

s fixed?

tability is the

nd the money

w regulation

the differen

and can trac

nd cares of th

y be said wit

163 

f the fluctua

ret and indig

g personal ri

nd snares to

nterference i

being natur

re still more

the people th

that they can

ealed or revis

man, who kno

to be a rule o

e unreasonab

yed few ove

concerning

nt species of p

e its consequ

he great bod

th some truth

ating policy w

gnation that s

ights, becom

the more ind

is but the fir

rally produce

calamitous.

hat the laws

nnot be read

sed before th

ows what the

of action; bu

ble advantag

r the industr

commerce o

property, pr

uences; a ha

dy of their fe

h that laws a

which has di

sudden chan

me jobs in the

dustrious an

rst link of a l

ed by the eff

It poisons th

are made by

, or so incoh

hey are prom

e law is toda

ut how can th

ge it gives to

rious and uni

or revenue, o

resents a new

arvest, reared

llow-citizen

are made for

irected the

ges and

e hands of

nd less

long chain o

fects of the

he blessings

y men of the

herent that

mulgated, or

ay, can guess

hat be a rule

o the

informed

or in any

w harvest to

d not by

ns. This is a

the few, not

 

f

s

eir

s

e,

t

 

 

James

What

knows

James

It may

good o

will h

incons

and ge

the ex

any gi

greate

defeat

numbe

Alexa

s Madison, F

prudent mer

s not but tha

s Madison, F

y perhaps be

ones; and m

ave little we

stancy and m

enius of our

xcess of lawm

iven period a

er stability in

ting a few go

er of bad on

ander Hamilt

Federalist # 6

rchant will h

at his plans m

Federalist # 6

e said that the

ay be used to

eight with tho

mutability in

government

making, and

as much mor

n the system

ood laws wil

es.

ton, Federali

62

hazard his fo

may be rende

62

e power of p

o the one pu

ose who can

the laws, wh

ts. They will

to keep thin

re likely to d

of legislatio

ll be amply c

ist # 73

164 

rtunes in any

ered unlawfu

preventing ba

urpose as we

n properly es

hich form th

l consider ev

ngs in the sam

do good than

on. The injur

compensated

y branch of

ul before the

ad laws inclu

ll as to the o

stimate the m

he greatest b

very instituti

me state in w

n harm; beca

ury which ma

d by the adv

commerce w

ey can be exe

udes that of

other. But thi

mischiefs of t

lemish in the

ion calculate

which they h

ause it is favo

ay possibly b

antage of pr

when he

ecuted?

preventing

is objection

that

e character

ed to restrain

happen to be

orable to

be done by

reventing a

 

n

at

 

 165 

 

Property

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the

liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same

opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy that it was worse than the

disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly

expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life,

because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is

essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the

reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will

be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his

opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former

will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.

The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not

less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is

the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of

acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately

results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective

proprietors ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them

everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different

circumstances of civil society.

A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other

points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously

contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes

 

 166 

 

have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,

inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and

oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity

of mankind to fall into mutual animosities that where no substantial occasion presents itself

the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly

passions and excite their most violent conflicts.

But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal

distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever

formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors,

fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile

interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized

nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.

The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern

legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary

operations of government.

James Madison, Federalist # 10

 

 

Pur

The pr

memb

extern

superi

Alexa

Was, t

the pr

not th

govern

a certa

sovere

We ha

kings,

shape

institu

that th

to be p

be fitt

Jame

it is th

James

rpose of

rincipal purp

bers; the pres

nal attacks; th

intendence o

ander Hamilt

then, the Am

ecious blood

at the people

nments of th

ain extent of

eignty?

ave heard of

, not kings fo

that the soli

utions of a di

he public goo

pursued; and

ted for the at

s Madison, F

he reason, alo

s Madison, F

governm

poses to be a

servation of

he regulation

of our interco

ton, Federali

merican Revo

d of thousand

e of America

he individual

f power and

f the impious

or the people

id happiness

ifferent form

od, the real w

d that no form

ttainment of

Federalist #

one, of the p

Federalist # 4

ment

answered by

the public p

n of commer

ourse, politic

ist # 23

olution effec

ds spilt, and

a should enjo

l States, that

be arrayed w

s doctrine in

e. Is the sam

of the peop

m? It is too ea

welfare of th

m of govern

this object.

45

public, that o

49

167 

y union are th

eace, as wel

rce with othe

cal and comm

cted, was the

the hard-ear

oy peace, lib

t particular m

with certain d

the old worl

me doctrine to

le is to be sa

arly for polit

he great body

nment whatev

ought to cont

hese the com

ll against int

er nations an

mercial, with

e American C

rned substan

berty, and sa

municipal est

dignities and

rld, that the p

o be revived

acrificed to t

ticians to pre

y of the peop

ver has any o

trol and regu

mmon defens

ternal convul

nd between t

h foreign co

Confederacy

nce of millio

afety, but tha

tablishments

d attributes o

people were

d in the new,

the views of

esume on ou

ple, is the su

other value t

ulate the gov

se of the

lsions as

the States; th

untries.

y formed, wa

ons lavished,

at the

s, might enjo

of

made for

in another

f political

ur forgetting

upreme objec

than as it ma

vernment.

 

he

as

,

oy

ct

ay

 

 

Justice

be pur

James

Gover

indivi

A goo

the ha

be bes

are de

attenti

James

e is the end o

rsued until it

s Madison, F

rnment is ins

duals. Jame

od governme

appiness of th

st attained. S

eficient in the

ion has been

s Madison, F

of governme

t be obtained

Federalist # 5

stituted no le

es Madison,

ent implies tw

he people; se

Some govern

e first. I scru

n paid to the

Federalist # 6

ent. It is the

d, or until lib

51

ess for prote

Federalist #

wo things: fi

econdly, a k

nments are d

uple not to as

last.

62

168 

end of civil

berty be lost

ction of the

54

irst, fidelity

knowledge of

eficient in b

ssert that in

society. It ev

in the pursu

proptery tha

to the object

f the means

oth these qu

American go

ver has been

uit.

an of the per

t of governm

by which th

ualities; most

overnments

n and ever w

sons of

ment, which

at object can

t governmen

too little

 

will

is

n

nts

 

 169 

 

Qualifications for office

Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend

him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of

religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the

inclination of the people.

James Madison, Federalist # 57

 

 170 

 

Ratification; Method and significance of

First. -- In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in

relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its

ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them;

and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be

founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected

for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by

the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct

and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and

ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State the

authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution will

not be a national but a federal act.

James Madison, Federalist # 39

 

 

Reb

But it

passed

well a

I answ

the fir

federa

use of

forme

exigen

light,

Alexa

WE H

could

would

regula

emplo

exclus

it imp

. . . T

reflect

body o

conce

season

but th

invade

bellion

may be agai

d for executi

and as fully u

wer in the sec

rst instance,

al governmen

f its powers,

ed, and take s

ncy may sug

must always

ander Hamilt

HAVE seen t

not, without

d be the dang

ating its own

oyed in such

sion of other

racticable to

The improbab

tion, that it c

of the people

ive that this

ns, be violate

at so fundam

ed to the pre

in asked, Wh

ing the powe

upon the sim

cond place th

of the prope

nt should ov

the people,

such measur

ggest and pru

s be determin

ton, Federali

that an uncon

t hazard, be

ger on the ot

n elections to

a manner as

rs by confini

o the citizens

bility of the a

could never b

e, headed an

characterist

ed, in respec

mental a priv

ejudice of the

ho is to judg

ers of the Un

mple grant of

hat the natio

er exercise of

verpass the ju

whose creatu

res to redress

udence justif

ned by the n

ist # 33

ntrollable po

committed t

ther side; tha

o the Union i

s to promote

ing the place

s at large to p

attempt may

be made wit

nd directed b

ic right of fr

ct to a particu

vilege, in a co

e great mass

171 

ge of the nec

nion? I answ

f those powe

onal governm

f its powers,

ust bounds o

ure it is, mu

s the injury d

fy. The propr

nature of the

ower over th

to the State l

at is, from co

itself. . . . B

e the election

es of election

partake in th

y be satisfact

thout causing

by the State g

reedom may,

ular class of

ountry so sit

s of the peop

essity and pr

wer first that t

ers as upon th

ment, like ev

, and its cons

of its authori

ust appeal to

done to the C

riety of a law

powers upo

e elections t

legislatures.

onfiding the

But it is alleg

n of some fav

n to particula

he choice.

torily inferre

g an immedi

governments

, in certain tu

f citizens, by

tuated and en

ple by the del

ropriety of t

this question

he declarator

very other, m

stituents in t

ty and make

the standard

Constitution

w, in a const

n which it is

to the federa

Let us now

ultimate righ

ed that it mi

vorite class o

ar districts an

ed from this

iate revolt of

s. It is not di

turbulent and

y a victorious

nlightened, s

liberate poli

the laws to b

n arises as

ry clause; an

must judge, in

the last. If th

e a tyrannica

d they have

n as the

titutional

s founded.

l governmen

see what

ht of

ight be

of men in

nd rendering

single

f the great

ifficult to

d factious

s majority;

should be

cy of the

 

be

nd

n

he

al

nt

g

 

 

govern

incred

Alexa

[Spea

citizen

extrem

to sub

Alexa

nment witho

dible.

ander Hamilt

aking of thos

ns, not less t

mes of their r

bstitute men w

ander Hamilt

out occasioni

ton, Federali

se who woul

tenacious tha

respective S

who would b

ton, Federali

ing a popula

ist # 60

ld devise unj

an conscious

tates to the p

be disposed

ist # 60

172 

ar revolution

just election

s of their righ

places of ele

to avenge th

n, is altogethe

n rules:] Wou

hts, would fl

ection, to ove

he violated m

er inconceiv

uld they not

flock from th

erthrow their

majesty of th

vable and

fear that

he remotest

r tyrants and

he people?

 

d

 

 173 

 

Representatives to control purse strings

a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger States by which they

will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives

cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of

government.

They, in a word, hold the purse --- that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the

history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people

gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as

it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the

government.

This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual

weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people,

for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and

salutary measure.

James Madison, Federalist # 58

 

 

Rep

Is it no

depen

should

willin

and th

his ass

and th

Alexa

It is a

intere

to tho

relate.

James

presenta

ot natural th

ndent on the

d take care to

ng to allow th

he necessity

sent are the t

he constituen

ander Hamilt

sound and im

sts and circu

se circumsta

.

s Madison, F

atives to

at a man wh

suffrages of

o inform him

hem their pro

of being bou

true and they

nt.

ton, Federali

mportant pri

umstance of

ances and int

Federalist # 5

know th

ho is a candid

f his fellow-c

mself of their

oper degree

und, himself

y are the stro

ist # 35

inciple that t

his constitue

terests to wh

56

174 

he will o

date for the f

citizens for th

r disposition

of influence

f and his post

ong cords of

the represent

ents. But this

hich the auth

of consti

favor of the

the continuan

ns and inclin

e upon his co

terity, by the

f sympathy b

tative ought

s principle c

hority and ca

ituents

people, and

nce of his pu

nations and sh

onduct? This

e laws to wh

between the

to be acqua

can extend no

are of the rep

who is

ublic honors

hould be

s dependence

hich he gives

representativ

ainted with th

o further tha

presentative

 

,

e,

s

ve

he

an

 

 

Rep

A repu

place

James

Let us

The

delega

rest; s

latter m

The

views

may b

will b

regula

the pe

thems

On the

or of s

suffra

small

public

In th

repres

few; a

publican

ublic, by wh

s Madison, F

s examine th

two great po

ation of the g

econdly, the

may be exte

effect of the

by passing t

best discern t

e least likely

ation it may w

eople, will be

selves, conve

e other hand

sinister desig

ges, and then

or extensive

c weal; and i

he first place

sentatives mu

and that how

n form; i

hich I mean a

Federalist # 1

he points in w

oints of diffe

government,

e greater num

ended.

e first differe

them throug

the true inter

y to sacrifice

well happen

e more conso

ened for the

d, the effect m

gns, may, by

n betray the

e republics a

it is clearly d

e it is to be re

ust be raised

wever large it

ingredie

a governmen

10

which it vari

erence betwe

, in the latter

mber of citiz

ence is, on th

gh the mediu

rest of their

e it to tempor

n that the pub

onant to the

purpose.

may be inver

y intrigue, by

interests of

are most favo

decided in fa

emarked tha

d to a certain

t may be they

175 

ents of

nt in which t

es from pure

een a democ

r, to a small

ens and grea

he one hand,

um of a chose

country and

rary or parti

blic voice, pr

public good

rted. Men of

y corruption,

the people. T

orable to the

avor of the la

at however sm

n number in o

y must be lim

the scheme o

e democracy

cracy and a r

number of c

ater sphere o

, to refine an

en body of c

whose patri

al considera

ronounced b

d than if pron

f factious tem

, or by other

The question

election of p

atter by two

mall the repu

order to guar

mited to a ce

of representa

y, ...

republic are:

citizens elect

of country ov

nd enlarge th

citizens, who

iotism and lo

ations. Under

by the repres

nounced by t

mpers, of loc

r means, first

n resulting is

proper guard

obvious con

ublic may be

ard against th

ertain numbe

ation takes

first, the

ted by the

ver which th

he public

ose wisdom

ove of justic

r such a

sentatives of

the people

cal prejudice

t obtain the

s, whether

dians of the

nsiderations.

e the

he cabals of a

er in order to

 

he

e

f

es,

a

o

 

 

guard

cases

in the

large t

a grea

In th

the lar

practic

suffra

the mo

It m

which

you re

lesser

too lit

forms

to the

James

Exten

probab

other

it to d

James

... in a

they a

against the

not being in

small repub

than in the s

ater probabili

he next place

rge than in th

ce with succ

ges of the pe

ost attractive

must be confe

h inconvenien

ender the rep

interests; as

ttle fit to com

a happy com

national, the

s Madison, F

d the sphere

ble that a ma

citizens; or i

discover their

s Madison, F

a democracy

assemble and

confusion of

n proportion

blic, it follow

mall republi

ity of a fit ch

e, as each rep

he small rep

cess the vicio

eople being m

e merit and t

essed that in

nces will be

presentative

s by reducing

mprehend an

mbination in

e local and p

Federalist # 1

e and you tak

ajority of the

if such a com

r own streng

Federalist # 1

y the people m

d administer

f a multitude

to that of the

ws that if the

ic, the forme

hoice.

presentative

ublic, it will

ous arts by w

more free, w

the most diff

this, as in m

found to lie

too little acq

g it too much

nd pursue gre

n this respect

particular to

10

ke in a greate

e whole will

mmon motiv

gth and to act

10

meet and exe

it by their re

176 

e. Hence, the

e constituent

proportion o

er will presen

will be chos

l be more dif

which electio

will be more

fusive and es

most other ca

e. By enlargi

quainted with

h, you rende

eat and natio

t; the great a

the State leg

er variety of

have a com

ve exists, it w

t in unison w

ercise the go

epresentative

e number of

ts, and being

of fit charact

nt a greater o

sen by a gre

fficult for un

ons are too o

likely to cen

stablished ch

ases, there is

ing too much

h all their lo

er him undul

onal objects.

and aggregat

gislatures.

f parties and

mmon motive

will be more

with each oth

overnment in

es and agent

f representati

g proportion

ters be not le

option, and c

eater number

nworthy cand

often carried;

nter on men

haracters.

a mean, on

h the number

ocal circumst

ly attached to

The federal

te interests b

interests; yo

e to invade th

difficult for

her.

n person; in

ts. A democr

ives in the tw

ally greatest

ess in the

consequently

r of citizens i

didates to

; and the

who possess

both sides o

r of electors

tances and

o these, and

Constitution

being referred

ou make it le

he rights of

r all who feel

a republic

racy,

 

wo

t

y

in

s

of

,

n

d

ess

l

 

 

conseq

region

As the

permi

will in

republ

people

James

The g

should

depen

this sh

Stabil

for a l

of elec

energy

by a s

James

The fi

govern

with th

Revol

to rest

quently, mu

n. James Ma

e natural lim

t the most re

nclude no gr

lic is that dis

e to meet as

s Madison, F

enius of repu

d be derived

ndence on the

hort period th

ity, on the co

length of tim

ctions; and a

y in governm

ingle hand.

s Madison, F

irst question

nment be str

he genius of

lution; or wit

t all our poli

st be confine

adison, Fede

mit of a demo

emote citizen

eater numbe

stance from

often as may

Federalist # 1

ublican liber

d from the pe

e people by

he trust shou

ontrary, requ

me the same.

a frequent ch

ment require

Federalist # 3

that offers i

rictly republi

f the people o

th that honor

tical experim

ed to a small

eralist # 14

ocracy is that

ns to assemb

er than can jo

the center w

y be necessa

14

rty seems to

eople, but tha

a short durat

uld be placed

uires that the

A frequent c

hange of mea

s not only a

37

itself is whet

ican. It is ev

of America;

rable determ

ments on the

177 

l spot. A rep

t distance fro

ble as often a

oin in those

which will ba

ary for the ad

demand on

at those intru

tion of their

d not in a few

e hands in w

change of m

asures from

certain dura

ther the gene

vident that no

with the fun

mination whi

e capacity of

public may b

om the centr

as their publ

functions, so

arely allow th

dministration

one side not

usted with it

appointmen

w, but a num

which power

men will resu

a frequent c

ation of powe

eral form and

o other form

ndamental pr

ch animates

f mankind fo

be extended o

ral point whi

ic functions

o the natural

he represent

n of public a

t only that al

t should be k

nts; and that

mber of hand

is lodged sh

ult from a fre

change of me

er, but the ex

d aspect of t

m would be re

rinciples of

every votar

or self-govern

over a large

ich will just

demand, an

l limit of a

tatives of the

affairs.

ll power

kept in

even during

ds.

hould continu

equent return

en: whilst

xecution of i

the

econcilable

the

ry of freedom

nment.

 

nd

e

g

ue

n

it

m

 

 

James

What,

questi

politic

found

If w

govern

name

body o

a limit

It is es

not fro

tyrann

aspire

republ

Jame

The re

govern

does n

every

their p

It is a

applie

preten

experi

s Madison, F

, then, are th

ion to be sou

cal writers to

d. ...

we resort for

nment are es

on, a govern

of the people

ted period, o

ssential to su

om an incon

nical nobles,

e to the rank

lic.

s Madison, F

epublican pr

n the conduc

not require a

transient im

prejudices to

just observa

es to their ve

nd that they a

ience that th

Federalist # 3

he distinctive

ught, not by r

o the constitu

a criterion t

stablished, w

nment which

e, and is adm

or during goo

uch a govern

nsiderable pro

exercising t

of republica

Federalist #

rinciple dema

ct of those to

an unqualifie

mpulse which

o betray their

ation that the

ery errors. Bu

always reaso

hey sometime

39

e characters o

recurring to

utions of diff

to the differe

we may defin

h derives all

ministered by

od behavior.

nment that it

oportion or a

their oppress

ans and claim

39

ands that the

o whom they

ed complaisa

h the people

r interests.

e people com

ut their good

on right abou

es err; and th

178 

of the republ

principles b

fferent States

ent principles

ne a republic

its powers d

y persons ho

.

be derived f

a favored cla

sions by a de

m for their go

e deliberate s

y intrust the m

ance to every

may receive

mmonly inten

d sense woul

ut the means

he wonder is

lican form?

but in the app

s, no satisfac

s on which d

c to be, or at

directly or in

olding their o

from the gre

ass of it; oth

elegation of

overnment th

sense of the

managemen

y sudden bre

e from the ar

nd the PUBL

ld despise th

s of promotin

s that they so

Were an ans

plication of t

ctory one wo

different form

least may b

ndirectly from

offices durin

eat body of th

herwise a han

their powers

he honorable

community

nt of their aff

eeze of passi

rts of men, w

LIC GOOD.

he adulator w

ng it. They k

o seldom err

swer to this

the term by

ould ever be

ms of

estow that

m the great

ng pleasure f

he society,

ndful of

s, might

e title of

should

fairs; but it

on, or to

who flatter

This often

who should

know from

r as they do,

 

for

 

 179 

 

beset as they continually are by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the

ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, by the artifices of men who possess their

confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess rather than to

deserve it.

When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance

with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the

guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion in order to give them time

and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection. Instances might be cited in which a

conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences of their own

mistakes, and has procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who had

courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 71

 

 

Rep

It has

countr

of men

choice

accide

Alexa

the Ho

recolle

minds

compe

is to b

there f

title to

I w

restrai

its ful

societ

can co

It crea

few go

degen

from m

societ

publics r

been freque

ry, by their c

n are really c

e, or whether

ent and force

ander Hamilt

ouse of Repr

ection of the

s by the mod

elled to antic

be reviewed,

forever to re

o a renewal o

ill add, as a

ining them f

l operation o

ty. This has a

onnect the ru

ates between

overnments

nerates into ty

making lega

ty? I answer:

require

ently remarke

conduct and

capable or n

r they are fo

e.

ton, Federali

resentatives

eir dependen

de of their ele

cipate the mo

and when th

emain unless

of it.

fifth circum

from oppress

on themselve

always been

ulers and the

n them that c

have furnish

yranny. If it

al discriminat

: the genius o

enlighte

ed that it see

example, to

not of establi

orever destin

ist # 1

is so constit

nce on the pe

evation can b

oment when

hey must des

s a faithful di

stance in the

sive measure

es and their f

deemed one

e people toge

communion o

hed example

be asked, w

tions in favo

of the whole

180 

ened citi

ems to have b

decide the i

shing good g

ed to depend

tuted as to su

eople. Before

be effaced b

n their power

scend to the

ischarge of t

e situation of

es, that they

friends, as w

e of the stron

ether.

of interests a

es; but witho

what is to rest

or of themsel

e system; the

izenry

been reserve

important qu

government

d for their po

upport in the

e the sentime

by the exerci

r is to cease,

level from w

their trust sh

f the House

can make no

well as on the

ngest bonds

and sympath

out which eve

train the Hou

lves and a pa

e nature of ju

ed to the peo

uestion, whe

from reflect

olitical const

e members an

ents impress

ise of power,

, when their

which they w

hall have esta

of Represen

o law which

e great mass

by which hu

hy of sentime

ery governm

use of Repre

articular cla

ust and const

ople of this

ether societie

tion and

titutions on

n habitual

sed on their

, they will be

exercise of i

were raised;

ablished thei

ntatives,

will not hav

s of the

uman policy

ents of which

ment

esentatives

ss of the

titutional

 

es

e

it

ir

ve

h

 

 

laws;

a spiri

If th

legisla

liberty

James

A goo

the ha

be bes

are de

attenti

James

and, above a

it which nou

his spirit sha

ature, as wel

y.

s Madison, F

od governme

appiness of th

st attained. S

eficient in the

ion has been

s Madison, F

all, the vigila

urishes freedo

all ever be so

ll as on the p

Federalist # 5

ent implies tw

he people; se

Some govern

e first. I scru

n paid to the

Federalist # 6

ant and man

om, and in r

o far debased

people, the p

57

wo things: fi

econdly, a k

nments are d

uple not to as

last.

62

181 

ly spirit whi

return is nour

d as to tolera

eople will b

irst, fidelity

knowledge of

eficient in b

ssert that in

ich actuates

urished by it.

ate a law not

e prepared to

to the object

f the means

oth these qu

American go

the people o

t obligatory o

o tolerate an

t of governm

by which th

ualities; most

overnments

of America -

on the

nything but

ment, which

at object can

t governmen

too little

 

-

is

n

nts

 

 

Res

An ind

affairs

to his

declin

makin

with th

emotio

indisc

wisdo

system

James

No go

respec

stabili

James

pectabil

dividual who

s without any

own unstead

ne to connect

ng their fortu

his melanch

ons than the

cretions of ea

om and stabil

matic policy

s Madison, F

overnment, a

ctable; nor b

ity.

s Madison, F

lity abro

o is observed

y plan at all,

diness and fo

t their fortun

unes out of h

holy distincti

latter, are u

ach other. Ev

lity, may cal

of its wiser

Federalist # 6

any more tha

e truly respe

Federalist # 6

oad

d to be incon

, is marked a

olly. His mo

nes with his;

his. One natio

on, perhaps,

under fewer r

very nation,

lculate on ev

neighbors.

62

an an individ

ectable witho

62

182 

nstant to his

at once by al

ore friendly n

and not a fe

on is to anot

, that the form

restraints als

consequentl

very loss whi

dual, will lon

out possessin

plans, or pe

ll prudent pe

neighbors m

ew will seize

ther what on

mer, with fe

so from takin

ly, whose aff

ich can be su

ng be respect

ng a certain

erhaps to carr

eople as a sp

ay pity him,

e the opportu

ne individual

ewer of the b

ng undue adv

ffairs betray a

ustained from

ted without b

portion of o

ry on his

eedy victim

but all will

unity of

l is to anothe

benevolent

vantage of th

a want of

m the more

being truly

rder and

 

er;

he

 

 183 

 

Rights given up upon joining society

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government; and it is equally

undeniable that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of

their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers.

John John Jay, Federalist # 2

 

 184 

 

Seat of government - exclusive legislation over

[Regarding power to] "exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such

district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the

acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; and to

exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the

States in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards,

and other needful buildings."

The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government carries its

own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union, I might say

of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it not only the public authority

might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the

members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the

government for protection in the exercise of their duty might bring on the national councils

an imputation of awe or influence equally dishonorable to the government and

dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy.

This consideration has the more weight as the gradual accumulation of public

improvements at the stationary residence of the government would be both too great a

public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles

to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The

extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an

opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State

ceding it; as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of

the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to

become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of

the government which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for

local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as

the authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to

 

 

concu

of the

James

The n

govern

proper

particu

Union

object

conce

James

ur in the cess

Constitution

s Madison, F

ecessity of a

nment, is no

rty deposited

ular State. N

n may depen

tions and scr

rned in ever

s Madison, F

ion will be d

n, every ima

Federalist # 4

a like authori

ot less eviden

d in them, re

Nor would it

d to be in an

ruples are he

ry such estab

Federalist # 4

derived from

aginable obje

43

ity over forts

nt. The publi

equire that th

be proper fo

ny degree de

ere also obvi

blishment.

43

185 

m the whole p

ection seems

s, magazines

ic money exp

hey should b

or the places

pendent on a

ated by requ

people of the

s to be obvia

s, etc., estab

pended on s

be exempt fro

on which th

a particular m

uiring the co

e State in the

ated.

lished by the

uch places,

om the autho

he security o

member of i

ncurrence of

eir adoption

e general

and the publ

ority of the

of the entire

it. All

f the States

 

lic

 

 

Sen

one br

James

It is ce

may d

Union

which

capaci

been d

princi

safegu

Alexa

It is a

govern

and pr

branch

be in a

requir

the am

James

ate; Nat

ranch of the

s Madison, F

ertainly true

destroy the n

n to the possi

h could not h

ities, wholly

done it woul

ple, and wou

uard which t

ander Hamilt

misfortune i

nments, that

rove unfaithf

h of the legis

all cases a sa

ring the conc

mbition or co

s Madison, F

ture of t

legislature i

Federalist # 5

that the Stat

national gove

ibility of inju

have been av

y from a plac

ld doubtless

uld certainly

they will enjo

ton, Federali

incident to r

t those who a

ful to their im

slative assem

alutary check

currence of t

orruption of

Federalist # 6

the

is a represen

58

te legislature

ernment. . .

ury from the

voided witho

ce in the orga

have been in

y have depriv

oy under thi

ist # 59

republican go

administer it

mportant tru

mbly distinct

k on the gov

two distinct b

one would o

62

186 

tation of citi

es, by forbea

. So far as t

e State legisl

ut excluding

anization of

nterpreted in

ved the State

s provision.

overnment, t

t may forget

ust. In this po

t from and d

vernment. It

bodies in sch

otherwise be

izens, the oth

aring the app

that construc

latures, it is a

g the States,

f the national

nto an entire

e governmen

though in a l

t their obliga

oint of view

dividing the p

doubles the

hemes of usu

sufficient.

her of the St

pointment of

ction may ex

an evil; but i

in their poli

l governmen

dereliction o

nts of that ab

less degree t

ations to thei

a senate, as

power with a

security to t

urpation or p

tates

f senators,

xpose the

it is an evil

itical

nt. If this had

of the federa

bsolute

than to other

ir constituent

a second

a first, must

the people by

perfidy, whe

 

d

al

r

ts

y

ere

 

 

Slav

It wer

not be

immed

James

It oug

twenty

loudly

James

very

re doubtless t

een postpone

diate operati

s Madison, F

ght to be con

y years may

y upbraided t

s Madison, F

to be wished

ed until the y

ion.

Federalist # 4

sidered as a

terminate fo

the barbarism

Federalist # 4

d that the pow

year 1808, or

42

great point g

orever, withi

m of modern

42

187 

wer of prohi

r rather that

gained in fav

in these Stat

n policy

ibiting the im

it had been

vor of human

es, a traffic w

mportation o

suffered to h

anity that a p

which has so

of slaves had

have

eriod of

o long and s

 

d

o

 

 

Stan

Safety

ardent

life an

contin

securi

be mo

Alexa

The in

appen

Alexa

Thus w

engine

armie

Alexa

The sm

it; and

submi

jealou

suppo

nding ar

y from extern

t love of libe

nd property i

nual danger,

ity to institut

ore safe, they

ander Hamilt

nstitutions ch

ndages of mil

ander Hamilt

we should, i

es of despoti

s.]

ander Hamilt

mallness of t

d the citizens

it to its oppre

us acquiescen

ose may be e

rmies

nal danger is

erty will, afte

incident to w

will compel

tions which h

y at length be

ton, Federali

hiefly allude

litary establi

ton, Federali

n a little tim

ism which h

ton, Federali

the army ren

s, not habitu

essions, neit

nce in a nece

xerted to the

s the most po

er a time, giv

war, the conti

l nations the

have a tende

ecome willin

ist # 8

ed to are STA

ishments.

ist # 8

me, see establ

have been the

ist # 8

nders the nat

ated to look

ther love nor

essary evil a

e prejudice o

188 

owerful dire

ve way to its

inual effort a

most attach

ency to destr

ng to run the

ANDING AR

lished in eve

e scourge of

tural strength

up to the mi

r fear the sol

and stand rea

of their rights

ector of natio

s dictates. Th

and alarm at

ed to liberty

roy their civi

e risk of bein

RMIES and

ery part of th

f the old wor

h of the com

ilitary power

ldiery; they v

ady to resist

s.

onal conduct

he violent de

ttendant on a

y to resort for

il and politic

ng less free.

the correspo

his country th

rld. [Speakin

mmunity an o

r for protect

view them w

a power whi

t. Even the

estruction of

a state of

r repose and

cal rights. To

ondent

he same

ng of standin

overmatch fo

tion, or to

with a spirit o

ich they

 

f

d

o

ng

or

of

 

 

The

faction

encroa

Alexa

garriso

perma

practic

from t

profou

expen

indust

would

Alexa

As far

those

are lea

that th

the po

Alexa

If, to o

of arm

specta

to prep

army under

n, or an occa

achments ag

ander Hamilt

ons must eit

anent corps i

cable, would

their occupa

und peace. A

nse of a frequ

trious pursui

d be as burde

ander Hamilt

r as an army

hands of wh

ast likely to

he people are

ossession of t

ander Hamilt

obviate this

mies in time o

acle which th

pare for defe

r such circum

asional mob,

gainst the uni

ton, Federali

ther be furnis

in the pay of

d be pernicio

ations and fam

And if they c

uent rotation

its of individ

ensome and

ton, Federali

may be con

hich the peop

be jealous. F

e commonly

those of who

ton, Federali

consequence

of peace, the

he world has

ense before i

mstances may

, or insurrect

ited efforts o

ist # 8

shed by occa

f the governm

ous. The mil

milies to per

could be prev

n of service,

duals, would

injurious to

ist # 24

nsidered as a

ple are most

For it is a tru

y most in dan

om they ente

ist # 25

e, it should b

e United Stat

s yet seen --

it was actual

189 

y usefully ai

tion; but it w

of the great b

asional detac

ment. The fir

itia would n

rform that m

vailed upon

and the loss

form conclu

the public as

dangerous w

likely to be

uth, which th

nger when th

ertain the lea

be resolved t

tes would th

that of a nat

lly invaded.

id the magis

will be unabl

body of the p

chments from

rst is imprac

not long, if at

most disagree

or compelle

of labor and

usive objecti

s ruinous to

weapon of p

jealous than

he experienc

he means of i

ast suspicion

to extend the

hen exhibit th

tion incapaci

As the cerem

strate to supp

le to enforce

people.

m the militia

cticable; and

t all, submit

eable duty in

d to do it, th

d disconcerti

ions to the s

private citiz

ower, it had

n in those of

e of all ages

injuring thei

n.

e prohibition

he most extr

itated by its

mony of a fo

press a small

e

a, or by

d if

to be dragge

n times of

he increased

ion of the

cheme. It

zens.

better be in

f which they

s has attested

ir rights are i

n to the raisin

raordinary

Constitution

ormal

 

l

ed

d,

in

ng

n

 

 

denun

territo

men f

prepar

All th

storm

We m

by our

create

the me

Here

would

have l

saved

The fa

permi

regula

kind. C

The A

occasi

that th

howev

acquir

Alexa

the pe

liberty

nciation of w

ories must be

for the protec

re to return i

at kind of po

must be abs

must expose o

r weakness t

ed by our cho

eans necessa

e I expect w

d be at all tim

lost us our in

.

acts which fr

t us to be the

ar and discip

Consideratio

American mil

ions, erected

he liberty of

ver great and

red and perfe

ander Hamilt

eople of Ame

y from stand

war has of lat

e waited for

ction of the S

it.

olicy by whi

stained from

our property

to seize the n

oice, depend

ary to its pre

e shall be to

mes equal to

ndependence

rom our own

e dupes of su

plined army c

ons of econo

litia, in the c

d eternal mon

their country

d valuable th

ected by dili

ton, Federali

erica may be

ding armies i

te fallen into

as the legal w

State. We mu

ch nations a

m, as contrary

and liberty

naked and de

dent on our w

eservation.

old that the m

the national

e. It cost mill

n experience

uch a sugges

can only be s

omy, not less

course of the

numents to t

y could not h

hey were. W

igence, by pe

ist # 25

e said to hav

n time of pe

190 

o disuse, the

warrant to th

ust receive t

anticipate dis

y to the genu

to the mercy

efenseless pr

will, might en

militia of the

l defense. Th

lions to the U

e forbid a rel

stion. The st

successfully

s than of stab

e late war, ha

their fame; b

have been es

ar, like most

erseverance,

ve derived an

eace.

presence of

he governme

the blow bef

stant danger

uine maxims

y of foreign i

rey, because

ndanger that

country is it

his doctrine,

United State

liance of this

teady operati

y conducted b

bility and vig

ave, by their

but the brave

stablished by

t other thing

, by time, an

n hereditary i

an enemy w

ent to begin

fore we could

and meet th

of a free go

invaders and

e we are afra

t liberty by a

ts natural bu

in substance

es that might

s kind are too

ions of war a

by a force of

gor, confirm

r valor on nu

est of them fe

y their effort

gs, is a scienc

nd by practic

impression o

within our

its levies of

d even

he gathering

overnment.

d invite them

aid that ruler

an abuse of

ulwark, and

e, had like to

t have been

o recent to

against a

f the same

m this positio

umerous

feel and know

ts alone,

ce to be

ce.

of danger to

 

m

s,

o

on.

w

 

 

Alexa

The le

two ye

new re

face o

They

of an a

confid

Alexa

the St

guardi

will co

ready

to be t

Sche

execu

by pro

betwe

Alexa

It has

of an a

once p

resour

ander Hamilt

egislature of

ears, to delib

esolution on

of their const

are not at lib

army, if they

dence.

ander Hamilt

ate legislatu

ians of the ri

onstantly ha

enough, if a

the VOICE,

emes to subv

ution. An arm

ogressive aug

een the legisl

ander Hamilt

been said th

army to the p

possessed of

rces in that v

ton, Federali

f the United S

berate upon t

n the point; a

tituents.

berty to vest

y were even

ton, Federali

ures, who wil

ights of the c

ave their atten

anything imp

but, if neces

vert the liber

my, so large a

gmentations

lature and ex

ton, Federali

hat the provis

period of tw

f a force larg

very force su

ist # 26

States will b

the propriety

and to declar

in the execu

incautious e

ist # 26

ll always be

citizens agai

ntion awake

proper appea

ssary, the AR

rties of a gre

as seriously

s; which wou

xecutive, but

ist # 26

sion which l

wo years wou

ge enough to

ufficient to e

191 

be obliged by

y of keeping

e their sense

utive departm

enough to be

not only vig

inst encroach

e to the condu

ars, to sound

RM of their

eat communi

to menace th

uld suppose n

t a continued

limits the app

uld be unava

awe the peo

nable him to

y this provisi

g a military f

e of the matt

ment perman

e willing to r

gilant but sus

hments from

duct of the na

d the alarm to

discontent.

ity require ti

hose libertie

not merely a

d conspiracy

propriation o

ailing, becaus

ople into sub

o dispense w

ion, once at

force on foot

ter by a form

nent funds fo

repose in it s

spicious and

m the federal

ational rulers

o the people,

ime to matur

es, could onl

a temporary

y for a series

of money fo

se the execu

bmission, wo

with supplies

least in ever

t; to come to

mal vote in th

or the suppor

so improper

d jealous

government

s, and will b

, and not onl

re them for

ly be formed

combination

of time.

r the suppor

utive, when

ould find

from the ac

 

ry

o a

he

rt

a

t,

e

ly

d

n

rt

cts

 

 

of leg

posses

Alexa

It is no

Union

especi

alway

Alexa

there m

the mi

laws a

Ind

requir

say th

repres

securi

If th

but in

forms

exerte

indivi

In a si

differe

govern

islature. But

ssion of a fo

ander Hamilt

ot easy to co

n as to deman

ially if we ta

ys to be coun

ander Hamilt

might somet

ilitia to prese

against those

dependent of

re a more per

hat the whole

sentatives of

ity for the rig

he representa

the exertion

of governm

ed with infin

dual State.

ingle State, i

ent parcels, s

nment in eac

t the question

rce of that m

ton, Federali

onceive a po

nd a force co

ake into our v

nted upon as

ton, Federali

times be a ne

erve the pea

e violent inv

f all other rea

remptory pro

e power of th

f the people.

ghts and priv

atives of the

n of that orig

ment, and wh

itely better p

if the person

subdivisions

ch, can take

n again recu

magnitude in

ist # 26

ssibility that

onsiderable e

view the aid

a valuable a

ist # 26

ecessity to m

ce of the com

asions of the

asonings upo

ovision agai

he proposed

This is the e

vileges of the

people betra

ginal right of

ich against t

prospect of s

ns intrusted w

s, or districts

no regular m

192 

urs, upon wh

n time of pea

t dangers so

enough to pl

d to be derive

and powerful

make use of a

mmunity and

em which am

on the subjec

nst military

government

essential, and

e people wh

ay their cons

f self-defense

the usurpatio

success than

with supreme

s of which it

measures for

at pretense c

ace?

formidable

lace our libe

ed from the m

l auxiliary.

a force const

d to maintain

mount to insu

ct, it is a full

establishme

t is to be in t

d, after all, th

hich is attaina

stituents, the

e which is p

ons of the na

against thos

e power beco

consists, ha

r defense. Th

could he be p

can assail th

erties in the l

militia, whic

tituted differ

n the just au

urrections an

l answer to th

ents in time o

the hands of

the only effic

able in civil

ere is then no

aramount to

ational rulers

se of the rule

ome usurper

aving no dist

he citizens m

put in

he whole

least jeopard

ch ought

rently from

uthority of th

nd rebellions

hose who

of peace to

f the

cacious

society.

o resource le

o all positive

s may be

ers of an

rs, the

tinct

must rush

 

dy,

he

s.

eft

 

 193 

 

tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their

courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often

crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult

will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more

easy will it be to defeat their early efforts.

Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the

military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the

part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence

of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.

The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased

extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend

them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the

artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more

competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny.

But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the

masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general

government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments,

and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by

throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights

are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How

wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage

which can never be too highly prized!

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State governments

will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public

liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses

so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large.

The legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a

distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power and the confidence of the people,

 

 

they c

resour

States

The

utility

agains

should

head w

the op

was le

We

by the

a large

of the

When

capab

who a

for the

The ap

the res

Alexa

If a w

to be u

of the

over th

and th

can at once a

rces of the co

s, and unite t

great extent

y against the

st the enterpr

d be able to q

with fresh fo

pposition in o

eft to itself, i

should recol

e resources o

e army; and

community

n will the tim

le of erectin

are in a situat

eir own defe

pprehension

sources of ar

ander Hamilt

ell-regulated

under the reg

national sec

he militia in

he pretext to

adopt a regul

ommunity. T

their commo

t of the coun

attacks of a

rises of amb

quell the res

orces. The ad

others; and t

its efforts wo

llect that the

of the countr

as the mean

y will proport

me arrive that

g a despotism

tion, through

ense, with all

n may be con

rgument and

ton, Federali

d militia be t

gulation and

curity. If stan

n the same bo

such unfrien

lar plan of op

They can rea

n forces for

ntry is a furth

foreign pow

bitious rulers

sistance of on

dvantages ob

the moment

ould be rene

e extent of th

y. For a long

ns of doing th

tionably incr

t the federal

m over the g

h the medium

l the celerity

nsidered as a

d reasoning.

ist # 28

the most natu

d at the dispo

nding armies

ody ought, a

ndly instituti

194 

pposition, in

adily commu

the protectio

her security.

wer. And it w

s in the natio

ne State, the

btained in on

the part whi

wed, and its

he military fo

g time to com

his increase,

rease.

government

great body of

m of their St

y, regularity,

a disease, for

ural defense

osal of that b

s are dangero

s far as poss

ions.

n which they

unicate with

on of their c

We have alr

would have p

onal councils

e distant Stat

ne place mus

ich had been

s resistance r

orce must, at

me it will no

the populat

t can raise an

f the people

tate governm

and system

r which there

e of a free co

body which i

ous to libert

sible, to take

y can combin

each other i

common libe

ready experi

precisely the

s. If the feder

tes would be

st be abando

n reduced to

revive.

t all events,

ot be possibl

tion and natu

nd maintain

of an immen

ments, to take

m of independ

e can be foun

ountry, it oug

is constituted

ty, an efficac

e away the in

ne all the

in the differe

erty.

ienced its

same effect

ral army

e able to mak

ned to subdu

submission

be regulated

e to maintain

ural strength

an army

nse empire,

e measures

dent nations?

nd no cure in

ght certainly

d the guardia

cious power

nducement

 

ent

t

ke

ue

d

n

?

n

y

an

 

 

If the

call fo

the em

oblige

of pre

In o

of the

Const

the ex

his on

Alexa

The sa

be des

call ou

the for

It wou

its dec

office

that a

would

or of a

It bein

POSS

has be

the mi

was in

make

federal gove

or the militar

mployment o

ed to recur to

venting its e

rder to cast a

Union, it ha

titution for re

xecution of h

nly auxiliary.

ander Hamilt

ame persons

spotic and un

ut the POSS

rmer exceed

uld be as abs

clared power

rs who may

right to enac

d involve tha

abolishing th

ng therefore

SE COMITA

een drawn fr

ilitia, is as un

ntended to be

use of it wh

ernment can

ry arm in sup

of a different

o the latter. T

existence tha

an odium up

as been rema

equiring the

his duty; whe

.

ton, Federali

s who tell us

nlimited info

E COMITA

ds it.

surd to doubt

rs would inc

be intrusted

ct laws nece

at of varying

he trial by ju

evident that

ATUS is entir

rom it, in its

ncandid as i

e the sole in

en necessary

command th

pport of the

t kind of forc

To render an

an a thousand

pon the powe

arked that th

aid of the PO

ence it has b

ist # 29

in one breat

orm us in the

ATUS. The la

t that a right

clude that of

d with the ex

ssary and pr

the rules of

ury in cases r

t the supposi

rely destitute

application

t is illogical

strument of

y?

195 

he aid of the

civil magistr

ce. If it cann

n army unnec

d prohibition

er of calling

ere is nowhe

OSSE COM

een inferred

th that the po

e next that it

atter, fortuna

t to pass all l

requiring th

ecution of th

roper for the

f descent and

relating to it.

tion of a wa

e of color, it

to the author

. What reaso

authority, m

e militia in th

rate, it can th

not avail itsel

cessary will

ns upon pape

forth the mi

ere any prov

MITATUS to

d that military

owers of the

t has not auth

ately, is as m

laws necessa

he assistance

hose laws as

imposition

d of the alien

.

ant of power

t will follow

rity of the fe

on could ther

merely becau

hose emerge

he better dis

lf of the form

be a more c

er.

ilitia to exec

vision in the

assist the m

y force was

e federal gov

hority suffic

much short of

ary and prop

of the citize

s it would be

and collectio

nation of lan

to require th

that the con

ederal govern

re be to infer

use there is a

encies which

spense with

mer, it will b

ertain metho

cute the laws

proposed

magistrate in

intended to

vernment wil

cient even to

f the truth as

per to execute

ens to the

e to believe

on of taxes

ded property

he aid of the

nclusion whic

nment over

r that force

power to

 

h

be

od

s

be

ll

s

e

y,

ch

 

 

Alexa

"The p

injurio

milita

nor ev

To ob

under

might

charac

public

It wou

which

millio

so con

succee

with r

order

in the

"Bu

misch

digest

militia

of a se

case o

of wel

requir

ander Hamilt

project of di

ous if it were

ary movemen

ven a month,

lige the grea

arms for the

be necessar

cter of a wel

c inconvenie

uld form an a

h, calculating

on pounds. T

nsiderable an

ed, because

respect to the

to see that th

course of a

t though the

hievous or im

ted plan shou

a. The attent

elect corps o

of need. By t

ll-trained mi

re it.

ton, Federali

sciplining al

e capable of

nts is a busin

, that will su

at body of th

e purpose of

ry to acquire

ll-regulated m

ence and loss

annual dedu

g upon the pr

To attempt a t

n extent wou

it would not

e people at la

his be not ne

year.

scheme of d

mpracticable;

uld, as soon

tion of the go

of moderate s

thus circums

ilitia ready to

ist # 29

ll the militia

f being carrie

ness that requ

uffice for the

he yeomanry

f going throu

the degree o

militia, woul

s.

ction from th

resent numb

thing which

uld be unwis

t long be end

arge than to

eglected, it w

disciplining

; yet it is a m

as possible,

overnment o

size, upon su

scribing the p

o take the fie

196 

of the Unite

ed into execu

uires time an

attainment o

and of the o

ugh military

of perfection

ld be a real g

he productiv

bers of the pe

would abrid

e: and the ex

dured. Little

have them p

will be neces

the whole na

matter of the

be adopted

ought particu

uch principle

plan, it will b

eld wheneve

ed States is a

ution. A tole

nd practice.

of it.

other classes

exercises an

n which wou

grievance to

ve labor of th

eople, would

dge the mass

xperiment, if

more can re

properly arm

ssary to assem

ation must b

utmost impo

for the prop

ularly to be d

es as will rea

be possible t

er the defens

as futile as it

erable expert

It is not a da

s of the citize

nd evolutions

uld entitle th

the people a

he country to

d not fall far

s of labor an

f made, coul

easonably be

med and equi

mble them o

be abandoned

ortance that

er establishm

directed to th

ally fit it for

to have an ex

se of the Stat

t would be

tness in

ay, nor a wee

ens to be

s, as often as

em to the

and a serious

o an amount

short of a

d industry to

ld not

e aimed at

ipped; and in

once or twice

d as

a well-

ment of the

he formation

service in

xcellent bod

te shall

 

ek

s

s

t

o

n

e

n

dy

 

 

This w

at any

be for

all inf

rights

devise

Alexa

There

the mi

the na

our ne

daily m

feeling

Alexa

If ther

militia

undert

slaver

who h

imagin

an abu

Alexa

will not only

y time oblige

rmidable to t

ferior to them

and those o

ed for a stand

ander Hamilt

is somethin

ilitia that on

ame of comm

eighbors, our

mingling wi

gs, sentimen

ander Hamilt

re should be

a? If there sh

take a distan

ry upon a par

had meditate

ned intrench

used and inc

ander Hamilt

y lessen the c

e the governm

the liberties o

m in disciplin

f their fellow

ding army, a

ton, Federali

ng so far-fetc

e is at a loss

mon sense ar

r fellow-citiz

th the rest of

nts, habits, a

ton, Federali

an army to b

hould be no

nt and distres

rt of their co

d so foolish

hments of po

censed peopl

ton, Federali

call for milit

ment to form

of the people

ne and the u

w-citizens. T

and the best p

ist # 29

ched and so e

s whether to

re our fears t

zens? What

f their count

and interests

ist # 29

be made use

army, whith

ssing expedi

ountrymen, d

as well as so

ower, and to

e?

ist # 29

197 

tary establish

m an army of

e while there

se of arms, w

This appears

possible sec

extravagant

treat it with

to end if we m

shadow of d

trymen and w

?

e of as the en

her would the

ition for the p

direct their c

o wicked a p

make them a

hments, but

f any magnit

e is a large b

who stand re

to me the on

curity agains

in the idea o

gravity or w

may not trus

danger can th

who particip

ngine of desp

e militia, irri

purpose of r

ourse, but to

project to cru

an example

if circumsta

tude that arm

body of citiz

eady to defen

nly substitut

t it, if it shou

of danger to

with raillery

st our sons, o

here be from

pate with them

potism, what

itated at bein

riveting the c

o the seat of

ush them in

of the just v

ances should

my can never

zens, little if

nd their own

te that can be

uld exist."

liberty from

... Where in

our brothers

m men who a

m in the sam

t need of the

ng required t

chains of

the tyrants,

their

vengeance of

 

d

r

at

n

e

m

,

are

me

e

to

f

 

 

A stan

provis

conseq

precau

rashly

exert a

which

James

[Spea

safety

liberti

James

The on

vision

force

been e

of this

That t

succes

unifor

establ

patien

prepar

dream

like th

nding force,

sion. On the

quences may

ution. A wis

y preclude its

all its pruden

h may be inau

s Madison, F

aking of the

y are happily

ies.

s Madison, F

nly refuge le

nary supposit

for the proje

employed to

s danger.

the people an

ssion of men

rmly and sys

ishment; tha

ntly behold th

red to burst o

ms of a delirio

he sober appr

therefore, is

smallest sca

y be fatal. O

e nation will

self from any

nce in dimin

uspicious to

Federalist # 4

navy:] The

such as can

Federalist # 4

eft for those

tion that the

ects of ambit

little purpos

nd the States

n ready to be

stematically

at the govern

he gathering

on their own

ous jealousy

rehensions o

s a dangerou

ale it has its i

On any scale i

l combine al

y resource w

nishing both

its liberties.

41

batteries mo

n never be tur

41

who prophe

federal gove

tion. The rea

se indeed, if

s should, for

etray both; th

pursue some

nments and t

g storm and c

n heads must

y, or the misj

of genuine p

198 

s, at the sam

inconvenien

it is an objec

ll these cons

which may be

the necessity

.

ost capable o

rned by a pe

esy the down

ernment may

asonings con

f it could be n

a sufficient

hat the traito

e fixed plan

he people of

continue to s

t appear to e

judged exagg

atriotism.

me time that i

nces. On an e

ct of laudabl

iderations; a

ecome essen

y and the da

of repelling f

erfidious gov

nfall of the S

y previously

ntained in the

necessary no

period of tim

ors should, th

for the exten

f the States s

supply the m

everyone mo

gerations of

it may be a n

extensive sca

le circumspe

and, whilst it

ntial to its sa

anger of reso

foreign enter

vernment aga

State governm

y accumulate

ese papers m

ow to dispro

me, elect an

hroughout th

nsion of the

should silent

materials unti

ore like the in

f a counterfei

necessary,

ale its

ection and

t does not

afety, will

orting to one

rprises on ou

ainst our

ments is the

e a military

must have

ove the realit

uninterrupte

his period,

military

tly and

il it should b

ncoherent

it zeal, than

 

ur

ty

ed

be

 

 199 

 

Extravagant as the supposition is, let it, however, be made. Let a regular army, fully equal

to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the

federal government: still it would not be going too far to say that the State governments

with the people on their side would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to

which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country

does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part

of the number able to bear arms.

This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or

thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million

of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves,

fighting for their common liberties and united and conducted by governments possessing

their affections and confidence.

It may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by

such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the late successful

resistance of this country against the British arms will be most inclined to deny the

possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over

the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to

which the people are attached and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a

barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple

government of any form can admit of.

Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are

carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the

people with arms. And it is not certain that with this aid alone they would not be able to

shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local

governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the

national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia by these governments and

attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance that

the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions

which surround it.

 

 200 

 

Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion that they would

be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession than the

debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their

oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever

reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment by a blind and tame

submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.

James Madison, Federalist # 46

 

 

Statgove 

The d

or an a

object

organi

necess

author

confed

The p

makes

repres

impor

the ter

Alexa

It is ce

may d

Union

which

capaci

If this

the fed

absolu

Alexa

te goverernmen

efinition of a

association o

ts of the fede

ization of th

sity, for loca

rity of the un

deracy.

proposed Co

s them const

sentation in t

rtant portions

rms, with the

ander Hamilt

ertainly true

destroy the n

n to the possi

h could not h

ities, wholly

had been do

deral princip

ute safeguard

ander Hamilt

rnmentsnt

a confederat

of two or mo

eral authority

e members b

al purposes;

nion, it woul

nstitution, so

tituent parts

the Senate, a

s of sovereig

e idea of a fe

ton, Federali

that the Stat

national gove

ibility of inju

have been av

y from a plac

one it would

ple, and wou

d which they

ton, Federali

need vo

te republic se

ore states int

y are mere m

be not abolis

though it sho

ld still be, in

o far from im

of the nation

and leaves in

gn power. Th

ederal gover

ist # 9

te legislature

ernment. . .

ury from the

voided witho

ce in the orga

d doubtless h

uld certainly

y will enjoy

ist # 59

201 

oice in f

eems simply

to one state.

matters of dis

shed; so long

ould be in pe

n fact and in

mplying an a

nal sovereign

n their posses

his fully corr

rnment.

es, by forbea

. So far as t

e State legisl

ut excluding

anization of

have been int

have depriv

under this pr

federal/n

y to be "an a

The extent,

scretion. So

g as it exists

erfect subord

theory, an a

abolition of t

nty, by allow

ssion certain

responds, in

aring the app

that construc

latures, it is a

g the States,

f the national

terpreted int

ved the State

rovision.

national

ssemblage o

modification

long as the

, by a consti

dination to t

association o

the State gov

wing them a

n exclusive a

n every ration

pointment of

ction may ex

an evil; but i

in their poli

l governmen

to an entire d

government

l

of societies,"

ns, and

separate

itutional

the general

f states, or a

vernments,

direct

and very

nal import o

f senators,

xpose the

it is an evil

itical

nt.

dereliction o

ts of that

 

a

f

f

 

 202 

 

States' rights

I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they [the states]

would, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and

unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to abridge

them in the exercise of it would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any

article or clause of its Constitution.

An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would

imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them

would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims

only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the

rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively

delegated to the United States.

This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty would only exist in

three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the

Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another

prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority

to the Union to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally

contradictory and repugnant.

I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble

it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a

concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences in the policy of any

branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in

point of constitutional authority.

The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the

sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly

divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor is not only a theoretical

consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument

 

 

which

notwit

pointe

reside

The te

circum

interp

refute

Alexa

Was, t

the pr

not th

govern

a certa

sovere

We ha

kings,

shape

institu

that th

to be p

be fitt

James

the St

the fed

h contains th

thstanding th

ed care in tho

e in the State

enth section

mstance is a

retation out

s every hypo

ander Hamilt

then, the Am

ecious blood

at the people

nments of th

ain extent of

eignty?

ave heard of

, not kings fo

that the soli

utions of a di

he public goo

pursued; and

ted for the at

s Madison, F

ates will reta

deral head; a

e articles of

he affirmativ

ose cases wh

es to insert ne

of the first a

clear indicat

of the body

othesis to the

ton, Federali

merican Revo

d of thousand

e of America

he individual

f power and

f the impious

or the people

id happiness

ifferent form

od, the real w

d that no form

ttainment of

Federalist # 4

ain all pre-ex

and that this

the propose

ve grants of

here it was d

egative claus

article consis

tion of the se

of the act, w

e contrary.

ist # 32

olution effec

ds spilt, and

a should enjo

l States, that

be arrayed w

s doctrine in

e. Is the sam

of the peop

m? It is too ea

welfare of th

m of govern

this object.

45

xisting autho

exclusive de

203 

d Constitutio

general auth

deemed impr

ses prohibiti

sts altogether

ense of the c

which justifie

cted, was the

the hard-ear

oy peace, lib

t particular m

with certain d

the old worl

me doctrine to

le is to be sa

arly for polit

he great body

nment whatev

orities which

elegation can

on. We there

horities, there

roper that the

ing the exerc

r of such pro

convention, a

es the positio

e American C

rned substan

berty, and sa

municipal est

dignities and

rld, that the p

o be revived

acrificed to t

ticians to pre

y of the peop

ver has any o

h may not be

n only exist

e find that,

e has been th

e like author

cise of them

ovisions. Th

and furnishe

on I have ad

Confederacy

nce of millio

afety, but tha

tablishments

d attributes o

people were

d in the new,

the views of

esume on ou

ple, is the su

other value t

e exclusively

in one of thr

he most

rities should

by the State

his

es a rule of

dvanced and

y formed, wa

ons lavished,

at the

s, might enjo

of

made for

in another

f political

ur forgetting

upreme objec

than as it ma

y delegated t

ree cases:

 

es.

as

,

oy

ct

ay

to

 

 

where

particu

to the

the St

Alexa

e an exclusiv

ular authorit

States; or w

ates would b

ander Hamilt

ve authority i

ty is granted

where an auth

be utterly inc

ton, Federali

is, in express

to the Union

hority is gran

compatible.

ist # 82

204 

s terms, gran

n and the ex

nted to a Uni

nted to the U

xercise of a li

ion with wh

Union; or wh

ike authority

ich a similar

here a

y is prohibite

r authority in

 

ed

n

 

 

Stat

fede

the St

guardi

will co

ready

to be t

Alexa

there m

the mi

laws a

Ind

requir

say th

repres

securi

If th

but in

forms

exerte

indivi

In a si

differe

govern

tes to gu

eral/nati

ate legislatu

ians of the ri

onstantly ha

enough, if a

the VOICE,

ander Hamilt

might somet

ilitia to prese

against those

dependent of

re a more per

hat the whole

sentatives of

ity for the rig

he representa

the exertion

of governm

ed with infin

dual State.

ingle State, i

ent parcels, s

nment in eac

uard aga

ional go

ures, who wil

ights of the c

ave their atten

anything imp

but, if neces

ton, Federali

times be a ne

erve the pea

e violent inv

f all other rea

remptory pro

e power of th

f the people.

ghts and priv

atives of the

n of that orig

ment, and wh

itely better p

if the person

subdivisions

ch, can take

ainst enc

overnme

ll always be

citizens agai

ntion awake

proper appea

ssary, the AR

ist # 26

ecessity to m

ce of the com

asions of the

asonings upo

ovision agai

he proposed

This is the e

vileges of the

e people betr

ginal right of

ich against t

prospect of s

ns intrusted w

s, or districts

no regular m

205 

croachm

ent

not only vig

inst encroach

e to the condu

ars, to sound

RM of their

make use of a

mmunity and

em which am

on the subjec

nst military

government

essential, and

e people wh

ray their con

f self-defense

the usurpatio

success than

with supreme

s of which it

measures for

ments of

gilant but sus

hments from

duct of the na

d the alarm to

discontent.

a force const

d to maintain

mount to insu

ct, it is a full

establishme

t is to be in t

d, after all, th

hich is attaina

stituents, the

e which is p

ons of the na

against thos

e power beco

consists, ha

r defense. Th

f

spicious and

m the federal

ational rulers

o the people,

tituted differ

n the just au

urrections an

l answer to th

ents in time o

the hands of

the only effic

able in civil

ere is then no

aramount to

ational rulers

se of the rule

ome usurper

aving no dist

he citizens m

d jealous

government

s, and will b

, and not onl

rently from

uthority of th

nd rebellions

hose who

of peace to

f the

cacious

society.

o resource le

o all positive

s may be

ers of an

rs, the

tinct

must rush

 

t,

e

ly

he

s.

eft

 

 206 

 

tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their

courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often

crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult

will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more

easy will it be to defeat their early efforts.

Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the

military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the

part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence

of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.

The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased

extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend

them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the

artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more

competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny.

But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the

masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general

government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments,

and these will have the same disposition towards the general government.

The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.

If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of

redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an

advantage which can never be too highly prized!

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State governments

will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public

liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses

so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The

legislatures will have better means of information.

 

 

They

and th

which

comm

protec

The

utility

agains

If the

would

be aba

reduce

revive

We

by the

a large

of the

When

capab

who a

for the

The ap

the res

Alexa

Were

the St

can discover

he confidenc

h they can co

municate with

ction of their

e great exten

y against the

st the enterpr

federal army

d be able to m

andoned to s

ed to submis

e.

e should reco

e resources o

e army; and

community

n will the tim

le of erectin

are in a situat

eir own defe

pprehension

sources of ar

ander Hamilt

it admitted,

ate governm

r the danger

e of the peop

ombine all th

h each other

r common lib

nt of the coun

attacks of a

rises of amb

y should be a

make head w

subdue the op

ssion was lef

ollect that the

of the countr

as the mean

y will proport

me arrive that

g a despotism

tion, through

ense, with all

n may be con

rgument and

ton, Federali

however, th

ments to exten

at a distance

ple, they can

he resources

in the differ

berty.

ntry is a furt

foreign pow

bitious rulers

able to quell

with fresh for

pposition in

ft to itself, it

e extent of th

y. For a long

ns of doing th

tionably incr

t the federal

m over the g

h the medium

l the celerity

nsidered as a

d reasoning.

ist # 28

hat the federa

nd its power

207 

e; and posse

n at once ado

of the comm

rent States, a

ther security

wer. And it w

s in the natio

l the resistan

rces. The ad

others; and

ts efforts wou

he military f

g time to com

his increase,

rease.

government

great body of

m of their St

y, regularity,

a disease, for

al governme

r beyond the

ssing all the

opt a regular

munity. They

and unite the

. We have al

would have p

onal councils

nce of one St

dvantages ob

the moment

uld be renew

force must, a

me it will no

the populat

t can raise an

f the people

tate governm

and system

r which there

nt may feel

e due limits,

e organs of c

r plan of opp

y can readily

eir common

lready exper

precisely the

s.

tate, the dist

btained in on

t the part wh

wed, and its r

at all events,

ot be possibl

tion and natu

nd maintain

of an immen

ments, to take

m of independ

e can be foun

an equal dis

the latter wo

ivil power

position, in

y

forces for th

rienced its

same effect

ant States

e place must

hich had been

resistance

be regulated

e to maintain

ural strength

an army

nse empire,

e measures

dent nations?

nd no cure in

sposition wit

ould still hav

 

he

t

t

n

d

n

?

n

th

ve

 

 208 

 

the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State,

though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State, and

should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately

and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone.

The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would

but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be

prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be

resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable

measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom

fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case,

the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand.

The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with

the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the

embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such

occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a

large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States

happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would

hardly be willing to encounter.

But ambitious encroachments of the federal government on the authority of the State

governments would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only.

They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common

cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One

spirit would animate and conduct the whole.

The same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was

produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be

voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as

was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal

government to such an extremity?

 

 

James

The on

vision

force

been e

of this

That t

succes

unifor

establ

patien

prepar

dream

like th

howev

Let a r

entirel

that th

The h

carried

one tw

This p

thirty

of citi

fightin

their a

circum

s Madison, F

nly refuge le

nary supposit

for the proje

employed to

s danger.

the people an

ssion of men

rmly and sys

ishment; tha

ntly behold th

red to burst o

ms of a delirio

he sober appr

ver, be made

regular army

ly at the dev

he State gove

ighest numb

d in any cou

wenty-fifth p

proportion w

thousand me

izens with ar

ng for their c

affections an

mstanced cou

Federalist # 4

eft for those

tion that the

ects of ambit

little purpos

nd the States

n ready to be

stematically

at the govern

he gathering

on their own

ous jealousy

rehensions o

e.

y, fully equa

votion of the

ernments wi

ber to which,

untry does no

part of the nu

would not yie

en. To these

rms in their h

common libe

nd confidenc

uld ever be c

46

who prophe

federal gove

tion. The rea

se indeed, if

s should, for

etray both; th

pursue some

nments and t

g storm and c

n heads must

y, or the misj

of genuine p

al to the reso

federal gove

th the peopl

, according t

ot exceed on

umber able to

eld, in the Un

e would be op

hands, office

erties and un

ce. It may we

conquered by

209 

esy the down

ernment may

asonings con

f it could be n

a sufficient

hat the traito

e fixed plan

he people of

continue to s

t appear to e

judged exagg

atriotism. Ex

urces of the

ernment: stil

e on their sid

to the best co

ne hundredth

o bear arms.

nited States,

pposed a mi

ered by men

nited and con

ell be doubte

y such a pro

nfall of the S

y previously

ntained in the

necessary no

period of tim

ors should, th

for the exten

f the States s

supply the m

everyone mo

gerations of

xtravagant a

country, be

ll it would n

de would be

omputation,

h part of the w

.

an army of

ilitia amount

chosen from

nducted by g

ed whether a

oportion of re

State governm

y accumulate

ese papers m

ow to dispro

me, elect an

hroughout th

nsion of the

should silent

materials unti

ore like the in

f a counterfei

as the suppos

formed; and

not be going

e able to repe

a standing a

whole numb

more than tw

ting to near h

m among the

governments

a militia thus

egular troop

ments is the

e a military

must have

ove the realit

uninterrupte

his period,

military

tly and

il it should b

ncoherent

it zeal, than

sition is, let i

d let it be

too far to sa

el the danger

army can be

ber of souls;

wenty-five o

half a millio

emselves,

s possessing

s

s. Those wh

 

ty

ed

be

it,

ay

r.

or

or

n

o

 

 

are be

arms w

Beside

almos

are att

enterp

form c

Notwi

carried

people

And it

But w

thems

appoin

militia

Europ

Let us

be les

debase

oppre

reduce

submi

James

The tr

tempo

few ye

est acquainte

will be most

es the advan

st every othe

tached and b

prises of amb

can admit of

ithstanding t

d as far as th

e with arms.

t is not certa

were the peop

selves, who c

nted out of th

a, it may be

pe would be

s not insult th

s able to def

ed subjects o

ssors. Let us

e themselves

ission to the

s Madison, F

rue question

orary regulat

ears, and a h

ed with the la

t inclined to

ntage of bein

r nation, the

by which the

bition, more

f.

the military e

he public res

ain that with

ple to posses

could collect

he militia by

affirmed wit

speedily ove

he free and g

fend the righ

of arbitrary p

s rather no lo

s to the nece

long train o

Federalist # 4

to be decide

tion, be dang

hundred or tw

ate successfu

deny the pos

ng armed, wh

e existence o

e militia offic

insurmounta

establishmen

sources will b

this aid alon

ss the additio

t the nationa

y these gove

th the greate

erturned in s

gallant citize

hts of which

power would

onger insult t

essity of mak

f insidious m

46

ed, then, is w

gerous to the

wo hundred

210 

ul resistance

ssibility of it

hich the Ame

f subordinat

cers are appo

able than an

nts in the sev

bear, the gov

ne they woul

onal advanta

al will and di

rnments and

est assurance

pite of the le

ens of Ameri

they would b

d be to rescu

them with th

king the expe

measures wh

whether the s

e public liber

for a few mo

e of this coun

t.

ericans poss

te governmen

ointed, form

ny which a si

veral kingdo

vernments a

ld not be abl

ages of local

irect the nati

d attached bo

e that the thro

egions which

ica with the

be in actual

ue theirs from

he suppositio

eriment by a

hich must pre

smallness of

rty? Whether

ore, be a safe

ntry against t

sess over the

nts, to which

ms a barrier a

imple govern

oms of Europ

are afraid to t

le to shake o

government

ional force, a

oth to them a

one of every

h surround it

suspicion th

possession t

m the hands

on that they

a blind and ta

ecede and pr

f the number

r sixty-five m

fe depositary

the British

e people of

h the people

gainst the

nment of any

pe, which ar

trust the

off their yoke

ts chosen by

and of office

and to the

y tyranny in

t.

hat they wou

than the

of their

can ever

ame

roduce it.

r, as a

members for

y for a limite

 

y

re

es.

y

ers

uld

r a

d

 

 

and w

give a

have r

actuat

charac

their p

and ev

dispos

the St

many

a cons

unable

States

of the

to betr

fuller

makes

from t

the lib

Const

The ex

person

Federa

We m

encroa

well-guarded

a negative an

received with

tes the State

cter of every

present temp

very second

sed to form a

ate legislatu

means of co

spiracy of th

e to conceive

s, any sixty-f

people at la

ray the solem

population o

s no part of m

the probable

berties of Am

titution. Jam

xecutive and

ns employed

alist # 84

may safely rel

achments of

power of leg

nswer to this

h regard to t

legislatures,

y class of citi

per, or under

year repeat t

and pursue a

ures, which m

ounteracting

he latter again

e that there a

five or a hun

arge, who wo

mn trust com

of our countr

my pretensio

e state of them

merica canno

mes Madison

d legislative

d in every de

ly on the dis

f the national

gislating for

question, w

the present g

, and the prin

izens. I am u

any circums

the choice o

a scheme of t

must feel so m

the federal l

nst the libert

are at this tim

ndred men ca

ould either d

mmitted to th

ry may prod

ons. But judg

m within a m

ot be unsafe

n, Federalist #

bodies of ea

epartment of

sposition of t

l authority.

211 

the United S

without first o

genius of the

nciples whic

unable to con

stances whic

of, sixty-five

tyranny or tr

many motive

legislature, w

ties of their c

me, or can b

apable of rec

desire or dare

hem. What ch

duce requires

ging from th

moderate per

in the numb

# 55

ach State wil

f the national

the State leg

Alexander H

States? I mu

obliterating e

people of A

ch are incorp

nceive that th

ch can speed

or a hundre

reachery. I a

es to watch a

would fail ei

common con

e in any sho

commending

e, within the

hange of circ

s a prophetic

he circumstan

riod of time,

ber of hands

ll be so many

l administrat

gislatures to e

Hamilton, Fe

ust own that

every impres

America, the

porated with

the people of

dily happen,

d men who w

am unable to

and which p

ither to detec

nstituents. I

ort time, in th

g themselves

short space

cumstances

c spirit to dec

nces now be

, I must pron

proposed by

y sentinels o

tion Alexan

erect barrier

ederalist # 85

I could not

ssion which

spirit which

the political

f America, in

will choose

would be

o conceive th

possess so

ct or to defea

am equally

he United

s to the choic

of two year

time, and a

clare, which

efore us, and

nounce that

y the federal

over the

nder Hamilto

rs against the

5

 

I

h

l

n

,

hat

at

ce

rs,

h

d

on,

e

 

 212 

 

Suffrage; voters qualifications

Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor;

not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more

than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great

body of the people of the United States.

James Madison, Federalist # 57

 

 

Suin

It is in

withou

exemp

every

of the

ideal.

Alexa

The co

sovere

indepe

Alexa

ng a sov

nherent in th

ut its consen

ption, as one

State in the

convention,

ander Hamilt

ontracts betw

eign, and hav

endent of the

ander Hamilt

vereign

he nature of s

nt. This is the

e of the attrib

Union. Unle

, it will rema

ton, Federali

ween a natio

ve no preten

e sovereign w

ton, Federali

sovereignty n

e general sen

butes of sove

ess, therefor

ain with the

ist # 81

on and indivi

nsions to a co

will.

ist # 81

213 

not to be am

nse and the g

ereignty, is n

e, there is a

States and th

iduals are on

ompulsive fo

menable to th

general prac

now enjoyed

surrender of

he danger in

nly binding o

orce. They c

he suit of an i

ctice of mank

d by the gove

f this immun

ntimated mus

on the consc

confer no righ

individual

kind; and the

ernment of

nity in the pl

st be merely

ience of the

ht of action

 

e

an

 

 

Tax

It is ev

experi

consid

to enf

disapp

Alexa

In so o

much

Ameri

kind, f

this la

In Am

on suc

Alexa

The g

Alexa

... per

way th

Alexa

xes

vident from

ience we hav

derable sums

force the coll

pointed, and

ander Hamilt

opulent a na

more tolerab

ica, far the g

from impost

atter descript

merica it is ev

ch duties.

ander Hamilt

enius of the

ander Hamilt

sonal proper

han by the im

ander Hamilt

the state of t

ve had on th

s by direct ta

lection have

the treasurie

ton, Federali

ation as that o

ble, and from

greatest part

ts and from e

tion.

vident that w

ton, Federali

people will

ton, Federali

rty is too pre

mperceptible

ton, Federali

the country,

e point itself

axation. Tax

in vain been

es of the Sta

ist # 12

of Britain, w

m the vigor o

of the nation

excises. Duti

we must a lon

ist # 12

ill brook the

ist # 12

ecarious and

e agency of t

ist # 12

214 

from the ha

f that it is im

x laws have i

n tried; the p

ates have rem

where direct t

of the govern

nal revenue i

ies on impor

ng time depe

e inquisitive

invisible a f

taxes on con

abits of the p

mpracticable

in vain been

public expect

mained empt

taxes from s

nment, much

is derived fr

rted articles

end for the m

and peremp

fund to be la

nsumption.

people, from

to raise any

multiplied;

tation has be

ty.

superior wea

h more pract

rom taxes of

form a large

means of rev

ptory spirit o

aid hold of in

the

very

new method

een uniforml

alth must be

ticable than

f the indirect

e branch of

venue chiefly

f excise law

n any other

 

ds

ly

in

t

y

ws.

 

 

[Spea

patrol

Alexa

A nati

Alexa

Person

subjec

Alexa

It is a

nature

withou

this ob

not alw

eluded

proper

Alexa

... ther

one sh

aking of tax

s are necessa

ander Hamilt

ion cannot lo

ander Hamilt

nal estate (as

cted to large

ander Hamilt

signal advan

e a security a

ut defeating

bject, the say

ways make f

d; and the pr

r and moder

ander Hamilt

re must be in

hape or anoth

collection pa

arily armed

ton, Federali

ong exist wit

ton, Federali

s has been b

contribution

ton, Federali

ntage of taxe

against exces

the end prop

ying is as jus

four." If duti

roduct to the

rate bounds.

ton, Federali

nterwoven in

her.

atrols:] The

would be int

ist # 12

thout revenu

ist # 12

efore remark

ns by any oth

ist # 12

es on articles

ss. They pre

posed -- that

st as it is wit

ies are too hi

e treasury is n

ist # 21

n the frame o

215 

arbitrary and

tolerable in

ue.

ked), from th

her means th

s of consump

scribe their o

t is, an exten

tty that, "in p

igh, they les

not so great

of the govern

d vexatious

a free countr

he difficulty

han by taxes

ption that th

own limit, w

nsion of the r

political arith

ssen the cons

as when the

nment a gen

powers with

ry.

y of tracing it

on consump

hey contain i

which cannot

revenue. Wh

hmetic, two

sumption; th

ey are confin

neral power o

h which the

t, cannot be

ption.

n their own

t be exceede

hen applied t

and two do

he collection

ned within

of taxation, i

 

ed

to

is

in

 

 

Mo

which

compl

the res

ingred

ensue

eligibl

atroph

Alexa

in the

will b

It mig

least b

Alexa

The ta

be sub

be ma

indeed

consu

Alexa

It is no

regula

establ

oney is, with

h sustains its

lete power, t

sources of th

dient in every

: either the p

le mode of s

hy, and, in a

ander Hamil

usual progre

e found at le

ght be demon

burdensome.

ander Hamilt

axes intended

bdivided into

ade to both, y

d, as to the la

umption

ander Hamilt

ot contended

ating the pro

ishment of t

propriety, c

life and mot

therefore, to

he communit

y constitutio

people must

supplying the

short course

lton, Federal

ess of things

east equal to

nstrated that

.

ton, Federali

d to be comp

o those of th

yet the reaso

atter, by whi

ton, Federali

d that the nu

portion of th

the same rule

onsidered as

tion and ena

procure a re

ty will perm

on. From a d

be subjected

e public wan

e of time, pe

list # 30

s, the necessi

its resource

the most pro

ist # 35

prised under

e direct and

oning upon it

ich must be u

ist # 36

umber of peo

hose who are

e for the app

216 

s the vital pr

ables it to per

egular and ad

mit, may be re

eficiency in

d to continua

nts, or the go

rish.

ities of a nat

s. Alexande

oductive sys

r the general

those of the

t seems to be

understood d

ople in each S

e to represen

portionment o

rinciple of th

rform its mo

dequate supp

egarded as a

this particul

al plunder, a

overnment m

tion, in every

er Hamilton,

stem of finan

denominati

e indirect kin

e confined to

duties and ex

State ought n

nt the people

of taxes will

he body polit

ost essential

ply of revenu

an indispensa

lar, one of tw

as a substitut

must sink into

y stage of its

, Federalist #

nce will alwa

on of interna

nd. Though t

o the former

xcises on art

not to be the

e of each Sta

l probably b

tic; as that

functions, A

ue, as far as

able

wo evils mus

e for a more

o a fatal

s existence,

# 30

ays be the

al taxes may

the objection

r branch. An

ticles of

e standard fo

ate. The

e as little

 

A

st

e

y

n

d

or

 

 217 

 

contested; though the rule itself, in this case, is by no means founded on the same

principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the

people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference

to the proportion of wealth of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary

cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the

relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least exceptionable

among the practicable rules

James Madison, Federalist # 54

 

 218 

 

Term limits

The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all power

should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in

dependence on the people by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during

this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands. Stability,

on the contrary, requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a

length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of

elections; and a frequent change of measures from a frequent change of men: whilst energy

in government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a

single hand.

James Madison, Federalist # 37

 

 

Titl

Could

decisi

federa

each o

James

Nothin

This m

they a

than th

Alexa

es of no

d any further

ve one migh

al and the Sta

of the latter.

s Madison, F

ng need be s

may truly be

are excluded

hat of the pe

ander Hamilt

obility

r proof be req

ht be found in

ate governm

Federalist # 3

said to illustr

denominate

there can ne

eople.

ton, Federali

quired of the

n its absolut

ments; and in

39

rate the impo

ed the corner

ever be serio

ist # 84

219 

e republican

te prohibition

its express g

ortance of th

rstone of rep

ous danger th

complexion

n of titles of

guaranty of t

he prohibitio

publican gov

hat the gover

n of this syst

f nobility, bo

the republic

on of titles of

vernment; for

rnment will

em, the mos

oth under the

an form to

f nobility.

r so long as

be any other

 

st

e

r

 

 

Tre

little d

obliga

the im

Alexa

Laws

operat

part o

other

To pro

resort

same

indisp

differe

divers

the sam

To av

of a nu

one co

settle

Alexa

But it

infere

aties

dependence i

ations of goo

mpulse of any

ander Hamilt

are a dead le

tion. The tre

f the law of

laws, be asc

oduce unifor

, to one SUP

authority wh

pensable. If t

ent final dete

sities in the o

me court dif

oid the confu

umber of ind

ourt paramou

and declare

ander Hamilt

is said that t

nce can be d

is to be plac

od faith, and

y immediate

ton, Federali

etter without

eaties of the U

the land. Th

ertained by j

rmity in thes

PREME TRI

hich forms th

there is in ea

erminations

opinions of m

ffering from

fusion which

dependent ju

unt to the res

in the last re

ton, Federali

the laws of t

drawn from t

ed on treatie

which oppo

interest or p

ist # 15

t courts to ex

United State

heir true impo

judicial dete

se determina

IBUNAL. A

he treaties th

ach State a co

on the same

men. We oft

each other.

h would unav

udicatories, a

st, possessin

esort a unifo

ist # 22

the Union ar

this, or what

220 

es which hav

ose general c

passion.

xpound and

es, to have an

ort, as far as

erminations.

ations, they o

nd this tribu

hemselves. T

ourt of final

e point as the

en see not on

voidably resu

all nations ha

ng a general

rm rule of ci

re to be the s

t would they

ve no other s

consideration

define their

ny force at a

s respects ind

ought to be s

unal ought to

These ingred

jurisdiction

ere are court

nly different

ult from the

ave found it

superintende

ivil justice.

supreme law

y amount to,

sanction than

ns of peace a

true meanin

all, must be c

dividuals, m

submitted, in

o be institute

dients are bot

, there may b

ts. There are

t courts but t

contradictor

t necessary to

ence and aut

w of the land.

if they were

n the

and justice to

ng and

considered a

must, like all

n the last

ed under the

th

be as many

endless

the judges o

ry decisions

o establish

thorized to

What

e not to be

 

o

as

f

 

 221 

 

supreme? It is evident they would amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the

term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to

observe. This results from every political association.

If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme

regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political

society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its

constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies and the individuals of whom

they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the

parties, and not a government, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND

SUPREMACY.

But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the larger society which are not

pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of

the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts

of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that the clause

which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just before

considered, only declares a truth which flows immediately and necessarily from the

institution of a federal government. It will not, I presume, have escaped observation that it

expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution; which I

mention merely as an instance of caution in the convention; since that limitation would

have been to be understood, though it had not been expressed.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 33

 

 222 

 

Usurpation

[Quoting Montesquieu]: "It is very probable" (says he *) "that mankind would have been

obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they

not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican,

together with the external force of a monarchical, government. I mean a CONFEDERATE

REPUBLIC.

"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to

become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of

societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations,

till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the

united body.

"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without

any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be

supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to

have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that

which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he

had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are

able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain

sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may

be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of

each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association,

of all the advantages of large monarchies."

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 9

 

 

AN O

last ad

indivi

of the

might

Allow

confes

admin

author

appea

Comm

charm

ought

privat

other

provid

It is th

usurp

power

that re

of the

Alexa

A wea

or the

once b

OBJECTION

ddress may p

dual citizens

Union too p

be judged p

wing the utmo

ss I am at a l

nistration of

rities of that

ars to me to h

merce, financ

ms for minds

in the first i

te justice bet

concerns of

ded for by lo

herefore imp

the powers w

rs would be

eason, would

national gov

ander Hamilt

ak constitutio

usurpation o

begun, will s

N of a nature

perhaps be li

s of America

powerful, an

proper to leav

ost latitude t

loss to disco

the general g

description.

hold out slen

ce, negotiatio

governed by

instance to b

tween the cit

a similar nat

ocal legislatio

probable that

with which t

as troubleso

d contribute

vernment.

ton, Federali

on must nec

of powers re

stop at the sa

different fro

ikewise urge

a. It may be

nd to enable i

ve with the S

to the love o

over what tem

government

. The regulat

nder allureme

on, and war

y that passio

be lodged in

tizens of the

ture, all thos

on, can neve

t there should

they are con

me as it wou

nothing to th

ist # 17

essarily term

equisite for t

alutary point

223 

om that whic

ed against th

said that it w

it to absorb t

States for loc

of power whi

mptation the

could ever f

tion of the m

ents to ambi

seem to com

on; and all th

the national

same State,

se things, in

er be desirab

d exist a disp

nnected; beca

uld be nugat

he dignity, to

minate in dis

he public sa

t, or go forw

ch has been s

e principle o

would tend to

those residua

cal purposes

ich any reaso

persons intr

feel to divest

mere domesti

ition.

mprehend all

he powers ne

depository.

the supervis

short, which

ble cares of a

position in th

ause the atte

tory; and the

o the import

solution for

afety. Wheth

ward to the da

stated and an

of legislation

o render the

ary authoriti

s.

onable man

rusted with t

t the States o

ic police of a

l the objects

ecessary to th

The admini

sion of agric

h are proper

a general jur

the federal co

empt to exerc

e possession

tance, or to t

want of pro

her the usurp

angerous ext

nswered in m

n for the

government

ies, which it

can require,

the

of the

a State

which have

hose objects

stration of

culture and o

to be

isdiction.

ouncils to

cise those

of them, for

the splendor

per powers,

ation, when

treme, must

 

my

t

I

e

of

r

 

 

depen

assum

out of

James

there m

the mi

laws a

Ind

requir

say th

repres

securi

If th

but in

forms

exerte

indivi

In a si

differe

govern

tumul

courag

crush

The sm

regula

efforts

nd on the con

mptions of po

f the full exe

s Madison, F

might somet

ilitia to prese

against those

dependent of

re a more per

hat the whole

sentatives of

ity for the rig

he representa

the exertion

of governm

ed with infin

dual State.

ingle State, i

ent parcels, s

nment in eac

tuously to ar

ge and despa

the oppositi

maller the ex

ar or systema

s. Intelligenc

ntingencies o

ower called f

rcise of the l

Federalist # 2

times be a ne

erve the pea

e violent inv

f all other rea

remptory pro

e power of th

f the people.

ghts and priv

atives of the

n of that orig

ment, and wh

itely better p

if the person

subdivisions

ch, can take

rms, without

air. The usur

on in embry

xtent of the t

atic plan of o

ce can be mo

of the mome

for, on press

largest const

20

ecessity to m

ce of the com

asions of the

asonings upo

ovision agai

he proposed

This is the e

vileges of the

e people betr

ginal right of

ich against t

prospect of s

ns intrusted w

s, or districts

no regular m

t concert, wi

rpers, clothe

yo.

territory, the

opposition, a

ore speedily

224 

nt. Tyranny

ing exigenci

titutional aut

make use of a

mmunity and

em which am

on the subjec

nst military

government

essential, and

e people wh

ray their con

f self-defense

the usurpatio

success than

with supreme

s of which it

measures for

ithout system

d with the fo

e more diffic

and the more

obtained of

has perhaps

ies, by a defe

thorities.

a force const

d to maintain

mount to insu

ct, it is a full

establishme

t is to be in t

d, after all, th

hich is attaina

stituents, the

e which is p

ons of the na

against thos

e power beco

consists, ha

r defense. Th

m, without re

orms of lega

cult will it be

e easy will it

f their prepar

s oftener gro

fective consti

tituted differ

n the just au

urrections an

l answer to th

ents in time o

the hands of

the only effic

able in civil

ere is then no

aramount to

ational rulers

se of the rule

ome usurper

aving no dist

he citizens m

esource; exc

al authority, c

e for the peop

t be to defea

rations and m

own out of th

itution, than

rently from

uthority of th

nd rebellions

hose who

of peace to

f the

cacious

society.

o resource le

o all positive

s may be

ers of an

rs, the

tinct

must rush

cept in their

can too often

ple to form a

at their early

movements,

 

he

n

he

s.

eft

n

a

 

 225 

 

and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed

against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar

coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.

The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased

extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend

them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the

artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more

competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny.

But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the

masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general

government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments,

and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by

throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights

are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How

wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage

which can never be too highly prized!

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State governments

will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public

liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses

so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The

legislatures will have better means of information.

They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power

and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in

which they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily

communicate with each other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the

protection of their common liberty.

The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already experienced its

utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely the same effect

 

 

agains

should

head w

the op

was le

We

by the

a large

of the

When

capab

who a

for the

The ap

the res

Alexa

But it

infere

suprem

term,

observ

This r

laws o

societ

to the

societ

st the enterpr

d be able to q

with fresh fo

pposition in o

eft to itself, i

e should reco

e resources o

e army; and

community

n will the tim

le of erectin

are in a situat

eir own defe

pprehension

sources of ar

ander Hamilt

is said that t

nce can be d

me? It is evi

includes sup

ve.

results from

of that societ

ties enter into

powers intru

ties and the i

rises of amb

quell the res

orces. The ad

others; and t

its efforts wo

ollect that the

of the countr

as the mean

y will proport

me arrive that

g a despotism

tion, through

ense, with all

n may be con

rgument and

ton, Federali

the laws of t

drawn from t

dent they wo

premacy. It i

every politic

ty must be th

o a larger po

usted to it by

individuals o

bitious rulers

sistance of on

dvantages ob

the moment

ould be rene

e extent of th

y. For a long

ns of doing th

tionably incr

t the federal

m over the g

h the medium

l the celerity

nsidered as a

d reasoning.

ist # 28

the Union ar

this, or what

ould amount

s a rule whic

cal associatio

he supreme r

olitical societ

y its constitu

of whom they

226 

s in the natio

ne State, the

btained in on

the part whi

wed, and its

he military f

g time to com

his increase,

rease.

government

great body of

m of their St

y, regularity,

a disease, for

re to be the s

t would they

t to nothing.

ch those to w

on. If individ

regulator of

ty, the laws

ution, must n

y are compo

onal councils

e distant Stat

ne place mus

ich had been

s resistance r

force must, a

me it will no

the populat

t can raise an

f the people

tate governm

and system

r which there

supreme law

y amount to,

A LAW, by

whom it is pr

duals enter i

their conduc

which the la

necessarily b

osed.

s. If the feder

tes would be

st be abando

n reduced to

revive.

at all events,

ot be possibl

tion and natu

nd maintain

of an immen

ments, to take

m of independ

e can be foun

w of the land.

if they were

y the very m

rescribed are

into a state o

ct. If a numb

atter may ena

be supreme o

ral army

e able to mak

ned to subdu

submission

be regulated

e to maintain

ural strength

an army

nse empire,

e measures

dent nations?

nd no cure in

What

e not to be

eaning of th

e bound to

of society, th

ber of politic

act, pursuan

over those

 

ke

ue

d

n

?

n

he

he

cal

nt

 

 

It wou

govern

But it

pursua

the sm

of usu

Hence

like th

and ne

escape

Const

that lim

Alexa

the mo

the pr

Congr

of the

the su

which

strikin

Jame

[Rega

into ex

govern

uld otherwis

nment, whic

will not foll

ant to its con

maller societi

urpation, and

e we perceiv

he one we ha

ecessarily fro

ed observati

titution; whic

mitation wo

ander Hamilt

ost minute p

etext for gra

ress have bee

ir chartered

ubject; and w

h seems to ha

ng defects of

s Madison, F

arding the] "

xecution the

nment of the

e be a mere

ch is only an

low from thi

nstitutional p

ies, will beco

d will deserv

ve that the cla

ave just befo

om the instit

on that it exp

ch I mention

uld have bee

ton, Federali

provisions be

adual and un

en betrayed,

authorities w

would be no i

ave provided

f the old.

Federalist #

"power to ma

e foregoing p

e United Stat

treaty, depen

other word f

is doctrine th

powers, but w

ome the sup

ve to be treat

ause which d

ore considere

tution of a fe

pressly conf

n merely as a

en to be und

ist # 33

ecome impor

observed usu

, or forced by

would not a l

inconsiderab

d no less stud

42

ake all laws

powers, and

tes, or in any

227 

ndent on the

for POLITIC

hat acts of th

which are in

reme law of

ed as such.

declares the

ed, only decl

ederal gover

fines this sup

an instance o

erstood, thou

rtant when th

urpations of

y the defects

little surpris

ble argument

diously for t

which shall

all other pow

y departmen

e good faith o

CAL POWE

he larger soc

nvasions of th

f the land. Th

supremacy o

lares a truth

rnment. It wi

premacy to l

of caution in

ugh it had n

hey tend to o

f power. A li

s of the Conf

e those who

t in favor of

the lesser tha

be necessar

wers vested b

nt or office th

of the partie

R AND SUP

iety which a

he residuary

hese will be

of the laws o

which flows

ill not, I pres

aws made pu

n the convent

ot been expr

obviate the n

ist of the cas

federation, i

have paid n

f the new Con

an the more

ry and proper

by this Cons

hereof."

s, and not a

PREMACY

are not

y authorities

merely acts

of the Union

s immediatel

sume, have

ursuant to th

tion; since

ressed.

necessity or

ses in which

into violation

no attention t

nstitution,

obvious and

r for carryin

stitution in th

 

.

of

n,

ly

he

ns

to

d

ng

he

 

 228 

 

. . . There are four other possible methods which the Convention might have taken on this

subject. They might have copied the second article of the existing Confederation, which

would have prohibited the exercise of any power not expressly delegated; they might have

attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms

"necessary and proper"; they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them by

specifying the powers excepted from the general definition; they might have been

altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction

and inference.

. . . As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the government

which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of

betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by

exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not expressly

granted.

. . . for in every new application of a general power, the particular powers, which are the

means of attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that

object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.

Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper

for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less

chimerical; and would have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the

enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority.

. . . No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is

required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every

particular power necessary for doing it is included.

. . . If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this

part of the Constitution and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning. I answer

the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the

general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated;

the same, in short, as if the State legislatures should violate their respective constitutional

 

 

author

and ju

in the

more

The tr

of the

the for

the inn

effecti

betwe

forme

unredr

James

The tr

tempo

few ye

and w

give a

have r

actuat

charac

I am u

circum

choice

schem

I am u

watch

rities. In the

udiciary depa

last resort a

faithful repr

ruth is that th

federal than

rmer will be

novation, to

ing a change

een the State

er, violations

ressed.

s Madison, F

rue question

orary regulat

ears, and a h

well-guarded

a negative an

received with

tes the State

cter of every

unable to con

mstances wh

e of, sixty-fiv

me of tyranny

unable to con

h and which p

first instanc

artments, wh

a remedy mu

resentatives,

his ultimate r

n of the State

e an invasion

sound the al

e of federal r

legislatures

s of the State

Federalist # 4

to be decide

tion, be dang

hundred or tw

power of leg

nswer to this

h regard to t

legislatures,

y class of citi

nceive that th

hich can spee

ve or a hund

y or treacher

nceive that th

possess so m

ce, the succe

hich are to ex

ust be obtaine

annul the ac

redress may

e legislatures

n of the right

larm to the p

representativ

and the peo

e constitution

44

ed, then, is w

gerous to the

wo hundred

gislating for

question, w

the present g

, and the prin

izens.

he people of

edily happen

dred men wh

ry.

he State legi

many means

229 

ss of the usu

xpound and

ed from the p

cts of the usu

be more con

s, for this pla

ts of the latte

people, and t

ves. There be

ople intereste

ns are more l

whether the s

e public liber

for a few mo

the United S

without first o

genius of the

nciples whic

f America, in

n, will choose

ho would be

islatures, wh

of counterac

urpation will

give effect t

people, who

urpers.

nfided in aga

ain reason th

er, these will

to exert their

eing no such

ed in watchin

likely to rem

smallness of

rty? Whether

ore, be a safe

States? I mu

obliterating e

people of A

ch are incorp

n their prese

e, and every

disposed to

hich must fee

cting the fed

l depend on t

to the legisla

o can, by the

ainst uncons

hat as every

l be ever rea

r local influe

h intermediat

ng the condu

main unnotic

f the number

r sixty-five m

fe depositary

ust own that

every impres

America, the

porated with

ent temper, o

y second year

form and pu

el so many m

deral legislatu

the executiv

ative acts; an

election of

stitutional ac

such act of

ady to mark

ence in

te body

uct of the

ced and

r, as a

members for

y for a limite

I could not

ssion which

spirit which

the political

or under any

r repeat the

ursue a

motives to

ure, would

 

ve

nd

cts

r a

d

I

h

l

 

 

fail eit

comm

in any

recom

dare, w

What

requir

from t

moder

the nu

Jame

the Ho

recolle

minds

compe

is to b

there f

title to

I wi

restrai

its ful

societ

can co

It crea

few go

ther to detec

mon constitue

y short time,

mmending the

within the sh

change of ci

res a prophet

the circumst

rate period o

umber of han

s Madison, F

ouse of Repr

ection of the

s by the mod

elled to antic

be reviewed,

forever to re

o a renewal o

ll add, as a f

ining them f

l operation o

ty. This has a

onnect the ru

ates between

overnments

ct or to defea

ents. I am eq

in the Unite

emselves to

hort space of

ircumstance

tic spirit to d

ances now b

of time, I mu

nds proposed

Federalist #

resentatives

eir dependen

de of their ele

cipate the mo

and when th

emain unless

of it.

fifth circums

from oppress

on themselve

always been

ulers and the

n them that c

have furnish

at a conspira

qually unable

ed States, any

the choice o

f two years,

s time, and a

declare, whic

before us, an

ust pronounc

d by the fede

55

is so constit

nce on the pe

evation can b

oment when

hey must des

s a faithful di

stance in the

sive measure

es and their f

deemed one

e people toge

communion o

hed example

230 

acy of the lat

e to conceive

y sixty-five

of the people

to betray the

a fuller popu

ch makes no

nd from the p

ce that the lib

eral Constitu

tuted as to su

eople. Before

be effaced b

n their power

scend to the

ischarge of t

situation of

es, that they

friends, as w

e of the stron

ether.

of interests a

es; but witho

tter against th

e that there a

or a hundred

e at large, wh

e solemn tru

ulation of ou

part of my p

probable stat

berties of Am

ution.

upport in the

e the sentime

by the exerci

r is to cease,

level from w

their trust sh

f the House o

can make no

well as on the

ngest bonds

and sympath

out which eve

he liberties o

are at this tim

d men capab

ho would eit

ust committed

ur country ma

pretensions.

te of them w

merica canno

e members an

ents impress

ise of power,

, when their

which they w

hall have esta

of Represent

o law which

e great mass

by which hu

hy of sentime

ery governm

of their

me, or can b

ble of

ther desire or

d to them.

ay produce

But judging

within a

ot be unsafe

n habitual

sed on their

, they will be

exercise of i

were raised;

ablished thei

tatives,

will not hav

s of the

uman policy

ents of which

ment

 

e

r

g

in

e

it

ir

ve

h

 

 

degen

from m

societ

laws;

a spiri

If th

legisla

liberty

James

There

author

legisla

To den

servan

thems

author

Alexa

encroa

people

consti

The tr

upon f

less vi

nerates into ty

making lega

ty? I answer:

and, above a

it which nou

his spirit shal

ature, as wel

y.

s Madison, F

is no positio

rity, contrary

ative act, the

ny this woul

nt is above h

selves; that m

rize, but wha

ander Hamilt

achments ha

e they are th

itutional obst

ruth is that th

for permane

irtue and eff

yranny. If it

al discriminat

: the genius o

all, the vigila

urishes freedo

ll ever be so

ll as on the p

Federalist # 5

on which dep

y to the teno

erefore, contr

ld be to affir

his master; th

men acting b

at they forbi

ton, Federali

ave generally

he warmest d

tacles to arre

he general G

nt effects. P

ficacy than a

be asked, w

tions in favo

of the whole

ant and man

om, and in r

far debased

people, the p

57

pends on cle

or of the com

rary to the C

rm that the d

hat the repres

y virtue of p

d.

ist # 78

y originated

defenders of

est them in a

GENIUS of a

articular pro

are commonl

231 

what is to rest

or of themsel

e system; the

ly spirit whi

return is nour

d as to tolerat

eople will b

earer princip

mmission und

Constitution,

deputy is grea

sentatives of

powers may

with the men

popular libe

a favorite car

a governmen

ovisions, thou

ly ascribed to

train the Hou

lves and a pa

e nature of ju

ich actuates

urished by it.

te a law not

e prepared to

ples than that

der which it

can be valid

ater than his

f the people

do not only

n who endea

erty, but who

reer.

nt is all that c

ugh not alto

o them; and

use of Repre

articular cla

ust and const

the people o

obligatory o

o tolerate an

t every act o

is exercised

d.

s principal; th

are superior

what their p

avor to persu

o have rarely

can be substa

gether usele

the want of

esentatives

ss of the

titutional

of America -

on the

nything but

of a delegated

, is void. No

hat the

r to the peop

powers do no

uade the

y suffered

antially relie

ess, have far

f them will

 

-

d

o

ple

ot

ed

 

 232 

 

never be, with men of sound discernment, a decisive objection to any plan which exhibits

the leading characters of a good government.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83

 

 

 

Veto

An ab

admitt

encroa

Alexa

The pr

virtue

that th

rights

its del

which

the po

one is

throug

Alexa

They w

keep t

likely

legisla

amply

Alexa

o power

bsolute or qu

ted, by the a

achments of

ander Hamilt

ropriety of th

in the execu

he love of po

of other me

liberations; t

h itself, on m

ower in quest

to increase

gh haste, ina

ander Hamilt

will conside

things in the

to do good t

ation. The in

y compensate

ander Hamilt

r

ualified negat

ablest adepts

f the latter up

ton, Federali

he thing [vet

utive, but up

ower may so

mbers of the

that impressi

maturer reflec

tion upon th

the chances

advertence, o

ton, Federali

er every insti

same state i

than harm; b

njury which

ed by the ad

ton, Federali

tive in the ex

in political

pon the form

ist # 66

to] does not

pon the suppo

metimes bet

e governmen

ions of the m

ction, would

he executive

in favor of t

or design.

ist # 73

itution calcu

in which the

because it is

may possibl

dvantage of p

ist # 73

233 

xecutive upo

science, to b

mer.

turn upon th

osition that t

tray it into a

nt; that a spir

moment may

condemn. T

is to enable

the commun

lated to restr

y happen to

favorable to

ly be done b

preventing a

on the acts o

be an indispe

he suppositio

the legislatur

disposition

rit of faction

y sometimes

The primary

him to defen

nity against t

rain the exce

be at any gi

o greater stab

by defeating

number of b

of the legislat

ensable barri

on of superio

ure will not b

to encroach

n may somet

hurry it into

inducement

nd himself; t

the passing o

ess of lawma

iven period a

bility in the s

a few good

bad ones.

tive body is

ier against th

or wisdom o

be infallible;

upon the

times pervert

o measures

t to conferrin

the secondar

of bad laws,

aking, and to

as much mor

system of

laws will be

 

he

or

t

ng

ry

o

re

e

 

 234 

 

A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single VETO might not scruple to return

it for reconsideration, subject to being finally rejected only in the event of more than one

third of each house concurring in the sufficiency of his objections.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 73

 

 

War

It is to

make

monar

and ob

affron

partisa

sovere

intere

John J

Safety

ardent

life an

contin

securi

be mo

Alexa

It is o

author

Alexa

r

oo true, how

war whenev

rchs will oft

bjects merely

nts, ambition

ans. These a

eign, often le

sts of his peo

John Jay, Fe

y from extern

t love of libe

nd property i

nual danger,

ity to institut

ore safe, they

ander Hamilt

f the nature

rity.

ander Hamilt

ever disgrac

ver they have

en make war

y personal, s

n, or private c

and a variety

ead him to e

ople.

deralist # 4

nal danger is

erty will, afte

incident to w

will compel

tions which h

y at length be

ton, Federali

of war to inc

ton, Federali

ceful it may b

e a prospect

r when their

such as a thir

compacts to

of other mo

ngage in wa

s the most po

er a time, giv

war, the conti

l nations the

have a tende

ecome willin

ist # 8

crease the ex

ist # 8

235 

be to human

of getting an

r nations are

rst for milita

aggrandize

otives, which

ars not sancti

owerful dire

ve way to its

inual effort a

most attach

ency to destr

ng to run the

xecutive at th

n nature, that

nything by it

to get nothin

ary glory, rev

or support th

h affect only

ified by justi

ector of natio

s dictates. Th

and alarm at

ed to liberty

roy their civi

e risk of bein

he expense o

t nations in g

t; nay, that a

ng by it, but

venge for pe

heir particul

y the mind of

ice or the vo

onal conduct

he violent de

ttendant on a

y to resort for

il and politic

ng less free.

of the legisla

general will

absolute

t for purpose

ersonal

lar families o

f the

oice and

t. Even the

estruction of

a state of

r repose and

cal rights. To

ative

 

es

or

f

d

o

 

 236 

 

If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the raising

of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary

spectacle which the world has yet seen -- that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution

to prepare for defense before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal

denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our

territories must be waited for as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of

men for the protection of the State.

We must receive the blow before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy

by which nations anticipate distant danger and meet the gathering storm must be abstained

from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free government. We must expose our

property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders and invite them by our weakness to

seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our

choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty by an abuse of the means

necessary to its preservation.

Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and

would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to

have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been

saved. The facts which from our own experience forbid a reliance of this kind are too

recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion.

The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be

successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less

than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the

late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their

fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have

been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like

most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance,

by time, and by practice.

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 25

 

 

Let us

moder

exting

Alexa

To jud

destru

the mi

specul

human

Alexa

Of all

those

Alexa

 

s recollect th

rate or unam

guish the am

ander Hamilt

dge from the

uctive passio

ild and bene

lations of las

n character.

ander Hamilt

the cares or

qualities wh

ander Hamilt

hat peace or w

mbitious we m

mbition of oth

ton, Federali

e history of m

ns of war re

eficent sentim

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 238 

 

Appendix 1- The Constitution  

Preamble 

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 

Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 

general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 

ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.  

Article. I.  

Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 

United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.  

Section. 2.The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 

second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have 

the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 

Legislature.  

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five 

Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when 

elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.  

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which 

may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be 

determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 

Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 

Persons [Modified by Amendment XIV]. The actual Enumeration shall be made within 

three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every 

subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of 

Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have 

at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New 

Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode‐Island and 

Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New‐York six, New Jersey four, 

Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South 

Carolina five, and Georgia three.  

 

 

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When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority 

thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.  

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have 

the sole Power of Impeachment.  

Section. 3.The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 

State, chosen by the Legislature thereof [Modified by Amendment XVII], for six Years; and 

each Senator shall have one Vote.  

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall 

be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first 

Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the 

Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so 

that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, 

or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may 

make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then 

fill such Vacancies [Modified by Amendment XVII].  

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and 

been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an 

Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.  

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no 

Vote, unless they be equally divided.  

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the 

Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the 

United States.  

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that 

Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is 

tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the 

Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.  

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, 

and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the 

United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to 

Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.  

 

 

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Section. 4.The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 

Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 

Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places 

of chusing Senators.  

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the 

first Monday in December [Modified by Amendment XX], unless they shall by Law appoint 

a different Day.  

Section. 5.Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its 

own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a 

smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the 

Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House 

may provide.  

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for 

disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.  

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the 

same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and 

Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of 

those Present, be entered on the Journal.  

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, 

adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two 

Houses shall be sitting.  

Section. 6.The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their 

Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. 

They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from 

Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to 

and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall 

not be questioned in any other Place.  

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be 

appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have 

been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; 

and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either 

House during his Continuance in Office.  

 

 

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Section. 7.All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but 

the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.  

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, 

before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;[2] If he 

approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in 

which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, 

and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall 

agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, 

by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it 

shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by 

yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be 

entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the 

President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, 

the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their 

Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.  

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of 

Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be 

presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, 

shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of 

the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations 

prescribed in the Case of a Bill.  

Section. 8.The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 

Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of 

the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the 

United States;  

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;  

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 

Indian Tribes;  

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of 

Bankruptcies throughout the United States;  

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of 

Weights and Measures;  

 

 

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To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the 

United States;  

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;  

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 

Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;  

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;  

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences 

against the Law of Nations;  

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning 

Captures on Land and Water;  

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a 

longer Term than two Years;  

To provide and maintain a Navy;  

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;  

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 

Insurrections and repel Invasions;  

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such 

Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the 

States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the 

Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;  

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding 

ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, 

become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority 

over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same 

shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock‐Yards, and other needful 

Buildings; — And  

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 

foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 

the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.  

 

 

 243 

 

Section. 9.The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing 

shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 

thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such 

Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.  

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases 

of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.  

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.  

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 

Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.  

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.  

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of 

one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be 

obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.  

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made 

by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all 

public Money shall be published from time to time.  

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any 

Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of 

any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or 

foreign State.  

Section. 10.No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters 

of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and 

silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or 

Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.  

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports 

or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws; 

and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, 

shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject 

to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.  

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or 

Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, 

 

 244 

 

or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent 

Danger as will not admit of delay.  

Article. II.  

Section. 1.The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 

America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the 

Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:  

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number 

of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the 

State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person 

holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.  

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of 

whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they 

shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which 

List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the 

United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, 

in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and 

the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be 

the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; 

and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of 

Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them 

for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the 

said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the 

Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a 

quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the 

States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after 

the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the 

Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have 

equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President [Modified by 

Amendment XII].  

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they 

shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.  

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of 

the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall 

 

 245 

 

any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five 

Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.  

 

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or 

Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on 

the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, 

Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer 

shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be 

removed, or a President shall be elected [Modified by Amendment XXV].  

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall 

neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been 

elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United 

States, or any of them.  

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or 

Affirmation: — "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of 

President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and 

defend the Constitution of the United States."  

Section. 2.The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 

States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the 

United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of 

the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective 

Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the 

United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.  

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 

provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and 

with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 

Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 

States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 

established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 

Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads 

of Departments.  

 

 246 

 

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess 

of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next 

Session.  

 

Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the 

Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary 

and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of 

them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of 

Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive 

Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 

executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.  

Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be 

removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 

high Crimes and Misdemeanors.  

Article. III.  

Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, 

and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 

The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good 

Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which 

shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.  

Section. 2.The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 

this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 

made, under their Authority; — to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers 

and Consuls; — to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; — to Controversies to 

which the United States shall be a Party; — to Controversies between two or more States; 

— between a State and Citizens of another State [Modified by Amendment XI]; — 

between Citizens of different States; — between Citizens of the same State claiming 

Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 

foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.  

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which 

a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other 

Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to 

 

 247 

 

Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 

make.  

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial 

shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not 

committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may 

by Law have directed.  

Section. 3.Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against 

them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be 

convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or 

on Confession in open Court.  

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of 

Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person 

attainted.  

Article. IV.  

Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 

and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws 

prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 

the Effect thereof.  

Section. 2.The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 

Citizens in the several States.  

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from 

Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the 

State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction 

of the Crime.  

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into 

another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 

Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or 

Labour may be due [Modified by Amendment XIII].  

Section. 3.New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State 

shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be 

formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of 

the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.  

 

 248 

 

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 

respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in 

this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or 

of any particular State.  

 

Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 

Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application 

of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against 

domestic Violence.  

Article. V.  

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 

Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds 

of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 

Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified 

by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 

fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 

Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One 

thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses 

in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be 

deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate [Possibly abrogated by Amendment XVII].  

Article. VI.  

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this 

Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under 

the Confederation.  

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 

States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 

bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 

notwithstanding.  

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several 

State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of 

the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; 

 

 249 

 

but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust 

under the United States.  

Article. VII.  

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the 

Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.  

 

The Word, "the," being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page, 

The Word "Thirty" being partly written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first 

Page, The Words "is tried" being interlined between the thirty second and thirty third 

Lines of the first Page and the Word "the" being interlined between the forty third and 

forty fourth Lines of the second Page.  

Attest William Jackson 

Secretary  

done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth 

Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven 

and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof 

We have hereunto subscribed our Names,  

Go. WASHINGTON — Presidt.  

and deputy from Virginia  

 

New Hampshire {  

JOHN LANGDON  

NICHOLAS GILMAN  

Massachusetts {  

NATHANIEL GORHAM  

RUFUS KING  

Connecticut {  

 

 250 

 

WM. SAML. JOHNSON  

ROGER SHERMAN  

New York . . . .  

ALEXANDER HAMILTON  

New Jersey {  

WIL: LIVINGSTON  

DAVID BREARLEY.  

WM. PATERSON.  

JONA: DAYTON  

Pennsylvania {  

B FRANKLIN  

THOMAS MIFFLIN  

ROBT MORRIS  

GEO. CLYMER  

THOS. FITZ SIMONS  

JARED INGERSOLL  

JAMES WILSON  

GOUV MORRIS  

Delaware {  

GEO: READ  

GUNNING BEDFORD jun  

JOHN DICKINSON  

RICHARD BASSETT  

JACO: BROOM  

 

 251 

 

Maryland {  

JAMES MCHENRY  

DAN OF ST THOS. JENIFER  

DANL CARROLL  

Virginia {  

JOHN BLAIR  

JAMES MADISON jr  

North Carolina {  

WM. BLOUNT  

RICHD. DOBBS SPAIGHT  

HU WILLIAMSON  

South Carolina {  

J. RUTLEDGE  

CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY  

CHARLES PINCKNEY  

PIERCE BUTLER  

Georgia {  

WILLIAM FEW  

ABR BALDWIN  

In Convention Monday, September 17th, 1787.  

 

Present  

 

The States of  

 

 252 

 

 

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, MR. Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, 

Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.  

 

Resolved,  

 

That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United States in Congress assembled, 

and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a 

Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the 

Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each 

Convention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof to the United 

States in Congress assembled. Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as 

soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution, the United 

States in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by 

the States which have ratified the same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble 

to vote for the President, and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this 

Constitution. That after such Publication the Electors should be appointed, and the 

Senators and Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for 

the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified, signed, sealed and 

directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress 

assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place 

assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole purpose 

of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President; and, that after he shall be 

chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to 

execute this Constitution.  

 

By the Unanimous Order of the Convention  

 

Go. WASHINGTON — Presidt.  

W. JACKSON Secretary.  

 

 253 

 

Appendix 2 - The Federalist Papers – Links  

 #  Date    Title 

1  1787 Oct  27  General Introduction

2  1787 Oct  31  Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence 

3  1787 Nov  3  Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)

4  1787 Nov  7  Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)

5  1787 Nov  10  Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)

6  1787 Nov  14  Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States 

7  1787 Nov  15  Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States 

(continued) and Particular Causes Enumerated 

8  1787 Nov  20  Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

9  1787 Nov  21  The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction 

and Insurrection 

10   1787 Nov  22  The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction 

and Insurrection (continued) 

11   1787 Nov  24  The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a 

Navy 

12   1787 Nov  27  The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue

13   1787 Nov  28  Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

14   1787 Nov  30  Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory 

Answered 

15   1787 Dec  1  Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

16   1787 Dec  4  Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union 

 

 254 

 

(continued)

17   1787 Dec  5  Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union 

(continued) 

18   1787 Dec  7  Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union 

(continued) 

19   1787 Dec  8  Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union 

(continued) 

20   1787 Dec  11  Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union 

(continued) 

21   1787 Dec  12  Other Defects of the Present Confederation

22   1787 Dec  14  Other Defects of the Present Confederation (continued) 

23   1787 Dec  18  Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the 

Preservation of the Union 

24   1787 Dec  19  Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

25   1787 Dec  21  Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered 

(continued) 

26   1787 Dec  22  Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the 

Common Defense Considered 

27   1787 Dec  25  Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the 

Common Defense Considered (continued) 

28   1787 Dec  26  Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the 

Common Defense Considered (continued) 

29   1788  Jan  9  Concerning the Militia

30   1787 Dec  28  Concerning the General Power of Taxation

31   1788  Jan  1  Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued) 

 

 255 

 

32   1788  Jan  2  Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued) 

33   1788  Jan  2  Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued) 

34   1788  Jan  5  Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued) 

35   1788  Jan  5  Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued) 

36   1788  Jan  8  Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued) 

37   1788  Jan  11  Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper 

Form of Government 

38   1788  Jan  12  The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the 

Objections to the New Plan Exposed 

39   1788  Jan  16  Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles

40   1788  Jan  18  On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government 

Examined and Sustained 

41   1788  Jan  19  General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution 

42   1788  Jan  22  The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered

43   1788  Jan  23  The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered 

(continued) 

44   1788  Jan  25  Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States 

45   1788  Jan  26  Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State 

Governments Considered 

46   1788  Jan  29  The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared

47   1788  Jan  30  The Particular Structure of the New Government and the 

Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts 

48   1788  Feb  1  These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No 

Constitutional Control Over Each Other 

 

 256 

 

49   1788  Feb  2  Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One 

Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a 

Convention 

50   1788  Feb  5  Periodical Appeals to the People Considered

51   1788  Feb  6  The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks 

and Balances Between the Different Departments 

52   1788  Feb  8  The House of Representatives

53   1788  Feb  9  The House of Representatives (continued)

54   1788  Feb  12  Apportionment of Members of the House of Representatives 

Among the States 

55   1788  Feb  13  The Total Number of the House of Representatives 

56   1788  Feb  16  The Total Number of the House of Representatives (continued)

57   1788  Feb  19  The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the 

Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with 

Representation 

58   1788  Feb  20  Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as 

the Progress of Population Demands Considered 

59   1788  Feb  22  Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of 

Members 

60   1788  Feb  23  Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of 

Members (continued) 

61   1788  Feb  26  Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of 

Members (continued) 

62   1788  Feb  27  The Senate

63   1788 Mar  1  The Senate (continued)

64   1788 Mar  5  The Powers of the Senate

 

 257 

 

65   1788 Mar  7  The Powers of the Senate (continued)

66   1788 Mar  8  Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for 

Impeachments Further Considered 

67   1788 Mar  11  The Executive Department

68   1788 Mar  12  The Mode of Electing the President

69   1788 Mar  14  The Real Character of the Executive

70   1788 Mar  15  The Executive Department Further Considered

71   1788 Mar  18  The Duration in Office of the Executive

72   1788 Mar  19  The Same Subject Continued, and Re‐Eligibility of the Executive 

Considered 

73   1788 Mar  21  The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto 

Power 

74   1788 Mar  25  The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning 

Power of the Executive 

75   1788 Mar  26  The Treaty‐Making Power of the Executive

76   1788  Apr  1  The Appointing Power of the Executive

77   1788  Apr  2  The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the 

Executive Considered 

78   1788  Jun  14  The Judiciary Department

79   1788  Jun  18  The Judiciary Continued

80   1788  Jun  21  The Powers of the Judiciary

81   1788  Jun  25 

 

The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial 

Authority 

82   1788  Jul  2  The Judiciary Continued

 

 258 

 

83   1788  Jul  5 

 

12 

The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury 

84   1788  JulAug 16 

 

Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution 

Considered and Answered 

85   1788  Aug  13 

 Concluding Remarks 

  

 

 259 

 

Appendix 3 - Chronology of the Federalist Papers  

Year Month Day Event Pro- Anti- Subject Opposes

1781 Mar 1 Articles of Confederation adopted

1786 Sep. 14 Annapolis Convention

1787 Feb 21 Congress calls for convention in Philadelphia

1787 Apr 16 Madison's Virginia Plan

May 25 Constitutional Convention opens

May 29 Virginia Plan

Jun 15 New Jersey Plan

Jun 18 Hamilton Plan

Jul 16 Great Compromise

Aug 6 First Draft

Sep 17 Final version approved, Conv. closes

Oct 5 Centinel #1

Responsibility, Checks

Federalist #10, 51

Oct 6 James Wilson

Oct 8 Federal Farmer #1

Extended republics, taxation

Federalist #8, 10, 14, 35, 36

Oct 9 Federal Farmer #2

Extended republics, taxation

Federalist #8, 10, 15, 35, 36

Oct 18 Brutus #1 Extent of union, States' Rights, Bill of Rights,

Federalist #10, 32, 33, 35, 36,

 

 260 

 

Taxation 39, 45, 84

Oct 22 John DeWitt #1

Need for stronger union

Federalist #1-6

Oct 27 Federalist #1

John DeWitt #2

Need for stronger union

Federalist #1-6

Oct 31 Federalist #2

Nov 5 John DeWitt #2

Bill of Rights Wilson (Nov. 28), Federalist #84

Nov 14 Federalist #6

Nov 22 Federalist #10

Nov 27 Cato #5 Executive powers Federalist #67

Nov 29 Brutus #4 House of Representatives

Federalist #27, 28, 52-54, 57

Nov 30 Federalist #14

Dec 7 Delaware ratifies

Dec 12 Pennsylvania ratifies

Dec 18 New Jersey ratifies

Federalist #23

Penn. Minority

Extent of union, States' Rights, Bill of Rights, Taxation

Federalist #10, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 45, 84

Dec 27 Brutus #6 Broad construction, taxing powers

Federalist #23, 30-34

1788 Jan 2 Georgia ratifies

Jan 3 Cato #7 Regulating election

Federalist #59

Jan 9 Connecticut ratifies

Jan 16 Federalist #39

 

 261 

 

Jan 24 Brutus #10 Defense, standing armies

Federalist #24-29

Jan 26 Federalist #45

Jan 31 Brutus #11 Judiciary Federalist #78-83

Feb 6 Massachusetts ratifies

Federalist #51

Feb 7 Massachusetts proposed amendments

Brutus #12, Pt. 1

Judiciary Federalist #78-83

Feb 14 Brutus #12, Pt. 2

Judiciary Federalist #78-83

Feb 19 Federalist #57

Feb 27 Federalist #62

Mar 15 Federalist #70

Mar 20 Brutus #15 Judiciary Federalist #78-83

Apr 10 Brutus #16 Senate Federalist #62, 63

Apr 26 Maryland ratifies

May 23 S. Carolina ratifies

May 28 Federalist #78, 84

Jun 5,7 Patrick Henry

Nature and powers of Union

Federalist #1, 14, 15

Jun 21 New Hampshire ratifies; the 9th state

Jun 20-27

Melancton Smith

Representation in Congress

Federalist #52-57, 62-63

Jun 25 Virginia ratifies

Jun 27 Virginia proposed

 

 262 

 

amendments

Jul 26 New York ratifies

Aug 4 N. Carolina rejects

1789 Mar 4 Constitution takes effect

Jun 8 Madison introduces Bill of Rights amendments

Nov 21 N. Carolina ratifies

1790 May 29 Rhode Island ratifies

1791 Nov 3 Bill of Rights amendments take effect