Europe’s enclosed seas are as diverse as the continent’s peoples are diverse. Yet the Bal-tic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas all face similar challenges of pollution that undercut the ma-rine ecosystems and the economic potential and health of surrounding human populations. Theattempts to address the environmental quality of Europe’s seas also vary in architecture, funding,and effectiveness. By comparing and analyzing the state of environmental management aroundthe Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas, scholars and policymakers may draw valuable lessonsfor replicating success stories and avoiding failed pathways.
It was with this goal in mind that the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholarsassembled a group of scholars and practitioners on May 14, 1999 at the Wilson Center in Wash-ington, DC. This volume reflects the scholarship and debate featured at that conference, entitled“Saving the Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering Environmental Cooperation in Europe.”As the official memorial to the United States twenty-eighth president, the Wilson Center providesa non-partisan, non-advocacy forum for discussion of today’s pressing public policy issues. Un-der the leadership of Lee H. Hamilton, the Wilson Center strives to generate “knowledge in thepublic service.”
As co-sponsors of the Protecting Regional Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering En-vironmental Cooperation in Europe effort, we would like to thank a number of individuals andsupporters who made the conference and this publication possible. Robert Ponichtera, formerlyof the East European Studies program, provided the critical spark. Aisha Haynes, Jane Mutnick,Jessica Powers, Michael Vaden, Dean Caras, and Alex Hill were all instrumental in producing asuccessful international conference. Special thanks to Jessica Powers for her diligence workingwith authors and editing this publication. Many thanks to Karin Mueller for her assistance inpublication layout and design. And finally, special thanks to co-editor Stacy VanDeveer, who as ashort-term fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, guidedus around the politics of European seas.
Generous funding for Protecting Regional Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering En-vironmental Cooperation in Europe and the May conference was provided by the Woodrow Wil-son Center and by the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Population througha cooperative agreement with the University of Michigan Population Fellows Programs.
Geoffrey D. DabelkoDirector, Environmental Change and Security Project
Martin C. SletzingerDirector, East European Studies Program
Samuel F. Wells, Jr.Director, West European Studies Program
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Glossary of Acronyms
BSEC – Black Sea Economic CooperationBSEP – Black Sea Environmental ProgrammeCCB – Coalition Clean BalticCEE – Central and Eastern EuropeCI – Counterpart InternationalEAP – Environmental Action ProgrammeEBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentECO – environmental citizen’s organizationEIB – European Investment BankEMC – environmental management componentsENGO – environmental nongovernmental organizationEU – European UnionFAO – Food and Agricultural OrganizationGEF – Global Environmental FacilityGIS – geographic information systemHELCOM – Helsinki CommissionHELMEPA – Hellenic Maritime Environmental Protection AssociationIBSAD – International Black Sea Action DayIBSP – International Black Sea PartnersICZM – integrated coastal zone managementIGO – intergovernmental organizationISO – International Organization for StandardizationISPA – Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-AccessionJCP – Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action ProgrammeMAP – Mediterranean Action PlanMDB – Multilateral Development BanksMEDPOLMNCs – multinational corporationsNAP – National Action PartyNATO – North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNEAP – national environmental actions programNGO – nongovernmental organizationNIB – Nordic Investment BankOMRI – Open Media Research InstituteOSPARCOM – Oslo and Paris CommissionsPABSEC – Parliamentary Assembly of the BSECPCU – Program Coordinating UnitPITF – Program Implementation Task ForcePPC – Project Preparation CommitteeRAC – Regional Action CenterSAP – Strategic Action PlanSGP – Small Grants ProgrammeTDA – Transboundary Diagnostic AnalysisTER – Ecological Youth of Romania (in Romanian)TIME – This is My EnvironmentTNC – transnational corporationsTURMEPA – Turkish Maritime Environmental Protection AssociationUN – United NationsUNCED – United Nations Conference on Environment and DevelopmentUNEP – United Nations Environment ProgrammeUNDP – United Nations Development ProgrammeWBCSD – World Business Council for Sustainable DevelopmentWTO – World Trade Organization
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[Insert Europe Map-camera ready onto Page 9 in center]
6
Environmental Cooperation,Capacity, and European Seas:
An Introduction
By
Stacy D. VanDeveer andGeoffrey D. Dabelko
Europe’s regional seas are sharedbetween Eastern and Western Europeansand also help to define and bridge theboundaries of the continent. The Baltic,Mediterranean and Black Seas have beenthe focus of international environmentalconcern and cooperation for many years.These seas also served as theaters ofCold War competition and internationalcontact. They have played host to vastquantities of marine resources, shipping,recreation, and pollution loading. Theseseas separate and link European andnon-European states, societies, cultures,and economies.
Beginning in the 1970s, the Bal-tic and Mediterranean regions witnessedthe construction of international organi-zations and institutions designed to pro-tect marine environmental quality. In theBlack Sea region, this process did notget underway until the 1990s. Never-theless, no one would call these seas“protected” from ecological harm. Theyare not out of danger. As the title of thisreport suggests, one of the central con-cerns of the chapters contained here isexplaining how additional internationalenvironmental cooperation might befostered in these regions.
Intense international environ-mental cooperation will not protect orimprove marine environmental qualityby itself. States and societies must pos-sess the capacity to protect the seas.
They must be able to meet the interna-tional commitments they make – tomake and implement public policy andaffect private sector and public behaviorchange. International relations scholarsand practitioners have most often fo-cused on states’ interests and intent insigning and ratifying internationalagreements. States’ capacity to imple-ment the agreements is too often ig-nored. Public sector capacity is complexand multidimensional. The concept in-cludes factors related to human resourceand organizational and broad institu-tional dimensions (Grindle, 1996). Invarying ways, all of the papers containedhere attempt to address these capacity-related concerns. Furthermore, envi-ronmental protection efforts are closelylinked to a scientific and technical un-derstanding of the natural environmentand the ecological impacts of human ac-tivities. As such, environmental policyrequires minimal levels of scientific andtechnical capacity to be effective.
During the workshop at whichthese papers were first presented, AlanSimcock, Head of Marine, Land, andLiability Division of the Department ofthe Environment, Transport, and the Re-gions, outlined a number of aspects ofthe complex institutional background ofmarine governance in Europe. Thereremain substantial differences amongEuropean states and societies vis-à-visenvironmental protection. Often, politi-cal cleavages are apparent between thegenerally “greener” Northern Europeanstates (Germany, the Nordic countries,and, sometimes, the United Kingdom)and those in Southern and EasternEurope (and Ireland), with greater con-cern for economic development and re-structuring. Furthermore, formal envi-ronmental agreements and organizations
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have overlapping jurisdiction and mem-bership. There are separate multilateralagreements around the North East At-lantic and the North Sea, and the Baltic,Mediterranean, and Black Seas. In ad-dition, states have created a host of fish-eries conventions and numerous riversand lakes agreements. Lastly, the Euro-pean Union has a number of directivesimportant for marine environmentalprotection. In the face of such institu-tional complexity, Simcock highlighted“seven threats to the seven seas,” in-cluding: (1) dumping at sea; (2) fisheriesand biodiversity protection; (3) land-based sources of pollution; (4) shipping;(5) oil and gas exploration and extrac-tion, (6) coastal development; and (7)climate change. This laundry list of en-vironmental threats highlights the im-portance of integrating environmentalpolicy across the hydrological cycle andacross organizational and jurisdictionallines. For all of these environmentalthreats, one needs to identify “capacityissues” faced by state policymakers intheir attempts to protect ecological qual-ity.
The first chapter, by StacyVanDeveer, compares the capacitybuilding efforts of the Baltic and Medi-terranean regional seas regimes. Thischapter outlines various aspects of tech-nical, human resource, organizational,and institutional capacity, which shouldbe considered in designing internationalcapacity building programs. Tamar Gut-ner’s chapter also examines internationalenvironmental cooperation efforts in theBaltic region. Her chapter focuses on theenvironmental portfolios of three majormultilateral development banks (theWorld Bank, the European Bank of Re-construction and Development and theEuropean Investment Bank). In chapterthree, Miranda Schreurs provides com-mentary on first two chapters. MartinSampson and Omer Faruk Genckaya ex-amine the Black Seas EnvironmentalCooperation and the Black Seas Envi-ronmental Project, highlighting the votesof World Bank funding, NGOs, andtransnational network building in the lasttwo chapters.
8
Capacity Building Efforts andInternational EnvironmentalCooperation in the Baltic and
Mediterranean Regions
By
Stacy D. VanDeveer
Introduction
International relations scholarsand practitioners often have beenpreoccupied with concerns about howcooperative international regimes areestablished and how to enforce andimplement such agreements in theanarchic international system. Ratherthan focusing on whether state officialsdo or do not comply with internationalagreements (or whether they intend to doso), this paper examines issuesassociated with whether or not they areable to meet their international environ-mental commitments. Do all states in agiven cooperation regime really have thecapacity to meet their internationalobligations? How can such capacity beenhanced or “built” through internationalcooperation?
International cooperation withinthe environmental protection regimes forthe Baltic and Mediterranean seas hasproduced an impressive array of statecommitments and institutional and or-ganizational structures. These marineprotection regimes remain effective infacilitating, sponsoring, encouraging,and expanding multilateral interstate andtransnational cooperation. Both regionalregimes successfully established andpromulgated a set of transnational prin-ciples and norms for environmental pol-
icy. In other words, both regimes fa-cilitated, encouraged and promoted thetransnationalization of regional envi-ronmental policy.1 The two regimes andtheir central organizations – the HelsinkiCommission (HELCOM) and the Coor-dinating Unit for the Mediterranean Ac-tion Plan (MAP) offer sets of minimumenvironmental policy standards, againstwhich to assess each region’s states. Inthe Baltic regime, this transnational en-vironmental policy frequently exceedsthe requirements and specificity ofEuropean Union (EU) policy. Comparedto the MAP content, however, EU stan-dards are generally higher and more spe-cific.
As used here, the term “capacitybuilding” refers to efforts and strategiesintended to increase the “efficiency,effectiveness, and responsiveness ofgovernment performance.”2 In thisformulation, responsiveness denotes thelinks’ communicated needs and abilitiesto address them. In other words,responsiveness refers to qualities such asadaptability, learning, and analyticalabilities of public organizations. In thiswork, capacity building is used as ageneral term, encompassing capacityenhancing, strengthening, and develop-ment. As such, its use does not implythat a total absence of capacity forparticular functions exists in a givenlocation among a given group.3
Capacity building efforts can be focusedon any number of “sites” or focal points:government bodies, NGOs and civilsociety, independent unions, politicalparties, scientific and technical commu-nities, private sector actors, and publics.
This chapter proceeds in foursections. The first presents a discussionof the multiple dimensions of interna-tional capacity building programs andresearch. The next two sections offer
9
brief overviews of regional environ-mental cooperation around the Balticand Mediterranean seas, highlightingthese regimes’ accomplishments to dateand their records vis-a-vis building ca-pacity at the states level. The last sec-tion draws some conclusions from thesetwo cases of regional environmental co-operation in and around Europe.
Capacity Building and OrganizedSkepticism“Capacity building” – though widelyalluded to in international organizations,assistance programs, and scholarship –often has no clear definition, nor doesthe term evoke a common set ofstrategies among its users. Yet, it isoften understood to be centrallyimportant among international develop-ment assistance practitioners. It remainsan important concern for sustainabledevelopment and the implementation ofthe Agenda 21 action program from the1992 United National Conference onEnvironment and Development in Rio.4
Research on the internationalenvironmental protection regimesaround the Baltic and Mediterraneanseas and the long-range transboundaryair pollution regime in Europe usesinternational environmental standards asprimary standards in assessment ofdomestic environmental policy andscience needs.5 Existing environmentalpolicies are measured against interna-tional standards – usually taken from EUdirectives and international environ-mental agreements – in attempts to“harmonize” domestic environmentalpolicy with exogenous standards. Statecapacity proves to be a key limitingfactor on the domestic influence ofinternational regimes and “harmoniza-tion” programs in transition countries.In other words, many post-communist
states are incapable of meetinginternational standards, not unwilling todo so.
Such work confirms findingsfrom other research on the effectivenessof international environmental institu-tions and foreign aid programs,6 whichfound capacity to be one of threeconditions for effectiveness of interna-tional institutions (the other two aresufficient concern and solutions tocontractual problems). Like mostinternational organizations and regimes,regional seas regimes rely on states,governments, and public bureaucraciesto implement their projects and enforcenew laws, regulations, and procedures.In most cases of international assistance(or aid) – almost by definition – capacityin the recipient country is lacking.Political science and policy research istherefore interested in administrativecapacity and “the ability of non-governmental organizations and domes-tic political institutions to translateconcern…into policy.”7 When efforts tobuild capacity fail, often they do sobecause of a lack of domestic concern inthe recipient country about the policyobjective.8 Other foreign and interna-tional policy-related research alsoidentifies the importance of domesticinstitutions and capacity to formulateand implement policy.9 Such workcatalogues numerous cases in whichinternational organizations and programsassisted in building public sectorcapacity – in post-communist, less-developed, and developed countries –for environmental protection and com-pliance with international obligations.
Recent research, mostly derivedfrom areas of environmental, economicand social policy, suggests that (at least)four broad types of state capacity exist:institutional capacity, technical capacity,
10
administrative capacity, and politicalcapacity.10 Most bilateral and multilateral capacity building programs focusalmost exclusively on the enhancementof technical capacity through suchactivities as education and trainingprograms. A multifaceted approach tostate capacity suggests that theseprograms are likely to fail if broaderadministrative, institutional, and politicalconsiderations remain ignored orunattended.
Recent work on capacity buildingtakes the quality of public sector humanresources, organizations, and institutionsas central to good governance.11 Table 1illustrates these three dimensions ofpublic sector capacity, includingexamples of foci and specific activities
within each dimension. Grindle and hercolleagues have identified many casestudies of capacity building programsaround the world to illustrate that allthree dimensions (human resources,organizations, and institutions) are inter-related. As such, capacity buildinginitiatives which largely ignore one ortwo of the dimensions in favor ofanother court failure. While mostcapacity building initiatives concentrateon one dimension, the other dimensions'impacts on public sector performancecannot be ignored. Furthermore, withoutcareful analysis of actual causes ofincapacity in given situations, the initialfocus of capacity building programs maybe misguided.
Table 1: Capacity Building Initiatives (Grindle, 1997)Dimension Focus ActivitiesHuman Resource Development Supply of professional and
Institutional Reform Institutions and systems;macrostructures
Rules of the game foreconomic and politicalregimes, policy and legalchange, constitutional reform
Capacity – like incapacity – iscontingent on contextual factorsassociated with the public sectorfunctions under examination. Social science research has demonstrated theimportance of critical and/or evaluativesocial institutions to the reliability,utility, and credibility of knowledge inpublic decision-making in areas of such
complexity. For example, studies ofregulatory decision making in the USillustrate the value of multipleopportunities for diverse participants tocritique and challenge the use of expertknowledge in policy making.12 In areassuch as food and drug regulations andenvironmental and public healthstandards, such participants form
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“critical communities” within “criticalinstitutions” – so called organizedskepticism – in the framing, production,validation, and utilization of expertisefor policy. In terms of the threedimensional capacity building frame-work discussed above, the state oforganizational and institutional forms oforganized skepticism are important toconsider. As such, capacity buildingefforts are advised to assess and evaluatethe state of systems for critique andlearning within the organizations theytarget and within the larger institutionalenvironment.
Highly complex policy areassuch as public health, occupationalsafety, economic management, andenvironmental protection requireinstitutionalized systems of critique andlearning if they are to develop and besustainable over time. Because of themany differences across countries –culture, understandings of risk,organizational and institutional struc-tures, and so on – one should not expectthe specific organizational forms oflearning and critique (here called“organized skepticism”) will be the sameacross countries and cultures. Onemight expect, however, that a number offunctions must be accomplished if safemanagement is to be constructed. Suchfunctions include information sharing,monitoring, inspection, policy andsystems critique, and evaluation and useof results of critical analysis. Suchfunctions should be identifiable in allthree of Grindle’s dimensions ofcapacity. In short, if expertise isimportant to decision-making within allthree dimensions, then institutions oforganized skepticism are critical in allthree.
In the United States, for example,public sector capacity is deeply
embedded in systems of learning andcritique – embedded in larger communi-ties of technical and policymakingexpertise and analysis. Policy making indemocratic societies has developed intandem with the use of scientific andtechnical information and institutions oforganized skepticism.13 Furthermore,personnel and some aspects of programsand organizational structure are subjectto periodic assessment, such asemployee evaluation or congressionalscrutiny. Of course, this does not meanthat the US public sector alwaysfunctions effectively, efficiently, and/orreasonably. Nor does it mean thatpeople or organizations always respondto critique by attempting to improveoperations. Sometimes they do andsometimes they do not. Some peopleand programs are more insulated fromcritique than others. The existence ofcritical communities is not a guarantor ofhighly effective and efficient policy. Itis more accurately understood as anecessary condition. Such systems ofcritique and learning are, of course, notsolely responsible for policy outcomes.Yet they remain central to policy-making in the United States and otherdemocratic states and open societies.
Institutions of organized skepti-cism and associated critical communitiescontain nodes of expertise (individuals,groups, and organizations) associatedwith critical communities. Members ofsuch communities often push for greateraccountability, effectiveness, efficiencyor transparency. They sometimescritique aspects of their organizations’views and practices, or those of otherorganizations. In addition, fundingprotocols, exchange and educationprograms, and shared formal andinformal networks link actors and roles.Individuals often move across or among
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the actor groups. Like the other membersof the organizations, they belong tonumerous technical, policy, or issuenetworks. All are involved in forms ofinformation production, consumption,and distribution regarding, for example,marine and riverine environmentalprotection, sewage treatment, and/orhabitat protection and management.
Organizations involved inWestern environmental protection alsoexist within larger systems ofinstitutionalized social practices oforganized skepticism and critique.Examples of such institutions includepublic debate, protest, public hearings,investigative journalism, human resourcemanagement systems and ideas,academic research and analysis, andenvironmental impact statement proce-dures – to name only a few. Thesepractices constitute well-establishedinstitutions within US and West Euro-pean democracy and society. Many donot have well-established or wellfunctioning analogues in many post-communist and lesser developed coun-tries.
Technical assistance programs –which constitute a large fraction ofinternational assistance within the Med-iterranean regime – in particular havebeen criticized for their frequent failureto increase public sector capacity.14
What is clear, however, is that “thedesign of such projects and the contextin which they are carried out are primarydeterminants of success or failure.”15 Inother words, success of technicalassistance programs is contingent onmuch more than whether or not thetechnologies “work.” To put itdifferently, if technical assistanceprograms fail it is likely to be the fault ofprogram design, not the fault ofrecipients. If such assistance programs
are not sensitive to institutional andorganizational context and humanresource issues – and hence, designedinappropriately – recipients should notbe blamed when programs fail to achieveestablished goals.
Foreign assistance programs,bilateral and multilateral, tend to bedonor driven. They are usually designedby donors, rather than recipients.Analysis of many assistance programsoperated by multilateral banks suggeststhat this frequently results in donorslooking around for problems to which toapply their pre-conceived assistanceprograms.16 While donors have im-portant roles to play, under involvementof aid recipients often leads to programdesigns which fail to take local andnational context and personnel intoaccount. As problems with technicalassistance programs illustrate, capacitybuilding initiatives often fail to assessthe actual roots of constraints on theperformance of individuals andorganizations. Instead, they focus onconcrete and obvious (to donors)expressions of incapacity such as theabsence of certain technologies orprocedures, or failure to perform specificfunctions.17 Unfortunately, these typesof identified incapacity are oftensymptoms, not causes, of organizationaland institutional dysfunction.
In sum, social science and policyanalysis research on capacity buildingprograms demonstrates that:
good governance requires time,commitment, innovative ideas,consensus building, changedbehavior and norms for thosewho work in the public sector,new rules of the game, efficientdesign and resource allocation intechnical assistance… [B]uilding
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state capacity also requireseffective efforts to develop hu-man resource capacity, particu-larly among technical and pro-fessional staff; organizationalstrengthening initiatives, particu-larly those focused on incentiveand managerial systems; andinstitutional reforms, particularlythose that address underlyingconstraints on government tocontribute more effectively…18
With this view of capacity building inmind, a particular awareness of the im-portance of organizations and institu-tions for organized skepticism, and therole of technical assistance, the follow-ing section assesses the ability and po-tential of the Baltic and Mediterraneanenvironmental protection regimes tobuild environmental management ca-pacity in lesser developed and post-communist countries.
Baltic CooperationIn the environmental protection
regime around the Baltic Sea, stateparties agreed to two regionalconventions designed to protect theBaltic against pollution (in 1974 and1992). The 1974 Helsinki Conventionestablished the Helsinki Commission(HELCOM), cooperation which hasresulted in over 175 recommendationson pollution control and environmentalmanagement in the Baltic region. Inaddition, HELCOM participates (oftenformulating final statements) in regionalministerial-level meetings – which haverepeatedly produced declarations withsubstantial environmental commitmentsand content. Over time, HELCOMrecommendations have become morespecific and more stringent. Theregime’s activities, the scope of its
environmental commitments and the sizeof the HELCOM organization also havegrown substantially over the last 20-plusyears.
HELCOM's expansion has crit-ics, however. Some governmental andnongovernmental organization (NGO)participants complain that the organiza-tion is too large, expensive, and slow toact.19 Of particular concern is the num-ber of HELCOM meetings each year. In1994 there were 45 such meetings, eachlasting three or four days. Such largeparticipant time commitments forHELCOM activities mean that the re-gime constitutes a significant portion ofindividual participants’ professional ac-tivities. However, the frequency andlength of meetings also demonstratesthat HELCOM has the capacity to prom-ulgate its principles, policy norms, andstandards to individuals from (andwithin) member states.
HELCOM has amassed a numberof environmental and organizationalsuccesses. Oil inputs into the Baltic Seadeclined as have concentrations in livingorganisms of toxic substances such asDDT, PCBs, mercury, and cadmium.20
The numbers of gray seals, ringed seals,harbor porpoises, and some bird speciesappear to be recovering slowly, thoughmostly on the Northern side of theBaltic.21 International and transnationalcooperation around HELCOM greatlyincreased the likelihood that vesselsviolating environmental regulationswould be caught and held responsible.22
It also increased coordination incombating accidents and minimizingtheir environmental damage. Theexchange of technical information andknowledge became commonplace,intensifying steadily following the 1974signing and expanding greatly after thecollapse of state-socialist governance.
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International cooperation has helped toreduce phosphorus or nitrogen loads,though these declines remain far short ofthose needed to reduce eutrophicationand exceptional planktonic algaeblooms.23 Despite a host of remainingenvironmental challenges, general agree-ment exists among Baltic officials andmembers of the regional scientificcommunity, that the Baltic Sea wouldhave deteriorated into a more pollutedbody of water – with significantecological and economic costs – in theabsence of the 1974 Convention and theensuing forms of environmentalcooperation.Domestic Influence and Implementation
Significant HELCOM regimeinfluence on environmental policy canbe identified in Estonia, Latvia, andLithuania. HELCOM requirements andrecommendations are frequently used inthese countries' domestic environmentallaws and policies. As in manyMediterranean states, environmentalcapacity remains a major constraint onRussian HELCOM implementation.24
HELCOM coordinates the Baltic SeaJoint Comprehensive EnvironmentalAction Programme (JCP) identifiesenvironmental problems and prioritizesaction in all of the countries of the Balticcatchment area. Its main focus, how-ever, rests on the most severely degradedareas in the former communist states.The Programme serves as a long-termoutline for curative and preventiveenvironmental action to clean upexisting and ongoing ecological damagefrom point and non-point sources,promote sustainable development, andimprove domestic legislation, regulation,institutional capacity, resource use, andfinancing for environmental activities.25
The JCP covers six component areas ofaction: (1) policy, legal, and regulatory
reform; (2) institutional strengtheningand human resources development; (3)infrastructure investment; (4) manage-ment of coastal lagoons and wetlands;(5) applied research; and (6) publicawareness and environmentaleducation.26 The total cost of the 20-year program is estimated at 18 billionECU (approximately $25 billion). TheJCP’s six components include activitiestargeting the multiple dimensions ofcapacity building discussed above.Rather than a near exclusive focus ontechnical assistance (e.g. construction,equipment provision and technicaltraining), the JCP seeks to assistrecipient states in building statecapacities and public awareness andparticipation.
HELCOM intended the JCP toidentify areas of need and legitimizethem through expert scientific andtechnical assessment. HELCOM organ-izes resource mobilization workshops,bringing together officials and privatesector actors in the post-communiststates with representatives of bilateraland multilateral donor and lendingorganizations and prospective foreigninvestors (see Gutner, this report). Ahigh-level HELCOM task forcecompiled the JCP based on nationalplans drafted by all of the participantstates, pre-feasibility studies, and specialstudies of specific ecological areas ofconcern such as wetlands andagricultural runoff. International NGOscommented on drafts of the pre-feasibility studies and the preliminaryversion of the JCP, includingGreenpeace International, WorldWideFund for Nature (WWF), and CoalitionClean Baltic (CCB). CCB is a trans-national umbrella group for local andnational environmental NGOs from allof the Baltic littoral states. It serves as a
15
vehicle for environmental NGOs inWestern Baltic states to support those intransition states.
The JCP calls for the use ofnumerous domestic, bilateral, andmultilateral funding schemes and itidentifies a significant private sector rolewithin the context of the privatization,restructuring, and modernizationprocesses underway in the formercommunist countries. HELCOM and allregime participants have been clear that“co-financing” for environmentalprojects would be the rule rather than theexception. In other words, local andnational beneficiaries of these projectsare expected to share costs. The JCPwas explicitly formulated to serve as abasis for consideration by themultilateral development banksparticipating in the task force.
The JCP offers a comprehensiveoutline of the required steps to improveregional, national, and local ecologicalquality and state capacity, oftenaddressing specific regions, states, andindustrial sectors. In short, the JCPoperationalizes the regime’s centralprinciples and norms. The implementa-tion of the JCP, as the operationalizationof transnational regime principles andnorms, takes HELCOM deeper intodomestic political arenas. It has madeHELCOM a “player” in thereconstruction of post-communistEstonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
Co-financing, combining finan-cial resources from numerous interna-tional and domestic sources, has beenthe primary means of funding most hotspot mitigation and developmentprograms.27 International fundingsources include the World Bank, theEuropean Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment (EBRD), the EuropeanInvestment Bank (EIB), Nordic Invest-
ment Bank (NIB), and the EU (throughthe PHARE and LIFE programs)28 andWWF as well as the governments ofFinland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany,Switzerland, Canada, Netherlands, Nor-way, France, the United Kingdom, andthe United States. Of these, bilateralassistance programs of the donor coun-tries of the Baltic region (Denmark,Finland, and Sweden) are by far thelargest sources of internationalfunding.29
Scientists, Principles, and NormsHELCOM’s regional authority
and legitimacy was established on thebasis of its scientific and technicalorientation and its use of relateddiscourses. While regional politicalchanges opened the way for regimechange in the Baltic, the nature anddirection of the change, during the 1988-1992 period, was shaped largely byHELCOM and ministerial meetings.HELCOM functioned both as theregional knowledge broker, by framingscientific findings within the context ofthe organization's principles and norms,and as an entrepreneurial leader, bymoving to participate in, and takeadvantage of, dramatic political changesin the region. HELCOM officials alsobrokered scientific consensus for stateleaders, gradually “renegotiating”understandings of sovereignty andaccess to information.
The fundamental principles andpolicy norms of the Baltic Seaenvironmental protection regime stillrest heavily on scientific and technologi-cal consensus and authority. However,recent changes in these principles andnorms move the regime in a moreexplicitly political and (environmentally)ideological direction. This shift oc-curred with the active support andparticipation of the scientists within the
16
regime and HELCOM's various bodies.Rather than merely embodyingnormative consensus (and on somepoints, a lack of consensus) as outlinedin the 1974 Convention, HELCOM andmany of the regime participantsembarked on a mission to broaden,reformulate, and reconstruct a newregional normative consensus. Duringthe 1980s, consensus on new principlesand norms emerged at the elite level –mostly among the region’s scientists andacross European environmental policycommunities. Thus, HELCOM pro-grams now attempt to alter and changethe regional consensus on principles andnorms for environmental policy amongand within its member states. Theresulting regional environmentalprotection regime has expanded wellbeyond its original scientific andtechnological focus.
HELCOM attempts to addressorganizational and resource shortcom-ings with training seminars andconferences, marshalling World Bank,EU, and bilateral support. Themultilateral banks are interested indeveloping local institutional andorganizational capacity and encouragingdecentralization, especially in municipalservices such as water, waste and power.The United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) and the WorldBank organized a Water Supply andSewage Utilities Partnership Workshopunder their program “Baltic UtilitiesInitiative,” “where the need forautonomous and self sufficient publicutilities has been emphasized.”30
Environment ministries also recognizethe need for more such training andcapacity building programs. Multilateralefforts at retraining public officials andindividuals facilitate the transfer of
Many international donors areinterested in promoting the polluter paysprinciple and expanding organizationaland administrative capacity. Forexample, the World Bank is organizing aUS$20 million Municipal ServicesDevelopment Project aimed at financinginvestments in municipal services andtechnical assistance to Latvian munici-palities.31 As in Estonia, bilateralenvironmental assistance to Latvia isalso strongly influenced by the HelsinkiConventions, HELCOM recommenda-tions, and the JCP.32 As the largestsources of funding, these programs areespecially important. The level ofpersonal contacts between Latvian andenvironmental experts from Finland andSweden is also high, includingenvironment-related advisory, exchangeand training programs, conferences, andjoint research projects. Their existencehelps to explain the transference ofscientific, political, and environmentaldiscourses across the Baltic. Activitiesconsistent with JCP implementation,under all six of the program’scomponents, explain much of thetransfer of institutions like regionalprinciples and policy norms.Institution Building
How are transnational principlesand environmental policy norms trans-ferred into Baltic state law andregulation? In addition to changes in theregional discourse regarding Balticenvironmental protection, one can citethe many training seminars, conferences,and education programs conducted inassociation with HELCOM activities.33
Programs associated with JCP elements1 and 2 (law and policy, and institutionalcapacity and human resources) are alsoimportant. Finland and Sweden alone
17
have spent millions of ECU on trainingand environmental management pro-grams.34 Multilateral sources includingEBRD, PHARE, and the HarvardInstitute for International Developmenthave supported at least six programsconcerning implementation of JCPelements 1 and 2.35 These programs areguided by the basic principles of theHELCOM regime, generally includingsessions on implementation of centralenvironmental policy norms andharmonization with EU environmentalstandards.
Given their generallytechnocratic nature, both HELCOM andthe EU tend to focus their trainingefforts on those who are supposed toimplement and enforce environmentalpolicy, rather than those who draft it. Insmall countries, however, theseindividuals are often the same people.For example, Estonian officials partici-pate in HELCOM Program Implementa-tion Task Force (PITF) seminarsdesigned to educate them on the natureand content of HELCOMrecommendations and the JCP. In fact,national officials are thoroughlyeducated about international environ-mental commitments and standards. Asa result of the high level of involvementof Finnish and Swedish environmentalofficials, Estonian national policymakersare well-versed in Swedish and Finnishpolicy, as well. Institutional capacityand expertise at local levels remains low,however. Programs organized withdomestic and international financesunder JCP elements 5 and 6 (appliedresearch and public awareness) alsopromulgate HELCOM norms in Estonia.Their content is usually stronglyinfluenced by JCP goals and HELCOMrecommendations. In particular, pro-grammatic reforms in higher education
programs for environmental manage-ment and research influence policydevelopment over time.
While training, institutionbuilding, and public awareness activitiesreceive international expert advice andsome international financing (fromsources like EU PHARE, Finland,HELCOM PITF, Sweden, and the U.S.Environmental Protection Agency allrequire substantial support fromdomestic sources. This is consistentwith the co-sponsoring requirements ofthe JCP. Programs are guided by thefundamental principles and policy normspromulgated by HELCOM, focussing onthe application of HELCOM and EUprinciples, policy norms, and regulatorystandards. Thus, multiple mechanismsfor the cross border transfer ofinstitutions such as principles and normscan be identified within the many JCPimplementation activities. For example,nature protection areas programsincorporate the precautionary principleby assuming economic activities damagethe areas when natural resources areextracted from these areas, polluter anduser pays schemes are applied.
Environmental policy changes inthe Baltic states, particularly Estonia andLatvia, demonstrate that internationalassistance aimed at institutional andorganizational capacity building canwork. The knowledge and expertise ofBaltic national environmental policy-makers and managers have grownrapidly since the late 1980s. Much ofthis growth resulted from bilateral andinternational sponsorship of training andassistance programs. Because of lack-luster Soviet efforts to implement orpublicize HELCOM recommendations,detailed knowledge of them was lackingin the Baltic states. International educa-tion and training efforts rectified this
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situation. Bilateral and EU assistanceprograms also raised levels of know-ledge and technical expertise concerningEU environmental policies. HELCOMand EU principles, policy norms, andstandards shape domestic environmentalpolicy in the Baltic states.
Higher levels of Swedish andFinnish political, economic and histori-cal involvement with Estonia and Latvia– relative to Danish-Lithuanian coopera-tion – helps to explain Lithuania's lag-ging environmental policy reforms.Certainly, domestic factors also play animportant role in explaining Lithuania'slagging environmental policy reforms.International support in all three Balticstates remains far below the levels re-quired to fully implement HELCOM'sJCP and the plan remains unimple-mented in the majority of hotspots – es-pecially industrial and agricultural ones.However, feasibility studies and mitiga-tion plans are generally complete or un-derway. Such reports serve as mecha-nisms for transnational institutionaltransfer because they are conducted inaccordance with JCP and HELCOMprinciples and norms.
Both the Baltic and theMediterranean regimes serve as arenasfor environmental negotiation andconsensus building among the moredeveloped members. However, HEL-COM serves this function with greaterfrequency than does the MAP, where EUbodies tend to be the fora for theseagreements. In the Baltic, westernEuropean states most often serve as leadcountries in the development of newproposals. They have used the regime tonegotiate specific environmental stan-dards for specific industries and wastewater treatment plants. In general,developed states built consensus amongthemselves and then attempted to bring
the communist (now post-communist)states on board. This process helpsdeveloped states in the Baltic regionavoid or reduce competitive dis-advantages stemming from stringentdomestic environmental policy. Balticministerial meetings amplified domesticenvironmental concern, creating a kindof international “greenness” competitionamong states such as Denmark,Germany and Sweden.36 These statesoften play international environmentalinstitutions and programs such asHELCOM, OSPARCOM, and the EU,off of one another – working to getstronger policies that they supportadopted in one forum in order topressure others. In addition, regime in-stitutions increase information sharing aswell as joint spill-combating exercises,research, and monitoring in the region.
Mediterranean CooperationIn the Mediterranean region,
states’ representatives formulated theMediterranean Action Plan (MAP) andnegotiated and adopted the 1976framework Barcelona Convention andeight subsequent pollution control andenvironmental management protocols.Over time, these protocols expanded thescope and increased the specificity ofinternational commitments in the region.Regional activities and the number ofenvironmental organizations havegrown, as have the number of interstatecooperation programs for research,information exchange, and pilot projects.
To date, parties have adoptedthirteen common measures, recentlyamending the Barcelona Convention andthree of its protocols. Amendmentsexpand coverage of the Convention toinclude coastal areas and incorporateimportant new concepts in environ-mental governance and management into
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the agreements. State parties developed ahighly specified set of rules, proceduresand mandates for regime-sponsoredconferences, meetings, Med Planadministration, Regional Action Centres(RACs) and other regime programs andactivities.37 Other accomplishments in-clude “Action Plans” to protect monkseals (1987), marine turtles (1989),cetaceans (1991) and encourage sustain-able development.
Organizationally, the regime hasgrown substantially in 25 years. Partiesestablished a Coordinating Unit for theMed Plan in 1982, taking the Secretariatand some administrative functions out ofUNEP's headquarters (then in Geneva).To date, there are eight RACs thatadminister various MAP programs andfacilitate implementation of theBarcelona Convention and its protocols.With the growth in MAP'sorganizational structure has comegrowth in the number of programs,training seminars, consultant activities,meetings, conferences, presentations,and publications. Staff and budgets ateach RAC remain small and each RAC’sactivities fall well short of the list taskedto it upon creation. MAP regimeorganizational bodies are not wellcoordinated, nor clearly related within asingle organizational structure.Implications of this decentralizedstructure are discussed below. The MAPregime also includes numerous inter-governmental and nongovernmentalorganizations (IGOs [intergovernmentalorganizations] and NGOs) in itsactivities. The numbers and activities ofNGOs participating in the regime grewover time. While direct collaborationwith the MAP Coordinating Unitremains rare and often vaguely defined,NGOs actively participate and supportmany regime activities. Their role is less
central than in the Baltic regime,however, where NGOs serve as “leadparties” for policy research andimplementation.
Other international level accom-plishments include the “refocusing” ofregime programs on coastal areamanagement and sustainabledevelopment.38 These changes reflectalterations in the views and discourse ofthe region's environmental scientists incombination with renewed interestsamong regime participants in revivingthe MAP's integrated developmentplanning component. From an ecologi-cal perspective, greater focus on coastalareas is significant because pollutionremains most chronic there. Politically,the regime has managed to overcomestates' traditional reluctance to makeinternational regulatory commitmentsregarding the use and pollution ofcoastal water – long considered part ofstates' sovereign territory and not subjectto multilateral decision making.
The success of internationalcooperation within the Med Plan regimeis limited, however. The environmentalimpacts or “improvements” resultingfrom all of this international cooperationremain small, few in number, andcontroversial. Oil spillage andbiological contamination of beacheshave fallen, but eutrophication, beachtar, and solid litter appear to be on theincrease.39 Coastal development re-mains largely unplanned and un-constrained by environmental concernsand habitat losses continue.40 Whilesewage treatment capacities grow, so dopopulations, economies, and wastegeneration. Environmental protection ofthe region’s dune and wetland eco-systems, ancient harbors and historicalsites, threatened species and marineparks remains poor or non-existent.41
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MAP has implementation plans for thegrowing number of internationalcommitments within the regime. In fact,little assessment of nationalimplementation even exists on whichsuch plans could be based. Parties havefailed to agree on the annexes andcommon measures necessary to assessimplementation of existing protocols.EU Influence
The limited success of regionalMediterranean cooperation demonstratesthat states, international organizations,NGOs and expert communities can re-spond to environmental challenges at theinternational level. The MAP regime is“transnationalizing environmental pol-icy.” Recent MAP agreements are char-acterized by greater specificity andscope and the regime's research activitiesand demonstration projects expandknowledge and participation around theregion. Driven by scientific consensusand discourse, individuals and organiza-tions with normative and material inter-ests in international political and scien-tific participation can establish andmaintain regional cooperation. Statelevel implementation remains problem-atic, however.
The Med Plan regime facilitatesenvironmental cooperation and standardsetting among the developed states aswell, especially France and Italy. Exceptin cases where EU standards are alreadyestablished, however, the developedMediterranean states have not alwaysdemonstrated high levels of cooperationwith each other. Recently, this haschanged somewhat, with the four EUMediterranean states cooperating inpursuit of agreement and adoption ofnew protocols to the Barcelona Con-vention.
Little “competitive greenness”occurs among the states around the
Mediterranean. EU applicant states haveadded some of this to the region, how-ever. In need of ways to demonstratetheir willingness to adopt EU environ-mental policies and standards, Cyprus,Malta, and Slovenia have been quick tofollow EU states in adopting new re-gional protocols. In contrast to the Bal-tic regime, where the most developedmembers frequently pushed for higherstandards, UNEP is often the drivingforce in the MAP regime. As in theBaltic region, developed Mediterraneanstates use the MAP regime as a vehicleto “export” their higher environmentalstandards around their region. In effect,EU Mediterranean states are sometimes“forced to lead” in the regional regime ifthey are to reduce competitive disad-vantages arising from higher environ-mental standards imposed by the EU.
In the Mediterranean region,regime influence on nationalenvironmental law and regulation varies,but remains generally low. In EU states,the Union’s greater legal and financialcapacity to pursue member stateimplementation of EU directives (sincethe Single European Act of 1987 and the1992 treaty of Maastricht) has indirectlyresulted in greater implementation ofMAP requirements. Despite an im-pressive list of international accomplish-ments, the regime has limited influenceon domestic environmental policies andstate implementation in the region. EUmembership and aspirations of suchmembership are more importantdeterminants of state level implementa-tion of international environmentalcommitments around the Mediterraneanregion. Member states France, Greece,Italy, and Spain witnessed growingstringency in environmental laws andpolicies over the last twenty years. In allfour states, environmental policy
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development was guided and pushed byEC/EU environmental policy, rather thanby the MAP regime.
Among states currently applyingto the EU, MAP implementationincreased as a result of these states’attempts to introduce environmentalpolicies equivalent to those of the Union.Four non-EU Mediterranean states haveformally pursued EU membership:Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, and Turkey. Inaddition, Croatian officials haveannounced their intention to apply formembership. Though they remainedMAP regime members in good standing,Malta and Cyprus only moved to expandenvironmental law and regulation in the1990s following their interest in EUmembership. Likewise, Slovenia andCroatia expanded and strengthened theirenvironmental protection policies inparallel with their growing interest in EUmembership. All four states availthemselves of the EU assistance andcapacity building programs for whichthey are eligible. Turkey, on the otherhand, was influenced by MAP activitiesin the early years of the regime.42 AsTurkish interests in EU membership(and its prospects for it) waned in the1990s, so has state interest inenvironmental protection. Thus, in EUmember states and applicant states, theUnion rather than MAP exerts greaterinfluence on states’ environmentalpolicy.In the Mediterranean region,regime influence on national environ-mental law and regulation varies, butremains generally low. In EU states, theUnion’s greater legal and financialcapacity to pursue member stateimplementation of EU directives (sincethe Single European Act of 1987 and the1992 treaty of Maastricht) has indirectlyresulted in greater implementation ofMAP requirements. Among states cur-
rently applying to the EU, MAPimplementation increased as a result ofthese states’ attempts to introduceenvironmental policies equivalent tothose of the Union. Thus, in EU mem-ber states and applicant states, the Unionrather than MAP exerts greater influenceon states’ environmental policy.Scientific Institutions, State Capacity,and Implementation
Scientific collaboration andcooperation is widespread, involvinghundreds of scientists and scientificorganizations, producing massiveamounts of data and hundreds ofpublications, conferences and conferencepapers, workshops, training seminarsand demonstration projects. Peter Haasoutlines national level environmentalpolicy progress in the 1980s in Algeria,Egypt, and Turkey, positing thesecountries as best cases for demonstrationof national level epistemic communityinfluence.43 However, little hashappened at the national level sincethese states’ initial interests in domesticenvironmental policy. Like the regimehe studied, Haas neglected criticalquestions concerning these states’organizational capacity vis-a-visenvironmental policy. In the wake ofstagnant or declining state environmentalcapacity, little environmental policydevelopment or implementation hasoccurred in Algeria, Egypt, or Turkey.Furthermore, collapsing state capacity inAlbania, Bosnia, and Lebanon have leftthese states devoid of comprehensiveenvironmental policy – let alone MAPimplementation. Libya and Syria alsolack sufficient state environmentalpolicy capacity to comply or implementMAP commitments and state officialshave not attempted to build it. In manyMediterranean states, only pilotprograms and projects with international
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funds appear to be influenced sig-nificantly by internationally agreed uponenvironmental standards. Without aminimum level of state capacity, there isno policy development for experts toinfluence, nor any place for theinstitutionalization of environmentallyfriendlier principles and policy norms tooccur.
One group of Mediterraneanstates clearly lacks the ability toimplement comprehensive environ-mental policies of the kind requiredunder the Med Plan: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria.Yugoslavia, a state traditionallysupportive of the Med Plan regime, nolonger exists as it was. It remains toosoon to know what posture the smallerYugoslavia will take toward the MedPlan regime. In Albania, Bosnia, andLebanon, state control and authority overthe populations and territories withintheir recognized boundaries remainsproblematic. The same can be said forAlgeria, Cyprus, Turkey, and Yugo-slavia. If states lack basic authority overtheir populations and territory, it isunrealistic to expect (or pretend) thatthey can successfully implement andenforce international environmentalagreements.
The Mediterranean environ-mental protection regime does little toaddress the lack of state capacity infailing states. Is the organizationalcollapse witnessed in these statestemporary, or longer-term? If tempo-rary, then regime participants mighteasily choose to wait out crises. If,however, the low levels of stateenvironmental policy capacity found inthe region are part of a long-termproblem, the Med Plan’s ability toprotect the Mediterranean from pollutionwill remain constrained because MAP
relies on states for implementation.Albania, Bosnia, Lebanon possessvirtually no state environmental capac-ity. In general, they lack most aspects ofenvironmental law, regulation, andadministration needed to comply with orimplement MAP requirements.
Another group of Mediterraneanstates might best be characterized as“muddling through” in the area ofenvironmental policy. In these states,state environmental policy capacity isnot increasing over time despite theincreasing number and scope ofinternational environmental commit-ments. Such states include Algeria,Egypt, Turkey, Libya, and Syria. In fact,state environmental capacity in some ofthese states may be declining. Absentincreasing EU efforts to assist andcompel Greece to comply with andimplement international environmentalcommitments, Greece also might beconsidered a “muddling through” state.
Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey arethree of the Mediterranean states thatembarked on environmental policy andbureaucracy expansions following theconstruction of the Med Plan regime inthe 1970s. All three are among PeterHaas’ “strongest cases” of epistemiccommunity influence.44 Ongoing civilconflicts, high population growth, andanemic or negative per capita economicgrowth combined to halt “epistemicallydriven” environmental policy develop-ment in these states. As noted above,Turkey's commitment to environmentalpolicy and regulatory expansion wanedwith its interest and prospects for EUmembership.
“Informed” by epistemic com-munity members, Algeria and Egyptembarked on efforts to incorporate manyaspects of the regional environmentaldiscourse into law and policy in the
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1970s and 1980s.45 These states passedbasic environmental laws, ratifiedinternational environmental agreements,established administrative bodies forpollution control and participated innumerous Med Plan regime activities.However, domestic political elites“talked the talk” of internationalenvironmental protection. Since the late1980s little domestic environmentalpolicy expansion has occurred, despite agrowing number of internationalcommitments. The authoritative infor-mation and discourse of scientific andtechnical experts proved unable tosignificantly affect law and regulatorypolicy in these states. Algeria and Egyptlack the material and administrativeresources to implement, monitor, andenforce environmental policy. In bothstates, social conflict and laggingeconomic growth constrain the ability ofstates to prioritize medium and longer-term concerns.
In Libya and Syria the story isdifferent. These authoritarian states donot appear to be experiencing generalstate organizational crisis. However,neither state has witnessed much growthin environmental law, regulation, oradministrative bureaucracy. Domesticlaw, policy, and administrative structureshave not kept pace with increasinginternational environmental commit-ments. Rather than “muddling through,”both appear to be losing ground vis-B-visstate environmental capacity. Libya andSyria remain minimally supportive ofthe MAP regime. Their participation atinternational conferences is sporadic, butgenerally not obstructionist. Syriaacceded to the Barcelona Conventionand its first four protocols, signing theOffshore Protocol a year after itsadoption in 1994. Syrian officials rarelyparticipate in the preparation or adoption
of the regime's recent multilateralagreements, lacking representationduring the preparation of recent proto-cols.
Libyan officials ratified theBarcelona Convention and its first twoprotocols and approved the Land BasedSources and Special Areas protocols –all following the agreements’ entry intoforce. Libya did not sign either theOffshore nor the Syracuse protocols.Syria and Libya possess little domesticenvironmental legislation, regulation, oradministration. This situation haschanged little in the last twenty years.Libyan and Syrian participation in theregime might best illustrate a“rationalist” or “instrumentalist” ap-proach to international environmentalcooperation. Both states remainreluctant to make additional internationalcommitments until such agreementsenter into force. Once in force, regime-sponsored compliance and imple-mentation programs begin or expand.These programs frequently offer limitedfunds for research, planning, informationsharing, and participation in meetingsand travel. Given each state’s smallannual contribution to the regime, bothLibya and Syria get positive returns onregime participation – especially sinceneither has aggressively pursued costlydomestic implementation.
The regional environmentaleffects of state collapse in small statesremain small. However, the lack ofenvironmental policy progress in statessuch as Algeria, Egypt, Greece, andTurkey is another story. Both the WorldBank and the EU have stepped upfunding for state environmental capacitybuilding. But such funds continue torepresent a small portion of developmentassistance given by these bodies.Furthermore, even if World Bank and
24
EU development assistance wereadequately “greened” – a highly ques-tionable proposition – the amount ofsuch assistance relative to domestic andforeign investment is quite small.Without functioning state organizations,there exists no location for theembedding of transnational principlesand norms for environmental policy.
Most bilateral and multilateralcapacity building programs focus almostexclusively on the enhancement oftechnical capacity through such activitiesas education and training programs. Yet,merely increasing the technical skills ofa given set of individuals or simplyincreasing their access to particular typesof technology is unlikely to improvescience advice to policymakers. Norwill it automatically improve policy-makers’ capacities to act on such advice.As such, a few internationally sponsoredprograms, such as MEDPOL, areunlikely to expand state capacity. Forexample, neither science-based policyadvice nor the actions taken on such abasis are likely to produce effectivepolicy absent domestic institutions tocritique and frame scientific andtechnical information.46 Merely fundingscientific and technical programs inrecipient countries will not createscience-policy institutions and insti-tutions of organized skepticism auto-matically. A multifaceted approach tostate capacity suggests that programsfocussed exclusively or even primarilyon technical capacity alone are likely tofail, if broader administrative, insti-tutional and political considerationsremain ignored or unattended.
Regional environmental coop-eration and implementation of inter-national commitments is constrained byvery limited, often declining, stateorganizational capacity in many
Mediterranean countries. Internationalscientific and/or policy cooperationproduces increased environmental law,regulation, or protection absent adequatestate administrative and legal capacity.States facing challenges presented bylow levels of organizational capacity, inother words, can not “walk the walk” ofincreasing environmental protection.The MAP regime has done little toaddress this problem. With fewprospects for increased funding, theregime is unlikely to possess thecapabilities to combat lagging stateenvironmental policy capacity anytimesoon. Such states do not lack commit-ment to the regime, its goals, or thecommitments they made in internationalagreements; they lack the ability tooperationalize environmental discourseand administer environmental policy.47
Other states, including Albania, Bosnia,Lebanon, Libya, and Syria, lack stateenvironmental policy capacityaltogether.
In both the Baltic andMediterranean seas, regional environ-mental improvements that can beattributed to the regimes remain rare. Inthe Baltic, dramatic reductions inpollution emissions from the formercommunist states primarily result fromdeclines in economic output andproduction since 1989. Notably absentfrom HELCOM’s regional efforts,however, is serious regulation offisheries use. In the Mediterranean, fewdeclines in effluent have been recorded.While coastal water environmentalquality generally and slowly improves inboth regions, regime participants inneither region have yet to improve oreven address marine eutrophication, themajor ecological threat to both seas.Many species remain endangered andhealth-threatening levels of numerous
25
toxins, heavy metals and hazardouswaste discharges continue, andecologically insensitive coastaldevelopment continues apace (particu-larly in the Mediterranean).
ConclusionsIn both the Baltic and the
Mediterranean regions, internationalenvironmental protection regimes andtheir constituent internationalorganizations have successfullyfacilitated international cooperationbetween states with different, oftenopposing, political and economicsystems and with divergent levels ofdevelopment. The Baltic regimemaintained cooperation across the East-West divide while the Med Plan regimemanaged to cope with East-West andNorth-South conflicts, as well as Arab-Israeli and Greek-Turkish tensions. Acentral difference between the regimes,however, is the differing level ofbilateral assistance within them.HELCOM activities frequently facilitate,encourage and request bilateralassistance of a financial, expert,implementation and information gather-ing nature between members. To date,MAP has been less successful atproducing a similar bilateral response.In the Mediterranean, only the EU hasstepped up bilateral assistance forregime programs.
Regime influence at the nationallevel – on law, policy, and implementa-tion – remains uneven in both regions. Ingeneral, national level regime influenceis greater around the Baltic Sea than inthe Mediterranean region. In bothregions it is clear that state capacity andthe availability of financial andadministrative resources remaincentrally important for national leveladoption of regime principles and policy
norms and the implementation ofinternational commitments. In theMediterranean region, state organi-zational capacity is a primary factorlimiting the influence of transnationalnormative force. Without a location inwhich to become embedded, theinfluence of transnational institutionssuch as principles and policy norms onstates remains limited. Both regimesoffer insights into effective ways to buildstate capacity and promote state levelimplementation, adding to recentresearch.48
Institutional and organizationalcapacity building: With respect toenvironmental protection regimes,minimum levels of state institutional andorganizational capacity must exist inboth science and environmental policyadministration to achieve implementa-tion. Regarding scientific capacity, bothregimes have been successful inenhancing regional scientific capacityand in applying scientific consensus topolicy. In fact, both regimes excel atfacilitating the construction of regionalscientific consensus and in spreadingparticipation in scientific and technicalresearch throughout their regions.Regime programs in both regionsinclude the provision of neededscientific and technical training andequipment to meet regional research andmonitoring goals as established by therespective regimes. However, the lackof a centralized regime organizationalstructure and limited state administrativecapacity have limited MAP's abilities topush state compliance with theinternational commitments justified byscientific consensus. Furthermore,enhancing national scientific and tech-nical capacity does not automaticallyenhance science and technology-basedpolicy advice or the capacity of
26
policymakers to use such advice. Theserequire institutionalized understandingsand practices, as well.
Regarding state environmentalpolicy and administrative capacitybuilding, the results are mixed. Whilesome successful programs for ad-ministrative capacity building can beobserved in both regimes, the scope ofsuch programs and their influenceremains greater in the Baltic region.Institutional capacity building has been ahigher priority in the Baltic, garneringmore resources and attention from otherinternational regimes and programs inthe region. Furthermore, the content ofstate environmental policy developmentand administrative capacity buildingprograms is extensively influenced byHELCOM. Actors in both regimesrealize that increasing state capacity cannot be assumed, it must be supported.Low economic development levels inmany Mediterranean states and lowerenvironmental commitment in theregion’s developed states present greaterchallenges in this area. Certainly, statecapacity building efforts in the Balticregion are not an unqualified successes.The Russian state has been littleinfluenced, nor has it received muchattention from the regime.49 HELCOMhas focused more on the St. Petersburgregion. Yet without greater environ-mental capacity and organizationalstability in Moscow, such efforts remainseverely constrained.50 Likewise, localand municipal public sector environ-mental management and administrativecapacities lag in most post-communiststates (outside major cities).
International relations practitio-ners and analysts can not merely assumeexpanding state environmental manage-ment capacity over time. Both regionalcases demonstrate that state
environmental policy capacity can re-main low or decline over time. Bothillustrate the benefits of internationalcooperative efforts within regimes toexpand state capacity in such areas asenvironmental law, policy, administra-tion, enforcement, and scientificmonitoring. Additional research is war-ranted on the limits of stateorganizational capacity an on the designand effectiveness of initiatives intendedto address these short-comings.
Implementation efforts: Regionalinternational environmental cooperationcan be accomplished with relatively fewresources. Implementation, however,costs much more. Estimates of the costsof implementation of HELCOMcommitments in the transition states ofthe Baltic region exceed $20 billion.Roughly the same amount is needed tobring only four EU member Med-iterranean states into compliance – andthis figure does not include the costs ofimplementing other internationalenvironmental commitments nor otherexpenses to be born by consumers.51
HELCOM leadership, Baltic regionalpolitical changes and the commitment ofgreater resources and internationalinvolvement, produced a Joint Compre-hensive Plan for implementation ofregime requirements and recommen-dations. While current funding remainsshort of estimated needs, numerousmunicipal waste treatment projects andnational policy reform and capacitybuilding efforts have been fundedthrough JCP channels.
The JCP produced a scientificallylegitimized laundry list of neededenvironmental objectives. It put costestimates on necessary investments,giving international legitimacy to claimsby transition state officials that they areunable to “clean up” many areas absent
27
international assistance. Although theMediterranean Action Plan offers guide-lines for environmental managementneeds in the region, the MAP regimelacks a comprehensive and specificimplementation plan for its protocols.Nor does it possess a concerted effort toassess and increase state environmentalcompliance or capacity.
In their third decade of activity,the Baltic and Mediterranean regimes forenvironmental protection are engaged in“Europeanizing” environmental protec-tion principles and policies in theirrespective regions. Western Europeanprinciples and policy norms are beingregionally standardized around the Balticand Mediterranean regions. Increas-ingly, this regionalization is accom-plished in conjunction with EU actorsand standards, taking advantage of theEU’s position as the primary ideationaland economic construction in late
twentieth century Europe. Regionalactors and institutions, including the EUare constructing and standardizing theroles of scientific communities andscience advice in conjunction with thepromulgation of principles and policynorms for environmental protection.Such processes Europeanize stateswithin the two regions, altering theirlaw, bureaucratic structure, content, andpractice in a host of Baltic andMediterranean littoral countries. How-ever, as comparisons of the two regionalregimes demonstrate, state structure,law, and behavior do not changeautomatically to implement internationalagreements. Without serious attention tomultiple dimensions of public sectorcapacity, state level implementation ofthe burgeoning set of internationalenvironmental agreements, standards,principles, and policy norm remainsunlikely.
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Endnotes: 1 Stacy D. VanDeveer, Normative Force: The State Transnational Norms and International EnvironmentalRegimes (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 1997).
2 Merilee Grindle, ed., Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of DevelopingCountries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1997), 5.
3 For a discussion of the history of interest in capacity building and related research, see Grindle, 1997: 6-8;and David Fairman and Michael Ross, “Old Fads, New Lessons: Learning from Economic DevelopmentAssistance” in Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, eds, Institutions for Environmental Aid (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1996).
4 Mattias Koch and Michael Grubb, “Agenda 21” in Michael Grubb, et al., The Earth Summit Agreements:A Guide and Assessment (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993).
5 VanDeveer, 1997; and Stacy D. VanDeveer, “European Politics with a Scientific Face: Transition Coun-tries, International Environmental Assessment and Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution” ENRP Dis-cussion Paper E-98-9 (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1998).
30
6 Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth (Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 1993), 75-133; and Keohane and Levy, 1996.
7 Robert O. Keohane, “Analyzing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions” in RobertO. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, eds. Institutions for Environmental Aid (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1996), 12.
8 Fairman and Ross, 1996
9 David G. victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, eds. The Implementation and Effectiveness ofInternational Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998);Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Jacobsen, eds., Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with Inter-national Environmental Accords (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Miranda Schreurs and ElizabethEconomy, eds., The Internationalization of Environmental Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1997); Daniel C. Esty, et.al., State Failure Task Force Report: Phase Two Findings (McLean, VA:Science Application International Corporation, 1998).
10 Grindle, 1997.
11 Ibid.
12 see e.g., Clark Miller, “Extending Assessment Communities to developing Countries” ENRP DiscussionPaper E-98-15 (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1998); Sheila Jasa-noff and Brian Wynne, “Science and Decisionmaking” in Steve Rayner and Elizabeth L. Malone, eds.,Human Choices and Climate Change: Volume 1: The Societal Framework (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press,1998) 1-88; Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policy Mak-ers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Sheila Jasanoff, Risk Management and PoliticalCulture (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); R. Brickman, et al., Controlling Chemicals; the Poli-tics of Regulation in Europe and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); BrianWynne, Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1995); and Brian Wynne, Rationality and Ritual: The Windscale Inquiry and Nuclear Decisionsin Britain (Chalfont St. Giles, UK: British Society for the History of Science, 1982).
13 Y. Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); T. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity inScience and Public Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
14 e.g. Eliot J. Berg, Rethinking Technical Cooperation: Reforms for Capacity Building in Africa (NewYork: UNDP/Development Alternatives Inc., 1993).
15 Grindle, 1997: 9.
16 Barbara Connolly, Tamar Gutner, and Hildegard Berdarff, “Organizational Inertia and EnvironmentalAssistance in Eastern Europe” in Robert O. Keohane and Marc a. Levy, eds., Institutions for EnvironmentalAid (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 1996).
17 Grindle, 1997: 11.
18 Ibid, 26.
19BNA, "Commission Directing Baltic Sea Cleanup Seen as Overly Bureaucratic, Slow to Act,"International Environment Reporter (8 February 1995): 100-101.
31
20 Harold Velner, "Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission," in Comprehensive Security for theBaltic: An Environmental Approach, ed. Arthur H. Westing (London: Sage Publications, 1989): 78; LudwikZmudzinski, "Environmental quality in the Baltic Region" in Comprehensive Security for the Baltic: AnEnvironmental Approach, ed. Arthur H. Westing (London: Sage Publications, 1989): 49; and HELCOM,"Final Report on the Implementation of the 1988 Ministerial Declaration," BSEP No. 71, 1998.
21HELCOM, "Final Report."
22Bengt Broms, "Multilateral Agreements in the Baltic Region." in Comprehensive Security for the Baltic: AnEnvironmental Approach, ed. Arthur H. Westing (London: Sage Publications, 1989): 64.
23HELCOM, "Final Report."
24Alexei Roginko, "Domestic Implementation of Baltic Sea Pollution Controls in Russia and the BalticStates," IIASA Working Paper 96-91 (August 1996).
27Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt, "'Hot Spotting' in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania." HELCOM NEWS 1, no. 1(March 1995).
28PHARE is the main EU programme for financial support for restructuring the post-Communist economies ofEastern and Central Europe. LIFE is the EU fund for environmental investments within the EU, but somemoney can be spend in states on the Union's periphery.
29Alexei Roginko, "Domestic Implementation of Baltic Sea Pollution Controls in Russia and the BalticStates," IIASA Working Paper 96-91, August (Laxenburg, Austria: IIASA, 1996).
30Roginko, "Domestic Implementation," 27, note number 43.
31Roginko, "Domestic Implementation," 27.
32This influence is clear in interviews conducted in October 1996 and in reports on the amount of internationalfunding which goes to JCP hotspots and projects. See also, Roginko, "Domestic Implementation."
33Lists of these programs are contained in country and lead party reports to HELCOM PITF, HELCOM NEWSand some BSEPs.
34Ministry of the Environment, "Questionnaire." Other major bilateral donors include the Denmark, Germanyand United States.
35Federal Environmental Agency (Germany), "Investment Activities/Non-point Source Pollution" GermanLead Party report on Traffic, 1996, HELCOM-PITF 8/96. Doc. 8.2/1.
36Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Protection (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1990).
37Evangelos Raftopoulos, The Barcelona Convention and Its Protocols: The Mediterranean Action PlanRegime, (London: Simmonds & Hill, 1993); and UNEP, Report of the Ninth Ordinary Meeting of theContracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution and ItsProtocols. UNEP (OCA)/MED IG.5/16 (8 June). (Athens: UNEP, 1995).
32
38See UNEP, The State of the Marine, and UNEP, Report of the Ninth.
39UNEP, The State of the Marine, especially chapter 3.
40BNA, "Mediterranean Nations Adopt Declaration on Safeguarding, Rehabilitating Wetlands," InternationalEnvironment Reporter (12 June 1996): 473.
41Erdal Ozhan, ed., MEDCOAST 93: Proceedings of the First International Conference on the MediterraneanCoastal Environment, November 2-5, 1993, Antalya, Turkey. Ankara: MEDCOAST Permanent Secretariat,1993.
42 Haas, 1990
43 Ibid
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Miller, 1998.
47Turkey may be a partial exception to this statement. With the waning of both Turkey's perceived chances ofEU membership and its commitment to pursuing such membership, its commitment to environmental policymay also have wavered somewhat.
48 Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff, 1998; and Brown Weiss and Jacobson, 1998.
49 Geoffrey D. Dabelko and Stacy D. VanDeveer, “European Insecurities: Can’t Live With ‘Em, Can’tShoot ‘Em” Security Dialogue 29:2 (1998), 177-190; Stacy D. VanDeveer and Geoffrey D. Dabelko,” Re-defining Security Around the Baltic: Environmental Issues in Regional Context” Global Governance 5(1999), 221-249.
50Roginko, "Domestic Implementation."
51 F. B., de Walle, M. Nikopoloulou-Tamvaki, and W.J. Heined, eds., Environmental Conditions of theMediterranean Sea: European Community Countries (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993).
33
Cleaning up the Baltic Sea:The Role of Multilateral
Development Banks
By
Tamar Gutner
Donor aid institutions, both bilat-eral and multilateral, have been impor-tant actors in regional efforts to clean-upthe Baltic Sea. This paper focuses on thethree major multilateral developmentbanks (MDBs) operating in Central andEastern Europe (CEE)1 and the types ofactivities they have undertaken vis-à-visthe Baltic Sea. The World Bank, theEuropean Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment (EBRD), and the EuropeanInvestment Bank (EIB) are major donororganizations in the region, involved todifferent degrees, in international coop-erative efforts for the Baltic Sea. TheMDBs not only provide financing forindividual projects, but may also be in-volved in broader agenda-setting exer-cises and other capacity building effortsat the national or municipal level. TheseMDBs, along with their smaller counter-parts, were participants in efforts to de-velop and implement the Baltic Sea JointComprehensive Environmental ActionProgram (JCP) set up in 1992 under theHelsinki Commission (HELCOM).2 TheJCP identified actions for the ecologicalrestoration of the Baltic, and developed alist of over 130 point and non point-source “hot spots” within its catchmentarea requiring investments estimated at10 billion Euro.3 The MDBs havesought to finance specific water andwaste water treatment projects in someof the hot spot areas, to help recipientcountry governments fulfill theirHELCOM obligations.
More broadly, the MDBs’ proj-ects typically provide larger amounts offinancial transfers (mainly throughloans) than their bilateral counterparts.MDB loans also attract additional bilat-eral, private sector, and recipient gov-ernment funding, which further increasesthe size of an individual project. Finally,the World Bank and, to a lesser extentthe EBRD, have also been involved inpolicy discussions and economic reformprojects and programs that may have apositive impact on the Baltic Sea.
Despite the potentially pivotalroles the MDBs may have in actions toaddress the Baltic Sea’s severe pollutionproblems, their lending and policy ef-forts have been mixed. The World Bankhas been most deeply involved in in-vestment projects, agenda setting, andpolicy activities regarding the Baltic Sea,while the EIB has made few efforts tofinance projects that address Baltic Seapollution. The EBRD maintains an in-termediate position, more active than theEIB in its Baltic Sea-related work, butwith less breadth of activity than theWorld Bank. This is an interestingfinding since on the global scene manynongovernmental organizations (NGOs)are critical of the World Bank's envi-ronmental activities, whereas environ-mentalists have only recently begun toscrutinize the EIB.
Yet, even where the banks havefunded specific projects to address “hotspots” designated by the JCP, all threehave faced numerous challenges in theimplementation phase, as they grapplewith domestic political, technical, andother issues. These implementation is-sues highlight the different goals of theMDBs vis-à-vis local municipalities ornational governments, and the ways inwhich policy solutions that are attractiveon paper may run into difficulties in the
34
process of being translated into action.This paper describes major differencesin the three banks’ lending strategies be-fore turning to an analysis of their in-volvement in regional efforts to tacklethe Baltic Sea’s environmental prob-lems. It then looks more closely at someof the individual water projects theyhave financed, and the challenges theyhave faced in implementing these proj-ects in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,home of the greatest concentration ofMDB water projects tied to the JCP.
MDB ApproachesThe World Bank, EBRD, and
EIB are among the major donors inCentral and Eastern Europe (CEE), to-gether providing around $30 billion inloans to the region in the period fiscal1991-97.4 Environmental aid has been apriority of donor countries working inCEE, in order to help address the envi-ronmental damage found in different ar-eas throughout the region, to assist inenvironmental policy reform efforts, andmore recently, to help countries hopingto join the European Union (EU) tacklethe enormous costs of bringing their en-vironmental standards up to EU stan-dards. The European Commission esti-mates the latter effort alone has adaunting price tag of $130 billion.5
The three MDBs have adoptedsomewhat different approaches to ad-dressing environmental issues in CEE,which can be explained in part by share-holder politics, and by how “bank-like”each MDB is designed to act.6 In termsof shareholder politics, external pressurefrom major shareholder countries (usu-ally supported or pushed by environ-mental NGOs) has been an importantfactor in determining the depth of eachMDB’s commitment to addressing envi-ronmental issues. There has been much
stronger pressure from shareholders atthe World Bank and EBRD, with theUnited States often taking the lead rela-tive to the EIB, whose shareholders arethe EU member states and the EUCommission. Yet, even where majorshareholders have expressed a desire foran MDB to address environmental is-sues, institutional design and incentivesystems play critical roles in determininghow these ideas are translated into proj-ects with primary environmental goals orsignificant environmental components.
In particular, an important aspectof institutional design and incentivesystems is how “bank-like” the MDB isdesigned to be. All MDBs are designedin some ways to behave like financialinstitutions, in the sense that their pri-mary function is to make loans to cred-itworthy governments or private sectoractors for projects that, at minimum, ful-fill the banks’ criteria on economic, fi-nancial, technical, and legal viability.Yet, at the same time, MDBs havesomething grafted onto them not foundamong commercial banks; that is, gov-ernment functions. As development in-stitutions, MDBs are asked to elaborate,incorporate into their lending, and im-plement a variety of mandates given tothem by their shareholder member states,to help shape policy reform in recipientcountries.
MDBs differ in the degree towhich they emphasize their bankinggoals or their non-banking goals. Thosebehaving more like financial institutionsthan development agencies will be moredriven by client demands and containfewer incentives for staff to situate proj-ects within broader policy goals, such asthe environment, than a less “bank-like”MDB. By contrast, in a less “bank-like”MDB there will be more incentives forstaff to seek to influence recipient gov-
35
ernments to accept particular invest-ments linked to various policy goals. Atthe same time, this type of MDB mayface a greater challenge in selling itsprojects to recipient countries that haveaccess to alternative sources of financingwith fewer non-financial policy condi-tionality strings attached.
Of the three MDBs, the WorldBank is least bank-like, the EIB is most“bank-like,” and the EBRD has a posi-tion somewhere between the other two.The World Bank’s primary mission hasevolved considerably over the years,moving it increasingly away from the“Bank-as-bank” model.7 The WorldBank’s stated major emphases are onpoverty alleviation and environmentallysustainable development, and it is theonly one of the three MDBs that regu-larly funds projects focusing on issuessuch as education, health, or nutrition.8
It also tends to have the most non-economic conditionality attached to itsloans, and undertakes the most policy-related work, from structural adjustmentlending (conditioned on macroeconomicpolicy reforms) to assisting countries inthe development of national environ-mental action programs (NEAPs).9 Ofthe three, the Bank is a major source ofpolicy advice and technical assistance toborrowing countries, and its vast re-search arm’s budget totals around $25million a year.10 World Bank lending isaimed at government agencies, is basedon policy dialogues with governments,and requires sovereign guarantees.11 Interms of global environmental issues, theWorld Bank is the main implementingagency of the Global Environmental Fa-cility, which provides grants to help poorcountries address global environmentalissues. It also helps to manage theMontreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund,to finance the incremental costs devel-
oping countries face in phasing outozone depleting substances under theMontreal Protocol. While ambitious inthe scope of its activities and goals, theBank regularly faces criticism for some-times running into trouble in carryingthem out.12
The London-based EBRD wasestablished in May 1990 to help post-communist countries in Central andEastern Europe, and later the rest of theformer Soviet Union as well, to buildmarket economies and pluralist democ-racies. It was distinctive among MDBsin its explicit focus on the private sector.The Bank was directed to target at least60 percent of its loans and guarantees tothe private sector, with the remaining 40percent going to public sector projects.While such an orientation inherentlymade the EBRD more demand- and cli-ent-driven than the World Bank, inpractice it took a few years for theEBRD to jumpstart its operations sincethe task of designing private sector proj-ects in countries where no private sectorexisted was an enormous challenge. Atthe same time, the EBRD was set up topursue policy initiatives such as the en-vironment in a much stronger way than aprivate sector bank.13 It is the first MDBborn with an environmental mandate,albeit a broad one, of promoting “envi-ronmentally sound and sustainable de-velopment.”14
The EIB, based in Luxembourg,was created by the 1957 Treaty of Rometo be the European Community’s (nowthe EU) long-term lending institution, to“contribute to the balanced and steadydevelopment of the Common Market inthe interest of the Community.”15 Whilethe EIB is owned by its EU memberstates and the vast majority of its lendinggoes to its member states, in fact it is aglobal actor. It operates in over 120
36
countries in Africa, Asia, Latin Americaand elsewhere that have signed coopera-tion or association agreements with theCommunity. The Bank entered the CEEarena in 1989 and has been authorized tolend a total of 8.2 billion Euro through2000, with an additional 3.5 billion Europre-accession facility for CEE countriesand Cyprus.
The EIB is the most “bank-like”MDB of the three, in the sense that it islargely client-driven, and the least pro-active in addressing policy issues inCEE.16 The EIB takes on new policymandates given to it by the Council anddoes not engage in its own countrylending strategies. Its small staff (under900) is one-tenth the size of the WorldBank’s staff (at 9,300), while in recentyears the EIB's lending has surpassedWorld Bank lending. For example, theEIB's loans totaled over $34 billion infiscal year 1998, compared with $21 bil-lion for the World Bank.17
The EIB has not had a policyvoice like the other two MDBs, whichmakes sense when one considers that itsmajor shareholders are also its majorborrowers and therefore have little in-centive to create an institution that tellsthem what to do. The EIB has no sepa-rate policy research arm and does notdirectly promote a particular set of itsown policy ideas or innovative types ofloan conditionality. In CEE, it offers thecheapest loans of the three MDBs, withthe least attached conditionality.
Of the three MDBs, EIB also hasthe least developed or explicit environ-mental policy goals, and by far thesmallest number of staff whose job isspecifically to finance “green” projects.It mainly addresses environmental issuesin its work, not by actively seeking tofinance specifically “green” projects, butby ensuring that projects within the EU
comply with various EU legislation ornational legislation – whichever ishigher – and that non-EU projects com-ply with relevant environmental legisla-tion. Generally, the EIB is much lessproactive in identifying projects withsignificant environmental goals than theother two MDBs.
Although the EIB is the most“bank-like” of the three, it will also oneday be the most important (and eventu-ally the only) MDB in pre-accession/accession countries in CEE.As the transition process matures inthese countries, and other MDBs movetheir activities and resources further east,the EIB will remain as Europe's multi-lateral bank.
MDBs and Baltic Sea CooperationThe three banks’ action on Baltic
Sea issues can be divided into policy andproject activities. At the policy level,the World Bank is the most active of thethree – as can be seen in its intellectualleadership within the high-level TaskForce that helped to draft the JCP, in as-sisting recipient countries in the regionin the development of NEAPs, and indrafting the Regional EnvironmentalAction Programme (EAP), one of themost visible outcomes of the Environ-ment for Europe process.18 The EBRD,in turn, has been involved in a handful ofpolicy-related exercises, but over timehas focused most of its attention on proj-ect lending, where it believes its com-parative advantage lies. Both the WorldBank and EBRD are involved in theProject Preparation Committee (PPC), amicro-institution created by the Envi-ronment for Europe process to facilitatethe implementation of the EAP. ThePPC is a network of bilateral donors andMDBs that acts as a matchmaker tobring together bilateral and multilateral
37
assistance for projects that support theEAP’s goals.
The EIB is least involved inbroader policy exercises and is at most aperipheral player in the policy networksthat have developed around the Envi-ronment for Europe process. At thesame time, however, it has been rela-tively more active in regional efforts toaddress the environmental degradationof the Baltic and Mediterranean seas.
The bread-and-butter work of thethree MDBs is project lending. Happilyfor the banks, water sector projects com-bine their dual interests in identifying“bankable” projects that are relativelyeasy for them to finance, with their in-terest in showing the public that they areactively financing “green” projects thathave positive environmental outcomes.Indeed the financing of water and wastewater treatment projects have long beena part of the traditional MDB portfolio,but can now be categorized as part of anMDB’s “green” activities. Of course,not all water projects are environmen-tally beneficial; for example, they can beenvironmentally harmful if they involvediverting rivers or draining aquifers in anunsustainable manner. Water projectsoften require partial environmental as-sessments due to their potentially im-portant environmental impacts. Addi-tionally, whether or not a wastewatertreatment plant relies on mechanicaltreatment, versus biological or chemicaltreatment greatly affects its potential en-vironmental impact.
All three MDBs are financing wa-ter and waste water projects in the Balticregion in cities and towns identified bythe 1992 JCP as “hot spots,” or prioritiesfor environmental clean-up. In these“hot spots,” wastewater was (is) oftendumped, untreated or partially treated,into the Baltic Sea, where it has been a
major source of pollution. These citiesand towns either had no waste watertreatment plants, old ones that needed tobe upgraded, or partially built new So-viet-designed plants that were generallytoo big for the capacity needed. Thepoor condition of municipal wastewatertreatment resulted in a widespreadproblem of inadequate or no collectionor treatment of sewage. It also increasedthe likelihood of contamination ofgroundwater or drinking water, sinceoften the pipes for the waste water andwater supply systems were built tooclose to each other.
The World Bank to date hasfunded the most water projects in theBaltic region; five projects in the Balticstates and two in Poland. The EIB hasfunded the fewest in CEE; it has co-financed an EBRD project in Riga, andfunded one water project on its own inWarsaw, which has been stalled for thepast several years. On the other hand, ofthe three banks, the EIB is the only onethat can finance projects in rich WesternEuropean countries, and has done so innorthern Germany and Sweden. 19 Thefollowing section focuses on the threebanks’ projects in the Baltic states,which were among the first designed bythe MDBs in the region and are gener-ally further along in their implementa-tion.
MDB Baltic Water ProjectsThe World Bank has made loans to
five water and waste water treatmentplants in the Baltics: in Klaipeda ($7million) and Siauliai ($6.2 million),Lithuania; in the Haapsalu and Matsalubays in Estonia ($2m); and Liepaja($4m) and Daugavpils ($6.9m)20, Latvia.The loans are part of larger financingpackages organized by the Bank, whichcan include bilateral grant contributions,
38
and contributions from the national gov-ernment and municipalities. For exam-ple, the project cost of the Siauliai to-taled $23 million.21 All five projectscontain water sanitation and supplycomponents, and with the exception ofthe Daugavpils project, they contain spe-cific “environmental management com-ponents” (EMCs) funded mainly withbilateral grant money. These EMCs, notundertaken by the other two MDBs, fo-cus on issues specifically related to theenvironment, such as coastal zone man-agement. The goal of all five projects isto reduce the discharge of wastewaterinto the Baltic Sea through the im-provement of waste water and watersupply services. The EMC components,in turn, support the development ofmanagement plans for sustainable devel-opment of nearby coastal areas and wet-lands.
In the Baltic states, the EBRD hasfinanced four water projects: in Riga,Latvia (18.1 million Euro); Kaunas,Lithuania (11.9 million Euro); and inEstonia, a project in Tallinn (47.9 mil-lion Euro), and a "Small MunicipalitiesEnvironment Project" that provides in-vestments in water services outside ofTallinn (24 million Euro). The EBRD’sapproach tends to be narrower than theWorld Bank’s, emphasizing the corpo-ratization of the municipal entity.
The EIB, to date, has financed onlyone water project in the Baltic states.This is a 15 million Euro investment inthe upgrading and rehabilitation ofRiga’s water and waste water systems, aproject the EIB is co-financing with theEBRD, which the latter took the lead indesigning.Capacity Building Efforts
All three MDBs are involved incapacity building at the municipal levelin terms of seeking to create water and
waste water plants that can function asprofitable entities, through the use andcollection of tariffs, as well as imple-mentation of cost cutting measures. Asthe EBRD has noted:
Generally, the operational and fi-nancial performance of municipalwater and sewerage companies ispoor, revenue generation is inade-quate and services are not pro-vided in an efficient and cost-effective way. Many of the pres-ently operated systems are markedby wastage of resources, high lev-els of physical losses, and lack offinancial rationale in operationsand investments. Financial per-formance is hampered by inade-quate capacity in revenue admini-stration, financial management,and investment programming andbudgeting.22
Financial performance objectivesoften involve municipal water utilitiesincreasing tariffs and collecting them, aswell as cutting costs to meet the re-quirements developed by the banks toensure that utilities can function as self-financing entities. Indeed, the WorldBank and EBRD projects have also in-volved “twinning” the Baltic water utili-ties with Nordic counterparts, as a meansto share technical and managementskills.
Capacity building in terms of im-proving a water or waste water utility’sfinancial performance can have envi-ronmental impacts in several importantways. For example, the failure of waterutilities to adequately measure waterdemand through pricing or metering, re-sults in excessive consumption andwastage. Where energy prices havebeen underpriced, energy consumption is
39
often higher than necessary and ineffi-cient. In addition, for pre-accessioncountries, the banks include in theirwork with the municipal water compa-nies strategies on how to meet EU regu-latory standards, which affects and isaffected by financial/management ca-pacity building issues.
In terms of capacity building onspecifically environmental issues, of thethree banks, the World Bank has beenmost proactive in the ways it has directlyaddressed broader watershed issues in itswork. While the national governments ofthe three Baltic states are keen on proj-ects linked to the JCP, municipalitiestend to be more interested in local issues.This has generally meant that munici-palities prefer aid money to improvedrinking water, whereas waste watertreatment or broader watershed/BalticSea issues are less of a priority.23 As aresult, the Bank “sold” the EMCs to re-cipients not as loans that would have tobe repaid, but as grant components sup-plied by bilateral donors. There wastherefore no cost to recipients for agree-ing to projects that included EMCs.These EMCs were also a very small pro-portion of total project costs. For exam-ple, the EMCs contributed $1.4 millionof the $23 million Siauliai project.
At the same time, the water proj-ects designed by the Bank almost alwayswent beyond what the municipalitiesinitially had in mind, as the World Banktacked on additional components to pur-sue a broader watershed approach. TheBank had particular leverage to do sowith these projects, because most mu-nicipalities could not find alternativesources of financing at the time theywere designed, even from other MDBs.The World Bank also brought bilateraldonors into financing parts of the waste
water and drinking water components ofthe loans as well.
To illustrate the Bank’s leverageand influence, in Haapsalu, Estonia, forexample, the municipality hoped tocomplete construction on a biologicalwastewater treatment plant to replace theexisting mechanical treatment plant.Construction on the plant began beforeEstonia achieved independence in 1991,and after that, the Estonians did not wantto complete construction on the Soviet-designed plant with Russian technology.Estonia was unable to secure financingfor the project from the Swedish aidagency or the EBRD. The World Bank,however, expressed an interest in fi-nancing the project if it included anEMC that focused on nearby MatsaluBay, which itself was on the HELCOMlist of priority “hot-spots” as an impor-tant wetland and nature reserve.24
The municipality of Siauliai,Lithuania, in turn, wanted to complete itspartially constructed wastewater treat-ment plant, while addressing the prob-lem it faced by its inadequate capacity tohandle sludge.25 Siauliai is the fourthlargest city in Lithuania, one of its mainindustrial centers, and home – beforeLithuania’s independence – to the largestSoviet military airport in EasternEurope. The partly constructed Soviet-style plant was to replace an older plantthat no longer met the city’s needs.26
However, the design of the unfinishedplant was too big for the city.
The World Bank project, instead ofconfining itself to the completion of themunicipality's wastewater treatmentplant, added onto the project a number ofadditional environmental components.These included the EMC that would or-ganize bilateral funding for training,technical assistance, and other supportfor a Lielupe River Commission where
40
Lithuania and Latvia could cooperate onissues concerning management andclean-up of the river.27 This componentwould also provide technical support,equipment, and training for two Lithua-nian regional environmental protectionoffices; assistance in the development ofprocedures to monitor discharge; a planfor sludge management; and a largestudy complemented by demonstrationactivities aimed at improving the prac-tices of large local pig farms in manag-ing agricultural run-off. The Bank ar-gued that better practices by local pigfarmers would greatly enhance the proj-ect's benefits in terms of reducing pollu-tion to the Baltic Sea.28
Challenges FacedThe MDB Baltic water projects
have faced a variety of challenges in im-plementation. All three MDB projectshave struggled to increase tariffs and re-duce costs to meet the financial obliga-tions laid out in the loan documents. Ithas been politically difficult for somemunicipal governments to agree to in-crease water tariffs as required under theloans. All of the MDB-financed waterutilities also have faced sharper-than-expected declines in water demand,which in turn reduced expected revenuesthat can be collected from tariffs. As aresult, many of the MDB water projectsare not performing as well as expected infinancial terms.
In terms of the World Bank proj-ects, the EMCs have had mostly small, ifany, tangible results. They have pro-duced some studies that may or may notbe useful in future policy development,such as integrated coastal zone manage-ment plans in Lithuania and Latvia. TheBank canceled the EMC for the LielupeRiver Commission, due to lack of localinterest, plus the fact that the EU's
PHARE program was interested infunding this on its own. Yet, some ofthe EMCs are viewed as successful, suchas the pig farm study in Siauliai, whichproduced recommendations on practicesthat were adopted by Lithuania's pigbreeders' association. The EMC for theLiepaja project included the purchase ofa reed harvester for Latvia’s Lake Pape,a large coastal wetland that is part of thecoastal wildlife habitat. The harvesterallowed the local municipality to harvestreeds that clog up the lake, and sell themin Denmark and Lithuania, where theyare used for roof material.
A number of the MDB projectsfaced delays, caused by a variety of rea-sons. The EBRD's Kaunas project, forexample, was delayed for over a year,due to difficulty in meeting covenants ontariff increases. The initial project de-sign, inherited from the Soviets, was alsodetermined to be too big, based on opti-mistic estimates of water consumption.One actor involved in the project notedthat the central government was slow intransferring its share of project financ-ing, while others complained that someof the bilateral actors involved in com-ponents of the project (such as PHARE)provided poor consultants. Other actorsalso noted that some delays were causedby constant political changes in the city,reflected by the fact that there were eightdifferent mayors from the time the proj-ect was agreed upon in mid-1998. TheTallinn project, in turn, lost around ninemonths due to slow Parliamentary ap-proval of the project. The EIB andEBRD’s project in Riga has also faceddelays, due to slowness in the procure-ment process.29
The World Bank found that itsprojects in Lithuania were somewhatmore difficult to implement than those inEstonia or Latvia. Some of the problems
41
were outside of its control, such as arapidly changing group of Lithuanianpolicymakers at the national level (in-cluding three different environmentministers in the space of six years). TheKlaipeda project was delayed due toslow procurement tendering after theMinistry of Environment insisted on are-tendering to involve more Lithuanianfirms. Shifting government require-ments on waste effluents delayed theproject for another 12 months. Dis-agreements between the Bank and theLithuanian environment ministry alsodelayed the water projects. One generaldebate was over whether or not thewaste water plants needed back-uppieces of certain equipment (such aspumps or piping), which were requiredunder the old regime (and by old Sovietstandards), since equipment often brokedown. Such additional back-up systemsadd to project costs, and are generallynot required in Western-style plants.
On the positive side, the MDBwater projects are expected to have, orare already having, important impacts inreducing pollution into the Baltic Sea.According to Tallinn water officials, by1998, treated waste water going into theBaltic Sea was two to three times cleanerthan in 1993. Drinking water was alsosignificantly cleaner after treatment,while further investment is needed in thewater network to get the higher qualitywater to consumers.30 The World Bank-funded plants in Liepaja (Latvia) andHaapsalu (Estonia) are also up and run-ning. Environmentalists in Lithuaniahave applauded the EBRD's Kaunasproject, since Kaunas has been responsi-ble for around 90 percent of the un-treated wastewater discharged in Lithua-nia. Kaunas is Lithuania's second largestcity, with a population of 403,000, andbefore the EBRD project it had no
wastewater treatment. The project fi-nanced the first phase of the constructionof a wastewater plant (along with newpumping stations, new network, andother components) that included me-chanical treatment with chemical floc-culation, while biological treatment ofwastewater was planned for the medium-term. Its goals were to reduce heavymetals by 70 percent, total nitrogen by10 percent, total phosphorus by 85 per-cent, BOD by 60 percent, and suspendedsolids by 33 percent.31
ConclusionThe three MDBs' efforts to re-
duce pollution to the Baltic Sea fromland-based sources highlight some of thebroader challenges faced by donorsseeking to coordinate regional coopera-tion and capacity building efforts. Thebanks' comparative advantage as finan-cial institutions is in the financing ofwater supply and wastewater treatmentplants in the hot spot areas identified bythe JCP. Yet, how “bank-like” the MDBis does have an impact on the degree towhich it seeks out and finances suchprojects, as well as its efforts to addressbroader watershed issues in its activities,versus capacity building contributionsmore limited to the performance of thewater utilities.
Finally, the implementation ofthese water projects rarely occurs asspecified in the project documents, asprojects must adjust to political realities,technical delays, and other unanticipatedissues. While a number of the MDB-financed utilities are now making a con-tribution to the reduction of untreated orpartially treated waste water into theBaltic Sea, there are clearly many other“hot spots” that need to be addressed.
The demand for water andwastewater projects in pre-accession
42
countries is increasing as countries workon meeting European water directives.A new EU fund – Instrument for Struc-tural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA)– will come on-line in 2000, and provideone billion Euros in grants a yearthrough 2006 for projects in the envi-ronment and transport sectors. ISPAwill provide a new source of co-financing for the MDBs, and may givethem the opportunity to expand theirwork in the HELCOM municipal point
source hot spot areas in pre-accessioncountries. The degree to which thebanks respond to this new initiative willdepend on several factors. One of themost important is the extent to whichmunicipalities try to finance their needsthrough the new grants, avoiding MDBloans. ISPA grant financing can makeup a high percentage of total projectcost, up to 75 percent in some cases, butcities may find ways to stretch thatamount to cover their needs.
References:
1 This paper adopts a commonly used definition of CEE countries as Central European countries and thethree Baltic states. Unlike the World Bank and the EBRD, the EIB does not operate in the rest of theformer Soviet Union, nor does it lend to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and FYR Macedonia.2The other two, much smaller international financial institutions involved in the Baltic states are the NordicInvestment Bank (NIB), and the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO). The NIB providesinvestment for projects of Nordic interest throughout CEE, while NEFCO focuses on environmental in-vestment in CEE, mainly in Poland, the Baltic states, and northwest Russia.31 Euro=1 ECU, as of January 1, 1999.4 The breakdown is: World Bank, $13.4 billion; EBRD, $8.3 billion; EIB, $7.9 billion. Note that the WorldBank’s fiscal year is July 1 –June 30, whereas the other two banks have fiscal years based on the calendaryear. Sources: World Bank, EBRD, EIB Annual Reports, 1990-97.5 Gillian Handyside, “EU Hopefuls Face $130 Billion Environmental Bill,” Reuters Ltd., September 19,1997.6 For a detailed explication of this argument, see Tamar L. Gutner, “Banking on the Environment:Multilateral Development Banks and Environmental Policymaking in Central and Eastern Europe,”Doctoral Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science,February 1999.7 Moises Naim. 1994. “The World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture.” In BrettonWoods: Looking to the Future. Washington DC: Bretton Woods Commission: C273-87.8 The EBRD is not involved in these sectors at all. The European Council asked the EIB in 1997 tobecome involved in lending for health and education in the EU through the “Amsterdam SpecialAction Programme” to help boost employment in Europe.9 NEAPs describe and assess a country’s environmental problems and propose various policy options foraddressing them.10 Nicholas Stern and Francisco Ferreira, “The World Bank as ‘Intellectual Actor,” in The World Bank: ItsFirst Half Century, ed. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb (Washington DC: The BrookingsInstitutions, 1997), p. 523.11 The World Bank tends to refer to the IBRD and IDA. IDA provides interest free loans to very poorcountries. The World Bank Group includes the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which lends to theprivate sector; and the Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which insures private sector investorsagainst non-commercial risks in developing countries.12 See for example, Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment,and the Crisis of Development (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994).13 For example, it has a municipal and environmental infrastructure team that funds mainly public sectorprojects, as well as a small energy efficiency unit that finances small energy efficiency projects. It alsoadministers a donor-funded Nuclear Safety Account to improve the safety of CEE nuclear power plants.
43
14 EBRD, “Articles Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,” (EBRD:London, 1990).15 Treaty of Rome, Article 130, which has become Article 198E under the Maastricht Treaty.16It is, however, less “bank-like” in the sense that it is the most risk-averse of the three MDBs. It seeksdouble guarantees (both sovereign and EU guarantees) for loans outside of the EU. The EBRD, bycontrast, does not even have to pursue sovereign guarantees in its private sector lending, and increasingly,even its municipal lending.17 World Bank. 1998 Annual Report. (Washington DC: World Bank); Sir Brian Unwin, “Statement to theEIB Board of Governors,” June 14, 1999, www.eib.org/pub/news/agm_st.htm. The World Bank staff figureincludes Washington DC staff, as well as local office staff.18 The EAP is a set of guidelines, principles, and priority areas for environmental management in CEE,which was endorsed by Eastern and Western environment ministers at the 1993 Environment for Europeconference in Lucerne, Switzerland. The “Environment for Europe” process, in turn, is a loose set of in-stitutional initiatives and regional meetings set up as a political framework for cooperation on environ-mental protection in Europe. This process was launched in 1991 in response to early failures at environ-mental aid coordination and prioritization in the region, together with a desire in some corners for a pan-European environmental policy. It has brought together governments from East and West, multilateral de-velopment banks, international actors such as the OECD and the European Commission, and environmentalNGOs in a process of dialogue, policy development and environmental assistance.Ironically, in contrast to the JCP, the EAP argued that the level of damage to human health should be themain criterion driving the prioritization of environmental problems, which gave (for the region as a whole)preference to air pollution over water pollution, with an emphasis on airborne dust caused by coal-burning,lead found in air and soil, and sulfur dioxide and other gases emitted primarily by the burning of high-sulfur coal or fuel oil.19 EIB. 1995. Annual Report. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank, p. 44.20The water and wastewater components are part of a larger $27 million “Municipal Services DevelopmentProject” for Latvia.21World Bank, “Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of Lithuania: Siauliai Environment Project,” World Bank,November 1995, p. i.22EBRD, “Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure: EBRD involvement to date in the MEI [Municipaland Environmental Infrastructure] sector,” (London: EBRD, 1999), p. 4.23This section is based on personal interviews with municipal water company officials, Bank projectimplementation units, and municipal officials in Haapsalu, Estonia; Liepaja, Latvia; and Siauliai andKlaipeda, Lithuania; as well as environmentalists and environmental ministry officials in all three Balticstates, June 1998.24Official of Haapsalu Water Works, Haapsalu, Estonia, interview with the author, 15 May 1998. “StaffAppraisal Report: Republic of Estonia: Haapsalu and Matsalu Bays Environment Project,” World Bank,March 15, 1995.25The city's sludge is pumped directly into lagoons, which were largely filled by 1996, and sludge was notdistributed according to levels of toxicity. World Bank, “Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of LithuaniaSiauliai Environment Project,” World Bank, 1995, p. 10.26The old sewage treatment plant could only process 60 percent of daily collected water, which meant a dailydischarge of around 10 tons of polluted water directly into the Kulpe River, which flows directly into theBaltic Sea. The sewage is highly contaminated with heavy metals, which also means that the sludge removedfrom the plant cannot be used for agriculture. “Ecological Problems of Siauliai,” Siauliai MunicipalityEnvironmental Affairs Department, 1994, pp. 12, 15.27In fact, Siauliai is the source of most of the pollutant load discharged into the Lielupe. Pollution sources onLatvia's portion of the river tend to be small.28According the project's task manager, two of the big pig farms, with 20,000 pigs each, contribute morewaste than the entire city of Siauliai. World Bank project manager, interview with the author, April 30, 1998.29In addition, the only water project the EIB fully designed itself, in Warsaw, has faced very long delays (ofseveral years), due to a variety of problems, including difficulties in terms of the ownership of land wherethe new waste water plant would be built, since property rights of the proposed sight were contested. Inter-views with EIB project official, Polish finance ministry official, official at another MDB working Warsaw,July 1996, October 1997, June 1999.
44
30Official of Tallinn Water, interview with the author, May 14, 1998.31EBRD, “Lithuania: Kaunas Water and Environment Project,” Memorandum to Board of Directors,BDS95-99”, 30 June 1995, Annex 5.
45
Environmental Clean-UpChallenges in European Seas
By
Miranda Schreurs
October 1999 marked the decadeanniversary of the collapse of the BerlinWall and the end of the Cold War. Theten-year anniversary of this historicevent was a time for reflection. Whenthe Wall was torn down, expectationsran high for the future. The reunificationof Germany, the disintegration of theSoviet Union, and the democratization ofthe Central and Eastern European stateswere all expected to result in an im-provement in living conditions. Thenormalization of relations between Westand East were to expedite the economicand political transformation of the for-mer Soviet states. Aid from the Westand democratization in the East weresuppose to help improve environmentalconditions.
The Soviet era had wreakedhavoc on the environment. Industrialplants lacked adequate pollution controlequipment and were highly inefficient.Air and water pollution near industrialareas was terrible. Nuclear plants hadbeen built and operated without suffi-cient regard to safety. Toxic waste wasdumped on land and at sea. In manycities, there was either no wastewatertreatment or the treatment plants thatexisted were inadequate. It was not untilthe Soviet Union collapsed that scientistsand the general public learned just howserious the environmental problems ofthe region were.
A decade later, environmentalconditions are improving, but enormousproblems remain. Much of the im-
provement in the state of the environ-ment comes as a result of the closingdown of highly polluting and non-competitive industries. The shuttingdown of out-dated plants has improvedair and water quality to some extent.Yet, their closure has also contributed tothe high unemployment levels and therise of extremist parties in many centraland eastern European states. Further-more, while environmental movementsplayed an important role in bringingabout the collapse of the Soviet Union,unemployment problems and generalconcerns about economic conditionsnow dominate public opinion. As a re-sult, even though some environmentalgroups are active in the central and east-ern European states, their political im-pact is limited.
The passing of a decade since thefall of communism, calls for an appraisalof Western efforts to assist the centraland eastern European states democratize,shift from planned to free marketeconomies, and address the environ-mental problems that resulted under theCommunist period. In hindsight, it iseasy to say that the expectations of adecade ago for a miraculous transforma-tion, in conditions as a result of democ-ratization and economic transformation,were unrealistic. In some areas envi-ronmental conditions have improved, butin others, little has changed. The envi-ronmental clean up challenges remainenormous.
What lessons can be learned bygovernments, NGOs, and private institu-tions that are involved in assisting thecentral and Eastern European countriesamend the damages caused by decadesof environmental neglect? Do the expe-riences in international environmentalcooperation with post-Communist states
46
provide any lessons for other developingregions? The chapters by Tamar Gutnerand Stacy VanDeveer explore two formsof Western involvement in environ-mental clean up efforts in the post-Communist states and in the Mediterra-nean region. Gutner explores the role ofthe multilateral development banks(MDBs) and VanDeveer that of interna-tional environmental regimes.
Clearly, there have been somesuccesses. Many new environmentalnorms and institutions have been createdas a result of international cooperativeefforts. VanDeveer’s comparison be-tween environmental protection regimesin the Baltic Sea region and the Mediter-ranean Sea area suggests that the col-lapse of communism has put new steaminto the regional pollution control regimein the Baltic region, which may be lack-ing in the Mediterranean regime. TheBaltic Sea is bordered by Finland, Swe-den, Denmark, Germany, Poland,Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Russia.There is, therefore, much interest in thepart of several wealthy European Union(EU) states in the clean-up of this sea. Incomparison, the Mediterranean regimelacks the force of environmentally pro-gressive member states pushing for pol-icy reform. This suggests that an im-portant component of environmentalclean up is the level of interest in donorstates in those projects.
The first environmental regimefor the Baltic was created in 1974 by theHelsinki Convention. After this con-vention, environmental hot spots wereidentified and the release of toxic chemi-cals was reduced. The end of commu-nism resulted in greatly expanded com-munication and information exchangesamong the Baltic Sea’s littoral states re-garding environmental priorities and
projects. In 1993, a Baltic Sea JointComprehensive Environmental ActionProgramme was established. The Hel-sinki Committee’s (HELCOM) recom-mendations appear to have influencedsignificantly the environmental policiesof Estonia, Poland, Latvia, and Lithua-nia. Eager to be accepted into the Euro-pean Union, these transition economieshave embraced many of the norms andpriorities established in the Baltic SeaJoint Comprehensive EnvironmentalAction Programme. These norms andpriorities heavily reflect the interests ofthe wealthier European states that aremembers of the regime and who haveactively pushed them in the transitionstates.
Similarly, Gutner’s chapter sug-gests that the efforts of the multilateraldevelopment banks have helped to es-tablish new environmental clean-up pro-grams and reduced the release of efflu-ents into the Baltic Sea. Yet, bothVanDeveer and Gutner agree that theaccomplishments pale compared withthe serious environmental problems af-flicting the region. They suggest thateffective environmental program imple-mentation depends in large part on thesuccess of capacity-building efforts. AsVanDeveer notes, most bilateral andmultilateral capacity-building initiativeshave focused on strengthening the tech-nical capacity of states and municipali-ties to address environmental problems.They have paid much less attention tobroader administrative, institutional, andpolitical capacity issues. This may ex-plain why many capacity building ef-forts, although good in intention, havehad only limited success.
Capacity building has been de-fined narrowly by donor institutions andforeign governments, which tend to fo-
47
cus their attention on technical pro-grams. They too often neglect the con-text within which new technologies mustwork. As VanDeveer notes, using thework of Grindle (1997), capacity build-ing must include human resource devel-opment, organizational strengthening, aswell as institutional reform. There mustalso be institutionalized systems of cri-tique and learning built into these threedimensions of capacity. This is impor-tant if programs, policies, and institu-tions are to be become more effectivesand efficient. Foreign assistance pro-grams tend to be donor driven and as aresult may fail to take local and nationalcontext and personnel needs adequatelyinto consideration. Instead, donors maybe tempted to shop around for programsand proposals they already have in hand.
Gutner’s chapter examines indetail the role played by bilateral andmultilateral donor aid institutions in en-vironmental clean-up efforts in the BalticSea. Gutner suggests that donor aid in-stitutions have achieved some successesin clean-up efforts, but that in the wholethe record is mixed. Implementationdeficits result in large part from capacityproblems and the lack of priority placedon environmental clean up in some ofthe Central and Eastern European states.But as Gutner suggests, part of theproblem is also with the donor aid insti-tutions. There is room for learning in theWest as well.
Gutner contrasts the approachesof the World Bank, the European Bankfor Reconstruction and Development(EBRD), and the European InvestmentBank (EIB) to international environ-mental cooperative efforts. Of thesethree lenders, Gutner suggests that thatthe World Bank and the EBRD are themost involved in environmental clean-up
initiatives. Their level of involvement inenvironmental programs in the Balticregion is dependent to some extent onthe structure of the banks and their rela-tionships with their clients and recipientstates. The World Bank has as its mainfunctions poverty alleviation and sus-tainable development. As the least“bank-like” of the three MDBs, theWorld Bank was actively involved inenvironmental institution-building in theregion. The EBRD, in contrast, has con-centrated more on project lending whereits comparative advantage lies. The EIBhas been the least involved in regionalenvironmental initiatives primarily be-cause it functions more like a traditional,demand driven bank than do the othertwo MDBs. All three MDBs have beeninvolved to some extent in capacitybuilding at the municipal level, focusingin particular on the establishment of self-financing wastewater plants. The WorldBank also has been involved withbroader watershed issues, incorporatingthe needs of local municipalities intobroader water shed protection and clean-up initiatives.
Despite various programs of theMDBs, there have been few tangible re-sults in terms of the development ofmanagement plans for sustainable devel-opment of coastal areas and wetlands.The reasons are somewhat project spe-cific, but include limited local interest,political difficulties with getting policy-makers and citizens to agree to raisewater tariffs to pay for treatment facili-ties, political turnover in recipient mu-nicipalities and national governments,and project delays. More successfulhave been efforts to reduce the levels ofpollution entering the Baltic Sea as a re-sult of improvements in waste watertreatment.
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These two chapters suggest thatenvironmental protection efforts are af-fected as much by the priorities and pro-grammatic approaches of donors as theyare by the capacity and priorities of re-cipients. Even the best of programs willbe limited in their impact if the scale ofthe programs relative to the size of theenvironmental problems is small. Sus-tained commitment on the part of theWest will be necessary to improve envi-ronmental conditions in the developingstates of Central and Eastern Europe andthe Mediterranean. Where environ-mental pollution has direct impacts onEU member states, and particularly themore environmentally progressive ofthose states, there is likely to be greaterenthusiasm behind cooperation.
Maintaining commitment in theWest, however, may be difficult as a re-sult of donor fatigue. The costs of post-Communist transition proved to be fargreater than anyone anticipated. Moreo-ver, as more and more states apply formembership in the EU, the willingnessto use funds to assist these states maythin. This should make the successfuluse of existing funds a high priority.Donors are more likely to support aidwhen there are signs of success.
Gutner and VanDeveer suggestthat there are steps that can be taken bydonor institutions and international re-gimes to improve the effectiveness ofenvironmental program implementation.
Most important may be enhancing sensi-tivity to the political and social contextswithin which programs must be imple-mented. They must be embraced both bythe donor and the recipient. Giving re-cipient states a greater role in programformulation may increase their commit-ment to programs in the implementationphase.
Environmental protection is alsoa matter of example. Donor states havemore credibility in pursuing environ-mental clean up goals in developingstates when they have addressed theirown environmental problems. In thecase of the Baltic Sea, this might meangreater commitment on the part of EUstates to address agricultural contribu-tions to the pollution of the seas.
Despite numerous problems, theimportance of international cooperationfor environmental protection must not beunderestimated. While environmentalimprovements remain limited, Interna-tional cooperation has helped to turn at-tention to serious environmental prob-lems in systems that had long neglectedenvironmental problems. It has contrib-uted to changes in recipient state institu-tions and laws. It has also increasedcontact among developed and develop-ing states at various levels. In the longrun, such contact and cooperation canhave many positive consequences – po-litical, economic, and environmental.
49
Black Sea EnvironmentalCooperation:
Toward a Fourth Track
By
Martin Sampson
The Black Sea Environmental Pro-gramme emerged in the 1990s from coop-eration among the coastal states of the BlackSea, the Global Environmental Facility(GEF), the United Nations EnvironmentalProgramme, and various other funders andindividuals. By far the most ambitious re-gional environmental undertaking for theBlack Sea in the 1990s, the program’s en-ergy, ambition, and accomplishments from1994 to 1997 are a remarkable contrast withthe region’s prior history of little communi-cation and virtually no cooperation amongthe major Black Sea coastal states. Despitethe program’s record, impressive by stan-dards of regional sea programs anywhere fora comparable time period, the GEF declinedto provide a second large grant to the BlackSea Environmental Programme to fund threeyears beyond 1996. Without that fundingthe program began to diminish into what by1999 seemed to be a holding action in searchof better financial and political underpin-nings for a renewed Black Sea environ-mental program.
The first part of this chapter dis-cusses the environmental problems of theBlack Sea and the establishment of theBlack Sea Environmental Programme(BSEP). The second section is a brief ex-amination of various parts of the program,some thoughts about what the program hasaccomplished, and a more extensive discus-sion of two of the significant problems itcould not resolve. The third section assesses
the program from the perspective of Haas,Keohane, and Levy’s criteria of contractualenvironment, concern, and capabilities.1
The final section observes that, for reasonsunrelated to the program itself, a recasting ofthe program seems necessary to revive themomentum to build upon BSEP’s accom-plishments.
I. Background
The Black Sea is an odd sea, with anecosystem particularly vulnerable to the en-vironmental stresses of the late twentiethcentury. Unlike any other marine sea, theBlack Sea has two layers of water betweenwhich very little exchange of water occurs.The heavier, lower 90 percent is very salty,anoxic water that has a large hydrogen sul-fide content and for centuries has not sup-ported marine life that requires oxygen.“Dead” long before the industrial revolutionand the advent of contemporary environ-mental degradation, this lower layer ofheavier water confines the marine life of thesea to the relatively shallow upper strata ofwater. The lighter, upper ten percent is low-salt-content water, historically rich in fishand other life typical of marine seas. TheBlack Sea has no major interface with alarger sea that can rapidly replenish its wa-ter. Almost entirely landlocked, it links toother seas through the narrow BosphorusStrait, three-quarters of a mile wide at itsnarrowest point. The key sources of replen-ishment for the upper strata of water ac-cordingly are rainfall and river flow into theBlack Sea.
The environmental stresses of thelate twentieth century have taken numerousforms in the Black Sea. Metallic, nitrogen,and phosphorous effluents, and other pollu-tion from industrial and agricultural produc-tion, much of it carried by the Danube River
50
to the Black Sea; sewage from coastal citiesand non-coastal, watershed cities; and damsthat reduced the flow of fresh water into thesea are some examples of these stresses. Aspecies of comb jelly fish that ships broughtin the 1980s from the Chesapeake Bay de-voured fish larvae and by 1990 had reacheda biomass of a billion tons, larger than theworld fish harvest. Excessive investment inmore effective fishing vessels compoundedthe stress on fish stocks. In the words of a1999 study, “from the late 1960s to the early1990s events occurred in the Black Sea thatcan objectively be considered an environ-mental catastrophe.”2 By the last decade ofthis century, a massive collapse in fishstocks and significant damage from the ac-cumulated effects of years of eutrophicationhad occurred. Studies appeared suggestingthat the Black Sea might be the first marinesea that “dies” in the sense of ceasing tosupport significant quantities of typical ma-rine life.3 Peoples of the region found theprice of fish sky-rocketing and the conditionof resort beaches deteriorating. A sea thathistorically had provided five times morefish per square mile of surface area than theMediterranean had undergone an appallingchange and was widely regarded as the mostenvironmentally stressed marine sea on theplanet.
One of the difficulties of rectifyingthis situation is that the coastal states controlonly part of the Black Sea’s watershed. Rus-sia, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, andRomania, the six coastal states, contributesignificant amounts of pollutants of variouskinds to the sea. Eleven other states controlthe rest of the watershed, whose most sig-nificant single contributor to the environ-mental stress of the Black Sea is the DanubeRiver. The Danube carries staggeringamounts of pollutants as it winds from
Western Europe eastward into the Black Seain Romania. Environmentally damagingpractices of upstream peoples in Westernand Eastern Europe obviously cannot befixed through an environmental programlimited to the downstream coastal states andpeoples.
Another complication is the diversityof the coastal region and its long-standingpolitical and cultural divisions. Historicallythe power centers in this region have beenthe Turkic speaking, Muslim southern shoreand the Russian/Ukrainian speaking, Ortho-dox Christian northern shore. Tensions be-tween these two shores have taken manyforms over many centuries. Beside thiscleavage, the region has five distinct na-tional Orthodox churches and numerous re-ligious minorities. Linguistically the major-ity languages of the six states include a Ro-mance language, Slavic languages, an Indo-European language, and a Turkic-Uralic lan-guage. The late twentieth century has addedother factors, including the dearth of moderncommunication facilities, the depth of eco-nomic stress in post-communist countries,the uncertainty about numerous basic politi-cal issues, and the isolation of the formerlycommunist areas from many important in-ternational regimes during the Cold War.The result is an area fraught with excuses forwhy international environmental cooperationmight not occur or succeed. The Black Sea lagged far behindmost other regional seas in the developmentof a regional organization to foster remedialenvironmental cooperation.4 Curiously, theCold War is the major reason for both lackof cooperation in the 1970s, when many re-gional seas programs appeared, and for thebeginning of cooperation in the last half ofthe 1980s.
51
Turkey belongs to NATO. During the ColdWar the other coastal states – Bulgaria, Ro-mania, and the USSR – belonged to theWarsaw Pact. Beginning in 1969, the Sovi-ets made repeated proposals to Turkey fordiscussions about environmental coopera-tion among all Black Sea states. Turkeyroutinely rejected those overtures, whichwould have pitted it against three WarsawPact states and raised unwanted questionsabout Turkey’s commitment to NATO. Inthe Gorbachev era, the Turkish governmentchanged its stance on the question of Turk-ish-Soviet environmental talks. Reportedlythe Foreign Ministry saw environmental dis-cussions as a low risk avenue for exploringGorbachev's overall foreign policy intentionsas they pertained to Turkey. Constructiveenvironmental talks would point to opportu-nity for issues of importance to the ForeignMinistry and suggest that the Soviet Union’snew leadership was markedly different fromits predecessors. Failed environmental talkswould be inexpensive and easy to dismisssince the discussions pertained only to theenvironment. On this basis the ForeignMinistry advised environmental personnel inthe Turkish government to talk with the So-viets. However, they rejected the details ofthe Soviet proposal, instead proposing in-stead a duplicate of the Barcelona Conven-tion for the Mediterranean (to which Turkeyhad been a party for over a decade). Themove was shrewd in two respects. From theperspective of Turkish bureaucratic politics,the government of Turkey had already en-dorsed that concept for the Mediterranean. Itwas unlikely that the Foreign Ministrywould object to a Black Sea agreementbased upon the Mediterranean provisionsalready approved. From the perspective ofregional politics, proposing an agreement
based on the world’s best known regionalsea program was a politically neutral stance.
By 1992, the Soviet Union had dis-integrated and Ukraine and Georgia had be-came independent countries. The Turkishleadership had become staunchly supportiveof Black Sea cooperation and Ukraine’sleadership recognized that Black Sea envi-ronmental issues would underscoreUkraine’s legitimacy as an independentstate. By this time it was also widely evi-dent that significant deterioration in the en-vironment of the Black Sea had begun. Inspring 1992, the six coastal states signed theConvention on the Protection of the BlackSea Against Pollution at Bucharest (hencethe Bucharest Convention). This convention,similar to the Barcelona Convention for theMediterranean, is a framework treaty thatcommits the coastal states to reduce thepollution levels of the sea.
Far more was in the air at that 1992Bucharest meeting than the Bucharest Con-vention. As early as 1991, discussions in-volving state representatives, UN officials,outside experts, and experts from the regionhad been underway to devise cooperationthat would be far more ambitious than theprovisions of the Bucharest Convention. Atmeetings in Geneva, Istanbul, Varna, andelsewhere in 1992 and 1993, participantshammered out a set of objectives that drewextensively on the recently completed RioConference and Agenda 21. The fruits ofthis endeavor included the following: (1) theMinisterial Declaration on the Protection ofthe Black Sea of April 1993 (also known asthe Odessa Declaration), which proclaims anumber of objectives and attaches deadlinesto them; (2) an agreement on a projectdocument for a program to alleviate the en-vironmental stress of the Black Sea; (3) GEFfunding for three years of that project; (4)
52
and meetings to enlist regional nongovern-mental organizations’ (NGOs) help in theprogram.
In a formal sense, the region hadrapidly moved from no regional environ-mental agreements among the coastal statesto three sets of agreements (or “tracks”), anyone of which could be the basis for a BlackSea environmental cooperation. The 1992Bucharest Convention was one track. TheOdessa Declaration in spring 1993 was asecond track. Broader in scope and farmore specific in its expectations of whatstates would do than the Bucharest Conven-tion, the Odessa Declaration was the firstinternational marine sea agreement to reflectthe thinking of the 1992 Rio Conference onsustainable development. The third trackwas the Black Sea Economic Cooperation(BSEC). Established in 1992, the BSECexists to encourage trade and developmentin the Black Sea region through a member-ship that includes the six coastal states plusGreece, Albania, Moldova, Azerbaijan, andArmenia. A provision of its treaty refers toenvironmental protection of the Black Sea.However, except for a few conferencesabout Black Sea environmental issues, littlehappened in the BSEC arena during the1990s. In contrast, between 1994 and 1997a great deal happened in the BSEP (BlackSea Environmental Programme) arena thatwas a fusion of Track I and Track II diplo-macy and a direct product of the environ-mental negotiating process involving the sixcoastal states.
II. The Black Sea Environmental Pro-gramme
The BSEP was supposed to supportthree years of assessment of conditions anddevelopment of investment priorities; that
base would then be developed with invest-ments in the subsequent seven years. InJune 1993 in Varna, Bulgaria, the six coastalstates finalized a project design that estab-lished six separate activities, each with adistinct network that would include all sixcoastal states in an effort to better under-stand the actual situation of the Black Seaand actions needed. Each state would serveas coordinator and host the Activity Centerfor one of these networks or activity catego-ries. Bulgaria took emergency response;Romania took fish; Georgia took biodiver-sity; Russia took integrated coastal zonemanagement;5 and monitoring was dividedbetween routine monitoring headquarteredin Turkey and special monitoring headquar-tered in Ukraine. Each activity would in-clude extensive compilation of informationand a set of actions to enhance thesustainability of the region. The GEF pro-vided a $9.3 million grant, eventually tripledthrough financial assistance from other do-nors. Overall direction of the programcame from the Program Coordinating Unit(PCU) in Istanbul, which opened in early1994. The PCU director was Laurence Mee,an oceanographer who had written thewidely cited Ambio article about the BlackSea and was well known to delegates in-volved in the development of the OdessaDeclaration.6
It is important to underscore thestarting points of the BSEP project. Inte-grated coastal zone management was a newconcept for most of the Black Sea. No over-all study had been done of the water qualityof the sea. Nor had there been any regionaleffort to systematically catalogue the area’sbiodiversity. There were only back-of-the-envelope estimates of the financial costs tothe region of Black Sea degradation. Theregion had no fishing agreement, no effort to
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evaluate or coordinate emergency responsecapabilities, and no impetus for investmentin the region to enhance its environmentalsustainability. Furthermore, no comparisonhad been done of environmental legislationin coastal states, nor were there any regionalfora for NGOs.
The PCU first concentrated on es-tablishing the six Activity Centers and theassociated regional networks. It coveredairline fares, furnished computers for e-maillinks, hosted conferences, and within a yearhad nurtured networks that were meetingand producing reports and attending trainingsessions. It established other network en-deavors: support for environmental NGOs inthe region; assessment of the economic coststo the region of marine sea degradation; ex-amination of existing environmental laws inthe region with respect to possible harmoni-zation of legal policies; and a global infor-mation system project to make available theinformation the program was collecting.NGOs were represented in the steeringcommittee, and from the beginning the pro-gram hosted national level meetings to sup-port intra-state organization of the region'senvironmental NGOs, held annual regionalmeetings, and issued the first directory ofenvironmental NGOs in the region. Finally,the PCU supported the development of pro-posals in each state for a preliminary in-vestment project and of plans for subse-quent, more elaborate, and expensive proj-ects. The PCU’s first year report states that itmobilized “over 582 regional experts…to atotal of 43 training sessions, workshops,training sessions, and meetings”7 during1994. The number grew the next year,BSEP reporting that in 1995 it brought ap-proximately 1000 experts to more than 50workshops, meetings, and training sessions.
All together, the networks linked some 40institutions around the Black Sea.8
In June 1996, the GEF grant ran outas expected. The GEF provided a smallbridge grant to continue the program, but asnoted below, declined to provide a “GEF II”grant to support another block of years forthe program. The obvious marker points forassessing the program’s accomplishments, isthe 1994 to 1996-1997 era, almost threeyears after the PCU began operating.
The scope, industriousness, and as-sessment of visiting evaluation teams of theBSEP merit a discussion of far greaterlength than is possible here. A comparisonof what was attempted and achieved in theBSEP with the first three years of other re-gional sea programs, is also outside thescope of the present discussion. Instead,what follows are observations about BSEPhighlights and disappointments.In the September 1996 issue of Saving theBlack Sea the Turkish Ministry of Environ-ment official who served as the national co-ordinator for the BSEP program said thefollowing about BSEP:
There is a long tradition of envi-ronmental protection in Turkey.Now we have a lot of initiatives,such as through municipalities,communities, and NGOs. There isan increased amount of activity,which is of a higher quality than itwas before. More actions, more in-tegrated actions, and much morecomprehensive actions are beingplanned and implemented.9
In the same article Dr. Sharabidze of Geor-gia observed that:
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Our main problem is pollution fromdomestic sources. Many of the mu-nicipal sewage treatment facilities donot operate any more. Under theBSEP the government has alreadyreceived a loan from the World Bankfor $18 million to improve domesticwaste treatment facilities in Batumiand Poti.10
The combination of acquisition of invest-ment resources and stimulation of environ-mental protection activities evident in thesetwo statements echoes the objectives of theprogram, which in at least three major waysappear to have been met.
One major accomplishment is prog-ress in understanding the water condition ofthe Black Sea itself. In June 1996, the PCUissued its Black Sea Transboundary Diag-nostic Analysis (TDA), the “work of sixteenleading specialists drawn from fourteencountries including all six Black Sea coun-tries together with the five PCU specialiststaff…(who) analyzed the thematic reportsbased upon the work of over 100 Black Seaspecialists cooperating through the BSEPnetwork.”11 The study provided the firstoverall realistic picture of the ills of theBlack Sea. In the words of Zaitsev andMamaev,
The results of the TDA clearly dem-onstrate that the Black Sea environ-ment can still be restored and pro-tected. The BSEP pollution surveysrevealed that the Black Sea is not adeadly soup of toxic waste as sug-gested by one international newspa-per in 1993…Contamination byheavy metals and pesticides appearsto be limited to a few sites nearcoastal sources. Furthermore levels
of radionuclides do not represent ahealth hazard… In order to identifythe origins of pollution, carefulstudies were made of every signifi-cant discharge of liquid waste intothe Black Sea, and the cost of re-ducing or eliminating the most im-portant sources… Particularly urgentattention needs to be given to im-proving sewage treatment in all sixBlack Sea countries if human healthis to be better protected and thetourist industry fully developed. Inthe case of nutrients, well over halfthe load to the Black Sea is trans-ported by the Danube...12
The TDA is more than a water qual-ity report. Its overview (or “level one”) in-formation identifies seven major environ-mental problems of the sea, specifies theeconomic/social/political root causes of eachproblem, and stipulates types of action re-quired to rectify the problems. Its “leveltwo” overview of action areas analyzesproblems, stakeholders, uncertainties, pro-posed actions and costs, and “products andmilestones” for each of the seven majorproblem areas. “Level three” of the report,entitled “Detailed Analysis of the IdentifiedIssues,” provides data on water quality andelaborates the discussion of possible actions.Among its other features is a discussion ofpollution hotspots, whose amelioration logi-cally became the theme of BSEP’s recom-mendation for investment projects in thecoming years. Other regional seas programsviewed the format and organization of thisreport as a model of how to present such in-formation. For a two and a half year old pro-gram, the Transboundary Diagnostic Analy-sis is an impressive accomplishment.
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The second major accomplishmentof 1996 was the completion and subsequentsigning by all Black Sea states of the Strate-gic Action Plan for the Rehabilitation andProtection of the Black Sea. Once the activ-ity networks were established in 1994 thePCU worked to weave input from the activ-ity networks into draft ideas for a Black Seaaction plan. Envisioned as a relatively suc-cinct document, the draft was to be re-viewed, revised, and eventually signed bythe states, pushing the legal structures ofBlack Sea environmental cooperation be-yond the 1992 Bucharest Convention and the1993 Odessa Declaration. Mid-1995 tomid-1996 became a race to complete thedocument. With numerous meetings thePCU succeeded in completing the draft byearly summer 1996. On 31 October 1996,the Black Sea states signed the Black SeaStrategic Action Plan at a meeting in Istan-bul.
The Strategic Action Plan beginswith a seven point statement of the problemsand a set of principles for addressing them.are far more sophisticated than the 1992 Bu-charest Convention version of the problemand how to proceed.13 In the core of thePlan, “Policy Actions,” the signatoriescommit to more than a score of deadlines,most prior to 2000. These deadlines refer toactivities ranging from adoption or harmoni-zation of standards to establishment of en-forcement mechanisms to provision of in-formation or completion of studies.14 Dead-lines of 2005-2006 pertain to amelioration ofpollution hotspots identified by the BSEPpollution monitoring activities.15 One dis-cussion of the Black Sea Action Plan offersthe following overall summary:
The Black Sea Strategic Action Plantakes a pragmatic approach to the is-
sue of pollution control which fol-lows the ‘paradigm of iterated man-agement’…there has to be recogni-tion (of threat to ecosystems)...Thecomplete removal of the threat wouldbe desirable but is often impractica-ble in the short/medium term for so-cial and economic reasons and aninterim strategy is necessary for pol-lution control. The...states...as thecooperating partners involved thenagree on a short-term target for re-duction. In the first iteration, the re-duction is agreed on the basis ofwhat can reasonably be achievedwithin a given time frame. Theagreement is made on the basis ofcommon but differentiated responsi-bilities, in this case each partnerfinds the most economically con-venient approach for reaching theagreed target… The partners alsoagree on a program of research andmonitoring to refine the estimate ofoptimal reductions so that…new tar-gets may be set with lower uncer-tainty regarding the outcome. Theiterations should continue until allpartners agree that the environmentis adequately protected.16
An additional category of success isthe BSEP’s prowess in developing ideas forinvestment projects. Many of the activitynetworks, including biodiversity and inte-grated coastal zone management, focusedpart of their efforts on potential investmentopportunities. From the beginning of theprogram the PCU supported a program ofpre-investment studies that would helpcountries develop preliminary proposals forthe urgent investment project. It was hopedthe efforts would be funded and carried out
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during the first stage of the BSEP program.Georgia obtained funding for a municipalservices project in Batumi and Poti. Russiaproposed a Greater Rostov EnvironmentalStrategic Action Plan, Ukraine a waster wa-ter treatment facility in Odessa, Bulgaria awater company project in Varna, and Turkeya solid waste treatment project in Trabzon.17
For the roster of long range investment proj-ects, the BSEP identified pollution hot spotsand 50 locations where investment couldreduce those hotspots, mostly through theestablishment of waste water treatment fa-cilities or improvement of harbor facilities.An international consultant will use this in-formation to complete a scoping study,leading to a portfolio of investments, (pre-sumably three per country).18 The BSEPprovoked thinking about environmental pri-orities, provided assistance in preparing in-vestment ideas, and identified investmentstrategies that contribute to the ameliorationof environmental problems of the Black Sea.
While learning about the Black Sea’senvironmental situation, the PCU strove tomake that information available to others.The geographic information system (GIS)became operational and a readily accessiblesource of complex information about theBlack Sea. Information on biodiversity, na-tional priorities, and various other topicswas published in a series of studies.
The creation and maintenance ofwebs of people communicating across na-tional boundaries about specific aspects ofthe Black Sea environmental agenda alsobelongs on this list of accomplishments.Whether the results were short run successesor disappointments, each network fosteredcommunication that had not existed previ-ously. These networks were the basis of thework that emerged as the Black Sea Strate-
gic Action program and as the Trans-boundary Diagnostic Analysis. There were both successes and alsofrustrating sequences of endeavors that fellfar short of what was expected when on con-siders the details of BSEP endeavors by ac-tivity group. On the minus side, for exam-ple, the Transboundary Diagnostic surveycame from data collected for a Food and Ag-ricultural Organization (FAO) survey ratherthan from the all centers of the routinemonitoring network. This survey reflectedthe PCU’s efforts to strengthen capabilitiesbut it fell short of the objective of a continu-ous monitoring program throughout the re-gion. Routine monitoring of the sea contin-ued in only two of the states by 1997,19
largely because funds were not available topay for research centers whose equipmenthad been updated and whose staffs had beentrained in an earlier phase of the BSEP pro-gram. Lack of funds is an endemic con-straint on the spin-offs and core activities ofthe BSEP.
A different kind of limitation is sug-gested by contrasting projects where successis primarily in the gathering of scientific in-formation and projects where success is achange in existing state policy. Juxtaposingthe Emergency Response and the Biodiver-sity areas illustrates this point. In 1994, theEmergency Response working party’s firstreport indicated that regional capabilities tohandle oil spills and other emergencies weremodest.20 Small to medium size problems,close to shore that did not cross nationalboundaries tested the limit of capabilities.Most states of the region had not signed themajority of the international conventionsthat pertain to emergency response and nonational emergency response contingencyplans existed, let alone a regional emergencyresponse contingency plan. Under BSEP
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auspices, the Emergency Response networkheld a number of training sessions, meetingswith individuals from the InternationalMaritime Organization, and other similarmeetings. Yet, three BSEP annual reportsstate that the national contingency plans arestill in preparation. The 1996 report indi-cates that additional time is needed for leg-islative changes, and the 1997 report saysthat most of the participants in BSEP'semergency response effort are environmen-talists while the people in the countries re-sponsible for such issues are transport min-istry people.21 Thus the emergency responseactivity brought together people from aroundthe Black Sea, but it made no dent on thepolicies or allocation of resources that definethe Black Sea region’s preparedness fortanker collisions or other emergency situa-tions. By the last year of the PCU, the ob-jectives had broadened from emergency re-sponse to emergency response plus im-provement of port facilities to reduce pollu-tion hot spots.
In contrast, the Biodiversity activitynetwork made major accomplishmentswithin its defined responsibilities. The ac-tivity moved from first year preparatorymeetings and workshops on standardizationof methods to an impressive set of suc-cesses. Within a year it produced nationalreports on each country's coastal biodiver-sity. During subsequent years, it proposedpilot programs for each country; made rec-ommendations on subjects such as keystonespecies, protections of shelf areas, and up-dating the Bucharest Convention; and pro-duced a regional strategy for conservationareas that the states were reviewing in 1997.Clearly this activity network marshaled im-pressive knowledge and derived numerouspolicy ideas from that knowledge. A large
part of BSEP's publications are the work ofthis activity group. While the PCU was achieving clo-sure on the Black Sea Strategic Action Pro-gram and publishing its Transboundary Di-agnostic Analysis, both nurtured from theactivity webs of the BSEP, it was simultane-ously waging a fight to maintain its funding.Efforts to obtain an additional, “GEF II”grant occurred in context of extensive praisefor the project, arguments by the PCU staffto the GEF that two years was an insufficienttime for a region with no heritage of suchcooperation, and some confusion within theGEF about its mission in relation to marinesea projects. Ironically the 1996 GEF vac-illation about whether to continue support-ing the program coincided with the processof the six coastal states deciding in October1996 to sign the Black Sea Strategic ActionProgram. As noted above, the GEF de-clined to provide another sizeable grant tothe program. Director Mee commented thatobtaining more GEF funds was
much more difficult than expected.Firstly, the request came at a timewhen the GEF operational strategywas still under final considerationand there were frequent changes orreinterpretations of the rules. Sec-ondly, there had been no prior GEFproject, which had achieved almost100 percent implementation exactlyaccording to schedule and was re-questing additional funds to developnew avenues and to consolidate theinitial achievements. Thirdly, whenthe request for support was finallycleared by all partners, the new inter-sessional approval mechanism of theGEF council failed since a quorumof comments was not achieved (the
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consultation was conducted bypost).22
The result was the end of significant fundingfor a remarkable program at exactly the timeit needed continuing financial resources.
The PCU remained open, and theBSEP kept functioning in late 1996 and1997 primarily with money from the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP)and the European Union Phare and Tacisprograms as well as with a small bridgegrant from the GEF. With the loss of majorGEF funds, a decline in PCU staffing and adecline in the endeavors of the BSEP oc-curred. The PCU lost an environmentaleconomist, a fish specialist, a regional NGOcoordinator, and eventually Director Mee.In 1998 the PCU became the Program Im-plementation Unit (PIU), “implementation”referring to the Black Sea Strategic ActionPlan. Funding from the UNDP plus pledgesof $20,000 from each coastal country keptthe office open in 1999, despite four of thesix coastal countries not paying their$20,000 share.
It is possible that the internal dy-namics of the GEF process focused on thefailure of the states to carry through on theirpledge to establish a Secretariat, which wasone of their main commitments in the Bu-charest Declaration. The PCU worked onthis problem but could not resolve it. Al-though tangential to the BSEP and an issuethat the coastal states rather than BSEPshould have resolved, this failing is one ofthe major disappointments in the 1990s his-tory of Black Sea environmental coopera-tion. Another disappointment is the massivegap between the vigor of the BSEP and thelack of public awareness of its activities, anissue on which BSEP also worked. Bothshortcomings merit discussion.
Why did the coastal states fail to establish aregional environmental secretariat?
The 1992 Bucharest Conventionclauses for establishing a Secretariat andcreating a commission were to be the keymechanisms for Black Sea states’ oversightof environmental cooperation. Turkey hadpledged to cover 40 percent of the costs ofthe Secretariat. In 1994, with BSEP under-way, the expectation was that the countrieswould proceed to appoint commissionersand establish the Secretariat. It did not workout this way. The states' active enthusiasmebbed as soon as BSEP began to function.No Secretariat materialized. Some statesindicated that they were financially unable tocontribute to a Secretariat and that theycould not anticipate contributing for the nexttwo years. Subsequently, Russian-Turkishdisputes over a headquarters agreement forthe Secretariat became an intractable issue,and negotiations about details of a Secretar-iat headquarters came to a stalemate. Thesituation had moved from an enthusiasticflurry of state-level activity circa 1991-1993to a failure by 1997 to establish the Secre-tariat. That in turn left the PCU with no re-gionally controlled entity to which it couldturn over the BSEP activities it had nurtured.In the words of one Ministry of Environmentofficial of a Black Sea state, “They are try-ing to hand a program to the states on a sil-ver platter, and the states are not taking it.”The contrast between energetic state effortsto start the GEF program and anemic statesupport for creating oversight capabilitiesfor the program is striking.
It would be instructive if some defector fatal flaw in the PCU’s strategy vis-B-visthe region became pivotally important in theissue of whether or not to establish a Secre-
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tariat. The evidence suggests, however, thatsuch a flaw is unlikely and that a differentstrategy by the PCU would not have changedthe outcome. The rapidity with which thePCU assembled the networks of people andinstitutions plus the apparent productivity ofthose networks over two years suggests thatthe program was unexpectedly successful,which should have sufficed to encouragestate creation of a Secretariat. The explana-tion instead seems to reside in external fac-tors beyond the control of the PCU. Theseinclude the following:
No spectacular disasters. For theduration of the BSEP there were no cata-strophic or near calamitous environmentalissues involving the Black Sea. A tankerdid catch fire at the northern entrance to theBosphorus Straits, but that event did nothave serious consequences. Nothing, inother words, provoked broad public atten-tion that might have encouraged states topoint out that they were addressing BlackSea environmental health in the guise oftheir support for BSEP. Nor did anythingdramatic happen that underscored for statesthe importance of progress on the environ-mental agenda of the Black Sea region.
No aggressively committed nationalleaders. After 1993, no state leader in theregion energetically pushed Black Sea coop-eration. Worried that the end of the ColdWar would render Turkey strategically in-significant to the states of Western Europeand North America, President Turgut Ozalof Turkey had played the role of the aggres-sive leader in the early 1990s. The BlackSea Economic Cooperation was his project,which as leader of the only coastal state witha strong economy and capitalist economicinstitutions, he was uniquely situated to cre-ate. The less publicized Black Sea Envi-ronmental Cooperation fits the same con-
cept. With the death of Ozal in spring 1993,no leader of any other Black Sea coastalstate pushed for Black Sea regional coop-eration to the extent that Ozal had done.The Ministry of Environment personnelthroughout the region had no top-level sup-port for the concept of a Black Sea coopera-tion. It also meant that no single leadercould cut through the objections of his owngovernment or appeal to leaders of othergovernments to move forward on the estab-lishment of the BSEP secretariat.
Economic stress. This factor is fre-quently given as the reason for the failure ofthe coastal states to create a Secretariat. TheBlack Sea region states of the formerlycommunist world failed to match the eco-nomic transition and recovery of formerlycommunist states such as Poland or theCzech Republic. State financial resourcesdiminished. States lent little support toepistemic communities' research and policyefforts, leaving little prospect of scientificideas affecting public policy. Certainly theunexpectedly stubborn economic stress inthe region undermined policies of countriessuch as Ukraine that originally had endorsedthe Black Sea Environmental Programmeand saw its existence and success as an ele-ment of Ukrainian strategy to underscore itssovereign independence.
While the depth of economic stressin the region was appalling, it does notautomatically follow that the $9 million theGEF put into the BSEP program betweenJune 1993 and June 1996 could not be raisedin the region itself. Although the BucharestConvention does not provide for the creationof a regional funding mechanism, that ideahas been part of the Black Sea environ-mental discussions for a number of years.
From the early days of the BSEP, itsProgram Coordinating Unit was involved in
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discussions about the possible creation of aregional environmental fund that would notdepend upon coastal state contributions forfinancial support of a secretariat or other ac-tivities. One of the ideas that emerged fromformal and informal discussions of this con-cept was a proposal to tax Black Sea tankersaccording to the volume of their oil cargos.That tax would go directly into the BlackSea Environmental Fund. This mechanismwould be easy to monitor, simple to under-stand, symbolically relevant to the pollutionof the sea, and potentially lucrative enoughto cover costs of a secretariat, the BSEP ac-tivities, and even have money left over foreach state's environmental ministry.
Apparently with encouragementfrom local NGOs the PCU pushed this issueby bringing it to the Black Sea EconomicCooperation (or “Track III”). As notedabove, the Black Sea Economic Cooperationcharter has an environmental provision andthe organization also has an environmentaltask force. Since it operates at the ForeignMinistry level, its support for an environ-mental tax would be a very promising steptoward state endorsement of a regionallyfunded Black Sea environmental fund.
At the Black Sea Economic Coop-eration’s Meeting of the Working Group onEnvironmental Protection in Tblisi, Georgiaon 27 September 1994, the PCU’s econo-mist discussed a proposal for the creation ofsuch a tax.23 The delegates reportedly rec-ognized the importance of this kind offunding and recommended that the BlackSea Economic Cooperation Secretariatshould devote further study to the proposaland present specific proposals to the nextmeeting. At the next meeting, in Athens on21-22 March 1995, the topic appears in theminutes as an item that was discussed, pre-sumably with no official result.24
However, these discussions were theend of this particular effort to use Track IIIto resolve a Track I problem. The reasonsfor the failure are not entirely clear. First,the Black Sea Economic Cooperation had inprinciple agreed to establish a Black Sea de-velopment bank in Salonika, Greece. ABlack Sea environmental fund might be anappropriate activity for such a bank. Therewas pressure to put the fund at that bank,whose location would be a state that wasneither a signatory of the Bucharest Con-vention nor a Black Sea coastal state. Underthe auspices of a Black Sea Economic Co-operation development bank rather than theBlack Sea environmental secretariat stipu-lated in the Bucharest Convention, thesefunds would be subject to decisions of theeleven states that comprise the Black SeaEconomic Cooperation rather than the sixstates of the sea coast and the BSEP. A sec-ond issue pertained to shipping. With thedemise of the Soviet Union, Greek shippingactivity in the Black Sea increased. Newinvestment in Central Asian oil fields andthe prospects for the Black Sea to become ashipping outlet for some of that oil may havereinforced concerns of Greek, Russian, andother shipping interests that this tax wouldinterfere with tanker trade and affect thecompetitiveness of oil exported from theBlack Sea region. Third, a PCU officialcommented a few years later that proposalsthat necessitate coastal states changing theirtax laws can be problematic. The attempt to secure Black SeaEconomic Cooperation endorsement of anenvironmental fund could have been a win-win situation. A “yes” would have gener-ated funds, while a “no” might have stimu-lated more effort by the coastal states to re-solve this financial problem. At a late spring1995 BSEP meeting in Istanbul, the coastal
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states again discussed and agreed to continuestudying the idea of establishing a Black SeaEnvironmental Fund.25 The UNDP urged theGEF to support a set of meetings to developthis idea, and a number of meetings weresubsequently held. As it turns out, the statesfailed to create a regionally generated fundfor environmental purposes. The idea re-mained in discussions, one of its versions aninnovative concept of a regional debt-for-nature swap.
Extraneous political static: tensionsbetween the regional giants. In September1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin dis-missed the Russian Congress of People’sDeputies, the military used tanks to fire onthe headquarters of the Congress, and dem-onstrators protested in Moscow. Amid thechaos of this unrest in September and Octo-ber, word slowly emerged that one of thelast acts of the now defunct Congress wasthe ratification of the Bucharest Convention.Russia thus became the key fourth ratifyingstate, whose endorsement put the conventioninto effect. Turkey had expected to be thefourth ratifying party, but the sudden deathof President Ozal in spring 1993 confrontedthe National Assembly with other issues,and consideration of the treaty was delayedfor reasons unrelated to the treaty itself.Turkey became the fifth ratifying state. Inthose heady days of 1993 and 1994, thereappeared to be ample support in both Mos-cow and Ankara for the BSEP.
The existence of these problems andthe Bucharest Convention specification thatthe headquarters of the Secretariat would bein Istanbul are not a coincidence. Rumorsthat Russia in recent years has opposed es-tablishing the Secretariat in Istanbul may becorrect. In a larger sense there is no single,clear, unequivocally correct explanation ofwhy Russia’s early 1990s cooperative stance
on Black Sea environmental cooperationseems to have shifted. Conjecture includesthe following factors, more than one ofwhich may be relevant. Unable to play itsappropriate role until on firmer economicground, Russia would prefer to slow downregional developments. When Russia canagain assert its authority, then it would againpush for regional solutions to address re-gional issues of this kind. Conversely, per-haps Russia was unable to play its accus-tomed role vis-B-vis the south shore of theBlack Sea in 1992-1994, and now it is doingso, in accord with a long heritage of Turk-ish-Russian antipathy. Third, perhaps theenvironment has largely dropped from theofficial priorities of the Russian State. Fi-nally, delays and inconsistent positions atconferences may be a function of adminis-trative and political disarray at home, par-ticularly in issues that do not have compel-ling visibility at the top level of the Russiangovernment.
Resolving the Secretariat host coun-try agreement and personnel immunity de-tails would have been necessary whether ornot there was a financial crisis. It is possiblethe problems would have been as intractablein a healthier regional economic climate.Certainly there has been a deterioration inTurkish-Russian relationships overall duringthe 1990s. By the latter half of the 1990s,Turkish-Russian relations encompassed anumber of difficult issues that had been lessserious in the early 1990s. The delicatematter of Turkic speaking groups and/orMuslim groups rebelling within Russia isone such issue, illustrated by the case ofChechnya. Where the proposed pipelinefrom Central Asian oil fields would exit isanother problem: Turkey prefers a southernroute that would bring the oil to a port onTurkey’s Mediterranean coast, while Russia
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favors a northern route that would reinforceits historical benefit from Central Asian oil.Tension over shipping through the Bospho-rus Strait is a related issue. The MontreuxConvention of 1936 stipulates that Turkeykeep the waterway open for commercial traf-fic. A vast increase in the number of shipsusing the Straits in the 1990s led Turkey tocreate rules to ease the congestion in the nar-row passageway, which sometimes causeddelays for Russian ships. Russia opposedthese policies. Turkey also took a verystrong stand against increased oil trafficthrough the strait on the grounds that thewaterway is too narrow to safely accommo-date super tankers and that a super tankerfire in the Straits could ignite much of thecity. Export of oil from Central Asiathrough Russia, would likely increase thesuper tanker traffic. Without access to theStraits for this export, one of the easiestways of moving Central Asian oil to worldmarkets is blocked. All of these matterscomplicate the milieu in which BSEP oper-ates.
Why did BSEP not receive more attentionfrom the regional population?
Unprecedented state cooperationbridging venerable antipathies of the BlackSea coast, plus the rapidity with whichthings moved ahead in 1993, augured forgreat media stories and extensive public in-terest in BSEP. After all, a recent historysaw environmental groups underminingcommunist policies, the psychological im-pacts of Chernobyl were vivid, and therewas widespread awareness that somethingwas wrong with the Black Sea. The BlackSea Environmental Programme might havebeen an emblem of the newly emergingBlack Sea regional consciousness.
The reality turned out to be quite dif-ferent. BSEP endeavors to orchestrate re-gional cooperation for analyzing and recti-fying those ecological problems unfoldedwith very little publicity despite efforts bythe PCU. The BSEP, lauded by evaluationteams, was virtually invisible in the media.The media also paid little attention to detailsof Black Sea environmental stress. Whywas there a discontinuity between the qualityof the BSEP and the public’s awareness ofthe BSEP? Why did the program not attractmore public attention?
Clearly the PCU was aware of theproblem. Level One of its Black Sea Trans-boundary Diagnostic Analysis lists “insuffi-cient public involvement” as a “main rootcause” of six of seven major problems of theBlack Sea.25 The point is reiterated as oneof the four key obstacles to Black Sea envi-ronmental cooperation listed by departingPCU Director Mee in his commentary in the1997 Annual Report. He stated there “is avery poor level of environmental awarenessand public participation in all Black Seacountries.”26 Previous Annual Reports from1994 to 1996 and the PCU’s publicationSaving the Black Sea discuss numerousBSEP efforts to educate the public aboutBSEP.
Early in the process, BSEP devotedconsiderable effort and expense to buildingNGO capabilities and communication. Itensured that NGOs were represented in itssteering committee. Those efforts continuedas long as BSEP had funding, as indicted bya number of projects listed in the 1997 An-nual Report. As the BSEP developed, frus-tration is evident in these reports focusing onNGO isolation from the public. By 1997,the section on NGOs in the Annual Reporthad been renamed “Environmental Citizen’sOrganizations (ECOs).” The discussion as-
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serts that “the failure of NGOs to involve thepublic or become involved in the environ-mental decision-making process is often dueto weak cooperative spirit among NGOsrather than a lack of money, resources, orpeople.”27 The 1997 Annual Report containsan interesting commentary about the transi-tion in the Black Sea region from a vigorousNGO movement in the late 1980s and early1990s to a declining movement by the end ofthe decade. In the words of the report,
Since the early 1990s when manyforeign environmental grant-makingfunds made their way to the CIS re-gion, NGOs have multiplied likemushrooms after the rain. In mostcases they are small organizationsspecializing in a specific area andcannot be called grassroots organi-zations. Nevertheless many NGOstend to think that they automaticallyrepresent “the public” and “publicopinion” even though they are onlyrepresenting themselves and theirrole is rather limited; hence the lim-ited scale of their activities… TheNGOs nonetheless have a crucialrole to play in increasing publicawareness of the issues raised byBSEP.28
The PCU engaged in a number ofeducational and other endeavors to make itswork more widely known, but this activitydid not generate much overall publicity. Asmall indication of the invisibility of BSEPand its agenda is evident from the data of theOpen Media Research Institute’s (OMRI)daily news summaries. Searching for“Black+Sea+Environment” in all newssummaries between 1 January 1993 and 31December 1997 elicited fewer than ten
records. Only one of those pertains to BSEP;a report on 27 July 1993 of the forthcomingGEF grant to clean up the Black Sea. Thatnews coincided with approval or nearapproval of the BSEP program document byBlack Sea states. The search words BSEP or“Black+Sea+Environmental+Program”produced no articles at all.
For the previously communist west,north, and east coasts of the Black Sea theexplanation for this lack of attention seemssimple. Economic stress overwhelmedpeople's environmental sensitivities. Thisstress worsened as the 1990s unfolded.Without some conceptual key that linked theenvironment to economic recovery andprosperity, it is unsurprising that peoples andmedia of most of the Black Sea states paidlittle attention to BSEP or to the sea’senvironmental problems.
As with the Secretariat issue, how-ever, there is also reason to suspect theproblem is far more complicated than eco-nomic stress. In this case it is instructivethat in the one Black Sea country that didnot experience unmitigated 1990s economicstress, BSEP was also virtually unknown.Turkey, host of the PCU and location of theActivity Center for Routine Monitoring, waspotentially the most newsworthy portfolio ofthe six original BSEP activities.
Turkey’s economy grew significantlyduring the 1993-1997 era. Yet between 1993and 1997, it was remarkable how littleTurkish awareness of BSEP existed amongan attentive public interested in the politicsof the Black Sea region. No systematicstudies appear to have examined the Turkishpublic’s awareness of BSEP, indicating thatBSEP was virtually unknown.29 The BSEP'srelative absence from the media ensured thatfew people could learn about it. There was astark disconnect between the caliber of
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BSEP's performance and public awarenessof its activities.
What explains this condition in cir-cumstances of general economic well-beingcoupled with widespread awareness that theBlack Sea had become an environmentalproblem? Are there processes at work thatmight have resulted in low level of aware-ness of BSEP in a similarly prosperousUkraine or Romania or Bulgaria or Georgiaor Russia?
A basic argument of cognitive psy-chology is that people simplify. Humanminds cannot grasp most of the stimuli thatwe encounter. Human memories are falli-ble, and we have trouble keeping track ofextensive detail. If on a superficial leveldetails seem not to add to something coher-ent and clear, it is especially difficult to per-ceive and remember, let alone to make infer-ential leaps from the details to conclusionsabout an overall process. From this per-spective the lack of attention in Turkey toBSEP, despite the magnitude of environ-mental degradation in the Black Sea and thequality of the BSEP program, is an interest-ing problem. Its explanation includes thefollowing: No disastrous events and no clear,feasible criteria of success. As noted earlierin this discussion, the years of BSEP did notcoincide with any discrete, catastrophicevent that affected the environment of theBlack Sea. This lack of crisis deprived themedia and the public of a specific platformthat might have dramatized the work of theBSEP.
A related difficulty is that the phrase“Black Sea Environmental Cooperation”does not create an automatic focus on somespecific, measurable, meaningful target thatthe public or media can track. An errantMediterranean whale in the Black Sea at-
tracts attention. A tanker fire at the entranceto the Bosphorus Straits attracts attention.In both cases there is a simple story of howthe whale or the fire is progressing. Mediacoverage and public tracking of the storiesensue.
BSEP cannot easily provide such atarget because the problems of the sea arecomplex and require years of cooperation inan area that includes the Danube basinwhere a significant portion of Black Seapollution originates. Simply laying thegroundwork for the networks and trying tostart a routine monitoring of the sea was amassive challenge. There is no quick fix forthe problems of the Sea. Moreover, thegoal of the project was to stimulate munici-palities and experts in the region to identifyprojects that would begin a long process ofchanging the ways in which the coastal areasare used. This work lacks the elements ofsensationalism and promise of rapid changethat are the stuff of media coverage andpopular interest.
Diffuseness of the effects of environ-mental stress and shortage. This category isborrowed from Thomas Homer-Dixon's veryinteresting research on conflict and envi-ronmental stress in situations in which vio-lent conflict occurred. Homer-Dixon arguesthat shortage, not environmental degradationper se, prompts conflict. Homer-Dixon alsoargues that the link between environmen-tally-induced shortage and violent conflict isdiffuse, often sub-national, and persistent.30
Diffuseness means that what begins as anenvironmental stress reverberates politicallyas other kinds of stress, masking the under-lying environmental catalyst of the stress.Thus by the time environmentally triggeredviolence occurs, the situation is a complexof ethnic factors, civil-military factors, intra-military factors, and the like. Finally,
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Homer-Dixon argues that states differ intheir ability to cushion these kinds ofstresses.
Although Homer-Dixon's concern iswith violent conflict, his insight about thediffuse effects of environmental shortagesuggests a general perceptual phenomenon.It may not be that only angry people are un-able to recognize environmental stress asenvironmental stress. Under less intensecircumstances there is ample reason whypeople might be only vaguely aware of theimpact of environmental degradation. Someof the degradation does not take the form oftangible shortage. Some of the tangibleshortage blends smoothly with non-environmental understandings people haveof supply and demand phenomena. Existingperceptual categories may encompass theeffects of environmentally triggered pres-sures so that people’s attention is not drawnto “environment” as a specific category. Inother words, the effects of environmentalstress may be highly diffuse in regard topeople’s perception of what is happening.The effects intermingle with many otherfactors that ask the environmental compo-nent. In this way “diffuseness” is a helpfulconcept for understanding the difficulties ofattracting peoples' attention to the efforts toremedy environmental degradation.
This idea seems to fit the circum-stances of Istanbul, the major recipient ofmigration out of Turkey’s Black Sea coast.31
For example, assume that Black Sea degra-dation triggers migration among thousandsof young residents of the Black Sea coast toIstanbul. Near-collapse of fishing along thesouthern coast and the closing of fish can-neries at places such as Trabzon diminishthe economic opportunity for young people.As large numbers of new migrants arrive inIstanbul, the awareness of Black Sea envi-
ronmental stress spreads. People hear whythe migrants have arrived. Migrants them-selves express hopes of going home ifsomehow the sea can be fixed and massivequantities of fish and clean beaches reap-pear. In this kind of scenario, there is amplecognitive space for people to understand theimportance of the Black Sea EnvironmentalProgramme, even if it cannot rectify theproblems of the sea. One can even imagineresidents of Istanbul muttering that if onlythe sea could be repaired then the over-crowding and noise of the city would ease asBlack Sea people returned home.
The real story differs from thissketch. The corrected version creates virtu-ally no cognitive space for awareness ofBSEP. Many young people who recentlymigrated to the big city from the Black Searegion would have sought adventure orwealth in the city anyway, had there been noenvironmental problem in the Black Sea.Large numbers of their relatives migrated toIstanbul in the 1980s from the Black Searegion even when the Black Sea appeared tobe healthy and the fishing industry wasbooming. Most of the migrants, whetherthey came in the 1980s or the 1990s, preferto remain in Istanbul. Accordingly neitherthe newcomers nor their predecessors infusethe city with stories of environmentallyforced migration that underscore the condi-tion of the sea. Nor does the city populationhear stories of how a polluted sea tragicallyprecludes the return of innocent victims totheir original homes. Thus, massive BlackSea environmental degradation has not beenlinked to what is happening in the urban areathat receives a large number of migrantsfrom the Black Sea coastal region of Turkey.
One might add that the impact ofBlack Sea degradation is further diffused bythe existence of migration to Istanbul from
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other parts of the country. Istanbul report-edly grows by 500,000 people a year, in-cluding 300,000 new immigrants. No onecan precisely estimate the contribution ofBlack Sea environmental woes to the con-gestion of a city that grows by two or threehundred thousand emigrants a year. Theimpact of Black Sea degradation on migra-tion is lost among other stimuli includingeconomic conditions in poor parts of Tur-key, the civil war in the South East, and theusual dose of youthful preference to experi-ence the city. Were the Black Sea's envi-ronmental condition suddenly rectified, whatwould change in Istanbul? Experts do notknow the answer to such questions, whichpertain to very complicated systems inwhich people can do many things to adjustto adversity and to opportunity. Thus, theBlack Sea's environmental degradation hasno prominence as a cause of problems thatworry people; its rectification also has noprominence as remedy for what troublespeople.
Ask residents of Istanbul about supertankers plying the Bosphorus and one im-mediately hears fears of fire engulfing thecity in the aftermath of a super tanker acci-dent. In a city whose houses traditionallywere wood and where fire was far more wor-risome than outside invasion during centu-ries of Ottoman Empire rule, this is a societythat remembers fires. Its people have cogni-tive schemas that link fire to the destructionof the city.32 Those schemas are deeplyrooted, and the new fact of super tankerslinks readily with the venerable con-cept/schema of fire and destruction. Ask aresident of Istanbul about the pollution in theBlack Sea and typically there is no diagnosisof the relationship of that problem to theperson’s life in Istanbul or prescription ofwhat might happen because of that pollution,
even though the person would express dis-may over what has happened to the sea.
Thus, there is not an obvious cogni-tive niche into which the Black Sea Envi-ronmental Programme can fit. Lack of pub-licity and attention follow from this cogni-tive lapse. The problem actually is far worsebecause something else has occupied thecognitive niche of cooperation among BlackSea states that have previously not cooper-ated.
Coaptation of the Black Sea Label:The Black Sea Economic Cooperation. An-other entity, the Black Sea Economic Coop-eration (BSEC), has a label that sounds de-ceptively similar to that of BESP. It s suc-cess in gaining publicity has also rooted theeconomic cooperation label deeply enoughto become the schema of the novel phe-nomenon of Black Sea state cooperation.
In 1992 President Ozal of Turkeysuccessfully formed the Black Sea Eco-nomic Cooperation (BSEC) around a treatysigned by 11 regional states. The objectiveof the BSEC (not BSEP) is a free trade zonein the Black Sea region. Its members are thesix coastal states plus non-Black Sea statesGreece, Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, andMoldova. The Black Sea Economic Coop-eration’s annual meetings are extensivelypublicized because Foreign Ministers andother cabinet level officials attend. The con-ferences rotate among various membercountries, publicizing the concept of BlackSea cooperation by echoing the name BlackSea Economic Cooperation. Photo opportu-nities, days of coverage, and reports on thediscussions, are the media's standard treat-ment.
In English “BSEC” and “BSEP” lookquite similar. In Turkish “economic” (eko-nomik) and “environment” (cevre) are moredistinct words than they are in English, but
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as in English they follow the adjective BlackSea. Mention “Black Sea EnvironmentalProgramme” to someone who follows thepolitics of the region, and the response fre-quently assumes that you meant Black SeaEconomic Cooperation and either mis-spokeor actually said economic program. TheBlack Sea Economic Cooperation appears tohave acquired the symbolism of “BlackSea.”
Under these circumstances the BSEPfaced a virtually impossible publicity task in1993-1996. It could not trade on the noveltyof Black Sea cooperation because that in-formation was already part of public aware-ness of the Black Sea Economic Coopera-tion. Its initials could not provoke surprise(positive or negative) for the same reason.Probably it also did not help that the organi-zation that co-opted the symbolism of BlackSea governmental cooperation was often farmore an official formality than an activeprogram. Someone understanding the con-cept of Black Sea state cooperation on thosegrounds, would likely lead one to overlookthe energetic details of the quite differentBSEP program.
Momentum was beginning to buildon the publicity front just as the GEF wasdeciding to not refund the program. ThePCU was involved in a host of projects, buttheir main sponsors were other institutions.In 1996, the Black Sea Economic Coopera-tion hosted a meeting of Parliamentarians ofthe Black Sea to discuss Black Sea environ-mental issues. In 1997, the Black Sea Eco-nomic Cooperation also hosted a meeting ofover 1,000 business people, primarily fromTurkey, to discuss Black Sea environmentalissues. The meeting attracted Rami Koc,one of the richest people in the world whosefamily business is one of the largest in Tur-key.
Except for Turkey, the majoritypopulations throughout the Black Sea statesare Eastern Orthodox Christians, dividedinto national churches for Bulgaria, Roma-nia, Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia. For cen-turies the leader of Eastern Orthodoxy hasresided in Istanbul. Although the Patriarchdoes not have the leverage over the EasternChurch that the Pope has over the westernCatholic church, he is the most importantleader of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.
The current Patriarch is deeply inter-ested in environmental issues. In 1997, HisAll Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bar-tholomew I organized a boat trip around theBlack Sea to dramatize its environmentalproblems. In September 1997, he and 250other people traveled by boat from Trabzon,Turkey to a number of other Black Sea portsand then to Thessaloniki, Greece for a con-ference. Designed to be a symbolic juxta-position of religion and science under theauspices of the Patriarch, the ship's passen-gers included the Director and the formerAssociate Director of the BSEP-PCU, peo-ple from various ministries of the environ-ment of Black Sea states, a large array ofenvironmentalists including Sylvia Earle, theAga Khan, the President of the Commissionof the European Union, the Bishop of Lon-don, and other religious leaders. The Patri-arch proclaimed that religion can provide theethical context and direction for activism.He also called for scientists and theologiansto set aside their differences and work toimprove the environment. Sylvia Earlecommented,
Combining the knowledge of wis-dom and science with the sensitivityof diverse religions will create a newand effective ethic for caring for na-ture starting with the greatly stressed
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Black Sea environment. In fact, thethoughtful responses of the unlikelybut congenial mix of Patriarchs,Holinesses, Highnesses, Excellen-cies, scientists, economists, policy-makers, businessmen, press, and oth-ers during the days of deliberationwhile sailing over these troubledwaters suggests that the process is al-ready well underway.33
Metropolitan John of Pergamon’s concludedat the end of the Thessoloniki meeting that
The gravity of the environmentalsituation, in a context of extremeeconomic hardships of societies intransition, obliges us to questionwhether conventional approaches areadequate. The intellectual effort tofind a new synthesis between scienceand religion is an expression of anew state of mind motivated by hu-man concern and a profound sense ofconcern of the incompleteness of ei-ther language...34
The trip generated extensive publicity in theregion. The National Action Party (NAP), aright wing, staunchly nationalist Turkishpolitical party demonstrated in Trabzonagainst what they regarded as an effort tounite the Black Sea's Orthodox Christiansagainst Turkey. Coverage of that demon-stration amplified awareness in Turkey ofthe actual purpose of trip, generating praisefor the Patriarch's commitment to the envi-ronment.
Capacity, Concern, and Contractual En-vironment
There is a marked disjuncture be-tween the BSEP’s energetic creation andnetworks around particular activities andexternal funding agency support, for thisprogram. The effort was ripe for more yearsof progress even if political tensions in theregion obstructed aspects of interstate coop-eration. With more financial resources andassurance of more years of existence, muchmight have happened. The GEF decision notto fund a second grant truncated those possi-bilities for the 1990s.
If one looks at the GEF era of theBlack Sea Environmental Programme from1994 to 1996, from the perspective of an in-terest in capacity building, concern, andcontractual environment, what initial judg-ments are appropriate?35 Employing acounterfactual, would things that happenedsince 1993 have been highly unlikely hadthere been no BSEP?
The counter-factual question of howwould the situation differ without BSEP hassome answers that are straightforward. Thewater quality appears to be slightly better atthe end of the decade. For the most part thatimprovement is largely unrelated to BSEPand would have happened had there been noOdessa Declaration or GEF funding. Thekey cause of this improvement are the eco-nomic downturn in the coastal and Danubestates.36 A more prosperous economic eramay reverse that again. BSEP’s early activi-ties then, have not had much effect on thesea water or its life.
It is equally clear that BSEP’s exis-tence has profoundly affected the growth ofknowledge about the Sea. Judging from thelack of enthusiasm among the states for es-tablishing an environmental secretariat andthe trajectory of Russian policy in the latterhalf of the 1990s, without BSEP there wouldhave been far less progress in the under-
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standing of the Black Sea and less scientificawareness of whether the condition of thesea in fact is improving. Without BSEP,there would have been no TransboundaryDiagnostic Analysis that brought togetherdata on the condition of the water and thesocial/economic/legal factors that contributeto the pollution of the sea. There wouldhave been no systematic identification ofpollution hot spots, at least some of whichmight be remedied by financial resourcesand the construction of sewage systems.Furthermore, there would have been no GIS-available information about the sea. Nor, isit likely that work on biodiversity wouldhave flourished to the extent that happenedunder BSEP auspices.
Without the BSEP there would havebeen no Black Sea Strategic Action Pro-gram, let alone a program that drew uponextensive work in a variety of activity areasthat linked all countries of the Black Seacoast. The Strategic Action Program,moreover, is an apt indicator of how farsome things had moved since the 1992 Bu-charest meeting. Concise and ambitious, theplan asks the states to follow through ontheir obligations of Bucharest to establish asecretariat and a full fledged environmentalcommission for the Black Sea. It recom-mends that the commission create sevensubsidiary Advisory Groups (the six activitygroups endorsed at Varna in 1993 whosework contributed to the Strategic ActionProgram), plus a group on information anddata exchange. Those seven functions hadbeen in place and underway for more thantwo years prior to the signing of the Strate-gic Action Program.
On a more basic level, the creation ofnetworks, the provision of communicationequipment to facilitate the Black Sea dia-logue, and the training sessions to impart
common measurement standards or nurturecommon understandings would not havehappened. The BSEP has increased thelikelihood that monitoring of water qualityin the Black Sea could expand very quicklywere financial resources made available tothe focal point institutions in each state thatwere part of the original routine monitoringnetwork. Were that to happen, cooperationwould be possible that would not have beenpossible prior to the BSEP. Researchersknow one another, have reached agreementsabout measurement standards they woulduse, and have similar kinds of equipment.BSEP has progressed to the point at which itis plausible that a disastrous tanker collisionon the sea that resulted in a mammoth oilspill would galvanize cooperation amongstates. Such cooperation did not come to-gether under the efforts of the BSEP to sup-port the Emergency Response network, butthe BSEP provided groundwork that couldsupport impressive progress if the state lead-erships wanted that progress to occur.
Two and a half years have broughtnumerous types of progress and some disap-pointments. The finalization of the BlackSea Strategic Action Program has enlargedthe contractual environment. The failure toestablish a Black Sea Environmental Secre-tariat has left a different aspect of the con-tractual environment in abeyance (which ismore a commentary on what else would nothave happened without BSEP than a com-mentary on BSEP’s shortcomings.)
Capabilities have grown in two gen-eral ways. First, far more is now knownabout the situation. Second, far more ca-pacity can now be brought to bear on thesituation. Perspectives encompass the entirecoastal region. Networks of people havegotten to know one another. The diversityof perspectives on the sustainability problem
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has resulted from substantively distinct ac-tivity networks. Research equipment andtraining provide know-how that helps pro-duce research results are comparable acrossstudies.
In the category of concern, BSEPappears to have contributed little to overallregional awareness about environmentalproblems or their solutions, except for peo-ple who have participated directly in theBSEP education and publicity efforts. TheBSEP has honed the concerns of the fewpolicymakers and scientists who are profes-sionally involved with the Black Sea. Itswork has begun a process of clarifying andarticulating what the problems are and whatmight be done to solve them.
Other aspects of what BSEP hasdone are more difficult to defend or to rejectas significant contributions. It is difficult tojudge what successes might have occurred iffinancial resources were provided or if somecatastrophe-driven surge of concern had fo-cused public attention. For example, theintegrated coastal zone management (ICZM)network began slowly and received helpfrom people associated with the Split Centerthat is part of the Mediterranean Action Pro-gram. By 1997, this activity group was at apoint of preparing national ICZM policies.According to the 1997 Annual Report, therewas recognition that all the coastal countriesface very similar problems. That report alsorefers to “the increasing number of people(who) are becoming involved in the ICZMprocess…”37 in the context of welcomingmore NGO participation. How does onejudge this endeavor by the standards ofchanging levels of capability or concern? Itwould appear difficult to do so; potential isin place that was not there before, but theprowess of that potential is difficult togauge. An infusion of financial resources
for ICZM investment projects would be asuitable test.
Toward Track IV
With time as the horizontal axis andprogram activity/accomplishment as thevertical axis, a graph of the Black Sea Envi-ronmental Programme from 1994 to the late1990s would have a sharply rising curve forthe 1994-late 1996 era and then a taperingoff that tumbles into a more rapid decline.Clearly much has been accomplished andmuch potential is in place, but those gainsare vulnerable to decay and deteriorationunless the program can retrieve its vitality.The formula or template of Bucharest andOdessa, labeled earlier in this paper asTracks I and II, appears to have served itsusefulness because the mechanisms for giv-ing control of the program to the coastalstates have not worked. There is no indica-tion that the Black Sea Economic Coopera-tion, Track III, can solve the problems thathave beset this formula. Accordingly aTrack IV is needed.
A Track IV is needed because ofchanges in the international funding envi-ronment, changes in the political dynamicsof the region, and a lack of change in theeconomic stress of the Black Sea’s western,northern, and eastern shores. The politicalbase of the Bucharest Convention and theOdessa Declaration has proved too narrowto deal with the Russian policy toward theregion in the late 1990s, in which Russian-Turkish sensitivities show no immediatesign of easing. The funding base similarlyneeds replacement. Unlike the Mediterra-nean, which has the support of France, Italy,and Spain, the Black Sea region has no eco-nomic powerhouses who can provide sig-nificant funds if they choose to do so.
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Something that brings financial resourcesfrom another part of the world to the BlackSea states has to be identified to replace theGEF, hopefully with a far longer commit-ment to the environmental cooperation ofthe region.
A Track IV is also needed thatmoves the program from a coastal states fo-cus to a Black Sea basin focus. There areclear advantages in a group of six statescompared to a group of seventeen states ifthe six states can work effectively. But, themarine resource shared by the six coastalstates is profoundly affected by activities inthe other eleven states. Furthermore, solv-ing the pollution problems of the Danube isone aspect of solving the pollution problemsof the Black Sea. Black Sea states can makemuch progress on their own. But, there is
also much that has to happen among the Da-nube basin countries that do not border theBlack Sea. A Track IV can make provisionfor that linkage.
It is unsurprising that by late 1999,momentum for creation of a Track IV is evi-dent in many quarters. The hope is that theEuropean Union can be a more effectivesource of funding than the GEF was forBSEP I. A second hope is that the endeavorwill bracket the Danube and Black Sea statesin ways that more broadly address the prob-lems and can also maintain momentum evenif a major country such as Russia opts forawhile to play a passive role. A third hopeis that there can be legal mechanisms thatcircumvent the obstacles in creating a BlackSea regional oversight entity as specified inthe Bucharest Convention.
Endnotes: 1 Robert O. Keohane, Peter Haas, and Marc Levy, “The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions,”pp 3-26 in Haas, Keohane, Levy, ed., Institutions for the Earth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).
2 “Eutrophication in the Black Sea: Causes and Effects.” Summary report by the Joint ad-hoc Technical WorkingGroup between the ICPBS and the ICPDR. May 1999 p. 6. AICPBS “stands for International Commission for theProtection of the Black Sea”, which is otherwise known and the Black Sea Commission. The ICPDR is the Interna-tional Commission for the Protection of the Danube River.
3 See Laurence Mee, “The Black Sea in Crisis,” Ambio 21:4 (June 1992): pp 278-286. This article is the basicsource for information about Black Sea environmental degradation in many World Bank and UN publications, in-cluding the 1993 GEF brochure for the program entitled Saving the Black Sea.
4 The following paragraphs are a condensed version of a more extensive assessment of the beginnings of the BSEP inMartin Sampson, “Black Sea Environmental Cooperation: States and the Most Seriously Degraded Regional Sea,”Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic, and Administrative Studies 9:1 (1995) pp 51-76. This journal ispublished by Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey.
5 Eventually this intercoastal zone management endeavor became an important part of the PCU’s strategy for devel-oping investment projects and perhaps the BSEP’s most important mechanism for the involvement of Black Seapeoples in environmental decision making. It is ironic that Russia sought and provided the leadership of this activity.As a member of the Baltic environmental program, the Soviet Union previously was uncomfortable with outside in-vestigation of its coastlines. Whether the Russian’s choice was the idea of individuals in its delegation to the 1992-1993 meetings or reflected a larger policy objective or drew upon some kind of Russian academic explorations ofcoastal land use policy is not known to the author.
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6 Neal Acherson, Black Sea (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp 270-271 describes the “display of human will” tosave the Black Sea and comments that at the 1993 Odessa meeting “....all the Ministers happily let themselves besteered by discreet UN advice from off stage - something which could never happen at a conference on the NorthSea, where governments, especially those of Britain or France, are notoriously touchy about maintaining the appear-ance of sovereignty.” Mee himself modestly observes that the Odessa Declaration was written with UNEP help. See“The Black Sea Today” in The Black Sea in Crisis, ed. Sarah Hobson and Laurence David Mee, pp 5-6. Singapore:World Scientific, 1998.
6 Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme. 1994 Annual Report, “The Black Sea Envi-ronmental Programme in 1994: An Overview,” p. i
8 Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme, Black Sea Transboundary Diagnostic Analy-sis, 1996. p. iii.
8 Gareth Jenkins, “National Coordinators Evaluate the First Phase of the BSEP,” Saving the Black Sea 4 (September1996), p 14. Saving the Black Sea is the title of an occasional magazine the PCU issued to publicize BSEP’s activi-ties. It should not be confused with the 1993 GEF brochure of the same name.
10 Ibid, p 14.
11 Transboundary Diagnostic Assessment. p. iv.
12 Yu Zaitsev and V. Mamaev, Biological Diversity in the Black Sea. (New York: United Nations Publications,1997), pp145-146.
13 Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme, Strategic Action Plan for the Rehabilitationand Protection of the Black Sea, 1996, sections 1-17.
14 Ibid, sections 36-66.
15 Ibid, sections 29-35.
16 “Eutrophication in the Black Sea: Causes and Effects.” p. 11
17 Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme, 1996 Annual Report, pp 24-26.
18 GEF, 1997 and Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme. 1997 Annual Report, pp 23-24.
19 Ibid, “The Black Sea Environmental Programme 1997: a Personal Overview,” p ii. Since the 1997 Annual Reportis the last issued under PCU Director Mee, his published list of obstacles to subsequent environmental cooperation inthe Black Sea region is particularly helpful.
20 See the Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme, Summary Report of the First Meet-ing of the Emergency Response Working Party. Varna, Bulgaria, May 16-18, 1994; pp 17-22.
21 1997 Annual Report, pp 2-3.
22 1996 Annual Report, p v.
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23 Handbook of Documents (Istanbul: Permanent International Secretariat of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation),p 289.
24 Ibid, p 293.
25 Christopher E. Cosslett, “Impact of Economic Transition on the Black Sea Environment,” Saving the Black Sea, 3(October 1995), p 5.
25 Black Sea Transboundary Analysis, p 2. “Insufficient public involvement” is further defined here as “lack of gen-eral awareness of environmental issues, deficient public participation, and lack of transparency.” Lack of awarenessof BSEP presumably blends with these problems.
26 1997 Annual Report, p iii.
27 Ibid, p 30.
28 Ibid, p 25.
29 The author spent spring 1993 and fall 1995 at Bogazici University in Istanbul teaching courses including a class oninternational environmental cooperation, and returned at least once a year through 1999. In general, university fac-ulty, students, and business people in civic groups with which the author had contact were aware of BSEC but hadnot heard of BSEP, despite the quality and vigor of its endeavors.
30 See Thomas Homer-Dixon “Project on Environment, Population, and Security: Key Findings.” EnvironmentalChange and Security Project Report 2 (1996), pp 45-48.
31 According to data from the PCU, in 1990 the net balance of migration into and out of Turkey’s Black Sea coastwas 208,311 people leaving. See Table 3.3, page 19 of Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea EnvironmentalProgramme, Black Sea Environmental Priorities Study National Report, June 1996, draft.
32 The author is unaware of any systematic studies of this tendency, which in the author’s experience is widespread.For a discussion of how people use schemas and analogical reasoning to relate potential dangers and problems toprior experiences, see Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), espe-cially chapter 8.
33 Press release from the Religion, Science, and the Environment Symposium II, “The Black Sea in Crisis”, 20-28September 1997. Available at: http://www.seaweb.org/black.html.
34 Ibid.
35 Keohane, et al, 1993.
36 Strategic Action Plan for the Rehabilitation and Protection of the Black Sea, paragraph 6, which attributes im-provement to “reduced economic activity in the region” and “to a certain degree of protective measures taken bygovernments.” The relationship of those measures to BSEP and the actual magnitude of improvement attributable tothose measures are unknown to the author.
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States and Non-State Actors inEnvironmental Policy Making:
An Overview of theGEF-BSEP NGO Forum
By
Omer Faruk Genckaya
“Present environmental govern-ance depends on easily accessible infor-mation about environmental quality andenvironmental policies, transparent ac-tions by international organizations andgovernment, the continued participationin environmental diplomacy by non-stateactors, sustained levels of public concernin major countries, and improved na-tional capacity for environmental pro-tection.”1 This chapter discusses stateand NGO actors with the Black Sea En-vironmental Program in terms of theseimportant factors. The paper beginswith a discussion of recent ideas andscholarly literature concerning state andNGO actors in international environ-mental politics.
State and Non-State Actors
The first major international at-tempt to bring all the nations together tosolve the global environmental problemswas the 1972 Stockholm Conference or-ganized by the United Nations (UN).The major contribution of this Confer-ence was that nongovernmental organi-zations (NGOs), for the first time wererecognized by the state actors interna-tionally. Two decades after the Stock-holm Conference, the relationship be-tween the UN system and NGOs evolvedin a multi-dimensional way and manylevels at the UN Conference on Envi-ronment and Development (UNCED) orthe Rio summit.2 Both the UNCED pro-
cess and Agenda 21 encouraged the es-tablishment of environmental NGOs andincluded them on environmental man-agement issues.
Following is a discussionof the rise of non-state participation inenvironmental policymaking, which willprovide the framework for this chapter.After a brief discussion of non-governmental participation on environ-mental issues, this paper will outline thestate of environment in the Black Sea.Next, there will be a sketch onenvironmental cooperation developed bythe state actors regionwide and finally adiscussion on the achievements of theGlobal Environment Facility-supportednongovernmental activites in the region.
Non-state participation in environ-mental policymaking
Global environmental govern-ance requires the participation of non-state actors, including NGOs, intergov-ernmental organizations (IGOs), andmarket-oriented actors, (e.g. multina-tional corporations), in solving theglobal environmental issues.3 Besidesstate actors, both IGOs and NGOs havebeen playing an increasingly key role forregional institutions, participating inmany activities, previously known“states-only” activities.4 Because of thereluctance of national governments totake effective measures against the envi-ronmental issues, non-state actors ap-peared to be the leader of environmentalactivities at local and global levels.While participating in formulating,promulgating, and enforcing rules, non-state actors affect the behavior of a widerange of actors.
Non-state actors carry an instru-mental function, especially in informa-tion gathering, policy development, and
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policy assessment5 for the states’ regu-latory actions. The unique capacity ofNGOs in mobilizing local institutions onadvocacy and awareness of global envi-ronmental problems essentially comesfrom “their singular attention to envi-ronmental issues; lack of territorial andsovereign allegiances; and their trans-parency.”6 Global scale environmentalproblems, like climate change, aremainly determined by individualsources7 so that, the success and failureof global environmental politics is de-pendent on the behavior of the ordinarycitizen, (i.e., compatibility of bottom-upand top-down institutional arrange-ments). In this respect, environmentalNGOs stand in a unique position bylinking the global and the local.
The functions of environmentalNGOs (ENGOs) in international institu-tions are complex. They link and trans-late norms, practices, and informationbetween national and international lev-els.8 The special significance of NGOslies in their ability to gain media atten-tion, mobilize support, provide informa-tion, offer or withhold legitimacy forgovernmental policies, and operatetransnationally in cementing the contri-bution of IGOs and the scientific com-munity.9 NGOs lobby states and advo-cate their interests within and across so-cieties. Additionally, transnational envi-ronmental activist groups enhance ac-countability, participation, and continu-ing momentum for political reform in-volving “world civic politics”.10
An emerging global civil societyparadigm emphasizes the networks ofprivate and voluntary organizations andinstitutions (global civil society actors)in international environmental politics asa bottom-up arrangement.11 Global civilsociety actors with their normative con-structs, seem to overcome the structural
constrains of the ENGOs, which can se-verely limit what an NGO can do12, inthe long–run. For example, it is evidentthat democratic political order facilitatesthe effectiveness of the NGO activities.Besides, “an environmental policy pro-posal by an NGO which would affect thevital interest of powerful organizations isunlikely to be accepted.”13 However,global civil society actors may replacethe elitist structure of the ENGOs by thevoluntary participation of greater public,who are directly affected by ecologicalchanges on the one hand and may boostthe influence upon the governmentalauthorities in decision-making process,on the other.
Another influential, non-stateactor on environmental politics, rela-tively autonomous from the state’s con-trol, is the business sector. It is arguedthat about 70 percent of world trade iscontrolled by 500 multinational corpora-tions (MNCs), one percent of whichcontrols half of the total foreign directinvestment.14 On the one hand, it is gen-erally accepted that both local and inter-national business use developing coun-tries as “pollution havens,” by benefitingfrom the lower environmental stan-dards.15 It is also evident that the MNCsbring more advanced technology todeveloping countries compared to thelocal businesses, which can foster thedevelopment of local standards.
On the other hand, in order tokeep their competitive advantage andpromotion in a global market, the busi-ness sector, especially MNCs and TNCs(transnational corporations), wrap them-selves in “green flags” by supporting“eco-efficiency” and “green competi-tiveness”.16 According to the “green andcompetitive” argument, the most suc-cessful companies are those that use themost advanced environmentally sound
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technologies.17 The positive relationshipbetween the economic and the environ-mental performance of industry was alsoobserved by the greening of the industryliterature emphasizing a wide range ofdeterminants of the environmental per-formance of industry.18 The literaturethat emphasizes which companies arethe sources of pressure in applying envi-ronmental standards is a critical factor insuccessful compliance by other MNCs.
The MNCs’ interest in the envi-ronment has been institutionalizedaround UNCED. The World BusinessCouncil for Sustainable Development(WBCSD) was formed by a group ofapproximately 120 MNCs in 1995.19
The WBCSD lobbies both the Interna-tional Organization for Standardization(ISO) and the World Trade Organization(WTO) to develop environmentallysound standards in industry and trade.Many MNCs have already developedsome “industrial guidelines and codes ofconduct for environmental practices.”20
Therefore, the business sector should beincluded in the analysis of present globalenvironmental politics. This is especiallyvital for the developing and transitionaleconomies, where the regulations are notyet set to counter the negative impact ofnational and foreign business practiceson the ecosystems. With the inclusion ofthe business sector in the national andinternational environmental fora, a part-nership can be formulated for sustain-able development.
At present, the IGOs and ENGOswith their elitist structure and top-downarrangements are still influential in in-ternational and national environmentalpolitics.21 The scope of NGO interactionwith the UN system contributes to theglobal governance at the same time.22
Contrary to the general wisdom, thepower and importance of non-state ac-
tors may not increase at the expense ofstate power. “States do not necessarilylose and in fact often gain through theenhancement of NGO access and par-ticipation.23 Under the present interna-tional system, which is based on sover-eign states, the non-state actors arefounded, maintained, and charged withadvancing state goals in the case ofIGOs, and are under the strict legal scru-tiny of the state actors in the case ofNGOs.24 The state actors have the ulti-mate power of approving all national andinternational actions.25
In fact, international cooperationrequires both the participation of stateand non-state actors in order to effec-tively regulate the private sector as wellas state sector actions. As state actorsface important economic and politicalissues, that are transnational in nature,“effective cooperation is decentralizedand non-hierarchic, a mode of coopera-tion whose possibilities are just begin-ning to be understood.”26 The develop-ment of multi-actor governance in deci-sion-making for sustainable develop-ment stands as an example of this kindof cooperation. Taking the governmentalsector, the business sector, and the NGOsector as major components of politicalinteraction, one can determine four al-ternative modes of interaction amongthese sectors.27 Despite the difficulties,the multiparty environmental govern-ance is the key towards promoting lib-eral and pro-market regimes in devel-oping countries.28 However, there is apotentially negative effect on world civicpolitics as domestic economic, political,and civic organizations integrate into theglobal system.29 Because the globalsystem imposes its own criteria andregulation as the model and the localsystems, due to their financial and tech-nical weakness, generally attempt to
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adapt themselves to them without ques-tioning if the model fits to their reality. Among other non-state actors,NGOs’ access and participation in envi-ronmental politics are mainly determinedby the states. Even at the Montreal Pro-tocol negotiations, where the NGOs’participation marked a new era of par-ticipation, the governments excluded thenon-state actors from the consultativegroup, by introducing the so-called fo-rum of informal informals.30 In otherwords, NGO participation is dependenton the political actors; however, theNGOs can provide high-quality adviceand support the state’s regulatory prac-tice technically and politically throughparticipation. With the establishment ofthe Global Environmental Facility (GEF)under the initiative of the World Bank todeal specifically with global environ-mental issues, NGOs found a greaterparticipation in the workings of interna-tional fora. 31
The GEF, as the first IGO tospecifically address globalenvironmental issues, mainly climatechange, ozone depletion, biodiversityloss, and maritime pollution,32 includedthe competent and relevant NGOs.33
NGOs are an important partner in thedesign and in the implementation ofGEF projects.34 NGOs are also eligibleto receive financial aid from the GEF’sSmall Grants Programme (SGP)according to the certain criteria.35 Themajor purpose of the GEF SGP is toenhance public participation inenvironmental preservation with an ideaof sustainability. By emphasizing NGOparticipation as way to provide valuableinformation and skills, beneficial to thestates, the GEF has paved the way forexpanding potential participants,including business NGOs. Thus, abroader NGO representation will provide
both a greater flow of information tostates and help critical local actors tojoin international fora.36
Environmental Issues in the Black Sea
One common element that cre-ates more interdependence among na-tions is the threat of a deterioratingglobal environment. National securityand sovereignty concepts have lost im-portance but are being redefined to in-clude environmental consequences.37
This global issue strengthened regionalcooperation for environmental protec-tion. Regionalization includes both defacto regionalization of economic affairson the one hand, and de jure regionali-zation of relevant matters, like the envi-ronment.38 In this regard, regionaliza-tion and globalization are mutually rein-forcing processes, especially with recentagreements, programs, and action plansadopted for regional cooperationschemes from Southeast Asia, the Bal-tics, North America, and the Mediterra-nean Sea.39
The Black Sea occupies a greatbasin strategically situated at thesoutheastern extremity of Europe. Theshores of the Black Sea lie within theterritory of the Russian Federation andUkraine on the north, Georgia on theeast, Turkey on the south, and Bulgariaand Romania on the west. The Black Seaconnects to the distant waters of theAtlantic Ocean by the Bosphorus, theSea of Marmara, the Dardanelles, theAegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea.It is permanently without oxygen below150 to 200 meters, accounting for 90percent of its total volume of 537,000cubic kilometers.40
The Black Sea is one of the mostpolluted bodies of water in the world.Pollution mainly comes from the
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surrounding countries’ runoff, includingrivers, discharges of cities, and industrialwastes and shipping. Its vulnerabilitystems partially from its isolatedgeography and partially from the totalsize of land-based sources of pollution.Among others, eutrophication-over-fertilization of the sea by nutrients fromland-based sources, is the biggestproblem41, leading to the decline of theBlack Sea fisheries. Upstream dams, anddiversions for irrigation and hydropowerreduced the flow and quality of riverwater and eventually increased coastalerosion. Another source of pollution ismarine-based pollution, including oil,garbage from ships, and dumping oftoxic waste.42 Due to development,forestation, and unregulated housing,continuing degradation of the wetlandsscattering around the rim of the BlackSea, could eliminate the natural bufferquality between the polluted rivers andthe Black Sea. For example, since theexplosion of Chernobyl reactor, nuclearparticles have been deposited into theBlack Sea through Dnieper River.
The environmental degradationof the Black Sea has had enormoussocial costs, such as health problems,migration, and unemployment, as well asgreat economic losses, e.g. fisheries.43
With this in mind, any environmentalpolicy should cover primarily humanhealth, the effect of economic activities,like tourism and fishing, and protectionof natural resources.44 In general, theecosystem of the Black Sea will have tobe rehabilitated. To develop asustainable policy for environmentalprotection of the Black Sea, an eligiblecoordinating structure, a long termcommon regional program, aninvestment strategy, and effectivemanagement tools and networks for
exchanging environmental informationare also required.45
Toward a Common Regional Ap-proach: Bucharest Convention andOdessa Declaration
With the idea of central planningwhich emphasized quantity rather thanquality of products, most of the formerSoviet Union states as well as EasternEuropean states, did not pay attention toenvironmental concerns in industry andenergy production.46 Agriculture andhousing also negatively affected thepollution of the Black Sea. After theintroduction of a market economy andthe establishment of the Black SeaEconomic Cooperation (BSEC) with theencouragement of international organi-zations, including the UN and WorldBank, the coastal countries of the BlackSea committed themselves torehabilitating natural resources forsustainable development.47 Article 15 ofthe Summit Declaration on BSECencouraged the participating states totake appropriate steps, includingpromotion of joint projects, for theprotection of the environment,particularly the preservation and theimprovement of environment of theBlack Sea, and the conservation,exploitation, and development of its bio-productive potential.
Realizing the need for closecooperation with competent internationalorganizations based on a concertedregional approach for the protection andenhancement of the marine environmentof the Black Sea, the six borderingcountries48 signed the BucharestConvention on the Protection of theBlack Sea Against Pollution and its threeprotocols49 on 21 April 1992. Within thislegal framework controlling marine
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pollution, the Black Sea Commissionwith a permanent Secretariat was taskedwith promoting the implementation ofthe Convention and elaborating criteriapertaining to the prevention, reduction,and control of marine pollution (Articles17 and 18). The Convention defines thetypes of pollution (Articles 6-14) and theways of scientific and technicalcooperation and monitoring (Articles 5,15, and 16).
About one year later, theministers responsible for the protectionof the marine environment of the BlackSea coastal states, met in Odessa. In thelight of the UNCED decisions andrecommendations, aiming at theimplementation of Agenda 21 in theBlack Sea region and reasserting theprovisions of Bucharest Convention,under the auspices of UNEP theyadopted the Declaration on theProtection of the Black Sea, known asthe Odessa Ministerial Declaration, on 7April 1993. The Odessa Declarationenhanced the desire to establish explicitenvironmental goals and in anunconstrained timeframe in order toconcentrate national, regional, andinternational resources on the mosteffective measures. As a final step inthis institutional development towardsthe rehabilitation and protection of theBlack Sea ecosystem, the StrategicAction Plan (SAP) was signed by thesix Ministers of the environment inIstanbul on 31 October 1996. Aside fromits technical priorities and requirements,the SAP underlines the importance ofpublic participation, particularly NGOparticipation in environmental decisionmaking (Articles 73-80).
To accomplish the identifiedprinciples, approaches and priority ac-tions, the Odessa Declaration urges bi-lateral and multilateral cooperation, in-
cluding cooperation with relevant inter-national organizations. In this regard, athree-year Program for the Environ-mental Management and Protection ofthe Black Sea, namely the Black SeaEnvironment Programme (BSEP), withthe technical support of UNEP and theparticipation of the other Global Envi-ronment Facility (GEF) partners wassigned on 29 June 1993.50 UNEP andGEF set aside US $9.3 million for threeyears51 and the international communityalso contributed some US $17 million.52
NGO Involvement in the BSEP
The successful implementationof the objectives of the BSEP requiredthe active participation and involvementof a broad range of partners – nationally,regionally, and internationally. NGOswere key actors in this overall process.The BSEP sought to promote closerlinks both between NGOs and thecommunities, and between NGOs andother partners (government agencies,business, etc.), in addition to fosteringcollaboration among NGOs on anational, regional, and internationalbasis. The underlying principle of theBSEP has been the inclusion ofnongovernmental actors, including theprivate sector, local communities, laborunions, non-profit foundations,organized associations, and the public-at-large, into planning, programming,and implementation of environmentalstrategies.53
The development of NGOs in theBlack Sea countries, except in Turkey, isa relatively new phenomenon.Environmental groups in former Eastern-bloc countries were spontaneouslyorganized, single-issue protest groupswithout official approval.54 Foundationsin Turkey have a centuries-old tradition
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going back to the Ottoman Empire andthat associations also have a long historydating back to the Republican period.55
Although the Turkish NGOs have thesame financial constraints as all NGOsin the region, the Turkish legal systemoffers relatively uncomplicatedprocedures for setting up an NGO. TheTurkish government also providesstructural funds to selective NGOs topromote their activities.
Environmental catastrophe in theformer Soviet Union also reinforcedecological demands with nationalistappeal resulting in the disintegration ofthe Union.56 Recently organized“Ecoglasnot” and/or “Ecology andPeace” movements contributed to thedevelopment of democracy and openedthe political system in these countries.However, due to chronic fundingproblems, environmental groups in thesecountries are loosing their grassrootscharacter and are becoming aprofessional bureaucratic institution withthe support of foreign donor assistance.57
Hence, NGOs’ credible positionbetween the public and the governmentis deteriorating.58 As in the formerSoviet Union, the legal framework forNGO activities and the lack of financialresources have created significantobstacles in many of the Black Seacountries for effective NGOparticipation. Therefore, withouteffective legislation that emphasizes therole of the public and of NGOs, “thedevelopment of NGOs will remainsomewhat erratic and confrontational,not encouraging a partnershipapproach.”59
The BSEP has directed its effortsto support NGO activities in variousareas.60 First of all, the BSEP hassupported NGOs and representativenetworks of NGOs, through capacity
building, by small grant programmes,and by inclusion of NGO delegates intothe BSEP Steering Committee meetingsand Donor Conference. Secondly, theBSEP functioned as a means ofchanneling donors support “for thestrengthening of the Black Sea NGOs.”Thirdly, with the strong commitments ofthe Black Sea Strategic Action Plan toenhance public participation in the BlackSea countries, a new form of partnershipwith various stakeholders including thelocal populations was initiated, parallelto the BSEP’s principles. Finally, theBSEP organized several internationalconferences in which the NGOrepresentatives actively participated.
Thus, the Black Sea NGOslearned from the experiences andactivities of other international NGOnetworks. The publication of a BlackSea NGO Directory, which includedonly those NGOs with a clearcommitment to addressing Black Seaenvironmental issues, also helped theorganizational development and publicrelations of these groups. (See Chart 1.)
In 1993, in Samsun, Turkey, apreliminary meeting was organized bythe UNDP as a first step toward settingup an International Black SeaEnvironmental NGO Forum with theparticipation of Georgia, Romania,Turkey, and Ukraine. Though theundertaking did not bring about theresults anticipated, it was instrumental ininitiating this process and sensitizingNGOs to the above issues. In 1994,several National NGO Fora wereorganized in the Black Sea countries,with support and assistance from theBSEP in collaboration with World Bankand the EU-TACIS programme to enablethe implementation of these activities
Black Sea NGOs included in theenvironmental projects designed by the
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European Union (EU) as the maincomponent of environmental awareness,participation, and democratization. Thus,the EU, which has been a collateralpartner of the BSEP, through thePhare/TACIS programmes – while thePhare Programme supports democracyfor a stable Europe, the TacisProgramme promotes both democracyand free market economy in the newlyindependent states and Mongolia61 –provided technical assistance andallocated small grants to NGOs.62
In fact, the EU assistance is moresignificant in those Eastern Europeancountries that have applied for EUmembership than those that have not.The Black Sea PHARE 92 RegionalEnvironmental Programme, had alreadyraised public awareness of the activitiesof Romanian and Bulgarian NGOsassociated with environmental issues inthe Black Sea. An international meeting,funded by the PHARE was held inVarna, Bulgaria, from 26-28 June 1994,to exchange results and relateexperiences, improving the flow ofinformation. This in turn created evenmore awareness of the problems facingthe Black Sea and led to arecommendation for further NGOcollaboration. The participants alsoproposed the establishment of nationalfoundations/information centers tosupport and strengthen NGO activities.63
Following the meetings ofnational NGO Fora between June-October 1994, the First Regional NGOForum Meeting was held in Constanza,Romania, between 8-10 November 1994with the participation of therepresentatives of NGOs from Romania,Bulgaria, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, andRussia, in addition to representativesfrom Birdlife International, CoalitionClean Baltic, the Danube NGO Forum,
and the International Black Sea Club.64
The participants discussed the nature andscope of the Forum’s structure,cooperation among the multipartitesectors, and the involvement of theinternational community and thenoutlined an agenda for future action.65
Black Sea NGO Forum
The Black Sea NGO Forum is aninformal association of nongovernmentalorganizations in the Black Sea countrieswith the aim to raise awareness of theBlack Sea environmental issues;promote public participation proceduresin decisions which are likely to have animpact on the Black Sea environment;support cooperation and coordinationamong organizations concerned with thestate of the Black Sea environment; anddevelop mechanisms of communication,locally, nationally, and internationallywith regard to Black Sea environmentalrelated aspects.66 Black Sea NGO Fo-rum meeting are held annually shortlybefore the BSEP Steering Committeemeeting with the aim to review and planthe NGO activities, articulate the NGOview on the development of the BSEP,and appoint two NGO representatives ina rotational basis to attend the BSEPSteering Committee meeting and otherregional meetings of relevance. (SeeFigure 1, which is a chart of the Forum.)
Two Black Sea NGO ForumRepresentatives are appointed in arotational basis annually with theresponsibilities to attend the BSEPSteering Committee, representing theNGO positions; work towards a two-waycommunication with the BSEP; presentthe activities of the Black Sea NGOs;coordinate the NGO Forum Focal Pointsactivities; represent internationally theBlack Sea NGO Forum and its
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objectives; and review and report on theNGO Forum activities and projects.
The Black Sea NGO Forum actsvia working groups in the areas ofenvironmental awareness raising, publicparticipation, communication and infor-mation exchange, environmental ed-ucation, and NGO management training.Specific activities are developed in acoordinated way by the Black Sea FocalPoints in each of the six Black Seariparian countries. Each country hastaken a regional role for one workinggroup. Working Group Focal Points areresponsible for managing regionalactivities and projects as well as ensure atwo-way communication flow with otherlocal and national institutions workingwith the BSEP.
National Black Sea NGO Forummeetings are organized as often asnecessary to review, evaluate, and planNGO activities and projects; outlinelocal and national NGO trends onenvironmental issues; appoint nationalBlack Sea NGO Forum Working GroupFocal Points to support the regionalNGO Forum; and mandate tworepresentatives per country to participateat the regional Black Sea NGO Forum.
National Working Group-FocalPoints are agreed upon and appointed atthe national level in each of the sixBlack Sea countries and for each of theregional working groups in order tosupport organization, management, andimplementation of national and localactivities and projects in the priorityareas identified by the Black Sea NGOForum; provide coordination at nationalscale within the regional framework;provide in-kind logistical support for theBlack Sea NGO Forum; identifyopportunities for activities and projectdevelopment; effectively communicatenationally and internationally; review,
evaluate, and report on the progress atlocal and national scale; and participateat the national Black Sea NGO Forummeetings.67
What has been achieved?
In 1995, the Black Sea NGOswere active not only in strengtheningnational coordination mechanisms, butalso in engaging in the concrete projectssuch as wetlands conservation andmanagement.68 The national Black SeaNGO Forums were organized incollaboration with the World Bank andthe EU Phare/TACIS programmes.These associate partners also supportedthe training and education projects inGeorgia, Romania and Bulgaria.69 Somepilot projects on public awareness in theBlack Sea countries, including a drawingcompetition, and a slide-show, wereimplemented.70
Meanwhile the third Black SeaNGO Forum meeting was organized inGurzof, Crimea, Ukraine, on 16-18October 1995. Some representativesfrom international organizations, namelyCoastwatch Europe and MilieukentaktOost-Europa and from the Ministry ofProtection and Nuclear Safety ofUkraine also attended the meeting. Themeeting confirmed that “the NGOForum will be sustained in the long term,in the form of a network and through theimplementation of common projects.The meeting elected two delegates torepresent the NGO Forum at the BSEPSteering Committee and at any otherregional/international events. Themeeting also decided to implement someshort term projects varying frominfrastructure development to concreteregional projects, like training andeducation on wetlands management.71
The BSEP provided some financial
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support for five concrete projects whichwere carried out in each country exceptRussia.72
In 1996, the Black Sea NGOsinitiated a series of basin-wide and localNGO training events. Prior to the BlackSea NGO Forum meeting, nationalBlack Sea NGOs organized their annualmeetings to plan the next year’sactivities. The fourth Black Sea NGOForum Meeting organized in Tblisi,Georgia, 27-31 January 1997. The maintask of the Tblisi meeting was “todevelop a basin-wide strategy for NGOinvolvement in the implementation ofthe Black Sea SAP.”73 The Black SeaNGO Forum also participated in theEuropean Seas Conference in Lisbon,Portugal in 1996.
In collaboration with someinternational organizations, such as theKnow How Fund of the UnitedKingdom, the Forum organized a seriesof training workshops on the training oftrainers in public participation tech-niques, project management, and NGOdevelopment skills. Within theframework of NGO Small Grant Pro-gramme two projects on “coastalmanagement” and “Monk Seals” whichwere initiated by the Turkish NGOs,were supported.74 Moreover, Black SeaEnvironment Information, Education,and Resource Centers were founded inVarna, Bulgaria and Constanza,Romania with the support of the EU-Phare programme. To promote publicawareness, an exhibition of children’sdrawings was held in Tblisi, Georgia on15 November 1996. Finally, the FirstInternational Black Sea Action Day(IBSAD), which was first proposed atthe Black Sea NGO Forum meeting in1995, was inaugurated and willhenceforth be celebrated on 31 October
on the anniversary of the signing of theBlack Sea Strategic Action Plan.75
In coordination with the BSEP-PCU (Program Coordinating Unit) andthe UNDP Field Offices, all six coastalBlack Sea countries organized broadmedia coverage on national and locallevels “to raise public awareness of thenature and scope of the Black Sea SAPand mobilize the coastal municipalauthorities and the NGOs to participatein the implementation of the plan.”76
During the final year of the BSEP,the Black Sea NGOs were concernedabout more practical activities such asthe preparation of the national BS SAP,Integrated Coastal Zone management(ICZM), Geographic Information Sys-tem (GIS), and monitoring as well aseducation and public awareness.77
Training on public participation and or-ganizational management for BS NGOswas given a special emphasis in the 1997activities. In February 1997, the FieldStudies Council and the EcologicalYouth of Romania (TER) organized afour-day training program for NGO offi-cers from around the Black Sea.78 As afollow up activity, between May andSeptember 1997, six national seminarswe`re funded by the EnvironmentalKnow How Fund of the UK, the BSEPand the British Council, to increase ca-pacity building in public participation.
Within the framework of the GEF-SGP, the national NGOs implementedseveral projects of public awareness onBlack Sea environmental issues as rec-ognized by the Black Sea NGO Forumheld in Tblisi in 1997.79 The SecondInternational Black Sea Day took placeon 31 October 1997 with several cam-paigns, competitions, and eventsthroughout the six countries. To encour-age the Black Sea-SAP, the BulgarianBlack Sea Environmental Educational
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and Resource Center and the Environ-mental Information and Sustainable De-velopment Center (“Rio”) of Georgiainitiated public hearings and publicationcampaigns simultaneously.80
The Black Sea NGO Forum washeld in Varna, Bulgaria on 6-7 Decem-ber 1997. The NGO representatives ex-pressed their ideas on the further institu-tionalization of the Forum, especiallywith the need for a secretariat, a fundingstrategy, and more effective networking.The main concern of the representativeswas what would happen to the Forumafter the termination of the BSEP PCU,since the Istanbul Commission wouldconcentrate on governmental activities(BS-SAP Article 18-25) when it re-placed the PCU. Hence, the NGOs willneed their own secretariat. However, therepresentatives did not reach a commonstrategy about the secretariat and its roleand responsibilities.
Another substantive questionraised during the Forum was “who willfund the NGOs in the future?” Havingleft these questions to uncertainty, theForum also appointed six workinggroups coordinated by members fromfive countries; the Black Sea ActionPlan, Environmental Education/PublicAwareness, the Forum, ICZM, oil/gasextraction, and transportation and riverproblems including the Danube Basin.81
However, the PCU decided to help withfundraising and information for the con-tinuation of the Forum activities in thefuture. The year 1998 was a critical pe-riod for the Forum. On the one hand, un-certainty about the future institutionali-zation of the Forum and on the othermonetary issues led some NGOs to de-velop new strategies regarding the coor-dination, communication, and coopera-tion of the NGOs in the Black Sea.
Quo Vadis the Black Sea NGOs ?
After four years of the BSEPsupporting developments originatingfrom the initial networking of the BlackSea NGOs, there has been a growingdissatisfaction with communication,implementation, vision, management,and finance.82 Although many objectiveshave been achived and a variety ofactivities were organized in a very shortperiod of time by the BSEP and itspartners, some of the NGOrepresentatives expressed the opinionthat“unfortunately there is no action,only meetings.”83 Another urgentquestion raised by the Black Sea NGOswas future of the Forum after theBSEP? “The support of the BSEP hasbeen, and will continue to be, vitallyimportant, “but it was the time toorganize themselves independently.84
The first initiative was led by theSociety of Peace with Nature, a Turkish-based NGO, which organized a series ofmeetings, including the Black Sea Unityfor Strength Conference in Istanbul,Turkey on 22-24 June 1998.85 About 27NGO representatives, businessmen,academics, and representatives of themunicipalities from around the BlackSea countries came together anddeclared the establishment of theNetwork of “Black Sea Partners,” as aninternational NGO with the aim offorming “a regional network ofinformation exchange and commonaction for supporting the rehabilitation,restoration, and protection of the BlackSea within an ecologically sustainableframework.”86 The main structure of theInternational Black Sea Partners (IBSP)included a regional office, a SteeringCommittee, and an Assembly in for bothstate and non-state actors includingunions, academicians, businessmen, and
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muncipalities to be represented equallyat national and international levels.
Following these activites, the BSNGO Forum was convened in Istanbulon 25-27 June 1998. During the meeting,the legal entity of the Forum wasquestioned. Actually it was the firstBlack Sea NGO meeting which was notfunded by the BSEP and its partners. Onthe other hand, the participation of therepresentatives of CounterpartInternational (CI) at these meetings wasnot a surprise because the President ofCI, Stanley Hoise, had expressed aninterest in forming a partnership with theBlack Sea NGO Forum back in 1997,when he attended the Black Sea in CrisisSymposium.87 CI, a Washington D.C.-based non-profit, international humandevelopment organization, wasinterested in establishing an office in theregion with the primary task ofcoordinating forum activities,communications, and fundraising andNGO capacity building. It already hadongoing programs in Georgia, Russia,and Ukraine based on partnership.
During the Forum meeting, ageneral agreement on a possibleoperational structure for a CI office wasreached. However, only Turkey andUkraine supported the idea of integratingthe Forum into the Black Sea Partners.88
The Forum also decided to providetraining and technical assistance to theBlack Sea NGOs, Moreover, eachcountry, except for Russia was entitledwithin the framework of Black SeaAction Day to organize special hotspotsareas, which could be funded by theWorld Bank.89
Another internationalcooperation initiative was led byBulgarian NGOs. During the Black SeaNGO Forum of 1998 it was announcedthat the TIME (This is My Environment)
Foundation from Bulgaria with thesupport of a Dutch development agencyNOVIB, mainly involved in catalyzingNGO lobbying efforts by using the EU’ssocial funds, proposed an internationalworkshop to strengthen BS NGOnetworking and lobbying capabilities.90
Following the Forum meeting, aseminar for Black Sea NGOrepresentatives organized by the TIME-Foundation with the support of NOVIBwas held in Varna on 1-5 September1998. About 23 representatives of the 10Black Sea NGOs from the Black Seacountries participated in the seminar.The workshop carried “the need ofcreating a new comprehensive andindependent international structure toraise the efficiency of NGOnetworking.”91 The NOVIB had alreadybeen supporting some NGO activites inBulgaria, Georgia, and Ukraine andpromised to find funds for Romania,Russia, and Turkey. According to oneTurkish NGO representative, theNOVIB later announced that it couldprovide some fund for other countries,too.92 CI also attended the meeting. Theworkshop selected the contact person foreach country to organize and conductnational NGO meetings.
The country meetings organizedduring November and December 1998covered the discussion and drafting ofNational NGO Action Plans forPreservation of the Black Sea, Bylaws ofthe Network, nominations of countryboard members, discussion of thepossibilities for fundraising at thenational level and operational and legalaspects of the Network functioning at thenational level. The international processbegan with a draft of the Network Bylawand the first regional board meeting,which was convened in Sofia, Bulgariaon 29-31 January 1999, adopted its final
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version. Thus, an independentInternational Black Sea NGO Networkwith the participation of ten individualrepresentatives of the NGO communityin the five BS countries, namelyBulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, andGeorgia was eventually founded (BylawChapter I, Article 1).
Although the Turkish NGOsattended the Varna meeting, the Turkishnational delegation was opposed to thisinitiative from the beginning sinceneither the TIME foundation nor theNOVIB had indicated any interest in theinitial years of the Forum. Additionally,they opposed the initiative since theNetwork was being based on a purelybureaucratic structure with high costsand randomly selected representatives ofthe NGOs from the region whoconsidered the Forum inactive anddecided to form a new establishment.93
Some of the representatives of theTurkish NGOs also claimed that whilethe EU politically supports this initiativefor its own purposes that petroleumcompanies, like Chevron, were supposedto penetrate the region through NGOactivities and the CI might have acted asits partner. Then the Turkish NGOsdecided to be represented at the Networkas observers. With these developments,the Turkish NGOs met in June 1999 andselected a Steering Committee for anational NGO Forum consisting of sevenpersons, dealing with the coordination,communication, and cooperation.
The Network whose operatingRegional Office was located in Varna,Bulgaria, has been under review by theBulgarian legislature. The Network wasbased on Country Network Offices, aRegional Office, a Country Assembly, aNetwork Board and a General Assembly(Bylaw Chapter V), as the operationalstructure. Although an NGO from one
of the Black Sea countries can applythrough the respective country NetworkOffice, a non-Black Sea organization isentitled to apply for membership directlyto the Regional Office and the Board hasto certify new members within one week(Bylaw Chapter IV, Articles 2,5,7).
Concerning the membership of anon-Black Sea organization in theNetwork, it is not clear how can thismember be represented at the decision-making process. This may beproblematic if and when a non-BlackSea organization, like NOVIB or CI,who essentially raised funds to theNetwork, wants to be a member of theNetwork.Until now, the Network mainly dealtwith the setup activities for the RegionalOffice. Morover, two issues of amonthly Network Newsletter weredistributed. Besides, four NGO projectson “green tourism” with the participationof two Bulgarian, one Georgian oneUkranian NGO were funded as pilotprojects for sustainable local practices.
The establishment of theNetwork was supposed to create adegree of disintegration in the Black SeaNGO community as pro-Forum and pro-Network groups mainly. The Networkleaders explained the discrepancy amongthe Turkish NGOs towards the Networkorganization by indicating that there is adivision between the resourceful, largeNGOs based in Istanbul and thoselacking resources that are small BlackSea coast NGOs. The former hadestablished close links with BSEP PIU.94
It is also argued that issues of personalpriorities in environmental concern,money, leadership problems led to thisconfrontation between Bulgarian andTurkish NGOs. Others argued for a“wait and see” policy, thereby taking noaction on the Black Sea developments.
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Meanwhile, Sergey Arzumanov, anNGO trainee at the BSEP, mentionedthat the BSEP, as the coordinating unit,has good relations with the TIMEFoundation as well as other NGOs andthe Network will understand that theBSEP's goals overlap with the Network.
Aside from the major oppositionof the Turkish NGOs towards the Net-work, there were other significant objec-tions about the Network by the widerand more experienced NGO communityin the region. First, the Forum activistsdenied the founding premise of the Net-work (i.e., that the Forum was inactiveand unsuccessful, therefore another or-ganization was needed). Secondly, noneof the National Forum member organi-zations attended the Network but rather aselect group of NGOs, who expressedtheir support for and joined the Network.Financial reasons may have been a cru-cial factor among others also. In otherwords, the Network stood as a new or-ganization denouncing the experience ofthe Forum. Thirdly, two Dutch organi-zations as well as NOVIB support theNetwork financially and the Interna-tional Center for Water Studies (ICWS)strongly backs the initiative. The latterhas been a member of the Consortiumthat was managing the EU Phare/TACISprogrammes in the region, especially inBulgaria and Romania.95 Fourthly, thereis a high possibility that the “lion’s sharewill go toward overhead and organiza-tional costs” in light of past experienceswith the EU’s Phare/TACIS projects.Finally, there were serious objections tothe management style of the Network:“information is disseminated after thedecision is taken.”96
General Evaluation and Prospects
The BSEP provided an opportu-nity for public participation and partner-ship dialogue among the different sec-tors of the society. The principal effortsof the BSEP for NGO strengtheningwere directed toward organizational de-velopment through national NGO fo-rums, capacity building through know-how exchanges and training, and part-nerships through project developments.97
Aside from its limited financial supportto the NGO community, the GEF-BSEPchanneled several donors, including theEU TACIS/Phare Programmes. TheGEF small grants program also sup-ported the Black Sea-NGOs in dealingwith short-term practical issues, likeICZM. The BSEP, in collaboration withother governmental and intergovern-mental organizations, integrated the lo-cal NGOs into an international eventranging from public awareness, to cam-paigns and summer schools. And, lastbut not the least, the publication of theBSEP-NGO Directory with its limitedentry, facilitated the identification ofcommunication problems.
In short, the BSEP, in a verycost-effective way, let the BS-NGOs beinvolved in a process of participationand partnership. Recently emerging ini-tiatives towards restructuring the scopeand mandate of the Black Sea NGOs in-dicate the fact that now the “ball is intheir court” in enhancing environmentalmanagement in the Black Sea coun-tries98. Naturally they face several obsta-cles as well as opportunities in dealingwith future objectives.
According to the findings of aquestionnaire survey aimed at assessingthe impact of the BSEP-NGO activitiesamong the Black Sea NGOs, the majorconstraint was the lack of effectivecommunication to facilitate the flow ofinformation between local, regional, and
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national NGOs.99 The response rate tothis survey, seven out of 40 NGOsproves that there are serious infrastruc-tural problems concerning communica-tion in this region. Secondly, fundrais-ing and project development was con-sidered as vital to the survival and inte-gration of the NGOs in the region. Onseveral occasions, the representatives ofthe Black Sea NGOs raised similarviews.100
Nongovernmental organizationsare a new phenomenon in the region.There is also a great diversity in terms ofhistory, structure, and objectives of theNGOs from country to country. With thesupport of the Western funds, the num-ber of NGOs, who claim to represent“the public opinion” has been increasedamazingly.101 In reality, however, thereare very few truly “grassroots” andcommunity based-organizations in theregion.”102 At present there are 116ENGOs, which were registered in theBlack Sea NGO Directory.103 This doesnot reflect the actual number of NGOs inthe region, but instead that those who arespecifically interested in the environ-mental issues in the Black Sea are verylimited. There is a growing number ofNGO participation from Georgia,Ukraine, and Romania through the BSEPactivities. Surprisingly the RussianNGOs are not represented sufficiently inthe Directory. Unfortunately, due to lackof communication or irregularity of theNGO operations in this region, the num-ber of NGO entries in the next edition ofthe Directory will radically drop down to65. This is also indicative of the fact thatespecially small and coastal Black SeaNGOs really need help to survive.
NGOs are key actors in gatheringand mobilizing communities. Althoughall the Black Sea countries adopted leg-islation allowing the formation and op-
eration of NGOs, especially since gov-ernmental authorities are unwilling toinclude them into the decision-makingprocess104 the greater public is suspi-cious of NGO activities. Among otherthings, registration of associations inmost of the former and eastern Europeancountries is prohibitively expensive andbureaucratic.105 Therefore, they have alimited capacity for membership. Byimplementing IBSAD and training in thepublic participation projects, the BlackSea NGOs showed their potentials.However, the lack of cooperation amongNGOs made them fail to “involve in theenvironmental decision-making process”effectively.106
The 1990/91 World Values Sur-vey107 indicated that three of the BlackSea countries, namely Bulgaria, Russia,and Turkey, listed at the higher rankingsconcerning “public support for environ-mental protection.” According to thisstudy, there is a moderate or no relation-ship between values and support for en-vironmental protection in these coun-tries, but natural disasters, like Cherno-byl have made the public more aware ofenvironmental problems. In fact, non-state actors, including business and thereligious institutions, have been activelytrying to raise public awareness con-cerning environmental problems in theBlack Sea Region. On the one hand,TURMEPA (the Turkish Maritime Envi-ronment Protection Association) and itsGreek counterpart HELMEPA organizedthe “Revelation and Environment”Cruise in September 1995 as a privatesector involvement. Later, from 20-28September 1997, about 300 religiousleaders, scientists, decision-makers, andenvironmentalists accompanied by jour-nalists assembled “the Black Sea in Cri-sis” symposium.108 Following a boat tripvisiting several Black Sea ports to publi-
89
cize the environmental problems of theBlack Sea, the symposium made certaincommitments towards future action, in-cluding fund-raising, public awareness,an education center for Orthodox clergy,and strong support for Black Sea SAP.
Despite the widening and deep-ening of the environmental concerns inthe region, ineffective management bythe state actors on environmental issueswith the idea of rapid economic growthand national security,109 constitute a se-rious obstacle towards achieving sus-tainable policies. To overcome this ob-stacle, NGOs may develop multi-stakeholder projects at national and re-gional levels and replicate them. Thus,while these projects stimulate NGOs towork together instead of competing forlimited funds, they may promote publicinvolvement in the decision-making pro-cess. In other words, BS-NGOs withtheir distinctive peculiarities and in col-laboration with community-based or-ganizations and the public can enhancepublic participation, as it was stressed inthe Black Sea SAP.
At present, governmentalauthorities must legitimize NGOs andencourage their activities, and includethem into the preparation of the NationalBlack Sea SAPs. Mass media will alsoplay a critical role in this process. Agood example of this has been recentlyexperienced in Turkey. A spontaneouscivic resistance developed against thegovernmental authorities and the EURO-GOLD a multinational corporation inBergama, Izmir when the newspapercoverage warned the people about goldmining with cyanide.110 Hence, not onlymust the governmental authorities (asthe signatories of the international envi-ronmental treaties), adhere to the inter-national requirements, but so must theforeign investors and local businesses
also comply with the requirement. Theprinciples of environmental ethics are apart of the global society, making a dis-tinction between short-term and long-term profits.
Although there is no reliable in-ventory indicating how many of thebusinesses, either local, national, ormultinational, in the Black Sea countriesare abiding by environmentally soundtechnologies or taking environmentalprecautions, it is obvious that both gov-ernmental and private enterprises are themain polluters in the region. The BlackSea NGO community has been integrat-ing with the global environmental net-work slowly but gradually. However,due to their chronic struggle for fundingto survive, some of them are losing theirgrassroots origins and transformingthemselves into bureaucratic organiza-tions. International institutions’ grantsdid not reach to local NGOs fully, sim-ply because of technical reasons, like thesize of these NGOs.
Meanwhile there is a growinginterest in this region because of itstransregional location and the naturalresources in the neigh boring countries,such as oil and natural gas. Both gov-ernmental and IGOs, MNCs and inter-national NGOs with special objectives,have been increasingly penetrating theregion’s countries. The Black SeaNGOs, which are hungry for money,easily become a partner of the interna-tional initiatives to overcome “bureau-cratic” obstacles in these countries. Inother words, the concept of an NGO hasbeen loosing its essential meaning inthese countries, and NGOs have deterio-rated.
The EU, through its Phare/TACIS-funded projects, has alreadycontributed to the public awareness ac-tivities of the Black Sea NGOs, espe-
90
cially in Bulgaria and Romania. How-ever, some NGOS argued “not only theEU assistance was not channeled to theBS NGO Forum, but regretfully, the Fo-rum representatives in many countriesfound it almost impossible to get infor-mation about what is going on.”111
Moreover, the approximation of the EUEnvironmental legislation by the 10Central and Eastern European countries,including Bulgaria and Romania, whohave association agreements with the EUwere completed.112
Furthermore, a new EU Phare/TACIS-funded project, entitled the“Funds for the Black Sea EnvironmentalProgramme” was launched. It cost 1.5million ECUs and will run for 18 monthson a wide range of activities in fivecoastal Black Sea countries, excludingTurkey. The ICWS, which is familiarwith the region, will manage the coastalzone management program in consulta-tion with other European firms.113 Asub-component of this program con-cerning Environmental Education andPublic Awareness cost 250,000 ECUsand was coordinated by the TIME-Foundation in Bulgaria, Romania, andGeorgia. Both the priorities of the EU,like Black Sea tourism and the contrac-tor/subcontractor relations in this chainremind us of the traces of “ecoimperi-alism.” In other words, the EU both pre-pares, organizes, and finances the entireenvironmental programs for the regionwhose countries, thus, have less freedomto set their own priorities.114
This is not particular to the EU-led programs. There is always the dangerof NGOs losing autonomy vis-B-vis thedonor institution, in formulating policies.Aid plays an important role in the crea-tion of environmental regimes and forcesNGOs to promote far-reaching objec-tives such as democracy and good gov-
ernance, well outside the scope of theirenvironmental goals. Because of thegovernmental weaknesses in most of thetransitional countries, the internationalorganizations have been able to moreeasily to penetrate these countriesthrough partnerships with the localNGOs rather than the government. It isopen to question, however, to what ex-tent the priorities of the donor and theenvironmental concerns of local publiccan be matched. In other words, con-cerns of the donor and the recipient, in-cluding NGOs, are very important aswell as capacity and contracting in theeffectiveness of environmental aid.115
International organizations mayhelp Black Sea NGOs in enhancing theircapacity in promoting public awareness,networking, and training. Foreign donorscan solve the difficulties experienced bylocal NGOs in harmonizing activities byinvesting in infrastructure and computertechnologies for local NGO administra-tors and can help to increase technicalskills concerning networking. Simplyput, foreign institutions should supply anew form of NGO small grant programs.Projects with a great amount of moneymay not be compatible with the capacityof the NGOs, may create competitionamong the NGOs, and support bureau-cratic tendencies, which is the mainhandicap of NGOs as volunteer organi-zations.
Instead of subcontracting NGOsin great environmental projects, foreigndonors may request the inclusion ofNGOs with them on an observer status.Otherwise, NGOs may lose their essen-tial identity and become a real entrepre-neur. Therefore, the international effortmust be channeled to improve the ca-pacity of small NGOs, not to use them assubcontractor of super NGOs of the re-gion with high tech and bureaucratic
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structure. As a regional intergovern-mental organization, the BSEP Secre-tariat and the Parliamentary Assembly ofthe BSEC (PABSEC) through its sub-committees have greater responsibility tostrengthen NGOs’ participation into thedecision-making process as it was con-ditioned by the Ministerial Declarationsand the Black Sea SAP.
If money were the sole problem,the Black Sea NGOs might encouragelocal individuals and businesses to do-nate money to local NGOs. The IBSADcan be an effective mechanism for fund-raising activities. In return, the BlackSea NGOs must function as vehicle tovoice public demands and build a massappeal on practical not theoreticalgrounds. Most of the Black Sea NGOshave been either established or run byacademic people. Therefore, their activi-ties were limited to their own objectivesand not disseminated to the greater pub-lic. In this respect, NGOs, by gainingsufficient infrastructure facilities, mustlink business, academia, central and lo-cal governments, media, and other inter-ested parties and inform them “what ishappening in the region.” According to
the interviews led by the author of thisarticle during the last three years theBlack Sea NGOs are hungry for infor-mation as well as in need of money.Through the regular and reliable flow ofinformation, the Black Sea NGOs canperform their major function of publicawareness, education and training. Also,they may keep a wider network of multistakeholders, providing money, skillsand expertise, at local and regional level.
Finally, NGO activities primarilyrequire dedication, unity, and coopera-tion. Recent NGO developments in theregion, due to the uncertainty about theBSEP activities and financial con-straints, signaled a temporary disinte-gration. The Black Sea NGOs have suf-ficient experience to move forward. Thefuture of the Black Sea environmentneeds impersonal, improvised, and inte-grated efforts of the regional non-stateactors. In this respect, not only ENGOs,but also scientific communities, localadministrations, mass media, and espe-cially business circles are to be inte-grated into the decision-making process
effectively.
Acknowledgments
I acknowledge the members of the Environmental Change and Security Project of theWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars who made this article possible. I es-pecially wish to thank gmit Çilingiroglu, Gul Goktepe, Nato Kirvalidze, VeleslavaTzakova, Tanay S. Uyar, and the staff of the Global Environmental Facility-Black SeaEnvironmental Program Coordinating Unit in Istanbul for their information and com-ments on the recent NGO developments in the region.
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Chart 1
BLACK SEA ENVIRONMENTAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS*
NAMES OF THE ENGOs A B C D
BULGARIA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 12 13 14 15
Bulgarian National Association on Water Quality 6 2 NA YBulgarian Society for the Protection of Birds 12 5 1,3,4,5 Y Y Y Y Y YBulgarian Society of Scientists-Varna 8 4 1,4 Y YBurgas Black Sea Club 7 NA NA YBurgas Branch of Bulgarian Nature ExploringSociety
NA 1 1,4 Y
Burgas Ecological Association 8 NA NABurgas Ecology Man Foundation 8 1 2 Y YBurgas Movement of Ecoglasnot 8 1 3,4 Y YCentre of Environmental Information and Educa-tion
8 1 3,4 Y Y
ECO-CLUB 2000 5 1 NA Y YEnvironmental Saving of Burgas Society 10 3 1 YGreen Balkans -Burgas 9 1 NA YIndependent Society Ecoglasnot Burgas 10 3 3,4 YIndependent Society Ecoglasnot Varna 11 NA NA YNational Ecological Club 10 2 6Society for Bird Protection-Varna 12 1 3,4 Y Y YStudent's Center for International Cooperation 5 1 1,3 Y YVarna Movement of Ecoglasnot 7 1 1,3,4 Y YR. of GEORGIAAcharian Association of Young Ecologists 8 3 NA Y YAdjara Regional Organisation of Georgia Greens 10 3 1,2,3 Y YBlack Sea Youth EcoAcademy 4 1 5 Y YCentre for Studies and Protection of Small Ani-mals
6 1 2,3 Y Y
Eco-Centre 6 1 2 YEco-Film Studio 5 1 2 YEcological Law Club 5 1 2 Y YEnvironmental Information Centre 4 2 2 YEnvironmental Protection and Cultural RevivalFund “Vazi”
4 1 1,2,3 Y Y
Environmental Relief Impulse 6 1 2 YFund "Mission" 5 1 2 Y YG.Nikoladze Alpinist Club of Tbilisi State U. 45 3 1,7 Y YGeorgia Greens 12 5 1,2,3 YGeorgia Youth EcoMovement 7 3 2 YGeorgian Geoinformation Centre “G. Info” 6 1 5 YGeorgian Society Tusheti 5 NA 2 YHistorical Ecological Assoc. of Zugdidi Mafalu 5 1 YHuman Ecology Centre 6 3 1,2,3 Y Y YJvari (Cross) 5 NA 2 Y YMarine Association "Poseidon" 6 2 1,2,3,8 Y YRegional Fund for Environmental Protection 8 NA 2 Y YSitsotskhle (Life) 5 NA NA Y Y Y YSociety of Friends of Nature “Tskhratskaro” 5 1 2 YSociety of Young Ecologists “ Green Cross” 5 1 2 Y Y YThe Biological Farming Association “Elkana” 7 1 1,2 Y Y YThe Ecological Group of Terjola 5 1 2 YThe Georgian Centre of Transition EconomicSystems and Sustainable Development
6 1 2 Y Y
Vashlovani 6 1 2 YVita Center 1 2 Y YROMANIAAnaconda 7 1 1,6 YDanube Delta Friends Foundation 9 4 5 Y Y
93
Earth-Kind Romania NA NA NA Y Y YEco Black Sea 7 NA NA Y Y Y YEco Mar 8 1 3,6 Y YEcological Association of Divers-DOLPHIN 10 NA NA Y YEcological Cooperation Group 10 1 5,9 YEcological Society for Study and Protection ofWild Flora and Fauna
7 1 5 Y Y Y Y Y
Friends of the Earth-Galati 9 1 NA YGroup for Underwater and Speleological Explora-tions
19 1 2,3,6,10 Y Y Y Y Y
Mare Nostrum 7 1 5,6 e Y YOceanic Club Constanta 8 2 3,6 Y YPro- Delta Club 8 1 NA Y Y YRom Coast 6 1 NA Y YRomanian Foundation for Democracy NA NA NA Y Y YRomanian Naval Leaque-Contanta Branch 10 4 1,6 Y YRomanian Ornithological Society 10 5 1,3,6,11 Y Y YThe Black Sea University Foundation 8 NA NA YThe Ecologist Youth of Romania 10 4 5,7 Y Y Y Y Y YThe Silvic Progress Society 114 4 NA Y Y Y Y YRUSSIAAcvatori 6 1 NoneCenter for Information and Environmental Mod-eling of Rostov State University
Environmental Centre of Sochi “ ECOS” 6 1 NA Y Y YGreen Don 11 1 None Y Y YPublic Committee of Economical Control 12 1 NAThe Fund of Alternative development of the Azovand Black Sea Basin
10 1 NA Y Y
Ecos 6 1 NA YTURKEYEnvironment Foundation of Turkey 22 1 5,7,12 Y YEnvironmental Protection Association of Zon-guldak
9 4 NA Y Y Y Y
Foundation for the Protection and Promotion ofCultural and Environmental Heritage
9 1 4 Y Y
Society for the Protection of Nature 15 5 1,3,5,6,13,14 Y Y Y YSociety of Peace with Nature 7 3 1,3,5,13 Y Y Y YSOS Environment Volunteers-Turkish 10 5 1,3 Y Y Y YThe Black Sea Environmentalists 8 3 1 Y Y YThe Research Association of Rural Environmentand Forestry
12 1 1,3,4 Y Y Y
The Turkish Foundation for Combatting SoilErosion, reforestation, protection of natural habitat
8 5 5,15 Y Y Y
Trabzon Province and Countries Education, Cul-ture and Society
14 3 1,3 Y Y Y Y Y
Turkish Association for the Protection of Nature 45 5 1,3 Y Y YTurkish Environment and Woodland ProtectionSociety
28 NA 1,3,4,7 Y
Turkish Environmental Protection and ResearchFoundation
9 1 3,7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Turmepa 6 1 1,3 Y Y Y Y YWildlife Conservation Society of Samsun 20 3 1,3 Y YUKRAINEAssociation EUROCOAST-Ukraine 6 3 NA Y Y Y Y YCrimea Republic Association "Ecology and Peace" 12 3 2,4,6 Y Y Y Y YDniepropetrovsk " Green World" 12 3 NA Y Y Y Y Y Y Y YEcological Foundation-NGO 8 3 6,11 Y YEcoPravo 7 1 2 Y Y Y YEcoPravo East, Filiation Kharkiv 7 1 2 Y Y YEcoPravo-Lviv 6 1 5 Y Y Y YEnvinet-Ukraine 6 1 2 Y YGreenpeace Ukraine 10 5 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y
94
Independent Ecological Security Service 5 1 2,8 Y Y Y Y YINECO of the National Ecological Centre ofUkraine
7 1 16 Y Y Y Y Y
Institute of Ecology, South Branch 5 1 2,4 Y Y YKherson-Ecocentre Organization 9 1 3 Y Y Y YMovement for the Black and Azov Seas Salvage 9 4 1 Y Y YNatural Heritage Fund 8 1 2,6 Y Y YNews Agency "Echo-Vostok" 8 1 2 Y Y YNikolaev Regional Environmental Association 12 2 2 Y Y Y Y YNikopol Association "Zeleny Svit" 11 3 2,3 Y Y YNongovernmental Ecomonitoring Station 7 1 2,6 Y YOdessa Socio-Ecological Union 13 1 2,3,6 Y Y Y YOut School Profile Association 19 1 1,2 Y Y YSevastopol branch, Geographic Society of Ukraine 14 3 2 Y Y YThe Youth Environmental Organization 12 1 1 Y Y YUkranian Union for Bird Conservation 6 5 1,6 Y Y Y Y YUkranian Ecological Academy, BlackSea Regional 6 1 11 Y Y Y Y YUnicorn Environmental Publishers 8 1 2,7 Y Y YUnion Rescuing from Chernobyl UEA Greenworld 11 4 2 Y Y Y YWorld of Water 6 3 NA Y Y Y Y YYalta Regional Dept of Crimea R. Association 11 3 6 Y Y Y Y YZaporozhye Ecological Club 10 2 3 Y Y Y YZaporozhye Nature Education Centre XXI century 7 1 7 Y Y
EXPLANATIONS: * These ENGO are listed in GEF-BSEP, Black Sea NGO Directory, 1995 and 1996 editions, which include onlythose NGOs or ENGOs who responded the questionnaire survey from the participating countries.A. Life-span in terms of yearsB. Number of Members: (1) 1-50; (2) 51-100; (3) 101-500; (4) 501-1000; (5) more than 1000C. Funding sources: (1) Membership Due; (2) Grant; (3) Donation; (4) Project; (5) International sources; (6) Sponsors; (7) Self
Financing; (8) Other Income; (9) Cotizations; (10) Services; (11) Contracts; (12) Income from the assets; (13) Fund Raising Ac-tivities; (14) Miscellaneous; (15) Private Sector; (16) Governmental Agencies
D. Activities: (1)Education, training, workshops, institutional development, organizing summer schools; (2) Public Awarenesscampaigns, lobbying, international cooperation, media campaign; (3) Information, data, publication, research, survey; (4) Policydevelopment and regional development; (5) Ecotourism, camps, diving; (6) Monitoring; (7) Legal assistance, environmentallegislation; (8) Project; (9) Protection, preservation, biodiversity; (10) Water treatment, marine culture, naval culture, fisheries,ships related environmental engineering; (11) Determination of OA priority areas; (12) Coastal management dynamics and (13)Forestry
E. (NA) not available
95
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Endnotes:
1 Haas, 1996: 44.2 Conca, 1996.3 McCormick, 1993; Haas, 1996: 22-25; Brooks and VanDeveer, 1997; and Auer, 1999.4 Raustiala, 1997: 719-24.5 Princen and Finger, 1994; Lipschutz and Conca, 1994; Humphreys, 1996; and Raustiala, 1997.6 Auer, 1999: 8.7 Auer, 1999: 2.8 Levy, Keohane and Haas, 1994: 420; Princen et al. 1994: 223.9 op. cit., Eccleston, 1996 and Ringus, 1997: 63-5.10 Lipschutz and Mayer, 1996 and Wapner, 1995.11 Auer, 1999: 7-9.12 Potter and Taylor, 1996: 4-6.13 Ibid.14 Korten, 1995.15 Chatterjee and Finger, 1994.16 Korten, 1995.17 Porter and van der Linde, 1995.18 Fuchs and Mazmanian, 1998.19 Finger and Kilcoyne, 1996.20 Haas, 1996: 37.21 Spiro, 1994: 46 and Porter and Brown, 1991.22 Gordenker and Weiss, 1996.23 Raustiala, 1997: 724-5.24 Auer, 1999: 5.25 Dahlberg and Soroos, 1985: 48.26 Sampson, 1995a: 25.27 Meadowcroft, 1999: 227-8.28 Haque, 1999.29 Jancar-Webster, 1997: 32.30 Raustiala, 1997: 733.31 Gerlak and Parisi, 1996: 9-13 and Raustiala, 1997: 734.32 GEF, 1996a.33 Raustiala, 1997: 734-6.34 El-Ashry, 1997.35 Gerlak and Parisi, 1996: 11-3.36 Ibid.37 Jain, 1992: 7 and Litfin, 1997.38 Oman, 1993: 6.39 McDowell, 1989; Sunneva, 1988; Haas, 1990; Jain, 1992; Thomas and Tereposky, 1993; Lempert andFarnsworth, 1994; Hjorth, 1994; Höll, 1994; Brooks and VanDeveer, 1997; Schreurs, 1999; and VanDe-veer and Dabelko, 1999.40 UNDP et al., 1993: 2.41 Ibid.: 3.42 Ibid.43 UNDP et al., 1993: 11 and Feschback and Friendly, 1992.44 Ibid.45 Ibid.: 1846 De Bardeleben and John Hannigan, 1995; Jancar-Webster, 1995.47 Gençkaya, 1993; 55.48 The six countries that surround the Black Sea are Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation,Turkey and Ukraine.49 The three protocols are Against Pollution by Land Based Sources, Against Pollution by Oil and otherHarmful Substances, Against Pollution by Dumping.
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50 GEF, 1995c.51 Goyet, 1997: 5.52 Ibid: 22-3 and UNDP et al, 1998: i.53 op.cit., and Goyet, 1997: 1.54 Stewart, 1992: 191-5; Lauber, 1994: 259-63; and VanBuren, 1995.55 Ural, 1995.56 Stewart, 1992; UNDP et al, 1998: 25; and Vari and Tamas, 1993.57 Jancar-Webster, 1997: 31 and Goyet, 1997: 2.58 UNDP et al., 1998: 25.59 Goyet, 1997: 4.60 Ibid.61 EU, 1999.62 UNDP et al., 1995: 3; UNDP et al., 1996: 26; UNDP et al., 1997:29 and UNDP et al, 1998: 25-33.63 UNDP et al., 1995: 31 and GEF, 1995a.64 Ibid.: 32 and GEF, 1995c.65 Ibid.66 GEF, 1995b: 37-40.67 GEF, 1995c: 37-38.68 UNDP et al., 1996: iii.69 Ibid.: 26.70 Ibid.: 25.71 GEF, 1996b.72 GEF, 1995b: 70-81.73 UNDP et al., 1997: 31.74 Ibid.: 29.75 Ibid.: 28.76 Ibid.: 28-29.77 UNDP et al., 1998: 26-36.78 Ibid: 27.79 Ibid: 28.80 Ibid: 29.81 Black Sea NGO Forum, 1997.82 Black Sea NGO Forum, 1998: 5.83 Ibid: 4.84 Nenciu, 1998: 7.85 Çilingirolu and Özarslan, 1998: 9.86 IBSP, 1998.87 Nenciu, 1998:7.88 Black Sea NGO Forum, 1998: 7.89 Black Sea NGO Forum, 1998: 9-11.90 Black Sea NGO Forum, 1998.91 TIME, 1999.92 Çilingirolu, 1999.93 Çilingirolu and Dartsimelia, 1998 a and b.94 TIME, 1999.95 BSEP, 1998:12.96 Kirvalidze, 1999.97 Goyet, 1997: 8.98 Goyet, 1997: 11 and UNDP et al, 1997: i.99 Gençkaya, 1996.100 Göktepe, 1997 and Petroune, 1999.101 Kirvalidze, 1998: 10.102 UNDP et al., 1997: i.103 BSEP, 1996c.104 Goyet, 1997: 10 and Kirvalidze, 1998: 10.
