Tactical

Operational

Strategic

From ADRP 3-0 paragraph 2-7: A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area (JP 3-0).

From ADRP 3-0 paragraph 2-58: A tactical action is a battle or engagement employing lethal and nonlethal actions designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entity. Tactical actions include widely varied activities. They can include an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a population, and the training of other militaries to assist security forces as part of building partner capacity.

From ADRP 3-0 paragraph 2-58: For Army forces, an operation is a military action, consisting of two of more related tactical actions, designed to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part

From JP 3-0 Glossary: strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) Not defined in Army Doctrine

From ADRP 1-02 and JP 1-02: engagement 2. A tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces. (JP 3-0) See also battle; campaign.From ADRP 1-02: battle – A battle consists of a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement. (ADP 3-90) See also campaign; engagement; major operation.

From JP 1-02 Glossary: operation — 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0).

From JP 1-02 Glossary: operational level of war — The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.

From JP 1-02 Glossary: major operation — 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See also operation. (JP 3-0)

From JP 1-02 Glossary: campaign — A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic andoperational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. (JP 5-0)

From ADPR 1-02: major operation – (DOD) 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See ADRP 3-0.

Are operations at the operational level of war?

Other Theorist Definitions

Tactical

Operational

Strategic

Naveh: Therefore, one can rightly claim that the operational level is the application of the universal system in the military sphere. The essence of this level, as the intermediary field between strategy and tactics, is the preparation, planning, and conduct of military operations in order to attain operational objectives and strategic aims. pg 9-10; Criteria for Operational: cognitive tension between strategic aim and tactical mission; industrious manoeuvre, expressing dynamic interaction between various elements of the system as well as between general action and the strategic aim; synergetic: more than a sum of its parts, combined arms, amalgamation of various forms of warfare, and integration of various units in geography and time; aim is disruption of enemy system; must account for randomness and chaos; non-linear nature. the plan should be hierarchically structured and express depth; interaction between notions of manoeuvre and attrition; must be independent from strategy; must be related to a broad and universal theory. pg 13-14

Kelly and Brennan: Operational Art: A two-way conversation between strategy and tactics. Operational level of war is the grouping of tactical action by time and space towards a single idea or intent.

Schneider: Operational Art characterized by employment of forces in deep distributed operations.

Swain: Operational Art = the employment of military forces to achieve strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations, through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.

Isserson (through Harrison): Now, the “main thing in the evolution of the modern operation, is its “depth, which determines its new and enormous intensity” as it makes its way through the enemy’s position (emphasis in the original). Pg 106.

Clausewitz: tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement. Pg 128

Clausewitz: strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war. Pg 128

Antoine-Henri Jomini, “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.” (From Swain JFQ Article)

Julian Corbett, “the art of directing force to the ends in view,” and classified it as major and minor, the former a branch of statesmanship and the latter having to do with plans of operations (From Swain JFQ Article)

Aleksandr A. Svechin: translated the broad abstract goals of strategy into discrete tactical tasks and provided the wherewithal to sustain action to accomplish intermediate goals, developing, in the whole, accomplishment ofthe strategic design. (From Swain JFQ Article)

Aleksandr A. Svechin : to do with maximization of weapon or material capabilities within particular contexts to solve immediate problems. (From Swain JFQ Article)

Aleksandr A. Svechin set broad goals to be achieved over relatively long periods compared with tactics. (From Swain JFQ Article)

3

Are operations at the operational level of war?

Tactical

Operational

Strategic

Size of operation

Battle

Operation

Campaign

Major Operation

Engagement

ARMY

JOINT

Type of Force

From ADRP 1-02: corps – The Army’s largest tactical unit and the instrument by which joint force commanders conduct operational-level maneuver. (FM 3-90)

From ADPR 1-02: division – An Army echelon of command above brigade and below corps. It is a tactical headquarters which employs a combination of brigade combat teams, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades in land operations. (ADRP 3-90)

4

ADRP 5-0, 2-1: Planning results in a plan and orders that synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions

From ADRP 5-0 paragraph 2-20. Conceptual planning is directly associated with operational art—the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art is a thought process that guides conceptual and detailed planning to produce executable plans and orders.

From JP 1-02 operational art — The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment — to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

From ADRP 3-0 Paragraph 4-1: For Army forces, operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. This approach enables commanders and staffs to use skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to overcome the ambiguity and intricacies of a complex, ever changing, and uncertain operational environment to better understand the problem or problems at hand. Operational art applies to all aspects of operations and integrates ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk. Operational art is applicable at all levels of war, not just to the operational level of war.

From ADRP 1-02 Glossary: operational art – (DOD) The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. See ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-0, and ADRP 5-0.

Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869)Summary of The Art of War (1837)

• Experience: Staff of Marshal Michel Ney, One of Napoleon’s Marshalls; later Russian Army in Tzar Alexander’s Headquarters• Motivation: “frantic scramble to succeed by making an impression on some key man.”• Derived theory from study of campaigns of King Fredrick the Great of Prussia; influenced by Lloyd and Bulow• “It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all operations of war, - a principle which must be followed in all good combinations” = Universal

Principles• Decisive Point (from Schneider & Lawrence – “Clausewitz’s Elusive Center of Gravity” also in Calhoun – “Clausewitz and Jomini”):

– Jomini fundamental principles of war consist of the following maxims:

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of the army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible, without compromising one’s own

2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s forces.

3. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow.

4. To arrange that these masses shall not be only thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with ample energy.• Lines of Operation

– If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations (as the primary means of attaining this end) may be regarded as fundamental in devising a good plan for campaign. (Jomini, pg113 and 176)

– Thus, when two armies confront each other, both on the battlefield and in the theater of operations, operations should usually be directed against one of the extremities of the enemy’s front and towards his communication with his rear. (Gat, pg119)

• “Principles of War”: – Initiative, Mobility & Movement, Concentration of Force

• Strategy is “the art of making war upon the map”• Simple – easy to understand (he wanted to sell books)• Serves as a field guide of practical advice for conduct of warfare through application of universal principles• Gat: “On one central point, Jomini’s theoretical outlook fundamentally differed from his predecessors. This divergence was related to the shift in emphasis from

tactics to strategy…” (pg115)• “The greatest secret of war consists in becoming master of the communications of the enemy” (Jomini did attribute to Napoleon, Gat, pg117)• The destruction of the enemy’s field army is the military aim. (Gat, pg117)• “The employment of masses upon the decisive points, constitutes alone good combinations, and … it should be independent of all positions.” (Gat, pg118)• Genius: the skill with which the commander could employ in combat the fundamental principles of war he is elucidating – how well can he identify the decisive point.

– “in every position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate by the right, by the left, or by the front. (Calhoun, pg34)• “Checklist”• Popular because it was “available,” having been written in French• Was linked by B.H. Liddle Heart as “strategy of the indirect approach” as means to break the gridlock of the modern battlefield• Still see his influence in current doctrine: interior/exterior lines; principles of war; etc.• Reynolds Theorist? No. Not sufficiently abstract (limited examples to Fredrick); does not achieve intersubjectivity (land-centered, principles specifically geared

towards land warfare); and does not show empirical relevance – true when tested against reality (principles don’t hold up to conflict today). (Calhoun, pg35)

Carl Philip Gottlieb Von Clausewitz (1780-1831)On War (1832 – published by his wife, Marie)

• Experience: Prussian Army, Administered Prussian General War College and tutor to Prussian Crown Prince• Motivation: Development of a general theory of war• Significant impact on U.S. doctrine: quoted to start (second paragraph, pg I-1) JP 1 (the fundamental principles and overarching guidance for employment of the

Armed Forces of the United States) – description of “art of war”• Theory: You can not develop a theory. Challenges: 1)Psychological forces (hostility, danger, intellectual qualities) on the CDR – forces interact in unpredictable

ways; 2)War’s inherently interactive nature; 3)Unreliability of information in war, a result of the many unobservable actions taken by the participants (Calhoun, pg28)

– Thus: theory should guide student of war… “light his way, eas his progess, train his judgement, and help him avoid pitfalls.”• Method: Dialectical reasoning, or contrasting opposites in discourse. Not specifically Hegel-esque, rather it’s contrasting extremes to show that practical reality

exists somewhere in between. (Calhoun, pg29-30)• Also published after his death; “The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished” – leads to confusion• War is an act of force, . . . Which theoretically can have to limits:

– Referred to in discussion of ethics by Walzer, pg23• War is extension of policy: “the continuation of politics by other means” (Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 24 heading)• Defense is stronger than offense, but has a negative object. Offensive has a positive object. (Dr. Brucino)• Fog of war: “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.

(pg101)• Friction in war: “the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective” (pg119)

– “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult” (pg119)– “Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper” (pg119)

• Duality (concept)• Paradoxical trinity between primordial violence (blind natural force: people), hatred (play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam:

commander & army), and enmity (element of insubordination, as an instrument of policy: government) – theory on war must maintain balance of the three.• COG:

– Book 8, CH4: “one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. This is the point against which all our energies should be directed.” (pg595-6)

– Book 6, CH27: “A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity.” (pg485)

• “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Book 1, CH1• “Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war.”• “Theory should be study, not doctrine” (pg141)• Military Genius: “any complex activity, if it is to be carrie don with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. If they are

outstanding and reveal themselves in exceptional achievements, their possessor is called “a genius.” (pg100)• Questions about revised chapters?

– Revised: Book1: On Nature of War, Book 7: The Attack, & Book 8: War Plans– Unrevised: Book Two: On the Theory of War, Book 3: On Strategy in General, Book 4: The Engagement, Book 5: Military Forces, Book 6: Defense

• Reynolds Theorist? Yes. Sufficiently abstract (broad description of phenomenon of war); achieves intersubjectivity (range of conflict from total war to limited war); and shows empirical relevance – true when tested against reality (says his principles don’t hold up to reality… is reality). (Calhoun, pg35)

Operational Art• Current (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-27): The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment – to

develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. See ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-0, and ADRP 5-0.– Strategy: A prudent idea or set of ideas for the employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national,

and/or multinational objective (JP 3-0)– Campaign: (DOD) A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See ADRP 3-

0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6)– Operation: 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational,

tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0) (JP 1-02, 15 July 2012)– Ends: objectives and desired end state (JP 3-0, pg II-4)– Ways: sequence of actions most like to achieve objectives and end state (JP 3-0, pg II-4)– Means: resources required to accomplish that sequence of actions (JP 3-0, pg II-4)

• Alternate Definition (ADP 3-0, pg 9): “Operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. … The effective arrangement of military conditions in time, space, and purpose is the task of operational art.”

• Old (FM 1-02, pg 1-138): (DOD) The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.

• JP 1-02 (Amended through 15 July 2012): The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment – to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0) (*Same as ARDP 1-02)

• James Schneider (Vulcan’s Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundation of the Operational Art): operational art is characterized by the employment of forces in deep distributed operations. (pg28)

• John Olsen and Martin van Crevald (The Evolution of Operational Art – From Napoleon to the Present): Broadly defined as the grey area between strategy and tactics, operational art spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a given theatre of operations. (pg1)

• Michael R. Matheny (Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945): At the heart of operational art is campaign planning. The campaign plan actually links tactics to strategy by determining where, when, how, and, most importantly, to what purpose military forces will engage the enemy. (pg xviii). While some would claim it was lost, he claims that it was never lost, and was called by different names, and it was rediscovered in 1981 when it was codified with the current name.

• Shimon Naveh (In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory): The introduction of the term “operational art” in the 1986 field manual (FM 100-5) marked the definite recognition of creativity, as the basic quality required from operational level commanders. . . . The American definitions of campaign and theater now resemble those of the Russians. (pg12)

– Naveh “test to deem something operational” (nine checks) – pg 13-4

1. Reflected cognitive tension between orientation towards strategic aim and adherence to the tactical missions

2. Muse be based on industrious maneuver, expressing dynamic interaction between elements in the system

3. Planned action should be synergetic (synthesis through aspects of combined arms combat, amalgamation of various forms of warfare, and integration of forces across geography and time)

4. At tactical level, operations aim at destruction of opponents system

5. Must reflect contemplative attitude towards randomness, chaotic dimensions and interrelation between contentious systems

6. Should be non-linear in nature (should be hierarchically structured and express depth)

7. Should reflect deliberate interaction between notions of maneuver and attrition

8. Should constitute a completely independent entity with specific scope of mission/aim

9. Concept, plan or act must be related to a broad and universal theory

Operational Approach• Current Definition: Operational Approach – (DOD) A description of broad actions

that the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. See ADRP 3-0 and ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-27)

• Through operational art, commanders translate their operational approach into a concept of operations and ultimately into tactical tasks. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-1)

• In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use a set of intellectual tools to help them communicate a common vision of the operational environment as well as visualizing and describing the operational approach. Collectively, this set of tools is known as the elements of operational art. These tools help commanders understand, visualize, and describe combinations of combat power and help them formulate their intent and guidance. (ADRP 5-0, pg 2-4)

Completed CDR Vision (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-4)

Depicting Operational Approach “Techniques”

JP 5-0, pg III-39 JP 5-0, pg III-15

(Ten) Elements of Operational Art (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-2)

Element Definition

End State and Conditions

The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-3)

Center of Gravity A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0 / ADRP 3-0, pg 4-3)

Decisive PointsA decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0 / ADRP 3-0, pg 4-4)

Lines of Operation & Lines of Effort

Line of Operation: a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and that links the force with its base of operations and objectives. LOOs connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of a geographic or force oriented objective. - A force operates on interior lines when operations diverge from a central point - A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemyLine of Effort: a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. (In operations involving man nonmilitary factors, LOEs may be the only way to link tasks to the end state. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-5)

Operational Reach The distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0, pg 4-5)

Basing A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported. Army basing overseas typically falls into two general categories: permanent (bases or installations) and nonpermanent (base camps). (JP 4-0 / ADRP 3-0, pg 4-6)

Tempo Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-7)

Phasing and Transitions

A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling and may be indicated by time, distance, terrain or an event. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-7)

Culmination The culminating point is the point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-8)

Risk(DOD) Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-32); Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Successful commanders assess and mitigate risk continuously throughout the operations process. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-9)

In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use intellectual tools to help them understand an operational environment as well as visualize and describe their approach for conducting the operation. Collectively, this set of tools is known as the elements of operational art. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-2)

CDR Role in the Operations Process (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-3)

Method Definition Consider

Understand

Understanding is fundamental to the commander’s ability to establish a situation’s context. It is essential to effective decision making during planning and execution. Analysis of the operational variables provides the information used to develop understanding and frame the problem (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-3) Mission variables include: Mission, Enemy, Terrain & Weather, Troops and support available, Time available, Civil considerations (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-9, Table 1-3)

• Mission• Enemy• Terrain & Weather• Troops & Support Available• Time available• Civil Considerations

Visualize

As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and the problem, they start visualizing a desired end state and potential solutions to solve the problem. Collectively, this is known as commander’s visualization – the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 5-0). In building their visualization, commanders first seek to understand those conditions that represent the current situation. Next commanders envision a set of desired future conditions that represents the operation’s end state. Commander complete their visualization by conceptionalizing an operational approach – a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 5-0) (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-4)

• Current Situation / Operational Approach / End State

Describe

After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate shared understanding and purpose. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization in updated planning guidance and directives resulting in FRAGOs that adjust the general order. Commanders express visualization in terms of commanders intent, planning guidance including an operational approach, CCIR and EEFI. (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-4-5)

• CDR Intent• Planning Guidance & Operational Approach• CCIR (PIR – intelligence requirement that CDR need to know to

understand enemy or OE & FFIR – information the CDR needs to understand his force or supporting capabilities)

• EEFI (critical aspect of friendly operation that if known by enemy could lead to failure – should be protected from enemy detection)

Direct

Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their commander’s intent, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units. Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by – preparing and approving plans and orders; establishing command and support relationships; assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures and task organization; positioning units to maximize combat power; positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure supervision; allocating resources to exploit opportunities and counter threats; committing the reserve as required. (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-6)

• preparing and approving plans and orders • establishing command and support relationships • assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures and task

organization• positioning units to maximize combat power• positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure

supervision• allocating resources to exploit opportunities and counter

threats• committing the reserve as required

LeadThrough leadership, commander provide purpose, direction and motivation to subordinate commanders, their staff and Soldiers. Where the commander locates within the area of operations is an important leadership consideration. (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-6)

• Leader Location• Balance of time between leading staff and away from

Command Post

Assess

Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current conditions and determine how the operation is progressing. Continuous assessment helps commanders anticipate and adapt the force to changing circumstances. . . . Based on their assessment, commanders modify plans and orders to adapt the force to changing circumstances. (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-7)

• Assessment of situation• Consideration of others assessment• Modification of plans and orders to adapt force to changing

circumstances

The commander’s role is to drive the operations process through activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading and assessing (as depicted in figure 1.1). (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-2)

(Eight) Elements of Combat Power (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1)

Element Definition

LeadershipCommanders apply leadership through mission command. Leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. The Army defines leadership as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1)

InformationInformation enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power. Ultimately, this creates opportunities to achieve definitive results. Knowledge management enables commanders to make informed, timely decisions despite the uncertainty of operations. Commanders use information as a mission command system to understand, visualize, describe and direct operations. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-2)

Mission Command

The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-2)

Movement and Maneuver

The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and over threats. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-3)

Intelligence The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-4)

Fires The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-4)

Sustainment The related tasks and systems that provide support and service to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-4)

Protection The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-5)

Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1)

To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the warfighting functions. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1)A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions (ADP 3-0, pg 13)

Operational and Mission Variables (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-7)An operational environment for each operation differs and evolves as each operation progresses. Army leaders use operational variables (PEMESII-PT) to analyze and understand a specific operational environment in which they are conducting operations. They use mission

variables (METT-TC)to focus on specific elements of an operational environment during mission analysis. (Paragraph 1-8, pg 1-2, ADRP 3-0)

Operational Variables (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-7)

Political Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers .

Military Explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment.

Economic Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.

Social Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members

Information Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

Infrastructure Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.

Physical Environment

Includes the geography and manmade structures, as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations.

Time Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational environment, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the operational environment.

Mission Variables (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-9)

Mission Commanders and staffs view all of the mission variables in terms of their impact on mission accomplishment. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. It is always the first variable commanders consider during decision-making. A mission statement contains the "who, what, when, where, and why" of the operation.

Enemy The second variable to consider is the enemy—dispositions (including organization, strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

Terrain & Weather

Terrain and weather analysis are inseparable and directly influence each other’s impact on military operations. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers and mountains) and manmade features (such as cities, airfields, and bridges). Commanders analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain expressed in the memory aid OAKOC: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment. The military aspects of weather include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, humidity.

Troops & Support Available

This variable includes the number, type, capabilities, and condition of friendly troops and support. These include supplies, services, and available support available from joint, host nation and unified action partners. They also include support from civilians and contractors employed by military organizations, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Army Materiel Command.

Time Available

Commanders assess the time available for planning, preparing, and executing tasks and operations. This includes the time required to assemble, deploy, and maneuver units in relationship to the enemy and conditions.

Civil Considerations

Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

(Nine) Principles of War / (Twelve) Joint Operations

Principle Principle as outline in JP 3-0, Appendix A “Principles of Joint Operations”

Objective The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.

Offensive The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Mass The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results

Maneuver The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power

Economy of Force The purpose of economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts

Unity of Command The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective

Security The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage.

Surprise The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

Simplicity The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.

Perseverance The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

Legitimacy The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations.

Restraint The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.

Since the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, joint doctrine has recognized nine principles of war. Subsequent experience from a wide variety of irregular warfare (IW) situations has identified three additional principles – restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Together they comprise the 12 principles of joint operations. (JP 3-0, pg I-2)

(Army) The twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of operations across the levels of war. The principles are not a checklist. While commanders can consider the principles in all operations, they do not apply in the same way to every situation. Rather, they summarize characteristics of successful operations. Their greatest value lies in educating the military professional. Applied to the study of past operations, the principles are powerful tools that can assist commanders in analyzing pending operations. While considering the principles, commanders synchronize efforts and determine if or when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-1)

Design• Operational Design: The conception and construction of the

framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. See also campaign; major operation. (JP 5-0) (JP 1-02, pg 234)

• Operational design is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns. (JP 5-0, pg III-1)

• Army Design Methodology: A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems in approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-3)

• A design is a vision expressed in terms of intent (what I want to do), concept (how I want to do it), and narrative (my instructions). (Swain - “Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd QTR 2009, pg 65)

(Thirteen) Elements of Operational Design (JP 5-0, pg III-18)Within operational art, joint force commanders and staffs consider elements of operational design. Elements of operational design are individual tools that help the joint force commander and staff visualize and describe the broad operational approach. (See figure 4-3. See JP 3-0 for a discussion of the elements of operational design.) Army forces use elements of operational design when functioning as a joint force headquarters. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-3)

Element Definition

Termination Termination criteria are developed first among the elements of operational design as they enable the development of the military end state and objectives. Termination criteria describe the standards that must be met before conclusion of a joint operation. (JP 5-0, pg III-19).

Military End StateMilitary end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. While it may mirror many of the conditions of the national strategic end state, the military end state typically will be more specific and contain other supporting conditions. (JP 5-0, pg III-19)

ObjectiveAn objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation should be directed. … Objectives prescribe friendly goals … Objectives describe what must be achieved to reach the end state. Four primary considerations for an objective: 1) establishes a single desired result (a goal); 2) should link directly or indirectly to higher level objectives or to the end state; 3) is prescriptive, specific, and unambiguous; 4) does not infer ways and/or means – it is not a written task. (JP 5-0, pg III-20)

EffectsAn effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. Four primary considerations for writing a desired effect statement: 1) should link directly to one or more objectives; 2) should be measurable; 3) should not specify ways and means for accomplishment; 4) should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task (JP 5-0, pg III-20 – 21)

Center of GravityA COG is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. It is what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends…the point at which all our energies should be directed.” An objective is always linked to a COG. There may also be different COGs at different levels, but they should be nested. At the strategic level, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level, a COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—such as a powerful element of the armed forces—but could include other capabilities in the operational environment. (JP 5-0, pg III-22)

Decisive Point A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective). … Although decisive points are usually not COG’s, they are the keys to attacking or protecting them. (JP 5-0, pg III-26)

LOO & LOE

A LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). LOOs describe and connect a series of decisive actions that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using LOOs generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence, although multiple LOOs can exist at the same time (parallel operations). Major combat operations are typically designed using LOOs. (JP 5-0, pg III-27)A line of effort links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. Lines of effort are essential to operational design when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance, such as in counterinsurgency or stability operations. (JP 5-0, pg III-28)

Direct & Indirect Approach

The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a COG. A direct approach attacks the enemy’s COG or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. However, COGs are generally well protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus, commanders usually choose an indirect approach. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s COG by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that lead to the defeat of the COG while avoiding enemy strength. (JP 5-0, pg III-31 – 32)

AnticipationAnticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs must consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with higher headquarters, subordinates, partner nations, and other organizations in the OA. (JP 5-0, pg III-33)

Operational ReachOperational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. Although reach may be constrained or limited by the geography in and around the OA, it may be extended through forward positioning of capabilities and resources, increasing the range and effectiveness of weapon systems, leveraging HNS and contract support (system, external, theater) and maximizing the throughput efficiency of the distribution architecture. The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of LOOs. (JP 5-0, pg III-33)

CulminationCulmination is that point in time and/or space at which the operation can no longer maintain momentum. In the offense, the culminating point is the point at which effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. During stability operations, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties. (JP 5-0, pg III-34)

Arranging Operations

Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to reach the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Planners should consider factors such as simultaneity, depth, timing, and tempo when arranging operations. (JP 5-0, pg III-35)

Force and Functions Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either adversary forces, functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both adversary forces and functions concurrently to create the greatest possible friction between friendly and adversary forces and capabilities. (JP 5-0, pg III-38)

Army Design Methodology (ADRP 5-0, pg 2-4 – 2-11)• Definition: a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems

and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). (ARDP 1-02, pg 1-3)• Key concepts:

– Critical & creative thinking– Collaboration and dialogue– Framing– Narrative Construction– Visual Modeling

• Army Design Methodology (4x activities)1. Improved understanding of operational environment

• Frame Operational Environment– Diagram current state of Operational Environment (product) & Narrative (product)– Diagram desired end state of the Operational Environment (product) & Narrative (product)

• Frame the Problem– Technique (ask these questions):

» What is the difference between the current state and the desired end state of the operational environment?» What is preventing US forces from reaching the desired end state?

2. Problem Statement (product)

3. Operational Approach (serves as link between detailed and conceptual planning)• Elements of operational art and method (defeat vs. stability mechanisms) related to core competency (CAM & WAS) feed into developing LOE chart

(logic of purpose vs. geographical reference: LOO)• LOE chart (product)

4. Initial Commanders Intent• Purpose• Key Tasks• Endstate: Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly force in relationship to desired conditions

of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations.

• Key Outputs– Problem Statement– Initial Commander’s Intent– Planning guidance, to include operational approach

• Operational Approach: organizes combinations of potential actions in time, space, and purpose that will guide the force to a desired end state• Planning guidance: orients the focus of operations, linking desired conditions to potential combinations of actions that force may employ to achieve

the desired end state

• Reframing: during operations, commanders decide to reframe after realizing the desired conditions have changed, are not achievable, cannot be attained through current operational approach, or because of change of mission or end state.

Activities of the Army Design Methodology

ADRP 5-0, pg 2-6

“A/The” Design Process (Swain – “Commander’s Business,” JFQ, issue 23, 2nd QTR 2009)

1. Figure out what inspired the external directive (Higher HQ Guidance/OPORD) that opened the deliberations

2. CDR has dialogue with superior to ensure complete understanding between sponsor (Higher HQ) and actor (Sub-units)

3. Conduct System Framing (effort to learn all one can in the time available about the nature and content of the systems creating the unsatisfactory situation): Create system frame which bounds the hypothetical portrayal of a relevant system, captured both graphically and narratively.

1. Contains a group of interacting actors and potential actors (must always contain the United States)

2. Define existing relationships that govern interactions

3. Then group actors into assemblages (subgroups with collective influence on system behavior)

4. Cognitively transfer from learning to action

5. Create a mental model (a depiction of sponsor’s desired state of affairs, or system, as a basis) of the desired system (may/should look similar to first system with different roles/links)

6. Assess logic of enemy rationale, logic of command rationale, and logistics rationale; and do not limit model to friendly side of considerations

4. Formulate the problem – what needs to be done to establish the conditions to achieve the desired endstate

5. Operational Framing: formulating the strategy, or pattern of actions to change the system described by the system frame (this is the defining act of design)

Guide to the use of Army Design Methodology (with references)

Why Army Design Methodology?: War is a complex system, which means that it is open, interdependent, emergent, multidimensional, purposeful, and counterintuitive (Clausewitz, Gaddis, Gharajedaghi, Doerner, Senge, Boyd/Osinga, Naveh, Lawson).

That said, a lot of the time in tactics and even campaigning, there are enough repetitive patterns to be useful, so a lot of the time, doctrine informed by military theory is enough. For example, in campaigning, we can use elements of operational art, principles of war, mission command, operational frameworks, and military theory elements of strategy and operational art (ADP 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0; JP 3-0 and 5-0; Jomini; Clausewitz; Liddell Hart; Isserson; Svechin).

Sometimes, these more common patterns do not fit as well or do not fit at all, which is usually an indication that the problem is unfamiliar. In such cases we can use different tools to improve planning: Army Design Methodology and Joint design, which emphasize understanding the operational environment, identifying the problem, and developing operational approaches—activities that are enabled by doctrinal tools such as visual modeling, narrative, framing, PMESII, DIME, and METT-TC.

In order to better apply these activities and tools, we study certain theories, which in turn provide tools that can fall into three broad categories:1. In thinking about all activities in planning, strive to: •Be aware of causal links, implicit and explicit (e.g.: Gaddis, Reynolds, Stone)•Be aware of cultural norms and assumptions—your own, enemy, local population (e.g.: Gat, Potter, Linn, Lynn, Gharajedaghi)-----Gharajedaghi:•Think holistically—structure, function, process, purpose/context •Think operationally—feedback loops, delayed responses, carrying capacity•Understand self-organization of the system—its propensity, especially toward cultural norms•Be interactive—experiment (wargame), test to see if it is the right problemDoerner:•Make more decisions•Test hypotheses•Have goals—structured, intermediate, tested•Think by analogy•Ask why questions•Freely experiment•Cull unsuccessful techniques•Develop well buffered systems—with stable negative feedback loops•Delegate—don’t overcentralizeBar-Yam:•Understand degrees of interdependence across the system•Scale responses/approaches to appropriate level•Look for patterns across the system

2. In checking the work of all activities, watch out for: •Causation, normalization, rhetoric, closure, focalization, underreading, overreading, and gaps in narratives (Abbott)•Falling into the icon trap, image trap, puzzle trap, numbers trap, or category trap (Lawson)•Vague goals, absolute language, overgeneralization, repair service behavior, solving problems one at a time, fixation on familiar issues or solutions, methodism, goal inversion, ballistic behavior, and dosage (Doerner)

3. Leadership, teamwork, and organization: These problems, activities, and tools are difficult. They can be dealt with by just the commander or select individuals on the staff, but that usually requires genius and/or a lot of time to do the work. As a result, commanders and leaders need support in dealing with difficult and unfamiliar work, which usually falls to staffs and planning teams. Those staffs and teams in turn require leadership and teamwork to be successful.

Strong teams and leaders are characterized by the qualities emphasized in ADP 5-0, ADP 6-0, ADP 6-22, JP 5-0, supported by the leadership and organizational lessons found in Kotter, Schoen, and Hatch.

Problem• No definition in ADRP 1-02 / JP 1-02• ADRP 5-0, pg 2-9: “2-41. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a

desired goal or objective. In a broad sense, a problem exists when an individual becomes aware of a significant difference between what actually is and what is desired. In the context of operations, an operational problem is the issue or set of issues that impede commanders from achieving their desired end state.”

– Problem Statement: A concise statement of the issue or issues requiring resolution. (ADRP 5-0, pg 2-9)

• Critical to defining the problem is determining what needs to be acted on to reconcile the differences between existing and desired conditions. (JP 5-0, pgs III-12 – 13)

– The JFC and Staff must identify and articulate (from JP 5-0, pg III-13):a) Tensions between current conditions and desired conditions at end state

b) Elements within the operational environment which must change or remain the same to achieve desired end states

c) Opportunities and threats that either can be exploited or will impede the JFC from achieving the desired end state

d) Limitations. An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, ROE, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host-nation issues.

– A concise problem statement is used to clearly define the problem or problem set to solve. It considers how tension and competition affect the operational environment by identifying how to transform the current conditions to the desired end state – before adversaries begin to transform current conditions to their desired end state. The statement broadly describes the requirements for transformation, anticipating changes in the operational environment while identifying critical transitions. (JP 5-0, pg III-13)

• Problem Statement example (from ADRP 5-0, pg 2-9) [141 words]– The Newland defense force is the primary impediment to establishing a democratic government in Newland and the

primary factor of instability in the region. For over forty years, the Newland defense force has maintained power for itself and the regime by oppressing all opposition within society. In addition, the Newland defense force has a history of intimidating Country Z through force (both overtly and covertly). Corruption in the Newland defense force is rampant within the leadership, and it has close ties to several drug cartels. General E is the latest of two dictators emerging from the Newland defense force. Even if General E is removed from power, the potential of a new dictator emerging from the Newland defense force is likely. There is no indication that the leadership of the Newland defense force is willing to relinquish their power within Newland.

ADP 3-0 “Logic Map”

Decisive Action• The Army conducts unified land operations, in the anticipated operational environment, in

support of unified action, executed through decisive action. (ADP 3-0, pg iii)

• Decisive Action – (Army) The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. (ADRP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-11)

– Offensive Operations: operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources and population centers. They include movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. (ADP 3-0, pg 5)

– Defensive Operations: operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive and stability tasks. These operations include mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. (ADP 3-0, pg 5-6)

– Stability Operations: military missions, tasks and activities conducted outside the United States to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. (ADP 3-0, pg 6)

– [Homeland Defense and] Defense Support Of Civil Authorities represents DoD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. They include tasks: provide support for domestic disasters; provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives incidents; provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies; and provide other designated support. (ADP 3-0, pg 6)

The Army’s two core competencies – combined arms maneuver and wide area security – provide the means for balancing the application of Army warfighting functions within the tactical actions and tasks inherent in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It is the integrated application of these two core competencies that enables Army forces to defeat or destroy an enemy from gaining a position of advantage. (ADP 3-0, pg 5)

Combined Arms Maneuver: The application of the element of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. (ADP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-8)

Wide Area Security: The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative. (ADP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-38)

Army Core Competencies (CAM & WAS)

“…You don’t do one without the other, it is not CAM is Combined Arms Live Fire, and WAS is KLE’s.”- LTG David Perkins (28 Nov 2012; talking to SAMS 13-01)

Defeat Mechanisms (ADRP 3-0, pg 2-9)(also, JP 5-0, pg III-30)

• Current Definition: The method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. (ARRP 1-02, pg 1-12)

• Generally, defeat mechanisms are appropriate for combined arms maneuver, while stability mechanisms are best suited for wide area security (ADRP, 3-0, pg 2-9)

• Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate and isolate.– Destroy: CDRs apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that is can no longer perform any function.– Dislocate: CDRs dislocate by employing forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s

dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.– Disintegrate: Disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations.

Leads to rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight.– Isolate: CDRs deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion,

influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action.• CDRs describe defeat mechanisms as Physical, temporal or psychological:

– Physically defeating: deprives enemy forces of ability to achieve enemy aims– Temporally defeating: friendly anticipates enemy reactions and counters them before they become effective– Psychologically defeating: deprives the enemy of the will to continue to fight

• JP 5-0: Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. Combat aims at defeating armed enemies – regular, irregular, or both, through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture by all means available. There are two basic defeat mechanisms to accomplish this: attrition and disruption. (pg III-30)

– The aim of disruption is to defeat an enemy’s ability to fight as a cohesive and coordinated organization. Th alternative is to destroy his material capabilities through attrition, which generally is more costly and time-consuming). …Joint doctrine favors disruption because it tends to be a more effective and efficient way of causing an enemy’s defeat. (pg III-30)

Stability Mechanisms (ADRP 3-0, pg 2-10)(also, JP 5-0, pg III 30-1)

• Current Definition: The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADRP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-84)

• Generally, defeat mechanisms are appropriate for combined arms maneuver, while stability mechanisms are best suited for wide area security (ADRP, 3-0, pg 2-9)

• The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. – Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and

dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.

– Control involves imposing civil order. – Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately behavior of

foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations through inform and influence activities, presence, and conduct.

– Support is to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

• As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone.

Tenets of Unified Land Operations (ADP 3-0, pg 7)

• Not defined in Army/Joint doctrine; explained in ADP 3-0• Unified land operations describes the Army’s approach to generating and

applying combat power in campaigns and operations. (ADP 3-0, pg 7)

Tenet DescriptionFlexibility employ a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations

Integration involves efforts to exercise inform and influence activities with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as well as efforts to conform Army capabilities and plans to the larger concept

Lethality The capacity for physical destruction is fundamental to all other military capabilities, and the most basic building block for military operations.... Lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of violence suffices to accomplish the mission.

Adaptability Army leaders must adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific situation they face. This requires an adaptable mind, a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment.

Depth Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, or purpose. Army leaders strike enemy forces throughout their depth by arranging activities across the entire operational framework to achieve the most decisive result.

Synchronization Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). It is the ability to execute multiple, related, and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing each task in isolation.

Campaign vs. Phase and Operation

• Campaign: (DOD) A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See ADRP 3-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6)

• Operation:– ADRP 1-02 does not have definition for “operation”– OLD: Operation – (DOD, NATO) 1. A military action or the carrying out of a

strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. See FM 3-0 (FM 1-02, pg 1-137)

– Joint – JP 1-02, 15 July 2012: operation – 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0).

• Phase: (Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-29)– OLD: Phase: (Army) A specific part of an operation that is different from those

that precede or follow. A change in phase usually involves a change in task. (FM 3-0 / FM 1-02, pg 1-145)

HVT vs. HPT vs. HVI• High-Value Target (HVT) – (DOD) A target the enemy commander requires

for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest. See FM 2-01.3 and FM 3-60. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-19)

• High-Payoff Target (HPT) – (DOD) A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander’s mission. See FM 3-60. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-19)

• High-Value Individual (HVI) – A high-value individual is a person of interest (friendly, adversary or enemy) who must be identified, surveilled, tracked and influenced through the use of information or fires. A HVI may become a HPT that must be acquired and successfully attacked (exploited, captured or killed) for the success of the friendly commander’s mission. (FM 3-09) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-19)

Doctrine• No definition of doctrine in ADRP 1-02

– Old Army FM: doctrine – (DOD) Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (NATO) Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See FM 3-0. (FM 1-02, pg 1-65)

• JP 1-02: Fundamental principles by which the military force or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See also multinational doctrine; joint doctrine. (JP 1-02, pg 97)

Center of Gravity (Schwerpunkt)• Current Definition: (DOD) The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. See ADRP 3-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6, also

described in various ADP/ADRP’s as both an element of operational design and operational art)• A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or the will to act (JP 5-0). This definition states in modern terms the classic description

offered by Clausewitz: “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”* The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat. The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool for planning operations. It provides a focal point, identifying sources of strength and weakness. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-4 – 4-5)

• Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral. . . . Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or a military force, are typically easier to identify, assess and target. They can often be influenced solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, religious tradition, tribal influence, or strong-willed populace. Military means alone usually prove ineffective when targeting moral centers of gravity. Affecting them requires the collective, integrated efforts of all instruments of national power. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-4)

• One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s staff during planning is identifying and analyzing friendly and adversary COGs. A COG is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. It is what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends…the point at which all our energies should be directed.” An objective is always linked to a COG. There may also be different COGs at different levels, but they should be nested. At the strategic level, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level, a COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—such as a powerful element of the armed forces—but could include other capabilities in the operational environment. In identifying COGs it is important to remember that irregular warfare focuses on legitimacy and influence over a population, unlike traditional warfare, which employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. Therefore, in an irregular warfare environment, the enemy and friendly COG will most likely be the same population. (JP 5-0, pg III-22) – This joint pub has four pages dedicated to COG.

– Joint definition of objective – 1. the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken which is essential to the commander’s plan. See also target (JP 5-0) (JP 1-02)

• Clausewitz:– A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the

center of gravity. (On War, Howard & Paret, pg 485 – Book 6, CH 27)– *… One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on

which everything depends. That point against which all our energies should be directed. … For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII and Fredrick the Great, the COG was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures. In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally their capital. In small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. (On War, Howard & Paret, pg 595-6 – Book 8, CH 4)

• Antulio J. Echevarria II (Clausewitz & Contemporary War, pg 177-190) on Center of Gravity:– Clausewitz clearly considered COG important – used it 50+ times in On War– Question of relevancy is valid – concentration of forces (mass refers to concentration of effects) is no longer considered a necessary principle of war; trend is towards non-contiguous

operations, and terrorists/insurgents/non-state actors have no physical center to attack• 1991 Gulf War, GEN Schwartzkopf (Combatant Commander) identified 3x COG: Saddam Hussein, Republican Guard & Iraqi Chem/Bio/Nuke capabilities while his Air

Component Commander, GEN Charles Horner, identified 12x “target sets” ranging from national leadership and command and control to railroads, airfields, and ports – each of which in his view corresponded to a center of gravity. (pg 184)

– Since reintegration into doctrine since 1980’s – multiple interpretations, Joint Publication definitions changed with each issue, and don’t accord with examples given– Pure Clausewitz concept: COG was the thing that, if struck, would lead one to decisive victory. Inspired by physics: “… it is against that part of the enemy’s forces where they are

most concentrated that, if a blow were to occur, the effect would emanate the farthest…”– Applied Concept: Clausewitz did allow for multiple COG’s (also said to ideally get to just one – pg 617, Book 8, CH 9), and it depended on the degree of connectivity, or overall unity,

the opposing force possessed – when Clausewitz references the COG where the forces are most concentrated, he is really referring less to the actual forces than to what concentrates them. Based on this, for Clausewitz, COG refers to the actual element that causes them to concentrate and gives them purpose and direction.

– Conclusions: term has become too diluted; better to think of COG as focal point rather than source of strength or specific strength or weakness; COG only exists where threat separate parts are connected enough to form a single entity; COG only valid if complete defeat of an opponent is sought; COG for jihadist organizations if political and ideological – reduce overall appeal & empathy is success; WMD is interesting factor when considering COG ; Finally – concept is effects-based, not capabilities-based, should encourage thorough thinking by policy-makers.

Analyzing Center(s) of GravityStrange, Joe and Richard Iron. Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part II: The CG-CC-CR-CV construct: A

Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship Between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities.

(1) Critical Capabilities (CC)ILE: Critical capability—Actions (verbs) that will achieve the objective.

JP 5-0: Critical capabilities are those that are considered crucial enablers for a COG to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s). (pg III-24)

Strange: Primary abilities or military instruments whose presence allows a centre of gravity to function and to be identified.

Strange & Iron: Every center of gravity has some primary ability (or abilities) that make a center of gravity in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission – including phases within campaigns or operations. Most simply stated: what can this center of gravity do to you that puts great fear (or concern) into your heart in the context of your mission and level of war? Within a critical capability, the key word is verb: it can destroy something, or seize an objective, or prevent you from achieving a mission. (pg7)

(3) Critical Requirements (CR)ILE: Critical requirements are essential resource, or means for the CoG to perform a critical capability.

JP 5-0: Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a critical capability to become fully operational. (pg III-24)

Strange: Those essential conditions, resources, and means that sustain effective critical capabilities.Strange & Iron: Are conditions, resources, and means that are essential for a CoG to achieve its critical capability. Examples are:

• Good weather, precise intelligence, fuel and ammo re-supply, chemical gear, ability to go 35mph across open desert for 6 hours

• Force X must accomplish its mission as a precondition before force Y can accomplish its mission

• A robust sea train for a warfighting fleet operating long periods at sea.• Political leader Y needs no less than X% popular support (pg7)

(4) Critical Vulnerabilities (CV)ILE: Critical vulnerabilities are aspect s of a critical requirement, which are deficient or vulnerable that if successfully attacked will degrade the CoG. (THESE BECOME DECISIVE POINTS)

JP 5-0: Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or signifigant results. (pg III-24)

Strange: Can be deduced from recognizing which of the enemy’s enemy requirements can be converted into vulnerabilities by an attacking force using means of interdiction, neutralization, or destruction.

Strange & Iron: Are those critical requirements, or components thereof, that are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization or defeat in a way that will contribute to a center of gravity failing to achieve its critical capability. The lesser the risk and cost, the better. Critical vulnerabilities may, usually, be of the silver-bullet type: so if success can be achieved by focusing on just a single vulnerable critical requirement, then that’s great! An example might be where one precisely targeted cruise missile destroys the enemy leadership and results in an immediate end to conflict. More typically, critical vulnerabilities are of the lead-bullet type; where final success can only be achieved by focusing on a combination of vulnerable critical requirements that can be neutralized, interdicted or attacked simultaneously or sequentially. Here it is the cumulative effect that produces decisive results. This involves seeking a series of successive battlefield advantages that will lead to the unbalancing and eventual culmination of the enemy, with or without a final dramatic decisive act. (pg8)

(2) CoGs (CG)ILE: The CoG possesses the critical capability. The CoG performs the action that achieves the objective.

JP 5-0: A COG is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (pg III-22)

Strange & Iron: CG are physical or moral entities that are primary components of physical or moral strength, power and resistance. They don’t just contribute to strength; they ARE the strength. They offer resistance. They strike effective (or heavy) physical or moral blows. At the strategic level, they are usually leaders and populations determined to prevail. At operational and tactical levels they are almost invariably specific military forces. (pg7)

CCIR (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-5)• Definition: commander’s critical information requirement – (DOD) An information requirement identified by

the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. Also called CCIR. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-8)

• The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements (JP 3-0). (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-5)

– Priority Intelligence Requirement – (DOD) An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. Also called PIR. See FM 2-01.3. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-30)

– Friendly Force Information Requirement – (DOD) Information the commander and staff need to understand to understand the status of friendly and supporting capabilities. Also called FFIR. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-17)

• A commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) directly influences decision making and facilitates the successful execution of military operations. Commanders decide to designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their visualization of the course of the operation. A CCIR may support one or more decisions. During planning, staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. During preparation and execution, they recommend changes to CCIRs based on assessment. A CCIR is—

– Specified by a commander for a specific operation. – Applicable only to the commander who specifies it. – Situation dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission. – Time-sensitive.

• Essential Elements of Friendly Information: Commanders also describe information they want protected as essential elements of friendly information. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. EEFIs establish elements of information to protect rather than ones to collect. Their identification is the first step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information.

MOP vs. MOE (and Indicator)• Measure of Performance: (DOD) A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is

tied to measuring task accomplishment. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-24) (MOP answers “was the action taken” or “were the tasks completed to standard” = “are we doing things right”)

– ADRP 5-0, pg 5-2: The uses of MOPs are a primary element of battle tracking. MOPs focus on the friendly force. Evaluating task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer. Examples of MOPs include:

• Route X cleared• Generators delivered, are operational, and are secure at villages A, B, and C

• Measure of Effectiveness: (DOD) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-24) (MOE answers “are we doing the right things”)

– ADRP 5-0, pg 5-2: MOE for the objection to “Provide a safe and secure environment” may include:

1) Decrease in insurgent activity

2) Increase in population trust of host-nation security forces

ADRP 5-0, pg 5-3

• ADRP 5-0, pg 5-4: In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that provides insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of performance. Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys and polls, and information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question “What is the current status of this MOE or MOP?” A single indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs. Examples of indicators for the MOE “Decrease in insurgent activity” are:

• Number of hostile actions per area each week. • Number of munitions caches found per area each week. • Number of reports of insurgent activity by the population per area per

week.

COA Sketch

ATTP 5-0.1, pg 4-20

ADRP 1-02, pg 10-1 – 10-4

ATTP 5-0.1, pg 4-21

COA Validity Check (ATTP 5-0.1, pg 4-16)(FAS-DC)

Screening Criteria Definition

Feasible The COA can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations.

Acceptable The COA must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.

Suitable The COA can accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent and planning guidance

DistinguishableEach COA must differ significantly from the others (such as scheme of maneuver, lines of effort, phasing, use of reserve, and task organization).

Complete

COA must incorporate:• How decisive operation leads to mission accomplishment.• How shaping operations create and preserve conditions for success of the decisive operation or effort.• How sustaining operations enable shaping and decisive operations or efforts.• How to account for offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks.• Tasks to be performed and conditions to be achieved.

36

(Three) Organizing Framework(s) (ADRP 3-0, pg 1-9 – 13)

• Organizing Framework not defined in ADRP 1-02; refer to ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0• An established operational framework and associated vocabulary can assist greatly in Army leaders are

responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources.

• Deep-Close-Security: historically associated with terrain orientation (contiguous; nonlinear and noncontiguous; nonlinear and contiguous) but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well.

– Deep: In contiguous areas of operations, a deep area is an area forward of the close area that a commander uses to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close area.

– Close: In contiguous areas of operations, a close area is an area assigned to a maneuver force that extends from its subordinates’ rear boundaries to its own forward boundary.

– Security: In contiguous areas of operations, a support area is an area for any command that extends from its rear boundary forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command.

• Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining: lends itself to broad conceptual orientation.– Decisive: the operation that directly accomplishes the mission– Shaping: an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors,

and the terrain.– Sustaining: operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and

maintaining combat power.

• Main and Supporting Efforts: more simplistic than other organizing frameworks, focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, commanders can employ it with either the deep-close-security framework or the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework.

– Main: The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success.

– Supporting: A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort.

Strategy• No definition of strategy in ADRP 1-02

• JP 1-02: A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0) (JP 1-02, pg 300)

• Clausewitz: “[Strategy] is the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war.” (On War – Howard & Paret, pg 177)– [Clausewitz’s definition of strategy] recognizes only one means, combat or fighting. Yet it is actually broader than his critics admit, and

demonstrably valid even in today’s postmodern setting. In judging his definition unfit, his detractors typically commit at least one of two classic errors: 1) mistake conclusions drawn from pure concept of war, that is, war considered from a strictly logical standpoint, as reflective of his approach to strategy; 2) they overlook the critical point that his definition of war’s means includes not only violence, but the threat of violence.” Echevarria (Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 133)

• Jomini: “Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations.” (Summary of the Art of War, trans. Mendell and Craighill, pg 69)

– OR… “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or invasion” (Swain - “Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd QTR 2009, pg 65)

• Napoleon: “Strategy is the art of making use of time and space.” (Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pg 161)

• Colin Gray: “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.” (Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 144) / “To paraphrase Gray, strategy is the product of the dialogue between policy and national power in the context of the overall international security environment.” (Mackubin Owens, “Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking, pg114)

• Richard Betts: “the link between military means and political ends” (Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 144)• Liddle Heart: “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” (Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 144)• Raoul Castex (French Admiral, inner-war): “Strategy is nothing other than the general conduct of operations, the supreme art of chiefs of a certain rank

and of the general staffs destined to serve as their auxiliaries” (Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, pg39)• Thomas Schelling: “Strategy is not concerned with the efficient application of force by with the exploitation of potential force.” (Strachan, “The Lost

Meaning of Strategy,” pg43)• Moltke: “Strategy is the transfer of knowledge to practical life… the art of acting under the pressure of the most difficult conditions.” (Strachan, “The Lost

Meaning of Strategy,” pg46)• Mackubin Owens: “In essence, strategy describes the way in which the available means will be employed to achieve the ends of policy” (“Strategy and

the Strategic Way of Thinking” pg111)• Julian Corbett: “the art of directing force to the ends in view” [and classified it as major and minor, the former a branch of statemanship and the latter

having to do with plans of operations.] (Swain - “Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd QTR 2009, pg 65)

Levels of War• The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions.

Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to all types of military operations. (FM 3-90, pg 1-2)

• Tactical level of war: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (JP 3-0, pg GL-17) / (JP 1-02, pg 309)

– The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Engagements are linked to battles. One or more battles are linked to winning major operations and campaigns, leading to operational success, which can lead to strategic success. (FM 3-0 discusses major operations and campaigns.)

– A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement (FM 3-0). Battles can affect the course of the campaign or major operation. A battle occurs when a division, corps, or army commander fights for one or more significant objectives. Battles are usually operationally significant, if not operationally decisive.

– An engagement is a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below (FM 3-0). An engagement normally lasts only a short time—minutes, hours, or a day. It can result from one side’s deliberate offensive movement against an opponent or from a chance encounter between two opponents, such as a meeting engagement. An engagement can be a stand-alone event or one of several related engagements comprising a battle.

– Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or components are not associated with a particular level of war. National assets, such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions are strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies.

– Advances in technology, information-age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels (see FM 3-0). (FM 3-90, pg 1-2-3)

• Operational level of war: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (JP 3-0, pg GL-14) / (JP 1-02, pg 234)

• Strategic level of war: The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (JP 3-0, pg GL-16) / (JP 1-02, pg 299)

Rapid Decisionmaking and Synchronization Process - RDSP (ADRP 5-0, pg 4-6)

• RDSP is a technique that commanders and staffs commonly use during execution. Consists of five steps;

1. Compare the current situation to the order– During execution:

• Monitor the situation to identify changes in conditions• Ask if changes effect overall conduct of of operations and if changes are significant• Identify the changed conditions represent variances from the order – especially

opportunities and risks

2. Determine that a decision, and what type, is required– Variance identified:

• Describe variance• Determine if variance provides significant opportunity or threat and examines the

potential of either• Determines if a decision is needed by identifying if variance

– Indicates

3. Develop a course of action

4. Define and validate the course of action

5. Implement

Elements of Decisive Action Chart(ADRP 3-90, pg 2-3)

Graphic Task Definition

Ambush

An attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-2, pg 9-1)

Attack by Fire

A tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy without closing with the enemy to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive the enemy. (FM 3-90) See also destroy; fix; frontal attack; support by fire; suppress; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-4)

Block

1. A tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or prevents his advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. 2. An obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or to prevent him from passing through an engagement area. See also contain; disrupt; fix; turn. (FM 3-90) See also avenue of approach, contain; disrupt; fix; tactical mission task; turn. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-5)

Breach

(Army) A tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available means to break through or secure a passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification. (FM 3-90) See also tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-5)

Bypass

A tactical mission task in which the commander directs his unit to maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force. (FM 3-90) See also tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6)

Canalize

A tactical mission task in which the commander restricts enemy movement to a narrow zone by exploiting terrain coupled with the use of obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver. (FM 3-90) See also tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6)

Clear

1. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area. (FM 3-90) 2. To eliminate transmissions on a tactical radio net in order to allow a higher-precedence transmission to occur. (FM 6-02.53) 3. The total elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually performed by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire. (ATTP 3-90.4) See also reduce; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-7)

Tactical Mission Tasks (1 of 8)

Graphic Task Definition

Contain

A tactical mission task that requires the commander to stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to cause them to center their activity on a given front and prevent them from withdrawing any part of their forces for use elsewhere. (FM 3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-9)

Control

A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations. (FM 3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-9)

Counterattack

Attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost, or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-10)

Counterattack by Fire

Delay or Delay (with a specific

time)

NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02

A form of retrograde in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged. (FM 3-90) (See page A-3 for symbol.)

No symbol in ADRP 1-02 Defeat

A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use. (FM 3-90) See also decisive point; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-12)

Demonstrate

NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02

Demonstration: 1. An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. See also amphibious demonstration; diversion. 2. In military deception, a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to deceive an adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended. (JP 3-13.4) (JP 1-02, pg 88)

Destroy

Destroy is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue that individual's adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander's will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use. (FM 3-90) See also reconstitution; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-12)

Tactical Mission Tasks(2 of 8)

Graphic Task Definition

No symbol in ADRP 1-02 Disengage

A tactical mission task where a commander has his unit break contact with the enemy to allow the conduct of another mission or to avoid decisive engagement. (FM 3-90) See also decisive engagement; tactical mission task (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-13)

Disrupt

1. A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90) 2. An obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up his formation and tempo, interrupt his timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort. (FM 90-7) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-13)

Envelopment

A form of maneuver* in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives behind those defenses that allow the targeted enemy force to be destroyed in their current positions. (ADP 3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-14)

Exfiltrate

NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02

Old: (DOD) The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. See also special operations; unconventional warfare. See FM 3-90

Exploit

NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02

Exploitation: An offensive task—usually following a successful attack —designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. (ADP 3-90) See also attack; offensive operations. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-15)

Feint

NO DEFINITION IN ADRP 1-02

In military deception, an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action (JP 3-13.4) (JP 1-02, pg 115)

Tactical Mission Tasks(3 of 8)

Graphic Task Definition

Fix

A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific period. Fix is also an obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a specified area, normally an engagement area. (FM 3-90) See also block; contain; disrupt; support by fire; tactical mission task; turn. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-16)

Follow and Assume

A tactical mission task in which a second committed force follows a force conducting anoffensive operation and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attrited, or unable to continue. (FM 3-90) See also attack; fix; follow and support; offensive operations; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-16)

Follow and Support

A tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead forceconducting an offensive operation. (FM 3-90) See also direct pressure force; encircling force; exploitation; follow and assume; offensive operations; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-16)

Infiltration

A form of maneuver* in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement throughor into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires. (ADP 3-90). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-20)

Interdict

A tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route. (FM 3-90) See also delay; disrupt; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-21)

Isolate

A tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off — both physically and psychologically — an enemy from his sources of support, deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces. (FM 3-90) See also encirclement; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-22)

Tactical Mission Tasks(4 of 8)

Graphic Task Definition

Neutralize

A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable ofinterfering with a particular operation. (FM 3-90). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-26)

Occupy

A tactical mission task that involves a force moving a friendly force into an area so that it can control that area. Both the force’s movement to and occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition. (FM 3-90). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-27)

Passage of Lines (Forward /

Rearward)*

A tactical enabling operation in which one unit moves through another unit’spositions with the intent of moving into or out of enemy contact. (FM 3-90) See also forward passage of lines; rearward passage of lines. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-28)

Penetrate

A form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. (FM 3-90). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-28)

No symbol in ADRP 1-02 Reduce

1. A tactical mission task that involves the destruction of an encircled or bypassed enemy force. (FM 3-90) 2. A mobility task to create and mark lanes through, over, or around an obstacle to allow the attacking force to accomplish its mission. (ATTP 3-90.4) See also assault; bypass; destroy; neutralize; obscure; secure; suppress; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-31)

Relief in Place

An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replacedin an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned area of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered. (FM 3-90). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-31)

Retain

A tactical mission task in which the commander ensures that a terrain feature controlled by a friendly force remains free of enemy occupation or use. (FM 3-90) See also tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-32)

Tactical Mission Tasks(5 of 8)

Graphic Task Definition

Retirement

A form of retrograde in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy. (ADRP 3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-32)

Secure

A tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action. (FM 3-90) See also assault; breach; denial measure; destroy; reduce; suppress; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-33)

Security

Screen: A security task that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (FM 3-90) See also concealment; flank guard; guard; security operations; sensor; surveillance. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-33)Guard: A security task to protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and to prevent enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body. (FM 3-90) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-18)Cover: A security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (FM 3-90) See also covering force; security operations. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-10) – Should be able to operate away from the main body.

Seize

A tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area using overwhelming force. (FM 3-90) See also contain; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-33)

Support By Fire

A tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force. (FM 3-90) See also attack by fire; overwatch; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-34)

Tactical Mission Tasks(6 of 8)

AA

Graphic Task Definition

Suppress

A tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission. (FM 3-90) See also tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-35)

Turn

1. A tactical mission task that involves forcing an enemy force from one avenue of approach or mobility corridor to another. 2. A tactical obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to divert an enemy formation from one avenue of approach to an adjacent avenue of approach or into an engagement area. (FM 3-90) See also avenue of approach; tactical mission task. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-37)

Withdraw / Withdraw Under

Pressure

A planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from anenemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy. See chapter 9 of this publication. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-39)

Tactical Mission Tasks(7 of 8)

Steps to Developing ScenariosSchwartz, Peter. The Art of the Long View. (New York: Doubleday, 1991.), 226-34. // Wilkinson, Lawrence. “How to Build

Scenarios” Wired. Step

Task Detail Instruction

1 Identify Focal Issue or DecisionBegin with a specific decision or issue, then build out toward the environment. The best way to begin with important decisions that have to be made and the mind-set of the management making them. …what keeps me awake at night?

2 Key Forces in the Local Environment

List the key factors influencing the success or failure of that decision… FACTS about [customers, suppliers, competitors, etc. – Frame the Environment]

3Driving Forces1. Social Dynamics (quantitative, demographic issues; softer issues of values,

lifestyles, demand, or political energy)2. Economic Issues (macroeconomic trends and forces shaping the economy as

a whole, microeconomic dynamics, forces at work or within the company itself)3. Political Issues (electoral, legislative, regulatory, and litigative)4. Technological Issues (direct, enabling, indirect)

Once the key factors have been listed, the third step involves listing driving trends in the macro-environment that influence the key factors identified earlier. / What are the forces behind the key forces. Some are predetermined (eg. Often demographics), some highly uncertain (eg. Public opinion). This is the most research-intensive step in the process. The scenario planner is searching for the major trends and trend breaks.

4 Rank by Importance and Uncertainty

Rank key factors and driving trends based on degree of importance, and degree of uncertainty. The point is to identify the two or three factors or trends that are most important and most uncertain. [THESE BECOME THE X and Y axis – understand that some large issues may get let behind, this becomes the driving factors that frame the future scenario] – Determining these axes is among the most important step in the entire scenario generating process.

5 Selecting Scenario LogicsAxes of crucial uncertainties presented along matrix (two axes). The logic of a given scenario will be characterized by its location in the matrix of most significant scenario drivers. [PUT THE X AND Y AXIS ON MODEL]

6 Fleshing Out the ScenariosFleshing out the skeletal scenarios can be accomplished by returning to the lists of key factors and trends identified in steps two (key forces ) and three (driving forces). Each key factor and trend should be given some attention in each scenario. Then weave the pieces together in the form of a narrative

7 ImplicationsOnce scenarios have been developed, return to focal issue or decision identified in step one to rehearse the future. How does the decision look in each scenario? What vulnerabilities have been revealed? Robust across all scenarios OR only one (a high-risk gamble)?

8 Selection of Leading Indicators and Signposts

Important to know which scenario is closest to the course of history as it unfolds. Once the different scenarios have been fleshed out and their implications for the focal issue determined, then it’s worth spending time and imagination on identifying a few indicators to monitor in an ongoing way.

Evolution of Operational ART

Operations

PolicyStrategy ( Mintzberg, Dolman, Clausewitz)

Tactics

Thuc

ydid

es (P

elop

onne

sian

War

) M

elia

n D

ialo

gue

–”St

rong

Do

wha

t the

y ca

n , w

eak

suffe

r”Su

n TZ

U –

“Su

bdue

the

enem

y w

ithou

t fig

hting

”

Nap

olei

n (J

ena

Cam

paig

n 18

06 –

Cor

ps

stru

ctur

e

Amer

ican

Civ

il W

ar (V

icks

burg

) Jom

ini

influ

ence

Revo

lutio

nary

War

(Geo

rge

Was

hing

ton)

1806

1776

Mex

ican

War

(Sco

tt’s

Cam

paig

n) Jo

min

i in

fluen

ce18

47

1863

Join

t Ope

ratio

ns in

the

Phili

ppin

es (L

uzon

) Pac

ific

Cam

paig

n

Viet

nam

War

(MAC

V W

estm

orel

and)

Sovi

et O

ffens

ive

Cam

paig

n ( O

pera

tion

Bagr

ation

)19

4419

44

Kore

an W

ar (U

N o

ffens

ive

Mac

Arth

ur)

1950

1962

Phill

ippi

nes

(Cou

nter

Insu

rgen

cy)

WW

II (O

verlo

rd, C

obra

, Goo

dwoo

d)

Fran

co P

russ

ian

War

(Bis

mar

k) G

ener

al st

aff -

Mol

tke

1900

1866

Meu

se-A

rgon

ne O

ffens

ive

(WW

1 Pe

rshi

ng)

1918

1944

Cam

bodi

an C

ampa

ign

(Abr

ahm

s/…

.Vie

tana

miza

iton)

1970

Yom

Kip

pur W

ar (

Egyp

t inv

ades

Isre

al)

1973

Ope

ratio

n D

eser

t Sto

rm (S

chw

arzk

oph)

)19

90Bo

snia

n W

ar S

eige

of S

araj

evo

(Blu

e H

elm

ents

199

2-19

95) U

N19

92

Ope

ratio

n D

eser

t Sto

rm (S

chw

arzk

oph)

)19

90

Fiel

d M

arsh

al S

lim (B

urm

a Ca

mpa

ign)

1942

Snieder (Vulcan’s Anvil) Civil War: decline of the decisive battle, the emergence of the empty battlefield and the rise of distributed free maneuver. Operational art Requires Instantaneous communication – IE technology

Epstein (Napolean’s Last Victory (1809) a strategic war plan that effectively integrates the various theaters of operations; the fullest mobilization of the resources of the state. Operational Art requires Structure- IE. Modern Task Org and mobilization.

Bruce Menning- “Operational Art’s Origins” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational ArtSoviet’s and Deep Battle: Operational art required the practitioner to:- Identify strategic objectives within theater.- Visualize a theater in three dimensions.- Determine what sequence of military actions – preparation, organization, support, battles, and command arrangements – would bring attainment of those objectives

CONCRETE

COGNITIVEDolman- Pure Strategy Operational Art- Directly matches means to ends. Bruscino, Thomas: “The Theory of Operational Art and Unified Land Operations Concrete vs Ethereal- The cognitive linking of strategy and tactics. Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory Operational Art is that cognitive tension between strategic aim and tactical execution

Swain: Filling the void “The employment of military forces to achieve strategic goals in a theater of war or a theater of operations, through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” 1982 FM 100-5

Industrial Revolution

Theory

History

Policy

Herring Manifest Destiny/ Monroe Cold War/ Bipolar World _____

MCDougal Old /New Testament Containment Global Police Forces

2003

-201

3W

ar o

n Te

rror

–

Eche

varr

ia “A

mer

ica

has

two

gram

mar

s of

war

- co

nven

tiona

l / u

ncon

venti

onal

“ A

pplic

ation

of

crea

tive

imag

inati

ons

by c

omm

ande

rs a

nd st

affs-

D

esig

n st

rate

gies

, cam

paig

ns a

nd m

ajor

ope

ratio

ns

and

orga

nize

and

em

ploy

Mili

tary

For

ces-

O

pera

tiona

l Lev

el is

whe

re th

is ta

kes

plac

e (u

sual

ly

Corp

s)

Wilsonianism

1969

Crisis

SpeculativeTheory

New Paradigm

Operational Art•Filled void in US Military thought•Linked Tactical Actions to Strategic Purpose•Reestablished importance of “policy” and involvement of PMs

Swain- “Filling the Void” (T105)

Loss in Vietnam

Soviet Threat

Yom Kippur War

Military Moral Crisis

Military Downsizing

1974 1977 1981 1985

Nixon Ford Carter Reagan

Abrams (~1973)•TRADOC Est.•DePuy- “Fight Tonight”•TRADOC Focus

• Doctrine• Training• Equipping• Organization

1976 FM 100-5•Intended for Revision•Focused BN/BDE•Focused General Defensive Plan (Europe)•Graphs/Charts•Prescriptive•“Active Defense” (match strength with strength)•Revolutionary Idea (Doctrine should be followed)• Standards based

training• Training Center

1982 FM 100-5•Air-Land Battle• Close Battle (BN,

BDE, DIV)• Deep Battle

(Corps)•Principles of War•Got rid of graphs/ charts•Elements of Combat Power•Operational Level of War

1986 FM 100-5•Human Dimension of Combat (CDR’s Vision, Leadership)•Addressed Campaigns (multiple engagements)•Structure of Modern Warfare•Defined Operational Art•COG (ID, Defeat, Protect)

•Abrams•DePuy•Starry

•DePuy•Gorman•G.O. Peers

•Otis•Downing•Sinnreich

•Wass de Czege, Henriques, Holder•Rogers•Menning•SAMS (est. 1983)

•Lind•Schneider•Luttwak

Army tests principles of

100-5 and debates

Defense (Pessimism)

Offense (Initiating)

Operational Art“The employment of military forces to achieve strategic goals in a theater of war or a theater of operations, through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.”