Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45157 June 27, 1985

MELY TANGONAN, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JUDGE ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER SCHOOL OF NURSING, THELMA N. CLEMENTE, SENAMAR L. PURA

and ADELAIDA SULIT, respondents.

Genaro B. Laya for petitioner.

Lorenzo P. Miravite for private respondents.

CUEVAS, J.:

Alleging that the Hon. respondent Judge 1 acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing 2 her petition for mandamus 3 petitioner comes to Us thru the instant petition for "Certiorari with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages" 4 raising the following issues—

1. Is his Honor guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he rendered the questioned decision without any formal hearing ?

2. Is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus available to an aggrieved party who was refused enrolment without lawful ground . . . expelled by private respondents without affording her the opportunity to be heard . . . and excluded from enrolling, while allowing others similarly situated, to enroll? and

3. Finally, is the decision of the respondent court conformable to law and the evidence?

Hereunder are the pertinent antecedents.

Petitioner MelyTangonan was temporarily admitted in May 1975 at the Capitol Medical School of Nursing for the school year 1975-1976, as a second year student subject to the submission of a sealed "Honorable Dismissal" and a "Transcript of Records" valid for transfer. Her admission in said school was on probationary

basis having merely submitted an unsealed "Honorable Dismissal" and a "Transcript of Records" not valid for transfer, on her promise that such records will be immediately replaced with official acceptable records. She enrolled for two (2) semesters. In her second semester, she flunked in Psychiatric Nursing but was allowed to cross-enroll in said subject in Summer 1976 at the De Ocampo Memorial School. Obviously, petitioner had enrolment problems at the De Ocampo Memorial School for she was reported to have attempted to bribe Dean FlorenciaPagador of the said school so that her name could be included in the list of Summer 1976 enrolled students. This is confirmed by petitioner's letter of apology which reads as follows—

May 14, 1976 Mrs. FlorenciaPagador

Dean of De Ocampo Memorial School of Nursing,

Nagtahan St., Sta. Mesa Blvd. Sampaloc, Manila

Dear Ma'm:

I am awfully sorry for offering you P50,00 just to help me. I hope and pray for your forgiveness. I wish to express my sincere apology. And please allow me to get enrolled officially,

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) MISS MELY TANGONAN

On June 14, 1976, petitioner applied for re-enrolment at respondent school (Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing) but was referred to the Guidance Counsellor for the following reasons—

a. On the replacement of her admission records when she first enrolled in May 1976;

b. On the results of her cross-enrolment for summer 1976; and

c. For explanation of a reported charge (supported by a Xerox copy of her apology to Dean Pagador) of attempting to bribe Dean Pagador.

Because of her refusal and/or failure, to submit the required explanation, the matter of her re-admission was submitted to the school's Board of Admission. Deliberating on petitioner's case, the

Board of Admission, in a Meeting held on June 25, 1976, 5 made the following recommendation—

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the foregoing findings, the Board of Admission declared her an undesirable student who should not be readmitted to CMCSN but without prejudice to her being given transfer credentials to another school.

SUBMITTED BY:

(Sgd) Benita Cortez

Minutes of the Board's deliberation on the matter which brought about said recommendation runs thus—

AGENDA: Case of MelyTangonan, nursing student who is seeking re-admission to the School of Nursing.

Findings: During the deliberation of the Board, the following findings were discussed:

A. ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE I

1. Admitted to the school on probation because of a failing mark in Communicable Disease Nursing at the PCC-Mary Johnston Hospital School of Nursing. EXHIBIT A)

2. Failed in Psychiatric Nursing during the second semester of School Year 1975-1976. EXHIBIT B)

B. CLINICAL PERFORMANCE

1. Average in the clinical performance.

2. Did not complete clinical experience required in summer. Stopped reporting in the clinical area without notifying the clinical instructor or coordinator. (EXHIBIT C)

3. had frequent absences in the clinical area.

C. ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS

1. Did not seek enrolment or notify school registrar of a desire to enroll during the scheduled registration dates for seniors. Came to enroll daring the week after regular classes. (EXHIBIT D)

2. Tried to bribe Mrs. Pagador, Dean, College of Nursing, DeOcampo Memorial School with P50.00 (Fifty Pesos) when she

was not yet officially enrolled when it was already the end of summer- classes. EXHIBIT E)

3. Violated rules and regulations of the school.(EXHIBIT F)

4. Refused to write a letter to the Board of Admission requesting for re-admission and apologizing for what she did against the Doms and Dean Pagador which has brought embarrasment to CMCSN She was asked to make this letter to the Principal through a telephone instruction to Mrs. Benita Cortez. Miss Tangonan allegedly stated that she would write the letter only if she is given the assurance by the Principal or by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees that she would be allowed to enroll.

Informed of the said board's decision disallowing her re-admission, petitioner lodged a complaint against the school before the Department of Education, Regional Office No. 4. A conference was accordingly conducted between petitioner and respondent school's authorities in the presence of Regional Director Manuel in the course of which, petitioner agreed to transfer to another school. But instead of transferring to another school, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus 6 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, presided over by respondent Judge, praying that pending adjudication of the case on the merit, an ex-parte order be issued commanding respondents to admit petitioner to enroll and attend classes upon payment of the prescribed fees; and after hearing, judgment be rendered requiring respondents to pay damages and attorney's fees.

On July 27, 1977, the lower court issued the writ prayed for thereby "ordering respondents to admit petitioner on probation basis for the school year 1976-1977 upon payment of the requisite fees and to attend classes" in respondent school. 7

In their Answer 8 filed on August 5, 1976, respondents alleged among others, by way of special defenses—

That the then petition states no cause of action because of the following circumstances:

a. Petitioner in the July 2, 1976 meeting at the office of Dr. Manuel already agreed to transfer to another school and therefore without condition, foreclosed her right to enroll at respondent school;

b. There has been no demand after July 1, 1976 by petitioner directed to respondent school to admit her as required in mandamus action;

c. To the extent, allowed by regulations and considering that petitioner was not yet an enrolled student, and hence the school had no jurisdiction vet to conduct any formal investigation and compel her presence therein, petitioner was given all the opportunity as early as June 14, 1976 to explain her side which privilege she however refused to take advantage of, by being adamant in submitting any explanation, oral or in writing to certain offenses made known to her, after having been compelled continuously to do so at several levels by respondents.

That it is within the prerogative of private schools to deny admission of students for scholastic insufficiency, incomplete scholastic records and commission of an offense, like attempt to bribe, violating school regulations.

The issues having been joined, the case was calendared for pre-trial on September 22, 1976. The parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs. 9 A second pre-trial conference was held on October 7, 1976 on which date, the court a quo issued the following Order 10 —

This is a second pre-trial conference of this case attended by the parties and their respective counsel.

Considering that this is a petition for mandamus so that the issue is limited to one of law, which is the question of whether respondent school had any legal ground for refusing the petitioner, Mely 'Tangonan, and therefore there is no factual issue involved, the parties are directed to submit to this Court not later than October 18, 1976, their respective affidavits and other pertinent documents they may wish to submit, in addition to what already appears on record, 'This is however, without prejudice to the continuous effort of both parties to settle this case. In this connection, the respondents have undertaken to persuade some other nursing schools in Metro Manila to admit the petitioner. If the plaintiff should agree to such admission to some other school, then this Court will dismiss this case if appropriate manifestations are made prior to October 22, 1976, otherwise, the Court will decide the case on the merits before October 22, 1976.

On October 8, 1976, respondents submitted a MANIFESTATION 11 stating therein that upon representations of respondent Dra. Thelma Clemente, President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of respondent school, the College of Nursing of the Ortañez University was willing to accept petitioner for enrolment therein, subject to the approval of the Department of Education and Culture.

On October 18, 1976, petitioner and respondents submitted their respective memoranda. 12

To the manifestation of respondent Thelma Clemente that Ortañezuniversity was willing to admit petitioner, the latter counter-manifested 13 that "in view of certain policies and requirements of Ortañez University she has no recourse but to demand her admission in Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing.

On October 22, 1976, the lower court rendered its decision 14 dismissing the petition and dissolving the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction earlier issued. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 15 having been denied, 16 she now comes before Us through the instant petition with the prayers aforesaid.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Petitioner's case in the court below is that of mandamus, to compel respondent to admit petitioner in its School of Nursing. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 17

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused of a ministerial duly, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, 18 nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. 19

On the part of the party petitioner, 20 it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. If the writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which it is not his duty to do or to which it is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a

command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. 21

In the case at bar, the petitioner has miserably failed to show a clear legal right to be admitted and be enrolled in respondent's School of Nursing. As correctly held by the court a quo—

Moreover assuming that respondent has a leal duty to enroll petitioner, it does not appear to this Court that this is merely a ministerial duty; it is rather a duty involving the exercise of discretion. Every school has a right to determine who are the students it should accept for enrolment. It has the right to judge the fitness of students This is particularly true in the case of nursing students who perform essential health services. Over and above its responsibility to petitioner is the responsibility of the school to the general public and the community. This Court take judicial notice that nursing has become a popular course because of the great demand for Filipino Nurses abroad, especially in the United States. It is essential therefore that Nursing graduates who go abroad and become in a sense our own ambassador should be highly qualified to perform their tasks. This is the responsibility of our school and in the discharge of this responsibility, they certainly should be given the greatest latitude in formulating their admission policies.

While petitioner questions the findings of respondent school as to her academic competence, the Court cannot find any legal jurisdiction to interfere in the exercise of judgment of the school on this matter. The Court finds it significant that even the Department of Education and Culture refused to intervene in this case although the Court qqqinits Order of July 6, 1976 invited the Department to send its legal officer as earlier mentioned, it is not disputed that petitioner agreed to transfer to another school during a conference held at the Department.

The Court, after weighing all the facts, does not find that the p resent case is one that calls for the application of Article 26 of the Declaration of Human Rights. She is not being prevented from completing her Nursing course. There are many nursing schools in Metropolitan Manila where she can finish her course. But she must enroll under the term, policies and conditions imposed by the schools, rather than on her own terms. She is moreover free to enroll in any of these schools. Respondent has not prevented her from doing so, and has offered to assist in such transfer.

On the contrary, respondent School appeared perfectly justified in refusing to admit petitioner in its School of Nursing. Its refusal is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual Regulations for

Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrolment of a student. It is incontrovertible that petitioner flunked in Psychiatric Nursing and that as of June 14, 1976, no official report of grades for her summer course in the said subject was or could be submitted by her, Likewise, undisputed, (in fact admitted in her letter of apology earlier quoted) is her involvement in an attempt to bribe the dean of the De Ocampo School of Nursing. She was admitted in respondent's school merely on probation because she could not submit a sealed "Honorable Dismissal" and "Transcript of Records" valid for transfer. On top of that she had a failing grade in Communicable Disease Nursing at the PCC-Mary Johnston Hospital School of Nursing. Her records in respondent's school also show that she did not complete the prescribed clinical experience required in summer. She stopped reporting in the clinical area without notifying the clinical instructor or coordinator. 22

The foregoing notwithstanding, still petitioner would want Us to compel respondent school to enroll her despite her failure to meet the standard policies and qualifications set by the school. To grant such relief would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the respondent school enshrined under Article XV, Section 8, Par. 2 of our Constitution which mandates "that all institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." This institutional academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them—the grant being to institutions of higher learning—free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent. 23

Elaborating further on the subject, this Court speaking thru that Eminent Constitutionalist then Mr. Justice now the Hon. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando 24 held—

Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further studies in the Loyola School of Theology. For respondent has no clear duly to admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is

admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations. No authorities were cited, respondent apparently being of the view that the law has not reached the stage when the matter of admission to an institution of higher learning rests on the sole and uncontrolled discretion of the applicant. There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of the petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding. (Emphasis supplied)

Anent petitioner's submittal that respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring the parties to submit memoranda or affidavits, instead of setting the case for a formal hearing on the merits—We find the same to be without merit. The very nature of the petition dictates its expeditious determination. This is implicit from Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 7. Expediting Proceedings; Preliminary Injunction.—The court in which the petition is filed, or a judge thereof, may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant a preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

In the case at bar, it was evident that on the basis of the pleadings filed, the case did not call for the formal presentation of evidence for purposes of determining whether or not respondent school could legally be ordered to admit petitioner for the school year 1976-1977. Petitioner's position appeared clearly stated in her basic petition which was further amplified by her verified Position Paper dated July 8, 1976: REPLY to the position paper of respondents dates July 23, 1976, petitioner's Trial Brief dated September 9, 1976 and Memorandum dated October 18, 1976. Upon the other hand, respondents' stance appeared thoroughly spelled out in their position paper dated July 21, 1976, Answer dated August 5, 1976, respondent's Pre-Trial Brief dated September 20, 1976, Manifestation dated October 8, 1976 and Memorandum dated October 18, 1976. Moreover, in the second pre-trial conference held on October 7, 1976, the lower court declared that "the issue is one of law and that there is no factual

issue involved. Hence, the parties were already required to submit their memoranda and the pertinent documents in support of their respective stand. Petitioner did not question the aforesaid order. Instead, she filed her memorandum. Consequently, she is now estopped from asserting that she was denied the chance to present her evidence in a formal hearing.

At any rate, as discussed earlier, petitioner is not legally entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Tangonan v. Cruz Pano

137 SCRA 245 (1985)

Facts: Petitioner brought suit for mandamus to compel the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing to admit her for the academic year 1976-1977. She had been previously provisionally admitted the previous school year, but she failed in Psychiatric Nursing. She tried to take the course again in another school, but she was refused admission because she tried to bribe the dean of the school. When she tried to re-enroll at the Capitol Medical Center, she was denied admission. She brought the matter on certiorari.

Issue: WON the school can be compelled by the court to re-admit petitioner. NO.

Held: Any duty on the part of the school to enroll pet.is not merely a ministerial duty but one w/c involves the exercise of discretion not compellable by Mandamus. Capitol was perfectly justified in refusing to admit her, its refusal (being) sanctioned by the Manual of Regulations of Priv. Schools w/c considers academic delinquency & violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing enrollment of a student. Adapted. Further, to grant relief to pet. would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by Capitol enshrined under Act. XV sec. 8 (2) Consti. Academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish & teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by w/c truths and conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to decide for itself how best to attain them - the grant being to institutions of higher learning - free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the over-riding public

welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide spread of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No.76353 September 29,1989

SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU, BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA. REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC, JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHEILA DINOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ANNALIZA EVIDENTE, FRANCIS FERNANDO, ZENNY GUDITO, EDGAR LIBERATO, JULIET LIPORADA, GABRIEL MONDRAGON, JOSE MARIA PACKING, DOMINIC PETILLA, MA. SHALINA PITOY, SEVERINO RAMOS, VICTOR SANTIAGO, CAROLINA SARMIENTO, FERDINAND TORRES, RICARDO VENTIGAN and other students of the PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (Q.C.) similarly situated, petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of PSBA, ATTY. BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, in his capacity as Vice- President for Admission and Registration, MR. RUBEN ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, MR. RAMON AGAPAY, in his capacity as Director of the Office of Student Affairs and MR. ROMEO RAFER, in his capacity as Chief Security of PSBA, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PARAS, J.:

On May 2, 1988, this Court through its Second Division rendered a Decision in the instant case which prodded the Intervenor Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union) to file a motion for reconsideration. Its argument hinges on the pronouncement that —

x xx. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers are for one semester. It is

thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with intervening teachers. Such being the case, charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. x xx (p. 12, Decision, italics supplied).(p. 874-875, Rollo)

with the allegedly inevitable consequence of extenuating the pernicious practice of management to arbitrarily and wantonly terminate teachers simply because their contracts of employment have already lapsed.

The motion likewise points out the fact that two of the faculty members, namely Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo, and Mr. Rene Encarnacion, supposedly found guilty by the Investigating Committee headed by Mr. Antonio M. Magtalas (p. 342, Rollo), had been issued permanent appointments (not mere temporary contracts) by no less than the President of the School himself. The appointment of Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo dated August 9, 1986 (p. 887, Rollo) can attest to this claim.

It is on the basis of the foregoing that We hereby amend Our previous statements on the matter.

In a recent Decision, 1 this Court had the opportunity to quite emphatically enunciate the precept that full-time teachers who have rendered three (3) years of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent (par. 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). Thus, having attained a permanent status, they cannot be removed from office except for just cause and after due process.

Now applying the same principle in the case at bar, Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo having stayed in the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA, for brevity) for three and one-half (3 1/2) years (in a full-time capacity) may be deemed a permanent faculty member provided, of course, the services rendered have been satisfactory to the school. However, because the investigation showed that Mr. Tamayo had participated in the unlawful demonstration, his services cannot be deemed satisfactory.

In the case of Mr. Rene Encarnacion, and Mr. Severino Cortes, Jr. who taught in PSBA for two and one-half (2 1/2) years and one and one-half (1 1/2) years respectively, to them a permanent status cannot be accorded for failure to meet the minimum requirement of three (3) years set by the aforementioned Manual of Regulations. Of equal importance, at this point, is the fact that the letter of appointment had been extended only to Mr. Tamayo and not to Mr. Encarnacion, neither to Mr. Cortes, Jr.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons adverted to hereinabove, the motion for reconsideration, except insofar as We have made the aforementioned clarificatory statements about the tenure of full-time teachers and professors, is hereby DENIED.

In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete their education in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of speech and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom into degenerate license.

SO ORDERED.

Alcuaz vs. PSBA, QC Branch

VOL. 161 7No. L-76353 , MAY 2, 1988

FACTS:Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City. The students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school.

On the exercise of student’s democratic rights, it has been agreed that protest actions can be conducted any day as long as they meet the following requirements: a) that they be held at the PSBA quadrangle from 12:30 pm to 1:00 pm only; b) that the protest action be removed to the PSBA parking lot if it will exceed the 1:00 time limit; c) that if the protest move exceeds 1:00 it will be limited only up to 2:30 pm; d) However, before any action is taken the organizers of the protest action should secure a permit 6 days before, or if on the same day, it still be under the first-come-first-served‟ basis in the use of facilities, volume of sound system shall be adjusted so as not to disturb classes.“It is the firm stand of the administration of PSBA that it will not allow the students to directly participate in the policy-making body of the school. In spite of the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues and demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. During the regular enrolment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986 – 1987 which prompted the President of the Student Council to file a

complaint with the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrolment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who have been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors-teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as “anarchic” rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly?

HELD: No. It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester, It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual that the “written contracts” required for college teachers are for “one semester.” It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. The petition is hereby DISMISSED

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 88386 August 17, 1989

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE UP BOARD OF REGENTS AND DEAN PATRICIO LAZARO, petitioners, vs.HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Br. VI, RTC-BAGUIO CITY, AND UP COLLEGE BAGUIO HIGH SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, SALVADOR VALDEZ, JR., respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking to annul the Orders of respondent Judge dated May 25, 1989 and June 14, 1989 in Civil Case No. 1748-R entitled, "UP College Baguio High School Foundation, Inc., et al,, v. The University of the Philippines, et al.," restraining petitioners from implementing the decision of the Board of Regents to phase out the UP College Baguio High School

(UPCBHS) and the Memorandum of petitioner Dean Patricio Lazaro directing the principal of UPCBHS not to accept new incoming freshmen for the school year 1989-1990.

Sometime in 1972, the UP Board of Regents approved the establishment of UPCBHS as an integral part of the graduate program in education to serve, among others, as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers. Provided, however, that UPCBHS must be self-supporting and should not entail any subsidy from the budget of the UP.

In 1978, the Board of Regents provided for the establishment of a Division of Education in UP College Baguio (UPCB) which shall be composed of a Department of Professional Education and a High School Department. However, the Department of Professional Education was never organized, although the High School Department has been in continuous operation.

In 1981, the Committee to Review Academic Program recommended the abolition of the UPCBHS. In 1985, the Program Review Committee likewise asked the UPCB to look into the viability of its secondary education program on account of limited financial resources plus the fact that UPCBHS failed to serve as a laboratory school for teacher training program as UPCB does not offer programs in Education. Subsequently, various discussions were held on the proposed phase-out of the UPCBHS.

On January 30,1989, the UP Board of Regents approved the proposed phase-out of UPCBHS on the grounds, inter alia, that only an insignificant number of UPCBHS graduates qualified for admission and actually enrolled in UPCB and that UPCBHS is not serving as a laboratory or demonstration school for prospective teachers much less a self-supporting unit. Subsequently, petitioner Dean Patricio Lazaro issued a memorandum directing the UPCBHS Principal not to accept new incoming high school freshmen for the school year 1989- 1990.

On May 25,1989, respondent UP College Baguio High School Foundation Inc., represented by its president, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Br. VI, presided by respondent Judge against herein petitioners, for Injunction with preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 1748-R, alleging among others, that the decision of the UP Board of Regents to phase out the UPCBHS is without legal basis and unconstitutional.

Thereafter, respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders restraining petitioners from implementing the Board's decision to phase out UPCBHS and the memorandum of Dean Patricio Lazaro. Petitioners' motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 1748-R was denied by respondent Judge.

Hence, this petition.

On June 27,1989, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the implementation of the assailed orders of respondent Judge.

Petitioners contend, among other things, that the decision of the UP Board of Regents to phase out the UPCBHS is an exercise of academic freedom guaranteed by the Constitution (Art. XIV, Sec. 5, par. 2).lâwphî1.ñèt

Respondents, on the other hand, take issue not with the exercise of academic freedom but rather on the right to quality education (Art. XIV, Sec. 1) and free public secondary education (Art. XIV, Sec. 2, par. 2) mandated by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 6655, otherwise known as "Free Public Secondary Education Act of 1988." Respondents ' contend that the abolition of the UPCBHS would be violative of said rights.

The conflict of the present petition pits the concept of academic freedom as against the right to free public secondary education. Art. XIV, Section 2, [2] of the Constitution, provides: "The State shall establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the right of natural parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age." On the other hand, Art. XIV, Section 5 [2], provides: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."

Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning such as the University of the Philippines?

We rule in the negative.

It is beyond cavil that the UP, as an institution of higher learning, enjoys academic freedom—the institutional kind.

In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology (68 SCRA 277 [1975]), the Court had occasion to note the scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution as follows:

(I)t is to be noted that the reference is to the 'institutions of higher learning' as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be

construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent.

xxxxxxxxx

It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedom of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study"' (Emphasis supplied; citing Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 491, (1962) and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (354 US 234 [1957]).

Rep. Act No. 6655, otherwise known as the "Free Public Secondary Education Act of 1988," includes in its coverage state colleges and universities (SCUs) offering secondary courses. Respondents cointend that since a secondary course is being offered in UPCB, petitioners cannot unilaterally withdraw therefrom, otherwise, the said Act would be nothing but a mere nullity for all other SCUs. Besides, respondents contend, petitioners already recognized the applicability of Rep. Act No. 6655 when they implemented the same at the UPCBHS for School Year 1988-89 and petitioners' assertion that UPCBHS was established only if it would be "self-supporting and should not entail any subsidy from the budget of UP" is but a lame excuse.

At this juncture, it must be pointed out that UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities, e.g., it must be self-supporting, it can serve as a feeder for the UP at Baguio, it can serve as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers, failing in which the University can order its abolition on academic grounds, specially where the purposes for which it was established was not satisfied.

Specifically, the University of the Philippines was created under its Charter (Act No. 1870 [1908], as amended) to provide advanced tertiary education and not secondary education. Section 2 of said Act states that "the purpose of said University shall be to provide advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to give professional and technical training."

It is apparent that secondary education is not the mandated function of the University of the Philippines; consequently, the latter can validly phase out and/or abolish the UPCBHS especially so when the requirements for its continuance have not been met, Rep. Act No. 6655 to the contrary notwithstanding. The findings of facts by the Board of Regents which led to its decision to phase out the UPCBHS must be accorded respect, if not finality. Acts of an administrative agency within their areas of competence must be casually overturned by the courts. It must be emphasized that UPCBHS was established as a component of the tertiary level, i.e.,

the teacher/training program. As it turned out however, the latter program was not viable in UPCB thereby necessitating the phasing out of UPCBHS, the rationale being its reasons for existence no longer exists. On this score, UPCBHS differs from the other UP high schools in Iloilo, Diliman, Cebu and Los Bañ;os. The latter schools serve as laboratory schools for the College of Education in said areas, whereas, in Baguio, there is no College of Education.

A careful perusal of Rep. Act No. 6655 could not lend respondents a helping hand either. Said Act implements the policy of the State to provide free public secondary education (Sec. 4) and vests the formulation of a secondary public education curriculum (Sec. 5), the nationalization of public secondary schools (Sec. 7) and the implementation of the rules and regulations thereof (Sec. 9) upon the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).lâwphî1.ñèt Rep. Act No. 6655 complements Sec. 2 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates that the State shall establish and maintain a system of free public secondary education. However, this mandate is not directed to institutions of higher learning like UP but to the government through the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). As an institution of higher learning enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide for secondary education. However, should UP operate a high school in the exercise of its academic freedom, Rep. Act No. 6655 requires that the students enrolled therein "shall be free from payment of tuition and other school fees.

In view of the foregoing, respondents do not have a clear legal right to UP secondary education.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to Grant the petition. The assailed Orders of respondent Judge dated May 25, 1989 and June 14, 1989 are hereby Set Aside and respondent Judge is ordered to Dismiss Civil Case No. 1748-R. Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports is requested to make arrangements with the other high schools in Baguio City for purposes of accommodating the students herein affected. The temporary restraining order issued is made permanent.

UP v. AYSON

GR No. 88386, August 17, 1989

FACTS: Sometime in 1972, the UP Board of Regents approved the

establishment of UPCBHS as an integral part of the graduate

program in education to serve, among others, as a laboratory and

demonstration school for prospective teachers. Provided,

however, that UPCBHS must be self-supporting and should not

entail any subsidy from the budget of the UP.

On January 30, 1989, the UP Board of Regents, acting of the

proposal of the Committee to Review Academic Program,

approved the proposed phase-out of UPCBHS on the grounds,

inter alia, that only an insignificant number of UPCBHS graduates

qualified for admission and actually enrolled in UPCB and that

UPCBHS is not serving as a laboratory or demonstration school for

prospective teachers much less a self-supporting unit.

Subsequently, petitioner Dean Patricio Lazaro issued a

memorandum directing the UPCBHS Principal not to accept new

incoming high school freshmen for the school year 1989-1990.

ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an institution

of higher learning such as the University of the Philippines?

HELD: We rule in the negative. The University of the Philippines

was created under its Charter (Act No. 1870 [1908], as amended)

to provide advanced tertiary education and not secondary

education. Section 2 of said Act states that “the purpose of said

University shall be to provide advanced instruction in literature,

philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to give professional and

technical training. ”It is apparent that secondary education is not

the mandated function of the University of the Philippines;

consequently, the latter can validly phase out and/or abolish the

UPCBHS especially so when the requirements for its continuance

have not been met. As an institution of higher learning enjoying

academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide for

secondary education. However, should UP operate a high school

in the exercise of its academic freedom, Rep. Act No. 6655

requires that the students enrolled therein “shall be free from

payment of tuition and other school fees.”

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents., petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is

impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation

and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation

to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parenspatriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask

this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parenspatriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

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After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner WilfridoVillacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost

implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful

ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable

and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even

invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as

amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No.L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save

in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Oposa v. Factoran

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

Facts: The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the “greenhouse effect”.

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

Issue: Whether petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth

Held: Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,

for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

G.R. Nos. 171947-48

METROPOLITAN MANILADEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAND NATURAL RESOURCES,DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,DEPARTMENT OF PUBLICWORKS AND HIGHWAYS,DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET ANDMANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINECOAST GUARD, PHILIPPINENATIONAL POLICE MARITIMEGROUP, and DEPARTMENT OFTHE INTERIOR AND LOCALGOVERNMENT,Petitioners,

- versus -

CONCERNED RESIDENTS OFMANILA BAY, represented andjoined by DIVINA V. ILAS,SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAHDELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNISQUINTERO, MA. VICTORIALLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICESEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, andJAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The need to address environmental pollution, as a

cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the

international community. Media have finally trained their sights

on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other

critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of

garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental

destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no

longer simply heals by itself.[2] But amidst hard evidence and clear

signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of

cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their

officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct

statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the

first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas

polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their

official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry

the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to

be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not

mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad

commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud

historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many

decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation

activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly

because of the abject official indifference of people and

institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents

Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several

government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the

cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled

to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC,

the complaint alleged that the water quality of

the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set

by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the

Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the

complaint stated, stemmed from: x xx [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the

continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of

the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);(8) Executive Order No. 192;(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners

be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a

concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht

Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T.

Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section,

Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment

and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated

that water samples collected from different beaches around the

Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content

ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml

when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a

safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational

activities, or the “SB” level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.

[4]

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and

Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners,

testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along

the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For

its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of

its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being

conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and

its LinisDagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes

accumulated or washed to shore.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up

and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a

Decision[5] in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or

adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs. SO ORDERED.

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA

filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal

which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV

No. 76528.

On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and

Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

(MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police

(PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and

agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under

Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the

said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated

appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

74944.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the

main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD

1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents

and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising

concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning

purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of

the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by

mandamus.

The CA Sustained the RTC

By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’

appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that

the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks

outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.[7]

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of

their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and supporting

arguments:

THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.

ARGUMENTS

I

[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL

II

THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of

PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water

Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or

are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution

incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by

mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the ManilaBay?

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties

on oral arguments.

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of

mandamus under the premises.

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila BayCan be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of

a ministerial duty.[8] A ministerial duty is one that “requires

neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.” [9] It

connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the

person executing it. It is a “simple, definite duty arising under

conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by

law.”[10] Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused,

on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of

judgment or discretion one way or the other.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take

measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal

systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of

judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that

the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions,

including choosing where a landfill should be located by

undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which

entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory

command is clear and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and

act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require

the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners,

the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to

choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which

discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token,

respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on

whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste

disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to

attend to such services.

We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to

perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how

they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different

concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated

tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of

the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is

ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We

said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court

directed the City ofManila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial

duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil

players to cease and desist from operating their business in the

so-called “Pandacan Terminals” within six months from the

effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the

instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and

appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as

well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial,

its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this

regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924

creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope

of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include: Solid waste disposal and

management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include theestablishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of

the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which

prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary

landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating

requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the

operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs.

36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local

government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law

on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for

solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the

use of controlled dumps.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal,

as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code

(PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of

putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be

characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion

presupposes the power or right given by law to public

functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or

conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that “allows a person to

exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to

perform.”[14] Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option

whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties

ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like

enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion:

these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory

obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or

indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and

preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing

not to perform these duties. Consider:

(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, [15] is the

primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,

development, and proper use of the country’s environment and

natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of

2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the

primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and

implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water

quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the

Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction “over all aspects of water

pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity,

causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution,

and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies,

to prevent and abate such pollution.”

The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a

National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water

Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality

Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope

covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275

provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary

government agency responsible for the implementation and

enforcement of this Act x xx unless otherwise provided herein. As

such, it shall have the following functions, powers and

responsibilities: a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;

b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the completion of the status report;

c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period

2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the preparation

of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.

[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final

Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.[17] Again, like the

MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks

assigned to it under RA 9275.

Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR

Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in

partnership with various government agencies and non-

government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005,

the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated

budget and time frame, denominated asOperation Plan for the

Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration,

and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the

implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod

the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them

under existing laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested

with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and

sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the

cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal

and Cavite, and charged with the duty:(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x xx

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of

supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe

the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of

these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water

standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct,

operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection,

treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water.

Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the

DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities,

inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection,

treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of

the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is

mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in

Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent

pollution in theManila Bay.

(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the

Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),[20] is designated as the

agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances

respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural

and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine

Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local

government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge

of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to

ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters

are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.

[21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating

with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality

standards in marine waters.[22] More specifically, its Bureau of

Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA

9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control

of water pollution for the development, management, and

conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of

the national government, is tasked under EO 292[23] to provide

integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among

others, flood control and water resource development systems in

accordance with national development objectives and approved

government plans and specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec.

3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to “flood

control and sewerage management which include the formulation

and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects

for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system.”

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered

into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made

the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro

Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the

implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of

the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall

include the removal of structures, constructions, and

encroachments built along rivers, waterways,

and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and

other pertinent laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the

Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979, [24] or the

Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary

responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing

marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It

shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with

the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution

Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the

effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall,

under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:

a. discharge, dump x xx harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;

b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and

c. deposit x xx material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.

(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior

and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law

on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to

“perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters

and rivers.” Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the

PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the

capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime

Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform

the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and

PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the

enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine

pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was

made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code

of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were

authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and

regulations.[25]

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated “to

establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized

national port system in support of trade and national

development.”[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the

PPA has police authority within the ports administered by it as

may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain

its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of

the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law

enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall

include the following:x xxx

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft.[27]

Lastly, as a member of the International Marine

Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for

the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL

73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the

provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals

for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine

ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are

necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and

liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into

the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and

apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at

ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP

Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up

and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid

disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal

systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and

enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary

include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.[29]

Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA

9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in

public places, such as roads, canals oresteros, open burning of

solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping,

burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in

flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as

enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management

facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of

1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed “when

persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad

tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and

other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and

playgrounds.” The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with

the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and

remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments

built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the

rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to

rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga,

Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or

eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the

concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of

such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in

violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination

with the DPWH and concerned agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76

of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and

regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that

affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or

municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in

coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned

agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the

collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the

establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment

system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities,

septageor a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be

employed.

In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of

Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of

its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the

regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by

private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the

requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of

sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies

are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the

Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate

subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all

levels.[32] Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration

with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine

Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide

educational campaign to promote the development,

management, conservation, and proper use of the

environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act

(RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the

integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all

levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.[33]

(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is

tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987

to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds

and revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s

development objectives.[

One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in

RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law

stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in

a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival

of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also

provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to

streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control,

and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of

water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of

appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for

the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national

program of water quality management that recognizes that issues

related to this management cannot be separated from concerns

about water sources and ecological protection, water supply,

public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive

management program for water pollution focusing on pollution

prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate

budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the

country’s development objectives.

All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in

themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the

obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the

law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the

cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the

Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in

general, not just specific pollution incidents?

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on

the subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart

provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of

PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x xx. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the

Environment Code is more apparent than real since the

amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists

in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup

operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20

of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the

matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to

cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have

to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which

defines the terms “cleanup operations” and “accidental spills,” as

follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152

merely direct the government agencies concerned to undertake

containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific

polluted portion or portions of the body of water

concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is

limited only to “water pollution incidents,” which are situations

that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution

events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and

cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that

the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires “cleanup operations” to

restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that

there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or

accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as

mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners

erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20

to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for

accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture,

respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the

coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec.

62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution

accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses

around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly

accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that

Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even

enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental

spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec.

17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental

issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their respective

mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality

of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners

are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD

1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase “cleanup

operations” embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such

limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases “cleanup

operations” and “accidental spills” do not appear in said Sec. 17,

not even in the chapter where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in

any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to

confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning

operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the

contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a

specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has

deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its

best usage.” This section, to stress, commands concerned

government agencies, when appropriate, “to take such measures

as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality

standards.” In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of

water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution

incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as

couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific

situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to

clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the

concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup

work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they

have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when

there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not

undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is

quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of

the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of

the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution

incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly

invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275

on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the

happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the

CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD

1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote:

“PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of

environmental protection and management. This is better served

by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting

them to specific pollution incidents.”[35]

Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-

vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have

overlooked the fact that the pollution of theManila Bay is of such

magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the

line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such

impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty

who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions

“water pollution incidents” which may be caused by polluters in

the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining

lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay.

Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to “any

person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies,” which

may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the

land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the

contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the

water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless

and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as

beyond the specific pollution incident level.

Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government

agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost

impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of

the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the

apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few

and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to

contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In

this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and

undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275,

previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes

a general cleanup situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an

aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The

preservation of the water quality of the bay after the

rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is

imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the

rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from

reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would

just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all,

the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the

ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other

relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the

petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices

under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to

perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up

the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal

level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing

mandamus,”[36] the Court may, under extraordinary

circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring

that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative

inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing

mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up

the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal

pollution.[37]

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties

and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks

along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital

Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-

Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-

Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus

(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and

connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge

their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage,

into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is

one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems

and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on

top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized

structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then

practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water

would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38]

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these

illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code, [39] which

prohibits the building of structures within a given length along

banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other

industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of

the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting

waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized

constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly

contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The

DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see

to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a

reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities

and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including

their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other

major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-

complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer

their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the

need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks,

we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the

garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are

embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the

garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is

shocking. Some highlights of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.

2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems andManila Bay.[40]

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should

now more than ever be established as prescribed by the

Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note

should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and

possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:

Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no

controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the

adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February

21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which

strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has

yet been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations

of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in

roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open

dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge

companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply

discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that

ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec.

27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies,

groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels,

and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage

or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes

the introduction by human or machine of substances to the

aquatic environment including “dumping/disposal of waste and

other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products

of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other]

radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid

substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-

made structure.”

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation,

the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all

concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately

act and discharge their respective official duties and

obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need

to set timetables for the performance and completion of the

tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of

their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource,

playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-

emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore

theManila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants

and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks

ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if

those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-

minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take

responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has

to take the lead in the preservation and protection of

the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad

hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations,

real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at

hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that

different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk

from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in

cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed

by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there

ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required

to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to

radically transform and improve waste management. It

implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which

explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the

right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord

with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated

that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even

be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and

political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the

inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental

importance with intergenerational implications.[41] Even assuming

the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding

petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women

representing them cannot escape their obligation to future

generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of

the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything

less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28,

2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No.

74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil

Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in

view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the

case. The falloof the RTC Decision shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the

primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,

development, and proper use of the country’s environment and

natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR

as the primary government agency responsible for its

enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully

implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal

Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of

the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call

regular coordination meetings with concerned government

departments and agencies to ensure the successful

implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with

its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the

Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government

Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of

general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in

establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the

Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in

Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and

Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and

private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their

respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the

Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las

Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers,

the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay

(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and

other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water

into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine

whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic

septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules

and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to

require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said

facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent

industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing

into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under

pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, [43] the MWSS is

directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary

adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal,

and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the

local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered

to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation

facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and

disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,

Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible

time.

(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR,

is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of

the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro

Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in

developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic

resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and

the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124

of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall

apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other

existing laws and regulations designed to prevent

marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is

ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the

discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-

generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked

at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs

and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in

Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected

LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development

Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall

dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other

encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and

other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,

the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-

Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways

and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal

implementor of programs and projects for flood control services

in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan,

Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,

affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned

government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,

constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA

7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-

Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus

(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting

waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the

Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and

maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a

period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters

within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the

discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and

like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and

filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the

respective penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the

Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8

of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision,

determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the

proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and

sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the

companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time

within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of

cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550,

and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall integrate lessons on

pollution prevention, waste management, environmental

protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to

inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them,

their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward

achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in

the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate

budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding

years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration,

and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line

with the country’s development objective to attain economic

growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,

and revival of our marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd,

DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also

of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of “continuing

mandamus,” shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to

the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities

undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.

Facts:On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

Issues:

a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.

b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:Regional Trial Court’s Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the complaint, the Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.

To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular: Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing

debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.

The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTC’s Decision

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be

written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.

TANADA v. ANGARA

272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts :This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the

country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pactasuntservanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

TAÑADA vs. ANGARA

[272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997]

Facts: Petitioner sought to have the agreement to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) declared unconstitutional on the grounds that: “(1) that the WTO requires the Philippines .to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products. and (2) that the WTO .intrudes, limits and/or impairs. the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to .develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods..”

Issues: Whether or not the petition presents a justiciable controversy or involves a political question.

Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement contravene Sec. 19, Art II and Secs.10 and 12, Art.XII, of the Philippine Constitution.

Whether or not the Provisions unduly impair or interfere with Legislative Power.

Whether or not the Provisions unduly impair or interfere with Judicial Power.

Whether or not the Concurrence of the Senate with the WTO Agreement and its Annexes sufficient and/or valid.

Held:Justiciable Controversy

There is a justiciable controversy. A part of the Court.s decision reads:

“We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government.s economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty “to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.”

Contravention of the Constitution

The Court held that there was no contravention of the Constitution since Art. II or the Declaration of Principles and State Policies is not self-executory. Secs.10 and 12, Art. XII, on the other hand, the Court said:

Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:

Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding

productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . .

xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

The Court further stated that the WTO comes with safeguards to protect weaker economies and that the Constitution does not rule out foreign competition

The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The court held that:

The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations.”

The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

A portion of the decision reads:

By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue — derogation of legislative power — will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.

So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.

Validity of the Concurrence of the Senate with the WTO Agreement and its Annexes

Excerpts from the decision read:

Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services — is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.

“A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference.” It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the “Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations” is contained in just one page in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:

(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.

The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet “to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.” [Footnotes Omitted]

Disposition: Petition was denied.

Memorandum of Ambassador Lilia Bautista Ambassador Bautista submitted a memorandum as amicus curiae which contained a chronology of the GATT reproduced as follows:

1947 The birth of GATT. On 30 October 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed by 23 nations at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The Agreement contained tariff concessions agreed to in the first multilateral trade negotiations and a set of rules designed to prevent these concessions from being frustrated by restrictive trade measures.

The 23 founding contracting parties were members of the Preparatory Committee established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946 to draft the charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was envisaged as the final leg of a triad of post-War economic agencies (the other two were the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction — later the World Bank).

In parallel with this task, the Committee members decided to negotiate tariff concessions among themselves. From April to October 1947, the participants completed some 123 negotiations and established 20 schedules containing the tariff reductions and bindings which became an integral part of GATT. These schedules resulting from the first Round covered some 45,000 tariff concessions and about $10 billion in trade.

GATT was conceived as an interim measure that put into effect the commercial-policy provisions of the ITO. In November, delegations from 56 countries met in Havana, Cuba, to consider the to ITO draft as a whole. After long and difficult negotiations, some 53 countries signed the Final Act authenticating the text of the Havana Charter in March 1948. There was no commitment, however, from governments to ratification and, in the end, the ITO was stillborn, leaving GATT as the only international instrument governing the conduct of world trade.

1948 Entry into force. On 1 January 1948, GATT entered into force. The 23 founding members were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil,

Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States. The first Session of the Contracting Parties was held from February to March in Havana, Cuba. The secretariat of the Interim Commission for the ITO, which served as the ad hoc secretariat of GATT, moved from Lake Placid, New York, to Geneva. The Contracting Parties held their second session in Geneva from August to September.

1949 Second Round at Annecy. During the second Round of trade negotiations, held from April to August at Annecy, France, the contracting parties exchanged some 5,000 tariff concessions. At their third Session, they also dealt with the accession of ten more countries.

1950 Third Round at Torquay. From September 1950 to April 1951, the contracting parties exchanged some 8,700 tariff concessions in the English town, yielding tariff reduction of about 25 per cent in relation to the 1948 level. Four more countries acceded to GATT. During the fifth Session of the Contracting Parties, the United States indicated that the ITO Charter would not be re-submitted to the US Congress; this, in effect, meant that ITO would not come into operation.

1956 Fourth Round at Geneva. The fourth Round was completed in May and produced some $2.5 billion worth of tariff reductions. At the beginning of the year, the GATT commercial policy course for officials of developing countries was inaugurated.

1958 The Haberler Report. GATT published Trends in International Trade in October. Known as the “Haberler Report” in honour of Professor Gottfried Haberler, the chairman of the panel of eminent economists, it provided initial guidelines for the work of GATT. The Contracting Parties at their 13th Sessions, attended by Ministers, subsequently established three committees in GATT: Committee I to convene a further tariff negotiating conference; Committee II to review the agricultural policies of member governments and Committee III to tackle the problem facing developing countries in their trade. The establishment of the European Economic Community during the previous year also demanded large-scale tariff negotiations under Article XXIV: 6 of the General Agreement.

1960 The Dillon Round. The fifth Round opened in September and was divided into two phases: the first was concerned with

negotiations with EEC member states for the creation of a single schedule of concessions for the Community based on its Common External Tariff; and the second was a further general round of tariff negotiations. Named in honour of US Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon who proposed the negotiations, the Round was concluded in July 1962 and resulted in about 4,400 tariff concessions covering $4.9 billion of trade.

1961 The Short-Term Arrangement covering cotton textiles was agreed as an exception to the GATT rules. The arrangement permitted the negotiation of quota restrictions affecting the exports of cotton-producing countries. In 1962 the “Short Term” Arrangement became the “Long term” Arrangement, lasting until 1974 when the MultifibreArrangement entered into force.

1964 The Kennedy Round. Meeting at Ministerial level, a Trade Negotiations Committee formally opened the Kennedy Round in May. In June 1967, the Round.s Final Act was signed by some 50 participating countries which together accounted for 75 per cent of world trade. For the first time, negotiations departed from the product-by-product approach used in the previous Rounds to an across-the-board or linear method of cutting tariffs for industrial goods. The working hypothesis of a 50 per cent target cut in tariff levels was achieved in many areas. Concessions covered an estimated total value of trade of about $410 billion. Separate agreements were reached on grains, chemical products and a Code on Anti-Dumping.

1965 A New Chapter. The early 1960s marked the accession to the general Agreement of many newly-independent developing countries. In February, the Contracting Parties, meeting in a special session, adopted the text of Part IV on Trade and Development. The additional chapter to the GATT required developed countries to accord high priority to the reduction of trade barriers to products of developing countries. A Committee on Trade and Development was established to oversee the functioning of the new GATT provisions. In the preceding year, GATT had established the International Trade Centre (ITC) to help developing countries in trade promotion and identification of potential markets. Since 1968, the ITC had been jointly operated by GATT and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

1973 The Tokyo Round. The seventh Round was launched by Ministers in September at the Japanese capital. Some 99 countries participated in negotiating a comprehensive body of agreements covering both tariff and non-tariff matters. At the end of the Round in November 1979, participants exchanged tariff

reductions and bindings which covered more than $300 billion of trade. As a result of these cuts, the weighted average tariff on manufactured goods in the world.s nine major industrial markets declined from 7.0 to 4.7 per cent. Agreements were reached in the following areas: subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, import licensing procedures, government procurement, customs valuation, a revised anti-dumping code, trade in bovine meat, trade in dairy products and trade in civil aircraft. The first concrete result of the Round was the reduction of import duties and other trade barriers by industrial countries on tropical products exported by developing countries.

1974 On 1 January 1974, the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, otherwise known as the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), entered into force. It superseded the arrangements that had been governing trade in cotton textiles since 1961. The MFA seeks to promote the expansion and progressive liberalization of trade in textile products while at the same time avoiding disruptive effects in individual markets and lines of production. The MFA was extended in 1978, 1982, 1986, 1991 and 1992. MFA members account for most of the world exports of textiles and clothing which in 1986 amounted to US$128 billion.

1982 Ministerial Meeting. Meeting for the first time in nearly ten years, the GATT Ministers in November at Geneva reaffirmed the validity of GATT rules for the conduct of international trade and committed themselves to combating protectionist pressures. They also established a wide-ranging work programme for the GATT which was to lay down the groundwork for a new Round 1986. The Uruguay Round. The GATT Trade Ministers meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, launched the eighth Round of trade negotiations on 20 September. The Punta del Este Declaration, while representing a single political undertaking, was divided into two sections. The first covered negotiations on trade in goods and the second initiated negotiation on trade in services. In the area of trade in goods, the Ministers committed themselves to a “standstill” on new trade measures inconsistent with their GATT obligations and to a “rollback” programme aimed at phasing out existing inconsistent measures. Envisaged to last four years, negotiations started in early February 1987 in the following areas tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles and clothing, agriculture, subsidies, safe-guards, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights including trade in counterfeit goods, and trade-related investment measures. The work of other groups included a review of GATT articles, the GATT dispute settlement procedure, the Tokyo Round

agreements, as well as the functioning of the GATT system as a whole.

1994 “GATT 1994” is the updated version of GATT 1947 and takes into account the substantive and institutional changes negotiated in the Uruguay Round GATT 1994 is an integral part of the World Trade Organization established on 1 January 1995. It is agreed that there be a one year transition period during which certain GATT 1947 bodies and commitments would co-exist with those of the World Trade Organization.

La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos

G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004

Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).

On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary,

Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.

Issue:Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources?

Held: The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of “every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.

The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to

grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La BugalB’laan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. vs RAMOSG. R. No. 127882 | January 27, 2004

Issue: The effectivity Of Executive Order No. 279

Ruling:Sec. 8 of EO 279 provides that it shall take effectimmediately after publication. Petitioners maintain that the 15 dayperiod under EO 200 is required.There is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law fromtaking effect on a date other than even before the 15-dayperiod after its publication. Where a law provides for its owndate of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed byE.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence of the phrase"unless it is otherwise provided" in Section 1 thereof. Section1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a statute doesnot provide for its own date of effectivity.What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due processrequires, as this Court held in Tañada v. Tuvera,is thepublication of the law for without such notice andpublication, there would be no basis for the application ofthe maxim "ignorantialegis n[eminem] excusat." It would bethe height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizenfor the transgression of a law of which he had no noticewhatsoever, not even a constructive one.While the effectivityclause of E.O. No. 279 does not requireits publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation since theConstitution, being

"the fundamental, paramount andsupreme law of the nation," is deemed written in thelaw.

Hence, the due process clause, which, so Tañadaheld, mandates the publication of statutes, is read intoSection 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No.200 which provides for publication "either in the OfficialGazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in thePhilippines," finds suppletory application. It is significant tonote that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the OfficialGazette

on August 3, 1987.E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon itspublication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.That such effectivity took place after the convening of thefirst Congress is irrelevant. At the time President Aquinoissued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validlyexercising legislative powers under the ProvisionalConstitution.

Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the1987 Constitution explicitly states:Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.The convening of the first Congress merely precluded theexercise of legislative powers by President Aquino; it did notprevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is aneffective, and a validly enacted, statute.