sureshkFile Attachment2000ed5ecoverv05b.jpg

TAIWANS SECURITY

When Chiang Kai-Shek fled from mainland China, his military was in disarray.Today, it appears to be a modern, well-equipped, and well-trained force. But howcapable is it? This book offers the first in-depth explanation and evaluation ofTaiwans defence forces and infrastructure. The author not only examines in detaileach of Taiwans military services, with descriptions of their organization,equipment, and personnel but also assesses the defence infrastructure as a wholewith a focus on the ongoing attempt to civilianize that organization.

As the Taiwan Strait remains the focus of international tension between Chinaand the United States this volume provides essential base-data and evaluation ofone of the major participants in this crisis and in this concluding part offers acomparative framework of Taiwan versus PRC militaries, with analysis of likelyfuture developments between the two states, based on that comparison.

This book will be essential reading for students of Asian Security, AsianPolitics, International Relations, and Security Studies as well as to analysts andpolicy-makers.

Bernard D. Cole served thirty years in the US Navy and is a widely publishedauthority on the Chinese and Taiwan militaries. He holds a PhD in History andhas traveled widely in China and Taiwan, including many visits to warships, airforce squadrons, and army units.

ASIAN SECURITY STUDIESEdited by

Sumit GangulyIndiana University, Bloomington

Andrew ScobellUS Army War College

Few regions of the world are fraught with as many security questions as Asia.Within this region it is possible to study great power rivalries, irredentist conflicts,nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, secessionist movements, ethnoreligiousconflicts, and inter-state wars. This new book series will publish the best possiblescholarship on the security issues affecting the region, and will include detailedempirical studies, theoretically oriented case studies, and policy-relevant analysesas well as more general works.

CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Alternate paths to global power

Marc Lanteigne

CHINAS RISING SEA POWERThe PLA Navys submarine challenge

Peter Howarth

IF CHINA ATTACKS TAIWANMilitary strategy, politics and economics

Edited by Steve Tsang

CHINESE CIVILMILITARY RELATIONSThe transformation of the Peoples Liberation Army

Edited by Nan Li

THE CHINESE ARMY TODAYTradition and transformation for the 21st century

Dennis J. Blasko

TAIWANS SECURITYHistory and prospects

Bernard D. Cole

TAIWANS SECURITY

History and prospects

Bernard D. Cole

First published 2006by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge

270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

2006 Bernard D. Cole

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,

mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any

information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataCole, Bernard D., 1943

Taiwans security : history and prospects / Bernard D. Cole.p. cm. (Asian security studies)

Includes bibliographical references and index.1. TaiwanArmed Forces. 2. National securityTaiwan.

3. TaiwanMilitary policy. I. Title. II. Series.

UA853.T28C58 2006355.033051249dc22 2005022645

ISBN10: 0415365813 (Print Edition)ISBN13: 9780415365819

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.

To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledgescollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO MY DAUGHTERS,JENNIFER AND MARISSA

CONTENTS

List of illustrations viiiPreface ixAcknowledgments xiList of abbreviations xiiNote on transliteration xvii

1 Introduction 1

2 History of Taiwans military 13

3 Threat to Taiwans security 32

4 Defense organization and administration 52

5 Personnel 72

6 Taiwan Army 91

7 Taiwan Air Force 105

8 Taiwan Navy 119

9 Civilmilitary relations in Taiwan 135

10 A look ahead 152

11 Conclusion 169

Appendices 186Notes 192Bibliography 233Index 247

vii

ILLUSTRATIONS

Map

1 Taiwan xviii

Tables

1 Chinas military regions 332 PLAN ships and aircraft 343 PLA aircraft 414 PLA systems 465 Chinas strategic missiles 486 PLA budget 507 Professional courses for civilian officials 858 Taiwan Army equipment 959 Taiwan Air Force equipment 107

10 Taiwan Navy equipment 12211 Self-identity among three generations 14712 MND five-year budget plan 15813 Taiwan defense expenditures 17314 The timedistance factor 180

viii

PREFACE

I was on sabbatical leave from the National War College during the 20042005academic year, serving as a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at National DefenseUniversitys Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), when I wrote thismonograph on Taiwans military and civilian national security structure. Myresearch was based on many years of study and experience with Taiwan and main-land China. For instance, I both participated in the last USTaiwan militaryexercise, in December 1978 (Shark Hunt XVIII), and hosted the first visit tothe United States by a Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship, in 1989.

My goal is to take a wide view of Taiwans security situation, focusing on morethan military capabilities. Those are important, of course, but really play asecondary role to the political positions and policies of Taiwan and China. TheUnited States also plays a crucial role supporting Taiwans independence fromChina. That status, although not formally recognized by most of the world, includ-ing Washington and the United Nations, is besieged by economic, political,sociocultural, and military pressures from Beijing. All of these are considered inthis work.

I visited Taiwan in September 1999 after a gap of more than twenty years, thefirst of a series of at least annual visits. More recently, I investigated the state ofthe Taiwan military and PRC views on that institution during 2004 and 2005,when I had the opportunity to talk with Chinese military and civilian officials, aswell as with many Chinese citizens, in Beijing, Qingdao, Xian, Shanghai,Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong. I also spent several weeks in Taipei, con-ducting extensive discussions with Taiwan military officers and civilian officials.

I visited and discussed the status of Taiwans defense forces with DefenseAttache Office (DAO) Beijing officers, and at Chinas National DefenseUniversity, the Academy of Military Sciences, the Chinese Institute ofContemporary International Relations, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,the Chinese Institute for International Studies, the Chinese Institute forInternational Strategic Studies, and Tsinghua University in Beijing; at XiamenUniversitys Taiwan Studies Center; at the Zhongshan University in Guangzhou,the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the Shanghai Institute for InternationalStudies, and Fudan University in Shanghai.

ix

I was privileged to have interviews with Taiwans Minister of Defense andChief-of-Staff of the Navy, as well as with American Institute in Taiwan officialsin Taipei and Washington, DC, and at Taiwans National Defense University,Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Navy Headquarters,Army Headquarters, Air Force Headquarters, Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff(DCOS), the Cross-Strait Prospect Foundation, the Chinese Association forPolicy Studies, the Institute for International Relations, Tamkang University,National Chengchi University, and various other think tank and academic analystsin Taipei.

My sessions at Taiwan military units typically began with an office call on amajor general (MG) or rear admiral (RADM), followed by sessions with 06 andjunior personnel. Both military and civilian government officials were interestedin my project and almost all eager to participate. I began each session with thejunior officers by noting that information would be on a not-for-attributionbasis and that my interlocutors would not be named. I was impressed by theapparent frankness and willingness to engage of almost all the Taiwan militaryofficers I interviewed.

PREFACE

x

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a debt to many individuals who facilitated my work on this book. ManyTaiwan and US military officers, government officials, and analysts wereextremely helpful but must go nameless. Lieutenant-General Michael A. Dunn,USAF, President of the US National Defense University, authorized my sabbati-cal during the 20042005 Academic Year; my absence from the National WarCollege during that year was approved by its Commandant, Rear Admiral RichardC. Jaskot, USN. I was privileged to join the superb team of fellows at INSS duringmy sabbatical; the Institutes Director, Dr Stephen J. Flanagan, was supportiveboth in terms of encouraging my work and providing funding for travel andresearch. The collegial atmosphere and staff at INSS was most beneficial.Ms Jean-Marie Faison of the National Defense University library provided superbsupport. The staffs of the Naval Historical Center and the Center for MilitaryHistory were also very helpful.

The manuscript was read in part or in whole by my chief mentor, Paul H.B.Godwin, and by Monte Bullard, who served for many years in Taiwan andprovided particularly helpful insights. Other readers included Kenneth Allen,Dennis Blair, Dennis Blasko, Daniel Blumenthal, Richard Bush, Richard Fisher,Alexander Huang, Ellis Joffe, Roy Kamphausen, Michael McCallus, EricMcVadon, Larry Mitchell, Ronald Montaperto, Alan Romberg, Philip Saunders,Mark Stokes, Michael Swaine, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and Andrew Yang. OtherChinese scholars and former military attaches readily provided advice and sug-gestions based on their experience and expertise. Colleagues at the National WarCollege were helpful and supportive, especially Robert Brannon, James Harris,Lee Kass, Theodore Lavin, Harvey Rishikof, B.A. Williams, and RichardSchwartz. Dr Cynthia A. Watson read several drafts of the manuscript with aninvaluable editorial eye. Ms Lora Saalman provided expert translation services,and Mr Patrick Bratton was tireless as a research assistant. I owe an incalculabledebt to my sister, Lisa.

All errors of fact or omission are, of course, strictly my own responsibility. Thismanuscript represents only my views and may not represent those of the NationalDefense University or any other agency of the US Government.

xi

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV Assault amphibian vehicleAAW Anti-air warfareAB Air force baseADIZ Air defense and identification zoneADM AdmiralAFP Agence France Presse AFRC Armed Forces Reserve CommandAFSS Air Force Staff SchoolAIDC Aero Industry Development CorporationAIP Air-independent propulsionAMRAAM Advanced medium range air-to-air missileAMW Amphibious warfareAOR Underway replenishment shipAPC Armored personnel carrierASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASROC Anti-submarine rocketASUW Anti-surface warfareASW Anti-submarine warfareATARS Advanced tactical airborne reconnaissance systemAWACS Airborne warning and control system aircraftBG Brigadier generalBVR Beyond visual rangeC2 Command and controlC3 Command, control, and communicationsC4 Command, control, communications, and computersC4I C4, intelligenceC4ISR C4, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceCAPT CaptainCCIT Chung cheng Institute of TechnologyCDC Combat Direction CenterCDR CommanderCEIB Communications, Electronics, and Information Bureau

xii

CEP Circle error probableCGS Chief of the general staffCIA Central Intelligence AgencyCIC Combat Information CenterCINC Commander-in-ChiefCIWS Close-In Weapons SystemCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staffCLC Combined logistics commandCMA Chinese Military AcademyCMC Central Military CommissionCOL ColonelCRC Central Reorganization CommissionCSBC China Shipbuilding CorporationCSIST Chung Shan Institute of Science and TechnologyCSS Center for Strategic Studies (NDU)CV Aircraft carrierCVBG Aircraft carrier battle groupDAO Defense Attache OfficeDCOGS Deputy Chief of the General StaffDCS Direct commercial salesDD DestroyerDDG Guided missile destroyerDIFAR Directional frequency and rangingDOD US Department of DefenseDPD Defense Procurement DivisionDPP Democratic Progressive PartyDSP Department of Strategic PlanningETDDC Education, Training, and Doctrine Development CommandEW Electronic warfareFAS Federation of American ScientistsFBM Ballistic missile submarineFDC Formosa Defense CommandFF FrigateFFG Guided missile frigateFMS Foreign military salesGA Group ArmyGAO General Affairs OfficeGEN GeneralGPS Global positioning systemGPWB General Political Warfare BureauGRC Government of the Republic of ChinaGSH General Staff HeadquartersGWOT Global war on terrorismHARM High speed anti-radiation missile

ABBREVIATIONS

xiii

HRD Human Resources DepartmentIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyIAO Integrated Assessment OfficeICAO International Civil Aviation OrganizationICBM Intercontinental ballistic missileIDF Indigenous defense fighterIl IlyushinINER Institute for Nuclear Energy ResearchIO Information OperationsIOC Initial operating capabilityIR InfraredIRBM Intermediate range ballistic missileISR Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceIT Information TechnologyIW Information warfareJAG Judge Advocate GeneralJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJDAM Joint direct attack munitionJIC Joint Intelligence CenterJOCC Joint Operations Command CenterJROTC Junior reserve office trainingJTDC Joint Training Development CenterKMT KuomintangKT KnotLACM Land attack cruise missileLANTIRN Low altitude navigation and targeting infrared for nightLCU Landing craft utilityLTC Lieutenant colonelLTG Lieutenant generalLY Legislative YuanMAAG Military Assistance Advisory GroupMAC Mainland Affairs CouncilMAD Magnetic anomaly detectionMCTL Militarily Critical Technologies ListMG Major generalMHC Mine hunter coastalMIB Military Intelligence BureauMIW Mine warfareMND Ministry of National DefenseMOFA Ministry of Foreign AffairsMOS Military Occupational SpecialtyMP Military PoliceMPC Military Police CommandMPH Miles per hour

ABBREVIATIONS

xiv

MR Military RegionMRD Military Resources DepartmentMSO Mine sweeper oceanNCO Non commissioned officersNDMC National Defense Management CollegeNHMP National health medical plannm Nautical mileNRA National Revolutionary ArmyNSA National Security AgencyNSB National Security BoardNSC National Security CouncilNTU New threat upgradeOSD Office of the Secretary of DefenseOTH Over the horizonPAP Peoples Armed PolicePB Procurement BureauPGM Precision guided munitionPLA Peoples Liberation ArmyPLAAF Peoples Liberation Army Air ForcePLAN Peoples Liberation Army NavyPLANAF Peoples Liberation Army Navy Air ForcePME Professional military educationPNTR Permanent normal trade relationsPOAM Plan of action and milestonesPRC Peoples Republic of ChinaPWO Political Warfare OfficerRAD Reserve Affairs DepartmentRADM Rear AdmiralRMA Revolution in Military AffairsROC Republic of ChinaROCA Republic of China ArmyROCAF Republic of China Air ForceROCN Republic of China NavyROE Rules of engagementROTC Reserve Officers Training CorpsRUV Remotely operated underwater vehicleRVN Republic of VietnamSAM Surface-to-air MissileSAR Search and rescueSEAD Suppression of enemy air defensesSIGINT Signals IntelligenceSLCM Sea launched cruise missileSLOCs Sea lines of communicationsSNIE Secret National Intelligence Report

ABBREVIATIONS

xv

SOC Special operations commandSOF Special operations forcesSP Self-propelledSPD Strategic Planning DepartmentSS SubmarineSSM Surface-to-surface MissileSSN Nuclear powered submarineSTUFT Ships taken up from tradeSu SukhoiTA Taiwan ArmyTAF Taiwan Air ForceTCG Taiwan Coast GuardTECRO Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative OfficeTFG Tactical Fighter GroupTFS Tactical Fighter SquadronTFW Tactical Fighter WingTGC Taiwan Garrison CommandTMIC Taiwan Military Industrial ComplexTN Taiwan NavyTOSS Tactical Operations Security SystemTRA Taiwan Relations ActTVM Track-via-missileUAVs Unmanned aerial vehiclesUSA US ArmyUSAF US Air ForceUSMC US Marine CorpsUSN US NavyVADM Vice AdmiralVLS Vertical launching system

ABBREVIATIONS

xvi

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The Pinyin system is standard for mainland names, titles, and terms, but theTaiwan situation is more complex: I have tried to follow common usage fornames and vocabulary, but while the Wade-Giles system predominates, there isno common system of transliteration in Taiwan.

xvii

Map 1 Taiwan.

1

INTRODUCTION

The most dangerous situation in East Asia is that involving Taiwan and thePeoples Republic of China (the PRC, or China), despite the possibility of NorthKorea deploying nuclear weapons.1 The issues are relatively simple: Beijinginsists that the island of Taiwan has historically been and remains part of China;Taipei maintains that it is independent, although just two dozen or so nationsformally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.2

The elected government in Taipei is headed by President Chen Shui-bian,leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In the 2004 presidential elec-tion, he defeated former Vice-President Lien Chan of the National Peoples Party(KMT) and James Chu-yu Soong of the Peoples First Party (PFP). Both Lien andSoong visited the mainland during April and May 2005 as guests of the Beijinggovernment, historic visits that further challenge Chens ability to rule effectively.

The United States is deeply enmeshed in this dispute, both as the worldsstrongest power, with vast interests in Asia, and as guarantor of the Taiwanesepeoples freedom of political choice. American support for democracy is an inher-ent feature of its foreign policy; in Chinas case, this for the past century hasmeant supporting the Republic of China (ROC), even when it was a military dic-tatorship ruled by Chiang Kai-shek. During the Second World War, PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt insisted, over the disparaging views of Winston Churchilland Joseph Stalin (as well as those of his own advisors), that the ROC be treatedas a major world power, and as one of the future four policemen he at one pointenvisioned maintaining peace in the postwar world.

This support notwithstanding, China emerged from its Civil War in 1949 as acommunist regime, an ally of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, and a self-declared enemy of the United States. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, PresidentHarry Truman tried to withdraw the United States from the China situation, withthe expectation that Taiwan would be conquered by mainland military forces andthat Washington would eventually recognize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)government. The Korean War ended this prospect and the United States reenteredthe Chinese Civil War in 1950, becoming the arbiter of Taiwans fate.

During the decades of diplomatic and sometimes military hostilities betweenWashington and Beijing, the central issue was Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-sheks

1

ROC government took refuge in 1949. He had been a difficult US ally during theSecond World War, and the relationship was often contentious thereafter.

The PRCUS relationship changed when the United States did not veto Chinareplacing Taiwan in the United Nations in 1971, and then with President RichardNixons 1972 visit to Beijing. The United States remained a primary participantin the ChinaTaiwan situation after this rapprochement began.

Washington formally shifted diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in1979, but without conceding that Taiwan was a Chinese province, and with thecaveat that any resolution of the islands status had to occur peacefully.3 As statedby President William Clinton in March 2000, the issues between Beijing andTaiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.4

China considers its 1949 Civil War victory incomplete without Taiwans reunifi-cation; the islands status remains the only issue between China and the UnitedStates that might draw these two nuclear-armed superpowers into armed conflict.

Although the United States is an important participant in the current disputebetween China and Taiwan, this book will concentrate primarily on the two con-testants. The US role will be addressed, but as an influence rather than a mainplayer. Events will be offered primarily from the perspective of Beijing andTaipei, not Washington.

The strategic view from Taipei

Taipeis view of its security situation understandably focuses on Chinas threatto use military force to prevent Taiwan from becoming formally independent.Taipei describes its defense policy as the prevention of war, maintaining stabilityin the Taiwan Strait, and defending the nation; self-stated guidelines for accom-plishing these objectives are all-out defense, modern defense capabilities,effective crisis management, promoting regional cooperation, and the threeassurances policy.

Taipei sees its strategic position as one of immense geostrategic significanceand the PRCs potential gateway to the Pacific Ocean with a controlling posi-tion over the Taiwan Strait, the Bashi Channel, and adjoining Pacific waters.5 Itsstrategy is based on a strong enough military posture to deter China from attack-ing, with the operational objectives command of the air and the sea and theability to conduct effective ground defensive operations, all through joint warfare.

Physical geography

Taiwan lies 90 to 105 nautical miles (nm)6 from the Chinese mainland, a distancewell within range of modern missiles and air-launched weapons, but any militarycampaign against the island would depend on naval or aerospace power. TheTaiwan Strait is frequently subject to high winds and seas, tidal ranges up to15 meters, complex currents, and is susceptible to typhoons during most of theyear. It is relatively shallow, with a maximum depth of less than 40 fathoms, and

INTRODUCTION

2

marked by shoals. There are very few suitable landing beaches on either ofTaiwans coasts; the eastern littoral is characterized by high cliffs and a steepocean bottom gradient, while the western is marked by wide areas of mud flats.7

Second, the hydrography of the Strait is not conducive to anti-submarine war-fare (ASW) operations. The shallow depth, rapid currents, frequent rough seas,often limited visibility, and the high number of fishing and merchant craft createa very high level of ambient noise in the Strait that severely hampers sonar oper-ation. These conditions also affect submarine operations, but they limit ships andaircraft more than submarines.

Third, the unpleasant weather conditions that characterize the Strait affectsurface ship operations, especially small landing craft, which are typically flat-bottomed to facilitate beaching to offload troops and cargo. Poor weather makesembarked troops seasick, makes maintaining formation difficult for the assaultships, increases command and control problems, and would also limit the airsupport so vital to a successful operation. Good weather would ameliorate theseproblems and would ease the voyage from the mainland, but would increase theefficacy of Taiwanese patrols.

Fourth, the Straits narrowness affects both sides. It eases an assault forcesproblem, of course, simply because it has a shorter distance to cover, but it alsoeases the defenders problem, since it places them on interior lines and limits theassaulting forces possible lines of approach.

Fifth, and most significantly, geography severely limits Taiwans ability todefend against sea and airborne assault. An island 245 miles long by 90 mileswide at its widest point, located no more than 105 nm from the Chinese mainland,greatly outnumbered in terms of manpower and numbers of aircraft and sub-marines, faces an extremely difficult security situation.

In his 2005 New Years Day speech, President Chen Shui-bian describedTaiwan as

confronted by . . . with the escalating belligerent rhetoric and militaryintimidation from the other side of the strait. . . . the other side remainsreluctant in giving up its military intimidation against Taiwan [and]continues its saber rattling and suppression of Taiwan on all fronts.

Chen then cautioned the PRC not to under-estimate the will of the Taiwan peoplein defending the sovereignty, security and dignity of the Republic of China, andstated Taiwan would continue to adhere to our policy of keeping a firm stancewhile moving forward pragmatically.8

China is serious about possibly using military force against Taiwan, but this isnot a preferred option. Beijing characterized its approach to Taipei during theperiod from 1979 to 1995 as offering Deng Xiaopings peaceful one country, twosystems.9 Additionally, the Anti-Secession Law passed by the National PeoplesCongress in Beijing in early 2005 repeatedly emphasizes peaceful reunificationthrough consultation and negotiation.10

INTRODUCTION

3

Taipeis primary defense focus is on Chinas military strength, embodied in thePeoples Liberation Army (PLA), but also has an appreciation of other regionalmilitary actors. Japans military was described in 2002 as efficient, small,powerful, and sophisticated; South Korea was considered to be improving [its]overall defense capabilities and establishing a 21st century armed force to workwith the U.S. in maintaining regional stability; North Korea was perhapssurprisingly described as having won diplomatic recognition from the U.S. andJapan and successfully [entering] the international stage. Analysis of Russiasmilitary status focused on arms sales to China and activities in Central Asia, whilediscussion of the Southeast Asian nations focused on the potential conflict oversovereignty claims in the South China Sea.11

The Ministry of National Defenses (MND) January 2005 Report on PRCMilitary Strength, argued that while the PRC has maintained a state of pre-paredness for potential military invasion of the ROC. . . . and is promotingmilitary modernization which has made significant advancement in war planning,weaponry and equipment as well as military training that supports Beijingsstrategy of preventing independence by military force. Chinese military actionagainst Taiwan would involve the PLAs enormous troops, expansive territory,missile strike capabilities, numerous submarines, massive amounts of weaponry,abundant petrol bombs, [and] swift mobilization.

The MND correctly identifies the keys to the Taiwan Strait military situationas control of the air, command of the sea, and effective command and control.Nonmilitary Chinese tactics might also be employed against Taiwan, to includecreation of a united front devoted to opposing independence, causing disunityamong the islands population, or courting support from Taiwan businessmenwith mainland interests.12

The Constitution on national defense

Taiwans Constitution has two articles that directly address the role of the mili-tary. Article 137 states that The national defense of the Republic of China shallhave as its objective the safeguarding of national security and the preservation ofworld peace. The organization of national defense shall be prescribed by law.Article 138 requires that The land, sea, and air forces of the whole country shallbe above personal, regional, and party affiliations, shall be loyal to the state andshall protect the people. These are supported by Article 1 of the 2000 NationalDefense Act, which describes the goal of the ROCs national defense as pro-tecting national security and safeguarding world peace through display ofnational strength as a whole and building of a national defense military force.This is described in Articles 2 and 3 of the 2003 National Defense Law as theutilization of comprehensive national power and all-out national defense,involving affairs pertaining to military, civil defense and those in political,economic, psychological and technological domains.13

INTRODUCTION

4

Three mission areas are identified as guidelines for accomplishing this goal:

1 preventing war and conflicts by establishing a sustainable defense and deter-rence capability;

2 maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait through dialogue and exchange ofsecurity information, transparency in military affairs, and increased mutualunderstanding on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; and

3 defending the national territory through military preparedness, effectivedeterrence, and resolute defense.

The MND is tasked with effectively using the personnel, material, and finan-cial assets of the nation to maintain combat readiness and strengthen overalldefense capabilities, in accordance with the policy of combining nationaldefense with peoples livelihood based on the principles of the ROCConstitution, which in turn requiresand presumably authorizesintegratingthe nations military, economic, and psychological infrastructures and promotingpopular participation, trust, integrated defense, and overall development to imple-ment comprehensive national defense mobilization during a security crisis.14

This last responsibility leaves moot the question of the span of MND control,especially in a time of security crisis. Who or what agency declares such a crisis?The ongoing transformation of Taiwans security infrastructure, which includesredefining the decision-making process in national security, is addressing that andother troublesome issues, but they are not easy to resolve.

National Security Policy

Taipeis National Security Policy includes sound cross-strait policies and promot-ing benign interaction with the mainland, expanding Taiwans internationalrole, developing its economy, promoting the peoples participation in nationaldefense affairs and striving for a consensus on all-out defense, promoting thedevelopment of advanced technologies in the civilian sector, establishing anautonomous, technologically advanced, dedicated military, and maintaining ademocratic governance that protects human rights and is not corrupt.15 Taiwanrequires an effective Military Strategy to realize these goals.

Military Strategy

Taiwans Military Strategy is based on effective deterrence and strongdefense posture, which includes effective information operations, electronicwarfare, effective antiballistic missile capability, gaining command of the air andthe sea, and establishing an all-out defense that includes popular partici-pation.16 More specifically, the Air Force is responsible for establishing air supe-riority, the Navy for exercising sea denial, and the Army for carrying outanti-landing warfare.

INTRODUCTION

5

The frequent reference to all-out defense undoubtedly reflects uncertainty onthe part of Taiwans senior civilian and military leadership about both its mili-tarys effectiveness against the PLA and the will of the Taiwanese people toendure a hard military conflict. The first of these concerns is well-founded, andwill be investigated in this book. The secondthe will of the peopleis moredifficult to evaluate, but also more important. Taipeis strategic problem is how toconfront an apparently insurmountable geopolitical situation that is further com-plicated by different views among Taiwans military services, including a Navyand Air Force perception that the Army is unjustifiably influential. There are alsodifferent views between senior military and civilian leaders.

The offensive option

Taiwans acquisition of offensive weapons will also be addressed. This strategicissue affects relations among the military services, including efforts to increasejointness among the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The Army has traditionallyemphasized the need to defeat a Chinese amphibious assault on the beaches, butthis focus blurred during the 1990s and probably changed irrevocably with ChenShui-bians presidency in 2000.

In a 1999 Defense White Paper, Chens DPP advocated the need to

emphasize air and naval superiority, materialize [sic] precision deepstrike capabilities. . . . develop joint air/naval operation capabilities. . . . topre-empt potential aggressions, . . . deploy military forces to conductnaval blockades against enemys sea ports and to carry out precisiondeep strikes against enemys inland targets.17

During Chens successful 19992000 campaign for the presidency, his opponent,Lien Chan, also advocated developing an intimidating military force to threatenBeijing.18 Several members of the Legislative Yuan (LY) at the time issued similarcalls.19

In May 2000, the new DPP government described a strategic concept of deci-sive battle outside the territory, to halt PLA forces while they were still at sea andin the air, not after they had established a lodgment on the island.20 By 2005, thishad led to calls for the capability to attack the mainland to deter Beijing fromemploying military force against Taiwan in the first place. After more than fiveyears in office, however, the government has done little to fulfill this rhetoric.

Advocates for acquiring an offensive capability argue that China would bedeterred by the threat of cruise or ballistic missiles poised against cities such asShanghai or Guangzhou. Some may also believe offensive weapons are moreaffordable than expensive defensive systems. This may be true for specificweapons, but fails to acknowledge the more important issues of targeting andeffectiveness: an ineffectual offensive capability misses the pointliterallyifdeterrence is not achieved.

INTRODUCTION

6

Arguments against offensive weapons include Taipeis inability to acquire anoffensive force strong enough to significantly impact PLA capabilities; and thatattacks against civilian targets would have the opposite of a deterrent effect onBeijing, provoking a devastating attack against Taiwan. This last would be devas-tating, given Taiwans relatively high population density in its urban areas. Finally,the United States opposes Taiwan deploying offensive weapons, and Taipei cannotafford to ignore its only strong supporter and principal arms supplier.

The armed forces missions are unambiguous: countering blockade operations,defeating amphibious landings, and defending against air threats. All of theserequire control of the sea and of the air, which are difficult to accomplish. Recentadditions to these missions require the military to defeat mainland informationwarfare (IW) and space systems.

A key point in gauging Taiwans defense is how it evaluates its own capabili-ties vis--vis the PLA. The MND argues that an imbalance in cross-straitmilitary strength will not occur until 2008. Writing in mid-2005, this seemsunrealistically optimistic, as will be discussed in Chapters 10 and 11.21

The US role in Taiwans defense

The US relationship with China since the late eighteenth century had beenunique, built on the twin pillars of commerce and religion, with strong diplo-matic, military, and Congressional commitment.22 The United States was thefirst nation to recognize the newly proclaimed ROC, in 1913, when PresidentWoodrow Wilson stated:

The government of the United States is not only willing but earnestlydesirous of aiding the great Chinese people in every way that is consis-tent with their untrammeled development and its own immemorialprinciples. The awakening of the people of China to a consciousness oftheir possibilities under free government is the most significant, if notthe most momentous, event of our generation.23

The CCPs 1949 assumption of power in China was a traumatic experience formany Americans. The United States has been the guarantor of Taiwans statussince 1950, when the onset of the Korean War spurred President Harry S. Trumanto recommit the United States to Taiwans defense. A series of crises in the TaiwanStrait and tensions between the two allies has marked the period since then, withthe relationship seemingly set on a terminal course when President RichardM. Nixon visited China in 1972.

In many respects, a de facto USTaiwan alliance has continued even afterPresident Jimmy Carter shifted US diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijingin 1979 and terminated the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. This continuing rela-tionship is codified in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by Congress inApril 1979 and including language designed to mitigate the effects of Carters

INTRODUCTION

7

diplomacy. The TRA reflects popular American sentiment, expressed throughCongress, for continued support of Taiwan.

The activities of American missionaries and the hopes of American business-men in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provided the base for thissentiment, which was sustained by strategic American interests during the ColdWar, including Taiwans substantial support for US military efforts during theKorean and Vietnam Wars. American support is now firmly rooted in the beliefthat upholding democratic regimes leads the list of US foreign policy priorities.24

The USTaiwan relationship is managed through the quasi-diplomatic vehiclesof the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in Taipei and the Taipei Economic andCultural Representative Offices (TECRO) in Washington and several other UScities.25 It is also the subject of two formal annual conferences. The USTaiwanMonterey Talks are conducted in Monterey, California; the USTaiwan DefenseReview Talks, are conducted at various sites. The former conference focuses ondefense and military strategy issues, while the latter is concerned largely witharmaments acquisitions and defense policy.26

Military equipment

The question of future US arms sales to Taiwan was addressed in the August 1982Shanghai Communiqu between the United States and China, in which PresidentRonald Reagan agreed that the United States

does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan;that US arms sales would not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantita-tive terms, the level of those supplied in recent years; and that the USintends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan.27

This agreement was based on the American understanding that China would notemploy non-peaceful means against Taiwan.28

US arms sales were reduced from $820 million in 1982 to approximately$580 million by the mid-1990s.29 From 1996 to 1999, however, the United Statesdelivered defense systems and services to Taiwan totaling $7.2 billion, and$4.5 billion during the period 2000 to 2003. Taiwan received the secondlargest amount of US defense assistance during 19961999 (behind Saudi Arabia)and the third largest amount during 20002003 (behind Saudi Arabia andEgypt).30

The US role is a basic, perhaps the pivotal, point in the cross-strait situation.Beijing and Taipei both believe their problem could be resolved by a change inUS policy. China credits American political support and military sales as crucialsupport not only for Taiwans independence, but as encouraging Taipei to push forde jure independence; Taipei blames American ambiguity for placing the islandat continued risk. Both are correct to a degree, but Washington is trying not tocommit to either side, seeking to maintain peace and stability in the area.31

INTRODUCTION

8

The following chapters describe and evaluate the components that make upTaiwans defensive capability. The focus is on the military equation, includingboth the uniformed military and the civilian defense bureaucracy.

Chapter 2 surveys the history of the Taiwan military, focusing on the19492005 period, with a brief look at the 19231949 period. The emphasis is onidentifying threads of organization and administration in the origin and maturingof the armed forces that continue to influence Taiwans military as the twenty-firstcentury begins. This chapter will include discussion of the US role inChinaTaiwan relations from 1972 to the present. The documents of this period,the three Sino-American communiqus (1972, 1978, 1982) and the 1979 TRAcontribute significantly to defining Taiwans status, but Taipei is neither asignatory nor was it a direct participant in the formulation in any of them.32

PRC, Taiwan, and US leaders have made public statements to supplement thesewritten documents. President Ronald Reagans Six Assurances to Taiwan in1982 was issued in the run-up to the third communiqu, and essentially negatedthe intent of that document as viewed by Beijing. He reassured Taipei that theUnited States would not

1 set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan;2 alter the terms of the TRA;3 consult with China in advance before making decisions about US arms sales

to Taiwan;4 mediate between Taiwan and China;5 alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan . . . and would not pressure

Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China; and6 formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.33

Chinese President Jiang Zemins 1995 statement of Eight Conditions, spelledout Chinas view of the unification process, noting that it

1 opposed an independent Taiwan or any contravention . . . of one China;2 did not challenge the development of non-governmental economic and

cultural ties by Taiwan with other countries;3 would hold negotiations with the Taiwan authorities on the peaceful unifica-

tion of the motherland;4 strove for peaceful unification of the motherland;5 would expand the economic exchanges and cooperation between the two

sides of the Taiwan Strait;6 urged that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should inherit and carry

forward fine traditions of Chinese culture;7 urged that all political parties in Taiwan promote the expansion of relations

between the two sides; and8 stated that Taiwan authorities were welcome to pay visits in appropriate

capacities . . . and that Chinese leaders were also ready to accept invitationsfrom the Taiwan side.34

INTRODUCTION

9

President Lee Teng-hui rejected this statement and later emphasized Taiwansindependence in his two state declaration in July 1999. This was received withconsternation in Beijing and perhaps in Washington, but such claims of Taiwanindependence have become commonplace during the terms of Lees successor,President Chen Shui-bian.

President Clintons enunciation of the three noes in a secret letter to JiangZemin in August 1995 was followed by his public statement in June 1998 that theUnited States (1) would oppose Taiwan independence; (2) would not supporttwo Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan; and (3) would not support Taiwansmembership in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.35

President George W. Bushs April 2001 interpretation of the TRA, in which hesaid the United States would do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself in the event of an armed attack by the PRC, made a notable impact in the media.Usually overlooked, however, is that the President followed this by stating thata declaration of independence by Taiwan is not part of the [USs] one-Chinapolicy.36

Bushs statement was followed by his April 2001 approval of the most com-prehensive list of weapons systems ever made available for Taiwans purchase.These two events seemed at the time to signal an important change in Americanpolicy, a change justified by the intent of the TRA to ensure the defense ofTaiwan, and by arguments that these weapons were needed by the Taiwan militaryagainst the much larger, modernizing Chinese forces. It seemed to indicate a newUS view of American responsibilities under the TRA.

However, the war against terrorism and Washingtons awareness of growingPRC military and economic power continue to underline US policy. ThePresidents April and June 2001 signals that American policy toward the defenseof Taiwan has fundamentally changed have been clarified by administration state-ments headlined by President Bushs December 2003 caution to Taipei: the long-standing US policy of deliberate ambiguity toward the ChinaTaiwan issueremains in effect.

Since Chen Shui-bians election to Taiwans presidency in 2000 and especiallysince his reelection in March 2004, the ChinaTaiwanUnited States diplomaticenvironment has been increasingly stirred by Taiwanese claims of sovereignty,American cautions against disturbing the cross-strait status quo, and Chineserefusal to deal with Chen, combined with warnings of military action should hedeclare de jure independence.

None of the three parties are willing to change the status quo in a way inimi-cal to their own interests, and do not even agree on how to define that term. InBeijings view, status quo means that Taiwan is part of China and negotiationsleading to reunification must occur. To Taipei, the status quo is defined asTaiwans independence. The US understanding of status quo is less definite,embracing no particular definition of Taiwans relationship to the mainland,focusing instead on the maintenance of peace and stability, and support for theislands democratic system. This reflects Washingtons perception that no

INTRODUCTION

10

mutually acceptable solution to this very difficult diplomatic and militarysituation is on the horizon.

Of all these documents and statements, only the TRA carries the force of USlaw. While it does not pledge US military assistance to Taiwans defense, it doesin effect guarantee that any unprovoked Chinese recourse to military (or eco-nomic) force against the island would be met by US intervention.37 On the otherhand, the three USPRC joint communiqus have been reaffirmed by every USpresident since they were signed and they constitute a formal framework forUSPRC relations concerning Taiwans status.

Chapter 3 describes the military threat to Taiwan, with a brief description ofChinas military capability. In addition to the army, navy, and air force, the mis-sile forces of the Second Artillery and the instruments of IW are surveyed.Chapter 4 describes and evaluates Taiwans new (c.2000) MND. The importantprocesses of civilianization and depoliticization of Taiwans defense establish-ment begun by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1977 are examined, as are the bureaucraticprocesses and civilmilitary relationships that influenced the reorganization.

Chapter 5 focuses on the personnel in Taiwans defense structure, both militaryand civilian. This chapter includes examination of the islands conscription sys-tem, training, and the extensive professional military education system. The roleof the political warfare officer in this (at least on paper) Leninist military will beexamined, especially in relation to the later discussion of civilmilitary relationson the island.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are devoted to examining Taiwans Army, Air Force,and Navy. The Marine Corps and Coast Guard are also discussed, although theCorps existence is endangered; the Coast Guard is an organ not of the MNDbut of the Executive Yuan. The armed forces capabilities will be examinedwithin a framework of Taiwans defensive strategy; equipment will of course bedescribed, but more importantly so will individual service cultures and opera-tional art.

The army always has been the dominant service in the Taiwan military in termsof leadership, budget share, and governmental influence. Taiwans current geopo-litical situation, however, has placed the army in a position of severely reducedoperational importance; given the islands maritime environment and the PRCsconcentration on naval and air force modernization, the primary military threat toTaiwan is not susceptible primarily to traditional army capabilities.

The Taiwan Air Force (TAF) established a sterling record against the PLA AirForce (PLAAF) during the 1950s Strait crises. This was due to pilot proficiency,but also owed a great debt to US equipment and training. At the beginning of thetwenty-first century, however, the TAF is facing its most daunting challenge, inview of the PLAAFs increasing inventory of fourth generation Russian designedfighters, the increasing presence of airborne warning and control system aircraft(AWACS)-type aircraft, and its acquisition of modern air-to-air missiles andaerial refueling capability. Additionally, the TAF faces a shortage of pilots andstagnant aircraft acquisition.

INTRODUCTION

11

The Taiwan Navy (TN) is composed of well-found and well-maintained ships.The submarine force is weak, and the naval fixed-wing aviation is almost non-existentnot a minor matter in view of Chinas growing submarine forcebut operates capable rotary wing assets. TN personnel appear to be well-trainedprofessionals; the questions included in this chapter are whether that forces train-ing and at-sea experience are sufficiently strong to defend Taiwan as part of ajoint military effort.

Chapter 9 may be the books most important, as it surveys the state ofcivilmilitary relations in Taiwan. The evolution of the islands government frommilitary autocracy to Western-style democracy is a remarkable accomplishment,one almost unique in modern history. How that process proceedsthe develop-ing nature of civilmilitary relationswill determine, in the final analysis, ifTaiwan is successful in maintaining itself as a distinct political entity.

Chapter 10 looks at the future, including budget problems, personnel shortfalls,and the steps under consideration to resolve them, strategic options, Taiwans acqui-sition of offensive weapons, and the US role in the current impasse. Examinationof Taiwans defense organization and military capabilities will be concluded inChapter 11. The preceding chapters will be summed up, examined, and integrated;material, organization, and military and civilian personnel will be factored into anevaluation of Taiwans ability to avoid war and retain its present political identity.

Conclusion

The present strategic situation in East Asia is dominated by old issues: Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese antagonism, unstable conditions on the Koreanpeninsula, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, insurgencies inthe Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, and the dispute over Taiwans status. TheUnited States is involved in all these situations, but none is so dangerous or sodeeply involves two nuclear-armed superpowers as does that involving Taiwansfuture. There are no apparent diplomatic solutions in the offing; the militaryinstrument of statecraft remains prominent on Chinas list of options, althoughBeijing clearly would prefer peaceful resolution of Taiwans status.

The PLA has been transformed over the past quarter-century, but is still no matchfor the US military at sea or in the air. That is not the crux of Taiwans militarypredicament, however, since its own military must be able to offer a credible deter-rent to Beijings willingness to use military force. US assistance to Taiwans militaryhas been a major factor in its growth and capability for more than half a century, andcontinues to represent a serious and complicated American commitment.

Resolution of Taiwans status depends in part on Beijings policy choices andin part on Washingtons decisions. Taiwans military must be strong enough toafford Taipei some freedom of choice, however, if it is to influence its own fate.Whether that fate is forced or peaceful unification with the mainland, or contin-ued de facto or even de jure independence will to a significant extent depend onthe Taiwan governments ability to avoid unjustifiable provocation.

INTRODUCTION

12

2

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

The Civil War is not ended: I question whether any serious civilwar ever does end.1

The early years

Taiwans military descends directly from the Nationalist Revolutionary Army(NRA) educated at the Whampoa Military Academy. Whampoa was founded inGuangzhou in spring of 1924 with the sole purpose of creating a new revolution-ary army for the salvation of China.2 The academys curriculum came primarilyfrom Soviet military and political advisors, and political indoctrination [was] itsmost important objective.3 The academy was a major influence in the organizationof both the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) and the Chinese CommunistParty (CCP) militaries. Sun Yat-sen was titular director and he appointed ChiangKai-shek as commandant, while Zhou Enlai headed the political department. Allofficers and students were expected to join the academys KMT cell.

Chiang led the NRA in the successful Eastern Expedition, which began inFebruary 1925. The Northern Expedition followed from 1926 to 1928, endingwith the nominal reunification of China under a central government, a majorevent in the emergence of both the Republic of China (ROC) and the PeoplesRepublic of China (PRC). The United Front (KMT and CCP) armies accom-plished remarkable military and political feats during the early stages of theNorthern Expedition, but fell apart in the summer of 1927, when the drive north-ward against warlords and competing national rulers invested the Yangtze RiverValley. Chiang Kai-shek then turned on his erstwhile allies, correctly suspectingthem of attempting to take over the revolutionary movement.

Chiang initially defeated his communist opponents and continued moving north,aware that he had little time to complete his campaign to unite China under theRepublican flag. Chiang often bribed and co-opted warlords and other opponentsduring his campaign, instead of defeating them in battle. The result was a swift cam-paign, but also a Nationalist army and republican movement that to a significantextent compromised its revolutionary credentials, a loss never regained. A unifiedROC was declared in December 1928, but in some respects was a hollow victory.

13

The Red Army of Workers and Peasants was organized as the CCPs formalmilitary force following the end of the First United Front with the Nationalists in1927. It was heavily influenced not only by Soviet advisors, but also by CCP lead-ers who had been trained in Moscow. The CCP and the Red Army soon resumedtheir version of the revolution, with the Nationalists the enemy.

Chiang Kai-shek faced both the Red Army and foreign economic, cultural, anddiplomatic pressures. British, Japanese, and US ships and troops stationedthroughout China made the country, in Mao Zedongs phrase, a semi-colony.4

The foreign military units enforced treaties of extraterritoriality and supportedeconomic and cultural intrusion. To these challenges was soon added Japans1931 seizure of Chinas three most northeastern provinces, followed by theoutright assault on Shanghai in 1932 and the invasion of northern China in 1937.

Chiang was unable to overcome either communist opposition or the Japaneseassault, and the KMT lost control of the Chinese revolution. A Second UnitedFront with Mao Zedongs CCP followed Chiangs kidnapping at Xian inDecember 1936, but neither Mao nor Chiang placed top priority on fightingJapan. Their primary concern remained winning the revolutionary struggle tounite China. Both at least nominally adhered to Sun Yat-sens Three PeoplesPrinciples of nationalism, democracy, and peoples livelihood. Both led armiesformed on a Leninist model, in which a hierarchy of political officers attemptedto ensure the primacy of political reliability. Both eagerly sought foreign assis-tance: military advisors and material assistance from Japan, Germany, the SovietUnion, and the United States were all grist for the revolutionary mill.

Under US pressure, Chiang and Mao conducted talks through representativesin Chongqing during the war, but neither was willing to reach an accommodationon other than his own terms. Chiang especially sought to wring the maximummaterial advantage from his American ally. He wanted this assistance not asmuch to fight the Japanese, however, as to hoard it for resuming the civil war afterJapan surrendered.5 Maos priority also lay with taking control of the Chineserevolution. He was unable to obtain significant US military assistance for theRed Army, but tried to establish a positive relationship with Washington untilhe became convinced that the United States unwaveringly supported theNationalists.

The efforts and professional abilities of General Joseph Stilwell and othersnotwithstanding, Chiang allowed his forces to fight the Japanese only when it wasunavoidable, preferring the operational delusions of US Army Air CorpsBrigadier General Claire Chennault, whose plans did not demand the resources ofStilwells more practical campaign.6 Nationalist troops fought well when properlyequipped, trained, and led, but were not often afforded that opportunity.7

After the Second World War

The Chinese Civil War reblossomed not long after Japans surrender in August1945, although dampened by the year long Marshall Mission, during which

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

14

General George C. Marshall, former commander of the US military effort in theSecond World War and future Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, triedvainly to bring the two sides together.8 He conceded defeat and was recalled toWashington in January 1947, after which the two sides resumed fighting in earnest.

Maos Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), as the Red Army was called after 1945,conducted a series of relatively conservative campaigns, ceding territory in favorof achieving political objectives. The PLA captured large quantities of US-supplied weapons from Nationalist troops and also received military equipmentfrom the Soviet troops who forced the Japanese surrender in northeastern China.The United States continued supplying military assistance to the Nationalists andChiang launched dramatic military movements made possible by US logisticalresources, but sometimes taken against the advice of American advisors. By mid-1947, the best Nationalist troops had deployed to North China, making themdependent on a communications network whose disintegration they couldnot prevent.9

During the Huai-Hai (Xuzhou) Campaign of November 1948January 1949,the PLAs East China Field Army (ECFA) and the Central Plains Field Army(CPFA) of more than 500,000 troops, augmented by 1.1 million civilian laborers,drove south from north China across through the Yangtze Valley, destroying theNationalist armies as an effective force.10 One observer of this campaign paintsan ugly picture of the army in defeat:

Rioters raided food stores . . . . at Xuchou where bodies were thrown intoopen graves, cannibalism was reported . . . . Chiang halted supplies to tryto force the garrison to break out, but they made no concerted move . . . .General Du Yuesheng fled disguised as an ordinary soldier; . . . but hewas captured. Another general did escape, shedding his uniform andbeing taken through the lines in a wheelbarrow. . . . On 15 January, afterlooting the shops, the last Nationalist crossed the Huai River, blowing upthe main bridge and killing thirty civilians who were on it at the time.The campaign cost the Nationalists 200,000 casualties. Even more mensurrendered or defected. . . . Officials and their families [in Nanking]joined an exodus to the south . . . . Chiangs eye was now on Taiwan. ThePLA crossed the Yangtze without opposition on 20 April 1949.11

The PLA victory was due to many factors, including better military leadership,higher morale, more acute operational decisions in the field, chance, extensivemobilization of the population to support the war effort, and not least, poormilitary judgment by Chiang and his commanders.12 The PLA campaign was aprominent example of Maos strategy of peoples war, drawing on the resourcesof the civilian population to defeat an enemy. Ironically, the Nationalists haddeveloped a similar concept during the Kiangsi Period of the mid-1930s, but theJapanese invasion contributed to their inability or unwillingness to again employthe strategy.13

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

15

To Taiwan

KMT forces had moved swiftly to Taiwan following Japans August 1945surrender. The Armys 70th Division landed on October 17 and the Japanesegarrison officially surrendered on October, 25 which was declared TaiwanRestoration Day.14 A crowd estimated at 300,000 Taiwanese greeted the arrivingNationalist soldiers, but their commander, General Keh King-en, disparaged theislands inhabitants: in a public address, he referred to Taiwan as beyond thepasses and a degraded territory populated by a degraded people.15 Despitethe welcoming crowd, Keh did face a generally pro-Japanese population; further-more, removal of Japanese police and troops meant the absence of authorities toenforce the rule of law.

Chiang Kai-shek visited Taiwan a year later, in October 1946. An estimated2 million military and civilian personnel (including family members) had madethe crossing to Taiwan by 1949, as part of what was to a degree an inglorioussauve qui peut scramble.

The first KMT Governor of Taiwan was General Chen Yi, whose primaryqualification was his personal loyalty to Chiang; Chen immediately announcedthat the Taiwanese people would not be granted the rights of the new (1947) ROCconstitution, but would be ruled under KMT tutelage.16 Chens oppressiveregime was marked by the 228 Incident, February 1947. The immediate causewas public reaction to policemen beating a female sidewalk vendor; the largerissue was KMT governmental behavior that was vastly inferiormore uncivi-lized, more corrupt, more lawless, and more arbitraryto that of their Japanesepredecessors. Civilian demonstrators were fired on by army troops with utmostbrutality; by the end of the incident, as many as 30,000 people may have died,many of them potential future leaders in Taiwans civilian society.17

US President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson had begunmoving the United States away from support of Chiang Kai-sheks regimefollowing the failure of the Marshall Mission in January 1947. The NationalSecurity Council (NSC) declared in October 1949, following the recommenda-tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that the U.S. Government does not intendto commit any of its armed forces to the defense of the island.18

The administration was concerned, however, that Chiangs Congressionalsupporters would link continued aid with the Marshall Plan request. Hence, a billfor $570 million in economic assistant to the KMT was sent to Congress inFebruary 1948 in conjunction with the funding the Marshal Plan for Europe; itprovided $63 million in economic assistance plus $125 million for the purchaseof military equipment.19

The US Administration presented its interpretation of why the communists hadwon in an August 1949 White Paper, understandably placing the blame squarelyon the ROCs shoulders:

The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of thecivil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

16

United States . . . . It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forceswhich this country tried to influence but could not . . . .The Nationalistarmies did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated.20

Truman then declared in January 1950 that The United States Governmentwill not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict inChina. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid oradvice to Chinese forces on Formosa.21

This did little to diminish continued Congressional and public support forChiang Kai-shek. The China Lobby in the United States took many forms andsucceeding administrations had to deal with this domestic pressure, while limit-ing diversion of diplomatic and military efforts from more important Cold Warobjectives.

Chiang had resigned from the ROC presidency before leaving the mainland in1949, but resumed the office after arriving on Taiwan. He continued a militarycampaign from Taiwan, with periodic attacks on various targets, not all of themcommunist. British, Polish, and other non-Chinese merchant ships were attacked;perhaps most egregious was the Nationalist Air Force bombing of Shanghai inFebruary 1950: US supplied aircraft and ordnance were used in this raid,which targeted the American-owned Standard Oil and Shanghai Power Companyfacilities and resulted in heavy casualties among civilians.

The State Department was outraged, in part because it was still manning the USConsulate in Shanghai. Taipeis response to the ensuing protest note was unsatis-factory, but the US Consul-General in Taipei reported that Taiwans militaryleaders believed that the United States will not retaliate in any serious wayalmost regardless of what they do.22

Korean War

In part because Washington interpreted North Koreas June 1950 invasion ofSouth Korea as the first step in a global communist assault, Truman ordered theSeventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait, nominally to prevent either China orTaiwan from attacking the other, but possibly also in acknowledgment of thecontinued domestic support for the Nationalist regime. He announced that

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communismhas passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nationsand will now use armed invasion and war. . . . in these circumstances theoccupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat tothe security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performingtheir lawful and necessary functions in that area. . . . The determinationof the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security inthe Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by theUnited Nations.23

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

17

Trumans decision returned the United States to the middle of the Chinese civilwar, where it remains. The President directed the US Seventh Fleet based at SubicBay in the Philippines to prevent the war from spreading to Chinese waters andislands. US Far East Commander General Douglas MacArthur was specificallydirected to prevent attacks by either China or Taiwan on the other, and cautionedthat no one other than the President as Commander-in-Chief has the authority toorder or authorize preventive action against [China].24

The aircraft carrier Valley Forge (CV-45), the heavy cruiser Rochester(CA-124), and eight destroyers sortied from Subic Bay to make a show of forcealong the China coast.25 This flotilla was by 1951 reduced to a destroyer tenderanchored in Kaohsiung Harbor and four destroyers, two of which were always onpatrol, transiting the Strait 1620 miles from the mainland. Aviation patrols werealso flown daily.26 US ships were stationed in the Taiwan Strait to maintain peacein the area, although in the words of one patrol commander, Chiang Kai-shek feltall along that his objective was to return to the mainland [while the United States]wanted to keep him there in Taiwan.27

Maos decision to intervene in the Korean War across the Yalu meant the indef-inite postponement of his planned invasion of Taiwan. This decision reflectedChinese concern about an allied military presence on its border with Korea, butalso apparently resulted to a degree from Maos belief that he had to prove him-self to Joseph Stalin as a true communist.28 The US strove to isolate the Taiwansituation; despite General Douglas MacArthurs favorable endorsement,Washington refused Chiang Kai-sheks offer of 33,000 Nationalist troops to fightin Korea.29

The battle for the islands, 19491952

The communist victory was not complete in October 1949, since Nationalistmilitary forces still occupied many islands, as well as some small areas on themainland. The PLA quickly took the more northern islands of Daxie, Jintang, andTaohua, due in large part to disorganized Nationalist defenders. In fact, the PLAattacks on these and several other islands were poorly planned and coordinated,without effective joint operations among sea, ground, and air forces. Despite theirsuccesses, these shortfalls became apparent during the assault on the more ablycommanded and better equipped Nationalist force on Jinmen (Quemoy).

The Jinmen campaign was launched on the night of October 24, 1949, whenmore than 9,000 troops of the PLA 28th Army attacked across the water nearXiamen. Planned follow-on support for the amphibious landing units did notarrive, however, and by the 27th the entire invasion force had collapsed afterintense fighting. Most of the 9,000 soldiers were killed and the remainder takenprisoner. It was a complete tactical defeat, the first of any significance sufferedby the PLA since the Kiangsi campaigns of the mid-1930s.

A recent critique by PLA General Liu Yazhou notes that in the battle of Jinmenthe 28th Army operations were uncoordinated and unsupported by logistics

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

18

forces. KMT planes and ships destroyed the PLAs 300 military vessels and aftera three-day battle not a single PLA soldier or boat escaped. Their lack of airsuperiority left several thousand PLA troops on the mainland powerless to assisttheir comrades on Jinmen. The PLA Daily has also analyzed the Jinmen defeat,noting that the assault force suffered from a lack of preparation, shortage ofassault ships, absence of experienced crews, inadequate communications, lack offirepower, and a lack of intelligence.30

Taking Hainan

Hainan was, after Taiwan, the largest island occupied by the Nationalists afterOctober 1949, and an important objective for Beijing. The PLA learned from theJinmen disaster; the assault on Hainan was carefully planned and rehearsed, withan emphasis on coordinated operations and massed firepower.

Approximately 100,000 PLA troops were placed under the unified commandof the 15th Group Army and assembled in staging areas on the Leizhou Peninsula,across from Hainan, in January and February 1950. They landed hundreds ofintelligence agents on the island to gather information for the assault force, andcommunications units were assigned throughout the assault force as part of aneffort to overcome the serious command and control problems that had severelyhampered the Jinmen operation.

The units designated for the initial amphibious attack on Hainan conductedfour major amphibious exercises before the operation. Another lesson taken fromthe Jinmen failure was the inadequacy of using unmodified civilian shipping tocarry the assault waves. For the Hainan operation, the PLA modified conscriptedcivilian ships with sandbags and light artillery.

The initial assault itself was conducted under cover of darkness, which enhancedthe element of surprise against the poorly organized Nationalist defenders. Poordeployment and disorganized patrol routines by the Nationalist navy resulted inless than half a dozen warships on patrol in the narrow waters between Hainanand the mainland, further enhancing the PLAs ability to launch a surprise attack.The Nationalist navy suffered significant losses in the naval engagements that didoccur, and were unable to hamper the invasion to any significant extent, althoughthey sank several PLA craft.

The actual assault was preceded by carefully planned artillery barrages from themainland that established control of the sea and airspace. The PLAs first wave ofapproximately 20,000 troops crossed the strait in almost 400 conscripted civilianships, many of them armed. They landed during the night of April 16 on severalsuitable landing beaches, and achieved almost complete surprise; the island wassecured by May 1, following additional, largely unopposed, amphibious landings.At least 70,000 Nationalist troops surrendered.

The Hainan defeat came at the hands of well-trained PLA troops executing acarefully designed operation plan, but was also due to extremely poor leadershipby Nationalist commanders, many of whom abandoned their troops and escaped

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

19

to Taiwan. It was a dark episode in the history of the Nationalist army, and furthertestament to the ineptness and poor morale of that military in the 1950s.

Taipeis military objectives in the early 1950s

Chiang Kai-shek formally resumed the presidency of the remnants of theNationalist government on March 1, 1950 and instructed the Army to secure themilitarys base in Taiwan before making the move to recover the Mainland.31 Hewould never publicly relinquish that goal.

Despite its strategic focus on the Cold War, the United States assistedNationalist incursions against the mainland, primarily through CIA-sponsoredoperations. One major effort was support of Nationalist remnants that had fledinto northern Burma in 1949, although the plan for these troops to invade ChinasYunnan Province was an unmitigated failure. The efforts in Tibet and alongChinas coast were more productive and sometimes costly to the mainland.32

The enthusiasm of CIA and US military advisors for these Nationalist militaryefforts was often stronger than that in Washington.33 Eisenhower, Dulles, andother senior American officials were concerned about Nationalist militarymorale, however, supported forays against the mainland to maintain Taipeisdetermination. Chiang Kai-shek used this argument to justify these attacks.34

Taiwan strait crisis, 19541955

The Hainan operation was followed by the efficient PLA seizure of severalsmaller islands; the final, significant phase of this campaign came in 1954, whenthe PLA secured the Dachen Islands. The Dachen Island campaign began withseveral weeks of sea and air battles from March through May 1954. Chinas EastSea Fleet attacked Taiwan naval forces north of Dachen; over several days, nineTaiwan combatants were sunk, or damaged, and forced to withdraw. The PLA AirForce (PLAAF) was not as successful, although by the beginning of May TaiwansAir Force (TAF) had largely withdrawn from the air over the Dachens.

Meanwhile, PLA ground forces were conducting the training and rehearsalsthat had proven so beneficial prior to the Hainan operation. The amphibiousassault began in the evening of May 15 with air cover and naval gunfire support.Despite achieving initial surprise, PLA air and naval forces suffered significantlosses; these were not sufficient to deter the overall attack, however, and the PLAsoon occupied four of the smaller islands in the chain, killing or capturing thedefenders.

Dachen itself, as well as Yijiangshan Island in the same chain, were attacked inJanuary 1955. Large naval and air forces supported the troops with whom theyhad trained and rehearsed the operation. Both islands were immediately seized,against numerically weak Nationalist defenders.

Under US pressure, Chiang Kai-shek directed the evacuation of the remainingDachen Islands on January 21. The successful evacuation of 13,701 military

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

20

personnel and the islands 11,120 civilian inhabitants was made possible byAmerican amphibious ships; US military officers effectively conducted theoperation and their reports of uncooperative Nationalist commanders echoedthose of earlier US military advisors to Chiang Kai-shek.35 In another echo of ear-lier Nationalist military shortcomings, the garrisons junior officers and enlistedpersonnel for the most part worked hard and courageously, while senior officersand staff stood by. The success of the operation was also due in part to the PLAsrules of engagement (ROE) imposed by Mao Zedong, which forbade attacks onUS units.

The Dachens were in PLA hands by the end of February 1955, which effec-tively ended the islands campaign, although future crises occurred over Jinmenand Mazu (Matsu), as discussed later. Chinas announced policy was to liberateTaiwan and its offshore islands of Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu.36 Mao orderedan artillery bombardment of these small islands in early September 1954 thatlasted for twelve days, but was not followed by an invasion attempt. The PLAbegan apparent assault preparations on the mainland opposite Jinmen, followingthe successful operations in the Dachens, but the crisis eased in April 1955 whenPremier Zhou Enlai called for talks over the issue at the Bandung Conference ofnonaligned nations.

Mao misjudged the strength of the US reaction in 19541955, and complained:We fired a few shells on Jinmen and Mazu [actually more than 10,000 werefired]. I did not expect the entire world would be so deeply shocked and thesmoke and mist is shading the sky.37 The United States misjudged Beijingsintentions in the Strait and the Administrations threats to attack China withnuclear weapons influenced Maos decision to develop a nuclear arsenal.

One of the reasons cited by Mao Zedong for bombarding Jinmen and Mazuwas to destroy the chance of the United States concluding the treaty withTaiwan,38 but in fact Maos policy was the primary cause of the December 1954Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan. Only Taiwanbenefited to a degree from the 19541955 crisis. In addition to the treaty, inJanuary 1955 Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, which authorized thePresident to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems neces-sary for the specific purpose of securing and defending Formosa and thePescadores (Penghus) against armed attack.39

The resolution also included the phrase security and protection of such relatedposition and territories of that area now in friendly hands, which was intendedby Congress to include Jinmen and Mazu.40 The Nationalists, however, wereforced off all the islands except the Penghus (Pescadores), Jinmen, and Mazu. Thelatter two were in a tactically valuable position near the harbors of Xiamen andFuzhou, respectively, and offered convenient outposts for launching raiders andpropaganda against the mainland, but they constituted a significant drain on theTaiwan military.

The 19541955 crisis had mixed results for the USTaiwan relationship. Whilethe Mutual Defense Treaty pleased Chiang Kai-shek, Washington insisted that he

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

21

not attack the mainland without first obtaining American approval, refusedovertly to include Jinmen and Mazu in the treatys coverage, and refused Chiangany control over US troops stationed in Taiwan. Chiang, in turn, thought thatWashington had reneged on a promise to publicly announce that the treatycovered the offshore islands.41

Neither President Dwight D. Eisenhower nor Secretary of State John FosterDulles especially favored the treaty with Taiwan, but the 19541955 crisis forcedthem to increase American support to Chiang in the face of what they interpretedas a global communist campaign directed by Moscow, and by popular sentimentin the United States. Military advice to the President was contradictory and ofteninflammatory; fortunately, Eisenhowers military credentials were impeccableand his judgment proved correct.42

At times during this crisis, both the President and the Secretary of State spokedirectly and forcefully to Chiang, to ensure that the United States was not drawninto a war with China, which some State Department officials thought was theTaiwan leaders objective.43 After approving the treaty with Taiwan, Eisenhoweropined that This has been a difficult negotiation but the result, I believe, stakesout unqualifiedly our interest in Formosa and the Pescadores [not Jinmen andMazu] and does so on a basis which will not enable the Chinese Nationalists toinvolve us in a war with Communist China.44

Taiwan strait crisis, 1958

The 19541955 crisis effectively ended with Zhou En-lais statements atBandung, Indonesia in April, and informal talks in Geneva in August 1955between Chinese and US ambassadors. Mao resumed artillery and verbal attacksin August 1958, however, that lasted until January 1, 1959. PLA artillery firedmore than 400,000 shells at Jinmen and Mazu during this period.45 Beijing prob-ably had several reasons for launching this crisis. First, Maos Great LeapForward campaign in 19581959 had proven an unmitigated disaster and he mayhave been seeking a diversion from domestic problems.

Second, the coming split with the Soviet Union was already apparent to Maoand he may have been seeking a means either to draw his ally into renewed sup-port of China or, failing this, to demonstrate that Nikita Krushchevs Soviet Unionwas no longer deserving as communisms world leader, a role more appropriateto Maoist China. Third, Mao thought that the Soviet nuclear arsenals and newinter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) established something of a nuclearsafety net for China; he also proclaimed the acceptability of a nuclear war,directly contradicting Krushchevs position that such a war was unimaginable.46

Fourth, the international scene in Asia was colored by the still burbling war inVietnam, insurgencies at various levels of activity throughout Southeast Asia andin Tibet, and US involvement in Lebanon in the summer of 1958. Mao may havealso thought that American involvement in the Middle East would limitWashingtons possible responses in support of Taiwan.

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

22

Fifth, not only did the USROC Mutual Defense Treaty and the FormosaResolution rankle, but Chiang Kai-shek was actively engaged in the first stagesof what he insisted was an eventual effort to retake the mainland by military force.In the mid-1950s, Chiang not only refused to evacuate Taiwan troops from Jinmenand Mazu, but reinforced those tenuously positioned islands, building to a forceof more than 86,000 on the former and over 23,000 on the latter, which repre-sented fully one-third of the army.47 Taiwans forces also continued making peri-odic raids on mainland installations, assisting Tibetan insurgents, and resupplyingKMT troops in northern Burma and northwest Thailand.

The President had little choice but to support Taiwan, given the ongoing ColdWar, although Dulles described the situation as a horrible dilemma. One aptdescription of American policy during the decades crises over the Taiwan Straitislands is that the United States slid down [a] slope of uncertainty and appre-hension into defense of Jinmen and Mazu.48 Military support became especiallysignificant in the mid-to-late 1950s, as TAF fighter pilots were provided withheat-seeking Sidewinder missiles that helped them establish and maintain airsuperiority over the Taiwan Strait.

Even more significant was the American provision of nuclear-capable 8-inchhowitzers, which were stationed on Jinmen and could easily reach targets onthe Chinese mainland. Although nuclear shells were not provided for theseweapons, nuclear-capable, 600 mile-range Matador missiles were stationed onTaiwan.49

Sixth, Mao may have been determined to demonstrate Chinas independencefrom the post-Stalin Soviet Union. He ordered resumption of a massive artilleryassault on Jinmen and Mazu, which began on August 23, 1958 with a 57,000 shellbarrage, while appearing to make preparations on the mainland for an amphibi-ous assault on the islands. The 48,000 PLA troops stationed in the Fuzhou areawere believed sufficient to take Mazu, but the 80,000 garrisoned on the mainlandnear Jinmen were considered far short of the 200,000 needed to occupy thatisland.50

Eisenhower and Dulles remained concerned that Chiang wanted to drag theUnited States into war with China, but Beijing probably never intended assault-ing Jinmen or Mazu in 1958.51 As was the case in 19541955, Mao forbade thePLA from attacking US forces without his prior permission. Despite his claimthat the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind in international affairs, Maowanted to pressure Taiwan, not get involved in a war with the United States.52

Mao once again misjudged the situation. He apparently underestimatedTaiwans morale and military determination. Not only did the TAF decisivelydefeat the PLAAF, but the Nationalist troops on Jinmen and Mazu withstood thePLA artillery bombardment with steadfast dedication.53

Washingtons reaction also seemed to surprise Beijing. In the face of a PLANattempt to blockade the islands to prevent resupply by sea, the President orderedUS Naval forces to escort TN ships resupplying the islands and assembled apowerful nuclear-capable task force in the area, including five aircraft carriers

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

23

and all available minesweepers, while the Strategic Air Command deployednuclear-capable B-47 bombers to Guam.54

Mao apparently had not believed Dulles public statements of January 12,1954, in which he had threatened massive [nuclear] retaliation againstCommunist aggression.55 Possibly sparked by the public disclosure of thedisagreement between Washington and Taipei about maintaining the garrisons onJinmen and Mazu, Mao decided not to continue threatening to assault the islands.A brief cease-fire was declared by Beijing in early October and succeeded by astrange period during which the islands were bombarded only on even days.56

Washington followed a careful line during the 1958 crisis to deter both Beijingand Taipei. John Foster Dulles insisted that the United States had to defend theStrait islands for symbolic rather than military reasons, but also ruefully observedthat the United States was drifting in very dangerous waters without an ade-quately prepared chart.57 Nuclear attacks against Chinese targets were discussedin an effort to deter China from trying to seize the islands, while Chiang Kai-shekwas warned not to attack mainland targets and contingency plans to evacuateJinmen and Mazu were drawn up.

As was the case during most earlier crises, except for the Air Force the Taiwanmilitary demonstrated poor organization and inadequate training in 1958.Extensive US assistance was required to resupply Jinmen and Mazu and some UScommanders suspected Taiwan military leaders of deliberately trying to make itappear that US strikes on the mainland were required to save the islands.58

Hence, the JCS issued, President Eisenhower approved, and local Americanmilitary leaders rigidly enforced strict ROE designed to prevent US clashes withChinese military forces. In the words of the Commander, US Seventh Fleet,I think if the ChiNats [Chinese Nationalists] would slow down now on provoca-tive actions that the situation would quiet down. This view was echoed by the UScommander on Taiwan.59

To reduce the chances of an inadvertent war with China, Washington placedUS commanders in a position where they could control Taiwanese as well asAmerican military forces, to include preparing to assume total responsibility forthe air defense of Taiwan.60 In retrospect, Beijing misjudged Taipei andWashington; Washington misunderstood Beijing and Taipei; Taipei flounderedthrough the crises, much as Chiang Kai-shek seemed to have done since 1927. Itwas not an example of wise statesmanship by either the PRC or the United States,as they allowed a relatively minor player to drive their relationship.

Chiang continued to be a difficult ally; his intransigence echoed that of earliercrises: Taiwan will not be coerced into changing its position because of the alliednations attitude, . . . If necessary, Taiwan will fight alone.61 Despite US adviceand pressure to reduce his military costs and the number of personnel in uniform,Chiang insisted on continuing to enlarge his military, maintaining 600,000personnel under arms and obligating 15 percent of Taiwans GNP and fully85 percent of total governmental expenditures devoted to the military.62

HISTORY OF TAIWANS MILITARY

24

The US commitment to defend Jinmen and Mazu remained an issue even afterthe 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty deliberately omitted them. It was a prominentpoint of dispute between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon during the 1960presidential campaign debates.63

Taiwan strait crisis, 1962

This episode was more a potential than an actual crisis, since no combat occurred.That was because Washington was determined not to allow Chiang Kai-sheksprovocations to drive its policies, and because of Beijings effective deterrentmoves. The scene was set by several factors. First, the United States and Japansigned a Mutual Defense Treaty in January 1960, which reinforced Beijings fearthat they were conspiring against China.

Seco