Tariq Rauf - Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad · Tariq Rauf * Introduction The third and final...

* Tariq Rauf was Head of Verification and Security Policy at the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Alternate

Head of the IAEA NPT Delegation 2002-2010. He has attended

all NPT meetings as an official delegate since 1987 through

2019. Personal views are expressed here for purposes of

discussion. A version of this report was published on

AtomicReporters.com. 1

Visions of Butterflies and Unicorns

as the Nuclear Arms Control Architecture

Collapses:

The Final Session of the Preparatory Committee

for the 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review

Conference

Tariq Rauf *

Introduction

The third and final session of the Preparatory Committee

(PrepCom) for the 2020 Review Conference of the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons1

(NPT) collapsed in disagreements over the pace and

extent of nuclear disarmament at United Nations

headquarters in New York on May 10, 2019. At the NPT

PrepCom held from April 28 through May 10, 2019,

representatives of 150 States parties took part in the

discussions, 106 statements were made in the General

Debate followed by scores of sometimes repetitive

statements under three “clusters” of issues:

1. Nuclear disarmament and security assurances;

2. Nuclear verification (IAEA safeguards), nuclear

weapon-free zones, regional issues including

with respect to the Middle East, and North

Korea and South Asia;

Journal of Strategic Affairs

2

3. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, NPT review

process and provisions for withdrawal from the

Treaty.2

In 2020, the NPT will mark its Golden Jubilee, 50 years,

in force since 1970 and 25 years since the Treaty was

extended in 1995 to remain in place indefinitely, i.e.

permanently. The NPT with 191 States parties is

considered to be the essential cornerstone of the global

nuclear governance regime covering nuclear non-

proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of

nuclear energy. The NPT is recognised to be a major

success in halting the further proliferation of nuclear

weapons and has contained their possession to nine

States (USA, USSR/Russian Federation, UK, France,

China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea – in that

chronological order)-though the last three States listed

never signed the NPT and North Korea withdrew from

the Treaty in 2003.

Many Western States are focusing on marking the

Golden Jubilee of the NPT in 2020 through highlighting

the widespread peaceful applications of nuclear energy

such as, for example, in agriculture, electricity

production, human health and salinity, and strengthening

the nuclear verification capabilities of the International

Atomic Energy Agency; while downplaying the failure

to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. On the

other side, many non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS)

from Asia, Africa and Latin America are pointing out

that the promise of the NPT to end the age of nuclear

weapons remains largely unfulfilled.

At NPT meetings, States set themselves up in political

groupings, the largest of which is the Group of Non-

Aligned States (NAM)3 numbering around 122; the

Western and Others Group (WEOG) that includes


3

Western countries (EU, NATO, Canada, USA) along

with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea;

and the Eastern Group that includes the Russian

Federation, Belarus, Hungary, Poland and some other

East European countries (even though some are in the

EU and NATO). In addition, there are issue-based

groupings, such as: the New Agenda Coalition4 (NAC)

with Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and

South Africa; the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Initiative5 (NPDI) with Australia, Canada, Chile,

Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the

Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab

Emirates; the Vienna Group of Ten6 with Australia,

Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland,

the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden; the

“de-alerting”7 (of nuclear weapons) group with Chile,

Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and

Switzerland; the “P-5” nuclear-weapon States (China,

France, Russian Federation, UK and USA); the Group of

Arab States,8 among others. Thus, there is a bewildering

array of groupings of States each pushing their

converging and diverging views and as a result making

the achievement of consensus or agreement even more

difficult.

The mandate9 of the Preparatory Committee is two-fold:

1. To complete the procedural preparations for the next

NPT review conference which include agreement on

the dates of the next two sessions of the PrepCom,

the rules of procedure, the agenda and programme of

work, and endorsement of the President of the review

conference;

2. To make “recommendations” on issues pertaining to

the “three pillars”10

of the Treaty-nuclear non-

proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses

of nuclear energy, in addition to security assurances


4

for non-nuclear-weapon States and regional issues.

This year’s session of the PrepCom, like its

predecessors, managed to complete the procedural

preparations and endorsed in principle the candidacy

of Ambassador Rafael Grossi (Permanent

Representative of Argentina to the International

Atomic Energy Agency and other international

organisations in Vienna) as President of the 2020

NPT Review Conference. However, as in previous

years, States parties were unable and unwilling to

overcome their deep differences and thus did not

agree on any “recommendations” even though these

are only indicative and not binding for the review

conference.

While much oxygen was expended and ink spilled on

concerns and allegations regarding the current sorry state

of international relations, political and military conflicts,

decline of multilateralism in favour of unilateralism and

pursuit of narrow national interests, in effect the

gathered diplomats fiddled verbally unable to do

anything to prevent the collapsing architecture of nuclear

arms control. The US has unilaterally withdrawn from

the 2015 “Iran nuclear deal” even though 14 successive

reports from the IAEA confirm that Iran is implementing

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action11

(JCPOA)

regarding limits on its nuclear programme, the 1987 US-

USSR Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range

Nuclear Forces12

(INF) is on track to be killed off in

August this year, and the 2010 New Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty13

between the US and the Russian

Federation is set to expire in February 2021 unless

renewed. Just as the senators of Rome fiddled away

while the city burned, today’s diplomats seem helpless

in averting the total collapse of nuclear arms control thus

paving the way for a dangerous new nuclear arms race

with increased risks of accidental or deliberate use of

nuclear weapons.


5

The Roots of Division and Discord

Nuclear Disarmament

From the very first NPT review conference held in 1975,

and every five years thereafter, the main area of division

and discord is on nuclear disarmament as required under

Article VI of the Treaty. The five nuclear-weapon States

(NWS) parties, along with their allies, traditionally have

linked disarmament to national and international security

considerations, as well as to disarmament also covering

conventional and other types of weapons. In contrast, in

general, most of the non-nuclear-weapon States have

emphasised the implementation of NPT Article VI as it

pertains to nuclear disarmament. Over the years, the

Western States have promoted a so-called “step-by-step

approach”,14

or “building blocks” to achieve

disarmament-i.e., the NPT to be followed by a

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,15

then a fissile

material control treaty,16

and then other unspecified

steps. In contrast, the NAM States have been proposing

a phased programme and a specified time frame for the

complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a

nuclear weapons convention or other similar legally

binding treaty17

.

At the 2000 NPT review conference, the NWS agreed on

an unequivocal undertaking towards the total elimination

of their nuclear arsenals through 13 practical steps for

systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article

VI of the Treaty in accordance with the principles of

transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.18

And, at

the 2010 NPT review conference reference was made to

the catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear

weapons that led to three international conferences on

the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons19

–

Oslo (2013)20

, Nayarit (2014)21

and Vienna (2014)22

.


6

These were followed by UN General Assembly

mandated “Open-ended Working Groups to develop

proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear

disarmament negotiations” that met in 2013-2014 and in

201623

– these meetings were boycotted by the NWS and

their allies. In 2016, the General Assembly, on a vote of

123 in favour, 68 opposed and 16 abstentions, mandated

negotiations in 2017 on a legally binding treaty to

prohibit nuclear weapons.24

These negotiations, again

boycotted by the NWS and their allies, led to the Treaty

on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons25

(TPNW) that

was adopted by 122 States in July 2017 – currently it has

70 signatories with 23 ratifications, and will enter into

force when 50 States have ratified26

. The TPNW has

further exacerbated divisions between its supporters and

opponents, NATO27

as well as the five NWS28

and India

and Pakistan have vociferously opposed the TPNW.

The proponents of the TPNW wisely opted not to make

this treaty the centrepiece of their statements in the

disarmament cluster thus disappointing the strident

opponents who feared that the PrepCom would be

“highjacked” by the TPNW. A new element, however,

was introduced by the US at the 2018 NPT PrepCom in

Geneva when it proposed “Creating the Conditions for

Nuclear Disarmament”29

(CCND), sweeping aside

previously agreed measures from the 1995, 2000 and

2010 NPT review conferences. At this year’s PrepCom,

the US reformulated its CCND proposal to “Creating the

Environment for Nuclear Disarmament”30

(CEND) and

based its new approach on the grounds that the “step-by-

step” approach had failed to deliver results and thus a

completely new track was needed to create the

conditions and environment that could lead to further

nuclear arms reductions involving all possessors of

nuclear weapons.


7

A new undefined vision of “Creating the Environment

for Nuclear Disarmament”, based on dreaming of

butterflies and unicorns to appear magically and sprinkle

fairy dust leading to an uncharted new world of nuclear

arms control, has left unquestioningly loyal allies, who

have docilely backed the “step-by-step” or “building

blocks” or “stepping stones” approaches, directionless

and squirming in the confusing cesspool of

unilateralism.

It is nonetheless interesting that at the Conference on

Disarmament in Geneva, when the US presented its

CEND approach on 26 March 2019, in its statement

Pakistan noted that “Pakistan can relate to the US

approach of CEND, as we have consistently held the

view that progress on arms control and disarmament

cannot be delinked from the security challenges and

concerns which force States to resort to nuclear

deterrence for self-defence. As such, a dialogue on

creating the environment for nuclear disarmament, and

addressing the underlying issues which hamper this

objective, is indeed an essential one”. As the US

foresees the CEND working group to involve only a few

selected States, Pakistan cautioned that “it is imperative

to ensure that the conversations on this subject have the

presence of all relevant stakeholders since the security

concerns of the States at the regional and global levels

are interlinked” and that “Pakistan remains committed to

the goal of a nuclear weapons free world achieved as a

cooperative and universally agreed undertaking, through

a consensus-based process involving all the relevant

stakeholders, resulting in equal and undiminished, if not

increased security for all States”31

. In this context, it

could be useful for Pakistan to resume its participation in

NPT review process meetings as a State non-party

observer - as it did until 1997.32

This would provide a

good forum in which Pakistan could advance its regional


8

security initiatives and differentiate itself from India’s

across the board opposition to most regional and global

nuclear disarmament initiatives, but then new thinking

needs to be the order of the day in the “Naya Pakistan”-

whether Pakistan can break out of its self-imposed

constraints and free itself of its defensive views, remains

an open question?

Middle East

In addition to discord and divisions over nuclear

disarmament, the second contentious issue concerns the

establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other

weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle

East (MEWMDFZ). At the 1995 NPT Review and

Extension Conference the decision had to be taken on

the future course of the Treaty. In order to get the

support of the States of the Arab Group and of Iran, the

three depositary States of the NPT – the Russian

Federation (USSR), UK and the USA – co-sponsored a

Resolution on the MEWMDFZ33

that became an integral

part of the inter-linked package that allowed for the

indefinite extension of the NPT. The 2000 NPT review

conference called upon Israel by name to accede to the

NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and for the

implementation of the 1995 resolution34

. The 2010 NPT

review conference mandated a regional conference on

the zone to be convened by 2012;35

however, the US

unilaterally postponed that conference leading to

criticism by the Arab States, Iran, the Russian Federation

and the NAM. The 2015 NPT review conference

collapsed into failure when the US followed by Canada

and the UK vetoed a proposal to hold such a conference

by 2016 under the aegis of the UN Secretary General36

.

In 2018, the General Assembly adopted a decision by

vote mandated the UN Secretary General to convene a

MEWMDFZ conference before the end of 201937

.


9

According to unconfirmed reports circulating at the

PrepCom, it was alleged that some Western States were

working behind the scene to prevent the convening of

such a conference, but it is known that some States

remain opposed38

to the proposals advanced by the Arab

States.

In general, led by the US, the Western Group and EU

States have opposed putting pressure on Israel to attend

such a conference leading to unhappiness and anger on

the part of the Arab States, Iran and the NAM. This issue

once again stumped agreement at the 2019 NPT

PrepCom. Even though now there are serious divisions

between some members of the Arab Group, and also

with Iran and Syria; nonetheless on the matter of the

MEWMDFZ the group manages to coalesce behind a

common position39

.

The Blame Game

Given the precipitous decline in international relations

over the past few years, not surprisingly there is growing

fatigue and frustration in the inability and powerlessness

of the majority of non-NWS to move on nuclear

disarmament through the NPT review process.

Consequently, many diplomats and research institute

experts are flailing around attacking the efficacy of the

review process, while largely ignoring the corrosive

effects of worsening political relations, hardened

positions, lack of flexibility, decline in negotiating skills

for compromise and growing ignorance of the

sophistication of the strengthened review process. NPT

review conferences were never designed to be forums

for either negotiating legally binding treaties or

conventions on nuclear weapons, for nuclear verification

measures for IAEA safeguards, or for battling over

major international political controversies and resolving


10

differences especially relating to ‘compliance’ with

IAEA safeguards by non-nuclear-weapon States.

Since 2014 in particular, the NPT review process has

been eroding and deteriorating with loss of civility and

respect in discourse, lack of political will and

competence to develop common ground in support of the

NPT, retracting agreed steps and actions under the NPT

review process, disregard of international law while

touting the preservation of a so-called “rules based

international order”, and blaming the review process for

the inability of States parties to join hands to strengthen

the integrity and authority of the NPT.

Just as the band playing on the deck of the Titanic could

not prevent its sinking, diplomats are unable and

unwilling to reverse the steady undermining of the NPT

strengthened review process as they persist in defending

entrenched positions, are unwilling to find common

ground in the interest of preserving the NPT, and are

failing to fully implement the relevant guidance from the

1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT review conferences.

Chairman’s Draft Recommendations

In accordance with the mandate for the third and final

session of the PrepCom to prepare a report containing

recommendations to the review conference, the

Chairman, Ambassador Syed Mohamad Hasrin (of

Malaysia), circulated his draft report to delegations on

Friday, May 3, 201940

. The draft recommendations

which on the whole were relatively balanced and broadly

reflected the views of States, inter alia, included:

Reaffirmation of the commitment to promote the full

implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as

well as the reaffirmation of the previous


11

commitments of the 1995 NPTREC, the 2000 and

2010 Review Conferences;

Call on nuclear-weapon States to cease the

development of new types of nuclear weapons, and

refrain from qualitative improvements to existing

nuclear weapons, and further minimise the role and

significance of nuclear weapons in all military and

security concepts, doctrines and policies;

Call for the entry into force as soon as possible of the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),

and pending the entry into force of the need to

maintain moratoria on nuclear test explosions;

Reaffirm that the IAEA is the competent authority

responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance

with the Statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards

system, compliance by States parties with the

safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of

their obligations under the NPT;

Note that the comprehensive safeguards agreement

and the additional protocol represent the enhanced

verification standard which enables the IAEA to

provide increased assurances on the non-diversion of

declared nuclear material and on the absence of

undeclared nuclear material and activities;

Reaffirm the central role of the IAEA in

strengthening the nuclear security framework

globally and in coordinating international activities in

the field of nuclear security;

Recall that nothing in the Treaty should be

interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the

Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production

and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

without discrimination and in conformity with the

Treaty;


12

Acknowledge that each State party has the right to

define its national energy policy and that nuclear

power is expected to continue playing an important

role in the energy mix of many countries;

Reaffirm the central role of the IAEA in promoting

international cooperation on nuclear safety-related

matters, including through the establishment of

nuclear safety standards;

Continue efforts towards the full implementation and

the realisation of the objectives of the 1995 resolution

on the Middle East and take into account the

conference for the negotiation of a binding treaty on

the creation of a Middle East zone free of nuclear

weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to be

held in 2019;

Note the strong support for the continued

implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action; and

Urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to

abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear

programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible

manner.

Given the prevailing deleterious international security

situation and ongoing squabbling among States it was

not a surprise that, on May 8 and 9, 2019, the Chair’s

draft report while perfunctorily praised, was attacked

from all sides for not adequately reflecting various

idiosyncratic views of different States and groupings and

many suggestions were made for “improving” the

document. As is usual practice, the Chair then circulated

a revised draft41

on the evening of May 9, 2019 that inter

alia included:

Reaffirm the responsibility of all States parties to the

full implementation of the Treaty and the importance


13

of open, inclusive and transparent dialogue to achieve

this end;

Express concern at the erosion of the treaty-based

disarmament architecture and underscore the

mutually reinforcing relationship of its relevant

treaties;

Call for the elaboration of measures that can

contribute to building confidence and to reduce the

risk of the use of nuclear weapons, either

intentionally, by miscalculation, or by accident, in the

context of achieving nuclear disarmament;

Reiterate the deep concern at the catastrophic

humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons,

including any intentional or accidental nuclear

explosion and call for further consideration to prevent

the devastation that would be visited upon all

humanity by a nuclear war and the consequent need

to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war

and to take measures to safeguard the security of

peoples; and reaffirm the need for all States at all

times to comply with applicable international law,

including international humanitarian law;

Acknowledge the need for a legally-binding norm to

prohibit nuclear weapons in order to achieve and

maintain a world without nuclear weapons;

Recognise that comprehensive safeguards agreements

have been successful in their main focus of providing

assurance regarding non-diversion of declared

nuclear material and have also provided a limited

level of assurance regarding the absence of

undeclared nuclear material and activities. Note that

the implementation of measures specified in the

model additional protocol provides, in an effective

and efficient manner, increased confidence about the

absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities

in a State as a whole. Note also that numerous States


14

are of the view that those measures have been

introduced as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards

system. Also note that it is the sovereign decision of

any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once

in force, the additional protocol is a legal obligation;

Recognise the indispensable role of science and

technology, including nuclear science and

technology, in achieving social and economic

development for all States parties call on the United

Nations development system to work closely with the

IAEA to maximise the potential role of nuclear

science and technology for development;

Note the significant progress made on the

establishment of the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium

Bank in Kazakhstan. Note also that the creation of

mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply

should not affect State parties’ rights under the

Treaty and should be without prejudice to their

national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the

technical, legal and economic complexities

surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the

requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards;

Recall that all States should abide by the decision

adopted by consensus at the IAEA General

Conference on 18 September 2009 on the prohibition

of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear

installations, during operation or under construction;

Stress the importance of maintaining peace and

stability on the Korean Peninsula, as well as of the

peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea nuclear issue, and

encourage efforts towards continuing dialogue and

engagement for the full denuclearisation of the

Korean Peninsula;

Call upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the

Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States promptly and


15

without conditions, and to bring into force

comprehensive safeguards agreements as required by

the Treaty; and

Encourage States parties to be represented at a high

level at the 2020 NPT Review Conference.

In his revised draft, in effect the Chair inter alia

strengthened the text on nuclear disarmament, referred to

the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, and

included a call on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to

the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

On the last day, May 10, 2019 there was near bedlam as

State after State mostly from the Western side criticised

the revised draft as being unacceptable and these States

then stated that they were prepared to work on the basis

of the original draft which they now miraculously found

either as a basis for moving forward or to be adopted

unchanged! On the other hand, many though not all

NAM States praised the revised draft and indicated their

willingness to accept it despite its shortcomings. The

complaints related to the language on nuclear

disarmament, the additional protocol to safeguards

agreements, the JCPOA and Iran’s compliance, non-

compliance by Syria with the NPT regarding its

undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor in 2007, the

Middle East WMDFZ conference, nuclear security,

North Korea denuclearisation and other matters.

It is noteworthy that the Chair performed his duties with

grace and humour and maintained the confidence of the

PrepCom throughout, though on the last two days his

luck ran out when several States expressed their

criticisms of his draft recommendations as discussed in

this report.


16

Conclusion

At 11:22 EST New York on May 10, the 2019 NPT

PrepCom Chair announced that in the absence of

consensus on both the original and revised draft

recommendations, he would circulate them as

“Recommendations by the Chair to the 2020 NPT

Review Conference”42

.

Yet again, NPT States abjectly failed to agree on

Recommendations after harping for nearly two weeks on

the importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the

global nuclear governance system and highlighting the

significance of the 50th anniversary of the NPT in 2020.

One astute participant was heard to mutter under his

breath rather cruelly that the right and left brain

hemispheres of some delegations were disconnected and

they were suffering from acute disconnection syndrome!

The main divisions between delegations were primarily

over nuclear disarmament, Iran, Syria, the IAEA

additional protocol, nuclear security, access to peaceful

uses of nuclear technology, the Middle East WMDFZ

conference and other related matters. In general, the EU,

NATO and “nuclear umbrella States”43

opposed the

revised draft recommendations; while NAM, African

and other States expressed support for them. In the

closing session, a numbers game was played in response

to NAM States assertions that NAM statements were on

behalf of 122 States; as France read out names of 70

States supporting a call for DPRK denuclearisation44

and

the US read out names of 52 States on Syrian non-

compliance with IAEA safeguards45

. China criticised the

French coordinated statement and stated that the NPT

review process was not the right forum for DPRK

matters. The Russian Federation bitterly complained

about problems in getting visas to attend NPT and UN


17

meetings and even suggested moving the 2020 review

conference to Vienna or Geneva if the visa problems

were not resolved. This author has been proposing since

2017, that the NPT review conference should be held in

Vienna, as unlike New York and Geneva all “three

pillars” are represented in Vienna given the presence of

the headquarters of the IAEA and the CTBT

Organisation (CTBTO), and he was responsible at the

2005 review conference in moving the first session of

the PrepCom to Vienna from New York starting in 2007.

The reversion to loss of civility in discourse in the

second week of the PrepCom was an unwelcome

reminder of the rancour at the end of the 2015 NPT

review conference. Iran, Russian Federation, Syria and

the United States engaged in frequent “rights of reply”

that sometimes resorted to language not usually heard in

diplomatic forums and left a bad taste all around. This

was reflective of the general discourse in international

relations prevalent today and the NPT review process is

not immune to this slide in civility.

Despite the doom and gloom referred to above there

were a couple of positive developments. In an

enhancement of the strengthened review process, the

Chairs of the 2017 and 2018 PrepCom sessions made a

useful innovation in submitting an “Inter-Chair working

paper: conclusions and recommendations for the

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons”46

. And, in 2017 the Chair circulated on his

authority his paper titled “Towards 2020: Reflections of

the Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory

Committee”47

; the Chair in 2018 followed suit in issuing

“Chair’s Reflections on the State of the Non-

Proliferation Treaty”48

; and the 2019 Chair put out his

“Reflections of the Chair of the 2019 session of the

Preparatory Committee”49

. This author has been


18

proposing for years (since 1998)50

that each session of

the PrepCom issue a “Statement on the State of the

NPT”51

document that would be parsimonious yet cover

all important matters and would reflect the general views

of States parties on the prevailing international situation

as it relates to the NPT at the time of the PrepCom. This

practice of issuing “Reflections”, i.e. a statement on the

state of the NPT, should be continued in the next review

cycle of 2020-2025.

NPT States parties will next gather at the United Nations

in New York for the 2020 NPT Review Conference from

April 27 to May 22 to mark the 50th anniversary, the

Golden Jubilee, of the world’s most important and

fundamental nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear

disarmament treaty and to chart the course for the next

five years (2020-2025). Some States favour a high-level

segment on the first two days that would result in a

Ministerial Declaration on the high importance of the

NPT and believe that this ought to suffice as the

outcome rather than negotiating a final document as is

mandated by the strengthened review process. Many

other States support negotiating a final document and

regard any Ministerial Declaration as insufficient. Over

the next 11 months, unless all States parties honour their

declarations on the importance of the NPT and work to

develop common ground to strengthen the authority and

integrity of the Treaty and its full implementation along

with the agreed obligations from the 1995, 2000 and

2010 review conferences, the chances of a consensus

outcome in 2020 would be slim and result in an

unprecedented two back-to-back failed reviews with all

the predicted dire consequences.


19

References

1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

IAEA document INFCIRC/140,

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/docu

ments/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf. 2. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “2019 Preparatory

Committee for the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Review Conference,” April 29 to May 10, 2019 in New

York,

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt2020/pr

epcom2019/. 3. Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons, “Working paper submitted by the

Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,”

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.11,

http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarma

ment-fora/npt/prepcom19/documents/WP11.pdf. 4. Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference


Nuclear Weapons, “Working paper submitted by the New

Agenda Coalition (Brazil on behalf of Egypt, Ireland,

Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa),”





Nuclear Weapons, “Working paper submitted by the

members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan,

Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland,

Turkey and the United Arab Emirates),”



ment-fora/npt/prepcom19/documents/WP24.pdf.


20

6. Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference


Nuclear Weapons, “Working paper submitted by

Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary,

Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and

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Djibouti (1977), Kuwait (1961), Libya (1953), Mauritania

(1973), Morocco (1958), Oman (1971), Qatar (1971),

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https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/arab_league.htm. 9. 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Final

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treaty-on-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons.pdf.


21

11.

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22

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affairs/humanitarian-efforts/humimpact_2013/id708603/. 21.

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2014,

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sarmament-fora/nayarit-2014/chairs-summary.pdf. 22.

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sarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-

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Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” October 24, 2018,


23

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/p5-joint-statement-

on-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-

weapons. 29.



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NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30,

https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30. 30

. Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference


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ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/116/42/IMG/N971164

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the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final

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the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the

resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension

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NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), 17. 35.


the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons


24

Final Document, Volume I, “Part I: Review of the

operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII

(3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution

adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference:

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NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 30,

https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I). 36.


the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Regional

issues: Middle East, “Working paper submitted by the

Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the

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https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT%20CONF

2015%20WP.49_E.pdf. 37.

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establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear

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Nuclear Weapons, “Recommendations to the 2020

Review Conference,” NPT/CONF.2020/PC.IIIICRP.4. 41.



Nuclear Weapons, “Recommendations to the 2020


25

Review Conference,”

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/CRP.4/Rev.1. 42.



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Recommendations by the Chair to the 2020 NPT Review

Conference,” NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.49. 43.

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Nuclear Weapons,” June 2018. 44.



Nuclear Weapons, “Addressing the North Korean nuclear

challenge,” NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/13. 45.



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Nuclear Weapons: Noncompliance by the Syrian Arab

Republic,” NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/12/Rev.1. 46.



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conclusions and recommendations for the Preparatory

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NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.4. 47.



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Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee,”

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/14. 48.



Nuclear Weapons, “Chair’s Reflections on the State of the

NPT,” NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/12. 49.



Nuclear Weapons, “Reflections of the Chair of the 2019


26

session of the Preparatory Committee,”

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/14. 50.

Tariq Rauf and John Simpson, “The 1999 NPT

PrepCom,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Winter 1999):

118-133, https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-

content/uploads/npr/prep62.pdf. 51.

Tariq Rauf, “Preparing for the 2017 NPT Preparatory

Committee Session: The Enhanced Strengthened Review

Process”, Dhanapala and Rauf, Reflections, supra note 11,

Chapter 5, 211-239.

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