1Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Stockholm,
Sweden. 2Global Economic Dynamics and the Biosphere, Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden. 3CORPNET, University of
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. *e-mail:
The role of ‘tax havens’ in the global economy has gained
increas-ing attention in recent years. The disclosure of classified
files from the law firms Appleby in 2017 (known as the ‘Paradise
Papers’) and Mossack Fonseca in 2016 (known as the ‘Panama Papers’)
has brought to light the intricate ways in which these finan-cial
secrecy jurisdictions lead to reduced transparency and substan-tial
losses of tax revenue globally — currently estimated to US$200
billion per year1. However, limited systematic consideration has
been given to the possible links between the use of such
jurisdic-tions and economic activities that undermine the
sustainability of global environmental commons. Most analyses have
instead been part of investigative journalism focusing on specific
cases. Examples include tax evasion through the British Virgin
Islands linked to deforestation and palm oil production in
Indonesia, and the exten-sive use of shell companies located in tax
havens by diamond min-ing companies operating in West Africa. The
absence of a more systemic examination is not surprising
considering the chronic lack of data resulting from the financial
opaqueness created by the use of these jurisdictions.
Here we examine the links between corporate use of tax havens
and resource extraction from two key global environmental com-mons
— the ocean and the Amazon rainforest. The ocean, and the fisheries
it supports, plays a vital role as protein source and income for
millions worldwide2, and the Amazon is critical for stabilizing the
Earth’s climate system3. The two cases also illustrate what has
been referred to in the economic geography literature as ‘furtive’
and ‘fictitious’ capital4. Our analysis of global fisheries
exemplifies flows of furtive capital and how tax haven
jurisdictions can be used to enable and disguise illegal fishing
activities. The Amazon case, instead, exemplifies flows of
fictitious capital in the form of foreign loans and advance
payments via tax haven jurisdictions to compa-nies operating in the
soy and beef sectors.
The two cases are thus complementary and build on a combi-nation
of data sources, with the ambition both to quantify flows of
capital and, as far as possible considering available data, assess
mechanisms by which the use of tax havens can be linked to
unsus-tainable resource extraction. We then identify critical
related to causality and transparency, and propose key research
questions and policy dimensions worth further consideration by both
the scientific and policy community.
A brief overview of tax havensIn the past decade, considerable
advancement has been made in our understanding of the political,
economic and social dimensions of tax havens. While these
jurisdictions have been argued to, in prin-ciple, provide
politically neutral and reliable arenas for institutional
innovation compared with settings dominated by political
turbu-lence and institutional legal vacuum5, a large body of
literature also highlights their negative effects. These include
the socio-political price these jurisdictions themselves pay by
hosting dispropor-tionally large amounts of foreign flows of
capital6; the destructive impacts of illicit financial flows for
human development, particu-larly in the Global South7,8; their role
in ‘money laundering’ and funding of illegal activities such as
trafficking of drugs and humans, terrorist financing and war
crimes9; and the risk of amplified global systemic financial risks
created by the lack of financial transpar-ency and
oversight1,10,11. Contributions from economics and soci-ology have
also mapped the suite of strategies used by companies for
aggressive tax planning through these jurisdictions, thereby
highlighting that the use of tax havens spans beyond wealthy
indi-viduals to also include companies, financial institutions and
their subsidiaries1,11,12. Although contested and technically
ambigu-ous, such aggressive tax planning strategies are usually
legal7,12 (Supplementary Information, Appendix 1).
Box 1 lists the jurisdictions often denoted as tax havens in the
academic literature. Note, however, that the terms ‘tax havens’,
‘offshore financial centres’ or ‘financial secrecy jurisdictions’
are debated13 (Supplementary Information, Appendix 2). Here we use
the term tax havens as it is well-established and widely used among
scholars, and in the public domain. Even though these jurisdictions
are generally described as ‘offshore’, recent studies show that
they are embedded in the wider operation of global financial
networks or global wealth chains5,14–16. In addition, recent
estimates show that between 10 and 30% of all foreign direct
investments (FDI) is
Tax havens and global environmental degradationVictor Galaz
1,2*, Beatrice Crona1,2, Alice Dauriach1,2, Jean-Baptiste
Jouffray 1,2, Henrik Österblom 1 and Jan Fichtner 3
The release of classified documents in the past years have
offered a rare glimpse into the opaque world of tax havens and
their role in the global economy. Although the political, economic
and social implications related to these financial secrecy
jurisdictions are known, their role in supporting economic
activities with potentially detrimental environmental consequences
have until now been largely ignored. Here, we combine quantitative
analysis with case descriptions to elaborate and quantify the
connections between tax havens and the environment, both in global
fisheries and the Brazilian Amazon. We show that while only 4% of
all registered fishing vessels are currently flagged in a tax
haven, 70% of the known vessels implicated in illegal, unreported
and unregulated fishing are, or have been, flagged under a tax
haven jurisdiction. We also find that between October 2000 and
August 2011, 68% of all investigated foreign capital to nine focal
companies in the soy and beef sectors in the Brazilian Amazon was
transferred through one, or several, known tax havens. This
represents as much as 90–100% of for-eign capital for some
companies investigated. We highlight key research challenges for
the academic community that emerge from our findings and present a
set of proposed actions for policy that would put tax havens on the
global sustainability agenda.
NATure eColoGy & eVoluTioN | www.nature.com/natecolevol
PersPective NATure ecOlOgy & evOluTiONchannelled through tax
haven jurisdictions17,18. These insights are important because most
trade in natural resources today forms part of global production
networks, which in turn are supported by an equally complex and
global network of financial infrastructure and capital. Few
scholars have explored in detail the operation of these global
financial networks, including tax haven jurisdictions, and how they
intersect with global production networks and natural resource
This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the use of
tax havens may lead to substantive losses in tax revenues, thereby
undermining socially and environmentally beneficial public
invest-ments in accordance with the ambitions of the United Nations
(UN) Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement. Second,
and as we elaborate in more detail below, the use of these
jurisdic-tions reduces financial transparency, thereby making it
difficult to analyse how distant financial drivers may underpin
regional and local ecological changes in land- and seascapes
The role of tax havens for global fisheriesMore than 30% of
large commercial fisheries are currently con-sidered
overexploited19, and between 11 and 26 million tonnes of illegal or
unreported catches have been estimated to be fished worldwide20.
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is repeatedly
identified by the UN General Assembly as “one of the greatest
threats to fish stocks and marine ecosystems”21. Besides
bio-diversity and economic losses, such practices threaten food
security and livelihoods in many countries2. While IUU fishing is
directly influencing marine ecosystems, such activities are also
commonly associated with a range of other crimes — referred to here
as ‘fisher-ies crimes’ — including bribery, fraud, trafficking,
money launder-ing and tax evasion22.
The fisheries industry is a global business, with owners,
fishing companies, customers and other actors in the value chain
spread across the world23,24. The global nature of fisheries value
chains, complex ownership structures and limited governance
capacities of many coastal nations make the sector particularly
susceptible to the use of tax havens in three important ways.
First, the use of these jurisdictions has been proved to support
aggressive tax planning and tax evasion25. Common strategies to
avoid taxes include exporting and re-exporting fisheries products
under incorrect article codes via subsidiaries, or selling to the
tax haven subsidiary at a highly discounted value and then
re-exporting to the real customers at the full value. Unreported
sales and re- categorization of sales income as agency fees charged
by a subsid-iary located in a tax haven represent additional ways
by which sea-food companies have been documented to avoid
Second, these jurisdictions also facilitate the evasion of
regula-tion designed to address overfishing and fisheries crime by
exploit-ing loopholes created by the fact that many well-known tax
havens also qualify as secrecy jurisdictions in other regards, such
as flags of convenience (FOC) states26–28. FOCs are countries to
which ves-sel owners flag vessels and from which they can expect
limited or no sanctioning mechanisms if they are identified as
operating in violation to international law. Recent findings
indicate that some of these vessel registries are run by private
entities, further reducing transparency and the ability of
governments to exercise formal and informal pressure directed at
FOC states29. By setting up company structures with subsidiaries in
jurisdictions that are both FOCs and tax havens, companies can
obfuscate profits and beneficiary owner-ship of subsidiaries and
This has implications for illicit activities, linking to the
third point — namely, that the secrecy afforded by combined use of
tax havens and FOCs also allows companies to secure the dual
iden-tity of a fishing vessel, one of which is used for legal and
the other for illegal fishing activities25. Historical examples of
IUU fishing from the Southern Ocean illustrate the destructive
Box 1 | list of jurisdictions classified as ‘tax havens’
The countries and jurisdictions are listed in alphabetical
order. All have the following features normally associated with
‘tax havens’ or ‘financial secrecy jurisdictions’: zero or low
taxes; lack of effective exchange of information; lack of
transparency; and no requirement of substantial activity. Countries
that also are identified as flags of convenience (FOC) states are
marked with an asterisk, based on the International Transport
Workers’ Federation list. See Supplementary Information, Appendix 2
for further details.AndorraAnguilla — overseas territory of the
United KingdomAntigua and Barbuda*Aruba — Kingdom of the
NetherlandsBahamas*BahrainBarbados*Belize*Bermuda — overseas
territory of the United Kingdom*British Virgin Islands — overseas
territory of the United KingdomCayman Islands — overseas territory
of the United Kingdom*Cook Islands — New ZealandCosta RicaCuraçao
(from 2010)Cyprus*DominicaGibraltar — overseas territory of the
United Kingdom*GrenadaGuernsey/Sark/Alderney — dependency of the
British CrownHong KongIrelandIsle of Man — dependency of the
British CrownJersey — dependency of the British
Islands*Mauritius*MonacoMontserrat — overseas territory of the
United KingdomNauruNetherlands Antilles — Kingdom of the
Netherlands (dissolved 2010)*Niue — New ZealandPanama*SamoaSan
MarinoSeychellesSingaporeSint Maarten (from 2010)St. Christopher
and NevisSt. LuciaSt. Vincent and the
Grenadines*SwitzerlandTonga*Turks and Caicos — overseas territory
of the United KingdomUS Virgin Islands — external territory of the
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PersPectiveNATure ecOlOgy & evOluTiON
tax evasion, hidden beneficiaries, falsely allocated catches and
the resulting depletion (or, in the instance of South African
stocks, col-lapse) of fish stocks, as well as reduction of
critically threatened sea-bird populations22,30–32.
Our analysis combines multiple datasets on fishing vessels and
flag information to specifically highlight the link between IUU
fishing and tax haven jurisdictions. While only 4% of all
registered fishing vessels are currently flagged in a tax haven
jurisdiction33, data from regional fisheries management
organizations and the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL)34 show that 70% of the vessels that have been found to
carry out or support IUU fishing and for which flag information is
available are, or have been, flagged under a tax haven jurisdiction
— in particular, Belize and Panama (Fig. 1).
The use of tax havens — and its associated problems such as loss
of tax revenues, reduced transparency and lack of compliance — make
tracing of fisheries resource use and allocation of account-ability
extremely difficult and costly25. As such, it represents a major
threat to the sustainability of global ocean resources that should
be acknowledged and taken seriously. Similar uses of tax haven
juris-dictions to support illicit environmentally destructive
activities in other ecosystems have been reported, including
illegal logging and trade with endangered species35, but require
Amazonian land-use change and tax havensThe Amazon basin has
suffered from extensive deforestation, despite being considered an
iconic ecosystem with unique biologi-cal values, and more recently
also playing a critical role in the global climate system3,36. As
the extractive activities of companies are reli-ant on access to
various forms of external capital (such as loans and equity
capital) to start or expand their operations37, increasing
attention has been directed towards understanding the financial
flows and fiscal incentives underpinning environmental changes in
the Amazon region38. However, the extent to which this capital is
channelled via tax havens has until now remained obscured.
As a means to explore the connections between global financial
and production networks14, we use a historical case, based on
offi-cial figures from the Central Bank of Brazil, from October
2000 to August 2011. These are currently the only public data
available, as the legal requirements for the publication of
transfers of foreign capital introduced in October 2000 were
suspended in August 2011 (Supplementary Information, Appendix 3a).
This allows us to quantify flows of foreign capital from financial
actors, based outside Brazil, to the nine largest companies
operating in the soy and beef sectors of the Brazilian Amazon — two
sectors represent-ing key drivers of deforestation38. The studied
time period overlaps partly with the most intense deforestation
period in the Amazon (1995–2004), as well as the start of Brazil’s
Soy Moratorium in 2006 39. The companies were selected only for
their market share, without incorporating any company-specific
environmental assessment (Supplementary Information, Appendix 3b).
We contacted the nine companies before publication and invited
responses. The con-tact letter and all received responses are
included in Supplementary Information, Appendix 3c, and provide
further details on the structure, operations, sustainability
practices and policies of some of the companies.
Figure 2 shows transfers of foreign capital to these companies
channelled through tax haven jurisdictions between the years
2000–2011. The types of financial transaction whose value and
currency must be declared to the Central Bank of Brazil include:
loans from a foreign entity; leasing/rental transactions; and two
types of transac-tion related to trade finance: cash in advance
Flagged in tax havens
Fishing Vessels Finder registered vessels
Fig. 1 | Fishing vessels and tax havens. Number of registered
fishing vessels globally in the FAO Fishing Vessels Finder database
(n = 257,798)33 compared with the number of vessels that have been
found to carry out or support illegal, unreported and unregulated
(IUU) fishing activities (n = 209)34. Dark blue wedges show the
percentage of vessels flagged in tax havens. The bar plot displays
the count of IUU vessels that are, or have been, flagged in the
different tax havens, where asterisks indicate overlap between tax
haven jurisdictions and flags of convenience (FOC) states (Box 1
and Supplementary Information, Appendix 2).
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PersPective NATure ecOlOgy & evOluTiON
of exports) and import financing transactions. We add these four
categories of financial transaction together to get an aggregate
figure of declared foreign capital incoming to Brazil in the form
of loans, financing or payments. Our analysis shows that a total of
US$26.9 billion of foreign capital was transferred to the selected
nine key companies between October 2000 and August 2011. Of this
capital, about US$18.4 billion was transferred from tax havens (as
defined in Box 1). In other words, 68% of all investigated foreign
capital to these focal companies was transferred through one, or
several, known tax havens. This percentage can be con-trasted with
the estimated 17% of all inward FDI transferred from tax havens to
Brazil in 2011, or with 38% of FDI transferred from tax havens to
Brazil the same year if only intercompany and intra-company loans
Our estimate of 68% of capital transferred via tax havens is an
average figure. For example, one company received US$6.9 billion
from its own subsidiaries registered in the Cayman Islands as cash
in advance, representing 90% of the total foreign capital received
by that company between October 2000 and August 2011. Another
company received virtually 100% of its foreign loans (about US$1.7
billion, representing 62.4% of the total foreign capital it
received) from its own subsidiaries located in the Cayman Islands
(Supplementary Information, Appendix 3d). Although the role of the
Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands for
flows of FDI to and from Brazil is generally well known41, to our
knowledge this is the first exploration of their associations to
com-panies operating in the Amazon biome.
The Cayman Islands is a central territory in the global tax
haven community and a jurisdiction with strong connections to the
global economy5,41. In our data, it is identified as the largest
transfer juris-diction for foreign capital to companies operating
in the Brazilian Amazon during the investigated period (Fig. 2).
Channelling capi-tal through the Caymans provides three benefits to
investors: legal efficiency, tax-minimization (mostly zero taxes
and low fees) and secrecy13,41. Financial secrecy in this case
means that the protection
of the interests of clients is safeguarded. Despite increased
interna-tional pressure to comply with international reporting
standards, the registrar in the Cayman Islands is able to release
on enquiry only the name, type of company, date of registration,
address of its registered office and status of the company. Except
where assistance to law enforcement agencies to combat illicit
activity is mandated or authorized, the disclosure of financial
information by government officials, professional agents, attorneys
and accountants and their staffs is considerably limited, despite
recent modifications in the country’s secrecy laws42.
The geographical reallocation of functions and funds within a
company not only provides market opportunities43, but also makes
possible the favourable use of differences in national taxation
poli-cies15. For example, economic actors can shift profits to
subsidiar-ies placed strategically in countries with very low, or
even zero per cent corporate tax rate. Another common strategy is
denoted ‘debt loading’, whereby companies finance their activities
in high-tax jurisdictions with loans from their own subsidiaries
located in a tax haven. This strategy allows companies to minimize
their taxes and sometimes receive a tax deduction in the high-tax
country (Supplementary Information, Appendix 1). The selected
companies described here together operate 2,200 subsidiaries around
the world, 143 (7%) of which are located in tax havens, most
commonly in the Cayman Islands, Luxembourg and Switzerland44
(Supplementary Information, Appendix 3).
Similar to the fisheries case, the use of tax havens in the
Amazon context also plays a key role in the complex governance
geography of many corporations. Company parentage is often
stretched across multiple jurisdictions, which in general
contributes to diminishing transparency. As an illustration, three
of the focal companies in Brazil are headquartered in one
jurisdiction, but incorporated in another — and tax havens feature
as both headquartering and incorporation jurisdictions.
How the financial capital flowing into Brazil-located companies
via tax havens is distributed across their operations is
Amount of capital(million US$)
PersPectiveNATure ecOlOgy & evOluTiONimpossible to assess.
While national mandatory reporting require-ments in both the United
States and Brazil (for example, through both the United States and
the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commissions) do contribute to
some degree of transparency, data about multinational companies’
annual revenue per sector and country are often unattainable for
research purposes, due to the non-public nature of
country-by-country reporting guidelines. As such, quantifying and
establishing direct causality between financial transfers via tax
havens and actual land-use change is cur-rently very difficult.
Studies suggest a strong causal link between access to rural credit
and deforestation rates in Brazil, but such a link has been made
only to municipalities and not to companies operating in the
Analyses in other sectors show that even though transfers via
tax havens are associated with reputational risks, they also
increase cash flow and profits, and lead to a reduced effective tax
rate, which in turn sends positive signals to investors and
stimulates the growth of economic activities across all
jurisdictions of a company46–49.
Financial secrecy, data availability and causalityThe examples
above show that the use of tax havens is not only a socio-political
and economic challenge, but also very probably an environmental
one. Direct proof of causality remains elusive as financial secrecy
also hampers the ability of scholars and inves-tors to analyse how
financial flows affect economic activities on the ground, and their
environmental impacts. Yet, in a globalized world where distant
drivers can induce regional and local ecological changes through
so-called ‘telecoupling’ mechanisms50,51, and where our
understanding of the close interplay between ‘onshore’ and
‘off-shore’ finance in the global economy is limited14, such
analyses are becoming increasingly important to policymakers,
investors and enforcement agencies.
A number of methodological advancements and improved access to
ecological and economic data (for example, through increased supply
chain transparency52) have paved the way for important insights53.
However, a key element for tracing causality to distant financial
drivers is long-term (decadal) data about how capital is
distributed across a company’s complex web of subsidiaries where
extractive and financial operations take place. The use of tax
haven jurisdictions poses major challenges to transparency and
makes it currently difficult, if not impossible, for scholars and
policymakers to track international flows of capital, and
associated social and eco-logical impacts (Supplementary
Information, Appendix 3e).
Putting tax havens on the global sustainability agendaThe lack
of clearly established causal links between capital flows via tax
havens and environmental change should not deter from further
inves-tigations. Instead, we hope that our analysis triggers
important ques-tions for those interested in the implications of
tax havens for global environmental sustainability. For scholars,
the questions centre on causality and the importance of legal and
illegal capital flows. That is:
• To what extent does the use of capital channelled through tax
haven jurisdictions allow companies to expand their extractive
operations in ways that they would not do otherwise? In
particu-lar, to what extent does the use of tax havens allow
companies to circumvent environmental regulation and
• Does the use of tax havens by multinational corporations lead
to underreporting of inward FDI into extractive activities
affecting important global environmental commons?
• Are these jurisdictions used to a different extent in
different extractive sectors, and if so, why?
• If losses of tax revenues are substantial over time, do these
undermine national and regional monitoring and enforcement
capacities that would help safeguard important global
Our study also raises important issues for policymakers. First,
in a similar way as is discussed for global fossil fuels
subsidies54, loss of tax revenue through the use of tax haven
jurisdictions by com-panies modifying the biosphere could be
conceptualized as indirect subsidies55 to economic activities with
possibly detrimental global environmental consequences. While
estimating the size of such subsidies will be challenging,
systematic analyses of whether aggres-sive tax planning in
extractive industries could be viewed as sup-porting environmental
degradation should be a priority in current international policy
discussions about the realization of the 2030 Agenda for
Second, leading international fora and organizations such as the
Group of Twenty, UN Environment, the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime should initi-ate
joint independent assessments of the natural capital costs, such as
loss of biodiversity and carbon sequestration, of these until now
unquantified subsidies. This assessment should help reduce
uncer-tainties around causality between capital flows and
environmental change, and include a more comprehensive set of
biomes, economic sectors, and companies and their subsidiaries than
Third, the international community should intensify its attempts
to stimulate corporate transparency and collaborate to uncover and
fight tax evasion, viewing such actions as important not only from
a socio-political perspective, but also for environmental reasons.
This includes recognizing the importance of FOC states in the
structure of the global offshore system, as well as expanding
current reform proposals. For example, the European Commission’s
proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax base, and the
US-initiated Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act1, as well as the
proposal to increase transparency by means of a country-by-country
reporting advanced by the European Commission and the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development56, should progress, be
made accessible for research and be complemented with targeted
assessments of the potentially large environmental benefits of
these proposals in sectors such as fisheries, forestry, and
extractive indus-tries including oil and gas. The legislation
introduced by the govern-ment of the United Kingdom in May 2018
with the ambition to force British overseas territories (which
include large tax havens such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and
the British Virgin Islands) to make public the names of the owners
of thousands of companies registered in these jurisdictions by the
end of 2020 should also be welcomed. Whether this measure will
result in increased financial transparency remains to be seen, but
it has the potential to allow for further assessments of the links
between tax havens and environ-mental degradation.
Bringing to light, quantifying and minimizing these hidden
indi-rect subsidies should be viewed as a key issue in our efforts
to pro-tect global environmental commons, and a priority at a time
when nations are coming together to endorse and finance the
ambitions expressed in the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
Data availabilityAll data supporting this article are openly
available in the fig-share repository
Information, Appendix 3f).
Received: 10 October 2017; Accepted: 31 January 2018; Published:
xx xx xxxx
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AcknowledgementsThe authors acknowledge support from the
Erling-Persson Family Foundation through the Global Economic
Dynamics and the Biosphere programme (GEDB) at the Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences, the Futura Foundation, Vinnova (Earth System
Finance), Mistra Financial Systems (MFS), the Nippon Foundation
(Nereus Program – Predicting the Future Oceans) and the Foundation
for Strategic Environmental Research (Mistra) through the Stockholm
Resilience Centre (Stockholm University). J.F. acknowledges funding
from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant no. 638946)
for the CORPNET project at the University of Amsterdam. We thank E.
Sundström (Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University) and
A. Causevic (Global Economic Dynamics and the Biosphere programme
(GEDB) at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences) for their
assistance in creating the database for the Amazon case study.
Author contributionsV.G., B.C., A.D., J.-B.J. and H.Ö. designed
research. V.G., B.C. and A.D. collected and analysed Amazon data.
J.-B.J. and H.Ö. collected and analysed global fisheries data and
cases. V.G., B.C., A.D., J.-B.J. and H.Ö. wrote the paper with
contributions from J.F.
Competing interestsH.Ö., J.-B.J., B.C. and A.D provide
scientific support to companies in the seafood sector through the
Seafood Business for Ocean Stewardship (SeaBOS) initiative
(http://keystonedialogues.earth/). Remaining authors declare no
Additional informationSupplementary information is available for
this paper at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-018-0497-3.
Reprints and permissions information is available at
Correspondence should be addressed to V.G.
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NATure eColoGy & eVoluTioN | www.nature.com/natecolevol
Tax havens and global environmental degradationA brief overview
of tax havensList of jurisdictions classified as ‘tax havens’
The role of tax havens for global fisheriesAmazonian land-use
change and tax havensFinancial secrecy, data availability and
causalityPutting tax havens on the global sustainability agendaData
availabilityAcknowledgementsFig. 1 Fishing vessels and tax
havens.Fig. 2 Foreign capital and tax havens in the Amazon.