No. 17-2323 IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 2017
CARSON CITY, Petitioner,
v.
CHUCK GAINES AND BRITTANY FIELDS, Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
TEAM 468 San Francisco, California Attorneys for Respondents CHUCK GAINES AND BRITTANY FIELDS
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act authorizes a claim against a
municipal entity based on the failure of law enforcement officers to modify standard on-
the-ground investigation and arrest procedures when confronting an individual with
known mental illness and neurological impairment?
II. Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires a municipal entity to
make modifications to its interview procedures when doing a non-custodial stationhouse
interview of an individual with a known mental illness and cognitive impairment?
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............................................................................................................ i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ............................................................................................... 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................................... 6
A. The United States District Court Grants Carson City’s Motion for Summary Judgement. .............................................................................................................. 6
B. Reversal of the District Court Order by The United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit. ............................................................................................. 7
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 11
I. MR. GAINES HAS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM FOR RELIEF UNDER BOTH A WRONGFUL ARREST AND A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION THEORY. ........................................................................ 11
A. Title II of the ADA Applies to Police Arrests. ......................................... 11
B. The Lewis Test Provides the Most Judiciously Expedient Analysis for Wrongful Arrest Claims. ........................................................................... 12
i. The officers misperceived Mr. Gaines’ conduct as unlawful and therefore wrongfully arrested him. ............................................... 13
C. Officers Klein and Taylor Failed to Provide Mr. Gaines with Reasonable Accommodations. ..................................................................................... 16
i. The evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact for trial if the officers failed to reasonably accommodate Mr. Gaines’ disability. ....................................................................................... 17
iii
II. CARSON CITY VIOLATED TITLE II OF THE ADA WHEN IT FAILED TO PROVIDE MS. FIELDS ANY REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION DURING A STATIONHOUSE INTERVIEW. .................................................................... 19
A. Ms. Fields is a Disabled Person Who Qualifies for and was Denied the Benefits of a Stationhouse Interview. ....................................................... 19
i. The disability and essential eligibility requirements necessary for Ms. Fields to qualify her for participation in a stationhouse interview are easily met here. ....................................................... 20
ii. The stationhouse interview conducted by Officer Taylor and Officer Klein qualifies as an activity of a public entity. ............... 21
iii. Ms. Fields was denied the benefits of a stationhouse interview conducted by law enforcement. ..................................................... 21
B. Carson City Failed to Provide Any Reasonable Accommodation for Ms. Fields’ Mental Illness, Thus Denying Her Meaningful Access to the Benefits of a Stationhouse Interview. ....................................................... 25
i. A “reasonable accommodation” requires Carson City to provide “meaningful access” to its stationhouse interviews ..................... 25
ii. Because absolutely no accommodation was provided to Ms. Fields, she was deprived of any meaningful access to the benefits of a stationhouse interview. ................................................................. 27
iii. Any one of the reasonable accommodations proposed by Ms. Fields would not have fundamentally altered the nature of law enforcement interview techniques. ................................................ 28
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 29
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2016) ...................... 29
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). .................................................................................. 29
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). ............................................................. 2, 19
Bahl v. Cty. of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2012). ................................................... 24, 29
Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir. 2007) ....................................................... 32
Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep’t of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D. N.J. 2000). ............ 11, 25
Crowder v. Kitawaga, 81 F.3d 148 (9th Cir. 1996) ...................................................................... 32
Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 409 (D. Md. 2014) ............................... 14
Folkerts v. City of Waverly, Iowa, 707 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2013) ........................................... 30, 31
Gile v. United Airlines, 95 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 1996) .................................................................... 28
Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 1999). ................................................... 10, 13, 14, 18
Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998). .................................................................. 18, 23
Helen L. v. Didario, 46 F.3d 325 (3rd Cir. 1995) ......................................................................... 29
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) ............................................................. 29
J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo Cty., No. CIV 12-0128 JB/LAM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94132 (D.N.M. July 8, 2014) ........................................................................................... 15, 19, 20
Lerma v. City of Nogales, No. CV 12-518-TUC-FRZ (CRP), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139613 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2014) .......................................................................................................... 14
Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Ind. 1997) ..................................................... 10, 14, 15, 16
Lynn v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:13-cv-00179-JMS-TAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96286 (S.D. Ind. July 16, 2014) ............................................................................................................ 14
Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008). ................................................................... 30
McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2001). ........................................... 15
v
McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2004) ........................................................ 28
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Landstar Sys., 622 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2010). ............ 1
Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) ................................................................... 9, 12
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988). ................................................................................... 1
Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass’n., 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994) .............. 29, 33
Rivera-Concepcion v. Puerto Rico, 786 F. Supp. 2d 442, (D. P.R. 2010) .................................... 29
Rodriguez v. City of N.Y., 197 F.3d 611 (2d Cir. 1999). ............................................................... 18
Roel v. Hamilton, Ohio/Hamilton Cty. Bd. Of Cty. Commissioners, 870 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2017)............................................................................................................................................ 30
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty of Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) ..................................................... 33
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). ........................................................................ 26
Shane v. Albertson’s Inc., 504 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2007). ............................................................. 1
Southeastern Cmty Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). ............................................................. 33
Staron v. MCDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353 (2nd Cir. 1995) ................................................... 28, 32
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962). ...................................................................... 2
Willits v. City of L.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2013) ..................................................... 23
STATUTES
28 C.F.R. § 35.108(a)(1)(i). .......................................................................................................... 22
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). .............................................................................................. 20, 21, 28
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). ....................................................................................................................... 1
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2). .............................................................................................................. 33
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) .................................................................................................................... 13
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B) ......................................................................................................... 12, 23
vi
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). ................................................................................................................... 22
42 U.S.C. § 12132 .................................................................................................................. passim
OTHER AUTHORITIES
H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3, at 50 (1990). ....................................................... 9
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 35694-01 (July 26, 1991). ........................................................................................ 21
Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010). ..................................................................................................... 24
1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1). 28 U.S.C. §
1254(1). The district court entered final judgement granting Defendant Carson City’s Motion for
Summary Judgement pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D. Order
at 20). Appellants Mr. Gaines and Ms. Fields filed a timely appeal. The Court of Appeals for the
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit reviewed the case de novo and entered judgement reversing the lower
court decision. (R. at 32). Petitioner Carson City timely filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.
This Court has granted that writ.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The applicable standard of review in this case is de novo review. Questions of law are
reviewed by the court de novo. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988). In conducting
de novo review, the court independently considers the legal matter anew as if no prior decision
has been entered. Shane v. Albertson’s, Inc., 504 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). The
interpretation of a statute is a question of law and subject to de novo review. Owner-Operator
Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Landstar Sys., 622 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2010). The issues before
the court require the interpretation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, to determine its application to law enforcement activities. Therefore,
both legal issues before the court are subject to de novo review for legal error.
De novo review also applies to cases resolved by summary judgment. United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is
“genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents Chuck Gaines and Brittany Fields are both residents of Carson City, a
municipality in the State of Carson. (D. Order at 3). Mr. Gaines and Ms. Fields have been in a
romantic relationship since the spring of 2013. (D. Order at 3). In February 2014, both Mr.
Gaines and Ms. Fields were eligible for and received government-subsidized housing in the
Summerville Heights Integrated Living Community (“SHILC”), a supportive housing complex
designed to integrate individuals with mental illnesses and neurological and intellectual
impairment into the greater community. (D. Order at 4).
Mr. Gaines has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”) and Bipolar
Disorder-Type 1. (D. Order at 3). His disabilities manifest in symptoms including social
impairment, difficulties with nonverbal communication, sensory-processing challenges,
problems managing emotions, and a tendency toward impulsive behavior. (D. Order at 3).
Ms. Fields has been diagnosed with a mild intellectual disability as well as Borderline
Personality Disorder (“BPD”). (D. Order at 3). Symptoms of Ms. Field’s intellectual disability
manifest in poor perceptual reasoning, verbal comprehension, memory, abstract thought,
problem solving. (D. Order at 3). Additional symptoms include gullibility, naiveté, obliviousness
to risk, and a tendency to follow orders. (D. Order at 3). Symptoms of her BPD manifest in
inflexible thinking and fear of rejection and abandonment. (D. Order at 3).
Through this supportive housing model, Carson City provides Mr. Gaines and Ms. Fields,
along with other eligible participants, with support services at a community center neighboring
the complex and in-apartment visits by a case manager. (D. Order at 4). Carson City Police
Department (“CCPD”) is a partner of SHILC and officers who regularly patrol SHILC have been
informed about the set up and about the disabilities of program participants. (D. Order at 4).
3
Jenny Smith, is a resident of Carson City who lives in a townhouse directly across from
the SHILC community center. (D. Order at 4). Ms. Smith actively opposed the city’s plan to
move SHILC into the Summerville Heights neighborhood. (D. Order at 4). She is also a member
of the “Neighborhood Watch” group which holds monthly meetings, occasionally attended by
CCPD officers, where members express “safety” concerns regarding the SHILC community. (D.
Order at 5). In addition to the monthly meeting, members maintain an electronic listserve to
further share these concerns. (D. Order at 5).
On February 21, 2014, CCPD received a call from Ms. Smith reporting that her
townhouse had been robbed. (D. Order at 5). Ms. Smith demanded that the perpetrator be
“hunted down” immediately, stated that she was sure the culprit was a SHILC resident, and
referred to SHILC residents as the “crazies.” (D. Order at 5). After the incident, members of the
Neighborhood Watch group began posing statements to the online platform accusing Mr. Gaines
and Ms. Fields as the perpetrators of the crime. (D. Order at 5).
On February 24, 2014, at approximately 10:00 a.m., CCPD received another call from an
upset Ms. Smith. (D. Order at 5). She reported as follows: “Chuck is on the sidewalk across the
street from my house. He has a bat in his hand. He’s pacing. He’s muttering. He is looking over
at my house. I’m scared. He is crazy. He’s from the institution. I know he is the one who robbed
me. I need help.” (D. Order at 5). Smith further asserted that she felt threatened because Chuck
was violent, unstable, and he had allegedly found out that Smith knew that he and his girlfriend
had robbed her townhouse. (D. Order at 5).
Officers Klein and Taylor arrived at the townhouse approximately ten minutes later. (D.
Order at 5). Informed only by Ms. Smith’s allegations, both officers went outside and
approached Mr. Gaines. (D. Order at 5). Officer Klein yelled as he crossed the street, “Hey,
4
Chuck. Let’s talk.” Mr. Gaines responded by shaking his head, backing away slowly, and
repeating “no” and “stay away.” (D. Order at 5). As the officers moved closer, Officer Klein
continued to yell, “Calm down. Sit down. We have heard about you harassing your neighbors,
and everything else you have done, and we need to talk about what you are doing here.” (D.
Order at 5). Mr. Gaines turned his back to the approaching officers, pointed his bat to the
community center, and expressed to the officers, “I don’t want to talk to you. You need to leave
me alone. I am feeling bad.” (D. Order at 6-7). Officer Taylor, using profanity, yelled at Mr.
Gaines to drop the bat, sit down, and listen. (D. Order at 7). Mr. Gaines subsequently dropped
the bat, turned to face the officers, but did not sit. (D. Order at 7). In an effort to pressure Mr.
Gaines to sit, Officer Klein told Mr. Gaines “that if he did not sit down immediately, they were
going to ‘make’ him sit down in the police car and then do the same to Brittany [Fields].” (D.
Order at 7). Mr. Gaines immediately became visibly agitated and began making erratic
movements with his arms. (D. Order at 7). Officers Taylor and Klein proceeded to use force to
subdue and arrest Mr. Gaines by knocking him onto the concrete sidewalk and using a taser. (D.
Order at 7). Mr. Gaines suffered physical injuries as a result, including injury to his head. (D.
Order at 7).
At around 1 p.m. Officers Klein and Taylor returned to SHILC looking for Ms. Fields at
her apartment, but were unsuccessful in locating her. (D. Order at 7). The officers later contacted
Jim Craw, SHILC case manager to inquire about Ms. Fields. (D. Order at 7). Mr. Craw
confirmed that she was a SHILC resident, informed the officers of her disabilities and symptoms,
as well as expressed concerns for how those symptoms would manifest during interactions with
police. (D. Order at 7). Nevertheless, Mr. Craw agreed to pass along a written note by the
5
officers notifying Ms. Fields of Mr. Gaines’ arrest. (D. Order at 8). The note instructed her to
come by the station to answer some questions. (D. Order at 8).
Ms. Fields arrived at the stationhouse at approximately 5:30 p.m. alone and visibly upset.
She agreed to go into a room and talk to Officers Klein and Taylor so as to inquire about Mr.
Gaines and when they could go home. (D. Order at 8). Officer Klein responded, “you can leave
now, but not with Chuck. If you want to know about Chuck, first you are going to need to give
us some information.” (D. Order at 8).
Officers Klein and Taylor began to interview Ms. Fields in accordance with standard
department procedure. (D. Order at 8). The Officers employed an aggressive questioning
technique in an attempt to obtain an admission of guilt. (D. Order at 9). At first, Ms. Fields
denied any involvement in the robbery and explained that she had been at work at the relevant
time. (D. Order at 8). She remained incredulous to officers’ false claims that they had
eyewitnesses who claim to have seen her and Mr. Gaines rob Ms. Smith’s townhouse and that
Mr. Gaines had incriminated her after his arrest. (D. Order at 8). Ms. Fields repeatedly asked to
go home, but was told by the officers, “Not with Chuck, unless you talk.” (D. Order at 9).
The aggressive questioning went on for several hours. (D. Order at 9). Ms. Fields became
increasingly agitated, began sobbing, and expressed confusion. (D. Order at 9). Eventually, Ms.
Fields complied with the officers’ demands to “tell the truth” and stated, “Ok. If this can be over,
then Chuck and I did it.” (D. Order at 9). The officers immediately followed up with a series of
leading questions to formulate a detailed admission of the crime. (D. Order at 9). Ms. Field’s
remained confused and on several instances throughout the admission she inquired about what
she “needed” to say. (D. Order at 9). Ms. Fields was arrested and both her and Mr. Gaines were
charged with the burglary of Smith’s townhouse. (D. Order at 9.
6
Two weeks later, CCPD officers found some of the burglarized items from Ms. Smith’s
townhouse in the home of another individual. (D. Order at 9). Further, CCPD investigation
revealed that Ms. Fields had been at work at the time of the Smith townhouse robbery. (D. Order
at 9). The charges against both Mr. Gaines and Ms. Fields were eventually dropped. (D. Order at
9).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case before this Court raises questions of law regarding the applicability of Title II of
the ADA to law enforcement activity, specifically arrests and stationhouse interviews. Plaintiffs’
Complaint arises from interactions with Carson City police officers who allegedly discriminated
against them based on their respective mental disabilities and intellectual impairments and failed
to accommodate those disabilities in violation of Title II of the ADA.
A. The United States District Court Grants Carson City’s Motion for Summary Judgement.
The United States District Court entered judgement granting Carson City’s Motion for
Summary Judgement. (D. Order at 2). The court addressed each of Plaintiffs’ claims finding that
all fail as a matter of law. In dismissing Mr. Gaines’ claims for wrongful arrest under Title II of
the ADA, the court held that because Mr. Gaines cannot claim that his behavior was at all times
lawful, he cannot claim that the officers simply misinterpreted his behavior as a manifestation of
his disability. (D. Order at 13). Further, regarding the claim alleging failure by officers to make
reasonable accommodations, the court took the position that the ADA does not require law
enforcement officers to make reasonable accommodations during on-the-scene encounters as a
matter of public policy. The court concluded that requiring such would (1) make an already
dangerous profession, more dangerous, and (2) impose further limits on officer discretion in how
they approach “often-dangerous investigative activities and arrests” beyond those limits imposed
7
by the Fourth Amendment. (D. Order at 14). The court then proceeded to dismiss Ms. Field’s
claim under Title II of the ADA finding that the ADA does not provide a cause of action when
an individual is neither denied a “benefit” nor subjected to intentional discrimination during a
non-custodial stationhouse interview. Thus, Ms. Field’s failed to sufficiently allege she was
denied a benefit. (D. Order at 18).
B. Reversal of the District Court Order by The United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit.
A timely appeal was filed and the case was heard de novo before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit. (R. at 21). The court unanimously reversed the decision of
the District Court. In doing so, the court declined to create a judicial exception to the ADA as
applied to law enforcement finding that (1) the statutory text, (2) legislative history, and (3)
administrative regulations interpreting the legislation all counsel against it. (R. at 22). Instead,
the court reasoned that the complexities of application of the ADA to law enforcement activities
“can be adequately accounted for through the analysis of whether particular accommodations are
‘reasonable’ given the totality of the circumstances.” (R. at 23).
Analyzing Appellant Mr. Gaines’ claim for wrongful arrest, the court held that there is a
question of material fact in determining whether Mr. Gaines was discriminated against as he was
approached by officers who improperly targeted him and accused him of criminal behavior. (R.
at 25). And, whether the subsequent behavior exhibited by Mr. Gaines was a manifestation of his
disability “triggered” by the way in which CCPD officers dealt with him. (R. at 25). Further, Mr.
Gaines’ claim survives the motion for summary judgement under the theory of failure to
accommodate because a question for the trier of fact exists in determining whether police action
constitutes discrimination when the same police action with respect to two individuals leads to
materially different results. (R. at 26). In turning to Ms. Field’s claim, the court found that Ms.
8
Fields has raised a question of material fact regarding whether the stationhouse interview
violated her rights under the ADA. It is a question of fact whether she was denied the meaningful
benefit of the truth-seeking function ingrained in an investigative interview. (R. at 28).
Following the unanimous decision by the Thirteenth Circuit reversing the District Court’s
decision granting Carson City’s Motion for Summary Judgement, Carson City filed a timely
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court granted that
certiorari.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Thirteenth Circuit correctly held there are genuine issues of material fact in
determining the applicability of Title II of the ADA to law enforcement activity. In finding that
Title II of the ADA applies to arrests, the court was correct in its holding because (1) the text of
the statute does not support a broad police exemption, (2) Congress intended the ADA to apply
to law enforcement activities, specifically arrests, and (3) public policy aimed to give individuals
with mental illnesses equal access to public service demands that police not be permitted to
escape liability.
First, there is no textual basis to support the conclusion that police departments are
subject to an exemption under the Act. In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998), the court held that the ADA applied to prisons. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998). Applying Yeskey, Title II does not “cast the coverage” of
police departments “into doubt.” Id. Second, Congress expressly intended for Title II of the ADA
to apply to arrests because during deliberations House members expressed the critical need to
protect individuals with disabilities from inappropriate police arrests. H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3, at 50 (1990). Third, allowing the application of standard arrest procedures
9
risks discrimination because police actions produce materially different results when dealing
with individuals with mental disabilities. Therefore, as a matter of public policy permitting
police departments to escape liability furthers stigmatization and discrimination against disabled
citizens.
District courts in the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits represent a
growing trend to follow the Lewis rule for finding a wrongful arrest in violation of Title II of the
ADA. To qualify for a claim of wrongful arrest under Lewis, three elements must be met: (1) the
suspect must be disabled, (2) the defendants must have known or should have known he was
disabled, and (3) the defendants must have arrested the suspect because of legal conduct related
to his disability. Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175, 178 (S.D. Ind. 1997). Here, Mr. Gaines has
been diagnosed with ASD and BPD thereby satisfying element one. Mr. Gaines has presented
substantial evidence to support the inference that the defendants knew or should have known he
is disabled. Specifically, CCPD is an official partner of SHILC and as such, CCPD Officers
Klein and Taylor were generally aware of the disabilities of each of the SHILC residents,
including Mr. Gaines. Moreover, the officers noted in their police report that Mr. Gaines was
“unstable,” “mentally ill,” and “potentially violent” as a by-product of the interaction. Thus,
element two has been satisfied. Finally, element three is satisfied because the officers
misperceived manifestations of symptoms of Mr. Gaines’ disabilities as unlawful behavior. It
was the way in which officers approached the investigation and subsequent arrest in the first
instance that led officers to misperceive the symptoms of Mr. Gaines’ disability as unlawful,
which in turn led to the use of force to subdue and arrest Mr. Gaines.
The Thirteenth Circuit was correct in asserting that an issue of material fact exists in
determining whether Mr. Gaines was denied reasonable accommodation in accordance with his
10
disability in the way in which officers targeted him for investigation, accused him of a crime, and
arrested him. Where standard arrest procedures provided to all citizens results in greater injury
and indignity when provided to an individual with a disability, the disabled individual may assert
a claim under Title II of the ADA for failure to arrest in a manner reasonably accommodating his
or her disability. Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 1999). Implementing a
reasonable accommodation to on-the-ground investigations and arrests, such as bringing a
mental-health professional to the scene, would have been prevented the injury and indignity Mr.
Gaines suffered.
The Thirteenth Circuit properly concluded that there is an issue of material fact in
determining whether in failing to provide Ms. Fields with any reasonable accommodations
during a non-custodial stationhouse interview, Carson City violated Title II of the ADA. Ms.
Fields is a qualified individual with a disability under Title II of the ADA as she has been
diagnosed as having a mild intellectual disability and Borderline Personality Disorder. As a
qualified individual, Ms. Fields is entitled to protection against “the denial of benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A stationhouse interview
qualifies as an activity of the public entity, Carson City.
Here, the benefit denied to Ms. Fields as articulated by the Thirteenth Circuit is the
benefit of allowing her to assert her innocence and provide exculpatory information. (R. at 28).
Where an individual is denied the ability to participate in an investigatory police interview as a
result of an absence of accommodation consistent with the individuals disability, that individual
has been denied the benefits of police questioning. Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep’t of
Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543, 556 (D. N.J. 2000). Officers Klein and Taylor were aware that Ms.
Fields was disabled and of the negative ways in which the symptoms of her disabilities could
11
manifest during a police interaction. This information was expressly communicated to the
Officers by Jim Craw, SHILC case manager. (D. Order at 7). Yet, the officers provided no
accommodations. Because Carson City failed to provide Ms. Fields any reasonable
accommodation in accordance with her mental disability, Carson City denied her meaningful
access to the benefits of a stationhouse interview.
ARGUMENT
I. MR. GAINES HAS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM FOR RELIEF UNDER BOTH A WRONGFUL ARREST AND A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION THEORY.
Title II of the ADA provides “[n]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denies the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12132. Here, Mr. Gaines has sufficiently stated a claim for relief under a theory of
wrongful arrest under Title II because the officers misperceived Mr. Gaines’ disability for
criminal conduct. Mr. Gaines has also sufficiently stated a claim under a failure to provide
reasonable accommodation theory because the officers did not provide him with any
accommodations for his known disability.
A. Title II of the ADA Applies to Police Arrests. The text of the ADA and its legislative history support the inference that Title II applies
to police arrests. A broad judicial exemption for police activity under the ADA ignores the plain
text of the statute, its legislative history, and is not supported by sound policy.
Title II defines “public entity” as “any department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). In
Yeskey, this court held that prisons are subject to the ADA because “the ADA plainly covers
state institutions without any exception that could cast the coverage of prisons into doubt.”
12
Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209. The rationale of the Yeskey holding applies equally as well to police
departments as it does to prisons. There is no textual basis in the statute itself to conclude that
Congress intended to exclude police arrests from Title II of the ADA. Carson City, and its police
department, is therefore a “public entity” covered by the text of the statute itself.
Further, the legislative history of the ADA shows that Congress expressly intended to
cover police activity with the ADA. In explaining the applicability of the ADA, the House
Judiciary Committee noted: “For example, persons who have epilepsy, and a variety of other
disabilities, are frequently inappropriately arrested and jailed because police officers have not
received proper training in the recognition of and aid of seizures.” This statement clearly shows
that Congress anticipated that Title II applied to police arrests. Thus, when passing Title II,
Congress certainly intended for the ADA to apply to police activity including arrests.
As a matter of policy, police departments should not be granted a broad exemption to
Title II of the ADA. Congress passed the ADA in order to “provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42
U.S.C. § 12101(b). Allowing a core public entity to escape liability for discrimination against
disabled individuals fails to effectuate the intent of the ADA and furthers stigmatization and
discrimination against disabled citizens.
B. The Lewis Test Provides the Most Judiciously Expedient Analysis for Wrongful Arrest Claims.
In general, a claim for wrongful arrest under the ADA stands when “police wrongly
arrested someone with a disability because they misperceived the effects of that disability as
criminal activity.” Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220.
In Lewis the district court articulated a three prong test for wrongful arrest claims under
the ADA. To qualify for a claim of wrongful arrest: (1) the suspect must be disabled; (2) the
13
defendants must have known or should have known he was disabled; and (3) the defendants
arrested the subject because of legal conduct related to his disability. Lewis, 960 F. Supp. at 178.
In Gohier, the Tenth Circuit relied on the Lewis three-prong approach, ultimately rejecting the
plaintiff’s claims of wrongful arrest. Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1222. In that case, the court clarified
that the Lewis test is not an alternative to the typical Title II analysis, “but a specific application
of the general standard” for the arrest context. Id. at 1220.
Further, district courts in the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
chosen to follow the Lewis test for wrongful arrest. See Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc.,
54 F. Supp. 3d 409 (D. Md. 2014); Lynn v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:13-cv-00179-JMS-TAB,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96286 (S.D. Ind. July 16, 2014); Lerma v. City of Nogales, No. CV 12-
518-TUC-FRZ (CRP), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139613 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2014); J.H. ex rel. J.P.
v. Bernalillo Cty., No. CIV 12-0128 JB/LAM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94132 (D.N.M. July 8,
2014; McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2001). While not binding,
these cases represent the growing trend of the Lewis approach and its utility in the wrongful
arrest context.
i. The officers misperceived Mr. Gaines’ conduct as unlawful and therefore wrongfully arrested him.
Applying Lewis to the case at bar, the first two prongs of this test are both met without
dispute. Mr. Gaines is diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder and Bipolar Disorder-Type 1,
which are covered under the ADA. (D. Order at 3). Officers Klein and Taylor knew or should
have known of Mr. Gaines’ disability after Smith called the station. The police report noted that
Mr. Gaines was “unstable,” “mentally ill,” and “potentially violent.” The facts indicate that the
officers were generally aware of the Summerville Heights Integrated Living Community and
14
further, that they knew of Mr. Gaines disability in particular from their conversation with Smith
before interacting with Mr. Gaines. (D. Order at 4,6).
Finally, and at issue here, Mr. Gaines has provided sufficient evidence for a trier of fact
to conclude that the police misperceived manifestations of his disability as unlawful conduct. Mr.
Gaines was wrongfully arrested because the police misperceived the effects of his disability as
criminal activity, thus subjecting him to discrimination by a public entity on the basis of his
disability.
In Lewis, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment for the
plaintiff’s wrongful arrest claim under Title II of the ADA. Lewis, 960 F. Supp. at 179. The
court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact if “[d]efendants knew Charles Lewis
was deaf but refused to take steps to communicate with him and then arrested him because he did
not respond to them appropriately.” Id. at 178,179. In that case, the police officers arrested the
deaf Lewis because he failed to comply with their verbal questions and orders. Despite multiple
warnings that Lewis was deaf and best communicated via writing, the officers did not modify
their approach. Eventually, because he did not comply with the verbal commands, the officers
used force to arrest Lewis.
Similarly here, Officers Klein and Taylor knew of Mr. Gaines’ disability and
misperceived the effects of his disability which led to Mr. Gaines’ arrest. Just like in Lewis, Mr.
Gaines was unable to respond to the officers’ questions due to his disability. In Lewis, the
plaintiff could not properly hear the questions and could therefore not respond as the officers
wanted. Here, Mr. Gaines’ disability caused him to respond to questions in a manner the officers
did not approve of. The two cases illustrate the same essential factual basis for the claim of
15
wrongful arrest: the police misperceived effects of their disability that prevented them from
communicating with the officers, leading to their arrests.
Mr. Gaines’ claim for wrongful arrest is not based so much on the exact moment of the
arrest itself, but the process of investigation that Officers Klein and Taylor engaged in
throughout the encounter. The entirety of the investigation process was premised on
misperceptions of Mr. Gaines’ disability, and therefore the ultimate arrest was wrongful. The
officers knew or should have known that Smith’s call was based at least in part on Mr. Gaines’
disability and that Mr. Gaines’ behavior outside was simply the manifestation of his disability.
Mr. Gaines was engaged in wholly lawful conduct before Officer Klein engaged in a use
of force. The officers asked Mr. Gaines questions and he responded with physical agitation, a
normal response for someone with his disability. While Mr. Gaines was not wholly responsive to
the questions, he did indicate his unease with the situation at the outset: “You need to leave me
alone. I am feeling bad.” (D. Order. at 7). When asked to sit down and drop the bat, Mr. Gaines
partially complied, dropping the bat, but not sitting. (D. Order at 7).
The officers used physical force after Mr. Gaines became “visibly agitated and began
making erratic movements with his arms”, as a result of Officer Klein’s questioning. (D. Order at
7). It is a question of fact for the jury if Mr. Gaines’ disability can produce these effects. Officer
Klein tackled Mr. Gaines, “knocking him to the concrete sidewalk”. (D. Order at 7).
The officers knew or should have known of Mr. Gaines’ disability and chose to target
him leading to his arrest. Their disregard of Mr. Gaines’ disability caused them to see his
agitation and hesitance as evidence of criminal behavior. While the city argues that Mr. Gaines’
conduct is an intervening cause, officers cannot knowingly entice a disabled individual to engage
16
in erratic behavior that is a manifestation of his or her disability and later claim innocence. (R at
27).
The evidence raises a question of material fact of whether the CCPD officers
discriminated against Mr. Gaines when they misperceived symptoms of Mr. Gaines’ disability
for suspicious behavior and, accordingly, discriminated against him by improperly targeting him
and accusing him of criminal behavior.” (R at 25). Overall, the police conduct during the arrest
raises a genuine issue of material fact if the officers wrongfully misperceived manifestations of
Mr. Gaines’ disability as unlawful conduct.
C. Officers Klein and Taylor Failed to Provide Mr. Gaines with Reasonable Accommodations.
In Gorman, the Eighth Circuit recognized a claim for failure to provide reasonable
accommodations during an arrest procedure. Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir.
1998). In that case, the plaintiff was a paraplegic man who sued his arresting officers for forcing
him to ride in the back of a police vehicle unable to safely accommodate wheelchairs. Id at 909.
The court held that the plaintiff had a sufficient claim under Title II for the police failure to
reasonably accommodate his disability. Id at 916. Likewise, in Gohier, while the plaintiff did not
bring a failure to accommodate claim, the Tenth Circuit recognized that “[u]nder Gorman's
rationale, Gohier might have argued that Title II required Colorado Springs …to investigate and
arrest such persons in a manner reasonably accommodating their disability.” Gohier, 186 F.3d at
1222.
The ADA “requires only that a particular service provided to some not be denied to
disabled people.” Rodriguez v. City of N.Y., 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1999). While the City
argues that there is no Title II violation because they offered Mr. Gaines the same services as a
normal citizen, that argument mischaracterizes the facts of this case. Here, in not providing Mr.
17
Gaines reasonable accommodations, the City failed to provide Mr. Gaines with the same service
it provides to other citizens which resulted in “greater injury or indignity in that process than
other arrestees.” Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220.
i. The evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact for trial if the officers failed to reasonably accommodate Mr. Gaines’ disability.
A genuine issue of material fact exists when the issue could reasonably be decided in
favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. Here, there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officers Klein and Taylor’s failure to accommodate
Mr. Gaines’ known disability was reasonable. The officers knew of Mr. Gaines’ disability when
they confronted Mr. Gaines and did not approach him in any manner that could accommodate his
known disability. Mr. Gaines’ expert provided four possible reasonable accommodations that
present a question of fact for a jury to decide if these suggested accommodations were
reasonable under the circumstances. The possible accommodations are: (1) call a mental
healthcare professional or officers trained in dealing with mentally ill individuals; (2) approach
Mr. Gaines in a non-confrontational manner; (3) allow him cooling off time; (4) respect his
personal space. (R at 27). The officers failed to perform any accommodation whatsoever, directly
causing Mr. Gaines harm and indignity.
While the city argues it has no duty to change its on the ground arrest procedure, that
argument misplaces the focus of the issue. The ADA requires that no disabled individual “be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §12132. When police action
“produces materially different results” for separate individuals, there is an ADA violation
because the playing field is not “level”. (R at 26); J.H. ex rel. J.P., No. CIV 12-0128 JB/LAM,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94132, at *401. By reasonably accommodating Mr. Gaines’ known
disability, Mr. Gaines would have had an opportunity to be given the same services as all
18
citizens. Instead, the officers failure to attempt to reasonably accommodate Mr. Gaines’ known
disability in any manner deprived Mr. Gaines of a level “playing field.” Id. at 401. In other
words, by not making any attempt to reasonably accommodate Mr. Gaines’ disability, the
officers subjected Mr. Gaines to discrimination because Mr. Gaines was not given the same
privileges non-disabled individuals are afforded.
Contrary to what the city argues, reasonable accommodations during the arrest procedure
are too burdensome to apply to on the ground policing. The city argues that as a matter of law,
Title II does not apply to the arrest procedure because of the exigent nature of arrests and the
needs of officer safety. However, that argument fails because the text of the ADA does not
support such an interpretation and as a matter of policy the burden on acting officers is not made
greater. First, the text of the ADA clearly applies to all “public entities” and contains no
exemptions for exigent circumstances for acting officers. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Instead, federal
regulations provide an affirmative defense that the public entity does not have to fundamentally
alter the nature of the service, program or activity offered in order to meet the needs of Title
II. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). As applied here, the fundamental alteration standard is the
appropriate method for the city to seek relief and argue that the ADA does not apply to the
particular facts at hand. However, the existence of the regulation alone precludes the notion that
the ADA does not apply at all to on the ground arrests.
Further, while the safety needs of officers on the ground can never be underestimated,
applying a reasonable accommodation standard does not create an undue burden on police
officers. Under a reasonable accommodation standard, the officers judgement will still be the
paramount guidepost. As applied here, the CCPD officers would be free to argue that in their
discretion, the needs of the situation were such that providing reasonable accommodations was
19
unreasonable under the circumstances. However, a broad exception as a matter of law does
nothing to protect disabled individuals. The reasonable accommodation standard maintains the
status quo and allows for greater protection for disabled individuals.
Here, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Gaines, it is completely
reasonable that any of the four suggested accommodations would have prevented the harm Mr.
Gaines suffered. While the public entity need not fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity to comply with the ADA, the burden is on the public entity to make that
factual showing necessary to a decider of fact. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). Here, because Mr.
Gaines has presented sufficient evidence of possible reasonable accommodations via sworn
expert affidavit and the city disputes its ability to provide those accommodations, there is a
genuine issue of material fact to be determined by a jury.
II. CARSON CITY VIOLATED TITLE II OF THE ADA WHEN IT FAILED TO PROVIDE MS. FIELDS ANY REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION DURING A STATIONHOUSE INTERVIEW.
A. Ms. Fields is a Disabled Person Who Qualifies for and was Denied the Benefits of a Stationhouse Interview.
Title II of the ADA mandates that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Thus, in order for Title II to require modification of police interviews
for the mentally disabled: (1) the interviewed person must be a qualified individual with a
disability; (2) the police interview must be an activity of a public entity; and (3) the individual
under interview must be denied the benefits of interrogation or otherwise face discrimination in
the course as a result of the disability.
20
i. The disability and essential eligibility requirements necessary for Ms. Fields to qualify her for participation in a stationhouse interview are easily met here.
To obtain Title II protection, the individual must be a qualified disabled person “who,
with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices…meets the essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). This requirement therefore requires that the
individual (1) have a disability within the meaning of Title II, and (2) is eligible to participate in
a police interview.
“Disability” is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(a)(1)(i). Here, there is no dispute that Ms. Fields is
disabled. She is diagnosed as having a mild intellectual disability and Borderline Personality
Disorder (“BPD”). (D. Order at 3). Ms. Fields is also eligible for and receives government-
subsidized services for a “supported housing” community in Carson City. (D. Order at 4). These
findings of fact by the district court definitively leads one to conclude that Ms. Fields is a
disabled person within the meaning of the statute.
To further qualify for Title II protection, the disabled individual must meet the “essential
eligibility requirements” to participate in the public entity’s activity. The Department of Justice
has indicated that there is no specific criteria in defining “essential eligibility requirements,” but
that participation in some activities may be minimal. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Disability in State and Local Government Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 35694-01 (July 26, 1991). For
instance, in cases where a public entity makes its service or activity available to all members of
the public upon request, the only eligibility criterion is requesting access. Id. Thus, the
government may extend eligibility simply by compelling the person’s participation. In the case
of a police interview, the essential eligibility requirement is the mere fact of being interviewed.
21
Therefore, all persons subject to an interview meet the eligibility requirements irrespective of
any mental disability.
ii. The stationhouse interview conducted by Officer Taylor and Officer Klein qualifies as an activity of a public entity.
The second statutory requirement of Title II is that a police interrogation be an activity of
a public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The broad definition of “public entity” includes “any
department, agency…or other instrumentality of a State…or local government.” 42 U.S.C.
§12131(1)(B). Carson City and its police department, as a municipality of the state of Carson,
easily fulfills this definition. See Gorman, 152 F.3d at 913 (“A local police department ‘falls
squarely within the statutory definition of “public entity.”’); Willits v. City of L.A., 925 F. Supp.
2d 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“The City of Los Angeles is a “public entity” within the meaning of
Title II of the ADA.”).
With respect to whether a police interrogation is an “activity,” the district court did not
deny that this Court in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, established “that the
ADA applies even to a government program that is not voluntary.” (D. Order at 18). Thus, there
is no dispute that a police interview qualifies as an “activity” within the meaning of the statute.
iii. Ms. Fields was denied the benefits of a stationhouse interview conducted by law enforcement.
The final statutory requirement of Title II demands that the disability cause the individual
to be “denied the benefits” or be otherwise discriminated against by the public entity. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132. Carson City incorrectly asserts that the benefits afforded by a stationhouse interview
are confined to law enforcement officials for investigatory purposes. (R. at 28). In reality, and as
the Thirteenth Circuit properly concluded, police interviews include the benefit of allowing the
suspect or witness to assert one’s innocence and provide exculpatory information. (R. at. 28).
22
In Bahl v. County of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2012), a deaf defendant was
taken into custody after an argument with a police officer became physical. Bahl v. Cty. of
Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2012). Following his arrest, a police investigator conducted
an interview without providing Bahl the accommodation of an interpreter because it “was not
necessary to the City’s case and did not justify the cost of an interpreter.” Id. A jury subsequently
convicted Bahl of misdemeanor obstruction of legal process. Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed in
part and remanded, finding that “a custodial interrogation with an interpreter would have
afforded Bahl certain benefits, including the right to ask questions and tell his side of the story,
which arguably could have affected the charging decision.” Id. at 788.
In Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Department of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543, 556 (D. N.J.
2000), the district court found that the benefit of providing an interpreter during a station-house
investigative questioning is to provide information to the police concerning the commission of
crimes, whether in a witness or suspect capacity. Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep’t of Police,
89 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (D. N.J. 2000). There, a deaf and functionally illiterate woman was
investigated for allegations of sexual assault. Id. The court found that “the assistance of an
auxiliary aid or service, which includes a qualified interpreter, would allow a hearing impaired
individual to participate in the specific police activity in an appropriate manner consistent with
her disability.” Id. A disability that impedes an individual from taking advantage of such an
activity deprives the suspect the benefits of police questioning. Id.
In both Bahl and Calloway, the individuals suffered from a physical disability that
effectively eliminated their ability to receive and communicate information. Such a disability—
without further accommodations—deprived these individuals the benefit of communication in a
stationhouse interview. Similarly here, Ms. Fields was denied the benefits of competently
23
providing information and asserting the innocence of her and her partner. Just as the deaf need an
interpreter to receive and convey information accurately, so, too, do the mentally disabled need
some form of accommodation to also take in and relay information.
Carson City argues that she was not denied the ability to tell her side of the story, and that
she was subjected to the “same exact” questioning as someone who is not disabled. (D. Order at
17). This finding alone is demonstrative proof that the district court failed to recognize the
inherent disadvantage the disabled possess, thus vitiating the fairness of being treated the “same
exact” way. The district court further agreed with Carson City and further stated that there is no
evidence Ms. Fields was “fundamentally unable” to communicate with Officer Taylor and
Officer Klein. (D. Order at 17-18). But both Carson City and the district court misunderstand the
nature of a psychological disability. While it is true that Ms. Fields is physically able to
communicate insofar as she was not deaf or mute, her mental illness significantly inhibits what
she communicates, and how accurately it is communicated.
Scholarship has generally found that individuals with intellectual impairments are at a
disadvantage during the course of interviews with law enforcement officials. This Court has even
factored in so-called “low intelligence” of the accused in determining whether a suspect was
vulnerable to being coerced into making a false confession. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 226 (1973). Indeed, persons with intellectual disabilities are significantly over-represented
in false confession cases. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 20 (2010). Compared to the general population,
persons with mental disabilities display greater suggestibility, tendency toward acquiescence,
and inattentiveness to long-term consequences, which makes them especially vulnerable to
deceptive tactics. Id. at 20-22.
24
Ms. Fields submitted evidence from a qualified forensic psychiatrist indicating that (1)
Ms. Fields’ intellectual impairment and personality disorder made her particularly vulnerable to
the techniques used; and (2) evidence shows that the mentally ill and intellectually impaired are
vastly overrepresented among the population of those who make false confessions. (R. at 30).
Her specific symptoms with respect to her intellectual disability include: poor perceptual
reasoning, verbal comprehension, memory, abstract thought, problem solving, gullibility,
naiveté, obliviousness to risk, and a tendency to follow others. (D. Order at 3). With regards to
her BPD, she possesses inflexible thinking and fear of rejection and abandonment. (D. Order at 3
– 4). And, during the course of the interview, the officers used a variety of interrogative
techniques such as deception and manipulation to elicit a response from Ms. Fields. All this is to
strongly suggest Ms. Fields’ susceptibility to making a false confession.
Ms. Fields’ vulnerability should have been a serious consideration in the course of her
treatment during the investigation. The record reflects that Officers Taylor and Klein knew that
Ms. Fields was disabled, and that the discovery of her partner’s arrest and talking to the police
would impact her negatively. (D. Order at 7). Both Officers Klein and Taylor witnessed Ms.
Fields’ instability—she was visibly upset, crying and shaking when she arrived at the station
alone. (D. Order at 8). That she would have conveyed a false confession is not beyond the realm
of possibilities. At minimum, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Ms. Fields’
disabilities would have impeded her from effectively communicating. Thus, like a deaf
individual without an interpreter or auxiliary aid, Ms. Fields was denied the benefit of accurate
and effective communication.
That Ms. Fields could terminate the interview does not also terminate her claim to a
benefit for which she is qualified. Although a custodial interrogation elicits a compelling reason
25
to tell one’s side of the story, that compelling reason does not go away merely because of the
non-custodial nature of an interview, especially for Ms. Fields. The objective of the distressing
interview was to discern Ms. Fields’ partner of guilt. This, alone, is enough to create a
compelling reason and therefore claim the benefit of conveying innocence.
B. Carson City Failed to Provide Any Reasonable Accommodation for Ms. Fields’ Mental Illness, Thus Denying Her Meaningful Access to the Benefits of a Stationhouse Interview.
In accordance with Title II, a public entity is required to make reasonable modifications
in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination
on the basis of the disability, unless such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
the activity. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i).
i. A “reasonable accommodation” requires Carson City to provide “meaningful access” to its stationhouse interviews.
Neither Title II nor its regulations define or otherwise elaborate upon the meaning of
“reasonable accommodation.” Courts often turn to the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and
Title I of the ADA for guidance, since the requirement of reasonable modification under the
Rehabilitation Act and Title I generally mirrors the reasonable accommodation standard. See
McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1266 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although Title II of the
ADA uses the term ‘reasonable modification,’ rather than ‘reasonable accommodation [under the
Rehabilitation Act],’ these terms create identical standards); Gile v. United Airlines, 95 F.3d 429,
497 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Rehabilitation Act incorporates the ADA’s definition of reasonable
accommodation…”); Staron v. MCDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355-56 (2nd Cir. 1995); Helen
L. v. Didario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3rd Cir. 1995); Bahl v. Cty. of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 783 (8th
Cir. 2012); see also Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass’n., 40 F.3d 926, 931 (8th
26
Cir. 1994) (interpreting the reasonable accommodation standard with reference to Rehabilitation
Act cases).
This Court defined a “reasonable modification” under the Rehabilitation Act as one that
provides an otherwise qualified plaintiff with disabilities meaningful access to the program or
services sought. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985). In accordance with Choate, and
the previously identified line of cases where courts relied on the Rehabilitation Act and Title I,
courts have cemented an understanding of reasonable accommodation as providing “meaningful
access.” A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2016);
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 282 (2d Cir. 2003); Rivera-Concepcion v. Puerto Rico,
786 F. Supp. 2d 442, 459-460 (D. P.R. 2010) (acknowledging organizations as violating § 504
when a disabled person is deprived of a reasonable accommodation necessary for meaningful
access to public service benefits, and that claims of “discrimination is analyzed under the same
standards as those used to determine whether Title II has been violated…”). At least one court
has elaborated on this “meaningful access” standard by requiring a showing that the defendant(s)
was intentionally or deliberately indifferent in failing to provide meaningful access to the
disabled person. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008).
It is important to note that there were no exigent circumstances here which would render
any accommodation unreasonable on exigent circumstances grounds. When there are exigent
circumstances, such as a threat to public health or safety, modifications may be deemed to be
unreasonable and preclude Title II failure-to-accommodate claims. See Roel v. Hamilton,
Ohio/Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commissioners, 870 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2017). The Thirteenth
Circuit correctly found that there were no exigent circumstances in interviewing Ms. Fields. (R.
27
at 30). Although Ms. Fields was unstable at the time of her interview, there is nothing to suggest
she posed a danger to the officers or anyone else.
ii. Because absolutely no accommodation was provided to Ms. Fields, she was deprived of any meaningful access to the benefits of a stationhouse interview.
In an Eighth Circuit decision, the court affirmed a district court’s granting of summary
judgment in favor of defendants, the City of Waverly. Folkerts v. City of Waverly, Iowa, 707
F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2013). There, an intellectually disabled male named Travis was investigated
by Troy Schneider for sexual assault. Id. at 979. Aware of his disability but not the extent of his
limitations, Investigator Schneider conducted an interrogation of Travis with various
accommodations. Id. Subsequent to this interrogation, Investigator Schneider filed a complaint
charging Travis with lascivious conduct with a minor. Id. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
concluded: “[v]iewing the facts most favorable to the Folkertses, no reasonable jury could
conclude that the defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations for Travis’ disability.
Schneider altered his questioning style, more fully explained the Miranda rights, interviewed
Travis in a less intimidating room, drove Travis to his parents’ home and explained the situation
to them, and arranged alternative and friendlier booking procedures.” Id. at 984. The Eight
Circuit further held that the defendant’s accommodations were reasonable even if they were not
necessarily the best accommodations the City could have provided. Id.
Although Folkerts is analogous to the case at bar, there is one critical and fundamental
distinction. Whereas Investigator Schneider sought to provide some kind of accommodation in
Folkerts, Officer Taylor and Officer Klein provided absolutely no accommodation that could be
deemed reasonable or unreasonable. (R. at 29). That there was no accommodation provided
28
necessarily means that Ms. Fields could not have been given any meaningful access to the
benefits of a police interview she was entitled to.
Furthermore, Ms. Fields suggested several possible modifications including: (1)
involving a mental health professional in the interview; (2) using less aggressive interview
methods; (3) avoid the use of leading questions and manipulative techniques; (4) avoid the use of
deception; and (5) stopped the interview to provide Ms. Fields breaks. (R. at 30). Whether or not
these modifications were unreasonable under the circumstances could not be discerned at the
summary judgment stage. Indeed, the reasonableness of a modification is a highly fact-specific
inquiry, as the Thirteenth Circuit correctly noted. (R. at 30); See also, Bircoll v. Miami-Dade
Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085-86 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d
1522, 1527 (11th Cir. 1997)) (“The reasonable modification inquiry in Title II-ADA cases is a
‘highly fact-specific inquiry.’”); Crowder v. Kitawaga, 81 F.3d 1480, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1996);
Staron, 51 F.3d at 356. As such, a determination of reasonableness or unreasonableness should
have been reserved for the jury.
iii. Any one of the reasonable accommodations proposed by Ms. Fields would not have fundamentally altered the nature of law enforcement interview techniques.
The District Court and Carson City asserts that any of the accommodations suggested by
Ms. Fields would have been unreasonable because such modifications would fundamentally alter
the nature of law enforcement techniques. But providing Ms. Fields a break (as one of the
suggested accommodations) can hardly amount to a “fundamental alteration” of law enforcement
interview techniques. Nevertheless, as iterated previously, the reasonableness of an
accommodation is a highly fact specific inquiry and thus should be left to the jury to determine
such reasonableness.
29
Under the Rehabilitation Act, a modification is unreasonable if it imposes an “undue
financial and administrative burden” on the public entity. Southeastern Cmty Coll. v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 412 (1979). Subsequent courts have applied the same principle in the context of the
ADA. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. of Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n. 17 (1987); Pottgen, 40
F.3d at 930. The regulations require difficulty and expense to be assessed in light of a non-
exhaustive list of factors, including the net cost, overall financial resources of the covered entity,
and the impact of the accommodation on the entity’s ability to operate. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2).
Again, it can hardly be said that a modification such as allowing Ms. Fields a break at the height
of her distress would amount to being administratively or financially impractical. Even still, such
a determination should be reserved for the trier of fact.
CONCLUSION
Title II of the ADA effectuates prohibitions against discrimination in public services
provided by government entities. Police departments are not exempt from the application of Title
II of the ADA. Its application to law enforcement activities was contemplated by the legislature.
Deliberations on the Act made clear that the ADA was intended to ensure that police officers
implement modified strategies when interacting with disabled individuals. Thus, law
enforcement should make reasonable accommodations for mentally ill and cognitively impaired
individuals.
Accordingly, Mr. Gaines was discriminated against based on his mental illness when law
enforcement officers wrongfully arrested him and failed to provide him reasonable
accommodations during that arrest. Law enforcement officers failed to provide reasonable
accommodations to Ms. Fields during a non-custodial stationhouse interview because they
denied her the benefit of explaining and providing exculpatory information.
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For the aforementioned reasons, the judgement of the Thirteenth Circuit should be
upheld.
Date: January 2, 2018
Respectfully Submitted. /s/ TEAM 468
TEAM 468 San Francisco, California Attorneys for Respondents CHUCK GAINES AND BRITTANY FIELDS
