Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report

This consultant’s report does not necessarily reflect the views of ADB or the Government concerned, and ADB and the Government cannot be held liable for its contents. (For project preparatory technical assistance: All the views expressed herein may not be incorporated into the proposed project’s design.

Project Number: 44151 April 2013

RETA 7543 (REG): Sharing Knowledge on Community-Driven Development in Asia and the Pacific (Financed by the Republic of Korea e-Asia and Knowledge

Partnership Fund)

Prepared by Raul P. Gonzales

For Asian Development Bank

ABBREVIATIONS ADB – Asian Development Bank BKM – badan keswadayaan masyarakat (community self-help

organization) CBO community-based organization CDD – community-driven development CEAC – community empowerment activity cycle DMC – developing member country DSWD – Department of Social Welfare and Development FGD – focus group discussion KALAHI-

CIDDS – Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan – Comprehensive and

Integrated Delivery of Social Services LGED – Local Government Engineering Department LGOP – Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development

(of the State Council) LGU – local government unit MDC – municipal development council MDF – municipal development forum MIBF Municipal Inter-barangay (intervillage) Forum NGO – non-government organization NUSSP – Neighborhood Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project O&M – operations and maintenance PMO – project management office PNPM

Mandiri – Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri

Perdesaan (National Program for Community Empowerment) PRC – People’s Republic of China PSA – participatory situation analysis RP4D – Rencana Pembangunan Pengembangan Perumahan dan

Pemukiman di Daerah (Regional Development Plan for Housing and Settlement)

SU – Saemaul Undong TLCC – town-level coordination committee UGIAP – Urban Governance Improvement Action Program UGIIP – Urban Governance and Infrastructure Improvement Project VGM – village general meeting WLCC – ward-level coordination committee

GLOSSARY

barangay – village Makamasang

Tugon – People’s Response

NOTE

In this report, "$" refers to US dollars.

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CONTENTS

Page

I. BACKGROUND 1

II. QUALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF SUBPROJECT INFRASTRUCTURE 3

III. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 7

IV. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 14

V. CDD IMPACTS ON GOVERNANCE 17

VI. SUMMING UP 23

VII. DESCRIPTION OF CDD PROJECTS STUDIED 26

A. Neighborhood Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project (Indonesia) 26 B. Saemaul Undong Movement (Korea) 27 C. Community-Driven Development Pilot (People’s Republic of China) 28 D. Urban Governance and Infrastructure Improvement Project (Bangladesh) 29 E. KALAHI-CIDSS Project (Philippines) 31

I. BACKGROUND

1. Introduced in the mid-90s, community-driven development (CDD) has gained recognition as an effective approach for addressing poverty, improving governance, and promoting inclusion. To date, CDD projects have been implemented in more than 100 countries, including countries in Asia and the Pacific. 2. The World Bank’s 2003 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Sourcebook describes CDD as an approach that gives community groups control over planning decisions and investment resources for local development projects. Similarly, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has adopted the following five elements as the essential features of CDD: community focus, participatory planning and design, community control of resources, community involvement in implementation, and community-based participatory monitoring and evaluation to ensure downward accountability to the community. 3. Since 2001, ADB has financed more than 93 projects with CDD characteristics throughout Asia and the Pacific. A 2006 ADB study1 cited the high potential for scaling up CDD projects, but cautioned against adoption of cookie-cutter approaches that disregard local contexts. The study also stressed the importance of partnerships among practitioners and institutions on CDD design and implementation, through networks, joint learning events, staff exchange programs and joint missions, and joint research. 4. ADB’s RETA-7543: Sharing Knowledge on CDD in Asia and the Pacific seeks to build capacity of developing member countries (DMCs) to scale up CDD operations through (i) research and documentation of lessons learned on selected themes; (ii) a CDD knowledge and learning hub to share and disseminate information among practitioners, DMCs, and development partners; and (iii) helping to establish and strengthen informal and formal CDD networks within ADB and between ADB and external agencies to support CDD practitioners. 5. Towards this end, RETA-7543 has documented the experience of the following five CDD projects – CDD Pilot Program (People’s Republic of China), Neighborhood Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project (Indonesia), Saemaul Undong Movement (Republic of Korea), KALAHI-CIDSS Project (Philippines) and Urban Governance and Infrastructure Improvement Project (Bangladesh) – to determine the extent that CDD has contributed to service delivery and governance in the beneficiary communities.2 6. Four major areas were studied, namely: (a) quality and sustainability of community subproject infrastructure; (b) responsiveness of subprojects to local community needs and expressed demand; (c) accountability of local leaders and the extent that residents were able to influence the behavior of the leaders, in particular, the experience of communities in dealing with attempts to misappropriate project funds; and (d) the extent that participation in the CDD Project helped build the capacity of the local governments, specifically, in institutionalizing participatory modes of service delivery and enhancing transparency and accountability in the use of local resources.

1 ADB. A Review of Community Driven Development and Its Application to the Asian Development Bank.

Unpublished. 2 See appendix for brief descriptions of the five CDD projects

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7. The five case reports are country-specific and have been published individually. This synthesis paper examines the major cross-cutting issues and lessons of the five studies to inform a broader audience on CDD theory and practice.

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II. QUALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF SUBPROJECT INFRASTRUCTURE

A. Finding 1. In general, the community subproject infrastructure delivered by the

five CDD projects is of good quality and considered satisfactory by village residents.

8. In Indonesia, the research team observed that community infrastructure funded by the

Neighborhood Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project (NUSSP) appeared to be in like-new

condition or, at the minimum, lacking any serious damage even after five years from date of completion. The high quality of NUSSP-funded infrastructure was attributed to the following factors: (a) planning was carefully conducted, (b) construction activities were closely supervised by technical facilitators (who were themselves infrastructure experts), and (c) community members who undertook the construction activities perceived the output as being not only for them, but also for their offspring. The significant sense of ownership among village residents of NUSSP subprojects caused construction activities to be performed carefully and wholeheartedly, particularly for the subprojects that were self-implemented by community members.

9. The same quality of subproject infrastructure was also observed in the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan – Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) project in the Philippines. Key informants from the study villages mentioned the use of standard materials and the supervision and technical assistance of project staff and local government officials as the two most important factors that account for the high construction quality. Other contributory factors included: (i) appropriate and well-designed plans and cost estimates; (ii) dedicated and trained project managers and workers; (iii) strict compliance with construction standards; (iv) transparency and continuous monitoring (residents are kept informed of implementation progress); (v) a sense of accountability among those responsible for construction; and (vi) timely action on suspected anomalous transactions. B. Finding 2. Operations and maintenance (O&M) activities to maintain subproject

infrastructure is uneven across the five country projects.

10. In Indonesia, the research team noted the absence of systematic scheduling of maintenance by the community self-help organizations (BKMs)3 in some of the study villages. In other villages, maintenance was performed using voluntary contributions from individual community members or funds from the village budget. Variations in the extent of community commitment for maintenance are considered to be closely related to the level of participation during the construction phase. Villages with minimal participation during construction tended to have lower ownership (and a lower sense of obligation towards maintenance) and vice versa. 11. Variation in maintenance practices was attributed to the tendency of BKMs, the village institutions utilized for NUSSP implementation, to function only when required by externally-initiated development initiatives and to lapse into dormancy when the required infrastructure works had been completed. This led the Indonesian research team to conclude that BKMs are not really community institutions as such but rather, agencies that exist at the insistence of external forces. As such, they are unsustainable since beneficiary communities will subsidize

3 badan keswadayaan masyarakat

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BKM operations only when such expenditure produces a “return” in terms of projects for the community.

12. In the Philippines, O&M arrangements for subprojects are considered to be satisfactory. Effective O&M is due to an appropriate plan, sufficient funds, a responsible and competent O&M committee, supportive legislation to safeguard the subproject, and regular monitoring by residents, local government officials, and KALAHI-CIDSS staff. 13. Residents support their subprojects in various ways, including provision of voluntary labor, cash contributions, in-kind contributions, strong patronage of common service facilities, and compliance with subproject policies. Residents also support their subprojects by monitoring them, with more than 40% of survey respondents claiming that they have reported problems related to their subprojects. 14. Municipal and village local governments also provide contributions for the O&M of village subprojects. However, the manner in which these contributions are disbursed and the degree of transparency surrounding the transactions varied across the study municipalities. C. Finding 3. Village residents generally feel that community subproject

infrastructure has been beneficial in terms of the services provided.

15. There is broad consensus that subprojects supported by the Indonesian NUSSP have benefited their recipient communities. In the household survey conducted by the research team, 95% of respondents – which included wealthy, middle-income, and poor households – judged the NUSSP to be “useful” or “very useful.”

16. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the road and water supply facilities established

through the CDD Pilot have greatly reduced the geographic and environmental challenges for rural development. With better roads and other community infrastructure, farming productivity has been enhanced, food production has increased, and farmers’ lives have improved. 17. The initial impacts of community infrastructure in PRC are also found in the Philippines where ninety percent of survey respondents said that in addition to the provision of social services, subprojects supported by KALAHI-CIDSS have also had positive effects on household income. For example, roads facilitate the transport of agricultural goods and this results in better prices since the goods are fresh when they arrive at the market. Household income is also increased by generating job opportunities for community residents, including employment for the poorest residents during the construction of subprojects. 18. The 2011 end-of-project impact evaluation of KALAHI-CIDSS reported a 12% increase in per capita consumption of households in beneficiary communities compared to households in villages that did not benefit from KALAHI-CIDSS4. In beneficiary villages with larger numbers of KALAHI-CIDSS subprojects, households enjoyed even higher increases in consumption, as much as 14% more than those in non-beneficiary communities. The study also reported significant improvement in employment rates, particularly among females, and more diversified employment with household members now employed in more than one sector.

4 World Bank, 2013. The KALAHI-CIDSS Impact Evaluation: A Revised Synthesis Report.

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19. In the Urban Governance Improvement and Infrastructure Project (UGIIP), impact surveys of community subprojects, which have been identified by a three-tiered committee structure (neighborhood, ward and town), established by the project have reported the following benefits: (a) income improvements, as evidenced by the increase in assets of households and the rise in the number of households who considered their income to be sufficient to meet household expenses; (b) improved living conditions, in terms of the number of households with access to clean water from nearby sources, improved road surfaces and drainage, and sanitary latrines; (c) improved waste disposal, using strategically-placed dustbins that are maintained by pourashava (secondary town) governments; (d) improved education services; and (e) improved local government unit (LGU) responsiveness to citizen’s needs through prominently-displayed citizens’ charters that detail LGU services to pourashava residents. 20. In contrast to the bottom-up selection processes described above, the Saemaul Undong (SU) Movement in Korea employed a more directed strategy in the choice of community subprojects. During its first stage (1971–1973), the SU movement focused on two types of community subproject:

(i) building and/or upgrading basic rural infrastructure, such as, village path networks, upgrading of small stream beds to increase availability of water for irrigation, and construction of community facilities; and

(ii) improving village living environments, such as, replacing thatched roofs with tin,

tile, or slate coverings, modernizing kitchen facilities, introduction of electrification and telecommunications, and forestry programs that beautified village environ-ments and expanded the supply of water available for agricultural production, and prevented loss of fertile topsoil through erosion and flooding.

21. In Stage-2 (1974–1976), the SU movement shifted its focus to the expansion of agricultural output through the construction of farm roads, alignment of farmland, and mechani-zation of agricultural production. Agricultural infrastructure projects were scaled up from individual village-level projects to inter-village Saemaul zones. SU-initiated village income-generating projects were likewise upgraded to agribusinesses and cottage industry facilities referred to as Saemaul factories.5 D. Finding 4. The above notwithstanding, some study informants are concerned that

the constructed community infrastructure is not consistent with beneficiary community’s priorities.

22. In the Indonesian NUSSP, the research team found that the identification of priority needs for improving neighborhood conditions varied among social groups. This was not altogether unexpected: after all, social groups would tend to give priority to improvements needed by their own immediate settlements. In one Indonesian community, for example, elite respondents assigned improvement of drainage facilities their highest priority, while their low-income peers identified the provision of clean water and a communal garbage dump as their most important priorities.

5 In Stage III (1977–1979), SU activities focused on extending participation in the SU movement including urban area residents, academics, professionals, members of the clergy, and high-ranking government officials.

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23. Even for NUSSP infrastructure subprojects that were consistent with the community-identified priorities, NUSSP resources were inadequate to address all infrastructure issues facing each village. Since NUSSP targeted a relatively large number of villages, its funds were spread relatively thinly across recipient communities.6 And since NUSSP resources allocated to a particular village were not spent in implementing a single project, but rather several subprojects, the funds available for each subproject were significantly reduced. 24. Thus, NUSSP subprojects tended to be small-scale and inadequate to completely address resident-identified priorities for infrastructure improvement. In a few instances, the impact of some NUSSP subprojects even became perverse.7 On hindsight, the implementation of subprojects would have been optimized if these had been complemented by more macro-scale neighborhood improvements. 25. At the macro level, the rather modest impact of the NUSSP in addressing the wide range of slum-related issues resulted from the absence of an integrated slum improvement strategy at the national, regional, and local levels. While one NUSSP project component facilitated the formulation of the Regional Development Plan for Housing and Settlement (RP4D), the Plan was often formulated during NUSSP implementation or, in some cases, after NUSSP subprojects had been completed. Further, local parliaments did not give RP4D the status of an enforceable regulation so that local governments were under no obligation to comply with its provisions. 26. Apart from the question of whether NUSSP subprojects were consistent with community priorities, majority of study informants believe that residential areas in most of the sample villages had improved significantly and that the number of slum areas had decreased substantially.

This may have occurred because, in addition to the NUSSP, a number of other development initiatives were being implemented in the sample communities over the same period, including the Urban Poverty Project, PNPM-Mandiri (National Program for Community Empowerment) among others.

6

In Lamongan District, each village only received Rp137 million to Rp214 million ($15,515–$24,235, at the exchange rate of Rp8.880/ $1 prevailing on 18 September 2011) for NUSSP subproject implementation.

7 For example, one respondent pointed out that the improvement work on one drainage system in a beneficiary community actually caused flooding rather than abating it. This is because the deepening of the drainage system financed under the NUSSP was not complemented by improvement by the city government of the primary drainage channel. This resulted in greater elevation of the surface level of the primary drainage channel than the neighborhood drainage channel, which was deepened under NUSSP financing. As a result, water from the neighborhood drainage system could not flow into the primary drainage channel, which resulted in flooding in the beneficiary community concerned.

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III. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

A. Finding 1. In large measure, the degree of participation in communities

participating in CDD programs depends on the social fabric that existed prior to the programs’ inception.

27. In Indonesia, villages with a long-standing tradition of community participation extended such tradition to NUSSP implementation, thus resulting in relatively high levels of participation in the subprojects implementation. These high levels of community participation tended to carry-over during the operations and maintenance phase of NUSSP subprojects, while those lacking such tradition cohesion tended to manifest low levels of community participation. 28. In general, community participation in rural sample villages was higher than urban sample villages. This may have occurred for a number of reasons, among them:

(i) rural villagers have more time available for public activities than urban residents; (ii) relatively greater degree of homogeneity of cultural identity, particularly the

dominance of Javanese culture in the rural sample villages; (iii) type of occupation or livelihood strategy pursued by most villagers in the

community, such as farming or fishing; and (iv) existence or prevalence of institutions that facilitated meetings of community

members. 29. Urbanization diminishes the level of homogeneity inherent in rural communities by mak-ing them more individualistic, which in turn reduces social cohesion and makes achieving high levels of community participation through implementation of development initiatives more difficult. As a result, communities in urban areas tend to be heterogeneous in terms of culture, occupation or livelihood strategy, socioeconomic status, and time constraints regarding construction works. Thus, encouraging large-scale involvement by members of such heterogeneous communities can in some cases complicate implementation of the development initiative concerned. 30. In the PRC, the CDD Pilot introduced a participatory strategy that empowers people with stronger voice in the management of their own local development which was quite different from previous development approaches, resulting in suspicions among the villagers at the start of the project. To promote the new concept, the Chinese government created information symmetry between the villagers through wider public awareness campaigns, which eventually led to community participation. B. Finding 2. The degree of community participation depends upon the institutional

features of the CDD Program that are established to elicit participation from residents.

31. The level of community participation in the Korean SU Movement was influenced by four factors, namely: institutional arrangements, leadership, ideological guidance, and financing. With regard to institutional arrangements, the government played a catalytic role in promoting participation in the movement through a series of systematic campaigns, particularly, publicity campaigns that were implemented with the assistance of a cooperative media. The impact of

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leadership on participation in the SU movement was shaped by the youthfulness of the movement’s leadership, the content and style of Saemaul training programs, and the pathways through which leadership problems were resolved. Ideological guidance, which was disseminated through Saemaul education, encouraged universal participation by reconciling tradition and modernization. And finally, availability of tangible resources and financing for the SU movement made widespread participation possible. 32. In the UGIIP project of Bangladesh, , citizens’ participation occurs at three levels – the community-based organization (CBO)8, the ward-level coordination committee (WLCC)9 and the town-level coordination committee (TLCC).10 The formation and activation of these committees are among the milestones that must be achieved if the participating pourashava is to access the performance-based funds from the UGIIP to respond to its infrastructure needs. 33. Each CBO has an executive committee whose members are given a specific responsibility, e.g., one member is in charge of drain and sanitation management, another for household solid waste disposal, another for cleanliness, etc. The CBO is mandated to discuss and address social issues, such as drug addiction among the youth, sexual harassment of schoolgirls, and prevention of child marriage, reducing poverty, and giving women jobs. Other CBO activities include management of drainage and sanitation, management of household solid waste, management of clinical and marketplace waste, maintenance of community infrastructure, cleaning of streets, and supervision of street lights. While it is not mandatory, the mayor and the local ward councilor usually attend CBO meetings to know firsthand the problems that are raised and the decisions taken. 34. At the WLCC meetings, which are held once every 3 months, community members raise local development and social issues, such as, water-logging, poor garbage collection, lack of pure drinking water, street lights, etc. On the other hand, the TLCC is the body where the pourashava council, including the Mayor, is held accountable to the people for its governance performance. 35. To further strengthen local government institutions, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government enacted the Local Government (Pourashava) Act of 2009. The law makes citizen’s participation a statutory requirement in government committees (such as the TLCC and WLCC) who are responsible for development planning and decision-making of municipalities. A number of provisions in the Act are based on UGIIP’s implementation experience. 36. In the Korean SU Movement, the male-female paired Saemaul leaders are elected by village residents at village general meetings (VGM). SU projects are planned, discussed, monitored and evaluated by community members at village meetings where decisions are

8 The CBO is made up of 200 to 300 families in a locality who are represented by the head of a family or a member above 18 years. The members elect a 12-member executive committee (five office bearers and seven members), one-third of which must be women. The poor, who constitute about 30% of the pourashava population, must also be represented in the executive committee.

9 Headed by the local ward councilor, the WLCC is the middle rung on the community participation ladder. Of the 10 members of the WLCC, four must be women and three must be representatives of the poor. The remaining members include representatives of civil society and professional groups. An assistant engineer or sub-assistant engineer (nominated by the mayor) is the member secretary for the WLCC.

10 Headed by the Mayor, the TLCC has about 50 members from the government, citizens’ groups and other local stakeholders represented by officials, elite to slum dwellers in town. One-third of TLCC members are women, while the poor must be represented by at least seven members, including two women.

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reached through majority voting. The role of the 15-member village development committee, which is chaired by the village chief, is limited to serving as the executing body to implement the decisions taken during the VGM. 37. In the Philippines’ KALAHI-CIDSS, community participation in decision-making occurs during village assemblies11 and in the Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum12 (MIBF), the venue for community subproject selection and resource allocation. Participants of focus group discussion (FGD) consider village assemblies to be an important and transparent vehicle for citizen participation in development planning and budgeting. However, they also raised a number of concerns, such as: (a) attendance at village assemblies takes away time that residents can devote to their economic activities; (b) it is not easy to achieve a 50% attendance rate for big villages, especially in municipalities whose residents tend to be heterogeneous; and (c) village officials often have to subsidize the costs of village assemblies using their personal funds. 38. Study respondents appreciate that the MIBF process allows community representatives to establish the criteria for subproject selection and determine the community subprojects to be funded. This is unlike the past when subproject selection was the prerogative of the local government. The element of competition in the MIBF also motivates villages to give their best efforts to obtain a high ranking for their proposed subprojects. Finally, the transparency of the MIBF enables both winners and losers to accept the results. 39. The above notwithstanding, study respondents raised the following concerns about the MIBF. First, there are the persistent rumors about collusion abound among “friendly” villages, sometimes with the blessing of municipal or village officials who champion their own proposals but assign low scores for the proposed subprojects of other villages. Second, the use of voting to rank subprojects creates divisiveness due to the intense campaigning by the villages; at times, this leads to the politicization of the selection process. And third, proposed subprojects requiring fewer funds are likely to be ranked higher than more expensive subprojects. 40. The element of competition in the MIBF has both advantages and disadvantages. Clearly, it has been effective in mobilizing the energies of community residents and village governments in the CDD process. Indeed, competition is the main energizing element for the high degree of participation in KALAHI-CIDSS. However, competition tends to give rise to traditional politicking and collusion, practices that actually run counter to the principles of CDD.

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Village assemblies or meetings are an essential feature of the CEAC. During the subproject preparation stage, these village assemblies orient residents on the objectives and processes of KALAHI-CIDSS and validate the priority problems and proposed subprojects identified during the participatory situation analysis (PSA). During subproject construction, village assemblies enable the village subproject management committees to report on the progress of implementation. And during subproject operations, village assemblies enable O&M committees and residents to discuss the status of subprojects, problems encountered, and plan for the future.

12 The MIBF is the mechanism for subproject selection within KALAHI-CIDSS. Each village is given a few minutes to present its proposal to the MIBF, followed by an open forum where representatives of other villages are given an opportunity to raise questions about the proposal. After the subproject presentations are completed, proposals are graded using the criteria agreed upon earlier. The scores of the proposals are consolidated to arrive at the subprojects’ overall ranking. The ranking of the subprojects is then used for allocation of the KALAHI-CIDSS municipal grant.

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C. Finding 3. Elites continue to have significant influence in village decision-making processes.

41. In the Indonesian NUSSP, community members are unable to voice their aspirations directly on the type and location of subproject facilities and the composition of the subproject’s technical management team. These decisions are generally made by the BKM management, village administration, rukun warga13 and rukun tetangga14 chiefs, and prominent community figures. 42. The Indonesian research team pointed out that, even if the entire community participates in formulating the proposal for an NUSSP subproject, final selection of proposals is ultimately in the hands of the village elite through their membership and control of the BKM. The position of the elites is sustained by social values and arrangements that cause other residents to defer to persons who are older or more senior. The elite also maintain their dominance because personal matters dominate the concern (and time) of most residents. Thus, attending to public matters is viewed as the domain of those who have retired from formal employment or have sufficient time to devote to public concerns. 43. A similar situation occurs at the SU movement where, at times, citizen and community participation was hampered by (i) cultural legacies that traditionally assigned elevated social roles to males and senior persons and (ii) rapid rural–urban migration that diminished the number of youthful rural workers and thus raised the average age of the rural labor force. 44. In the Bangladesh UGIIP, despite efforts to ensure participation of marginalized groups who had been excluded from community decision-making in the past – that is, women and the poor – local elites continue to be represented in the CBO, WLCC and TLCC. 45. The Philippine survey asked respondents to identify the three individuals/groups with the most influence in the selection of community subprojects. The survey results showed that three of the five most influential individuals are the village head (ranked first), other village officials (second), and the mayor (fifth). The other two are ordinary community residents (ranked third) and community volunteers (fourth). 46. The results of the Philippine survey confirm the strong influence of local officials in village subproject selection; however, this does not necessarily indicate elite capture of subproject benefits. After all, survey results also report widespread satisfaction with village subprojects and their services, clear indication that local elites have no monopoly on subproject benefits. Survey respondents also believe that they have participated significantly in the selection of subprojects. And finally, respondents also believe that the decisions of village officials reflect the priorities of the communities; this is a strong indicator that residents trust their officials to represent their needs and aspirations. It is therefore likely that residents believe that they have a confluence of views on community priorities with their village officials. 47. Ultimately, encouraging participation of community residents will need to consider the ingrained dominance of village elites in local-level decision-making processes and community affairs. Features to ensure that planning of the development initiative remains in the hands of the intended beneficiaries will need to be deliberately introduced into project design.

13

Administrative unit comprising several rukun tetangga.

14 Neighborhood unit comprising several households

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D. Finding 4. The degree of women’s participation varies across the CDD projects.

The quality and extent of women’s participation depends on the incorporation of strategies in CDD project design that address traditional gender biases against women’s participation.

48. In Indonesia’s NUSSP, community participation was particularly weak among women. Most of the women who did participate came mainly from the middle and upper classes. The usual role of women was in the provision of food to the men who actually did the construction work15. 49. The low levels of female participation in the NUSSP may be partially explained by the persistence of traditional values and practices that discriminate against female participation in public activities. In locales where these behavior patterns remain prevalent, women are encour-aged to remain at home, and only men attend to meetings and other public activities. In addition, the gender roles that dominate households in these communities typically assign the role of household head to men, the only exceptions being situations in which men are absent from the home by reason of death, divorce, or livelihood. 50. In contrast, women participated actively in the Korean SU movement. The SU movement made use of male–female paired leadership to elevate the role of women and to make the most efficient use of available labor. The election of male and female Saemaul leaders at VGMs provided public confirmation of the transformed role of women as well as the expectation of their full participation in all aspects of the SU Movement. This also encouraged the participation of men who were formerly reluctant to take part in community-level CDD initiatives. In a number of instances, the efficacy of the male–female paired Saemaul leadership was further increased when this pair was a husband-and-wife team. This effectively placed the husband in the position of having to defend his wife against tradition-bounded biases, which previously hampered the full participation of women in village-level development initiatives. 51. The Bangladesh UGIIP design also emphasized the participation of women. Four of the 10-member WLCC must be women and its vice president must also be a woman. Women must also constitute at least one-third of TLCC members. A Gender Committee, with a woman councilor as chairperson, is also mandated in the project design as well as the preparation of a gender action plan as part of the pourashava development plan. Both of these measures must be accomplished if the pourashava is to receive its allocation from the performance-based funds of the UGIIP. 52. At the beginning of the PRC CDD pilot, women’s participation and empowerment was generally constrained by the prevailing gender division of labor. To address these constraints, the pilot project required 20% women participation in the project management committee and about 50% of the project decision-making group memberships. As a result, women’s participation in public activities in some project communities became more dominant. Thus, the pilot project was able to demonstrate that – if encouraged by the right set of project operating procedures – women could break free of subjugation and have a strong voice in local affairs. However, the participation rate of women in other communities remained low, resulting in women not being able to give voice to their development needs.

15

A notable exception is in the sample village of Tugu where women were actually involved extensively in the construction of physical facilities.

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53. In the Philippines’ KALAHI-CIDSS, survey results indicated strong participation of women in subproject selection through their attendance of village assemblies and meetings16, planning sessions, and MIBF deliberations. Study respondents claim that women are more active in KALAHI-CIDSS because their husbands often leave the village for outside work. 54. Women were also involved in subproject implementation, mainly in documentation and staff work, such as, monitoring the volume and quality of construction materials. For the most part, women’s responsibilities in construction involved the preparation of food for male construction workers. A few women were engaged in construction work, although the heavier tasks were assigned to their male counterparts. Survey respondents generally appreciated the contribution of the project in building the confidence of women, thus enabling them to perform a significant role in decision making and community development. This is true even in communities of indigenous peoples where women have been traditionally regarded as having a secondary role. 55. The significant participation of women in KALAHI-CIDSS notwithstanding, there remains a number of unresolved gender concerns. First, while women and men are almost equally represented in the membership of KALAHI-CIDSS committees, men still outnumber women as chairs or leaders of the committees. Second, recognition of women’s contributions and the proper valuation of their efforts remain continuing challenges. The work of women as community volunteers is usually not documented and thus, their contribution is not recognized (this omission also affects male community volunteers). When a woman’s work is monetized for purposes of determining counterpart contributions, the monetary value of her work is sometimes less than that of her male counterpart. Third, participation in subproject activities is an added burden to women’s workload.17 Finally, there have been instances of domestic tension between husbands and wives because of the women’s increasing participation in KALAHI-CIDSS activities. E. Finding 5. Effective facilitation is crucial for community mobilization, the core of

the CDD approach.

56. In the PRC CDD pilot, facilitators had a pivotal role in encouraging villagers to organize themselves, in making sure that all those who wanted to could participate, and in obtaining assistance for villagers to overcome obstacles to the project, including inadequacies in budget and proposal preparation and project record keeping. Facilitators helped spread information about the project, provided technical support to communities, administrative villages and local governments, managed and supervised subprojects, settled complaints, and trained communities. In the course of assisting communities, facilitators accumulated a wealth of grassroots experience. The good relationships they formed helped them to deal with problems from both an insider’s and an outsider’s point of view. 57. On the negative side, some facilitators in the CDD pilot deviated from building community capacity and instead fostered an unhealthy relationship that created dependency of

16

In some study communities, respondents claimed that there were more women than men in village assemblies.

17 The solution is not to ban women from participating in subproject management activities rather, support mechanisms can be considered to reduce women’s responsibilities in household management and child care.

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the community on the facilitators. Recruitment and maintenance of facilitators also strained the resources of local governments who faced the constant challenge of putting together and training the huge teams of facilitators that will be needed to serve vast areas, and to ensure the sustainability of these teams. 58. In the Philippine KALAHI-CIDSS, community facilitators are the face of the program, the frontline staff working with participating communities. They mobilize residents, build capacity for collective action, ensure adequate representation and participation and, where necessary, mitigate elite domination. Amid such high expectations, community facilitators work under tremendous constraints, from internal demands for results to external pressures from entrenched local special interests. 59. The emphasis of KALAHI-CIDSS on social preparation and community capacity building has received criticism from those who perceive KALAHI-CIDSS as an “expensive” program and therefore, unsustainable in the long term. This perception is based on the short-sighted belief that views social preparation as a mere expenditure item. Rather, social preparation should be viewed and acknowledged as an investment in human capital formation. Moreover, investments in social preparation – unlike analogous investments in education and health that exhibit results only in the long-term – bear immediate fruit as enhanced community capacity results in well-managed village subprojects with strong prospects for long-term sustainability.

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IV. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

A. Finding 1. Strong national leadership is crucial for the success of CDD programs.

60. The broad success of the Saemaul Undong Movement was largely the result of a strong national political leadership with a commitment to sustainable CDD. In the Republic of Korea, President Park headed the SU movement with the help of dedicated technocrats, and as a result, the nation’s educated masses participated widely in the SU movement. 61. Not every country will have a Park Chung Hee leading its CDD program. However, many well-educated political leaders with a long-term vision of socioeconomic development can be found at both the national and local levels in modern-day developing countries. 62. In the SU movement, leaders were screened and trained to ensure that abuse of administrative power is avoided. The requisite qualifications of Saemaul leaders include passion, creativity, devotion, diligence, health, and secondary education. Saemaul leaders were not paid for their services, but instead performed them as volunteers with a few of them honored and encouraged by President Park himself.18 B. Finding 2. A CDD project is more likely to succeed if the government sets aside its

usual bureaucratic mindset and becomes a catalyst and facilitator to empower participating communities.

63. The rural population was both the starting point and beneficiary in PRC. In the past, the rural poor had been perceived to be perpetually dependent on government and thus, unable to organize, manage, develop, and monitor themselves. 64. The CDD pilot of the PRC was government-led19 but not in the usual sense that the government imposed its usual work style of top-down decision making. In the CDD pilot, the community was paramount and bottom-up implementation was the core approach used. Over the course of pilot project implementation, the passive attitudes of the rural poor changed enough for the pilot project to be implemented successfully. 65. In Korea SU Movement, implementation of community subprojects was ultimately the responsibility of rural residents; government intervention was limited to administrative guidance, financial support, technological assistance, and monitoring. To promote the SU Movement, new administrative units were created in central government ministries and local government

18

At the same time, it must be admitted that this recognition occasionally led to abuse when some of these individuals sought economic favors from higher-echelon government agencies.

19 Different levels of the government were involved in Project processes. The Foreign Capital Project Management Center led in introducing the CDD method into poverty reduction work in the PRC. It was also in charge of overall project decision making, integral design and promotion at the macro level, and overall financial management. At the local level, the provincial Project Management Office (PMO) was in charge of resource coordination and support. At the county level, the PMO and Project Leading Group Office were responsible for external policy, funding and other resources, technical support and coordination, and overall project management. Heads of other local government departments gave institutional, technical, human resource and funding support on a sector-specific basis e.g.,3 agriculture, water supply, power, communications, and other sectors.

15

agencies whose mandates and operations were essential to the movement’s success. 20 Saemaul promotional councils were formed in the national capital and at the provincial level to properly coordinate SU activities in both the public and private sectors. 66. Despite their participatory intent, the multilayered government support systems and cen-tral government policies, which had passed through five echelons of local government administration, ultimately reached the local community in the form of ultimatums or directives delivered to the village by town clerks. At times, bureaucrats reverted to top-down command-and-control behavior and distorted the decision-making process in the SU movement. Top-down command-and-control administration often discouraged participation by local community members, who were the bottom rung of an imposing administrative ladder. 67. A top-down stance likewise stifled creative ideas within the community and incentivized dependence on government support. Perhaps the most negative aspect of the command-and-control stance was that it seriously contradicted the Saemaul notion of self-help and the movement’s ultimate goal of an incentive system that would encourage self-assertion by members of the local community, thus facilitating a cooperative relationship between the government and the local community. 68. The Philippine KALAHI-CIDSS Project is also managed by a national government agency. There are clear advantages to this implementation arrangement, such as: (a) scale, since KALAHI-CIDSS is able to cover more than 50% of the country; (b) strong prospects for long-term sustainability, as the project can receive continued funding from the national government budget; and (c) possible ripple effects in terms of replication of the CDD approach by other national government agencies in the delivery of their own programs. 69. However, a major disadvantage – as demonstrated by the experience of the SU Movement – would be the threat of bureaucratic capture. Bureaucratic capture can manifest itself in a number of ways, such as: (a) centrally determined deadlines to force synchronized field implementation across multiple locations that have diverse contexts, (b) bureaucratic procedures and financial regulations that drain the initiative and energies of local implementers, (c) turf issues with other government agencies, and (d) difficulties in retaining staff. 70. The continuing challenge is how to insulate the CDD program and partner communities from having to work through what are perceived to be the debilitating policies and procedures of a government bureaucracy. Above all, this requires implementation time frames to be flexible. After all, a CDD strategy needs gradual and persistent learning-by-doing if it is to be effective. In particular, deadlines for the completion of construction activities should be flexible. Careful and adequate attention should also be given to the training and development of community

20

At the central government level, the Ministry of Home Affairs controlled the SU movement’s local administrative agencies. In 1971, a Saemaul director position was established for overall responsibility for the SU movement under the director-general of the local administrative bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This allowed creation of Saemaul divisions at each level of local SU movement adminis-trative agencies. In 1973, SU-related divisions were created in a number of central government ministries, including the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries, Commerce and Industry, Construction, and Energy and Resources. The government officials assigned to the new Saemaul-related divisions and sections were recruited from an elite corps of civil servants within the ministries concerned and were favored with respect to promotions for their service in their Saemaul-related posts. Eventually, local administrative agencies followed these same principles in staffing their SU-related positions. Further, these Saemaul-related positions were given a great deal of flexibility with respect to their budgetary allocations.

16

facilitators. Inexperienced facilitators must be given the chance to learn and grow under the supervision of experienced supervisors.

17

V. CDD IMPACTS ON GOVERNANCE

A. Finding 1. In general, implementation of the five CDD projects has been conducted

in a transparent and accountable manner.

71. In the Philippines, study respondents believe that KALAHI-CIDSS is relatively free of corruption. This is mainly because of the following features that have been incorporated into its design: (a) informed involvement of villagers in management of funds, (b) large number of individuals involved in the implementation of subprojects, (c) presence of KALAHI-CIDSS staff, (d) availability of procedures to remove erring officers, (e) direct transfer of KALAHI-CIDSS funds to a village bank account, (f) application of the “one-fund” concept to all funds (regardless of source) for a subproject, and (g) residents’ validation of completed subprojects. 72. Similarly, funds leakage in the PRC’s CDD Pilot was minimized through the direct transfer of subproject funds to communities, and through accountability, transparency, and complaint-handling mechanisms that were installed in the communities. 73. In Indonesia, the study team found that the level of transparency and accountability depended on the contracting arrangements for subproject construction and implementation. Transparency and accountability was greater in subprojects that were implemented by the community itself (a contracting arrangement known as SP3) than when construction work was implemented by a third-party contractor (the SP2 arrangement). This is not unexpected: in the SP3 arrangement, the community is directly exposed to all aspects of subproject implementation, while community involvement in the SP2 arrangement was limited to a number of representatives who were invited to meetings. B. Finding 2. Institutionalizing community participation, transparency, and

accountability requires the provision of sufficient time and experience to enable beneficiary communities and their local governments to assimilate new values and traditions.

74. In Indonesia, the one-year implementation period for the NUSSP was simply too short to influence the behavior of village government officials and community perceptions of transparency and accountability. 75. At the same time, villagers’ perceptions regarding improvements in transparency and accountability were often not based on objective criteria, such as, whether the village government made village financial reports public, the extent that village government involved more people in decision-making, or the extent that village government was responsive to community priorities. Instead, villagers’ perceptions were largely limited to issues related to corruption and the extent that village officials shared information, particularly about social assistance programs. 76. The minimal impacts of the NUSSP on the transparency and accountability within village administrative structures could also be due to differing contracting arrangements on subproject implementation across villages. The greater degree of community participation achieved through the SP3 arrangement (self-implementation by the community) likely gave residents more substantial information than the SP2 outside-contractor arrangement. Since the

18

dissemination of information was substantially less under the SP2 arrangement, it is understandable for residents to perceive village administration as being less transparent and accountable. 77. In 2008, the Philippine KALAHI-CIDSS initiated the Makamasang Tugon (People’s Response) pilot.21 Among others, the MT pilot enabled LGUs of participating municipalities to assume the lead role in the implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS, including the recruitment and supervision of their own technical and facilitation teams to support villages in situation analysis and subproject planning. 78. It is evident that the sustainability of KALAHI-CIDSS can be enhanced by devolving local implementation to responsive LGUs. The decade-long experience of KALAHI-CIDSS indicates that a number of municipal governments have managed to exceed expectations in their buy-in and support for KALAHI-CIDSS. Other municipal governments have also responded positively to the CDD goals of enhanced governance and improved service delivery, although they continue to struggle with the adoption of new values, roles, and relationships. 79. Despite these positive experiences, more support is needed to institutionalize CDD approaches within local government operations, given the highly-centralized governance styles of local chief executives who have traditionally been accustomed to making major budget and development decisions by themselves. There is little doubt that LGU-led CDD implementation is an ambitious proposition. 80. With the introduction of Makamasang Tugon, KALAHI-CIDSS is implemented using two modalities: regular implementation, where the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)22 takes the lead role, and LGU-led implementation, where the municipal government assumes leadership. Perhaps some thinking should go into the formulation of a third, middle-ground modality that is appropriate for local governments who are willing, but not yet completely prepared, to assume full responsibility for CDD implementation. C. Finding 3. The presence of champions and an effective incentive system is critical

for the institutionalization of CDD principles and practices within local government structures.

81. At the village level, KALAHI-CIDSS has facilitated the expansion of village development councils, who are responsible for the preparation of village development plans, to include citizen representatives, many of whom served as KALAHI-CIDSS community volunteers in the past. KALAHI-CIDSS interventions have also introduced and institutionalized participatory planning processes in the deliberations and planning processes of these councils. At the municipal level, community participation in local governance has increased through: (a) incorporation of village plans into municipal development plans, (b) public review of development plans; and (c) citizen participation in the selection of community subprojects for funding by municipal budgets.23 21

The MT pilot, which involved implementation of one cycle of KALAHI-CIDSS implementation in 33 municipalities and 782 villages, sought to align community facilitation and participatory processes with the planning and programming processes of municipal

local government units, thus enabling LGUs to

fund community subprojects that had been identified through KALAHI-CIDSS consultation processes.

22 The DSWD is the national agency tasked by the Philippine government to implement KALAHI-CIDSS.

23 In Mulanay, one of the study areas, the municipal government has institutionalized participatory budgeting by establishing complementarities in the functions of the municipal development council (MDC) and the municipal development forum (MDF), two entities with overlapping memberships. The

19

82. Institutionalization of CDD principles and practices, where this has occurred in a number of KALAHI-CIDSS villages and municipalities, has been due largely to the presence of champions within local governments. In villages, CDD champions include village heads and councilors, many of whom had served in the past as KALAHI-CIDSS community volunteers. Equally important is the recruitment of CDD advocates into key positions within the municipal bureaucracy, who were previously members of KALAHI-CIDSS technical and facilitation teams. Finally, the support of local government chief executives is crucial to the successful implementation of the Makamasang Tugon LGU-led modality and full institutionalization of CDD practices within the municipal government structure. 83. On the other hand, there are a number of constraints that hinder the adoption of CDD principles and practices within village and municipal governments. These include: (a) replacement (through election) of local chief executives who have become CDD advocates; (b) provisions within Philippine procurement laws that inhibit the participation of community residents in the management and implementation of village subprojects; and (c) concern of local government officials regarding their accountability for funds if residents are allowed to manage subprojects and funds are misused or problems are encountered during implementation. 84. Apart from the presence of champions, an effective system of incentives is required to, among others, encourage good-performing LGUs. Among the five CDD projects, the Urban Governance Infrastructure Improvement Project (UGIIP) in Bangladesh has instituted a performance-based fund allocation mechanism whereby participating pourashavas are aware that they will receive development funds from the project, but only after they have fulfilled a number of designated tasks. Thus, funds are earned through performance. 85. UGIIP requires all participating pourashavas to meet the minimum criteria of governance improvement—including participatory planning in the formulation of a pourashava development plan — even before they receive the first installment of funds for municipal development. In this way, governance improvement and infrastructure development are planned and implemented in an integrated manner. The progress of governance reform is monitored quarterly throughout the UGIIP project. 86. Implementation of the UGIIP is divided into three phases. In Phase-1, pourashavas must meet seven performance criteria related to: (i) formation of town-level and ward-level citizen coordination committees and community-based organizations, (ii) establishment of a gender committee, (iii) establishment of an urban planning unit and (iv) preparation of a pourashava development plan, and improvements in tax revenue collections. Upon graduating from phase 1, participating pourashavas receive 50% of their fund allocation for infrastructure improvement. 87. Pourashavas that do not achieve these milestones will not graduate to Phase-2 or receive infrastructure fund allocations until they do so, although they will not be dropped from the UGIIP project. UGIIP provides capacity building and guidance to pourashavas to help them meet these performance requirements. In Phase-2, participating pourashavas are required to achieve another set of governance improvement milestones including: citizens’ participation and accountability improvements, improvement of urban planning processes, promotion of gender equity and gender mainstreaming, integration of the urban poor, financial accountability and

MDF, which has broader citizen participation than the MDC, assumes the functions of municipal planning and approval of village subprojects and resource allocation. The MDC reviews, adopts, and confirms decisions of the MDF. The arrangement has transformed the MDC from a planner to a facilitator of development planning with broad-based community participation.

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sustainability and administrative transparency, 88. Pourashavas that do not achieve even the minimum performance ratings at the end of Phase-2 will not be permitted to graduate to Phase-3. They will receive no further funding and will be dropped from the UGIIP project. Achieving the minimum performance ratings in Phase-2 will allow a pourashava to graduate to Phase-3 and receive another 25% of its investment allocation. 89. Fully satisfactory performance in Phase-2 will entitle a pourashava to the remaining 50% of its funding allocation from the UGIIP project. In addition, it will be eligible for additional funds for infrastructure investments from the unused allocations of pourashavas that have not achieved the minimum or achieved only the minimum performance in their Phase-2 milestones. The disposition of these unused funds will be decided by the project management office and ADB after Phase-2 evaluations. 90. UGIIP also puts emphasis on enhancing the pourashavas’ performance in tax collection. Each pourashava is required to carry out an annual reassessment of the holding tax and to increase collection by more than 5% annually (up to 80% collection efficiency) to stay in the Project and move to Phase-3. Non-performers are dropped from the project. This rigorous requirement has stirred the pourashavas to action and set off a competition to do even better, resulting in the increased collection of property taxes and license fees of businesses operating in the municipal areas. D. Finding 4. Non-Government Organizations and other support institutions can

make important contributions to the implementation of CDD programs.

91. Of the five CDD Projects, only the PRC-CDD Pilot engaged non-government organizations (NGOs) in CDD implementation. The involvement of NGOs was intended to make up for government deficiencies in experience, expertise and resources, thereby enriching project implementation. 92. Three international NGOs took part in the CDD pilot project, one each in the three participating counties.24 These NGOs trained the villagers, facilitators, and government staff in CDD concepts and work processes, and offered various other forms of institutional and technical support to the communities and to local government. To a large extent, the effectiveness of the NGOs was dependent on its previous work within the county. The presence of staff members that were familiar with local political and economic conditions and had ample grassroots experience and expertise – e.g., in the empowerment of women – was invaluable. Sequenced, modular training also achieved good results.

93. On the negative side, frequent staff turnover affected the continuity of the work of NGOs. In one instance, vast differences between NGO philosophy, work principles, and work methods and those of the local government resulted in lack of cooperation and some conflict, despite attempts by the NGO to adjust. In the communities where literacy was low, the inability to communicate in a common language was also a significant barrier to the effectiveness of training provided by NGOs.

24

These were ActionAid in Jingxi county, Plan International in Baishui county (Shaanxi province), and World Vision International in Wengniute county.

21

94. While NGOs filled an important role that complemented the government, problems in cooperation between government and NGOs surfaced during the pilot project. These need to be addressed if NGOs are to become institutional partners of the government in future CDD implementation. Expanded implementation of the CDD approach in PRC will call for technical assistance from a large number of international and local professional NGOs. At the present time, however, there are not enough NGOs that can meet quality standards. 95. In summary, the participation of NGOs in the CDD Pilot demonstrates that success and a positive impact are more likely if the NGOs are highly localized, have stable staff arrangements, divide work properly, and are able to build collaborative relationships with local government. 96. Apart from NGOs, microfinance institutions can make positive contributions to CDD implementation. In the Korean SU movement, the Saemaul Bank (Village Bank) replaced the notorious private banking system that charged such exorbitant rates of interest on loans that low-income villagers became even more impoverished by providing funds for community projects, increasing the pool of savings available for communities, and assisting in the management of community assets. E. Finding 5. Community Driven–Development Programs should give equal

importance to subproject implementation and the promotion of values.

97. One of the major strengths of the Korea SU Movement is the promulgation of the Saemaul spirit and its three components of diligence, self-help, and cooperation. Saemaul education was able to foster discipline among the rural population and to educate them regarding the economic benefits of adopting modern agricultural and industrial technologies. Its target audience included people from all walks of life, regardless of gender, age, social status, regional background, or religious belief. 98. Saemaul education, which was provided by the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders, began by educating Saemaul leaders who were drawn from rural-community elites, cadres of local leaders, and local administrative officials. Later, members of the urban elite—including high-ranking officials of the central government, leaders from both the public and private sectors, and academic figures — all attended the same courses as rural community leaders. More than 600,000 members of both the rural and urban elite were trained at the institute during the 1970s. 99. Saemaul education required all participants to remain at an isolated training camp together for a period of one week or longer for education on the moral aspect of the Saemaul spirit, the dynamics of local community development, and the establishment of Saemaul leadership. The goal of Saemaul education was to change the overall attitude of participants by leading them through a cycle of stimulus, reflection, resolution, and practice. 100. Through its trainees, the SU movement was able to awaken an infectious “can-do” mindset within the Korean people who had been focused previously on chronic defeatism, thereby transforming passive obedience into self-assured community development based on volunteerism.

22

F. Finding 6. Building the capacity of communities goes beyond training. Communities build capacity as they go through repeated cycles of subproject identification, planning, implementation, operations and maintenance and monitoring.

101. In the PRC CDD Pilot, capacity building was provided for government, NGOs and communities. Apart from formal training, the cyclic process of subproject implementation was a practical way of building capacity in the communities. The cyclic implementation procedures were designed to help communities become better able to make important decisions on their own, and to organize, manage, and monitor themselves. 102. In the beginning, the implementation procedures of the CDD Pilot caused difficulties as villagers, who were hampered by low literacy levels, took a long time to learn and master them. As a result, fund disbursements slowed, delaying implementation and dampening, to some degree, the community enthusiasm and trust in their government. 103. Over time, community capacities improved gradually through repeated opportunities to propose subprojects, to have proposals undergo evaluation and selection, and to implement, manage, and supervise selected subprojects. Capacity building was realized through detailed operating procedures and relevant mechanisms, and with extended support from project facilitators.

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VI. SUMMING UP

104. While the five CDD Projects share the basic premise that communities and their residents should be at the forefront of their own development, there are subtle and substantive differences in the manner that they conduct their operations. These differences can be found in their geographic scope, timeframes, implementation arrangements, subproject selection mechanisms, funding flows, roles of secondary agents (i.e., national and local government and civil society organizations), and (even) in the extent of actual community decision making (as opposed to community consultation) in the allocation and use of resources. 105. Because of the above differences, each of the five CDD Projects offers its own unique lessons to CDD theory and practice.

(i). Sustainable and significant community impact requires a long-term commitment to CDD. An important learning from the Indonesian housing project is the need for CDD to have a long-term timeframe to have significant and lasting impact. Given the short (one-year) NUSSP implementation period, the Indonesian research team concluded that it would be unreasonable to expect significant impact on the governance styles in the sample villages, especially as this relates to transparency and accountability, citing the comments of NUSSP facilitators who felt that four years would be the minimum period to develop people’s awareness about the importance of participation, transparency and accountability in local government administration.

The research team concluded further that the institutionalization of community participation, transparency, and accountability within village administration requires more than mere involvement in a participatory development initiative since it requires assimilation of new values and traditions by the beneficiary communities.

The Indonesian study also found that assimilation of new values and traditions of participation, transparency and accountability is made more difficult by urbanization. Urbanization diminishes the homogeneity inherent in rural communities by making them more individualistic, which in turn reduced social cohesion and makes high community participation in development initiatives more difficult. Urban communities tend to be heterogeneous in culture, livelihood, and socio-economic status. Thus, encouraging large-scale involvement by members of such heterogeneous communities can further complicate implementation of CDD initiatives.

The assimilation of new values and traditions highlights the importance of education to ensure adherence to a common vision and implementation strategy across all areas where the CDD program is implemented. Among the five case studies, it is the Saemaul Undong movement that gives the greatest emphasis to education for values formation. During the 1970s, more than 600,000 trainees from both the rural and urban elite were trained in the Saemaul spirit and its three components of diligence, self-help, and cooperation. Saemaul education required all participants to remain at an isolated training camp together for a period of one week or longer for education on the moral aspect of the Saemaul spirit, the dynamics of local community development, and the establishment of Saemaul

24

leadership. The goal of Saemaul education was to change the overall attitude of participants by leading them through a cycle of stimulus, reflection, resolution, and practice. These highly-intensive training generated a large number of Saemaul cadres that was able to create an infectious “can-do” mindset within the Korean people who had been focused previously on chronic defeatism.

(ii). Strong support from the national government is a clear advantage to the

successful outcome of CDD programs, particularly those with a national scope, but this support can also have its drawbacks. The Saemaul Undong experience highlights the role of national government in providing strong leadership to a national grassroots program, even to the extent of determining the types of community subprojects to be implemented at different stages of the program itself. The original intent of the SU Movement was for government intervention to be limited to administrative guidance, financial support, technological assistance, and monitoring. Towards this end, new administrative units were created in both central government ministries and local government agencies. It was unfortunate that, in a number of instances, the interventions of these multi-tiered administrative units were sometimes perceived as ultimatums or directives delivered to the villages. At times, bureaucrats also reverted to top-down command-and-control behavior and distorted the decision-making process in the SU movement, thus discouraging participation by local community members. The top-down stance likewise stifled creative ideas within the community and incentivized dependence on government support. The key challenge is to maintain central government support while, at the same time, insulating the CDD program and its partner communities from having to deal with the debilitating policies and procedures of government bureaucracies.

(iii). In most contexts, LGUs will be chosen as the sustaining agent of CDD at the

local level. This arrangement has its advantages and challenges. The experience of both the UGIIP and KALAHI-CIDSS indicate that – with proper incentives, training and continuing technical assistance – some LGUs can rise to the challenge of principle agent for sustainable CDD implementation. A major contribution of the UGIIP is its performance-based allocation mechanism, which has been described earlier. At the core of the performance-based strategy is the Urban Governance Improvement Action Plan (UGIAP), which is implemented in three phases, with performance criteria established for each phase. Each participating pourashava must fulfill Phase-1 performance criteria before moving into Phase-2, and so on. An important feature of the performance-based mechanism is the built-in recognition that the performance of participating pourashavas will be uneven, with some exceeding expectations, while others will likely not succeed.

(iv). Competition is an efficient mechanism for sub-project selection and resource

allocation. However, counter-balancing measures must be introduced into the competition mechanism if resources are to flow to the neediest communities. In the PRC CDD Pilot (and in many other CDD projects), a central principle is the villagers’ right to choose subprojects for their community and to decide how

25

funds are allocated and utilized. Funds were allocated through the twin mechanisms of competition and negotiation between communities of differing capacities. Negotiation is considered to be particularly important to ensure that weaker and needier communities, whose subprojects tended to be less well-documented and well-designed, would not lose out in competition to “stronger” and more able communities.

(v). NGOs have an important contribution to CDD implementation. However, they do not have the capacity to serve as the main actors of a CDD program, particularly one that is national in scope. Of the five Projects, only the PRC-CDD Pilot engaged NGOs in CDD implementation. NGOs trained villagers, facilitators, and government staff in CDD concepts and work processes, and offered various other forms of institutional and technical support to the communities and to local government. The experience suggests that success and a positive impact are more likely if the NGOs are highly localized, have stable staff arrangements, divide work properly, and are able to build collaborative relationships with local government.

On the negative side, frequent staff turnover affected the continuity of the work of NGOs. In one instance, vast differences between NGO philosophy, work principles, and work methods and those of the local government resulted in lack of cooperation and some conflict, despite attempts by the NGO to adjust. In the communities, where literacy was low, the inability to communicate in a common language was also a significant barrier to the effectiveness of training provided by NGOs.

While NGOs filled an important role that complemented the government, problems in cooperation between government and NGOs surfaced during the pilot project. These need to be addressed if NGOs are to become institutional partners of the government in future CDD implementation. Expanded implementation of the CDD approach in PRC will call for technical assistance from a large number of international and local professional NGOs. At the present time, however, there are not enough NGOs that can meet quality standards.

Appendix 1 26

VII. DESCRIPTION OF CDD PROJECTS STUDIED

A. Neighborhood Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project (Indonesia)

1. The Neighborhood Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project seeks to improve the availability and quality of infrastructure in slum areas. Towards this end, the NUSSP used an integrated approach that enabled it to address a wide range of infrastructure-related issues in its beneficiary communities. The key to the integrated approach is the Neighborhood Upgrading Plan, which was used by each beneficiary community as a tool for analyzing its particular set of infrastructure-related problems, and following this analysis, propose individual subprojects for NUSSP funding that would address priority infrastructure-related issues in the community. 2. Each upgrading plan was required to conform to the community’s broader development plan, which was in turn incorporated into municipal- and district-level plans and then translated into the Regional Development Plan for Housing and Settlements (RP4D). The process of integrating village-level proposals into broader subdistrict, district, and even provincial plans made the NUSSP unique among externally-funded development initiatives. The subprojects were intended to be selected on the basis of the priorities of the neighborhood and to address all infrastructure problems present within the beneficiary communities concerned. Further, subproject selection was intended to be in accordance with the neighborhood upgrading plan at the village level and consistent with the RP4D at the district level. However, implementation of the integrated approach did not proceed in this manner.

3. Several factors hindered the implementation of this integrated approach. First, there existed competing interests at the district level regarding the manner of distribution of NUSSP subproject benefits at the subdistrict level. The local parliament and local government both exercised their right to determine the subdistricts where NUSSP funding would be distributed. This is a normal stratagem of politicians and political bodies to curry favor with constituents. Decentralization in Indonesia, which brought about direct election for even the lowest levels of political administrations, likely incentivized those in political power to assign development benefits to their constituents whenever possible as possible. As a result, NUSSP-supported subprojects were distributed evenly across all subdistricts, even those with no slum areas.

4. Second, at the time of the NUSSP, there existed no overall plan for resolving the problems of slum areas at the national, provincial or, most important, district levels of government administration. In fact, one of the components of the NUSSP provided support for drafting the RP4D. Since most slum improvement plans were only completed during NUSSP implementation, NUSSP-supported village subprojects were not necessarily consistent with the RP4D.

5. Third, the one-year period of NUSSP implementation did not provide enough time for achieving the NUSSP’s overall objectives of institutionalizing community participation and improving the overall level of transparency and accountability within the beneficiary communities.

6. Lastly, the BKM – the local organization in the community for implementing the NUSSP is, by its very nature, an unsustainable institution. Since its existence relies upon externally- funded development initiatives, rather than recurrent allocations from the public budget, the BKM operated with no long-standing traditions or values. This made it inherently difficult for these institutions to impact on the traditions and behavioral patterns deeply embedded in the

Appendix 27

beneficiary communities. B. Saemaul Undong Movement (Korea)

7. Saemaul Undong (SU), the New Village Movement25 was a CDD program pursued during the 1970s in the Republic of Korea. The SU Movement was hugely successful and is generally considered as the key program in the country’s long-term economic development initiative during the latter half of the 20th century. 8. The SU Movement was not the first rural community development initiative in the Republic of Korea. It was predated by the Christian 4-H (Head, Heart, Hand, and Health) Club, the nationalistic Ch’ŏndogyo agricultural cooperative movement that dated back to the days when the country was under colonial rule and the Government of the Republic of Korea Six-Year Rural Development Plan (1966–1971) in 1965 that included a series of projects that focused on increasing rural household income.

9. In 1970, the SU movement was launched by President Park Chung Hee during a speech delivered at a meeting of provincial government leaders in the southeastern city of Pusan. This speech made reference to a New Village Remodeling Movement based on the “Saemaul spirit,” whose three components are diligence, self-help, and cooperation.

10. The major aim of the SU movement was to overcome endemic rural poverty in the Republic of Korea. In the early 1970s, 33,267 mauls (traditional villages) participated in the SU movement, led by male and female Saemaul leaders that were democratically elected at a maul general meeting.

11. The outward achievements of the movement included rehabilitation of village infrastructure, improvement in the overall rural living environment, and a significant increase in household income. Implementation of the SU movement took place in three successive stages that focused on basic infrastructure (Stage I), development (Stage II); and dissemination (Stage III), which meant broadening the populace who embraced the principles of the movement.

12. Because of the upgrading of agricultural production infrastructure and introduction of high-yielding Indica and Japonica hybrid rice varieties, rural household incomes reached parity with those of urban industrial households by the end of Stage I. During Stage II, village life was improved through the modernization of rural dwellings, such as, replacement of thatched roofs with tin, tile, and slate roof coverings, electrification, and wide introduction of telecommunications in rural villages. By the end of the 1970s, the Republic of Korea had overcome its chronic shortfall in the domestic supply of food.

13. Ultimately, however, the most valuable long-term benefits of the SU movement were not its tangible achievements, but rather the sweeping changes in the mentality of the people that were induced by the SU movement itself. The SU movement built a national confidence infused with a “can-do” spirit that transformed a former national mentality of chronic defeatism into new hope, a long-term shared vision of a better life for all, and an infectious enthusiasm sustained by volunteerism at the community level.

14. The SU movement built social capital through community networking that took place in

25

Also known as “SU Movement”.

28 Appendix

Saemaul halls, in village forums, and at VGMs. From 1972–1980, more than 37,000 community halls were built, this total number translating into nearly one community hall per village. So great was the SU movement’s impact on community empowerment that the decision-making power of the nongovernment VGMs ultimately exceeded that of the semi-governmental village development committees, which in part comprised local government administrative officials. C. Community-Driven Development Pilot (People’s Republic of China)

15. Implemented from 2006 to 2009, the CDD Pilot Project in PRC had positive effects on the project communities and, more broadly, on rural poverty reduction. The pilot project was launched by the Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation (LGOP) and Development of the PRC State Council and implemented in four counties representing four basic poverty landscapes: Jingxi county in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (karst region in the southwest), Jialing district in Sichuan (hilly western hinterland), Baishui county in Shaanxi (on the heavily degraded Loess Plateau), and Wengniute county in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (semiarid farming and animal husbandry area on the northern border of the PRC). 16. Sixty administrative villages, 15 in each project county, were involved in the CDD pilot. The target groups and main beneficiaries were women, the elderly, children, and other vulnerable groups, numbering about 100,000.

17. The CDD pilot project comprised three types of subprojects: (i) improvement of small-scale infrastructure and services in the project communities (Subproject Type 1), (ii) funding for community development (Subproject Type 2), and (iii) improvement of natural resources management and environmental protection in the project communities (Subproject Type 3).

18. The pilot project proved effective in reducing poverty, leading to improvements in the following:

(i) individual and public welfare, through revenue increases, better public services

and infrastructure, more opportunities for sustainable livelihoods, and environmental improvements;

(ii) community development and public governance, through community and gender empowerment, the involvement of community organizations in the pilot project, and capacity building, thereby cultivating more cohesive, harmonious, and self-confident partners in development;

(iii) use of poverty reduction resources, through the direct allocation of CDD funds to communities, less government funds were lost in transfer, fairness and efficiency in the use of funds improved, indifference and negative attitudes of villagers toward public affairs was reversed and new social capital created in the communities; and

(iv) government’s approach to service delivery and poverty reduction approach, through the project’s emphasis on grassroots democracy and village autonomy instead of dependence on government.

19. This was the first time the CDD approach had ever been implemented in the PRC. Its overall success overall has significant implications for the wider implementation of the approach in the country and in the region.

Appendix 29

D. Urban Governance and Infrastructure Improvement Project (Bangladesh)

20. The Urban Governance and Infrastructure Improvement Project seeks to improve urban governance and infrastructure by increasing the participation of the community and enhancing the capacity of pourashava local governments to deliver desired municipal services to the people. The first phase, UGIIP-1, was implemented from 2003 to 2010. UGIIP-2 was launched in 2009 and is scheduled to be completed in 2014. Both UGIIP projects are implemented by the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, the national agency responsible for extending technical support to all rural and urban local governments, including those in pourashavas. 21. UGIIP, which began in 2003 and is targeted for completion in 2014, works with about 65 pourashavas to (i) promote good governance; (ii) build capacity to improve the performance of pourashavas in mobilizing their own resources and delivering better services to the people, especially the poor; and (iii) assist municipalities in mobilizing the community through grassroots organizations for the planning, implementation, and monitoring of programs that affect their lives. The project is recognized as a model of urban development that ensures sustainability, good governance, accountability, and transparency through community participation in the planning, monitoring, and implementation of projects identified and designed by the community people themselves. 22. UGIIP-2 has two objectives: (i) to develop and improve urban infrastructure facilities to increase economic opportunities and to reduce vulnerability to environmental degradation, poverty, and natural hazards; and (ii) to enhance accountability in municipal management and strengthen the capacities of urban local municipalities to deliver services. 23. The defining feature of the UGIIP is its performance-based fund allocation strategy. At the core of the performance-based strategy is the Urban Governance Improvement Action Plan (UGIAP), which is implemented in three phases, with performance criteria established for each phase. Each participating pourashava must fulfill Phase-1 performance criteria before moving into Phase-2, and so on. 24. For example, Phase 1 performance criteria, which are expected to be achieved in the first one-and-a-half years) include: (i) formation of a town-level coordination committee (TLCC); (ii) formation of a ward-level coordination committee (WLCC); (iii) formation of a community-based organization; (iv) formation of a gender committee with a woman councilor as the chairperson; (v) establishment of an urban planning unit of the pourashava; (vi) preparation of a pourashava development plan including a gender action plan and a poverty action plan; and (vii) continuation of the program to fix the holding tax for an interim period. 25. Pourashavas that do not achieve all Phase-1 governance improvement milestones will not graduate to Phase-2 nor receive infrastructure fund allocations until they do so, although they will not be dropped from the project. UGIIP provides capacity building and guidance to pourashavas to help them meet these performance requirements. 26. On graduating to Phase-2, pourashavas are entitled to a maximum of 50% of their total infrastructure investment allocation under the project for use in phase 2. 27. In phase 2, participating pourashavas are required to achieve a number of governance improvement milestones involving citizen participation and accountability improvements,

30 Appendix

improvement of urban planning processes, promotion of gender equity, integration of the urban poor, improvements in financial accountability and sustainability (including increased tax collection) and administrative transparency. 28. Achieving the minimum performance ratings in Phase-2 will allow a pourashava to graduate to Phase-3 and receive another 25% of its investment allocation. Pourashavas that do not achieve even the minimum performance ratings at the end of Phase-2 will not be permitted to graduate to Phase-3. They will receive no further funding and will be dropped from the project. 29. Fully satisfactory performance in Phase-2 entitles a pourashava to the remaining 50% of its funding allocation from the project. In addition, it will be eligible for additional funds for infrastructure investments from the unused allocations of pourashavas that have not achieved the minimum or achieved only the minimum performance in their Phase-2 milestones. The disposition of these unused funds is decided by the project management office and ADB after Phase-2 evaluations. 30. During its first phase (2003-2010), there were no minimum improvements in governance that the participating pourashavas had to meet in order to receive their first allocations. Thus, the linkage between infrastructure development and governance improvement was not strong. Performance evaluation of pourashava planned activities was also concentrated at the end of each phase, thus making it difficult to undertake corrective actions midway through implementation. 31. In contrast, the current phase of UGIIP requires all participating pourashavas to meet the minimum criteria of governance improvement—including participatory planning through the formulation of a pourashava development plan—even for the first allocation of funds. In this way, governance improvement and infrastructure development are planned and implemented in a more integrated manner. In addition, the progress of reform—particularly in governance—is monitored quarterly throughout the project. 32. The principal achievement of UGIIP is that it has proved that a performance-based project design can indeed be implemented, as evidenced by the overall satisfactory response of the participating pourashavas to performance-based project rules. Therefore, the transformation of project rules from infrastructure provision to governance-led infrastructure provision is indeed possible and desirable. This sets out a significant change in governmental fiscal relations relating to urban development and management. 33. The governance improvements sought to address a wide range of areas simultaneously—from participation to financial to administrative. The design of the urban governance improvements was innovative even in the wake of pre-committed resources to the pourashavas. Stakeholders agreed to the governance milestones and some even welcomed these as an opportunity to correct their shortcomings. 34. The considerable quantitative progress achieved in a relatively short period of time showed that it is possible for the pourashavas to adapt to a new body of practice in a short period of time. This was not without its difficulties but, in many cases, pourashavas were able to complete the activities and reach the milestones.

Appendix 31

E. KALAHI-CIDSS Project (Philippines)

35. The first phase of KALAHI-CIDSS (KC-1) was implemented from 2003 to 2010 at a cost of $182 million, with 54% funded through a World Bank loan and the remainder from the national government through its Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), beneficiary communities, and participating local governments. KC-1 was implemented in the country’s 42 poorest provinces, which represent more than half of all provinces in the Philippines. 36. The development objective of KALAHI-CIDSS is the “empowerment of local communities through their involvement in the design and implementation of poverty reduction projects and improved participation in local governance.” 37. The CDD strategy of KALAHI-CIDSS is based on the following four key assumptions. First, effective participation in the KALAHI-CIDSS Community Empowerment Activity Cycle (CEAC) enables villagers to address their development needs. Second, residents’ participation ensures that the community-based subprojects they select and implement reflect local needs and that services delivered are of good quality. Third, citizen participation in KALAHI-CIDSS increases accountability and transparency in governance. Fourth, engagement of local governments with community residents through the CEAC facilitates institutionalization of participatory, transparent, and accountable principles and practices into the planning and budgeting processes of LGUs. 38. Toward the latter part of KC-1 in 2008, DSWD launched the Makamasang Tugon pilot. Implemented in 33 municipalities in 17 KALAHI-CIDSS provinces, the pilot sought to institutionalize the CEAC into the local planning processes of participating LGUs and to transfer responsibility for implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS at the local level from DSWD to municipal governments. The lessons of the Makamasang Tugon pilot have been incorporated into the design of the current phase of KALAHI-CIDSS-1/Extension (KC-1/Ext). The extension, which started in early 2011, operates in 48 provinces, the original 42 plus 6 additional provinces. KC-1/Ext has received funding from the World Bank and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a donor from the United States. 39. KALAHI-CIDSS is generally considered to be an effective and well-managed project, with positive effects on several dimensions of poverty. KALAHI-CIDSS has been especially effective in: (i) facilitating broad-based participation of community residents, including special groups; (ii) enabling communities to implement quality subprojects that address local needs and sustain delivery of basic services to their intended beneficiaries; (iii) providing community residents with valuable experience in subproject management that enables them to exercise voice, hold their leaders accountable, and deal with attempts to misappropriate CDD funds; and (iv) creating space for the collaboration of LGU officials with community residents in subproject management, thereby initiating the institutionalization of participatory, transparent, accountable, and responsive principles and practices into local planning and budgeting processes. 40. KALAHI-CIDSS also provides an effective platform for integrating and coordinating the key elements of an effective local poverty-reduction strategy. First, the participatory planning processes of KALAHI-CIDSS ensure that all community members, especially the poor, have the opportunity to be involved in the situation analyses that lead to village development plans, which in turn serve as an important input into municipal development plans. Second, the transparency of the MIBF strengthens the responsiveness of local planning and budgeting systems to the

32 Appendix

needs of the poor. Third, community participation lowers costs and improves construction quality of subprojects. Community oversight helps to ensure smooth and rapid implementation of subprojects, while cash and in-kind community contributions (in terms of foregone wages, local materials, and others) all serve to lower overall subproject costs and promote a sense of local ownership. Fourth, shared responsibility promotes sustainability of the O&M of local investments. Village and municipal governments augment funds raised through internal cost-recovery measures, thus enhancing the sustainability of a community’s social infrastructure.