Technically Advanced Aircraft Safety and · PDF fileTechnically Advanced Aircraft Safety and...

Technically Advanced Aircraft Safety and Training

An AOPA Air Safety Foundation Special Report

Publisher Bruce Landsberg Executive Director

Editors Bruce Landsberg Executive Director

Kevin Murphy Vice President, Creative Development

Julie Summers WalkerManaging Editor

Machteld SmithTechnical Editor

Statistics Kristen Hummel Database Manager

J.J. Greenway Data Specialist

Design and Production Michael Kline Design Director

Angie EbersoleAssociate Art Director

Becky RichterProduction Coordinator

Mike FizerSenior Photographer

Steve KarpIllustration

Rebecca HeneginGraphic Designer

AOPA Air Safety Foundation421 Aviation WayFrederick, MD 21701800/[email protected]

The AOPA Air Safety Foundation gratefully acknowledges the support

of Robert Zemeckis in making this special report possible

AOPA Air Safety Foundation wishes toexpress its deepest gratitude to the

Trustees of the Emil Buehler Trust fortheir support of the ASF Safety

Database, GA's most authoritativeleader in data analysis.

© Copyright 2005 AOPA Air Safety Foundation

Technically Advanced AircraftSafety and Training

AOPA Air Safety Foundation

Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter 1

Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) are entering the

general aviation (GA) fleet in large numbers. The

categories are newly designed aircraft, newly

manufactured classic design aircraft equipped with new

avionics, and retrofitted existing aircraft of varying ages.

Early reviews of accidents show nothing unique to TAA

relative to other categories of aircraft.

Training requirements center on differences in

new-design TAA handling characteristics and the

addition of capable but complex avionics packages.

Light GA pilots are now undergoing the transition that

the airlines and corporate pilots did in prior decades.

The use of autopilots as an integral part of single-pilot

IFR TAA operations should be embraced.

Deliveries of new equipment have overtaken the training

infrastructure in some cases. CFIs and pilots are adapting

with the manufacturers and training organizations,

ramping up in experience and in capability. More and

better simulation will ease the transition. Training

nontraditional avionics in the traditional inflight way is

not optimal. Use of CD/DVD and online simulation is a

big step forward, as is the development of relatively

inexpensive simulators for new TAA.

Executive summary ..........................................................................................................................1

I. Introduction and overview ..............................................................................................................4Questions this report will answer ....................................................................................................4Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) defined ................................................................................4New, classic, and retro........................................................................................................................5More than just hardware....................................................................................................................5History of TAA ....................................................................................................................................5What’s next ..........................................................................................................................................6

II. Safety implications ........................................................................................................................8FAA—Industry Safety Study ..............................................................................................................8Aircraft handling characteristics ......................................................................................................9Transition to TAA ................................................................................................................................9New piloting paradigm ......................................................................................................................9The physical airplane ........................................................................................................................9The mental airplane ..........................................................................................................................9GA’s future..........................................................................................................................................10Beyond workload: Over-reliance ....................................................................................................10Conclusions ......................................................................................................................................10

III. Accident reviews ......................................................................................................................11Comparing TAA accident pilots to non-TAA accident pilots ........................................................11Comparing new-TAA to classic-TAA accidents ..............................................................................12Accident summaries and commentary ..........................................................................................13TAA and the parachute ....................................................................................................................15

IV. Training for the glass age ............................................................................................................19A training sequence..........................................................................................................................20Training a new breed of pilot ..........................................................................................................21Autopilot essentials ........................................................................................................................22My Point—Evolving design and some thoughts for the future ....................................................22Counterpoint—The future is now ..................................................................................................24Tracking pilot performance and its effect on human factors ......................................................24The autopilot experience ................................................................................................................25Training, Liability and Flight Data Recorders ................................................................................25

V. TAA hardware and software ..........................................................................................................26Weather displays ..............................................................................................................................26Terrain awareness ............................................................................................................................26Traffic avoidance ..............................................................................................................................27Engine/systems monitoring ............................................................................................................28Fabulous fuel solution......................................................................................................................28Technology abuse ............................................................................................................................30

VI. Report conclusions ....................................................................................................................31

2 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically Advanced Aircraft

TableofContents


Appendix A—Edited NTSB accident reports ......................................................................................34Cirrus accidents ..............................................................................................................................A-1Cessna 182 accidents....................................................................................................................A-40Mooney accidents ........................................................................................................................A-56Cessna 210 accident ....................................................................................................................A-80Lancair accidents..........................................................................................................................A-85A36 Bonanza accidents ................................................................................................................A-88

Appendix B—TAA articles from AOPA Pilot ......................................................................................B-1“High Terrain Tangle”—AA 965, Cali, Colombia ..........................................................................B-2“Back to Cali” ..................................................................................................................................B-4“Future Flight: Beaming Up the Weather” ....................................................................................B-7“Swapping Data Promises a Simpler Future” ............................................................................B-11“Diamond DA40-180: The Gee Meter”........................................................................................B-15“Alan & Dales Excellent Idea—Take the SR22 Cross Country” ................................................B-21“Setting the Standard—A Whole New Panel for the Cessna 182” ............................................B-25

Appendix C—Selected ASRS reports ..............................................................................................C-1Appendix D—Suppliers of datalink services ....................................................................................D-1Appendix E—Avionics displays ........................................................................................................E-1

Publication Updated June 21, 2005

IntroductionandOverview Section I

Questions this report will answerThis AOPA ASF Special Review of TAA will answerthree questions:

1. What is a TAA?

2. What adaptations will be required for the gen-eral aviation (GA) training structure as TAA enterthe fleet in significant numbers?

3. Do the earliest returns on GA accidentsinvolving TAA show any trend that can be usedto direct strategies for reducing GA accidentrates in the future?

Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) defined Technically advanced aircraft are equipped withnew-generation avionics that take full advantageof computing power and modern navigationalaids to improve pilot positional awareness, sys-tem redundancy, and depending upon equip-ment, improve in-cockpit information about traf-

fic, weather, and terrain. By FAA pronouncement,a TAA is equipped with at least:

a) a moving-map displayb) an IFR-approved GPS navigatorc) an autopilot.Many new aircraft go far beyond the basic def-

inition, sporting enough electronic displays toqualify as having a “glass cockpit.” Exactly howmuch glass is needed to deserve that label is stillbeing debated, but ASF’s working definition of a“glass cockpit” includes a Primary Flight Display(PFD) to replace the traditional “six-pack” or“steam gauges” as round-dial mechanical instru-ments are known, and a multifunction display(MFD). The MFD, as the name implies, can showmyriad items including a moving map, terrain,weather, traffic, on-board weather radar, engineinstrumentation, checklists, and more. (SeeSection V, page 28).)

In terms of new U.S. production, TAA haveclearly arrived. In 2004, 1,758 light GA piston air-craft rolled off the assembly lines of GeneralAviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA)member companies, a 10.6 percent increaseover 2003. Ninety-two percent were either trueTAA or sporting TAA-like equipment. Theremaining 8 percent were generally tailwheelaircraft, and field reports indicate that eventhose buyers are often opting to include ele-ments of TAA as the avionics evolution movesforward. There is no current reliable estimate onhow many existing aircraft have been retrofittedto become TAA, but it will be in the thousands.

Fleet sales to active flight schools and univer-sity flight departments in the last two years havegenerally been TAA, even for basic trainers.Several aviation universities have adopted TAA toprepare pilots for the next generation of flight, beit GA, corporate, or air carrier.


This report contains a preliminary review of Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) accidents. SinceTAA are just starting to enter the marketplace in significant numbers, there have been relativelyfew accidents involving them, making any comparison of accidents rates between TAA and con-ventional aircraft statistically suspect. Therefore, any conclusions in this report regarding relativesafety must be considered as preliminary. The AOPA Air Safety Foundation (ASF) will continue tomonitor the TAA safety record and report as new findings come to light.

Fig. 1: Primary FlightDisplay (PFD).

AOPA Air Safety Foundation IntroductionandOverview

New, classic, and retro Some TAA are completely new designs such asthe Lancair, Cirrus, Diamond, or Adam 500, whileothers are updated versions of newly producedclassic machines such as the Cessna 182, 206,Piper Saratoga, Beechcraft Bonanza, andMooney. Retrofitted—or Retro—aircraft are olderaircraft with reworked instrument panels.

More than hardwareMany observers believe that the deeper impor-tance of the TAA takeover goes beyond justequipment. The larger definition includes a newmindset for pilots, encompassing a revised viewof what constitutes GA flying, with airline-styleprocedures, regular use of autopilot, and greaterdependence on avionics for multiple tasksbeyond pure navigation. Although pilots flyingclassic high-performance aircraft under IFR oftenuse this approach, its application is essential inTAA. To process large amounts of informationand not allow flight safety to suffer, pilots mustadd “systems manager” to basic stick and rudderskills. This mental shift has proven to be a chal-lenge for some conventionally trained pilots.

History of TAAFrom the beginning of powered flight, throughthe 1970s and 1980s, traditional instrumentsand displays dominated aviation. For much ofthat time, VOR, DME, and ADF were consideredstate of the art, but were not a major concern inthe aviation training process. Once pilots mas-tered the principles of avionics systems man-agement, transition to a new airplane requiredonly cursory instruction on avionics because allequipment worked essentially the same way.The bulk of pilot checkouts were spent learningthe handling of airplane characteristics and systems.


New TAAAdam Aircraft A-500.

Classic TAAInstrument panel in a Mooney Ovation 2GX.

New TAAInstrument panel in a Diamond DA–40.

Retro TAAInstrument panel in a Piper Twin Comanche.

IntroductionandOverview AOPA Air Safety Foundation

Then, in the late 1970s, the first GA area-naviga-tion (RNAV) systems appeared. By the early 1980s,general aviation began to embrace the technologi-cal revolution as computers worked side by sidewith humans in the cockpit. The transition wasvisible first in military aircraft a decade or sobefore, but it wasn’t long before “glass” startedinvading the cockpits of business jets and largeAirbus, Boeing, and Lockheed aircraft .

Initial versions of computerized cockpits, in the 1980s and early 1990s, were relativelysimple by today’s standards; small glass TVscreens (cathode ray tubes, or CRTs) capable of displaying graphics of traditional aircraftflight instruments.

The new systems came to be known as glassand aircraft sporting them as glass cockpit air-craft. CRT displays were superseded in the mid-1990s by Liquid Crystal Displays (LCDs) that

delivered much larger pictures at a considerablesavings in weight and energy consumption. Theearly CRTs, however, could graphically representmultiple items of flight information in the samelocation on the screen, forever changing thebasic six-instrument scan three generations ofpilots had come to know so well.

Today, although the bulk of the existing180,000-plus light GA airplanes still use steamgauges, virtually every newly designed trans-portation airplane is a TAA, including Lancair,Cirrus, Diamond, and the Adam 500. And veryfew buyers of new production classic machinessuch as the Cessna 182, 206, Piper PA-28/32series, Bonanza, and Mooney even considersteam gauges, but go directly for glass. Manyowners are retrofitting their classic aircraft toconvert them to TAA with IFR-certified GPS nav-igators and multifunction displays.


New bizjet glass cockpitsin a Citation (right) and

Beechjet (far right).

A new Cessna 182equipped with a Garmin

G-1000 (right).

Traditional “steamgauges” or

“six-pack” on an instrument panel

(below).

AOPA Air Safety Foundation IntroductionandOverview

What’s next?Moving into the twenty-first century, airlinersand business jets are on the brink of even moresophisticated cockpit technologies, and GA air-craft are likely not far behind. The new Boeing787, Airbus A380, and the Dassault Falcon 7X willwork with Microsoft Windows-like displays andtrackballs to simplify data input. Knobs, in fact,will serve only a backup function as equipmenttunes everything automatically.

The trickle-down of Flight ManagementSystems (FMS) for light aircraft will likely migrateto keyboards with hard and soft key functions inthe next few years, replacing multifunction con-trols that must first be configured before data canbe entered. Keyboard and trackball data entry,not currently available on new light GA TAA, isdue largely to the space and cost constraints ofsmaller aircraft.

In the last decade, IFR-approved GPS naviga-tors have been added to panels already crowdedwith conventional avionics even for newly builtaircraft. Space constraints were at least part ofthe rationale behind limited control interfaces,which experience shows to be one of the morechallenging aspects for pilots transitioning toTAA. In the early 1990s there were at least fivemanufacturers building IFR GPS navigators andall had different operating logic and displays.This contributed significantly to the trainingchallenge for pilots who flew multiple aircraftequipped with different units. At this writing, twocompanies currently survive but others arerumored to be readying new designs.The surviv-ing companies that are committed to the devel-opment of TAA equipment are generally well cap-italized, which will allow more investment in thehuman factor interface.


Full-glass cockpit(left).

On new/classic TAAthere is plenty ofspace for new pilotinterfaces (left).

SafetyImplications Section II

The team findings were:1. “The safety problems found in the accidentsstudied by the team are typical of problems thatoccurred after previous introductions of new air-craft technology and all also reflect typical GA pilotjudgment errors found in analysis of non-TAAaccidents.”2. “Previous safety problems similar to thoseidentified in this study have been remediedthrough a combination of improved training and,in the case of new aircraft capabilities, pilotscreening (i.e., additional insurance companyrequirements of pilot experience).” 3. “The predominant TAA-system-specific findingis that the steps required to call up informationand program an approach in IFR-certified GPSnavigators are numerous, and during high work-load situations they can distract from the primarypilot duty of flying the aircraft. MFDs in the acci-

dent aircraft did not appear to present acomplexity problem. The team alsobelieves that PFDs, while not installed inany of the accident aircraft and just nowbecoming available in TAAs, similarlyare not likely to present a complexityproblem.” 4. “TAAs provide increased “availablesafety,” i.e., a potential for increasedsafety. However, to actually obtain thisavailable safety, pilots must receiveadditional training in the specific TAAsystems in their aircraft that will enablethem to exploit the opportunities andoperate within the limitations inherentin their TAA systems.” 5. “The template for securing thisincreased safety exists from the experi-ences with previous new technologyintroductions—the current aircraftmodel-specific training and insurancerequirements applicable to high-per-formance single and multiengine smallairplanes. However, the existing training

infrastructure currently is not able to provide theneeded training in TAAs.” 6. “Effective and feasible interventions have beenidentified, mostly recommending improvementsin training, and effective implementation mecha-nisms for the recommended interventions exist.Therefore, TAA safety problems can be addressed,and the additional available safety of TAAs toaddress traditional causes of GA accidents can berealized as well.”

We’ll explore these findings in greater detailwhile commenting on the aircraft themselves.

The good newsMoving maps with pinpoint GPS navigationalaccuracy provide pilots with significantly increasedpositional awareness. Overlays that can includedata-linked weather information, terrain databasesand traffic avoidance equipment have tremendouspotential to increase GA safety.

Some newly designed TAA themselves, with high-er wing loading and sleek aerodynamics, are fasterthan traditional light GA aircraft with similar power.Better systems redundancy reduces the probabilityof single-point failure. The new look has an undeni-able appeal for the light GA industry that has seenlackluster sales for more than 20 years.

With progress invariably comes responsibilityon the part of designers, regulators, CFIs, and,most importantly, pilots to make sure that all thefeatures, performance and extra information avail-able with TAA actually translate into safer flight.Achieving the benefits will depend on training andultimately, on a continuing evolution in equipmentdesign. Having watched GPS navigators evolve overthe last 15 years, the present generation is far supe-rior to early models and we have every reason tobelieve that it is only going to get better.

The challengeThe AOPA Air Safety Foundation identified twoareas of TAA that are likely to have the most impacton the GA safety record. The first is the different


TAA are creating both a new world of opportunity and challenge for general aviation pilots. In 2003, ASF participated with the FAA, academia, and other industry members to help write

General Aviation Technically Advanced Aircraft—FAA/Industry Safety Study.

A multifunction displayshowing two of manyavailable functions—terrain/routing (top) andtraffic (bottom).

AOPA Air Safety Foundation SafetyImplications

physical handling characteristics of some new-design TAA. This is obvious, straightforward, andwill be relatively easy to manage. The second is thewidespread adoption of new piloting techniques -different from the traditional role of the GA pilot.This may prove a bit more difficult.

Increased speed and unique handling character-istics of some TAA are likely, without proper train-ing, to lead less experienced pilots into difficulty intakeoffs and landings and in managing arrivals intothe terminal area. Some of these aircraft handle dif-ferently than conventional aircraft, with different“sight pictures” in the takeoff and landing phases offlight. Using the “old” techniques with a new designmay lead to a tail strike, a nose wheel landing or aninadvertent stall. (See illustration at right.)

When the Boeing 727 was introduced to the air-line community in the early 1960s, there were anumber of accidents until pilots and instructorsfigured out the quirks of the new design. Differentdoes not mean bad, but the training challenges forsome new TAA exceed those for pilots movingbetween many other classic aircraft. High-wingloadings on some of the new aircraft produce blaz-ing speeds and give a smoother ride in turbulencebut they also develop a higher sink rate withoutpower on landing.

One current difficulty is finding instructors whoare knowledgeable and experienced on the newaircraft, but that will improve as more TAA enterthe fleet. Several manufacturers have embarked onambitious programs to educate CFIs, and they arecommended for their efforts.

A related training issue is to bring the “planningahead” skills of lower-time pilots up to speed, punintended, as they transition from slower trainingaircraft to faster, sleeker designs, Any experiencedCFI is well aware of the extra instruction requiredfor pilots to think farther ahead in a faster airplane.If the aircraft is descending at 180 knots into theterminal area, the pilot had better be thinking at220 knots. With TAA, the additional learning curveof new avionics adds to the initial workload.

The advantages of TAA are many, but realizingthose benefits will require pilots to shift from a typ-ical GA piloting approach. In TAA, piloting movesfrom the “physical airplane,” the stick and rudderskills, to a more mental approach. Pilots who suc-cessfully adapt will enjoy these aircraft while gain-ing situational awareness and those who don’t, willfind challenge, complexity and possibly someunsafe situations.

The physical airplaneSince Wilbur and Orville, pilots have defined “goodpiloting” primarily as a set of eye-hand or stick andrudder skills that result in predictable outcomes. • Maintaining VY precisely during a climb.• Holding altitude within 50 feet.

• Tracking a VOR needle within one dot on eitherside.

• Landing in a full stall, with rate of descent per-fectly arrested at the exact instant the tires brushthe concrete.

As part of this mindset, alertness to the physicalenvironment is valued (“keep your eyes outside thewindow for traffic”) as is an almost zen-like unitywith the airplane (“can’t you feel that little buffet-ing? It’s telling you it’s ready to stall.”)

“Physical airplane” pilots, which is to say mostGA pilots who trained before 1980, often carry ado-it-yourself attitude, which regards assistance asan affront. Popular writings by author Ernest K.Gann capture this way of thinking, telling of earlyairline co-pilots who were often told by their cap-tains to shut up and watch and to make sure theydidn’t get their feet on the furniture.

Autopilots were scorned as unnecessary andwere often only available on the top end of lightaircraft so it was largely amoot point. This view of thepilot has largely changed inairline and corporate cock-pits. The pros have recognizedthat the hardware is far more reliable than thehumans overriding it. This certainly doesn’t meanan abdication of PIC responsibility but ratheran acceptance that the autopilot does a bet-ter job of mechanical flying. The automa-tion, however, is incapable of programmingitself and at times will significantly compli-cate a basic flying task. GA pilots are just begin-ning to face this transition.

The mental airplane The early corporate and airline operators whoinstalled the new equipment employed primarily“physical airplane” pilots, and the transition toglass cost considerably more time and money thanexpected. While most pilots were eventually suc-cessful in the move to glass cockpit of Boeing757/767 and Airbus equipment, some were not andretired. Some senior pilots admitted they remainedanxious about the complexities of glass right up totheir last day.

The transition to the “mental airplane” meanscoping with distractions from the additional infor-mation and learning unfamiliar displays. This is the


The wing, fuselage, and empennage area of a Lancair Columbia issuperimposed on aBeechcraft Bonanza A36.Proper training is neces-sary to overcome differ-ent handling characteris-tics between some TAAand conventional aircraft.

The more things change…Conventional wisdom still applies: Extensive cross-country flying on aschedule really should be done by instrument-rated pilots or by those whohave plenty of time to wait on the vagaries of weather. The idea that the newtechnology is so simple and will protect the uninformed or overbold is over-simplifying the current realities of cross-country flight. It may become easierin the future but the AOPA Air Safety Foundation will take the conservativeview until hard statistics show otherwise.

SafetyImplications AOPA Air Safety Foundation

root cause of the additional transition time. Amongthe casualties: a good see-and-avoid lookout forother aircraft. In airline and corporate cockpits,much of this is negated by having two professionalpilots, having Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems[TCAS], and spending much of the flight in positivecontrol airspace (Class A). Most operators have aninside/outside policy where one pilot is clearingvisually while the other deals with the internal sys-tems. For the single pilot, the attention must beappropriately split.

There have been numerous Aviation SafetyReporting System (ASRS) reports on crew confusionstemming from use of TAA or equipment that is typ-ically installed in TAA. (See appendix C.) Reportsincluded missing assigned routes, mis-program-

ming approaches, mode confusion, alti-tude busts because of distraction withthe equipment. It should be pointed outthat pilots have always been susceptibleto distraction, and many of these sameproblems are manifested in classic air-craft. Identical ASRS reports continuetoday, and for the same reasons.

In the case of corporate and airlineoperations, the landmark TAA-relatedaccident that graphically defined thepotential dangers occurred in Cali,Columbia, in 1995 when an AmericanAirlines Boeing 757 collided with ter-rain at night after the crew mispro-grammed its FMS. After that tragedy,the airlines changed their proceduresin how crews interacted with cockpitautomation. There are lessons for GApilots to write a safer history for TAA.(See “High Terrain Tangle” and “Back toCali,” Appendix B.)

The GA FutureThe corporate and airline experiencewith TAA-induced confusion and work-load issues is present in GA TAA also,but the degree to which those issues areor will be a factor is not yet clear. DonTaylor, vice president of training andsafety for Eclipse Aviation, manufactur-

er of the new Eclipse 500, cautions, “It is too early tosay that glass cockpits increase workload for thesingle pilot by an inordinate amount.” Eclipse offi-cials believe that extensive use of integration sim-plifies the operation of the aircraft's systems andreduces the chance of overload and error. Taylorconcedes, however, that pilots must be well trainedto use technically advanced aircraft. That comment,however, applies to any high performance aircraftflown in the IFR system. The Eclipse VLJ purports tohave an even higher level of automation than mostTAA today. This may simplify the pilot’s task.

There are not enough ASRS reports from GApilots to validate a statistical link between the airlineand corporate experience and that of GA TAA air-craft. ASF’s analysis of GA TAA accidents reported bythe NTSB to date also showed no statistically validlink between distractions blamed on TAA and otherdistraction-caused accidents in the non-TAA fleet.

Beyond workload: over-relianceA related safety issue, identified by the FAA as partof its recent hearings and reports on the FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS), concernspilots who apparently develop an unwarrantedover–reliance in their avionics and the aircraft,believing that the equipment will compensatefully for pilot shortcomings.

This is perhaps more related to human naturethan to TAA itself and was raised more than adecade ago after several accidents shortly after thePiper Malibu was introduced. At that time, FAAinstituted a Special Certification Review that ulti-mately exonerated the aircraft, finding that theMalibu problems were largely self-inflicted bypilots unfamiliar with operations in high altitudeenvironments. Many of the fatal accidentsoccurred after encounters with convective weatherwhile enroute. Some pilots did not understandthat FL250, the Malibu’s highest operational alti-tude, was arguably one of the worst levels to pene-trate a thunderstorm. Clearly, these pilots believedthat the aircraft, a fine piece of engineering, wascapable of more than reality allowed.

Related to the over-reliance is the role ofAeronautical Decision Making, which is probablythe most significant factor in the GA accidentrecord of high performance aircraft used for cross-country flight. The FAA TAA Safety Study found thatpoor decision-making seems to afflict new TAApilots at a rate higher than that of GA as a whole.

The review of TAA accidents cited in this studyshows that the majority are not caused by some-thing directly related to the aircraft but by the pilot’slack of experience and a chain of poor decisions.The fact that the aircraft involved was a TAA appearsto be coincidental. One consistent theme in many ofthe fatal accidents is continued VFR flight intoInstrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).


Trust, but verifyUnderstandably, the Americansystem of free enterprise doesnothing to discourage perceptionsof equipment as able replace-ments for pilot experience or dili-gence. ASF found one such exam-ple by pairing a product review fora GPS unit with an ASRS reportthat belies the boosterism:

From Flight Training magazine,July 1995: “The presentation of spe-cial-use airspace boundaries is oneof the unit's handiest features. Thedepicted boundaries are quiteaccurate, and just as long as themap's airplane symbol doesn'ttouch a boundary line, you shouldbe safely outside the depicted air-space.”

An ASRS report filed by aMooney pilot facing legal actionas a result of entering restrictedairspace over Virginia in February2002: “At no time did my GPS indi-cate I was inside restricted air-space (but later was) contacted byFAA and informed of a potentialviolation of restricted airspace.”

See and avoid: TAA equipment increases pilot performanceIn a September 2004 paper presented to the Human Factors and ErgonomicsSociety annual meeting, “The Effect of an Advanced Navigation Display withTraffic Information on Single-Pilot Visual Flight Operations,” by Kevin W.Williams of the FAA, the FAA found pilots could spot traffic faster with trafficdisplays. Sixteen pilots were tested in a flight simulator under VFR conditions.Results were mixed, but generally showed that even though pilots looked out-side less when using traffic displays, they were more successful at locatingtraffic but with some cautions. Some GA traffic will not be transponder-equipped for detection by TAA anti-collision equipment so pilots must main-tain an outside scan, particularly in high density traffic.

TAAAccidentHistory Section III

Comparing TAA accident pilots to non-TAA accident pilotsA comparison of the experience of 41 TAA acci-dent pilots vs. accident pilots in comparable non-TAA aircraft (Bonanza, Mooney, Cessna 210,Cessna 182) revealed some interesting informa-tion. Although TAA accident pilots had a higheraverage total time—2,413 hours vs. 2,030 hours—they had a much lower average time in type—305hours vs. 451. This amounts to about 30 percentless time in type at the time of the accident. Thedistribution of total time shows that a higher percentage of low time pilots are having acci-dents in TAA.

TAA ComparableNon-TAA

Total Time 2,413 2,030Time in Type 305 451


ASF’s GA Accident Database contains NTSB data on virtually every accident involving GA aircraftin the United States from 1983 to the present (fixed wing, weighing less than 12,500 pounds),accounting for more than 42,000 records. Unfortunately, government information-gathering onthose accidents generally contains no clear markers that define TAA from non-TAA. For the future,ASF has requested that accidents investigators note the on-board avionics in accident aircraft. Thiswill allow a more precise determination of which aircraft are involved in what type of accidents.

Classic TAA—Cessna 182

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

16.0%

18.0%

20.0%

0-2

00

200-4

00

400-6

00

600-8

00

800-1

000

1000-1

200

1200-1

400

1400-1

600

1600 1

800

1800-2

000

2000-2

200

2200-2

400

2400-2

600

2600-2

800

2800-3

000

3000-3

200

3200-3

400

3400-3

600

3600-3

800

3800-4

000

4000-4

200

4200-4

400

4400-4

600

4600-4

800

4800-5

000

5000+

Pilot total time—TAA vs. non-TAA

TAANon-TAA

New TAA—Cirrus SR22

(Non-TAA pilots—Cessna 210 and Mooney aircraft)

TAAAccidentHistory AOPA Air Safety Foundation

The TAA population is still very small, com-pared to classic aircraft. Two of the TAA acci-dent pilots included in the above averages hadmore than 20,000 hours of total time. Thissomewhat skewed the TAA average total flighttime to the higher end.

There are twohypotheses as to whyTAA accident pilotshave lower time intype as compared tothe comparable non-TAA pilots. It may beactual differences inpilots because of train-ing, technique, orinadequate risk asses-ment, or merely thefact that TAA are newto the fleet. If so, theaverage accident pilottime in type mayincrease somewhatover time.

Comparing new TAA toclassic TAA accidentsTo conduct at least apreliminary compari-son, ASF focused ontwo aircraft modelsthat could reliablycompare the accidentrate of new classic TAAto newly designed TAA:the Cirrus SR20 andSR22, versus newly-built Cessna 182 mod-els 182S, 182T andT182T (turbocharged)built from 1999 to2003. All or almost all

of these aircraft could be considered TAA becausethey have IFR GPS navigators with moving mapsand autopilots. Why select only new aircraft?Because there is some evidence that new aircraftare purchased by a different economic cohort ofpilots who use them differently than third orfourth generation buyers. ASF’s experience inconducting more than a dozen safety reviews hasconsistently showed a much higher accident cor-relation to how an aircraft is used than to a par-ticular make and model.

At the time of the study, each manufacturer hadproduced a similar number of aircraft: 1,680 forCirrus and 1,567 for Cessna. After discarding oneCirrus accident that occurred during a manufac-turer’s test flight during the period studied and wasnot considered indicative of normal flight opera-tions, there were a total of 21 fatal accidents in TAA,12 for Cirrus and nine for Cessna. This results in afatal accident rate per 1,000 aircraft produced of7.1 and 5.7 respectively.

Of more interest were the reasons these acci-dents occurred. All the accidents closely resem-bled typical non-TAA accidents with a few possi-ble exceptions: One Cirrus accident with verysketchy information, from which no reasonableguess could be made of causal factors, and aCessna T210 which was not included in the sta-tistical comparison but has all the earmarks of apilot losing situational awareness despite havingone of the newest GPS navigators. At the time ofthis report there were two fatal Cirrus accidentsin preliminary status involving a possible loss offlight instruments and another with icing in aTKS equipped, but non-icing approved SR22.

Both the Cessna and Cirrus models can gener-ally be considered “traveling” airplanes, likely tobe used much more extensively in cross-countryoperations than, say, Piper Warriors or CessnaSkyhawks, which are often used as trainers. As anatural consequence, cross-country accidentssuch as weather involvement, are more likely.

To expand the comparable aircraft studyslightly, ASF also searched accident records forBeechcraft A36 Bonanzas, which have long beenprototypical “traveling” airplanes for GA pilots. Asexpected, the long-term accident record for theseaircraft includes a relatively high percentage ofweather-related accidents, typically pilots withno instrument rating or not on an IFR flight plan,penetrating weather. Interestingly enough, of theapproximately 247 new Beechcraft Bonanza A36aircraft delivered since January of 2000, predomi-nately with Garmin 430/530 GPS navigator units,ASF found only two accidents, neither of whichcould be even remotely considered to be TAA-involved. One was attributed to a loss of controlduring a go-around, and the other resulted fromfuel mismanagement.


Twelve Cirrus SR 20 and SR 22 accidents studied:• Three appeared to be caused by pilot deci-

sions to continue VFR flight into instrumentmeteorological conditions.

• Two indicated the pilot was performingmaneuvers that exceeded design limits of theaircraft.

• One resulted from inadequate preflight plan-ning, when the aircraft was unable to outclimb terrain in a takeoff accident duringconditions of high density altitude.

• One occurred when the aircraft hit trees orterrain on an IFR approach.

• One suffered interference between an electri-cal switch and flaps, for which an AD wassubsequently issued.

• Two appear to be pilot spatial disorientation.• One appears to be a stall/spin on initial climb.• One appears to be flight into icing conditions.

Nine Cessna 182 model accidents studied:• Two stalled during an attempted go-around

(one is preliminary).• Two suffered pilot loss-of-control after enter-

ing instrument meterological conditionsduring VFR flight.

• Two were classified as pilot spatial disorienta-tion.

• One hit terrain while operating VFR in moun-tainous terrain.

• Two hit trees or terrain while executing an IFRinstrument approach.

New TAA vs. classic TAA accident summary

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TAANon-TAA

Non-TAA pilots—Cessna 210, Cessna182, Mooney, andBonanza aircraft.

AOPA Air Safety Foundation TAAAccidentHistory

Of the Cessna 182 and Cirrus accidents includedhere, a few were selected for their instructionalvalue as part of this report. A brief summary ofthe accident is presented first, followed by ASFcomments. More detailed NTSB accident reportsare included in Appendix A. ASF comments areoffered for educational purposes only. In somecases an accident is in preliminary status so theanalysis must be considered as preliminary also.Please note that instrument approach procedurecharts, provided to help readers better under-stand the flight environment, are current at thetime of publishing and may not exactly reflectthe procedure as it was at the time of the acci-dent.

Accident 1January 2003, about 4 p.m.; Cirrus SR20; San Jose,California. Likely cause: Lack of situationalawareness.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT This crash took place near the end of a trip fromNapa County Airport (APC) to Reid HillviewAirport (RHV), both in California. The weatheralong the route varied from marginal VFR to lightIFR, and the pilot was operating on an IFR flightplan. Along the way, ATC had provided numeroustraffic avoidance vectors.

At 1627, when the airplane was approximatelyabeam Oakland International Airport, the con-troller instructed the pilot to proceed to a fix nearPalo Alto Airport (PAO), believing it was thepilot’s destination. The pilot questioned theclearance, confirming that he was actuallyenroute to Reid-Hillview. The controller thencleared the pilot to an initial approach fix forRHV, but observed the aircraft heading towardthe erroneously issued Palo Alto fix. After a cor-rection and a reissuance of the Reid-Hillview fix clearance, the aircraft tracked more or lesssouthbound for 3 miles before turning toward the correct fix.

ATC again provided the wrong tower frequencyas the aircraft started flying the approach. Thepilot finally got to the right tower frequency, cor-rectly reported his position and then for reasonsunknown, made a 90-degree right turn. The radartrack was lost in a mountainous area with high-tension power lines. The Mode-C-reported alti-tude was 1,700 feet.

ASF comments This appears to be a loss of situational awarenessleading to the impact with power lines and amountain.

However, there are some clues that the pilotwas having trouble with the technology. The firstindication comes from radar data reported in thefull NTSB report, “The controller issued a clear-ance direct to OZNUM. After this exchange, radarindicated the airplane turned almost 90 degreesto the right, and tracked on a course consistentwith proceeding direct to PAO.” The pilot couldhave programmed PAO into the GPS before theclearance changed to OZNUM, and with theautopilot coupled, the aircraft would have turnedtoward PAO.

The second clue occurred during the lastmoments of the flight. “As the airplane passedjust northwest of OZNUM, the controllerinstructed the pilot to contact the tower on fre-quency “118.6.” This is the PAO tower frequency,not RHV. The pilot queried the controller but thecontroller insisted, “Yes sir, it is.” The pilot com-plied and contacted PAO tower. The pilot and thePAO controller discussed that he was on thewrong frequency and the pilot said he wouldswitch to the RHV frequency of 119.8. During thisconversation, radar indicated the airplane began


Accident summaries and commentaries


a turn to the right, with the target visibly dis-placed from the final approach course at 1652:33,approximately over JOPAN waypoint.

The Cirrus’ control stick is located on the leftside of the pilot, while the GPS on the lower rightof the pilot. NTSB noted that the pilot was likelyhand-flying the aircraft, while possibly program-ing the GPS on his right, he could have inadver-tently started a right turn by “leaning” to the rightand moving the control stick to the right. This is,again, speculative and the exact cause of the righthand turn into the power lines will never beknown.

Accident 2 May, 2002; Cessna 182S, in Sheboygan, Wiscon-sin. Likely cause: Failure to maintain control of the aircraft during a go-around.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT A Cessna 182S crashed in VFR conditions whileexecuting a go-around from Runway 21 atSheboygan County Memorial Airport,Wisconsin. Witnesses stated the aircraft beganto drift to the right during landing before theattempted go-around. Local winds were report-ed from 150 at 9 knots. Witnesses reported theaircraft banked to the right entered a rightdownwind to Runway 21, then impacted theground. Several pilots stated the engine sound-ed as though it was running smoothly at thetime of the accident. The aircraft was observedin banks of approximately 40 to 60 degrees andas far as 90 degrees prior to impact. The aircraftwas reportedly very close to the ground (approx-imately 10 to 20 feet agl) when making its firstturn, and approximately 200 feet agl when bank-ing sharply to the right to enter a downwind legfor Runway 21 prior to impact.

ASF comments:The presence of TAA equipment on this aircraftappears to have no bearing on this accident,which from all indications, was caused by a sim-ple lack of pilot proficiency and the inability tofly a normal pattern.

Accident 3 October 2002; Cessna 182S; Accident, Mary-land. Likely cause: Continued VFR flight intoIMC.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT:While en route, the noninstrument-rated privatepilot contacted air traffic control for flight follow-ing advisories and information about the cloudconditions ahead of him. The pilot also contacted

a flight service station (FSS), for further weatheradvisories. Upon contact with FSS, the pilot stat-ed that he was in level flight at 3,300 feet, flyingin and out of the clouds, and encountering lighticing conditions. The FSS specialist advised thepilot of instrument meteorological conditionsalong the route of flight, mountain obscuration,and icing conditions. The FSS specialist also rec-ommended that the pilot climb to 6,000 feet,where he could expect VFR conditions. The pilotresponded that his flight conditions were “notthat bad,” and he would remain at 3,300 feet.

The pilot recontacted the air traffic controller,requesting a climb because he was accumulat-ing rime ice. The controller replied that an air-plane had reported ice at 7,000 feet, and anotherhad reported cloud tops at 7,400 feet. The pilotthen stated that he could not maintain VFR, andhad "been in it" for 10-15 minutes. He furtherstated that ice was building up, but he was “OK”with it. The target disappeared from the radarscreen.

ASF comments:It is possible that this pilot succumbed to thebelief that the advanced avionics on board hisaircraft would compensate for the lack of qualifi-cation to fly in instrument weather conditions,and thus he entered deeper into IMC before call-ing for help. Or perhaps not, since a significantnumber of such VFR-into-IMC accidents occureach year in non-TAA. In any event, this pilot wasnot responding appropriately to the obviousweather warning signals.

Accident 4 September 2003; Cessna 182T; Concord,Massachusetts. Likely cause: Spatial disorienta-tion.

HISTORY OF FLIGHTThe pilot received vectors for a daytime ILSapproach for Runway 11 at Bedford, Mass-achusetts, in IMC. The airplane crossed the outermarker approximately 500 feet high, and thendescended 1,300 feet in 40 seconds. It then start-ed a climbing, left turn. When questioned by thecontroller, the pilot reported headings that wereconsistent with his radar track. The pilot'sanswers to questions from the controller weresometimes delayed and/or incomplete, andwhen instructed to execute a missed approach,the pilot did not know what heading to fly. Theairplane turned more than 360 degrees beforedescending into the trees in a steep left wingdown bank.



ASF comments: Although this instrument-rated private pilot wasestimated to have flown 60 total hours in the lastsix months, there was no record of the amount ofinstrument time. It appears that the pilot was notinstrument proficient. Attempting to verify con-troller instructions may have caused him to userapid head movements to reference instrumentcharts. Witnesses also reported hearing a largeincrease in power, which may have also con-tributed to kinesthetic illusions.

Basic lack of proficiency in attitude instrumentflying, exacerbated by spatial disorientation, wasthe apparent cause of this accident. The use ofautopilot could have helped. There is no indica-tion that the TAA equipment on board was anyfactor.

Accident 5 October 2004; Cessna 182S; Santa Rosa,California. Likely cause: Spatial disorientation.

HISTORY OF FLIGHTThe instrument-rated pilot took off from an air-port with a 600-foot ceiling. During his climb ininstrument meteorological conditions, the pilotfailed to maintain directional control and alti-tude, and subsequently entered a right descend-ing spiral until impacting terrain 2 miles west ofthe airport. According to the aircraft operator,the pilot rented the 182S because the Cessna206 he normally flew was down for mainte-nance. According to the operator, there was norecord of the pilot ever being checked out in the182S. The pilot’s logbook was not located, andthe pilot’s recent instrument experience was notdetermined.

ASF comments:It’s likely that this pilot became spatially disori-ented when trying to use avionics that he wasunfamiliar with. Flying single pilot in actual IFRconditions is not the time to learn how to pro-gram the GPS. The use of autopilot could havehelped.

Accident 6November 2003; Cirrus SR 20; Las Vegas, NewMexico. Likely cause: Spatial disorientation.

HISTORY OF FLIGHTDuring a cross-country flight, the non-instru-ment rated private pilot encountered heavy fogand poor visibility, and the airplane wasdestroyed after impacting the terrain in a wildliferefuge. An airmet, issued and valid for the area,reported the following, “Occasional ceiling below

1,000 feet, visibility below 3 miles in mist,fog...mountains occasionally obscured clouds,mist, fog....” On the day of the accident, the pilotdid not file an IFR flight plan or receive a formalweather briefing from an FAA Flight ServiceStation.

ASF comments:The noninstrument-rated pilot in this accidentmay or may not have been tempted to continuehis flight when encountering IMC conditionsbecause he had TAA equipment on board. ASFfiles bulge with similar accidents involving non-TAA, going back to 1983.

Accident 7 December 2001; Cessna 210TC; San Jacinto,California. Likely cause: Loss of positional aware-ness.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT During a GPS approach in IMC, the pilot did notturn onto the prescribed course toward the finalapproach fix. The pilot initially navigated alongthe prescribed instrument approach course, butfailed to make a critical 75-degree course change



toward the final approach fix. Instead of main-taining the 4,100-foot msl minimum altitudeuntil passing the final approach fix, the pilotdescended to 3,550 feet msl. The airplane wasequipped with a late-model GPS receiver with amoving map. The airplane crashed 5.9 nm east ofthe prescribed course and 550 feet below theauthorized altitude. The reason for the pilot’s lostof situational awareness and his track divergenceis unknown.

ASF comments:Although the NTSB does not speculate on thereason for the pilot’s loss of situational aware-ness, it’s possible that he was either distracted orconfused while dealing with the details of theGPS approach on the moving map display in hisT210. In the full NTSB report (contained inAppendix A), the flight instructor who conductedthis pilot’s last Instrument Proficiency Check didnot report any GPS approaches performed dur-ing the check. The availability of high-tech equip-ment does not alter the pilot’s responsibility toknow where the aircraft is relative to high terrainbut it should help him to locate it.

TAA and the parachuteSome TAA have added new features that did notexist just a few years ago. One such change isCirrus Design’s complete aircraft parachute. Thechute is designed to be deployed when the pilotbelieves there is grave danger.

Information from the Cirrus Design Web site“Ace in the Hole” regarding the Cirrus AirframeParachute System (CAPS) says, “This safety sys-tem will lower the entire aircraft to the groundin extreme emergencies and when all alterna-tives to land have been exhausted. With the pullof a handle, a solid-fuel rocket blows out the tophatch, deploying the parachute, and buried har-ness straps unzip from both sides of the air-frame. Within seconds, the canopy will positionitself over the aircraft and allow it to descendgradually. The final impact, roughly equivalentto falling 10-12 feet, is absorbed by the special-ized landing gear.”

The parachute raises questions that willalmost certainly affect other areas of TAA train-ing, including:• Will the presence of such a potentially life-sav-ing tool encourage pilots to intentionally fly intosituations they would not normally attempt inmore conventionally equipped aircraft?• What detailed guidance (if any) should be con-veyed to pilots of chute-equipped TAA to deter-mine when to “pull the chute?”

At publication time, there had been fourreported accidents involving use or possibleattempted use of the CAPS system. They aresummarized here. The NTSB accident reportsare included in Appendix A.

Accident 8March 16, 2002; Cirrus SR20; Lexington,Kentucky. Likely cause: Pilot failure to maintaincontrol of aircraft after apparent malfunction ofturn coordinator in IMC. Additional information:Pilot attempted to deploy the Cirrus AirplaneParachute System (CAPS) parachute, but wasunsuccessful. Parachute apparently deployedafter ground impact.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT The instrument-rated pilot and a passengerdeparted into instrument meteorological condi-tions (IMC), intending to practice some instru-ment approaches. Shortly after takeoff, the pilotreported a turn coordinator failure. The turncoordinator indicated a left bank regardless ofcontrol inputs, disorienting the pilot. The pilotstated he pulled the CAPS activation handlerepeatedly, however, the cable did not extend and“nothing seemed to happen.” The airplane brokeout of the cloud layer, and the pilot performed anemergency landing to a field. Witnesses near theaccident site reported that the CAPS parachutedeployed after ground contact. Post-accidenttesting of the wreckage did not reveal any pre-impact instrumentation, or autopilot failures.The CAPS system also functioned normally, how-

16 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically AdvancedAircraft


ever, it was noted that the pull forces to activatethe CAPS parachute varied significantly.

ASF commentsPilot decision-making in a potentially deadly sit-uation appeared to be proper, given that the pilotapparently believed that a crash would ensuewithout deployment of the parachute.

There was extensive post-crash investigationby the NTSB and Cirrus Design regarding pullforce required to activate the CAPS system. As aresult of this accident, and the subsequent test-ing, Cirrus Design issued Service Bulletin 20-95-03, which required replacement of the CAPS han-dle access cover. The new cover incorporated anexpanded description for the CAPS activationhandle use. Additionally, on July 10, 2002, SB20-95-05, was issued and required the replacementof the CAPS activation cable to further reduce thepull forces required to deploy CAPS. CirrusDesign issued similar service bulletins for theSR22 series airplanes, which were also equippedwith CAPS.

Pilot decision-making appeared sound giventhe situation, ASF reviewers questioned why lossof the turn coordinator only (as reported) shouldcause an instrument pilot to lose control of anaircraft in otherwise-benign IMC, but when facedwith what is a perceived life threatening situa-tion—pull the chute!

Accident 9 April 24, 2002; Cirrus SR22; Parish, New York.Likely cause: The pilot’s failure to maintain air-speed, which resulted in an inadvertentstall/spin. The continued spin to the ground wasa result of the pilot’s failure to deploy theonboard parachute recovery system.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT The airplane was maneuvering about 5,000 feetabove the ground, where witnesses noted that itseemed to be repeatedly practicing stalls, whenit entered a right, flat spin. It continued the spinto the ground, without deployment of theonboard parachute recovery system.Examination of the wreckage, and a subsequentexamination of the engine revealed no mechani-cal anomalies. The two accident pilots pur-chased the airplane 6 days before the accidentand had separately received airplane-specifictraining. The accident flight was their first flighttogether. The pilot in command, and the pilot atthe controls leading up to and during the acci-dent sequence could not be determined. Thepilot's operating handbook states that the onlyapproved and demonstrated method for spinrecovery is the deployment of the parachuterecovery system.

ASF comments Whether the pilots believed that chute deploy-ment was not needed, were unable to pull thechute for some reason, or simply forgot under thestress of the moment is not clear. If pilot deci-sion-making (or non-decision-making, as thecase may be) was a factor here, it argues foremphasis on scenario/case study type of instruc-tion during transition training.

ASF reviewers also questioned why a spin wasallowed to develop, considering that spins areclearly not approved in Cirrus aircraft. Was thepresence of the CAPS a factor in encouraging thepilots to presumably take the aircraft beyond itsflight limits, creating a false sense of safety?

Accident 10 September 19, 2004; Cirrus SR22; Peters,California. Likely cause: The pilot’s loss of controlafter a possible weather encounter resulted inwhat the pilot deemed to be a spin. Additionalinformation: The pilot activated the CAPS para-chute, preventing almost certain loss of life.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On September 19, 2004, at 1550 Pacific DaylightTime, a Cirrus SR22 landed in a walnut orchardduring an emergency descent. While flying in anarea covered by a convective sigmet and whereradar data showed the aircraft having consider-able altitude deviations, the pilot deployed theCAPS about 16,000 feet msl, and the airplanemade a parachute landing into the walnutorchard. The instrument-rated commercial pilotand single passenger were not injured, but theairplane was substantially damaged. Instrumentmeteorological conditions prevailed, and aninstrument flight plan had been filed but notactivated. The flight originated at Redding,California, at 1500.

The pilot reported to the NTSB that he waspassing through 14,000 feet msl with the autopi-lot set at 100 feet per minute (fpm) rate of climb.He and his passenger were using supplementaloxygen. There was a broken cloud layer 1,500feet below the airplane and he was in visualmeteorological conditions steering east to avoidsome weather. He said he heard a “whirring”sound in his headset and the nose pitched up.He disconnected the autopilot, the left wingdropped and the airplane appeared to enter aspin. The pilot determined that the airplanewould be in the overcast cloud layer before hecould recover and decided to activate the CAPS.The CAPS deployment was successful; the air-plane broke out of the clouds about 2,500 feetabove ground level (agl), and landed in the walnut grove.

Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter


There was a convective sigmet active in thevicinity where the airplane landed, warning of aline of severe thunderstorms 30 nm wide mov-ing from 300 degrees magnetic at 15 knots withcloud tops to 27,000 feet; hail up to 1 inch indiameter; with wind gusts up to 50 knots possi-ble. Weather radar showed Level 5 and Level 6(extreme) thunderstorms predicted in the vicinity of the accident.

ASF comments This is one of several accidents that shows suc-cessful deployment of the CAPS system in anactual emergency, likely saving lives. Given thatthe pilot believed the aircraft had entered a spin,the decision to activate the parachute appears tobe correct decision making, and the end result(no fatalities) bears this out.

A fair question is whether the availability ofCAPS was a factor in the decision-making thatled this pilot into an area of Level 5 (severe) andLevel 6 (extreme) thunderstorms in the firstplace. Had CAPS not been available as a lastresort, would the pilot have ventured into suchinhospitable weather? Is it possible that theautopilot played a part in the loss of control byattempting to climb or hold the aircraft in tur-bulence? None of this can be answered with certainty at this point, but training and attitudeare as important to TAA as they have been in thepast with classic aircraft.

Accident 11 October 3, 2002; Cirrus SR22; Lewisville, Texas.Likely cause: The improper reinstallation of theleft aileron by maintenance personnel.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT During cruise flight the left aileron separatedfrom an attach point, and the pilot executed aforced landing to a field. Prior to the accidentflight, the airplane underwent maintenance fortwo outstanding service bulletins. During com-pliance with one of the service bulletins, the leftaileron was removed and reinstalled. The pilotconfirmed with the service center personnelthat the maintenance on the airplane was com-pleted. After departure the airplane was level at2,000 feet msl for approximately one minute, thepilot noticed that the airplane began “pulling”to the left, and the left aileron was separated atone hinge attach point. The pilot then flewtoward an unpopulated area, shutdown theengine, and deployed the aircraft's parachutesystem. Sub-sequently, the airplane descendedto the ground with the aid of the parachutecanopy and came to rest upright in a field ofmesquite trees.

Examination of the left aileron and the air-frame aileron hinges revealed that the outboardaileron hinge bolt was missing, with no evidenceof safety wire noted. According to maintenancemanual procedures, the bolt and washer hard-ware were to be safety wired.

ASF comments Here is an excellent example of the safety factorintended by Cirrus Design through use of CAPS.The aircraft was being operated properly, and thepilot made an excellent choice to deploy theparachute when a flight control malfunctionedafter routine maintenance.

Accident 12 April 2004 over mountainous terrain in Canada.Cirrus SR20. Likely cause: Undetermined at thistime.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT The aircraft was flying at night over ruggedmountains in Southern British Columbia.Mountain peaks in the area rise to more than9,000 feet. A Canada’s Transportation SafetyBoard spokesperson noted “We have radar datashowing the aircraft in a spiral before it goes offradar.” There were reports of significant turbu-lence in the area. What caused the aircraft todepart controlled flight remains the subject ofinvestigation. The aircraft descended under theparachute, alighting on a steep rocky slopewhere the four occupants stepped out unin-jured.

ASF comments While one certainly cannot debate the outcome,many experienced mountain pilots would ques-tion the wisdom of flying a light single-engineaircraft fully loaded at night over high terrain inwindy conditions. Almost any one of these cir-cumstances would be cause for concern.Collectively they point to at a pilot who was likelydepending upon the aircraft’s “last resort” tech-nology where the risk/reward equation was notproperly balanced, in our opinion.

ConclusionAs noted earlier, there aren’t enough accidentsyet involving TAA to draw statistically valid con-clusions on the role (if any) that TAA might playin GA safety. It is encouraging, however, to seethat there are no strong negative indicators forTAA effect in the accident rate based on the verylimited data.


TrainingfortheGlassAge Section IV

On the local level, more than 150 avionicsshops that are members of the AircraftElectronics Association have adopted CD-ROM-based training for TAA-type avionics.

Other commercial users of the softwareinclude Professional Instrument Courses and OurPlane, a fractional ownership company forgeneral aviation pilots.

The U.S. government has adopted TAA trainingprograms on CD-ROM, with the U.S. Navy com-mitting to such education for its fleet of Garmin530 units installed inGrumman E-2s.

Manufacturers of full-motion simulators, for-merly reserved for airlineand high-end corporateflight departments, areintroducing modelsspecifically for the CirrusSR20 and SR22 aircraft.SimTrain, the first suchcompany, promises full-motion visual simulatorsat locations near Atlanta,Georgia, and on both theEast and West coasts inCirrus Training Centers.

The units simulateeither Avidyne EntegraPFD or standard instru-ment displays, andinclude a parachute acti-vation scenario for theCirrus AirframeParachute systems toemphasize the decision-making process leadingto CAPs deployment.


Training providers are jumping on the TAA bandwagon. As mentioned earlier, FBOs and aviationcolleges are all rapidly adding TAA to their fleets. Various commercial providers and equipmentmanufacturers are rushing to take advantage of the need for specific training on TAA avionics. ACD-ROM based interactive instructional system from Electronic Flight Solutions was introducedthis year, bringing to five, the number of instructional volumes in its Complete Learning™ library.Many of those volumes are directed at operation of specific TAA-related avionics.

Vflite’s interactive CD forGPS is shown at left.

Instrument training in aCirrus model aircraft(note the back-up instruments in front ofthe pilot, under the PFD).

A training sequence In the AOPA Air Safety Foundation’s opinion, thebest way to train pilots, either from the beginning(ab initio) or for transition, is to start learning theaircraft on the ground. That’s nothing new.

1. System training and basic avionics should bedone with CD/DVD or online. According to our sur-veys, most pilots do not find print media particular-ly helpful for advanced avionics systems. Too muchinteractivity is required to learn effectively by justpassively reading. Quick-tip cards with shortcuts,after the pilot has a basic grasp, is appropriate.Much training can take place long before the pilotshows up at the training center or before startingwith a CFI, especially as a transitioning pilot. 2. The next level would be a task trainer that

simulates the GPS navigator or PFD/MFD cock-pit. Having the actual knob/switch configurationof the most complex part of the instrumentationand proper reaction to all pilot inputs will go along way to preparing the pilot for flight. Here isan area where both avionics manufacturers andtraining providers have typically fallen short inoffering an inexpensive way to actually practicewith the equipment outside of an aircraft. This isgradually changing as training providers under-stand what is needed to effectively train pilots inthe new environment.

Some of the older units came with groundpower supplies and simulation software so pilotscould practice. With a full glass cockpit and largemoving map displays this is clearly not feasible.Short of having a dedicated ground trainer, thenext best alternative is to plug the aircraft into aground power unit. The disadvantage is that theaircraft and power must be available.3. Ideally, the next step is a cockpit simulator orflight-training device. This may or may not have avisual system or motion but it duplicates all otheraspects of the aircraft. Simulation has beenproven very effective in larger aircraft. With theadvent of relatively low cost visual systems andcomputers, the new systems now typically costless than half, sometime much less, than the air-craft they replicate and can be so effective inpreparing pilots, that we wonder why anyonewould train from the beginning in the aircraftitself. Professional pilots certainly don’t.4. Finally, it’s time to go to the airplane. This does-n’t preclude experiencing some basic physical air-plane handling and local flights before sim train-ing is complete but the full-fledged, cross country


TrainingfortheGlassAge AOPA Air Safety Foundation

Simulators help effectivelytrain pilots in the newenvironment.

The same technological advances thathave allowed the development of TAAare also giving innovative opportunitiesfor flight training providers, and maycreate significant momentum for anentirely new model of flight training inGA.

The first example of this is a remark-ably realistic flight-training device fornew TAA. Designed by Fidelity FlightSimulation, Inc., this device providesmotion cueing, external visual displays,and realistic aerodynamic modeling for various aircraft models.

Motion is created with electricmotors, rather than expensive tradi-tional hydraulic actuators typicallyused in motion simulators for airlineand corporate operators. Equipped

with a four-panel LCD, the cockpit canbe configured for virtually any TAA.According to the manufacturer, thesenew units can help revolutionize flighttraining by providing superior proce-dures training at a lower cost than con-ventional in-aircraft training.

As part of the research for thisstudy of general aviation TAA, ASFtraveled to Fidelity headquarters inPittsburgh to evaluate the Cirrus-stylesimulators. After a demonstration ridethat included simulations of a down-wind landing, a control system failureand a CAPS chute deployment, ouropinion is that this generation of elec-tronic simulators will be just the firststepping stone for revolutionizing theflight-training system.

The initial application of this tech-nology for general aviation TAA is beingpioneered by a start-up group calledSimTrain, which has purchased threeFidelity Flight simulators and config-ured them as Cirrus SR22 TAA models.Plans are to place one of the simulatorson the West Coast and one on the EastCoast, most likely in the pilot-richBoston-Washington corridor. One addi-tional SR-series simulator is plannedfor the Atlanta area.

ASF has long advocated use of bothpartial-task and full-motion simulatortraining in Part 61 and Part 141 curricu-lums, both for instructional efficiencyand for keeping the cost of flight train-ing affordable. This approach holdsgreat promise for doing exactly that.

TAA simulation—a better training environment

VFR and IFR departures and arrivals should waituntil the pilot has a solid grasp of the glass orMFD/GPS equipment. Too much training is cur-rently done in the actual airplane resulting in greatinefficiencies, and higher risk situations becauseof pilot and instructor distractions. These includemidair collision risk, airspace blunders, blown ATCclearances, and possible loss of control.

As soon as the pilot has mastered the mostbasic handling, we recommend as much actualshort, high workload cross-country experience aspossible. Droning around the pattern practicingtouch and goes at slow speeds in aircraft withwide-ranging speed operating envelopes doesnot prepare pilots for the critical transition phas-es of flight. Few pilots have difficulty leveling offat pattern altitude, throttling back to patternspeed and performing the before landing checkwhile staying in the pattern. En route, at altitude,the workload and risk is also low. It is the airspeed/altitude transition that causes the problem.

Unless the pilot is very light on cross-countryexperience and dealing with weather, the trainingtime is better spent in the high workload areassuch as the departure/arrival phases where prob-lems invariably arise with altitude, speed, andconfiguration changes. Heavy use of autopilotand appropriate division of attention is critical.

How long should all this take? As always, it willdepend on the pilot’s experience and the toolsavailable. A new pilot could take 5 days or longerand for very low time pilots, particularly thosethat are transitioning to faster TAA, a reasonablementoring period is suggested. They should begradually introduced to the broad range of condi-tions that the aircraft will ultimately encounter.

An experienced pilot with considerable highperformance time—and a good grasp of theavionics—might transition successfully in two orthree days. If they haven’t mastered the GPS navi-gator, expect to easily double the time to IFR pro-ficiency. One size certainly does not fit all, asconvenient as that may be for the trainingschools or manufacturers.

After training it is essential for all pilots to getout and practice what they’ve learned. Waitlonger than one week to get back into the aircraftor into a simulator and much of the retention isgone without additional instruction. Consider-able practice is the only way that pilots willdevelop and retain a high skill level.

Training a new breed of pilots?The FITS group theorized that a new breed ofpilots may be emerging, one that represents asignificant change in the pilot population. Manyare thought to be successful business people whowant aircraft strictly for personal and businesstransportation and are not necessarily aviation

enthusiasts. They view an airplane, like a car or acomputer, as a business tool. These people typi-cally do not hang around airports for long peri-ods to pick up an hour or two of flight time. Theyare busy professionals who will not be satisfiedwith a VFR private pilot certificate and want to beunrestricted by weather. Consequently, they needto earn a private pilot certificate with an instru-ment rating quickly and efficiently.

The traditional training approach needs modi-fication for this customer. These people arefocused on results, not the process to get there.This group may also place unwarranted trust intechnology to compensate for developing skillsand their inexperience.

While these comments suggest that a funda-mental shift is occurring with new pilots, this islargely anecdotal. There is little evidence to proveor disprove that new pilots are more focused ontransportation flight as opposed to local recre-ation flight. It is logical, however, to think thatpilots who buy aircraft capable of flight at morethan 150 knots might be interested in goingsomewhere. There have always been the “fastburners” who learned to fly in basic aircraft andwithin a year or two upgraded to high perform-ance cross-country machines.

The traditional sequence is still followed bymany pilots: Start in a basic trainer, upgrade to aslightly larger four-place aircraft, and spend sev-eral years getting cross country and instrumentexperience before making the jump to a high-performance aircraft. This allows seasoning andjudgment to take place in addition to formaltraining, a factor that some think is lacking withthe fast burners.

We believe a split still exists, often dictated bypersonal economics. Those that have a need totravel and the financial wherewithal will buy a highperformance aircraft. And those that previously fol-lowed a traditional approach to aircraft upgrading


AOPA Air Safety Foundation TrainingfortheGlassAge

Cirrus full motion flightsimulator by FidelityFlight Simulation, Inc.,(above).

may now become “fast burners” because of someTAA system simplicity (fixed gear, FADEC, etc.) andattractive pricing. It’s too early to determine if thisis anything more than a slight upsurge or a funda-mental shift in the pilot population.

There may also be a new group of pilots whoenter the system through Sport Pilot. They willhave learned basic flight skills, but there will bea significant transition into a full-fledged TAA.

Because the Sport Pilot certificate is so new, itis too soon to tell how this will play out: A pilottries out flying and as he or she becomes finan-cially able and desirous of more capable aircraft,they move from a very basic physical airplaneinto a mostly mental one—the TAA. This is a bigstep but not insurmountable with the right train-ing approach and appropriate mentoring.

Autopilot essentialsFor single-pilot IFR operations in TAA, we believethat autopilots are essential. All single-pilot jetsrequire an autopilot and pilots are trained to relyon it right from the beginning.

While TAA are simpler and slower than thejets, the workload is nearly the same. Since pilotsoperating TAA are required to function more asprogrammers and managers, it only makes senseto delegate much of the physical aircraft handlingto a reliable piece of hardware. GA pilots need to

view the autopilot as their second in command,and use it appropriately.

This is not how light-GA pilots have traditional-ly been trained. The autopilot was consideredancillary rather than essential. The airlines andcorporate world left that concept behind decadesago, recognizing that a properly managed autopi-lot can reduce workload tremendously. First, theuse of the autopilot must be considered as core tothe operation of TAA and pilots should be trainedin its routine usage. Depart-ures, en route, arrivals,and approaches should be flown such that thepilot is comfortable and completely proficient.Some hand-flying skill is appropriate but in manycases it is indicative of pilots who do not have therequisite autopilot skills to properly manage highworkloads in single-pilot TAA.

Proper programming is critical—mismanagethe machine and the workload is increased wellbeyond normal. Pilots must learn all the modesand their limitations. Confirm that the aircraft isdoing what they asked it to do—trust but verify—and how to react when the autopilot is, inevitably,misprogrammed. Learn from those mistakes toreduce their frequency in critical situations.

Some potential problem areas include fightingthe autopilot by holding onto the control yoke orside stick. The autopilot will methodically trimagainst the pilot and will either win the fight or



Some pilots and pundits have expressedskepticism about TAA and their inher-ent systems. The most common state-ment in the advanced avionics cockpit,according to airline and corporate pilotsis “What’s it doing now?” This refers tothe avionics doing something that thecrew didn’t expect.

Chip Rosenthal, CEO of UnicomSystems Development notes, “I'm notschooled in the science of human fac-tors, but I suspect surprise is not an ele-ment of a robust user interface.”

Jeff Raskin, Apple Computer’s formermanager of advanced systems, wasmore direct. “The multiple stupidities ofeven the latest designs…show either anunjustifiable ignorance of, or a near-criminal avoidance of what we do know[about existing engineering methods for designing human-computer inter-faces].”

In designing aircraft and avionics,key interface considerations are sim-plicity and consistency. The pilot’s pri-mary job is to know where the aircraft is

in four-dimensional space and where itneeds to go next. Beyond that, we’regetting into niceties. Change in flight isconstant and inevitable, so inputs mustbe made quickly and the system mustbe fault tolerant. The multifunction dis-play and moving map are hugeimprovements to situational awareness,and we can’t say enough good aboutthem. They provide the electronic “mapin the head” that all instructors attemptto build into their students.

But it often takes too many buttonpushes and knob twists to get the hard-ware to display the promised high levelof situational awareness in the time thatthe single pilot has available. Technol-ogy emerges as a double-edged sword,increasing pilot and aircraft capabilitiesbut frequently at the price of increasedworkload and education.

Some designers do not yet fully under-stand their customers or the environ-ment in which they operate. That is notunique to aircraft, of course, and can beseen daily in our technophile or techno-

phobe society—new home entertain-ment systems, wireless networks, com-puter software, PDAs, automotive soundsystems—the list is endless.

The difference with complex avionicsand aircraft design is that the penaltyfor slow learning, improper operation,or misunderstanding the equipmentcan be fatal. From an accident investi-gation perspective, the probable causewill likely be “the pilot failed to followthe instrument approach procedure” or“became disoriented for unknown rea-sons.” Tying the cause of an accidentback to a complex user interfacerequires analysis that is probablybeyond the current state of the art inaccident reconstruction.

To be fair, marketers, engineers, andcustomers themselves are constantly bal-ancing pricing, competitive features, andthe technology as it evolves, to make theright decision. This is not easy to do orwe wouldn’t have so many examples oftechnology that could be improved. Thenature of invention is to build products

My Point—Evolving design and some thoughts for the futureBy Bruce Landsberg, executive director of the AOPA Air Safety Foundation

disconnect with the aircraft badly out of trim andvery difficult to control. Some autopilots have arate of climb (ROC) or descent select. In our opin-ion, this capability is a potential trap especially inpiston aircraft. In a few documented cases, ROCmode was selected, for example, at 700 fpm andas the aircraft climbed, the engine power outputdeclined with altitude. As the actual ROCdeclined, the autopilot attempted to maintain theselected rate and pulled the aircraft into a stall.

Malfunctions are rare, far less than withhuman pilots, and these must be handled appro-priately. This is best done in a simulator wherepilots can actually experience the sensations andlearn the proper responses. In actual IMC thiswill include advising ATC that the flight has anabnormal situation. The concept of an abnormalsituation may be new to GA pilots, but simple tounderstand. It is in between normal operationsand a full emergency. The situation may not yetrequire drastic action, but if not handled properly,a real emergency could be imminent. When in anabnormal situation, ask for help. This might benothing more than insisting upon radar vectorsto the final approach course and no changes inrouting. It may also be prudent to divert to anarea of better weather or lower traffic density.

The FAA, in testing TAA pilots, should adapt tothe reality of autopilots as well. That moves away

from the traditional test methodology thatrequires pilots to hand fly complex departure andapproach patterns. The use of autopilots in TAAand the FAA’s approach to testing should be han-dled as they are in single-pilot jets.

Pilot performance and its effect on human factors TAA accidents examined for this ASF report werelargely indistinguishable from accidents withnon-TAA equipment. Would a more directapproach to human factors in GA accidents makesense? Some will refer to this as the GeorgeOrwell approach to safety, since it involves using



Chelton FlightSystem’sautopilot (above)—theTAA pilot’s friend.

that invariably are improved. It’s mucheasier to criticize than to create.

More features are not better, betterfunctionality is better. (A limited ASFstudy supports this view; because ofthe small sample size we continue togather data. Preliminary findings showthat pilots, as a group, preferred simpledesign and fewer choices to highlycapable, complex machines.) It takes avery good understanding of the single-pilot environment and a clear sense ofdirection to achieve this.

In the airline and corporate pilotenvironment where pilots are paid tothink about their jobs constantly andmust undergo extensive training on aregular basis, equipment design andtraining tasks are easier. The target pop-ulation is more homogeneous and theirmotivation is clear. In light GA, themotives and the pilot population arecompletely different even though thepenalties for failure are just as severe.

The occasional, or renter, pilot willhave a steeper learning curve to enjoymany of the promised advantages of thecurrent TAA, especially if he or she flies

several aircraft with different navigationsystems. In the future, that barrier maygo away as aircraft systems and avionicsget smarter. At this writing, more sys-tems commonality is gradually comingwhich eases the learning process, butthere is still a way to go.

To achieve the goal of significantlysafer flight for many more people, theinterfaces and the skills required mustbecome less demanding. Training andmaintaining proficiency must take lesstime and be simpler. Extensive trainingto make up for complex design puts atremendous burden on users. It’simpossible to consistently replicateexcellence in that wonderfully variableand unpredictable device—the humanpilot. Far better results are achieved bydesigning the product so well that mostpilot can consistently perform well.

Some might call it the “dumbingdown” of aviation but the majoradvances in airline and GA safety havehistorically come from technology. Forthe airlines and corporate flight depart-ments, jet engines, ground proximitywarning devices, traffic collision avoid-

ance systems (TCAS) and advanced sim-ulation for training had a huge impact onsafety. In GA, the advent of nose-wheelaircraft sharply reduced landing acci-dents. We predict that terrain, weather,and traffic avoidance now coming intothe new TAA will help—and all of thoserequire little or no manipulation on thepart of the pilot to provide life-savingfunctionality. They also the require pilotsto recognize the equipment-pilot-aircraftlimitations and not put themselves in ahigh risk situation based on the idea thatthe technology changes the fundamen-tals of aviation safety.

We are now on the cusp of a new erathat includes better training simulation,new engines, and some of the high-endtechnologies that the jet world hasenjoyed for decades. There will be grow-ing pains however, as manufacturers andcustomers come to understand eachother. The TAA and glass cockpits are abold step in this direction. Evolution willprecede revolution but the long-termresult will be a much safer and an evermore useful light aircraft transport sys-tem than we have today.

monitoring devices permanently installed in theaircraft to record flight operations.

The airlines have employed this technology,called Flight Operations Quality Assurance(FOQA) for years. It allows airlines to periodicallydownload data from the aircraft and to look formajor anomalies from normal flight operations.This might include unstabilized approaches,improper use of flaps, poor speed and altitudecontrol, etc. British Airways has employed thisapproach for more than a decade and claims thatit has allowed them to catch pilot performanceproblems and correct them before accidents orincidents occur.

Tracking pilot performance and its effect ontrainingAs we transition into the glass age, it’s still essen-tial to study accidents and mishaps to under-stand how they occurred and what can be doneto prevent them. This has ramifications for air-craft design and perhaps, most importantly, fortraining. TAA accidents examined for this reportwere largely indistinguishable from accidentswith non-TAA equipment. If we could reasonablyand inexpensively capture what the aircraft andthe pilot were doing just prior to impact it would

help distinguish between aircraft malfunctions,pilot judgment and skill issues. That would helpto improve training curricula, identify where apiece of equipment did not perform properly orwhere poor pilot judgment was the culprit.

Highly sophisticated Flight Data Recorders(FDRs) have been used in large corporate aircraftand airliners for decades to track dozens ofparameters regarding flight control input, switchpositions, aircraft configuration, attitude, alti-tude, engine parameters and speed. The FDR andcompanion Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR) havebecome essential in identifying the probablecause in the heavy aircraft accidents. Their use inlight aircraft has been impractical due to veryhigh cost, complexity and weight constraints.However, the digital data used for PFDs, MFDs,and navigation in new and in newly-built classicTAA lends itself to being recorded much moreeasily than in the past because the information iselectronic. It does not require the retrofit of ser-vos, transducers and additional computers, aswould be the case with the large, existing fleet oflight aircraft. This remains prohibitively expen-sive and difficult. Those concerned with privacyor “big brother” will rebel against this approachto safety, since it involves using monitoring



Counterpoint—The future is now

There are clearly other points of viewon the advanced technology. Withoutembarrassing or identifying anyone,here are some enthusiastic proponentsof TAA including marketers, reviewersor users:

• “The big difference is that a gaggle ofhuman factor experts have devised away to present all the information in asmall area, thus reducing the range ofone’s scan. Moreover, through the useof tape-type indications and digitaldisplays, the information is more intu-itive and easier to process.”

• “The MFD can basically be thoughtof as a situational presentation. That is,it can electronically display on the LEDscreen just about anything the MFDvendors can dream up.”

• “You can go very fast in comfort and safety with terrific visibility flying behind a state-of-the-art panelthat provides unprecedented situa-tional awareness in all types ofweather.”

• “Exceptional positioning informationis the key to flight safety.”

• “Isn't this GPS technology wonderful?”

• “Add to all that the fact that GPS iswidely regarded as the single easiestway to navigate, and you've got plentyof reasons to go shopping for a unit ofyour own.”

• “On a basic level, GPS will providereliable, accurate navigation to anypoint on Earth. Before situationalawareness became an aviation buzz-word, pilots flew safely by continuallyasking and answering three questions:Where was I? Where am I? Where am Igoing? With a GPS receiver's movingmap, those questions are answeredwith a momentary glance. There is nosubstitute for this tremendousadvancement.”

• “This new all-glass cockpit is thegreatest avionics system to come alongin nearly three decades.”

• “For pilots, that means that the newGPS system could allow aircraft to land

in zero/zero conditions, and for themilitary, Navy pilots can put a fighterdown on the deck of a pitching, heav-ing aircraft carrier—even when theycan’t see it.”

• “In a sense, the…system may bealmost too talented. The two screensintegrate so much information so con-veniently that you’re tempted to keepyour eyes inside the airplane too much,obviously a major benefit in IFR condi-tions, not so practical in good VFR.”

It could also be said that the pilot isultimately responsible for understandinghow installed equipment works – everyavionics manual has bold print warningsnot to operate the aircraft until fullychecked out. —Caveat emptor!

Copy of a warning from a GPS manual:“Caution: Use the [GPS Unit] at yourown risk. To reduce the risk of unsafeoperation, carefully review and under-stand all aspects of this Owner’sManual [in excess of 140 pages] and the Flight Manual Supplement andthoroughly practice basic operationprior to actual use….”

devices permanently installed in the aircraft torecord flight operations. However, the only timethe information should be used is when there hasbeen an accident.

Microprocessors in new aircraft engines and inengine monitoring equipment have the ability totrack how the engine is being flown. Engine mon-itoring has been successfully and inexpensivelyretrofitted to many airplanes after manufacture.It guides both pilots and manufacturers in run-ning engines more efficiently, is used in trou-bleshooting and is widely available for existingaircraft although not without some expense.Engine management has been greatly simplifiedand improved with this equipment.

The automotive experience There is no doubt that human behavior changeswhen participants know they are being watchedand usually it improves. When police are useradar, laser and camera devices to monitor speedon the highways, drivers slow down. To see howFDRs might affect GA, it’s predictive to look athow Event Data Recorders (EDRs) have affectedthe automobile industry. Automotive fleet studieshave shown that the installation of EDRs canreduce collisions by 20 to 30 percent.

Since 1990, General Motors has equippedmore than six million vehicles with the monitor-ing capability Events commonly recorded byautomotive black boxes include: vehicle speed;brake and accelerator pedal application forces;position of the transmission selection lever; seat-belt usage; driver seat position; and airbagdeployment data- very similar to FDRs. The datacollected belongs to owners except whenrequested by police or court order. Auto manu-facturers also will use it as a defense of the com-pany in a product liability lawsuit.

Some automakers are reluctant to use EDR forfear of how the information will be used in court.GM, however, believes that the potential forimprovements in auto safety far outweigh anypossible increase in litigation and in most cases,driver mishandling has caused the accident, notthe vehicle—exactly the same circumstance aswith aircraft.• Data from a black box caused jurors to questionthe prosecution's argument that the driver wasspeeding recklessly before a fatal head-on crashwith another vehicle. The driver was found notguilty after his truck's black box showed 60 mphat impact—not above 90 mph, as a witness hadclaimed.• A police officer won a major settlement forsevere injuries he suffered when a hearse struckhis squad car. The hearse driver claimed a med-ical condition caused him to black out before hehit the police car. But the hearse's black box

showed the driver accelerated to 63 mph—about20 miles more than the posted limit—secondsbefore he approached the intersection, thenslammed his brakes one second before impact.The black-box information was an unbiased wit-ness to the crash.• After a high-profile crash that killed a formerpro football player, the family filed a $30 millioncivil suit that claimed the vehicle’s air bagdeployed after the car hit a pothole and thatcaused him to hit a tree. Data from the black boxshowed the air bag deployed on impact asdesigned, and the survivors lost the case.

Training, Liability and Flight Data RecordersSome large U.S. flight training institutions usingTAA have installed small digital cameras andFDRs that allow fast, comprehensive reviews oftraining sessions on what actually occurred in thecockpit or simulator. The electronics revolution ofthe last decade—which itself has helped makeTAA possible—offers small and relatively inexpen-sive digital devices ideally suited for this purpose.The fact these are usually installed at the time ofmanufacture versus an expensive retrofit havemade them an inexpensive benefit in training.There’s nothing like seeing video or a flight pathof a training scenario to guide instructors and stu-dents. Olympic athletes, skiers, golfers and swim-mers all use monitoring to improve performance.

One leading GA aircraft manufacturer has seenits airframe liability insurance premiums triple inthe past few years because of consumer legalaction claiming defective equipment. It isrumored to be considering some form of FDR inits new production models to reduce its liabilityfrom speculative lawsuits and to improve the air-craft. For the builders of very light jets, severalcompanies have mentioned that FDRs and CVRsmight be a part of the package.

After many accidents, when lawsuits againstmanufacturers ask for millions in compensation,it is to everyone’s benefit to see that the facts arepresented unemotionally and correctly. From themanufacturers’ standpoint, claims for mainte-nance and warranty service can often be morefairly adjudicated with data from the devices.Historically, about 90 percent of the accidentsinvestigated by the NTSB show no design ormanufacturing defect.

FDRs emerge as a two-edged sword however,and in those cases where an aircraft or piece ofequipment is shown to be defective, the manu-facturer should settle the claim fairly and thenquickly resolve the technical problem for the restof the fleet. The advent of new production modelTAA equipped aircraft with FDRs may improvesafety where product liability and tort reformadvocates have been unsuccessful.



HardwareandSoftware Section V

The multifunction display (MFD) is the cen-ter for all these functions. MFDs come in a vari-ety of forms, and accept input from severalproviders. A listing of MFD-equipment manu-facturers and the providers of data streams areincluded in Appendix D.

Weather displays on TAAUntil very recently, anything approaching real-time display of convective weather in thecockpit was limited to aircraft with onboardradar. This equipment is the gold standard for

tactical avoidance of thunderstorms but isexpensive, somewhat fragile, and heavy.

Smaller GA aircraft usually made do with light-ning detection devices such as a Stormscope orStrikefinder to mark the location of suspectedturbulence, but they provided a mosaic displaythat requires considerable interpretation.

In TAA, however, suppliers of datalinkedweather images are making major inroads andsuch displays may greatly improve utility forlight GA. Weather graphics datalink has thepotential to greatly simplify inflight decision-making. Depending on aircraft and pilot capa-bility, the decision can be made, based on thelatest data, to divert, delay, continue, or landasap. Likewise, the availability of the latest TAFsand METARs for reporting airports allow bothVFR and IFR pilots to monitor weather aheadand around them. There will be very few excusesfor being surprised.

Terrain awarenessIntegral to most new GPS navigator units thesedays is terrain awareness, usually displayed on anMFD in a format using different colors to indi-cate different elevations. In some cases, the ter-rain shown near the aircraft will change color,based on the GPS-derived separation betweenthe aircraft and the ground.

TAWS (terrain awareness warning system) While GPS mapping modules with integratedvertical dimensions (elevation data) displayedvia different colors are becoming an expectedpart of new TAA displays, an extra featuredesigned to prevent perfectly good airplanesfrom smacking the ground while under controlis becoming popular.


Typical TAA displays• Weather is usually a Nexrad or enhanced radar image.• Terrain denotes the vertical extent of terrain shown by the moving-map display.• Traffic avoidance is provided by either ATC radar or returns from ADS-B transponders inCapstone-equipped aircraft independent of ATC equipment.• Engine instrument displays replaces conventional round dials or even more modern gas dis-charge displays.

Datalinked weather is displayed on a Apollo(now Garmin) MX20(below).

AOPA Air Safety Foundation HardwareandSoftware

TAWS is mandatory on March 29, 2005, for allturboprop or jet aircraft with six or more passen-ger seats, including those operated under FARPart 91. As prices drop, pilots of smaller TAA mayexpect to see TAWS emerge in their cockpit.

TAWS (technically, TAWS-B, a variation on theTAWS-A equipment required on Part 121 aircraftas early as 1974) evolved from radar altimeters,devices that emitted a warning when terraindirectly below the aircraft became closer than apreset value. The original device (called a GroundProximity Warning System, or GPWS), usedground return radar to measure the altitude fromthe airplane to points directly below. The devicesworked fairly well, and the rate of ControlledFlight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents in the late1960s and early 1970s was reduced.

But the radar altimeter GPWS units had amajor shortcoming: altitude measurements andthus the warnings of potential CFIT were unableto prevent fast-moving aircraft from strikingrapidly rising terrain if the aircraft had a highrate of descent. The integration of GPS naviga-tion and terrain database technology allowedthe design of equipment that computed aircraftposition, groundspeed, altitude, and flight pathto calculate a dangerous closure rate or collisionthreat with terrain or obstacles, and provided apredictive warning. This is the technologybehind TAWS.

The five functions provided by TAWS-B units (theversion most commonly installed in general avia-tion TAA) includes the appropriate audio alert for:

• Reduced required terrain clearance or immi-nent terrain impact. This is the forward-lookingterrain-alert function. This warning is generatedwhen an aircraft is above the altitude of upcom-ing terrain along the projected flight path, but theprojected terrain clearance is less than therequired terrain clearance. The warnings dependon the phase of flight, and whether the aircraft isin level or descending flight. There are 60-secondand 30-second warnings.

60-second aural warning: “Caution, terrain; cau-tion, terrain” (or “Terrain ahead; terrain ahead”)and “Caution, obstacle; caution, obstacle.”

30-second aural warning: “Whoop, whoop. Terrain,terrain; pull up, pull up!” or “Whoop, whoop.Terrain ahead, pull up; terrain ahead, pull up.” The“whoop, whoop” sweep tones are optional.

• Premature descent alert. This alerts the pilot ifthere's a descent well below the normal approachglidepath on the final approach segment of aninstrument approach procedure.

Aural warning: “Too low, terrain!”

• Excessive descent rate. This is a carryover fromGPWS, and alerts you if the rate of descent isdangerously high compared to the aircraft'sheight above terrain—and, for example, if flyinglevel over rising terrain.

Caution alert: “Sink rate!”

Warning alert: “Whoop, whoop! Pull up!”

• Negative climb rate or altitude loss after take-off. Another GPWS function, this is to assure apositive climb rate after takeoff or a missedapproach.

Caution alert: “Don't sink!” or “Too low, terrain!”

• The 500-foot "wake-up call." This occurs when-ever terrain rises to within 500 feet of the aircraft,or when the aircraft descends within 500 feet ofthe nearest runway threshold elevation during anapproach to landing. It's intended as an aid tosituational awareness, and doesn't constitute acaution or warning.

Call-out: “Five hundred.”

Traffic avoidance AOPA has assisted the FAA test in a project inAlaska and in the Ohio Valley that promises notonly weather datalinks but also collision avoid-ance, even in non-radar areas. Should this TAA-related technology prove itself, it will represent adramatic departure from the traditional full-timeseparation provided by ground-based air trafficcontrollers. It may also help push TAA morequickly into the realm of “free flight,” a newmodel for air traffic control now under FAA con-sideration as one possible answer to over-satura-tion in the existing radar-based ATC system. Thethree-year program called Capstone, is designedto evaluate various avionics systems that couldbecome an important part of air traffic controlwithin the National Airspace System. Most of the


TAWS-B units are mostcommonly installed ingeneral aviation aircraft.

testing was conducted in a remote corner ofAlaska, with GA aircraft serving as the test vehi-cles. Why test in a remote corner of Alaska, ratherthan a high-density area in the lower 48? Theanswer is that when Free Flight is fully imple-mented all participating aircraft are expected tobe fully equipped with appropriate avionics.Therefore, any evaluation of Free Flight conceptsbecomes more realistic as the percentage ofequipped aircraft flying in the test airspaceincreases. In Bethel, Alaska, the FAA was aimingfor nearly 100 percent participation.

Excluding the high-altitude airline traffic and afew daily commuter flights, it’s estimated thatthere are fewer than 200 aircraft operating within100 miles of Bethel. Mainly, these are single-engine air-taxi “workhorses” such as Beavers,Caravans, and a host of smaller machines, downto Cessna 180s, plus a handful of helicopters.These were the Capstone participants.

The FAA selected 150 of these aircraft for theproject, outfitting each with a GPS receiver, acolor multifunction display and an automaticdependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) trans-mitter/receiver. The ADS-B equipment allows air-craft to broadcast their positions to each other—and to air traffic controllers on the ground—viaspecial transceivers and ground stations. By thesame token, air traffic painted on ground radarcan be datalinked to aircraft displays. So canDoppler and other weather radar imagery, as wellas text messages such as ATC clearances and

weather reports. Even e-mail messaging is possible.

In the ideal world of the future, pilots and con-trollers would see the same targets and the sameinformation on a single display. (This is the surveil-lance component of the acronym.) Pilots could seepotentially conflicting targets as far away as 100nautical miles, and alter their courses and altitudesto avoid midair collisions. For more immediatetraffic threats in heavily traveled airspace, ADS-Bcould work equally well, although ATC would issuetraffic advisories, or TCAS-equipped airplanescould follow any traffic or resolution advisoriesissued by their own on-board equipment.


HardwareandSoftware AOPA Air Safety Foundation

GPSLocation

UAT Radio

ADS-BAircraft

Locations

Navigation Databases

ADS-B Other Aircraft Locations

FIS-B Weather & Flight InformationTIS-B Aircraft Locations from Radar

Multi-Function DisplayMoving MapsTerrain ProximityWeather and Flight InformationOther Aircraft

Ground-Based Transceivers (GBTs), Networks

AWOS

GPSInstrumentApproach

VHFVoice Radio

Weather & FlightInformation

fromMultiple Sources

Air TrafficControl

TowerOperations

CompanyFlight

Monitoring

AircraftLocation

from Radar

EachEquippedAircraft

ADS-B Technology

Traffic displayed on an Apollo MX20 (below).

AOPA Air Safety Foundation HardwareandSoftware

The whole idea behind ADS-B is to expandsystem capacity and enable the Free Flight con-cept, a logical extension of the capabilities ofTAA. Under the Free Flight proposal, aircraftwould be free to fly more direct routes usingGPS; pilots could see virtually all of the trafficaround them, and do more to safely separatethemselves; and ATC could be freed of much oftheir en route controlling workload, letting con-trollers focus more on the efficient managementof the entire airspace system, and to concen-trate their energies on sequencing and separa-tion in terminal areas.

Engine/systems monitoring Another area where the MFD excels is in helpingpilots to manage their engines. Some of the newinstallations have FADEC (Fully AutomaticDigital Engine Control), which allows the pilotto move only one power lever, much like a tur-bine. There is no need to adjust propeller or fuelmixture – it is all done automatically correctingfor ambient temperature and altitude. Gone arethe concerns of detonation, temperature controland fuel flow.

If a parameter moves into the “yellow” forwhatever reason, unlike gauges of old where thepilot must constantly monitor a needle for a1/8- inch movement, the MFD automaticallyadvises the pilot that something is out of toler-

ance before it becomes critical. The equipmentalso monitors the engine’s overall performanceand is routinely downloaded during mainte-nance to allow technicians a quick look at theengine’s history. This holds great promise toincrease reliability.

Even routine engine parameters, such as cylin-der head temperatures, EGTs, carburetor temper-atures, and duty cycles are now monitored as anaccepted part of TAA instrumentation. TAAinstrumentation often provides more data thanmost pilots know what to do with so there isanother need for training.


SPEED SENSORASSEMBLY

CYLINDER HEADTEMPERTURE

SENSOR

EXHAUST GASTEMPERATURE

SENSOR

MANIFOLDPRESSURESENORSTHROTTLE

POSTIONSWITCH

MANIFOLDTEMPERATURE

SENSOR

MANIFOLDTEMPERATURE

SENSOR FUELPRESSURESENSOR

ELECTRONIC CONTROLUNIT (ECU)

FIREWALLCONNECTORS

POWER & STATUS

LOW VOLTAGEHARNESS

SPARK PLUG TOWERS

SSA SIGNALCONDITIONER

ASSEMBLY

50 PINCONNECTOR

HIGH VOLTAGE COILS

MICROPROCESSORCIRCUT BOARD

FUELINJECTOR

SOLENOIDS

F W D

Chelton’s Highway in the sky.

FADEC sensoring system.

Technology abused?All tools have the potential to be misused andnew tools have the greatest risk because usershave to learn the pitfalls. Much of the new tech-nology aboard TAA falls into this category. A few,including some regulators, have suggested thatbecause something can be misused, that itshould not be developed or at least severelyrestricted. That logic would have forestalled thedevelopment of aviation itself.

Some concernsWeather datalink—There is some potential dan-ger for TAA pilots who mistakenly believe theirdatalinked radar images constitute true real-timeweather, such is the case with an onboard radar.The time lag between capture of the radar imageand the datalink display may be anywhere from 5minutes to 20 minutes. In a very active thunder-storm situation, a pilot attempting to navigatearound cells using old data could be in seriousjeopardy.

Similar dangers exist with radar-equipped air-craft when a pilot gets too close to a cell. This hashappened infrequently in both airline and corpo-rate flight. No one would suggest that on-board

radar be removed because it is occasionally mis-used. Rather, we identify the incident or accidentas an anomaly, publicize it for educational pur-poses, and move forward.

Terrain—As with weather graphics, there ispotential to misuse the terrain databases for scudrunning or an attempt to operate VFR in areas ofIMC. There was one accident in the Capstoneproject in Alaska where this happened. On bal-ance, however, the value of knowing obstacles areahead dramatically lowered the number of Alaskaaccidents.

Traffic avoidance—As mentioned earlier, pilotsgenerally can acquire targets visually faster withon board avoidance systems. Airline and corpo-rate systems have worked very well to date. To besure, there are two pilots and they tend to oper-ate in highly controlled environments. In themore open areas and smaller non-towered air-ports there will be more transponderless trafficso pilots will have to continue to scan outside.

Engine/systems monitoring—The only negativethat we can see is if the system fails. Cessna’sexperience with fuel monitoring has been so pos-itive that even an occasional malfunction will notoverride the benefits derived from spotting prob-lems sooner.

Parachutes—A minor downside to aircraft para-chutes is that pilots may come to rely on themwhen better decision-making would have pre-vented them from getting into a bad situation inthe first place. Several fatal accidents haveoccurred when pilots may have rationalized thatthe chute would save them if problems got out ofhand and then failed to deploy when neededwith fatal results. The technical solution is tohave an “auto-deploy” system when the aircraftsenses itself in grave danger. That level ofmachine intelligence is probably still a few yearsoff.

In the final analysis, the benefits offered by thisequipment far outweigh the downsides.


HardwareandSoftware AOPA Air Safety Foundation

Engine monitoring is displayed on screens suchas this one from Meggitt.

Fabulous fuel solution Other hardware-based display solutions havealready proven successful, and some are beingadapted from other modes of transportation.For instance, new GA aircraft annunciator tech-nology has virtually eliminated fuel mismanage-ment in new-production Cessna piston aircraft.Low-fuel warning lights for each tank, promi-nently featured in the panel annunciator systemand separate from occasionally inaccurate fuelgauges, have resulted in a major accident reduc-tion in this common pilot misjudgment area.According to Cessna safety engineering person-nel, there have been no recorded fuel-exhaus-tion accidents involving more than 5,000 Cessnasingles built since 1995.

ReportConclusion Section VI

While TAA are moving GA forward, they still sharemany characteristics with older aircraft, at leastat this point in the transition. The penalties forpoor judgment, misinterpretation, misprogram-ming, or clumsy flight-control handling remainthe same as they always have.

Learning to fly TAA will change the flight-train-ing world, and it should pay noticeable dividendsto all segments of the industry.

Current accident figures are generally compa-rable to classic single-engine aircraft. Until moreTAA are introduced to the fleet, it will be difficultto directly measure the safety benefit. In a fewcases, parachute-equipped aircraft have certainlysaved lives. While the track record of that tech-nology is still being written, there is evidence toshow that even though a pilot may have made abad decision, the negative outcome was meas-ured in insurance dollars rather than lives.

In the end, these discussions are not so muchabout airplanes but about the people who oper-ate them. Although the on-board technology andperformance of TAA is rapidly evolving anddespite the fact that the pilot-training industry ismaking a strong attempt to better integrate pilotswith their aircraft, pilots, for the most part, havenot changed.

A VFR-rated TAA pilot who departs into anarea of deteriorating weather may well haveattempted the same trip had he been flying aclassic aircraft. Poor judgment will always bepoor judgment. Did the new TAA cause the ensu-ing accident? Certainly not! It may have enticedthe pilot slightly, but that is not an inherent faultof the aircraft. As long as pilots are human theywill continue to make mistakes.

The real comparison of glass, not just TAA, willoccur as we acquire data on classic TAAs, theproven, old-line aircraft given a new panel. It’spremature to predict the outcome with certaintybut you can place your bets!

New generations of autopilots might allow for

full auto-land capabilities in small GA aircraft.This may allow a low-time IFR—or in an emer-gency, a VFR pilot—the opportunity to tell thecomputer to fly an approach to minimums. On-board systems may eventually function as theequivalent of a senior instructor, able to offeradvice based upon the inputs of all aircraft sys-tem sensors combined with up-linked informa-tion from the ground to form a forward-lookingpicture of what the aircraft is about to encounter.

TAA offer increased safety with added situation-al awareness. But for pilots to avail themselves ofthese improvements, the key ingredient willremain a balance between training tied to experi-ence and ever improving, smarter technology.


“Get rid at the outset of the idea that the airplane is only an air-going sort of automobile. It isn’t.It may sound like one and smell like one and it may have been interior-decorated to look like one;but the difference is – it goes on wings.” —Wolfgang Langewiesche

From Stick and Rudder, originally published in 1944


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