Territorialization, Enclosure and Neoliberalism (Corson, 2011)

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Territorialization, enclosure andneoliberalism: non-state influence instruggles over Madagascar's forestsCatherine Corson

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To cite this article: Catherine Corson (2011): Territorialization, enclosure and neoliberalism: non-state influence in struggles over Madagascar's forests, Journal of Peasant Studies, 38:4, 703-726

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Territorialization, enclosure and neoliberalism: non-state influence in

struggles over Madagascar’s forests

Catherine Corson

Using the case of the expansion of Madagascar’s protected areas, this paperexamines ‘state’ territorialization under neoliberalism as a process that involvesnon-state as well as state institutions. Challenging notions of state territorializa-tion as a state controlled process, it reveals the state as a vehicle through whichnumerous non-state entities sought to expand their control of and authority overMadagascar’s forests. It argues that, as state and non-state entities negotiatedMadagascar’s protected area boundaries, associated rights and acceptable uses,they determined not only claims to forest lands, but also the authority to makeforest policy and to decide who could accumulate wealth from Madagascar’sforests. Ultimately, the expansion entailed practices of primitive accumulation byenclosing common lands and creating new opportunities for private capitalaccumulation.

Keywords: territorialization, neoliberal conservation, forests, Madagascar, non-governmental organizations

In 2003, Madagascar’s former president, Marc Ravalomanana, announced hisintention to triple the country’s protected areas in five years1 to cover a total of sixmillion hectares (ha) or approximately 10% of the country’s territory. First knownas ‘the Durban Vision’ and later entitled the ‘Systeme d’Aires Protegees deMadagascar’ (SAPM) (System of Protected Areas in Madagascar), the initiativeaimed to meet the World Conservation Union’s (IUCN) target of protecting 10% ofevery country’s major biomes.2 Although the president of Madagascar made theofficial decision to expand the nation’s protected areas, non-state3 actors from

A special thanks to Nancy Peluso, as well as Christian Lund, Desmond Fitz-Gibbon, and twoanonymous reviewers who commented on earlier versions of this manuscript. Researchsupport came from the National Science Foundation, Andrew W. Mellon/American Councilof Learned Societies, Rural Sociological Society, University of California Berkeley Centerfor African Studies, the Foreign Language and Area Studies Program and the BeahrsEnvironmental Leadership Program. Thanks also to Vokatry ny Ala. Rebioma provided theshape files for the map.1The deadline was later extended to 2012.2The ‘10%’ standard was a environmental threshold and a territorial standard also embracedby the Millennium Development Goals and the 2010 Convention on Biological Diversitytargets, although the objectives of protecting 10% of a country’s territory or biomes are oftenconflated (Secretariat 2007, UN Statistics Division 2008).3I realize that ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ are generally difficult to render as mutually exclusivecategories, and I recognize that neither ‘state’ and or ‘non-state’ entities are homogenous. I donot go so far as James Scott (1998) in regarding the nation as being divided into state and non-state spaces; as I discuss here, the territories in question are contested, overlapping, and not

The Journal of Peasant Studies

Vol. 38, No. 4, October 2011, 703–726

ISSN 0306-6150 print/ISSN 1743-9361 online

� 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2011.607696

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outside Madagascar – including foreign aid donors, international non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs), consultants, and private commercial interests – shaped theboundaries, rights and authorities associated with the new protected areas. ByDecember 2010 and despite the 2009 political crisis that ousted Ravalomanana frompower, this group had created 125 new protected areas and sustainable forestmanagement sites that, together with pre-existing parks, covered 9.4 million ha intotal (Repoblikan’ i Madagasikara 2010a).

By tracing the negotiations among consultants, foreign donors, conservationNGOs, mining companies, and villagers, as well as various agencies, branches andlevels of the state, in the process of mapping Madagascar’s new protected areas,establishing new rights and determining acceptable uses within them, the analysispresented here challenges common notions of state territorialization as a statecontrolled process. Instead, it reveals the state as a vehicle through which numerousnon-state entities sought to expand their control of and authority over Madagascar’sforests, ultimately securing them as a means of potential wealth generation as well asa means of biodiversity conservation.

Using the case of Madagascar’s protected area expansion, I make threeinterrelated claims about territorialization, authority and enclosure in biodiversityconservation. First, ‘state’ territorialization under neoliberalism involves non-stateas well as state institutions in the governance process. Although Madagascar’s newprotected areas were still regarded as ‘state’ territories, they were developed andmanaged by alliances among state, private and not-for profit – and oftentransnational – entities. Second, drawing on Sikor and Lund (2009), I emphasizethat territorialization can be both a claim to control land and resources, as well as aclaim to the authority to determine who controls those resources. Through activeparticipation in the design and implementation of Madagascar’s protected areagovernance, transnational private and NGO actors legitimated their claims both toforest lands themselves and to the authority to determine forest policy. Third,territorialization entails practices of enclosure, not only of rural peasants’ lands, butalso of the authority to determine who can accumulate from them. Through thepromotion of private and NGO management of Madagascar’s new parks, as well asthe accommodation of mining interests, SAPM consolidated non-state and foreignaccess to and control over the process of determining land and resource rights, andthus who could accumulate wealth from Madagascar’s forests.

Redefining ‘state’ territorialization

In making this interjection on discussions of territorialization, I build onfoundational theorists (Sack 1986, Vandergeest and Peluso 1995), as well as morerecent work on territorialization (e.g. Sivaramakrishnan 1997, Brenner 1999, Pelusoand Vandergeest 2001, Buch-Hansen 2003, Wadley 2003, Peluso 2005, Sassen 2005,Roth 2008) to argue for an understanding of state territorialization as a dynamic,negotiated, and historically-contingent process that transpires through negotiations

homogenously understood at any level. Nonetheless, these entities do have official positionsand policies, and villagers or others often experience them as unified organizations. I havetherefore tried to use the term ‘state’ to refer to Malagasy governmental or parastatalinstitutions, distinguishing them, for example, from non-profit or non-governmentorganizations, private mining companies, and foreign aid donors. Where possible I refer tospecific institutions and the official policies or official positions of these institutions.

704 Catherine Corson

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and interactions among state and non-state actors. While the list of writing onterritory, territoriality, and territorialization is much longer and extends tonumerous geographers and sociologists (e.g. Elden 2009), in this study, I concentrateon the transformations of what has been called ‘internal territorialization’(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995, 385). This lineage can be traced to Sack’s (1986)ground-breaking challenge to biological determinists, who approached territorialityas an individual and adaptive behavior, to argue that territoriality is socially andgeographically rooted and to define it as ‘an attempt by an individual or group toaffect, influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting andasserting control over a geographic area’ (p.19). Expanding on Sack’s concept adecade later, Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) confronted traditional political scienceanalyses that focused on international territorialization, exploring instead whatthey termed ‘internal territorialization’ as the contested processes by which a stateinstitution ‘establishes control over natural resources and the people who use them’within national boundaries. Specifically, they argued that state territorializationentails the creation and mapping of land boundaries, the allocation of rights to‘private actors’, and the designation of specific resource uses by both state andprivate actors within specified territorial bounds. In a series of articles in 2001 and2006, they elaborated on the concept using Foucauldian genealogical analyses ofSoutheast Asian ‘political forests’ and ‘customary rights’ (Peluso and Vandergeest2001, Vandergeest and Peluso 2006a, 2006b). Innumerable political ecologists andother scholars have since drawn on their concept of internal territorialization in theiranalyses of property, access, territorialization, land rights and livelihoods (e.g. Ribotand Peluso 2003, Li 2007, Sikor and Lund 2009).

Starting from Vandergeest and Peluso’s conceptualization of territorialization,I explore the process of expanding Madagascar’s protected areas in the three keycomponents of territorialization – mapping boundaries, establishing and enforcingnew rights, and determining acceptable resource uses. However, the influences ofpowerful non-state actors such as mining companies, conservation NGOs,consultants, scientists and foreign aid donors on the SAPM process led me to moreexplicitly approach state territorialization as a process negotiated in specific ways ina neoliberal era of environmental conservation.

State territorialization under neoliberalism

Defining neoliberalism is no small feat, and I rely on Castree’s notion or ‘looseconsensus’ to include within the concept facets of privatization, marketization,deregulation, reregulation, public sector market proxies, and civil society provisionof state services (Castree 2008, 142). As neoliberal ideology has penetrated theinternational conservation agenda, numerous advocates have embraced the‘win-win’ idea that market-based conservation can simultaneously conservebiodiversity and promote economic growth (Buscher 2009). As a result, programssuch as payments for ecosystem services, carbon offsetting and private parks arecreating new opportunities for private accumulation across the globe (e.g. Igoe andBrockington 2007, Igoe et al. 2009, Brockington and Duffy 2010).

Simultaneously, as has been described in the literature, the deregulationassociated with neoliberalism is actually re-regulation in its creation of newgoverning structures and discourses that sustain neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell2002, McCarthy and Prudham 2004, Castree 2008). In particular, the establishment

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of ‘public-private partnerships’ and the ‘privatization of services’ have underpinnedthe rising influence of private and non-profit/non-governmental interests on whatwere previously state domains. The particular role of NGOs in this transition can betraced to the 1990s modified version of neoliberalism that emphasized civil societyassistance in state policy formulation and implementation (Mohan and Stokke 2000,Hart 2001).

The associated outsourcing of state functions to NGOs and other non-stateentities, many of which operate transnationally rather than locally, has constituted akey feature of what Ferguson and Gupta (2002, 990) have called an ‘emerging systemof transnational governmentality’. As aid to the global South increasingly comes inthe form of private investment in privatized, formerly ‘state or public’ resources, andas non-profit or non-governmental organizations step into manage formerly statespaces and institutions, state territorialization acquires an increasingly privatecharacter. Interconnected networks of public, private, and non-profit actorsnegotiate territorial boundaries and associated resource rights, and territorializedareas become, according to Igoe and Brockington (2007, 441), ‘transnationalisedspaces, governed according to the needs and agendas of transnational networks ofactors and institutions.’ These networks negotiate resource rights and access acrossinternational, national, regional and local scales. Just as multilateral fundingconditionalities often drive the reregulation and territorialization that emerges underneoliberalism (Igoe and Brockington 2007), so too do global conservation targets,such as the 10% goal to which SAPM aspired.

Importantly, these territorialized governance strategies for parks need to be seenas a concurrent practice of enclosure – i.e. a distinct practice of primitiveaccumulation that aids in the commodification of the park spaces. Primitiveaccumulation, Marx (1977, 875) argued, or ‘the historical process of divorcing theproducer from the means of production’, was the point of departure of the capitalistmode of production, exemplified in his writing by the British enclosures. More recentanalyses have explored contemporary primitive accumulation as an ongoing process(e.g. Angelis 1999, Kelly this volume). In reframing Marx’s concept of primitiveaccumulation, Harvey (2003) argues that capitalism requires the continual release ofnew assets that over accumulated capital can seize and convert to profit, and heintroduces the concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, as the mechanism bywhich capitalism overcomes inevitable over accumulation crises.

The reframing of primitive accumulation as an ongoing process enables us torecognize that it does not just entail the enclosure of land and resources, but also theenclosure of ideas (see Kelly this volume). Conservation enclosures can range fromthe taking of formerly common lands for protected areas to the creation ofcommodities from a variety of things previously isolated from capitalism (e.g.McAfee 1999, Buscher 2009). The enclosure of a park’s image can be a form ofprimitive accumulation, where processes of capital accumulation are launched viathe consumption of conservation images and values (Brockington et al. 2008, Carrierand West 2009, Igoe et al. 2010). Thus, accumulation is initiated through, forexample, the virtual consumption of conservation images and values. Here, theability to accumulate in the speculative conservation market, as in any speculativemarket, depends on perceptions of ‘conservation success.’ While foreign donors,governments and NGOs showcase the successful expansion of protected areas inorder to attract greater investment, private entities acquire wealth throughdevelopment and media contracts, for example.


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Harvey (2003, 145) focuses on the state role in primitive accumulation of ‘keepingthe territorial and capitalistic logics of power always intertwined . . . ’, yet, as hepoints out elsewhere, multilateral institutions like the World Bank and InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) influence state policy in the South. In addition to multilateralinstitutions numerous non-state actors influence state policy. Through funding,technical assistance and advocacy, they not only shape, but also claim publicauthority to align the territorial and capitalistic logics of power.

In conservation specifically, transnational conservation NGOs and private sectororganizations are becoming increasingly powerful as they influence and act underthe auspices of state power across international, national, regional and occasionallyeven local scales. Moreover, as donors and large transnational conservation NGOsembrace partnerships with the corporate world, complex, new power relationsamong private/non-profit/state actors emerge (e.g. Chapin 2004, Dowie 2005,Corson 2010). Thus, contemporary processes of territorialization are reworking notonly human-environment relations, but also power relations among social groups.

As these conservation advocates emerge as significant players in battles over landand natural resources, they often reinforce the broader political economic structuresthat have historically marginalized rural peasants from the sources of theirlivelihoods. Through projects aimed at capturing carbon credits and expandingprotected areas, they are staking claims to peasant-utilized commons in the name of‘the global commons’. In the neoliberal era of downsized national governments,these conservation claims are often initiated, shaped, implemented and even enforcedby private and non-profit actors operating in collaboration with and often under theauspices of the state. The implications of this form of ‘rule of experts’ (Mitchell 2002)are as serious as they are new. Alliances among these agents form in corridors duringinternational meetings and in foreign offices or domestic capitals – arenas ofteninaccessible to rural peasants. Yet, parties within these alliances negotiate not onlyrural peasants’ rights and access to land and resources, but also the authority tolegitimate these rights.

It is important to underscore that the international conservation agenda is nolonger engaged just in protecting natural resources by restricting human access topriority landscapes; it is increasingly promoting the protection of resources forthe purposes of capital accumulation by a host of actors. As Peluso and Lund (thisvolume) point out, enclosure through restricting resource use can have the sameimpact on rural peasants as enclosure through the physical fencing of space.Restrictions that preclude peasants from current and future accumulationpossibilities (as well as livelihoods) can serve to maintain the resources for futurecapitalist accumulation by others, be it via conservation or exploitation.

Re-theorizing state power

Recent scholarship on internal territorialization has significantly advanced thetheory in a number of ways. It has challenged the separation of state and non-statepractices and concepts (cf. Scott 1998) and instead examined territorialization aslocation-specific articulations of conflicting or mutually constituting state andcivil society practices (Sikor 2001, Wadley 2003, Peluso 2005, Roth 2008). It hasdocumented territorialization as an uneven process, which can vary across localities,depending on the actual enforcement of boundaries, police power of states or otherauthorities, and the historical, political, and ecological characteristics of the


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landscape (Sivaramakrishnan 1997, Wadley 2003, Roth 2004). Lastly, it hasillustrated how territories are produced at multiple scales and entail contestationsacross global, national, and local levels (Brenner 1999, Buch-Hansen 2003, Peluso2005, Sassen 2005, Rocheleau and Roth 2007). For example, Roth (2008), inchallenging the idea that state territoriality is based on abstract space (Lefebvre1974, Vandergeest and Peluso 1995), argues that park establishment is a process ofspatial reorganization. Here, just as ‘local’ and ‘national’ spaces are not pre-existing‘scales’ to be discovered, territorial designations are not given, either. They arerelational and are transformed as the social relationships that produce them changeand are changed by them (Roth 2008). How territorialization takes place and ismaintained is a historically specific, conflictual, and as Peluso (2005, 13) writes, ‘[a]dynamic and contingent process, an expression of relationships that emerge, operate,and converge across and within localities, national spaces and global networks’.

While this literature has established the complexities of state territorialization,it has also illustrated that state institutions remain central to the processes ofterritorialization, even in the context of globalization and privatization (Nevins andPeluso 2008). Territorialized organization of governance continues to be a crucialforce under capitalist production, where economic processes materialize territoriallyin state policies (Brenner 1999, Harvey 2003). Turning again to Ferguson and Gupta(2002, 996): ‘The central effect of the new forms of transnational governmentality isnot so much to make states weak (or strong), as to reconfigure states’ abilities tospatialize their authority and to stake their claims to superior generality anduniversality’. This process produces what Sassen (2005, 526) defines as ‘a very partialbut significant form of authority, a hybrid that is neither fully private nor fullypublic, neither fully national nor fully global’. It is somewhat akin to what Ongcalled ‘graduated sovereignty’ or ‘the differential state treatment of segments of thepopulation in relation to market calculations’ and ‘the state-transnational networkwhereby some aspects of state power and authority are taken up by foreigncorporations . . . ’ (Ong 2000, 57). To return to territorialization, as Lund (thisvolume) argues, control over land and space produces sovereignty.

Ultimately, the boundaries and rights created through territorializationprocesses both establish and reproduce terrains of struggle – i.e. the material andideological terms over which natural resource conflicts are fought (Sivaramakrish-nan 1997). The policies and programs that comprise governance themselvesgenerate sites of contestation (Peluso and Lund this volume). Consequently, Icontend that the creation of protected areas, regardless of the degree to which theyare exclusionary in concept, entails territorialization, and that territorialization canoccur through co-managed or community managed parks (Agrawal 2001, Li 2002),as well as exclusionary parks. Through active participation in the process ofshaping these terrains of struggle, non-state agents cement their authority todetermine rights and boundaries, regardless of the programmatic outcomes of thenegotiations.

In making this claim, I draw on Sikor and Lund (2009, 19) who argue that,‘Struggles over property are as much about the scope and constitution of authorityas about access to resources’. Territorialization is thus a critical mechanism throughwhich claims to authority are negotiated: ‘By making and enforcing boundar-ies . . . different socio-political institutions invoke a territorial dimension to theirclaim of authority and jurisdiction’ (p. 14). Thus, struggles over the boundaries,regulations, management plans, allowable resources uses, and appropriate managers


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all entail contestations not only over control of and access to the resourcethemselves, but also over the authority to determine these aspects of Madagascar’sprotected area governance.

Sikor and Lund (2009) acknowledge the potential for non-state actors to claimauthority through territorialization: ‘even institutions that are not the state or do notrepresent formal government claim this particular attribute of governance’. Pickingup on this reference, I argue that, through active participation in the institutionscreated to implement SAPM, transnational private and NGO actors ultimatelysecured not only resource rights, but ‘state’ authority to decide the rights andacceptable uses associated with Madagascar’s new protected areas.

Using the case of conservation in Madagascar, the next sections illustrate howthe process of expanding Madagascar’s protected areas – through mappingboundaries, establishing and enforcing new rights, and determining acceptableresource uses – can be seen as state territorialization. I begin with a briefintroduction on how the history of struggles over resources in Madagascar laidthe conditions for contemporary processes of re-negotiated state territorialization.I then turn to the specific negotiations, which took place among multilateral andbilateral foreign aid donors, private sector companies, conservation NGOs, andvarious branches of the Madagascar state – including those responsible for forests,parks, and mining – around the expansion of protected areas.

Establishing the historical conditions for new forms of territorialization

Material and ideological struggles over forests and their values have shaped thehistory of Madagascar’s eastern rainforest for over three centuries and areparticularly poignant today because of the country’s concurrent great biologicalwealth and immense human poverty. Madagascar is both one of the world’s richestcountries in terms of biodiversity, with an estimated 80 percent of its species beingendemic, and one of the world’s poorest countries with a World Bank-estimated2009 gross national income per capita at purchasing power parity of US$1040.Poverty rates are highest in rural areas, where 70% of Malagasy residents live andwhere peasants depend heavily on small-scale agriculture and forest products fortheir livelihoods.

The territorialization of Madagascar’s forests through the official establishmentof boundaries and designation of rights to resources was, until the mid-1980s,primarily a project of rulers. The state claimed ultimate control over forest land,while villagers’ customary land tenure was subject to arbitrary state sanction. Whileforbidding shifting cultivation, or ‘tavy’, in the eastern rainforest, it permittedvillagers ‘droit d’usage’ or customary use rights of forest products for noncommercialpurposes (e.g. Service de Colonisation 1913, Service des Forets 1930). The Frenchcolonial government addressed the ongoing conflict between production andconservation objectives by spatially separating the two in, for example, ‘naturereserves’, ‘special reserves’, and ‘national parks’ for conservation and ‘classifiedforests’ to manage commercial wood supplies. The country’s first ten nature reserveswere established in 1927, and the accompanying legislation prohibited local resourceuse, as well as tourism, within them (Decret: Creation de reserves naturelles aMadagascar 1928). In the last years of French rule and early years after Malagasyindependence in 1960, additional conservation areas were established, including20 special reserves with more lenient regulation, as well as two national parks


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(Saboureau 1958). At the same time, arretees (orders)4 in 1955 and 1957 introducedforet classee or ‘classified forests’ as reserves to ensure a continuous supply ofcommercial wood for use by the state, and by 1959, 3.2 million ha of forests had beenclassified (Randrianandianina et al. 2003). Despite these management efforts,commercial exploitation fueled the rapid destruction of classified forests during thecolonial and immediate post-colonial periods (Jarosz 1993).

These historical territorialization practices left a legacy that SAPM embraced in anumber of ways. In short, and as the next sections discuss in greater detail, SAPMlegislation reaffirmed state ownership of forest land, separated conservation andproduction zones, and protected minimal usage rights, while still restricting villagers’commercial forest-based activities.

However, despite the fact that the state was never a unified, autonomous, orcoherent entity, and was always influenced by foreigners, the power dynamics andspecific initiatives to promote private parks in the SAPM initiative destabilized thehistoric patterns in which ‘the state’ was the primary vehicle for territorialization.Diverging from historical policy and in recognition of continued low state capacityand inclination to enforce forest regulations, SAPM formally expanded policyformulation and management privileges to NGOs, local communities, and privatecompanies. While, as Hufty and Muttenzer (2002) note, the 1997 forest policy set aprecedent for the state to delegate forest management to private entities, the highlypublicized SAPM process and its associated policy committees instilled new life inthis concept, as donors, NGOs, scientists and private companies actively influencedthe gazetting of boundaries and the determination of rights and resource usesassociated with specific parks, as well as became official park managers.

This transformation of authority began at a key historical conjuncture in the midto late-1980s when donors’ neoliberal push for a reduced state, which led toincreased private investment and civil society participation in development policyglobally, converged with rising foreign interest in protecting Madagascar’sbiodiversity. In the 1980s, the indebted Madagascar government officiallyabandoned much of its formerly nationalist and socialist agenda and turned to theIMF. The resulting structural adjustment reforms reduced the central governmentand opened the economy to foreign investors. The shift also catalyzed a rapid rise inWestern donor assistance to Madagascar, and as it was struggling to meet IMFrestructuring demands, the Madagascar government turned to the AnglophoneWestern donor community, which had embraced the idea of integrating environmentand development embodied in the concept of ‘sustainable development’. At this time,the World Bank, in response to NGO pressure, began to place more attention onenvironmental issues in its development programs. Concurrently, species conserva-tion advocates launched a campaign to mobilize political support for biodiversity.When ecologist Norman Myers introduced the idea of protecting regions with highbiodiversity, he proclaimed Madagascar as one of the world’s top biodiversity‘hotspots’ (Myers 1990).

The foreign driven environmental agenda in Madagascar coalesced around aWorld Bank-sponsored 15-year/three-phase National Environmental Action Plan(NEAP). The associated 1990 environmental charter, which codified the NEAP,

4Following French law, a decret (decree) clarifies/defines how to apply a law. It is passed at theministerial level and is usually agreed to by all ministers in the government. An arrete (order)further defines the details of a law or decree.


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called for a reduced state role and liberalization of the economy in order to achieveenvironmental goals (Republique Democratique de Madagascar 1990). Moreover,reflecting the international trend at the time of involving civil society in developmentpolicy formulation and implementation, scientists, NGOs, and consultants, as wellas donors, were recruited to help develop its environmental priorities. Bilateral andmultilateral donors rushed to finance the program. As members of the overarchingComite Conjoint – the joint donor-government-NGO steering committee that guidedthe NEAP – donors and transnational NGOs shaped its implementation from itsinception. Moreover, because, at times, up to 90% of the costs of the Madagascarenvironmental program have been financed by foreign development agencies(Horning 2008) and because transnational conservation NGOs have been keyrecipients of donor environmental funds, these actors hold considerable sway.

One of the first activities to take place under the NEAP, and a condition forWorld Bank environmental funds disbursement, was the creation of the AssociationNational Pour le Gestion des Aires Protegees (ANGAP) (National Association forthe Management of Protected Areas)5 to oversee and coordinate the existing parksand proliferating donor-supported international conservation and developmentprojects (ICDPs). In the late 1980s, donors, particularly the US Agency forInternational Development (USAID), began funding ICDPs and by the time of theNEAP launch, Madagascar had 36 protected areas (Kull 1996). By the president’s2003 announcement, the country had 46 national parks, nature reserves and specialreserves covering 1.7 million ha (ANGAP 2003). Until the 1990s creation ofANGAP, the forest service managed both production and conservation zones,although it generally lacked the wherewithal to enforce its own regulations, due tomutually reinforcing lack of capacity and corruption. ANGAP was set up so thatdonors could fund it directly, and as such, its creation led to strained relations withthe underfunded forest service (Hufty and Muttenzer 2002, Montagne and Bertrand2006).

SAPM began under the environment program’s third phase, and its implementa-tion committees grew out of the already developed alliances. The remainder of thispiece tracks the role of state and non-state actors in the three key components ofterritorialization – the national processes of mapping, classifying and designatingresource uses – for two key protected areas in Madagascar’s eastern rainforest: theAnkeniheny-Zahamena and Fandriana-Vondrozo biological corridors, which wereestablished as temporary parks in 2005 and 2006, respectively. The details reveal howprivate sector interests, donors and transnational NGO actors were able to claimnot only rights to resources, but also the authority to decide the new rights andacceptable uses associated with the new protected areas. I commence with adiscussion of the negotiations around the 2003 announcement itself.6

5Now called Madagascar National Parks.6The material presented herein draws on document analysis, participant observation and 144semi-structured interviews conducted with former and current representatives of national,regional and local branches of the Madagascar government; foreign aid donors; internationalconservation and development NGOs; Malagasy NGOs; private sector companies; consultantgroups; and scientific organizations based in Antananarivo, the regional cities of Toamasinaand Fianarantsoa, and selected villages in the Ankeniheny-Zahamena and Fandriana-Vondrozo eastern rainforest corridors. Because of the sensitive nature of some of theinterviews, I agreed to protect confidentiality for all interviewees, and thus all information is


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Formulating the parks announcement

The composition of the ‘Malagasy’ delegation to the Fifth World Parks Congress,held in Durban, South Africa and where the former president made hisannouncement, reflected the sway of non-Malagasy state agents on Madagascar’sconservation policy. The group included government officials from the MadagascarMinistere de l’Environnement, Eaux et Forets (MINEnvEF) (Ministry of Environ-ment, Water and Forests) and ANGAP. Yet, as is common in delegations tointernational environmental meetings, it also contained NGO delegates fromorganizations such as the British Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust, Madagas-car-based conservation organizations Fanamby and l’Institut pour la Conservationdes Ecosystemes Tropicaux (Institute for the Conservation of Tropical Ecosystems)and transnational conservation NGOs Conservation International (CI), World WildFund for Nature (WWF-Madagascar), and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), aswell as the representatives from USAID and the World Bank. A subgroup of thisdelegation formulated President Ravalomanana’s announcement of his intention totriple Madagascar’s protected areas.

Prior to the president’s announcement, NGO representatives and governmentofficials huddled in a hotel room, debating the details of an announcement thatwould attract international attention and foreign aid, as well as expand theconservation agenda to forests then under forest service management.7 The ultimateannouncement proposed tripling Madagascar’s protected areas, in order to meet theIUCN target. In making it, Ravalomanana underscored that the new protected areaswould adhere to the IUCN protected area guidelines, which delineate sevencategories ranging from parks that prohibit human entry to those that allowsustainable use,8 and thus would not all be exclusionary parks.

In the days that followed, two events reinforced the authority of non-state actorsto influence the SAPM process. The first was the policy decision, in line with IUCNprinciples and in recognition that neither the forest nor parks service had thecapacity to manage additional parks, that NGOs, the private sector, and ‘localcommunities’, in addition to ANGAP, could manage the new parks (CommissionSAPM 2006). The second was the creation of the ‘Durban Vision Group’ (whichlater became ‘The SAPM Commission’) to coordinate various implementingorganizations. The official executive steering committee included only Madagascargovernment officials (Pollini 2007). However, the environmental officer for USAID-Madagascar and the Director General of the Malagasy National Environment Officeled its technical secretariat, which administered the specifics of the program

reported anonymously in that sources are identified only by general position; village identitiesare kept confidential; and interview dates are not revealed.7Interviews with an international conservation NGO representative and a former seniorMadagascar government official.8The most recent version of the IUCN’s system of categories for protected areas includes sevencategories of protected areas: Category Ia: Strict nature reserve/wilderness: for science orwilderness protection; Category Ib: Wilderness area: for wilderness protection; Category II:National park: for ecosystem protection and recreation; Category III: Natural monument: forconservation of specific natural features; Category IV: Habitat/Species Management Area: forconservation through management intervention; Category V: Protected Landscape/Seascape:for landscape/seascape conservation or recreation; Category VI: Managed Resource ProtectedArea: for the sustainable use of natural resources (Dudley and Phillips 2006).


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and oversaw several working groups9 that were responsible for various aspects ofSAPM’s implementation (Commission SAPM 2006). Through these workinggroups, Madagascar government representatives, foreign aid donors, consultants,scientists and national and transnational conservation NGOs oversaw thedevelopment of legal and management guidance, as well as the creation of theSAPM maps. They drafted, shared, marked up and finalized guidance, policies, andlaws that were ultimately issued officially by the Madagascar government.

Processes of territorialization: mapping boundaries

The idea to expand the number of parks in Madagascar was not new, and increasingparks was one of the overall objectives of the NEAP’s third phase. Years ofadvocacy by scientists and policymakers to expand Madagascar’s park network toinclude representation of all the country’s major ecosystems preceded the Durbanannouncement. Nicoll and Langrand (1989) had proposed the expansion ofMadagascar’s protected area network to ensure that Malagasy biodiversity wasfully represented in the 1980s. In April 1995, the Global Environment Facilityfunded a major scientific workshop in Madagascar, which concluded that asignificant portion of conservation and research priorities were located outside of theexisting parks (Hannah et al. 1998), and which led to subsequent efforts to expandthe park network. USAID then funded a park expansion planning exercise thatculminated in a National Protected Area Management Plan entitled PlanGrap,which proposed additional sites for protected status (ANGAP 2003). An ensuingbiodiversity priority setting exercise, entitled Reseau de la Biodiversite deMadagascar, or REBIOMA, in turn developed maps to help policymakers identifyconservation priorities by overlaying Geographic Information Systems (GIS) layersof estimated animal and plant species ranges with estimated threat levels(Randrianandianina et al. 2003, Kremen et al. 2008).

Reflecting the interests and expertise of the donors, NGOs and scientists engagedin these endeavors, none of these exercises incorporated substantial socioeconomicdata, such as where people lived or what environmental resources they used for theirlivelihoods. Thus, when the SAPM process began, policymakers had considerableinformation about forest biodiversity, but very little information about how ruralpeasants used forest resources. While there were regional and local efforts to mapcommunity conservation sites and differentiated land uses, the resulting nationalprotected area maps were based solely on biodiversity priorities and in effect, theyerased inhabitants, their livelihoods, and their existing community-managed areasfrom the targeted landscapes (Corson 2011).

Furthermore, the Durban announcement sped up the process of park expansion,increased its extent, and brought international and national political pressure to bearon it. As one senior Madagascar governmental official recounted, ‘The original planwas to increase protected areas by 6–7% with no limit on the time frame, but then[the conservation] organizations pushed for 10% in five years’. In this manner, the

9The Durban Vision Group oversaw five technical groups: 1) management and categorization,which was responsible for setting up a management system consistent with the IUCNguidelines; 2) biodiversity prioritization, which continued the biodiversity prioritization work;3) communication, which coordinated communication with regional and central authoritiesand the general public; 4) legal framework, which developed legislation relative to theprogram; and 5) funding.


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national politicians, foreign donors, and NGOs who wanted to implement theprogram rapidly drew on the aforementioned scientific studies to legitimate theirexpansionist ideas.

The territorialization of Madagascar’s forests under SAPM began, followingVandergeest and Peluso’s theory, with the creation and mapping of land boundaries.Specifically, it commenced with two government orders and accompanying maps,and their negotiation reflected the informal and formal negotiations among state,not-for-profit, and private entities that characterize the neoliberal state. In short,these orders and maps catalyzed competition among mining companies, mayors,transnational conservation NGOs, villagers, foreign aid donors, the forest service,the park service, and many others to stake claims on paper to Madagascar’sremaining forests.

Immediately after Ravalomanana’s announcement, and in an effort to protecttheir own interests, mining and timber extractors rushed to exploit forest lands thatmight become national parks. They used legal and illegal means, both workingthrough the formal permitting process and simply exploring without permits.10 Inreaction, donors and NGOs urged the government to halt new mining and timberpermits in any potential new protected areas until the parks could be established.Scientists who had been working on the biodiversity prioritization exercise weresuddenly catapulted into the limelight, as policymakers scrambled to put together amap that would show the locations of new protected areas. The resulting order,issued by the government in October 2004, suspended all mining and timber permitsfor two years in any area proposed for protected status, as defined by anaccompanying map, which had been created in the aforementioned biodiversityprioritization exercises (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2004c). This new territoryincluded the vast majority of Madagascar’s forests, and the order was to be renewedevery two years.

The hastily constructed map frustrated both mining and conservation advocates.Representatives of mining firms complained that the map creators had usedinaccurate GIS data that included un-forested, low biodiversity areas. Conserva-tionists retorted that certain high priority biodiversity areas had been excluded, thusleaving these areas to the mercy of mineral extractors.11

Thus began a series of both informal and official negotiations betweeninternational conservation NGOs and mining companies.12 In some cases, NGOrepresentatives and mining agents made informal joint field visits to contestedareas to ground-truth the map and negotiate new boundaries.13 In other areas, largemining companies, like Dynatec and QIT Madagascar Minerals, agreed to set asidealternative areas as private reserves and/or contribute to the donor-fundedBiodiversity Trust Fund in an effort to have ‘a net positive effect on biodiversity’

10Interviews with a conservation NGO representative, a bilateral donor official, and a foreignscientist.11Interviews with mining and international conservation NGO representatives.12The mining industry in Madagascar comprises two sub-sectors: the large-scale mining sector,which focuses primarily on various industrial ores, and the small-scale informal, unregulatedgemstone mining sector. The vast majority of mining takes place in the small-scale, informal,unregulated mining sector in Madagascar. Both illegal and legal mining are expanding rapidlyin Madagascar (Bilger 2006). The negotiations referred to in this section are betweenconservation NGOs and large-scale mining companies.13Interviews with mining and international conservation NGO representatives.


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(Sarrasin 2006). These biodiversity offset initiatives were one mechanism by whichSAPM facilitated private capital accumulation from formerly public land byproviding an avenue for ‘socially-acceptable’ resource extraction (Corson 2010).

These informal dialogues between conservation and mining interests paralleledthe official negotiations that took place under the Comite Interministeriel des Mineset des Forets (Inter-ministerial Mining and Forest Commission), which wasestablished in 2004 to coordinate between the Ministry of Energy and MinEnvEFspecifically to mediate conflicts where mining permits had been granted inenvironmentally sensitive areas (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2004a, 2004b). Priorto the 2004 order, the Bureau du Cadastre Minier (Office of Mining Registration)had issued mining permits in many of the areas claimed for SAPM, and it hadcontinued to grant mining permits in these areas after 2004.14 In their nationalanalysis of the overlap between mining concessions and protected areas, Cardiff andAndriamanalina (2007) found that mining concessions, primarily for researchpermits, overlapped with 33% of the surface area that had been slated for protectionin 2005 and 21% of that planned for 2006 and that the overlap had increasedbetween 2005 and 2006. In the Fandriana-Vondrozo corridor specifically, regionalSAPM committee members discovered in 2006 that mining permits had already beengranted in four-fifths of the areas slated for protected status.15 The 2006 order thatestablished the Fandriana-Vondrozo corridor as a new protected area attemptedto resolve this conflict by stating that permits granted before the October 2004prohibition of mining and logging in new protected areas would be honored,although owners would have to conduct environmental impact assessments (EIA)before proceeding (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2006).

Through these informal and formal means, the state, NGOs, and miningcompanies negotiated the boundaries and rights associated with the new parks. Theefforts ultimately minimized the extent to which the expansion of protected areasinterfered with the rapidly expanding mining industry.

During these discussions, interviewed peasants living the Ankeniheny-Zahamenaand Fandriana-Vondrozo corridors expressed very little, if any, knowledge aboutSAPM. The limited community engagement that occurred took place at the mayorallevel, where the effort to meet the five-year deadline superseded consultation effortswith villagers themselves, and some consultation leaders and/or Antananarivo-basedSAPM leaders suppressed mayoral dissent (Corson 2011). Two Malagasy villagers,who were aware of the program because they had been asked to give up part of theirland for an associated reforestation project, angrily conveyed their powerlessness inthe face of externally driven conservation efforts. One described the so-calledconsultation process: ‘Yesterday the land was marked here by the government. Therewas no discussion with the owner’. Another articulated the lost land’s immeasurableworth as an asset for his/her family’s future livelihoods (and wealth). Although noofficial compensation had been offered, s/he argued, ‘Even 100 million ariary is notenough for one hectare because we earn our living from this land forever . . . I wouldnot be here if my ancestors had done that’.

Many regional governmental and non-governmental actors anticipated futureprotests; a Direction Generale des Eaux et Forets (DGEF) regional agent expressedconcern for his/her own safety: ‘If we set limits . . . fast without consultation, it will

14Interviews with contractors and a regional Madagascar government official.15Interviews with regional international conservation NGO representatives.


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be us – field agents – who will become victims of the people’. A USAID consultantreport, written four years later in 2010, summarized upon reflection about the entireprocess: ‘Among many rural people SAPM gained an early reputation for beingtop-down and largely engineered by outsiders. This has bred skepticism and hostilitythat will be difficult to overcome’ (Freudenberger 2010, 47). While the processalienated some peasants, such as the two described above, directly and immediatelyfrom the sources of their livelihoods, others will be primarily affected by the resourceuse restrictions described below. Either way, I contend that it was theirmarginalization from decision-making processes – from the authority to determineboundaries, resource rights and acceptable resource uses on their customary land –that represented the ultimate dispossession.

It is important to remember that the state was not unified in its territorial claims.In 2006, as the government prepared to renew the 2004 two-year protection order foranother two years with a revised and improved map that incorporated the outcomeof these negotiations, the DGEF added a new twist. In an attempt to reclaim forestland for production, the DGEF protested that SAPM’s overwhelming focus onconservation ignored the need to protect timber and fuel wood supplies. A formerDGEF official summarized: ‘The forestry administration is terrified that if thisexpansion of the protected area turns out better, it will be the ANGAP who will haveall the forests of Madagascar’. With assistance from USAID Jariala, a forest sectorreform project managed by US contractor The International Resources Group, theDirector-General of Water and Forests proposed that the SAPM maps also include‘sites of sustainable development’, entitled ‘KoloAla’,16 that would promote‘development through sustainable use of timber and non-timber forest resources’.The result was the addition of sites of sustainable forest management in the renewalof the 2004 order.

Before turning to the 2008 renewal of the order, I explore the next twocomponents of Vandergeest and Peluso’s (1995) theory of territorialization: theallocation of rights and the designation of specific resource uses within specifiedterritorial bounds. The discussion reveals how the claims and counterclaims amongstate and non-state actors not only reflected struggles over material resources, butalso entailed ideological conflicts about the role of sustainable resource use inconservation. Ultimately, despite its claims of recognizing local rights, SAPMlegitimated the authority of consultants, private companies, scientists, transnationalconservation NGOs, and foreign aid donors to shape Madagascar’s future forestpolicy, including who could accumulate from them and how.

Processes of territorialization: determining rights and acceptable uses

As new borders were being gazetted, government agencies, foreign aid donors, andconservation NGOs based in the capital city Antananarivo engaged in lengthydebates over the extent to which peasants who lived in and around the new parksshould be able to use resources within them. In general, interviewed SAPMcommission members agreed that villagers living in and around the parks should notbe allowed to exploit forests to the detriment of the biodiversity contained therein.Most also thought that local residents needed ‘economic incentives’ to preserveforests.

16In Malagasy, this can be translated as ‘Tending the forest’.


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However, members of the group fought over the degree to which and where useshould be allowed, and they disagreed as to what exactly the economic incentivesshould be. While it is difficult to categorize the complexity of views of differentmembers in a short article, they fell generally into two groups. Relatively strictconservation advocates, typified by CI and WCS, urged that rights be limited totraditional, noncommercial use. They asserted that if communities were permittedto engage in economic activities, they would not be able to stand up to theeconomic and political power of timber and mining interests and the resultingcommercial extraction.17 Instead, these organizations advocated ‘biodiversityvaluation’, where sales of medicinal plants, ecotourism, carbon credits, andpayments for environmental services would compensate villagers directly for thereduction in their ability to meet their livelihood needs due to park restrictions.They pushed the SAPM initiative toward strict ‘sites de conservation’ orconservation sites, which would forbid any other form of commercial exploitationwithin park boundaries.

The countering view was represented by a coalition comprised of GermanCooperation, French Cooperation, the Malagasy organization Service d’Appui a laGestion de l’Environnement (Environmental Management Support Service, aprivatized state organization), the United Nations Educational, Scientific andCultural Organization, the United Nations Development Program, and WWF.This group argued that small-scale (as opposed to industrial) commercialextraction would motivate peasants to protect forests and could be managedsustainably under strict management plans that the DGEF, NGOs or otherorganizations providing technical assistance could approve. Specifically, the DGEFand French Cooperation put forth a concept called Le Territoire de Conservation etDeveloppement or ‘Development and Conservation Territory’, which advocatedcore sites protected for biodiversity and surrounding areas for use and whichcoincided ideologically with IUCN category five (Pollini 2007). This idea circulatedamong SAPM committee members for several months before it became clear thatstricter conservation interests would prevail, at least in the short term, and theFrench and other pro-commercial advocates temporarily left the Durban Visionnegotiations in 2006.18

MinEnvEF officials mediated these groups, trying to preserve the financialbacking of primarily US-based conservationists, while advocating privately toallow community resource use and protect domestic economic mining and timberinterests (Pollini 2007). Many regional Madagascar government officials, as well asregionally-based conservation NGOs and contractors, were more open to theidea of allowing sustainable use of resources in the new parks than theirAntananarivo counterparts. They also argued that rural development andagricultural assistance to compensate small farmers for reductions in access toland and resources should accompany SAPM. Government officials across anumber of ministries and quasi government departments expressed frustration atthe overwhelming emphasis by the donor community, in particular the Americans,on conservation issues. One official complained, ‘It is repeated in the meetingsthat we first have to solve the primary problems of food security before thinking

17Interviews with international conservation NGO representatives.18Interviews with bilateral donor officials.


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of conservation . . . yet the donors worry first about conservation, calling[Madagascar] a global heritage’. Very limited aid funds for compensation camethrough during my time there.

According to a number of interviewees, visits by IUCN consultants toMadagascar in March and July 2005 were critical in breaking the stalematebetween the clashing parties over allowable use rights. The consultants emphasizedIUCN guidance on protecting human rights, reducing negative impacts on locallivelihoods and including local communities in the management of parks (Borrini-Feyerabend and Dudley 2005). In theory, the visits bolstered the sustainable useadvocates’ position, and SAPM Commission leaders took advantage of the visits tochange the name of the new protected areas from ‘conservation sites’ to a ‘systemof protected areas’, in an effort to underscore that strict conservation would notprevail.19

Nonetheless, as one interviewee argued, the IUCN consultants’ reminders to usethe broad range of IUCN categories also meant that all parties could defend theirpositions using any one of the categories, and strict conservation advocates remainedpowerful in the SAPM technical committees. The government’s decision to use theCode de Gestion des Aires Protegees (COAP) (Code for Managing Protected Areas)law to implement SAPM bolstered their influence. Originally passed as a law in 2001,the COAP established the legal framework for ANGAP, which had historicallymanaged all natural reserves, national parks, and special reserves. The COAPfocused only on state management of parks. In fact, it declared all protected areas asproperty of the state and forbade residing in parks without written permission. Itwas specifically incompatible with IUCN category five: while it allowed traditional,non-commercial resource use in park buffer zones in order ‘to satisfy a population’sbasic livelihood needs and cultural traditions’, it prohibited most human uses,including commercial exploitation, such as fishing, hunting and plant collectingexcept for scientific reasons or the state-determined ‘public good’, unless specificallyauthorized by individual park management authorities. Finally, it detailed variousminor and major crimes, punishable by exceptionally strict penalties, again unlessspecifically authorized by management authorities. At their most extreme, thesepenalties included hard labor of 20 years, a fine of one billion Malagasy francs(approximately US$100,000), or two years in prison (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara2001).

Despite the fact that, by focusing only on state managers and forbiddingcommercial resource use, the law contradicted SAPM’s ‘new and improved’approach to protected area management, the Minister for Environment, Water,and Forests did not want to introduce new parks legislation again, having just foughtin the national assembly and senate to pass the original legislation two years prior tothe Durban announcement.20 Instead the Ministry issued two decrets d’application(decrees) to address some of the COAP’s limitations. The first decree, issued inJanuary 2005, codified the policy that protected areas could be managed by entitiesother than the state – such as NGOs, the private sector, and ‘local communities’.

19Interviews with a Madagascar government official, an international conservation NGOrepresentative and a bilateral donor official.20Interviews with international conservation NGO representatives, a bilateral donor, and acontractor.


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It laid out the process that such agents had to go through in order to create a newprotected area (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005b). The second, published inDecember 2005, defined four new categories of protected areas in line with the IUCNcategories, including Nature Parks, Natural Monuments, Harmonious ProtectedLandscapes, and Natural Resource Reserves. Furthermore, while it did not explicitlyforbid commercial use, it stressed that, in Harmonious Protected Landscapes,extractive activities must be ‘traditional’ and that at least two-thirds of the area ofany Natural Resource Reserve should be in its ‘natural state’ (Repoblikan’iMadagasikara 2005a).

Most importantly, this legal guidance left the ultimate decisions about allowableresource uses within the new parks up to the individual entities putting together thepark management plans – likely to be, under the new governance regime,conservation NGOs or private businesses. Both decrees underscored that individualpark managers had the authority to determine acceptable uses, and neither decreespecifically challenged the COAP’s strict restrictions and penalties. In this manner,they strengthened, by default, the power of non-state agents to determine acceptablepeasant resource uses in Madagascar’s forests.

In 2008, the government renewed the 2006 order with an updated map ofprotected areas (Map 1); introduced a revised COAP law; and issued a series ofpolicy documents that both allowed limited commercial resource extraction andreinforced non-state powers. Not yet passed at the end of 2010, the new COAPsought to codify the delegation of management to public or private individuals ororganizations, and the 2008 order and policy guidance stated that a steeringcommittee, comprised of national and local government officials and other people‘chosen for their expertise’ would ensure compliance with regulations during parkcreation (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2008a, 2009b). These documents also allowedmanaged commercial resource use in the less restrictive park categories, subject toindividual park management plans and biodiversity levels, and they permittedcustomary usage (non-commercial) under certain conditions. However, if passed, therevised COAP would uphold prohibitions on burning, deforestation, taking of plantsor animals, and various other activities, subject to penalties of up to 100,000,000Ariary (US$50,000) or five years in prison (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2008c,2009a, 2009b). In short, these policies reinforced the authority of individual parkmanagers – whether they be state agencies, sponsoring donors, conservation NGOsor private companies – to not only manage parks, but also to determine whatconstituted compliance, ‘the maintenance of biodiversity’, and ‘sustainable use’ and,therefore, punishable violations.

Ironically, these policies also carved out a process whereby agents seeking toprofit from the exploitation of village lands could formalize their claims byparticipating in conservation. While protection from mining was one of the keyjustifications for the rapid implementation of SAPM at the beginning, the 2008order lifted the ban on mining and forestry, which had been set in 2004 andreiterated in 2006, for certain sites under the condition that EIAs be done for anymining and logging activities (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2008a). At the sametime, new implementation guidance on park establishment required that miningconsultations be held before community consultations and that miners be includedin community consultations (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2009b). Together, thesepolicies re-opened possibilities for new rounds of negotiation among conservationadvocates and miners, in which villagers, under conditions of unequal power


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relations with these agents, will likely lose rights to and control over theirresources.

In December 2010, the government passed two new orders, which renewed the2008 temporary protection order, streamlined some of the regulations, includedmore explicit restrictions on the use of resources in marine and coastal protectedareas, created an intergovernmental ‘SAPM Commission’, explicitly separated thesites of sustainable forest management from ‘protected areas’, and codified 171protected areas and sustainable forest management sites covering 9.4 million ha intotal (Repoblikan’ i Madagasikara 2010a). More ethnographic research is needed toanalyze the politics behind the 2008 and 2010 changes and therefore detailed analysisof these orders is beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, it is important tohighlight the dynamic nature of the negotiations over the authority to determine whocan access and benefit from Madagascar’s natural wealth. While the 2010 officialcreation of an intergovernmental commission may represent a move to reinstate statecontrol over the process of expanding protected areas, a recent World Bank

Map 1. 2008 Protected areas, showing Ankeniheny-Zahamena and Fandriana-Vondrozobiological corridors.


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document summarizes the continuing strong influence by transnational NGOs,working across international, national and regional scales, on Madagascar forestpolicy. Using numbers that exclude 2.5 million ha of sustainable forest managementsites, the report summarizes:

The protected area network in Madagascar [includes] 2.4 million hectares of nationalparks managed by Madagascar National Parks (MNP) and 4.5 million hectares of newprotected areas . . . that are being developed predominantly by NGOs (including CI,WCS and WWF) . . . Triggered by the Convention on Biodiversity Conference ofParties (CBD COP) in Nagoya in October 2010, informal discussions have recentlycommenced amongst the Government and NGOs as to the feasibility of increasingcoverage of the network to cover 16–18 percent of the country’s surface. (World Bank2011, 31)21

New forms of territorialization, authority and enclosure

The case of conservation in Madagascar illustrates how the process of expandingprotected areas – through mapping boundaries, establishing and enforcing newrights, and determining acceptable resource uses – is ‘state’ territorialization.Nonetheless, it also reveals a form of state territorialization negotiated throughhistorically-constituted, power-laden and transnational alliances among state andnon-state entities. By drawing on precedents established under the NEAP’s steeringcommittee, and in the vacuum of state legal, financial, and technical capacityreinforced under neoliberal downsizing, non-state actors were able to influencewho had access to and control of Madagascar’s forests. In this sense, SAPM’simplementation through political promises, policy decision-making committees, mapproduction, and ambiguous legal guidance reflected the uneven formal and informalpower relations among state and non-state actors that characterize neoliberalgovernance.

At the same time, through activities ranging from membership on the Malagasydelegation to the parks congress and the SAPM implementing committees toinformal negotiations, foreign and non-state actors also cemented their power andauthority to recognize the validity of particular claims to forest land. In this manner,the ‘state’ gave way to the consortium of state officials, foreign donors, transnationalNGOs, contractors and private sector agents who in turn served in its place. In short,SAPM not only recognized the claims of the forest service, foreign conservationorganizations and mining interests over those of rural peasants, it also legitimatedthe power and authority of these agents to determine the fate of Madagascar’sforests, and in doing so, delegitimized the power and authority of rural peasants tocontrol the source of their livelihoods and ultimately garner wealth from forestresources.

The territorialization that occurred via SAPM enclosed peasant commons,restricted rural peasant resource uses and enabled others to benefit from nature’scommodification instead. The restrictions on peasants’ ability to exploit resourcesfor commercial ends not only limited their current and future livelihoods and wealthpotential, but also secured the resources for others who could accumulate then or inthe future by exploiting natural resources or selling conservation success. In this

21This would meet the newly negotiated CBD target to protect, by 2020, at least 17 percent ofterrestrial and inland water, and 10 percent of coastal and marine areas.


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manner, SAPM created new opportunities for capital accumulation throughdispossession by privatizing parks, promoting biodiversity offsets, accommodatingmining interests, and enabling donors, government and NGOs to attract newinvestment by showcasing Madagascar’s park expansion as a conservation success(e.g. Rajaobelina et al. 2010).

Ultimately, the case study demonstrates the interrelationship of neoliberalismand territorialization through conservation enclosures and the growing power ofnon-state private and non-profit agencies over natural resources. It reveals how stateprocesses can be produced through unelected and unaccountable entities, dispersingboth claims to and power over natural resources and subjects across local, national,and international boundaries. Finally, it details how the state, and the variousorganizations acting as ‘the state’, served to facilitate private sector accumulationfrom ‘public resources’.

In 2009, Marc Ravalomanana was overthrown. Elected in 2002, he had embracedneoliberalism, instituting a number of policies designed to attract foreign capital andprivatize government services, and he had endorsed international conservationagendas. While many foreign donors suspended their aid to Madagascar in protest,foreign NGOs continued to operate there, and the official count of protected areasincreased from 3.5million newhectares at the end of 2008 (Repoblikan’iMadagasikara2009a) to a reported 6.9 million hectares plus 2.5 million sites of sustainable forestmanagement by the end of 2010 (Repoblikan’ i Madagasikara 2010a).

I assert that, rather than expanding potentially ineffective conservationterritories, conservationists should have focused instead on making the existingparks system effective for three key reasons. First, the new protected areas will likelyhave limited effect on biodiversity conservation. The 2009 exposure of considerableillegal logging in national parks in Madagascar (Global Witness and EIA 2009)revealed that the creation of parks on paper is insufficient to protect the country’sbiodiversity. Second, regardless of their conservation outcome, by restrictingresource uses and by limiting their ability to profit from resources, the new parkswill alienate many rural peasants from their livelihood sources and impede theirability to improve their standard of living. Third, and most important, the policyprocess of developing the parks has legitimated transnational and Antananarivo-based power and authority to control access both to forests and to the wealthgenerated from them. In sum, and in direct contradiction of the community-basedconservation initiatives that emerged in Madagascar in the 1990s and early twenty-first century and the rhetoric surrounding SAPM, it has delegitimized peasants’power and authority to control access to and benefit from Madagascar’s forests.

References

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Catherine Corson is an Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies at Mount HolyokeCollege. Her research focuses on neoliberal conservation, foreign aid politics, internationalenvironmental governance, institutional ethnography, and political ecology. She received herPhD in 2008 from the University of California at Berkeley, and her dissertation analyzed howvarious state, NGO and private sector actors influenced U.S. environmental foreign aid toMadagascar across local, national and international scales. She has master’s degrees fromCornell University and University College London and has conducted ethnographic fieldresearch in Zimbabwe, Madagascar and the United States on rural women’s microenterprisesand local peoples’ resource access in protected areas. Her current project entails the use ofcollaborative event ethnography to study the co-production of conservation knowledge andrelations of environmental governance at key environmental conferences. Prior to heracademic career, she worked for ten years as environment and development policy analyst andconsultant.


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http://www.cbd.int/2010-target/goals-targets.aspx

http://www.cbd.int/2010-target/goals-targets.aspx

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/goals&lowbar;2005/Goal_7_2005.pdf

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/goals&lowbar;2005/Goal_7_2005.pdf

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Territorialization, Enclosure and Neoliberalism (Corson, 2011)

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