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The Physics of Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and the Iraq confrontation LBL Institute for Nuclear Astrophysics  November 15, 2002 email: [email protected] http://muller.lbl.gov Richard A. Muller 
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The Physics of Terrorism,

Counter-terrorism,and the Iraq confrontation

LBLInstitute for Nuclear Astrophysics

November 15, 2002

email: [email protected]://muller.lbl.gov

Richard A. Muller

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S ome of my experience on U S security:Jason Consultant 1972-2002

DoD, DoE, FBI, CIA, N S A, Army, Air Force, Navy3-4 weeks during summers, 2-4 weeks rest of year

reports on technical aspects of counter-terrorism (last 15 yr)

tracking terrorists, finding hostages, remote x-ray,

radiological weapons, nuclear power security, «summer of 2001: UBL!!

Technical aspects of S pecial Operations Forces (PI)

Technical aspects of Navy S eals (PI)

Advisory team: bugging of U.S

. Embassy Building in MoscowDoD special report: Did S outh Africa test a nuclear weapon?

US National Academy: Technical aspects of arms control

(with S oviet Academy, including S akharov!)

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September 112001

S eptember 11, 2001 - a date which willlive in infamy - the United S tates of America was suddenly and deliberatelyattacked by an anonymous terrorist forcethat issued no demands.

They have awakened a sleeping

giant and have instilled in him aterrible resolve

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W hat explosives did they use?

How did they smuggle them on board?

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My only complicated chart for the evening

o bject Cal o ries in o ne gram c o mpared t o TNTgasoline 10 15chocolate chip cookies 5 8

bullet (moving at speed of sound)

0.01 0.015

methane gas (CH4) 13 20

battery (flashlight) 0.01 0.015 battery (computer) 0.1 0.15hydrogen gas (H 2) for fuel cell 26 40TNT by convention* 1 (see footnote *) 1.5real TNT (trinitrotoluene) 0.651 1modern High Explosive(PETN)

1.06 1.6

Nitroglycerin (in dynamite) 1.59 2.44meteor (at 30 km/sec) 100 154uranium-235 20,000,000 30,000,000

*For weapons limitations treaties, 1 gram of TNT is defined as have 1 Cal.Thus, for example, an explosion that releases an energy equivalentof one ton of TNT will be a million Calories, i.e. a megaCalorie.

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Until they took over control of the planes, the

hijackers had done nothing illegal.Box cutters were allowed.

There was NO failure of airport security.

Guns weren¶t necessary: pilots had instructions tocooperate.

(This policy had saved lives and airplanes in prior hijackings!)

S eptember 11, 2001: the last hijacking of a plane in the U S .

(I made this prediction on 9-11-01.)

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U. S. use of f uel-air weap o n inAf ghanistan

Blu-82 Daisy-cutter

15,000 lb gasoline = 7.5 tons

originally developed to create helicopter landing area in Viet Nam jungle

equivalent to 112 tons of TNT =

1% of Hiroshima bomb

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understanding the terrorist mind

W hat did Osama bin Laden want?W hat were his goals?

What was his expected scenario?

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bin Laden¶s scenario (2001)

al Qaeda successful attack on U S (W TC, Pentagon, W hite House)

Osama bin Laden: credit for another miracle -- first Russia, now U S !

US attacks Afghanistan

Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Iran enter war against U S ´

US is bogged down -- U S bodies pile up ´

hatred of U S spreads throughout Muslim and Arab worlds ´

US

withdraws (after about 1 year)´

Public says, ³Never again fight in Mid-East. No blood for oil. ´ ´

Osama takes over S audi Arabia as new king ´

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It¶s tough to be a terrorist«S mart plan / low quality of suicide volunteers

Mohammed Atta: threatened the life of U S DA official

Richard Reid: couldn¶t ignite his own shoe

Jose Padilla: former Chicago street thugZacarias Moussaoui: flunked quizzes, didn¶t want to learn landing

crème de la crème? No -- l¶écume de l¶écume

destroyed infrastructure

Virtually no sanctuaries

High secrecy is now a weakness. Is it safe? W hom do you call?

Charismatic leader has disappeared. (Almost certainly dead.)

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W hat could terrorists still do?

small airplane attack on stadium

simultaneous explosions in checked baggage

attacks in other countries (Indonesia)

one person uncoordinated attacks

shoe bomber

sniper? anthrax?

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Onion: Passenger ban

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W hy not just install explosivedetectors at every airport?

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limitatio

nsof

explo

sive detectio

ninterior detection ± currently based on high nitrogen in most explosives ± high false alarm rate (one in twenty) from leather ± search luggage, or destroy it? ± not usable now. In future: electric quadrupole resonancehigh resolution x-ray ± look for wiring pattern ± check computers carefully

± currently in use on selected flightssniffers ± detects trace material on the outside of the luggage or on person

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Explosives sniffers: ion mobility spectrometers

But « there is no adequate way to detect explosives!

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Useful measures

Useless measuresconfiscate nail files, scissors, knives at airport

air marshals on flightsarm pilots

federalization of airport security workers

keep first-class curtains open in airplanes

associate passenger with luggage

check shoes

restrict passengers in terminalethnic/religious etc. profiling

international police work

infiltrate terrorist groups

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No w: Iraq & al Qaeda

simultane o usly

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easy prediction:

S addam will NOT allow inspections.

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Full-scale replica of Nagasaki bomb

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This was built! All it required (in 1991) was U-235.

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Calutrons at Tarmiya

Iraqi watch: At the time of the Gulf war, eight 1200mm units were in limitedoperation at Tarmiya, and preparations had begun for a second group of seventeen1200mm separators. According to Iraq's declarations to U.N. inspectors, it managedto produce 640 grams of enriched uranium with an average enrichment of 7.2% atTuwaitha and some 685 grams at an average enrichment of 3% at Al Tarmiya.

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former Iraqi Calutron (UN photo)

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CalutronsIAEA Hans Blix report on Iraq inspections

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Diamonds and U-235

W hat people pay for gem quality diamonds:

$5000 per carat =

$ 12,000,000 per lb

W hat S addam paid to obtain U-235 for his bomb:

$144,000,000 per lb

F or the right customer, U-235 is worth12 X the value of gem quality diamonds

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Is U-235 available?

K azakhstan 1995

ship remaining U-235 to RussiaQualify for benefits of 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty1996: Oops « they find another 450 lb

Turkey 2001Istanbul police seize 2 lb U-235 from smugglersAsking price: $750,000W hy so cheap?W hat fraction has been intercepted?

(Atom bomb requires about 20 lb)

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W hat c o uld Saddam d o with o ne b o mb?

put in shipping container and send to U S

drive it in truck to W ashington DCexplode itannounce that he was responsible

threaten to attack another U S city unless wewithdraw from Mid-East

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U S invasi o n

of Iraq (50%)of Baghdad (25%)

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K ey techn o lo gies

of the c o ming war

RPV -- remotely-piloted vehicles

(also known as ³UAV´ -- unmanned air vehicles)

IR -- infrared vision and night warfare

S AR -- ³synthetic aperture´ radar imaging

³W e own the night!´(motto of the U. S . S pecial Operations Forces)

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W hen the Pioneer came over Faylaka Island, near Kuwait City, the defenders heard the obnoxious sound emitted by thetwo cycle engine, because the air vehicle was intentionally being flown low to let the Iraqis know that they weretargeted. Recognizing that with the "vulture" overhead, there would soon be more of those 2000 pound naval gunfirerounds landing on their positions with the same accuracy, the Iraqis made the right choice and, using handkerchiefs,undershirts, and bed sheets, they signaled their desire to surrender. The remote pilot called his commanding officer and

asked, ³ S ir, they want to surrender. W hat should I do with them?´

Pioneer unmanned air vehicle (UAV)

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Predator

Primary Function: Airborne surveillance reconnaissance and target acquisitionC ontractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems IncorporatedPower Plant: Rotax 914 four cylinder engine producing 101 horsepower Length: 27 feet (8.22 meters)

Height: 6.9 feet (2.1 meters)Weight: 1,130 pounds ( 512 kilograms) empty, maximum takeoff weight 2,250 pounds (1,020 kilograms)Wingspan: 48.7 feet (14.8 meters)Speed: Cruise speed around 84 mph (70 knots), up to 135 mphRange: up to 400 nautical miles (454 miles)C eiling: up to 25,000 feet (7,620 meters)Fuel C apacity: 665 pounds (100 gallons)Payload: 450 pounds (204 kilograms)System C ost: $40 million (1997 dollars)

Inventory: Active force, 48; ANG, 0; Reserve, 0

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Thursday, February 7, 2002

CIA missile said to kill suspected al Qaeda leader

WASHINGTON - A missile fired by remote control from a pilotless CIA aircraft has hitwhat was believed to be a group of senior al Qaeda members in southeasternAfghanistan, killing at least one of them, U.S. officials said on Wednesday.

"It was a CIA Predator missile that was fired upon what was thought to be a senior al Qaedaofficial," said the official, who asked not to be identified. He said the attack took place on Mondaynight.

"At least one was killed and possibly others. It's not clear who the individual was," the official said,adding that bad weather in the region had prevented a mission to identify bodies.

The al Qaeda leader who was killed in the attack was taller than the handful of others surroundinghim, leading to some speculation about whether the United States may have hit its most wantedman in the war on terrorism -- Osama bin Laden.

Bin Laden, whose height is estimated on the FBI's most wanted terrorist list to be 6 feet 4 inchesto 6 feet 6 inches (193 cm to 198 cm), is blamed by the United States for the Sept. 11 attacks onAmerica that killed about 3,000 people.

But another U.S. official said several al Qaeda leaders were tall, including Ayman al-Zawahri, binLaden's top lieutenant.

U.S. officials believe it was an al Qaeda leader because of the manner in which the others aroundhim were paying homage. "You can tell from overhead that one guy's the center of attention," theofficial said.

"The central figure had a close encounter of the worst kind with a Hellfire missile," he said.

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Terrorist killed inYemen

November 4, 2002

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Washington Nov 4, 3:07 PM (AP): U

Sforces killed a topassociate of Osama bin Laden in Yemen in a missile strike «

a U. S . official said Monday. Qued S alim S iman al Harethiwas one of several al Qaida members traveling by car innorthwest Yemen when a Hellfire missile struck it S unday,

killing him and five others. « U. S . counter-terrorism officialshave said that al Harethi, also known as Abu Ali, was alQaida¶s chief operative in Yemen « [He] is a suspect in the

bombing of the destroyer U SS Cole in Aden, Yemen, on Oct.12, 2000.

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Inf rared visi

on

S pecial Operations:

³ W e own the night!´

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Q uickTime and a Sorenson Video decompressor are needed to see this picture.

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Q uickTime and a Sorenson Video decompressor are needed to see this picture.

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Q uickTime and a Sorenson Video decompressor are needed to see this picture.

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night vision

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R adar

isn¶t what it used to be«.

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Predator UAV

carries S AR radar

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Predator Tactical S yntheticAperture Radar

resolution: 1 foot

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Global Hawk

Global Hawk operates at ranges up to 3000nautical miles from its launch area, with loiter

capability over the target area of up to 24 hoursat altitudes greater than 60,000 feet. It is capableof simultaneously carrying electro-optical (EO),infra-red (IR), and synthetic aperture radar (S AR) payloads, and is capable of bothwideband satellite and Line-Of- S ight (LO S ) datalink communications.

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JS TAR S

(Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System)modified Boeing 707-300

Jstars can gather and display broad anddetailed battlefield information as eventsoccur, and relay it in near-real time to the

Army's ground stations.

Radar includes SAR (synthetic apertureradar), wide area surveillance, moving targetindicator (MTI), fixed target indicator (FTI),and target classification. The antenna has a120-degree field of view covering nearly19,305 square miles (50,000 squarekilometers) and is capable of detectingtargets at more than 250 kilometers (morethan 820,000 feet).

In addition to being able to detect, locate andtrack large numbers of ground vehicles theradar has some capability to detect low, slow-moving airplanes, helicopters, and rotatingantennas.

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GA Lynx S ynthetic Aperture Radar

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W ill Baghdad be a pushover?

unfortunately NO

but maybe not for the reasons you think.

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the Danger massive use by S addam of biologicalweapons against U. S . troops, Israel,

S audi Arabia, and his own people

possible solution:

convince Iraqi troops andcommanders to disobey their

doomed leader

That is what Saddam believes prevented

the invasion of Baghdad.

Is it true?

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a little bit of Political S cience «

(for which I am not credentialed)

W ho will be our strongest allies inthe Persian Gulf region in 2004?

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\

Kuwait

AfghanistanIraq

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S ummaryLarge-scale terrorism unlikely in U S

Key threat comes from Iraq nuclear Hope: Iraqis hate S addam, will overthrow

Invasion -- mode will surprise most peopleDanger: Iraqi biological weapons

viewgraphs available athttp://muller.lbl.gov/TerrorismTalk.htm

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