Textbook Oblicon 1-225

7/27/2019 Textbook Oblicon 1-225

1/114

Art.

A]|t.

Allt.

Art.

Art.

Art.

Ari.

Art.

tut.

7448

7449

661

661

661

661

662

662

662

663

663

663

1451

1452

t453

t454

1455

1456

..................

Article

Applied...

Idem;

Prescriptibility

ofactions

to

enforce

trust

...

Idem;

id.

Period of

prescription......

.......................

.

ldem;

Laches

maY

bar

aclit-rn...

Idem;

Acquisition

of

property by trustee

through

prescription..........

..........

Idem;

Illustrative

cases.......

........

Lrt.

1457

663

663

664

665

666

667

677

TITLE I- OBLIGATIONS

CHAPTER

1

GENERAL

PROVISIONS

Article

1156.

An obligation

is a

juridical

necessity

to

give,

to

do or

not to

do.'

Concept of

Obligations.

-

Evidently,

the

above definition

of

an obligation

is

adopted

from Sanchez

Roman's

classic definition of

an

obligation as "thejuridical

necessity

to

comply with a

prestation."'

Manresa, on the other

hand,

defines

it

as

a "legal

relation

established

between one

person and

another, whereby the

latter

is

bound to

the

fulfillment

of a

prestation

which the

former

may demand

of

him."'

It must be observed,

however,

that

obligations

may

be

either

civil or

natural.n A

civil obligation

is

one

which

has

a

binding

force

in

law,

and

which

gives to

the

obligee or

creditor the

right

ofenforcing

it

against

the

obligor

or debtorin a court

ofjustice.

This

is the obligation

which is

defined in

At. 1156

of

the Code.

A natural obligation,

on

the other

hand,

is

one

which

cannot

be

enforced

by

action,

but which

is

binding on the

party

who makes

it in

conscience

and

according to

BOOK

IV

OBLIGATIONS

AND

CONTRACTS

'/4

Srrrrchcz

Iloman

5ll.

tB

lvl,i' lr

H,,,5th ljd.,

llk.

I,1r.2l.

rAl'l

l,l:l:t.

('rvil (

lxl'.


2/114

Art. 1156

the

natural

law.o

Thus, when

an

action

has

prescribed

in accordance

with the statute

of

limitations,

a

natural

obligation

still

subsists,

although

the

civil obligation

is

extinguished.

This

may

be

illustrated

by the

following

example:

IfA has a

right

of action, evidenced

by

a

promissory

note,

to collect one

thousand

pesos

from B, and

such

promissory note prescribes

after

the expiration of ten

years from

the time

it

accrues,o

although

the

latter

is

no

longer

bound

to

pay

the obligation

in

accordance

with the statute

of

limitations,

he

is

still

bound to

pay

in

accordance

with

equity

and

natural law.'

It

is,

therefore,

clear that

a

civil obligation

and

a natural obligation

may

be distinguished

from each other

as follows:

(1)

A

civil obligation

is

based

on

positive

law,

while a

natural

obligation

is

based

on equity

and

natural

law;

and

(2)

The former

is enforceable

in courts

ofjustice,

while the

latter

is

not.'

Requisites ofObligations.

-

An

obligation

has

four essential

requisites.

They

are:

(1)

A

juridical

or legal

tie,

which

binds

the

parties

to

the

obligation,

and

which may arise

from either bilateral

or unilateral

acts

of

persons;

(2)

An

active subject

known as the

obligee

or creditor,

who

can

demand

the

fulfillment of the

obligation;

(3)

A

passive

subject

known as the

obligor

or debtor,

against

whom

the obligation

is

juridically

demandable;

and

(4)

The

fact,

prestation

or service

which constitutes

the object

ofthe

obligation.'

The

form

in

which the

obligation

is

manifested

is

sometimes

added

as

a

lifth requisite.

As

a

general

ru1e,

however,

it

cannot

be

considered

as essential.

Obligations

arising from

law,

quasi-con-

tracts,

acts

or

omissions

punished

by

law, and

quasi-delicts

do

not

require any

form

whatsoever,

yet

there

can

be

no

question

regard-

53

Bouvier's

l,aw Dicti{)nllry,

2:i{}4

2i11)1,.

6Art.

I14,1, Civil

(lxl{

?Agoncillo

vs.

Javrcr,

ilt{

l'1,,1

.l:1.1.

Vrllrrrrrl vs

rArl.

142:1.

(

livil

lin|,

"()\n[i,'l\\nu

th

lB(tl,ltrlrt"r',

\','l

I

I,

lll

ORI,I(}ATIONS

llslrrrrLr.

7l l'hil,ll)

.

il

(

,rs|"".7ll'

l,i,l

.

1,

:l{l

GENER{

PROVISIONS

Art.

1156

ing

their validity

or binding

force.

It is only

in

obligations arising

from

certain

contracts

that it

becomes essential.

Thus,

in a con-

tract involving

a donation

of

personal

property

whose

value exceeds

P5,000.00,

the law requires

that

the

donation and the acceptance

shall be

made in wdting;'' in

a

contract

of sale

ofa piece

of land or

any interest therein through an

agent,

the

law

requires

that

the

authority

of

the

latter

shall

be in w ting;" in

a contract of

simple

loan

or

mutuum, the

Iaw

requires that any

agreement with rcspect

to

interest shall be

expressly

stipulated in

writing;"

in

a

contract of

antichresis,

the law

requires that the amount

of

the

principal

and

of the

interest shall be

specified

in writing;'

in

a

contract involving

a

donation

of

immovable

property,

the law requires

that

the dona-

tion shall

be

made

in a

public

document,

while the acceptance shall

be made either in the same deed

ofdonation

or in a separate

public

document;',

in a

contract

of

partnership

where

immovable

property

or

real rights

are

contributed

to

the

common

fund,

the

law requires

that the contract shall be

in

a

public

instrument

to

which an inven-

tory

of

the

propefty

or

real rights, sigrred by the

partners,

must

be

attached;''

in

a contract of chattel

mortgage,

the

law

requires

that

the

personal property

which

is

the subject matter of the contract

shall be

recorded in

the

Chattel Mortgage

Register as

a

security

lbr

the

performance

of an obligation;''

and in a contract

involving

the sale

or

transfer of large cattle,

the

law requires that the

sale

or

transfer shall

be

registered.,' Non-compliance

with

such

formalities

would

have

the effect

ofrendering

the

contract or agreement void

or

inexistent.

Classification

ofObligations.

-

The

following

is

the

primary

classification

of obligations under

the Civil

Code:

(1)

Pure and

conditional

(Arts.

1179-1192).

(2)

With

a

period

(Arts.

1193-1198).

(3)

Alternative and

facultative

(Arts.

1199-1206).

"'Art.

?48.

Civil

Code.

rrArt.

1874. Civil

Code.

rrArt.

1956, Civil

Code.

"Art.

21:i4.

(livil

(lodo.

rrArt.

749,

(livil (ixk'.

hArlr

l7?1, l?7:],

(livil

(irrL.

I'L/\rl

:a 1,1{1.

(:ivil (

l{'(1.

,S.n

1l:l

A(tN,,.

ll47i

Arl

li,8l.(

rvrllixi,


3/114

Art. 115ti

OBLIGATIONS

(4)

Joint

and

solidary

(Arts.

1207

-1222).

(5)

Divisible

and

indivisible

(Arts.

7223-1225).

(6)

With a

penal

clause

(Arts.1226-1230)

There

are, however,

other classifications

of

a

secondary

char-

acter

which

can be gathered

from

scattered

provisions of

lhe Civil

Code, such

as:

(1)

Legal,

conventional

and

penal;''

(2)

Real and

personal;'o

(3)

Determinate

and

generic;'u

(4)

Positive and

negative;'

(5)

Unilateral

and

bilateral;"

(6)

Individual

and

collectivef"

(7)

Accessory

and

principal."

The following,

on the

other

hand,

is the classification

of

obligations

according

to

Sanchez

Roman:'u

(1)

As to

juridical

qualitY:

(a)

Natural

-

when the

obligation

is in accordance

with

natural

law.

(b)

Civil

-

when

the obligation

is

in

accordance

with

positive

1aw.

(c)

Mixed

-

when the obligation

is

in

accordance

with

both

natural and

positive law.

r3Ads.

1158-1162,

Clivil

Code.

''Arts.

1163-1168,

Civil

Code.

:oArrts.

1163-1166.

Civil

Codc.

'?rAlts.

11G7-l16tt.

(livil (lodo.

"Arts

I

I69- l

l9l.

(

livil

('rrl

'?:rArts.

1207,

122:1,

(

'iv'l

(',xli'.

fi^rl.H.

I

l{j(;.

l2.Lti,

tt srr

,

('rvrl

I

\ri'

7"r'l

S,'rr'1r.1 ll,,Dur r :lll

llr

GENI.]RAI, PROVISIONS

Art.

1156

2.

As to

perties:

(a)

Unilateral and

bilateral

-

unilateral,

where

only

one

party

is bound, and

bilateral,

where

both

parties

are

mu-

tually

or

reciprocally

bound.

(b)

Individual

and

collective

-

individual, where

there

is only one obligor,

and

collective,

where

there

are several

ob-

ligors.

The latter

may

be

joint,

when

each

obligor

is

liable

only

for his

proportionate

share

of

the obligation,

or

solidary,

when

each

obligor

may

be

held

liable

for

the entire

obligation.

3.

As to

object:

(a)

Determinate

and

generic

-

determinate,

when the

object

is specific;

generic,

when the

object

is

designated

by

its

class

or

genus.

(b)

Simple and

multiple

-

simple,

when there

is

only

one

undertaking;

multiple,

when

there are

several

undertak-

ings.

Multiple

obligations

may

be

conjunctive,

when

all

of

the

undertakings

are

demandable

at

the

same time,

or distribu-

tive,

when

only

one

undertaking

out of

several

is demandable.

Distributive obligations,

on the

other hand,

may be alterna-

tive, when

the obligor

is allowed

to choose

one

out

of

several

obligations

which

may

be due

and

demandable,

or

facultative,

when

the obligor

is allowed

to

substitute

another

obligation

for

one

which

is

due

and demandable.

(c)

Positive

and

negative

-

positive,

when

the obligor

is

obliged

to

give

or

do

something;

negative,

when

the obligor

must refrain

from

giving

or doing

something.

(d)

Real

and

personal

-

real. when the

obligation con-

sists

in

giving

something;

personal,

when

the

obligation

con-

sists

in

doing

or

not

doing something.

(e)

Possible

and

impossible

-

possible,

when

the

ob-

ligation

is

capable

of

fulfillment

in

nature as

well

as

in

law;

impossible,

when

the obligation

is

not capable

of

fulfillment

either in

naturc

or in

law.

(fl

l)ivisible

rnd

indivisiblc

-

divisible,

when

the

obli-

girt.iorr

is strsccptiblc

ol

pitrl,iirl

pt'rlortnttnctr;

indivisible,

when

llrr,

olrligrr

l,iorr

is ttol.

sttst

r'pl ilrlt'

ol

prtrl.iirl pt'r'litrmance.


4/114

Art.

1157

OBI,ICATIONS

(g)

Principal and accessory

-

principal,

when it

is

the

main undertaking;

accessory, when

it

is merely

an

undertaking

to

guarantee

the

fulfillment

of the

principal

obligation.

4.

As

to

perfection

and extinguishment:

(a)

Pure

-

when the obligation

is not

subject

to

any

condition

or

term

and

is

immediately

demandable.

(b)

Conditional

-

when the obligation

is

subject

to

a

condition which

may

be

suspensive,

in which

case

the

happen-

ing

or

fulfiilment

of the condition

results in

the birth of the

obligation, or resolutory, in which case the happening or

ful-

fillment of the condition results

in

the extinguishment of the

obligation.

(c)

With

a term

or

period

(

a

plazo)

when the obligation

is subject to a

term

or

period

which

may

be suspensive

or

from

a

day

certain, in which

case

the obligation is

demandable

only

upon the expiration ofthe term,

or

resolutory

or

to

a

day

certain,

in

which

case

the obligation terminates

upon

the expiration

of

the

term.

Art,

1157.

Obligations arise

from:

l.

Law;

2.

Contracts;

3,

Quasi-contracts;

4,

Acts

or

omissions

punished

by

law;

and

5,

Quasi-delicts."

Sources

of Obligations.

-

ln

Roman

law, the

sources

of

obligations

are'.

(7)

contractu;

(.2)

quasi-contro.ctu;

(3)

maleftcio;

and.

(4)

quasi-maleficio.2,

These sources

are

preserved

in the Civil

Code

with

the addition of

law

or ftrge.*

The

addilion

of

lege

as an

independent

source

of obligations,

however, has been

criticized

as

theoretically

erroneous. Thus, according to

the

Supreme Oourt:

'dArt.

1089.

Spttnish

(iivil

(

l, k..

il ,,",,,",1' l

Ii,r',,

'j?8

M:rnr()sr,

5th

[i .,

I]k

l.

1r

:15

lr^rl

I ll'7,

(

liv'l

('rrl

GENERAL

PROVISIT)NS

Art. 1158

"This

enumeration

of

the sources

of

obligations supposes

that

the

quasi-contractual

obligation

and

the

obligation

imposed

by

law

are

of different

types.

The

learned Italian

jurist,

Jorge

Giorgi,

criticizes

this

assumption

and

says that

the classification

embodied

in

the

Code

is

theoretically

erroneous.

His

conclusion

is

that

one

or the other

of

these categories

should have

been suppressed and

merged in

the other.

(Giorgi,

Teorio

de

las ObLigaciones,

Spanish

Ed.,

VoL

5,

Arts.

5, 7,

9)

The

validity of

the criticism

is, we think,

self-evident and

it

is

of interest

to note

that

the

common law

makes

no

distinction

between

the

two sources

ol

liability. The obligations

which

in

the

Code

are

indicated

as

quasi-contracts,

as well

as those

arising

e.r lege, are

in the

common

law

system

merged into the

category of obligations

imposed

by law,

and all are

denominated

implied

contracts."'"

Art.

1158. Obligations

derived

from law are not

pre-

surned.

Only

those

expressly

determined

in

this

Code or in

special laws are demandable, and

shall

be

regulated

by

the

precepts

of

the

low which

establishes them;

and

as to what

has

not

been

foreseen, by

the

provisions

of

this

Book.'o

Obligations

Arising from

Law.

-

Unlike other

obligations,

those

derived

from law

can

never

be

presumed.

Consequently,

only

those expressly

determined

in the

Civil

Code

or

in

special

laws are

demandable.

These

obligations

shall

be

regulated by the

precepts

of

the

law

which

establishes

them, and as

to

what has

not

been

foreseen,

by the

provisions

of

Book

IV of the Civil Code.''

How

can

we

determine

whether an obligation

ariscs from

law

or

from some other

source, such

as

a

contract,

quasi-contract,

criminal

offense

or

quasi-delict?

It

must be

noted that in

the

birth or

generation

of

an obligation,

there

is

always

a

concurrence between

the

law which

establishes

or

recognizes

it and an act or condition

upon

which

the obligation

is based or

predicated.

According

to

Manresa, when the

law

establishes

the obligation and

the act or

condition

upon which

it is

based

is nothing

more

than

a

factor for

determining

the

moment when

it

becomes demandable,

then the

law

"r'lllrr11

ltorr vs. O'llrion,lln I'hil llt2

"'Arl

llrlll), Sprnish

(livil

(

l L

'LA'l

Ill'8

('rvil

(

(xll


5/114

Arf

I

I l-r9

OBI,(IATIONS

itsell is

the source ol the obligation;

however, when

the law merely

recognizes

or

acknowledges the

existence

of

an obligation

generated

by an act

which

may

constitute a contract,

quasi-contract,

criminal

oflense

or

quasi-delict

and

its

only

purpose

is to regulate such

obligation, then the

act

itself

is

the source

of the obligation and not

the

law.,'Thus,

ifA

loses

a

certain

amount

to

B in

a

game

ofchance,

according to

Art.

2014

ofthe

Civil Code, the former may recover his

loss

from

the

latter, with

legal interest from the

time

he

paid

the

amount lost. It is evident

that

in

this

particular

case the source of

the

obligation

of B

to rel'und

to

A the amount

which he had

won

from

the

latter

is not a contract,

quasi-contract,

criminal offense or

quasi-

delict,

but

the law itself.,'The

same

can

also be

said

with

regard to

the obligation

of

the

spouses

to

support each other,* the obligations

of employers under

the

Labor Code,,'the obligations

ofthe owners of

the

dominant and servient

estates

in

legal

easements,.'and others

scattered

in

the

Civil

Code

and in

special laws.

Art.

1159.

Obligations

arising

frorn contracts

have

the

force of

law

between

the

contracting

parties

and should

be

complied

with

in

good

faith,,'

Obligations

Arising

from Contracts.

-

A contract is

a

meeting

of

minds

between

two

persons

whereby

one binds himself,

with respect

to

the

other, to

give

something

ortorendersome

service..s

As

a rule, contracts are

perfected

by mere

consent,

and from

that

momcnt

the

parties

are bound not only to the

fulfillment

of

what

has

lrcen

expressly stipulated

but

also

to

all

of

the consequences

whiclr

according to

their nature

may

be

in keeping with

good

faith,

usage

and law."'

These

contracts

are

commonly

called consensual

contracts.

Once the

contract

is

perfected,

the valid contract

has

the

force of

law

binding

the

parties

to

comply

therewith

in

good

faith,

where

neither onc

may

renege therefrom without

the consent of the

olher.

(Tiu

Peck

us.

CA 221

SCRA 618

t19931)

There are certain

3'?8

Manresa.

Sth

Ed.,

Bk. 1.

p.48.

""Leung

Ben vs. O'Brien.

38

Phil. 182.

lArt

291.

(livil

(l.rdc;

Il'layo vs.

liruron.

12

I'hil.45;1.

ilr'l}rutista

vs.

l]('rlomr\).

:ll-)

S(

llt^

I lll

r,rArls

6iJ4

(iu? (livi1 ('rxk.

';Arl

1091. Sp"nisl'

('rtil

(

inl,..

r' lr,rlilirrl lirrnr

"Arl

l;l{15.

(

ivrl

(',r1,.

r'rArl

lrl lt

('ivrl (',r1,.

Arl.

I

160

contracts, however, called real

contracts, such as deposil,

pledge

and

commodatum,

which

are

not

perfected

until lhe delivery

of

the

object

ofthe

obligation."'

Whether

the

contract

is

consensual

or

real,

the rule is

that

from

the

moment

it

is

perfected,

obligations which

may

be either reciprocal or unilateral arise. Reciprocal obligations

are

those

where the

parties

are mutually or reciprocally

obliged to

do

or to

give something;

unilateral

obligations, on

the

other

hand,

are those where

only one of the

parties,

the

obligor,

is

obliged

to

do

or to

give

something.

Unlike

other

kinds

of

obligations,

those

arising from

contracts

are

governed

primarily

by

the

agreement

of

the

contracting

parties.

This

is

clearly

deducible

not only from

the

nature

of contracts,

but

also

from Art. 1169

of

the Code

which

declares that such obligations

have

the force of law

between the contracting

parties

and should

be

complied

with

in

good

faith. "Compliance

in

good

faith"

means

performance

in accordance with the

stipulations, clauses,

terms

and conditions of the contract.

Consequently,

the Code recognizes

the right

of such

contracting parties to establish

such

stipulations,

clauses,

terms

and

conditions

as

they may

deem

convenient,

provided

they

are

not

contrary

to

law,

morals,

good

customs,

public

order

or

public policy..'

Good

faith

must,

therefore,

be observed

to

prevent

one

party

from

taking unfair

advantage over

the

other

party.

In

the case of

Royal

Lines,

Inc.

us. Court

of

Appeals,

143

SCRA 608

(1986),

it

was ruled that evasion

by a

party

of legitimate

obligations

afier receiving the benefits under

the

contract would

constitute

unjust

enrichment on

his

part.

However,

in default ofan

agreement,

the rules found in the Civil Code regulating such

obligations

arc

applicable.0

Art.

f160. Obligations

derived

from

quasi-contracts

shall

be

subject

to the

provisions

of

Chapter

1,

Title XVII,

of

thie

Book.,''

Obligations Arising from

Quasi-Contracts.

-

Quasi-

contracts

are those

juridical

relations arising

from

lawful, voluntary

(iENERAI,

PRoVISI()NS

ioArt.

1316.

(livil (10d(l.

'rArt

l:l{)6.

(livil (lxl('.

'lArl

l:ll15,

r/

srrl

,(livil

tirk,


6/114

A

l

lfil

and

unilateral

acts, by

virtue

of

which the

parties

become

bound

to

each

other,

based

on

the

principle

that

no one shall

be

unjustly

enriched

or

benefited

at

the

expense ofanother."

The most

important

of these

juridical

relations

which are

recognized

and

regr-rlated

by the Civil

Code

are

negotiorum

gestion'

ar'd.

solutio indebiti.*

Negotiorum

gestio

is

the

juridical

relation which

arises

whenever a

person

voluntarily

takes charge

ofthe

agency or

management

ofthe

business or

property

ofanother

without

any

power

or authority

from

the

latter.'r In this

type of

quasi-contract,

once the

gestor

or

officious

manager

has

assumed

the agency

or

management

ofthe

business

or

property,

he shall be

obliged to

continue

such

agency

or

management

until the

termination ofthe affair

and its incidents,"

exercising

such

rights

and complying

with

such

obligations

as

provided

for

in

the

Code."

Solullo indebiti,

on

the

other hand, is

the

juridical

relation

which

arises whenever a

person

unduly delivers a

thing

through

mistake to

another

who has no right

to

demand

it.'"

In

this type of

quasi-contract,

once

the

delivery has been

made, the

person

to

whom

the delivery is unduly

made

shall

have

the obligation to

return the

property

delivered

or

the

money

paid.''

The

Civil Code

provides

other

instances

of

quasi-contract.

Examples

are

those

found

in

Articles

2159, 2164

to

217

5.

In

the case ofPerez us.

Palomar,2 Phil. 682,

it

was significantly

noted that

in a

quasi

contract

where

no express

consent

is

given

by

the other

party,

the

consent needed

in

a

contract

is

provided

by law

through

presumption

(presumptive

consent).

Presumptive

consent

gives

rise

to

multiple

juridical

relations

resulting in obligations for

delivery of the thing

and

rendering

of

service.

Art. 116l.

Civil obligations arising

from offenses shall

be

governed

by the

penal laws, subject

to the provisions

of

Article

2177, and of the

pertinent provisions

of Chapter

2'

OBI,IGATIONS

11Art.

2142. Civil

Code.

'5Art.

2144. Civil

Code.

'6Art.

2154.

Civil

Code.

a?Art.

2144.

Civil

Codc.

*Ibid.

ilArts.2144

2152.

(livil

(lrrl,

roArl

2154.

(livil (i'd'

lo

Arr

I1fiI

Preliminary

Title, on

Human Relations,

and of

Title XVIII of

this

Book, regulating

damages,5i

Obligations

Arising from Criminal

Offenses.

-

As a

rule,

every

person

liable

for

a

felony is

also

civilly

liable." This

principle

is

based on

the fact that,

generally,

a crime

has a

dual

aspect

-

the

criminal

aspect

and

the

civil

aspect.

Although these two

aspects

are

separate and

distinct

from each other in the

sense

that

one

affects

the

social order

and

the other,

private

rights,

so

that

the

purpose

of

the

first is

to

punish

or

correct the offender,

while the

purpose

ofthe

second

is

to repair the

damages

suffered by

the

aggrieved

party,

it

is evident

that

the

basis

of the

civil

liability

is

the

criminal liability

itself.

Please

note,

however,

that

there

are offenses

and special

crimes

without

civil

liability.

Examples are crimes of

treason, rebellion,

illegal

possession

of

firearm

and

gambling.

But a

person

who

is not

criminally liable

may still be

civilly

liable.

Idem; Enforcernent

of

civil liability.

-

In

general

and

prior

to the

Revised

Rules of Criminal

Procedure

2000,

the

following

rules are

obserwed

in

the enforcement

or

prosecution

ofcivil

liability

arising

from criminal

offenses:

(l)

Institution

of criminal

q.nd

ciuiL

octions.

-

When

a

criminal

action is

instituted,

the

civil action

for

recovery

of

civil

liability

arising

from the

offense

charged is

impliedly

instituted

with

the

criminal

action,

unless

the

offended

party

(i)

expressly waives

the civil action,

or

(ii)

reserves

his right

to

institute

it separately,

or

(iii)

institutes the

civil

action

prior

to

the

criminal

action.

(2)

Independent

ciuil

action.

-

In the cases

provided in

Articles

31,

32,33,34

and,2177

ofthe

Civil

Code ofthe Philippines,

an

independent civil action entirely

separate and

distinct from the

criminal

action, may be

brought by the

injured

party

during

the

pendency

of

the criminal case,

provided

the

right is reserved.

Such

civil

action

shall

proceed

independently

ofthe criminal

prosecution,

and

shall require only

a

preponderance

of evidence.

zArl

I(X)2, SpaDish

(livil (ixir,,

irr

rrrrrIrd,

rl Iirrm

r':r^r{

l(X). Itovisod I1'nrrl

(ixI'l'hisrrrlr',h,,wov.r,issrrbj,'cltofh{'rulesstated

in Arlx

lol,

l02 and

ll);i,

It,'vir{rl

l'(''url

(lxl".

GF]NI]RAI, PROVISIONS


7/114

Afi

1161

G)

Other

ciuil

ections

arising

lfint

ollenses.

-.ln

all

cases

not included

in

the

preceding

rules, the

fbllowing

rules

are observed:

(a)

Criminal

and

civil actions

arising

fiom the

same

offense

may be

instituted

separately, but

after

the

criminal

action

has

been

commenced, the civil

action cannot

be

instituted

until

final

judgment

has been

rendered

in the

criminal

action;

(b)

Ifthe

civil

action

has

been

filed

ahead ofthe criminal

action,

and

the

criminal

action is subsequently

commenced,

the

civil

action shall

be suspended

in

whatever

stage before

final

judgment

it may be

found, until

final

judgment

in criminal

action

has

been

rendered. However,

if no final

judgment

has

been

rendered by the

trial

court

in the civil action, the

same

may be

consolidated

with the

criminal

action

upon

application

with

the

court

trying

the

criminal

action.

If

the

application

is

granted,

the

evidence

prevented

and admitted

in the civil

action shall be

deemed

automatically

reproduced

in the

criminal

action, without

prejudice

to the

admission of

additional

evidence

that

any

party

may

wish

to

present.

In

case

of

consolidation,

both

the criminal

and

the civil

action shall be

tried

and

decided

iointlv;

(c)

Extinction of the

penal

action does

not carry

with

it extinction

of

the civil,

unless

the

extinction

proceeds

from

a

declaration

in

a

finaljudgment that the

fact from which

the civil

might

arise

did

not

exist. In other cases,

the

person

entitled

to

the

civil

action

may

institute

it

in the

jurisdiction

and

in

the

manner

provided

by

law against the

person

who may

be liable

for

restitution of

the

thing

and

reparation or indemnity

for

the

damage

suffered.

Pursuant to Sec.

2, Rule III of the Revised

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure 2000, however,

it

is

stated

that

except

for

civil

actions

provided

for

in

Arlicles 32,

33,

34 and

2176

of the

Civil

Code, the

civil

action

which

has been

reserved cannot

be

instituted

until final

judgrnent

has been

rendered in the

criminal

action.

'lhe

action

contemplated,

as

pointed

out by

Justice

Oscar

Herrtrra

in

his

Treatise

on Criminal

Procedure,

is a civil

action

irrising

frttm

tt

crime

ifreserved

or

filed

separately and

it

trintinitl cirsc

is

lilotl il il hirs trr

be suspended

to

await

finrrl

.lrrdgntt'ttl

itt l.ltt't

ritttittitl itcl.iort.

The rule clrrrifit's

Lltrrl,,

'l)rrlrrr11

llrr'

pr'1trlr'ttcv

rrl

l.ltl

clitttitt:tl

action,

thr'

ltorirtrl

ol

lrtcrctilrltotr

ol

llrl

lrvil

ttcliotr

wlticlt

cttttttol

GEN ]RAI,

PROVISIONS

be instituted

separately or

whose

proceeding

has

been

suspended

shall

not

run."

Otherwise

stated,

the

period

ol

prescription

of the

civil

actions

under Section

3 ofthe

aforementioned

rules

shall

not be

suspended

because

they can

be instituted

separately.

This refers

to

civil actions

arising

from the

oflense

charged which

have not been

reserwed or

civil actions that

have

been

filed

ahead

r-rf

the criminal

action

but

have been suspended.

r'&

stice Oscar M.

Hetera,

Treatise

on

Historical

Deuelopment ancl

Highlights

of

AntencLment

of Rules

on

Criminal

Procedure,

February

2001).

(4)

Judgment

in ciuil

action

not

a bor.

-

A

linal

judgment

rendered

in

a

civil

action absolving

the

defendant

from civil

liability

is

no

bar

to

a

criminal

action.

(5)

Suspension

by

reason

ol

prejudiciuL questirtn.

-

A

petition

for

suspension

of the

criminal

action

based

upon

the

pendency

of

a

prqjudicial

question

in

a

civil

action

may be filed

in

the

office of

the

fiscal

(prosecutor)

or the

court

conducting

the

preliminary

investigation.

When

the criminal

action

has been

filed

in

court for

trial,

the petition

to

suspend

shall

be

filed

in

the

same

criminal

action

at

any

time

before the

prosecution rests.

Section

7

of the

Revised

Rules

of Criminal

Procedure

2000

provides

for

the

elements

of

a

prejudicial

question.

They are:

(a)

the

previously

instituted civil

action which

involves an

issue

similar

or

intimately

related

to

the

issue raised in the

subsequent

criminal

action,

and

(b)

the

resolution of

such

issue

determines

whether or

not

the

criminal action

may

proceed.

Section

T

limits

a

prejudicial

question

to

a "previously

insti-

tuted

civil action"

in

order

to minimize

possible

abuses by

the sub-

sequent

filing

of

a

civil action as

an

after thought

fbr

the

purpose

of

suspending

the

criminal

action.

(Justice

Oscar

M. Herrera,

Treatise

on CriminqL Procedure,

February 2001)

At a

glance,

therefore,

the

following are

lhe

salient changes

broughl

about

by

the

Revised

Rules of

Criminal Procedure

2000,

as

rnore

specifically

discussed

hereunder

by

Justice

Herrera

in

L'is

'l'reatise on

Crimintrl

Proccdure:

a.

The

rule

changes

thc 191J5 rulc as:rmended

in

1988.

llndor

tht:

l9lt5

Rtrlc, tht'it


8/114

Art.

1161 OBI,IGATTONS

from the same

act or omission are

deemed

impliedly

instituted

with

the criminal action

unless

the

oflended

party

waives

the

civil action,

reserves his right

to

institute

it

separately, or

institutes the civil action

prior

to

the criminal

action.

Under

the

present

rl.le,

only the

civil

liability

arising from

the

offense charged

is

deemed

instituted

with the

criminal

unless

the

offended

party

waives

the civil action,

reserves his

right

to institute

it separately, or

institutes the

civil

action

prior

to

the

criminal

action-

b.

Under the

former rule,

a

waiver ofany of three civil

actions

extinguishes the

others. The institution

o{

or

the res-

ervation

of

the right to file

any of said

civil

actions separately

waives

the

others.

This

is

no

longer

provided

for.

The reserva-

tion and waiver refers only to the

civil

action for the

recovery

of

civil

liability

arising fiom the offense

charged.

This

does

not

include

recovery

of

civil

liability

under

Articles

32,

33,

34 and

2176

ofthe Civil Code ofthe

Philippines arising from the same

act

or

omission

which

may

be

prosecuted separately

even

with-

out

a

reservation.

c.

The rulings

in

Shafer

us.

Judge, RTC of

Olongapo

City,

167

SCRA

376,

allowing

a

third-party complaint, and the

ruling

in

Jauier us.

Intermediate Appellate

Court,

171

SCRA

376,

as

well as Cabaero

us. Cantos allowing a

counterclaim

are

no

longer

in force.

Under the

2000 Rules, these

pleadings

are

no

longer

allowed.

Any

claim

which

could

have

been

the subject

thereof

may be

litigated in

a separate

civil

action.

d. The rule also incorporated

Circular

57-97 on the

filing

of

actions for

violation

of

Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22

mandating

the

inclusion of

the

corresponding

civil

action

for

which the

filing fee

shall

be

paid

based on

the amount

of

the

check

involved.

In

other cases,

no filing

fees shall be required

for actual damages.

Iden; Id.

-

Effect of acquittal.

-

If thc accused in a

criminal

action

is

acquitted

oflhe

offense

chargcd,

cirn

a

civil rrction

for damages based

on

the

same

ac:t

or

ornission

still hc

insl,i|utcd'?

This

question

requires a

tlualificd

irrrswor.

Il

l.hr' ;rcrlrril,Lrl

of't.ho

accused

is

bascd on

thc

grorrrr


9/114

Art t 16l OBT,I(}ATIoNS

With

regard to the first, it must

be

noted that where the civil

action is

based

on an

obligation not arising {iom the

act or omission

complained

of

as

a

criminal

offense

or

felony, such action

may

proceed

independently

of

the criminal action and

regardless of

the

result

of

the

latter."'

It is

evident

that in such case

the

basis of

the

civil

action may be

an

obligation arising

from

the

law, contract,

quasi-contract,

or

quasi-delict.

Thus, a

postmaster, who has

been

charged

criminally

for malversation

of government

funds

under

his

custody,

may still

be made

a defendant

in a

civil

case for the

recovery

of the

funds, not on

the

ground

of malversation,

but

on

the

ground

that under

Sec.

633 ofthe Revised Administrative

Code,

he

can be

held

accountable therefor.o'

The

basis

of the

civil action

in such

case

is not

the

obligation arising from the criminal

offense

of

malversation, but the obligation arising

from the law. Similarly,

if

a

passenger

in a certain bus

institutes

a

civil

action

to

recover

damages

from the operator of the

bus

line

for injuries

sustained

in

an

accident, such

action is

separate

and distinct from the criminal

prosecution

ofthe driver

for

criminal

negligence and

may, therefore,

be continued regardless

of the

result

of the

latter.

Consequently,

he

can

still

recover damages even

if the driver

is

acquitted

in

the

criminal

action. because it

is

clear

that

the action

in

such

case

is

based on culpa

contractuol

and

not

on

the

act

or

omission

of

the

driver

complained ofas

felony.d,

The

same

principle

is also

applicable

if

the offense

charged constitutes

what

is

known as culpa aquiliana

or

quasi-delict

under the

Civil Code.u' In such

case, the

injured

party

can

always

institute

a

civil

action to

recover damages independently

of

the

criminal

action and regardless

of the

result

of

the

latter. This

is so even

granting

that

the

accused

is

acquitted in the criminal

action

either on the

ground

of

reasonable

doubt

or

on

the

ground

that

he did not commit the

offense charged.

The

reason

for

this

is

that

the basis

of

the

civil

action is

no

longer

the

criminal

liability

of

the

defendant,

but

a

quasi-delict

or tort.o'

Art

1161

With regard to

the second,

it

must be observed

that

there

are

five

exceptional

cases

or

instances,

in addition

to

that

which

is

stated

in

Art.

31 of the

New Civil

Code,

where

the law

itself expressly

grants

to

the injured

party

the right to

institute a civil action

which

is

entirely

separate

and

distinct

from

the

criminal

action.

They

are:

(1)

interferences by

public

officers

or

employees

or by

private

individuals

with

civil rights

and

liberties," (2)

defamation,*

(3)

fraud,"'

(4)

physical

injuries,* and

(5)

refusal or

neglect

of a city

or

municipal

police

officer to

render

aid or

protection

in

case

of

danger

to life or

property.6,

In

all

of these

cases or instances,

although

the

act or omission

may constitute a

criminal

offense

in accordance

with

our

penal

laws, the

injured

party

may

institute

a

civil

action

to

recover

damages which

is

entirely

separate and

distinct from the

criminal action.

Once the action

is instituted, then

it may

proceed

independently of the

criminal

action,

and

shall

require only

a

preponderance

of

evidence.'o

Idern;

id.;

id.

-

Effect of

failure

to

make

reservation.

-

Section

2

ofRule

111

ofthe

New

Rules ofCourt

states:

"In

the cases

provided

for in Articles

31,

32,

33,

34 and

2177

of

the

Civil

Code

of

the

Philippines, an independent

civil

action entirely

separate and

distinct from the

criminal

action,

may be brought by the

injured

party

during the

pendency

of the

criminal

case,

provided

that

the

right

is

reserved as required in

the

preceding

section."

'lhe

insertion

in the

foregoing

provision

ofthe

phrase

provided

the

right is

reserved

as

required in the

preceding

section, resulted

in a debate among

academicians

which

lasted

for more than twenty

years.

Finally, interpreting the above

provision,

the

Supreme

Court,

in Carcia

us.

Florido,

declared:

"As

we have

stated

at

the outset, the same

negligent

act

causing

damages may

produce

a

civil

liability arising

from crime

or create

an action

for

quasi-delict

or

culpa

extra-contractual.

GF:NERAT, PROVISIONS

6oArt.31,

Civil

Code.

G'Tolentino

vs.

Carlos,39

OU.

(laz.,

N,,

(i,p.

l2l

6'San

Pedro Bus Line vs.

Nrvlrr('.

l),1 l'hil. 8.1{)i

lnirDrld(

r vs.

li,lrrl

Ltttul

'l\

tttts

Co..

?

SCRA

2?6.

63Art.217fi,

cl

srr7., {

ltvil

t

irl

"'Art.217?,

(livil

(irL:

llrrllr,rL'

r,r

t;,,r

rr

irrrl

Al'r'r'r',,,'/ll

l'lrl

l;lr'/.

l)yoxr

vB

Yatco,

l{)O

l'hrl. lol},i,,

(

rrl',

rrr

I'r'r,r1\,.

lolr l'l'rl l

ll2,

Slr"r r

vr'

li'r'. lrr'/ l'l'rl ll)11

"5Art.

:12.

Civil

Code.

sArt.

33.

Civil

Code.

"iIbid.

'"lbttl.

d"Art

:14.

(iivil

(ixl{

r"Arls.:12,

il:1, l).1,

(livil (ixl(.

rL5:ls('laA,lto'lhrs.rsr.wrrsrrlsocrlrrl

rrrrl

rlrrrlr'tl

in Mt'ttdoztt vs.

Arriclit.9l

s(

ItA

I

ti

lr;

Ii


10/114

Ad.

1161

OBLIGATIONS

The

former

is

a violation

ol the criminal law,

rvhile the latter is

a

distinct

and independcnt

ncgligence,

having always had

its

own

foundation

and individuality.

Sorne

legal

writers

are

of

the

view that in accordance

with

Article 31.

tht: civil action

based

upon

quasi-delict,

may

proceed

independently of the criminal

procecding

frrr

criminal

negligence and regardlcss

of

the

result

of

the

latter.

Hence,

'the

proviso

in

Section 2 of

Rulc

111 with

reference to

Articlcs

32, 33 and 34 of

the

Civil

Code is

contrary

to

the

letter and spirit

of the

said

articles, for

these articles

were

dralted and are

intended

to constitute

as

exceptions to

the

general

rule

stated in

what is

now Section I

of

llule

111.

The

proviso,

which

is procedural,

may

also

bc

regarded

as

an

unauthorized

amcndment

ofsubstantivc

law-'x

x

x"

Again, in AbeLlano

us.

Merobe,,,

the

Supreme

Court declared:

"The

restrictive interpretation

x

x

x does not

only

result

in its

emasculation

but

also

gives

rise to a

serious

constitutional

doubt. Article

33

is

quite

clear:

'In

case ofx

x x

physical

injuries,

a

civil

action

for

damages entirely separate

and distinct

from

the

criminal

action, may

be

brought

by

the

injured pafty.

Such

civil

action shall

proceed

independently

of

the

criminal

prosecution,

and

shall require

only

preponderance

of

evidence.'

That is a

substantive right

not

to be frittered away by

a

construction

that would render

it nugatory, if through

oversight,

the

offended

parties

failed

at the

initial

stage

to

seek

recovery for

damages

in

a

civil suit.

x

x x The

g"ant

of

power

to

this

Court

both in

the

present

Constitution

and under the

1935

Charter

does not

extend

to

any

diminution, increase

or modification of

substantive

right.

It

is a

well-settled

doctrine

that a

court

is

to

avoid construing

a

statute

or

legal norm

in

such

a manner

as

would

give

rise

to

a constitutional

doubt. x x

x

The

law

as an

instrument

ofsocial

control

will fail in

its function

ifthrough

an

ingenious

construction sought

to be fastened

on a legal

norm,

particularly

a

procedural

rule,

there is

placed

an

impediment

to

a

litigant

being

given

an opportunity

of

vindicating

an

alleged

right."

Thus,

in

Elcano

us. FIi1l,., where the

first

defcndant had

been

previously

charged

with

the criminal oflcnsc of'homicide

and

subsequently

acquitted on thc

ground

t.hirl his rrct. is not

crintinal,

Art.

1162

because

oflack ofintent

to

kill,

coupled with

a

mistake'

the Supreme

Court held,

despite

the

lhct that the

plaintiffs

(who

are

the

parents

of

the

alleged

victim)

failed to make

a

reservation

of their

right

to institute

the

civil

action separately,

that

such acquittal

of the

defendant

in

the criminal

case

has

not

extinguished

his

liability

for

quasi-delict

under

Al1.

2176 of the

Civil Code;

hence,

that

acquittal

is

not a bar

to

lhe

civil

action against

him.

The

same

ruling was

applied

in

Mendoza us.

Arrieta.'n

IL

effect,

the

procedural

requirement

provided

for

in

Section

2

of

Rule 111

ofthe

New Rules

of Court

is not

mandatory.

Rernoval

of

Reservation

Requirement

For

Independent

Civil

Actions

Accordingly,

Section

2 of

the

New Rules of

Court was

likewise

amended

to read

as:

"SEC.

3.

When

ciuil

action

moy

proceed

independ'ently.

In the cases

provided

in

Articles 32, 33,

34 and 2176 of

the

Civil

Code

of

the

Philippines,

the

independent

civil

action

may

be

brought

by

the

offended

party.

It

shall

proceed

independently

ofthe

criminal

action and

shall

require

only

a

preponderance

of

evidence.

In no

case,

however,

may the

offended

party recover

damages

twice

for the same

act

or omission

charged

in

the

criminal

action."

(8etised.

Rules

of

Criminal

Prccedure

2000).

Under

the

former rule,

the foregoing

actions

may only

be

allowed

ifthere

is a

reservation,

or were

filed ahead

ofthe

criminal

action.

(Justice

Oscar

M, Herrera,

Treatise

on Criminal

Procedure,

February

2001).

Art. 1162. Obligations

derived

from

quasi-delicts

shall

be

governed

by

the

provisions

of

Chapter

2,

Title XVII

of

the

Book, and

by

special

laws.?i

Obligations

Arising

from

Quasi-Delicts.

-

As

it is

used

in

this

part

of

the

Civil Code,

the term "quasi-delicts""

refers

to

all

of

those

obligations

which

do

not arise from

law, contracts,

quasi-

191

S('Rn l 3.

rr'Arl.

lollil,

S1)

rish

(livil (ixL

.

irr rrnr,

ntli'rl

lirrrn

;"ln

S;rrrrrrslr

lirw. i

rtrrst

./,'//r,,s

's

so'r),

lrrrr( s

kll,,wn

I's

\atl/t

dquilia

a

rt

tulp

trrfur

t.,tt,

tttNl.

GENF]RAI,

PROVISIONS

257

SCIiA r(x;

;r?7

s{

tta^

9r{

lll lt)


11/114

Art 11ri2

OBLIGATIONS

contracts, or criminal offenses.?? Thus,

using

Art. 217ti of

the

Civil

Code

and decided

cases as bases

or

anchors,

it

may

be

defined

as

the

fault

or

negligence

ofa

person,

who,

by his

act

or

omission, connected

or

unconnected with,

but indcpendent from,

any contractual relation,

causes

damage

to another

pcrson.

It

is,

therefore, lhe equivalent

of

the term

"tort"

in

Anglo-American law.'n

Idem; Persons liable.

-

Obligations

arising from

quasi-

delicts

are

demandable not

only

from

the

person

directly

responsible

for

the damage incurred,', but also

against

the following:

(1)

The

father

and, in case of

his

death

or

incapacity,

the

mother,

with respect

to

damages causcd

by

the minor

children

who

live in their company;

(2)

Guardians,

with respect to damages

caused by

the

minors

or incapacitated

persons

who arc under

their

authority and

who

live

in their

company;

(3)

The

owners

and managers of an establishment

or

enterprise,

with

respect

to

damages caused

by

their

employees

in

the

service

of

the

branches

in

which

the

latter

are employed

or

on

the occasion

of their

functions:

(4)

Employers

with

respect

to

damages caused

by

their

employees

and

household

helpers

acting

within

the scope

of their

assigned tasks, even

though

the

forrner are

not engaged in

any

business

or

industry;

(5)

The State, when it

acts

through

a special agent;

but not

when the

damage

has

been

caused

by the oflicial to

whom

the task

done

properly

pertains;

and

(6)

Lastly,

teachers

or

heads

of

establishments

of arts

and

trades,

with respect

to

damages caused by

their

pupils

and students

or apprentices,

so

long

as

they

remain

in their

custody.*u

It must

be

noted, however,

that the responsibility

of the above

persons

or

entities

shall cease if they

can

prove

that they have

?'Report

of tho

(l{trli'

(lornnrissi('r.

t)

llil

l'See

Elcanoand

lllcrrno vs. llrll,'rxl llrll. /;S(

lt^

l)t{

l'Art.

2l?(;.

(

livil

(

iri'

iA

2l80,

(livrl

(

,r1,.

:ll

Arl.

1162

observed

all

the

diligence of

a

good

father of a

family to

prevent

damage."

Idem;

R.equisites

of

liability.

-

In

actions

based

on

quasi-

delicts, before

the

person

injured

can recover

damages

{rom the

defendant,

it

is necessary that

he

must be

able

to

prove

the

following

lacts:

(1)

The

fault

or

negligence

ofthe

defendant;

(2)

The

damage

suffered or

incurred

by

the

plaintiff;

and

(3)

The

relation of

cause and effect

between the fault or

negligence of the defendant

and the damage

incurred

by the

plaintiff.*,

Idem;

Quasi-delicts

and

crimes.

-

Quasi-delicts

and crimi-

nal offenses

are sometimes

difficult

to distinguish

from

each

other.

However,

they

may

be distinguished

from

each

other

in

the follow-

ing

ways:

(1)

Crimes affect

the

public interest,

while

quasi-delicts

are

only

of

private

concern;

(2)

The Penal

Code

punishes

or corrects

the criminal

act,

while the

Civil

Code,

by means of indemnification,

merely repairs

the

damages incurred;

(3)

Generally, there are

two liabilities

in

crime:

criminal

and

civil. In

quasi-delict,

there

is

only civil

liability; and

(4)

Crimes are

not

as

broad as

quasi-delicts,

because

the

fbrmer are

punished

only if there

is

a law clearly covering them,

while

the latter include

all acts in

which any

kind of fault or

negligence

intervenes.'''

Idem; Scope of

quasi-delicts. ln

Elcano

us.

1{rll

{G.R.

No.

L-243O3, May

26,

1977), the

Supreme

Court

held

that

quasi-delicts

include

acts

which

are

criminal

in

character

or

in

violation of the

penal

law,

whether voluntary

or

negligent. Using

the

exact

language

of

the Court,

"it

is 'more

congruent

with

the

spirit

of

law, equity

andjustice,

and

more in harmony

with

modern

progress,'to

hold, as

"/'lirylr,r

vs

M,rrril:r l,llrrlr'ir

(ir,

lr;

I'l,il I

"'ll,'r',,,1,,

vs

(ilri',r

lr)rl

Alrnr,, /ilI'hrl

(i07

(IENERAL

PROVISIoNS


12/114

Art.

1162

OBT,TCATIONS

we

do hold, that

Article

2776, where it refers

to

lault

or negli5;ence,

covers not

only

acts

not

punishable

by

laut

but

also acts

criminal

in

character,

whether intentional

or

voluntary

or

negligent."

The

above

pronouncement

of

the Supreme

Court

is

startling. It

expands

the coverage

of

quasi-delicts

beyond what

was

originally

contemplated by

thc

larwmaker.

Under the

general plan

ofour

law on obligations,

the scope

of obligations

arising

from

the

law,

contracts,

quasi-contracts,

and acts

or omissions

punished

by

law is

well-defined. Their

boundaries are clearly

delineated and

drawn

with

precision.

It

is only

with respect to

obligations

arising

from quasi

delicts

that

there

is

a

problem

and

this is natural because

ofthe very

nature

ofsuch

obligations. Under our

system ofliabilities,

quasi-delicts

must

necessarily be a sort

of"dumping

ground"

or

"garbage can"

for

all kinds of

actionable

wrongs not falling within

the

puryie\4.

of

the

four

sources

of

obligations.

As we

look

at it,

the

original

plan

envisaged by the

lawmaker

is

as

follows:

The

coverage of

quasi-delicts

which do not

overlap with

crimes

under

the

Revised

Penal

Code

and

special

laws

(and

which we

can

very

well

call the

general

rule) are:

ifrst,

negligenl

acts or omissions not

punishable

as criminal

offenses;

secozd,

intentional

quasi-delicts

or torts,

such as those regulated

by

Arts.

19,

21,

22,26,27,28

and

1314

of the

Civil

Code; and

third.,

lhe

so-called strict liability

torts

where there

is

neither

negligence nor intent

to

cause

damage or injuqf,

such

as

in

the

case contemplated in

Art.

23 of

the

Civil

Code

or

in

the

case of

actionable

nuisances

undcr

Arts.

694

and

705 of

the Civil

Code.

The

coverage

of

quasi-delicts

which

overlap

with

acts

or

omissions

punishable

under

the Revised

Penal

Code

(and

which

we

can very

well

call the

exceptions)

are:

,/trst,

criminal

negligence;

aod second,

acts

or

omissions

punishable

as

crimes

under

the

Revised Penal

Code

but

the

Civil

Code expressly

declares that

the

civil

action

rLrising

therefrom is

separate and

independent

from the

criminal

action.

(Arts.

31, 32, 33

and

34 of

the Civil

Code)

We believe

that the

above

arrangemcnt

was

deliberately

planned.

Thus,

according to the

(bde

Commission

in its ll(lport:

"The

Commission

also thoughl.

of

llrr'

lxrssibilil.v

of

irrlopting

the word'tod'from Anglo

Anrr.ricrrrr

l;rw.

lhrl

'1.('rl

rrntl.r

l.hrri.

system is much

br(rr(icr

Llrrrn llrl

Sp;rrrrslr-l'hilippirrc

corl.r.pl

of

obligations

arisitrll li,rrrr rrorr lorrIlrrtIrrrrI

rrlgliglrrcr.

'lirrl.

irr

Anglo-Anrcrictrtr

jrrlrsgrrrlr.rrr'r.rrrr

lrtr|l,s rrol

orrly

rrrlllrglrrtr,.

Irul.

(}ENERAI

PROVISIONS

Art. 1162

also

intentionrrlcriminal

acts, such

as assault

and

battel1,

false

imprisonmont

rrnd

deceit.

In

the

general

plan

of

the

Philippine

legal

system,

irrtentional and

malicious

acts

are

governcd

by

the

Penal

Orxft',

rrlthough

certain

exceptions

are

made

in

the

Project."

(Rr1xrrt.

pp.

161-162)

Idem; Character

of

remedy.

-

In Padua

us.

Roble.s,*

in

his

concurring

opinion,

.Iustice

Barredo

declared:

"It

is

by

now

beyond

all cavil,

as to dispense

with the

citation of

jurisprudence,

that

a

negligent

act,

such

as

that

committed

in this

case,

gives

rise to at

least two

separate

and

independent

liabilities,

namely

(1)

the civil

liability arising

from crime

or culpa

criminol

and

(2)

the liability

arising

from civil

negligence

or the

so-called

culpa

aquiliana.

These

two

concepts

of

faults

are

so

distinct

from

each

other

that

exoneration

from one

does

not result in

exoneration

from the other'

Adjectively

and substantively.

they can be

prosecuted

separately

and

independently

of

each other, although

Lt'ticle

2177

of

the Civil

Code

precludes

recovery

of

damages

twice

for

the

same

negligent

act or omission,

which

means

that

should there

be

varying

amounts

awarded

in

two

separate

cases,

the

plaintiff

may

recover, in effect,

only

the bigger amount.

That is to

say,

if the

plaintiff

had already

been

ordered

paid

an

amount

in one

case and

in the other

case

the

amount

adjudged

is

bigger,

he shall

be entitled

in

the second

case

only to the excess

over

lhe

one fixed

in

the

first case,

but if

he

had

already been

paid

a

bigger

amount

in

the first case,

he may

not

recover

anyrnore

in the

second

case."

The above

opinion

was conlirmed

in

Elceno

us.

I1ill." Thus,

according

to the

Supreme

Court: "Consequently,

a separate

civil

action

lies against

the

offender

in a criminal

act,

whether

or

not

he

is

criminally

prosecuted and

found

guilty

or

acquitted,

provided

that

the offended

party

is

not allowed,

ifhe

is

actually

charged

criminally,

to

recover

damages

on

both

scores,

and

would

be

entitled

in

such

eventuality only

to the bigger

award

of

the two

assuming

that

the

awards

made

in

the two cases

vary. In

other

words, the

extinction of

the

civil

liability

refened

to

in

Par.

(e)

ofSection

3,

Rule

111,

refers

exclusively

to civil

liability founded

on

Article

100

of the Revised

Penal

Code,

whereas

the

civil

liability

for the

same

act considered

-{;{i

S1'laA

,tltl')

"?7

S|kn 98


13/114

Art.

'l '162

OBLIGATIONS

as a

quasi-delict

only and

not

as a crime is not

extinguished

even

by

a

declaration in the criminal

case

that

the

criminal

act charged has

not happened or

has not been

committed by the accused."

However,

in

Mendozaus. Arrietq,""

amore recent

case,

there was

a

return

to

the

old doctrine of selection

ofremedies. In

this

case,

the

Supreme

Court categorically

held

that

since

the

offended or

injured

party

had

chosen

the remedy

ofproceeding under the

Revised

Penal

Code by allowing

the

civil

action to

be

impliedly

instituted

in

the

criminal action, and

sinc

the court had expressly

declared

that the

fact from which the

civil

liability

did not exist, therefore, the civil

action for

damages subsequently

commenced by

said

injured

party

against

the

defendant has already

been

extinguished in consonance

with Sec.

3(c), Rule

111 ofthe Rules

of

Court.

And

even

if

plaintiffs

cause

of action against

defendant

is

nol

ex-delicto,

the

end

result

would

be

the same,

it being clear

from the

judgment

in

the

criminal

case that defendant's

acquittal was

not

based upon

reasonable

doubt.

Thus,

the

problem is

still

very much

with

us.

The

debate rages

on.

Barredo

vs. Garcia and Atnario

73

Phil.

60?

This case come up from

the Court

of Appeals

which held

the

petitioner

herein,

Fausto Barredo,

liable in damages

for

the death of

Faustino

Garcia

caused

by

the

negligence

of Pedro

Fontanilla,

a taxi

driver

employed

by said

Fausto

Barredo.

At

about

half

past

one

in

the

morning

of May

3, 1936,

on

the road

between

Malabon

and

Navotas,

Province

of

Rizal,

there

was

a

head-on collision

between

a taxi of the Malate

Taxicab driven by

Pedro

Fontanilla

and a

carretela guided

by

Pedro

Dimapilis.

"the

carretela

was

overturned,

and

one of its

passengers,

16-year-old

Faustino

Garcia, sulfered injuries

from

which

he died

two

days later.

A

criminal

action

was

filed

against

Fontanilla

in the

Court of

First

Instance

of

Rizal, and

he

was

convicted and sentenced to

an

indeterminate

sentence of

one

year

and

one day

to two

years

ofprlslon correccional.

Thc

court

in

the

criminal

case

granted

the

pctition

that

the right

to

bring

ir

scparatc civil action

bo

n.sr.rvrrl.

'l'lrr'

(

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rrr

rl.

of

Aplx'rrls

rrllirrnrrl

(}ENERAI

PRO\ISIONS

Art.

1162

the sentence

of the lower court

in

the criminal

case.

Severino

Garcia and'Iimotea

Almario,

parents

ofthe

deceased

on March

7,

1939, brought

an

action

in

the

Court of

First Instance of

Manila

against

Faustino Barredo

as

the sole

proprietor of the

Malate Taxicab

and employer of

Pedro

Fontanilla.

On July 8,

1939,

the

Court

of

First lnstance

of

Manila awarded damages

in

favor

of

the

plaintills

for P2,000

plus

legal

interest

from the

date

ofthe

complaint. This

decision was

modified

by

the Court

of

Appeals

by

reducing

the damages

to

P1,000

with legal

interest

from the

time

the

action

was instituted.

It

is

undisputed

that

Fontanilla's

negligence

was

the cause of the

mishap, as

he

was

driving

on the

wrong side of

the

road, and at

high speed.

As to

Barredo's

responsibility,

the

Court

ofAppeals

found:

"*

*

*

Itis

admitted

that

defendant

is

Fontanilla's

employer.

There

is no

proofthat

he exercised

the

diligence ofa

good

father

of

a family

to

prevent the

damage.

(See

p.

22,

appellant's

brief.)

In fact

it

is shown

he was careless

in

employing

Fontanilla

who

had

been

caught

several

times for

violation of

the Automobile

Law and

speeding

(Exnibit

A)

-

violations

which

appeared

in

the

records ofthe

Bureau

ofPublic

Works

available

to

the

public

and to himself.

Therefore, he

must

indemnify

plaintiffs

under

lhe

provisions

ofArticle

1903

ofthe

Civil

Code."

The

main theory of

the

defense

is that the

liability

of

Fausto Barredo

is

governed

by the

Revised Penal

Code;

hence,

his

liability

is only

subsidiary,

and

as

there

has been

no

civil

action against

Pedro

Fontanilla, the

person

criminally liable,

Barredo cannot be

held responsible

in this case. The

petitioner's

brief

states

on

page

10:

"*

* *

The

Court ofAppeals

holds

thatthe

petitioneris

being

sued

for

his

failure to exercisc

all

the

diligence of

a

good

father

of a

family in the

selection and

supervision of

Pedro

Fontanilla

to

prevent

damages

suffered

by

the

respondents-

In

other

words,

the

Court of

Appeals

insists on

applying

in

this

case

Article

1903

ofthe Civil

Code. Article

1903

ofthe

Civil

Code

is

found

in

Chapter

11, Title 16, Book

IV ofthe Civil

Code.

Ttris fact makes

said

article

inapplicable

to

a civil

liability arising

from

a crime

as

in the case

at

bar

simply

bccause

Chapter

II of Title

16 of

Book lV

ofthe

Civil

Code,

in

precise

words ofArticle

1903 ofthe

Civil Cod

itself,

is

applicable only

to

"those

(obligations)

arising

from wrongful

or negligent

acts

or omissions not

punishable

by

'l'he

gist

ofthc rlccision

ol

thr'

(

lorrrt

ol Appoals

is trxpressed

I

hrH:

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14/114

ORI,ICA'l'IONS

GENERAL

PROVISIONS

Art 1162

Art. 1162

(*

)k

*

We

cannot agree

to the dolilndant's

contention.

The liability sought

to

be

imposed

upon

him

in this action

is

not

a civil obligation

arising

from a

felony

or

a

misdemeanor

(the

crime

of

Pedro

Fontanilla),

but an obligation

imposed

in

Article.1903

ofthe

Civil Code

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