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VOLUME VJ WINTER 2000 ISSUE 2

The 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion in the Ardennes

By Tom Rainey

A ctivated on 25 July 1942 at Camp Carson, Colorado, the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion continued training at Camps

Livingston, Louisiana; Bowie and Hood, Texas; and Claiborne, Louisiana, where we took part in the 1943 Louisiana Maneuvers.

Alerted for overseas movement in early 1944, we staged through Camp Myles Standish, Massachusetts, and sailed to England aboard the good ship Sea Po1poise on 7 April. We land­ed al Newport, United Kingdom, on I 7 April. Traveling by train, we arrived in the pleasant town of Hertford, some 20 miles north of London, the next day. We were billeted in a combination of barracks and private residences. It was an agreeable location; numerous pubs and the natives

to dig deep and construct a roof; that artille1y can maim and dis­integrate a man; that mortars can be silent death; and that it docs not pay to move around unnecessarily. On 3 July, we reverted to 30th Division control and remained with it until the end of the war in Europe. We enjoyed an excellent relationship with "Old Hickory."

On 7 foly, the 30th Division made an assault crossing of the Vire River at St. Fromond and St. Jean de Daye, then turned south astride the St. Jan-St. Lo road. On 9 July, the I st Platoon, Co. C, led by !st Lt. Ellis W. Mcinnis, supported by a bazooka team from the I st Recon Platoon, was attacked by a column of

Shennan tanks of the 3d Annored were friendly. We were attached to the 30th Infantry Division, a rela­tionship which would continue with only a brief interruption until VE Day.

After learning to drive on the "wrong" side of the road. we drew

Editor:~ Note: The following three stories were writ­ten by Colonel Tom Raney. Tom served with the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion, 30th Infantry Division, dur­ing World War IL Previously, he contributed articles for Recall about the Ardennes Campaign.

Division. The tanks had turned north instead of south. Jn the exchange of fire, two Shermans were knocked out and a member of the 1st Rccon was killed by .50 caliber MG fire. On 11 July, we

equipment, all brand new, from various ordnance depots. Ow- pri­mary weapon was the 3-ioch towed gun, M-6. Our local training areas were small fields, barely large enough for a platoon. We had a period on the Salisbury Plain where there was room to maneuver.

Arter wate11>roofing our vehicles during lbe last week of May, we moved south to Oakridge Camp, near Basingstoke, and pitched tents on an open field. On the evening of 5 June, our divi­sion commander, Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs, spoke to the bat­talion, closing with the words, "I'll see you on the beaches."

We loaded on LSTs in Southampton Harbor on 19 June, sat in the harbor for three days while a stom1 raged across the Normandy beaches, and landed on Omaha Red Fox Beach on 24 June. Going ashore, we occupied indirect fire positions. On 26 June, we were attached to the 29th Division and took up direct fire positions. Here we started learning some basics: that it pays

were credited with our first enemy tank when two members of the I st Recon Platoon, Sgt. Carl Hanna and this writer, found a Mark IV which had hit a mine, breaking its track. Tbe two men each tired two bazooka rounds at the tank, doing minor damage but frightening the crew into sur­rendering.

On 16 July, a much needed 3d Recon Platoon was formed using clerks, radio operators, and drivers with an M-20 armored car and a couple of jeeps. 1st Lt. Arthur D. Cunningham was pla­toon leader.

The 30th Division continued the attack to the south in the extremely difficult bocage terrain against detennined resistance. The division suffered thousands of casualties, mainly infantry­men. On 25 July, Opcratio)l Cobra commenced which led to the breakout from Normandy. The division went into reserve in late July. The Luftwaffe was active at night during the period. On one occasion our battalion suffered two KIA and 11 WIA from

bombs. We were then near St. Romphairc. On 6 August, the division was ordered to Mortain. On 7

August, the enemy launched an atlack with fouJ Panzer divisions; their objective was to seize Avraoches to cut Third Anny's sup­ply line. TI1e vi llages of L' Abbaye Blanche, St. Martbelmy, and Mortaio lay directly in the path of the German dJive. When this battle ended on J 2 August, our battalion had destroyed a large number of enemy tanks and countless other vehicles. The I st Platoons of Companies A and B, led by l st Lis. Thomas Springfield and Lawson Neel, accounted for much of the enemy equipment knocked out. We also sustained a considerable num­ber of casualties, both ki lled and wounded, with 101 MIA. Some of these missing returned to duty sooner or later, some were killed, and others were taken prisoner. We losl 11 3-inch guns and tl1e same number of halftracks.

Now ensued the "rat race" across France, Belgium, and the Netherlands against sporadic resistance. We crossed the Seine at Mantes Gassicourt on 20 August and closed on the Dulch­German border by 17 Septe mber. From 5 October to 15 December, our division broke t11rough the West Wall (Siegfried Line) and advanced to the Roer River south of Juelich against heavy resistance including numerous counterattacks led by tanks. We lmockcd out several Panthers and Tiger Ils but only with flanking shots.

On 15 December, the 30th Div ision and our unil were in reserve. The battal ion CP was in Hoengen, some 12 kilometers northeast of Aachen. Ninth Army General Order 69 of 15 December directed the conversion of our unit lo an M-10 battal­ion effective 18 December. By then we already had received some 12 M- l Os, making us two-thirds towed and one-tl1ird self­propelled.

Our battalion executive officer, Major Edward A. Costomiris, re lates that on the evening of 16 December he and his driver, PFC Benward, rcnrrning from division HQ, saw flares and enemy paratroopers being dropped to the south.

On 17 December, when we received the order to move south, many of our men were on pass in Heerlen, Holland. We rounded them up and moved out, starting at J 650. Bud Costomiris, properly a stickler for good order and discipline, had to stop some of our M- 1 Os and have the stoves and other " homey devices" removed.

Moving through the rubble of Aachen, the division went into a perimeter defense around Eupen, Belgium. Bud attended a meeting with Brig. Gen. Wm. K. Harrison, Asst. Division Commander, who ordered the I 17th Infantry, with our Co. C attached, to move south to Malmedy and hold it at all costs.

Late in the evening of 18 December, Bud recalls that the bat­talion CP set up in a bed factory in Malmcdy. After a day or so, the CP was moved to a paper mill. On 23 December, six 9th Air Force B-26s dropped 86 bombs on Malmedy, hitting the center of town. The pilots reported "excellent results." The bed factory was destroyed. The Stars and Stripes reported Malmedy in enemy hands. On 24 December, 18 D-24s dropped their bomb loads, leveling the center of the city. Some 125 civilians were killed. American losses were 37 killed and 100 wounded.

On 2 1 December, Co. B elements played a major role in throwing back an attack by SS Lt. Col. Skorzeny's I 50th Panzer Brigade. This unit employed a number of Panther tanks disguised as M-JOs.

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On 18 December, the I st Battalion, I 17th Infantry, rein­forced by the 1st Platoon of our Co. C, had fought its way into Stavclot and secured that part of the town north of tl1e Ambleve River except for several blocks still held by Kampfgruppe Peiper e lements at the western edge. With a Recon Platoon of the 823d, I joined the !st P latoon of Co. Con 19 December. The M-10 pla­toon leader was Lt. Mclnnjs. During that day, Mac and I were in an observation post on the second floor of a building. From a window to our front we could sec the Ambleve River and the bridge leading into Stavclot from the south, about 150 years from us. To our left was a window through which we could look down on one of Mac's M-1 Os, commanded by Sgt. Ray Dudley. He was covering the bridge and the road leading to it from the southeast. This road was Lined with buildings except for the last 100 years or so before the bridge. F rom behind the last building, we saw the long lube of a Tiger Jl's 88mm gun emerge. Before tl1e Tiger had completely cleared the building, the M-10 gunner fired one round of armor-piercing shot which penetrated the armor on the right side just above the track. The tank came to an abrupt halt. Surprisingly, it did not bum. (The only way we could knock out the mighty Tiger was to hit it on the side or rear where the armor was relatively thin.) The tank was No. 222, belonging to the 50 I st SS Heavy Tank Battalion, attached to Kampfgruppe Peiper.

Capt. Bruce Crissinger commanded our Co. A, which then consisted of one M-10 platoon and two towed platoons. On 18 December, Co. A was attached to the I 19th Infantry., The regi­ment's mission was to hold Stoumont and LaGlicze. Tbe two towed platoons moved into LaGlieze along with a battalion of the I J 9tb. The SS troops retook the village and the two TD platoons lost their guns. Later, Bruce, accompanied by Lt. Arthur Cunningham, reconnoitered on foot. They came under machinc­gun fire. Cunningham was wounded (for the second time) but evaded capn1re. Crissinger was taken to the CP of SS Lt. Col. Jochen Peiper. After a brief conversation, Bruce was taken to another cellar. That night, Peiper, his unit out of gasoline and ammunition, moved out on foot witli his men and Major Hal McCown, CO, 2nd Battalion, 119th Infantry, as hostage. Mc­Cown escaped during the night. Tbe J 19tb occupied LaGLieze the next day, and Bruce returned to his company.

On 13 January 1945, the 30th Division attacked south out of Mahnedy in the direction of St. Yilh. The ll 7th Infantry cleared the five-way intersection of Maugnez, four kilometers south of Malmedy. At this location on l 7 December 1944, members of Kampfgn1ppe Peiper, an element of I st SS Panzer Division (Leibstandarte Adolf.Hitler) had murdered 83 men of Battery A, 285th FA Observation Battalion, who had been captured and dis­anned. A few men oftbe unit had escaped to relate what had hap­pened. Members of the 291st Engineer Battalion uncovered the snow-covered bodies, photographed, and evacuated them.

On 27 January, we went into reserve and on 2 Febrnary returned to the area 11011heast of Aachen.

We crossed the Rhine on 24 March and reached the Elbe near Magdeburg. On 17 April, we participated in the attack on that city. On 18 April, our last day of combat, Co. B. lost three men k illed and two wounded when their M-10 was struck by a Panzerfaust.

We destroyed 124 tanks and self-propelled guns between Normandy and the Elbe River. We were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the Meritorious Unit Commendation, the French

RECALi,

Croix de Guerre with Palm, and the Belgian Fourragere. Our bat­talion rerumed to the States and was inactivated al Camp Shanks, New York, on 24 October 1945. Our unit is continued in the Regular Army as the 823d Tank Battalion.

Friendly Fire! Company I, 33d Armored Regiment

vs. 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion

On 9 July 1944, in response lo a report of 50 enemy tanks moving north out of St. Lo on tl1e highway running through SL Jean de Daye and thence north to Carentan, the CG, 30th Infantry Division, directed our battalion commander to move all tl1rce of his gun companies to the vicinity of the crossroads 1.5 km south of St. Jean de Daye. We were equipped with 3-inch towed guns, 12 to a company, towed by halfTracks.

The gun companies occupied positions as follows: Company A: a couple hundred meters southwest of the above crossroads on the road toward Le Desert; Company B. just south of the crossroads; and Company C: 1.5 km south of tl1e cross­roads astride tl1e north-south highway.

As platoon leader of the I st Reconnaissance Platoon, I was directed to form two bazooka (2.36-inch rocket launcher) teams and support Company C. I took five men, including Sgt. Carl Hanna, in two jeeps with two bazookas and ammunition and joined the I st Platoon, Co. C, which was the southernmost gun platoon. 1st Lt. Ellis W. McTnnis was the platoon leader. It was midday, the weather was cloudy, tl1e visibility was 700 to 800 meters. We had barely occupied these positions when a Gerrnan soldier on a motorcycle came tearing up the road. When he was about 20 meters from our lead elements, he was shot and kj1Jcd by Pvt. George Holliday with an M-3 submachine gun. It we had­n't been fully alert prior to this, we certainly were now. Also, members of an infantry unit retreating tJ1rough our position reported being followed by enemy tanks.

Shortly thereafter, a column of Sherman tanks came into view, moving nortl1 toward us single file on the highway. When they had closed to perhaps 500 meters, the lead tank opened fire with his 75mm main gun, his two caliber .30s, and his caliber .50. A member of my platoon, Pvt. Ernie Jacobs, was bit in the head by a caliber .50 round and killed instantly. As the Sherman contin­ued to move toward us firing, Lt. Mcinnis ordered his lead gun, directly across the road from my men and me, lo open fire. The leading tank and tl1e one behind it were promptly knocked out. One 3-inch gun and a halfTrack were struck by 75mm armor piercing rounds and slightly damaged.

Al this time, we saw that we were going to be overrun, and I believe that we also recognized that these were indeed American tanks manned by American soldiers. I remember not­ing the unit designation painted on the front and rear of the

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Shermans. At any rate, Mac and I ordered our men to fall back to the crossroads south of St. Jean. Some panic ensued among our men at this time. Mack and 1, being the last to leave lhc scene, stood beside a stone building facing the road, tl1c building to our left. The lead tank came abreast of us, traversed his 75mm gun toward us, and fired a round of high explosive which hit the building a meter or so to our left. The fragments passed in front of us. The second tank also traversed his gun on us. Mack had the presence of mind to wave his anns; tl1c tank didn' t fire. The remaining tanks, perhaps seven or eight, pulled off the road to the right (cast) and coiled in a field behind a hedgerow. Mac and l then proceeded lo tl1e crossroads. l cannot remember whether we walked or rode. Anyway, no sooner had we gotten there, when up came Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Acting CG of XIX Corps dur­ing the temporary absence because of illness of Maj. Gen. C. H. Corlett. Gen. Walk.er, who had questioned me during tl1e assault crossing of the Vire at Aire! two days before, asked me what was going on. Arter l bad briefed him, he said, "Get your men back on position." I then got in my jeep and headed south. After riding a short distance, it occurred to me that I'd make a smaller target on tl1e ground than in the jeep, so I got out and proceeded on foot, keeping close to the ditch. I approached the tan.ks in !lie field east of the road to my left. Suddenly one of them opened fire on me witll a long burst of caliber .30 which (happily) went over my head. I quickly hit the ditch whjch had a couple of inches of water in it. After a time, I got to my feet, gave the band-and-ann signal to cease firing, and shouted tlle same at the top of my voice. I then went over to the tanks and discussed the situation with the lieutenant in charge. (The company commander had been severe­ly wounded when his tank was struck by our fire.) The unit belonged to Company I, 33d Arrnored Regiment, 3d Arrnored Division.

This unfortunate affair was investigated by Major Ashby 1. Lohse, the battalion operations officer. A copy of his report is in the after action report files of the 823d TD Battalion in the Military Records Branch of the National Archives.

I learned later that the tank company, a part of Combat Command B, 3d Armored Division, had been moving through the bocagc south of us and upon intersecting with the St. Jean de

Daye-St. Lo road, had turned north toward us instead of south toward the enemy. In fact, in 1951, I met a

lli'reJ lieutenant at Ft. Hood who had ------4~~ been the T/4 tank driver of the

f Company l commander's (lead) tank on iliac fateful day in 1944. He confirn1ed the accuracy of tlle

. foregoing account insofar as it per­tained to his unit.

The pamphlet entitled Normandy, published by the Army in 1947, contained the following discussion on page 3 1: "The whole mix-up on the highway was 'one

oftl1osc things' that could happen to any unit, particularly troops that were still inexperienced. Perhaps the best commentary on the affair, and on tl1e attitude of troops that went through it, is the report for 9 July of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion:

" ' ... There was lots of small arms fire, shelling and mortar

PAGE THREE

ftre blanketed the area, everybody fired in every direction, rumors flooded the air, and when infantry units withdrew in dis­order leaving some gun positions exposed, it became necessary to withdraw to successive positions. The exact movement of each platoon is at present obscured in the confusion of battle ....

" 'Unit took two prisoners which were its first, suffered its first fatal casualties, was shot up by its own infantry and anuored force and in tum shot up our own infantry and armored force, but under all circumstances came through their fust critical engage­ment in fairly good shape ....

" 'Combat efficiency satisfactory but mad as hell.' " The above cited report for 9 July was undoubtedly written

by Major Lohse, Battalion S-3.

Action on 22-23 November 1944 By way of background, the Histo1y of the 30th Jnfa11t1y

Division records on page 156 that "During the night of 21-22 November I 944, the enemy reinforced his disorganized troops still in the Division's path- mainly stragglers and rear-echelon groups from the 3d Pwzcr Grenadier Division- with a fresh replacement battalion, 300 men strong, and a battalion of assault guns. The assault gun battalion introduced Old Hickory to the newest weapon in the German armory, an 88mm gun mounted on a Mark V tank chassis, known as the Jugdpantlzer (pursuit Panther). The replacement battalion moved into Lohn. The assault guns operated mainly on the flanks and caused consider­able trouble."

On 21 November, the 3d Battalion, I 20th Infantry, attacked the village of Lohn, some 20 ki lometers northeast of Aachen and about 12 krn south-southwest of Juelich. Their attack was

- repulsed by a German counterattack. On the 22d, the 1st Platoon, Company C, 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion, took up direct fire positions in Fronhoven, which was some 1.2 km (about 1300 yards) southwest of Lohn. My reconnaissance platoon, tl1e 3d, also moved into the village to support the lst Platoon, led by 1st Lt. E. W. Mcinnis.

The weather was overcast with occasional light rain. Spotting what we thought was a Tiger II, later identified as a Jugdpanther, located just south of Lohn about 1000 yards from us, Mac had one of his towed 3-inch guns go into position on the northeast edge of Fronhovcn. A sturdy bam was about I 0 feet to the left of the tube. There was not time to dig the trail spades in. The gun crew being sho1t-handed, so Mac held down the left trail spade and I leaned on tJ1e right one. This was necessary because of the violent recoil. A crewman loaded a round of high velocity am10r piercing (HIVAP) ammunition (muzzle velocity 3400 fs). The gunner laid on the target with his telescopic sight, and anoth­er crewman pulled the lanyard. We watch the tracer projectile streak toward the Jagdpanther, hit the glacis plates, and ricochet up onto the clouds.

Hardly had the gun returned to batte1y when T saw a bright Dash on the tru.nk of Lhe apple tree and heard an explosion. I quickly dashed into the barn. My immediate thought was that I must be the only one not a casualty, but Mac and tbe other two crewmen were right behind me. The Jagdpanthcr had fired an armor-piercing (AP) round, obviously being out of high explo­sive (HE) ammunition. No one was hurt.

A few minutes later, a Forward Observer (FO) from a corps

PAGE FOUR

arti llery 8-inch howitzer battalion came up and offered assis­tance. Mac, the FO, and l climbed up into the barn's hay mow. Some ti le was missing from the roof, and we could see tl1e enemy vehicle, which hadn't moved. The FO contacted his Fire Direc­tion Center on his radio and asked for one round of HE, which landed a few yards to the right of the target. This must have annoyed the Jagdpanther, for it promptly fired one 88mm round of AP which went through the barn 8- 10 feet to our left. The 20-pound projectile made a very loud "crack" as il went through the front wall and out the back. The three of us tumbled out of the hay mow, landing on some bay on the floor. After a minute or so, we climbed back into the hay mow. This time the enemy gunner didn't wait for any spotting round but fired again at om barn, the AP round going tl1rough the wall several feet to our right. We repeated our hasty exit from the hay mow and agreed that that was enough of that.

Mac and I repaired to his nearby platoon CP in a cellar to get a cup of coffee and critique the operation, so to speak. We'd hard­ly sat down when there was a tremendous explosion close by. Our ears rang, The candle went out, and plaster from the ceiling showered down on us. Mac and I rushed out and discovered that the Germans had sent a small tank loaded with high explosive against us. One of Mac's gun crews had fired on the vehicle at a range of about 400 yards. There was a crater 10-12 feet in diam­eter and four feet deep, with parts of the little tank scattered all around.

Although J was not aware of it at the time, om Company A, on the southeastern end of tl1e village, was heavily engaged with enemy armor and taking casualties. George Simmons and Leo Clavier were wounded there, as were several others from their company. A new officer, LL Chasten, was killed by a large-cal­iber projectile.

Tbat evening, 22 November, our battalion commander, Lt. Col. Dettmer, ordered me to accompany the assault infantry, the 2d Battalion of the !20th, in their attack on Lohn the next day (Thanksgiving) and find positions for Mac's guns. We jumped off at 0700 (still dark) and had an exciting trip-on foot, of coursc­across 1200 yards of fire-swept ground. The radio operator for the company commander whom I was accompanying was wounded on the way across. Our artillc1y, which had been pound­ing Lohn, lifted as we approached the viliage. We took cover for a short time in a ccmetc1y on the edge of the village, then moved into the built-up area while an assault gun, a 75mm on a Mark ID chassis, crniscd up and down the main street firing at targets of opportunity, then he pulled out.

l left the cellar where I'd been talcing cover from the assault gun and walked toward lo far edge of town where Mac had posi­tioned his guns. On the way, someone yelled, "Counterattack" (meaning the Germans). I had only a pistol, so I grabbed a Sturmgewehr 44 (Gem1an assault rifle) and fami liarized myself with it. Mac's men knocked out two Mark TVs. I d idn't witness this so can't described the action. I didn't need my SG 44 after all. Later on, we got our Thanksgiving Dinner, delivered by jeep in Mermite cans. This ended an exciting 24 hours.

As a postscript to the above account: When we stopped in Fro11hoven in May 1990 during our battlefield tour, Leo and George showed us the building near which they were wounded on that dark November day. Then a few of us walked to the north­east edge of tbe village to have a look at Lobo. To our astonish-

RECALL

ment, it was no longer there. A resident ofFrohoven told us that the village bad been moved lo accommodate an extensive open­pit brown coal mining operation. A huge power shovel was work-

ing at the time. Tmagioe the logistics involved in moving a sever­al hundred years old village, complete with cemetery! On the way to Juelich, l saw a sign point to New Lohn.

The Battle of Mortain By Major Jeffrey Pope

Two months after the Nonnandy landings, the Allied Annics believed they had! clear sailing LO the German border. How­

ever, there were still many battles to be fought and won. One such battle was to take place in a s leepy little town in France known as Mortain.

A German counterallack known as "Operation Luttich" was designed by Hitler to strike with lig htning speed to the coast­cutting off American forward units. Then a force of eight Panzer divisions would turn north and ro ll up the entire Allied beach­head in Normandy. Hitler envisioned that the Allies would be thrown back into the sea.

Unaware the Germans were planning such a daring coun­le1thrust, the U.S. Vll Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Lawton Collins, continued its exploitation of recent successes. On 6 August, the 30th Infantry Division a National Guard division consisting of units from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee---commanded by Maj. Gen. Leland Hobbs, relieved the I st Infantry Division in the

advance, efforts shifted to relieving the men on Hill 3 14. The 2d Battalion became known to history as the "Lost Battalion."

Commanding the battalion on La Suisse Normande was Capt. Reynold C. Ericl1son. Erichson gained command when the battalion's commander was captured and taken prisoner. For more than five days, Erichson refused to surrender and denied the enemy tllis key terrain feature. During the siege, Capt. Erichson consistently thought of innovative ways to sustain the battalion until it could be relieved.

The 230th and I 13th Field Artillery Battalions directed fire missions onto the hill with medical supplies and ammunition encased in shell casings. Soldiers dug potatoes our of the ground and ate green apples off trees within their perimeter. Additional food was provided by local French farmers. Meanwhile, riflemen kept up an around-the-clock effort, repulsing each attack, despite a constant a ir bombardment and artillery fu:e.

On the evening of9 August, the situation on Hill 3 14 was desperate. Under a flag of trnce, a

vicinity of Mortain. Moving into the I st Div ision 's hastiily prepared positions, the 120111 Infanny occu­pied positions in and around Martain. The I 17th Infantry moved into positions in the vicini­ty of St. Marthemy, while the I l9tJJ Infantry Regiment, assigned

Editor 's co111nre11t: This article was taken from The ON GUARD. Vol. xxm. No. l l , newspaper of the Army and Air National Guard, August 1994. lt is a brief but excellent account of 30th Infantry Division un its fighting in a critical battle foJJowing the Nonnandy breakthrough during World War Il.

German SS officer made his way to the top of the hill requesting the 2d Battalion's surrender. Offering good treatment in lieu of total annihilation, the SS officer's sur­render ultimatum was turned down by Erichson.

as division reserve, assembled near Juvigny. As these units dug in, little did they know that four Panzer divisions were already rolling at full speed toward them.

The Gennan counterattack kicked off at approximately 1 a.m., 7 August, and would last five days. Dw·iog ilie first few hours of the attack, the 30t11 came under intense fire all along its seven-mile front. Although the initial enemy penetration was halted on the first day, the 30th could not dislodge the enemy. The fighting at Martain developed into close-range, small unit com­bat.

While the entire 30th Division fought gallantly, the soldiers o f the 2d Battalion, !20th lnfantry, literally fought for their exis­tence on Hill 314. Hill 314, known to ilie French as La Suisse Normande, was a roch.-y mass whose western edge was a sheer drop known as U1e Cliffs of Monrjoie. Those who occupied this key piece of terrain controlled operations for as far as the eye could see. On a clear day, the provinces of Maine, Brittany, and Normandy were visible along with the road networks running from Mortain to the coast. For now, the 2d Battalion, I 20th Infantry, occupied the hill, but ilie Germans wanted it back.

During the initial German penetration on 7 August, Hill 3 14 was surrotmded and bypassed. On it the 2d Battalion found itself isolated and cut off from the rest of the division. While the l l 7th and ll9th Infantry Regiments fought to stop the Gennan

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La ter that evening, as German Pa11Zers reached Company E 's perimeter, the SS offi­cer 's promise seemed to be coming true. However, massed artillery fire was called in on their own positions, and the gallant stand made by the I 20th 's soldiers tu.med the tide. Just before dawn, the Gcnnan Pruizers withdrew.

As the sun rose on 11 August, the men on Hill 314 detected Germans moving cast away from Martain. Relief, however, was slow in coming to the besieged 2d Battalion. Artillery and sniper fire from dug-in Panzer grenadiers rang down on them all day and night.

Shortly before noon on 12 August, elements of the I st Battalion, 119th Infantry, and the 35th Infantry Division finally made contact wiU1 tile "Lost Batta.lion." The siege was over.

From their superior position, the 2d Battalion had paralyzed Gennan c ff01ts in the area. While the 30th Division was figh ting for its life, Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, commanding general, 12th U.S. Anny Group, env isioned the opportunity to crush the German Army. "[This is the) greatest tactical blunder I ever heard of," Bradley said of the German attack. "Probably won't happen again in a thousand years." Bradley was referring to Hiller 's leav­ing himself open to a short envelopment by throwing so much of his annor forward. Taking advantage, Bradley countered suc­cessfully over the next several days. The 30th Infantry Division had kept the Gennans occupied long enough for Gen. Bradley to

PAGE FIVE

execute bis plan. During the siege of Hill 3 14, more than 300 2d Datta lion

soldiers were killed or wounded. The "Old Hickory" Division had lost more than 3,000 soldiers in the six-day battle.

After the battle at Mortain, the Gennan Armies began a mass exodus back toward Germany. For the Germans, the battle of France was lost.

Nate4r o-rv Nortiv Ca.v~ 2 Otiv Centtt,,,,..y

Military Heroes By Sion H. Harrington 111

Coordinator, Military Collection Project, NC Division of Archives and History

North Carolina has a long and proud military tradition. Her sons and daughters have served bravely and with honor in

every American conflict since the birth of our nation in 1775. In the 20th century alone over a mi!Jion Tar Heels have

served in their nation 's am1ed forces in defense of the freedoms we hold so dear. Unfortunately, that service has not always been without cost.

Though all No1th Carolinians who have worn their country's uniform are heroes, the stories of four in particular serve to demonstrate the spirit of selfless service and devotion to duty that has characterized Tar Heel service members throughout tbis country's military history.

The First World War was supposed to be the "War To End All Wars." Many Americans in 19 17 and 19 18 hoped that their participation in the terrible struggle of that era would end armed conflict forever. One such optimistic youth was Private Robert Lester Blackwell, the 23-ycar-old son of a poor tenant fanner from Hurdle Mills in Person County. On the bloody battle field of St. Souplet, France, on I I October 1918, Private Blackwell's pla­toon of Company K, I 19th f nfantry, 30th Division, was in danger of being surrounded and destroyed by the Germans. Without raclios, the only way to alert headquarters to the unit 's plight was to send a message by a runner. Though enemy machinegun and arti llery fire was extremely intense, Private Blackwell volun­teered to attempt the dangerous trip through "No Man's Land" to get help. He never made it. In recognition of the young North Carolinian's will ingness to forfeit his own life in an etfo11 to save those of his comrades, he was posthumously awarded the Con­gressional Medal of Honor, the nation's highest award for valor. His statue stands on the courthouse grounds of Roxboro in silent testimony to the county's brave native son.

On the momjng of 7 December 1941, Smithfield native Quartermaster 1st Class James D. Lancaster was aboard his ship, the battleship USS Arizona. When the Japanese attack began, he, like thousands of other sailors, ran to his battle station and began to fight back as best he could. At some point in the battle, Lancaster was blown off the deck into the burning oil floating atop Pearl Harbor and received severe bums to his head and shoulders. Fortunately, he was able to make bis way to an adja­cent battleship where he assisted in firing U1e guns of that ship's secondary batteries. When his ship exploded and sank into the harbor's muddy waters, James Lancaster's best friend, another Johnston County boy, went down with her. Due to post-battle confusion, James D. Lancaster was erroneously reported as

PAGE SIX

"Missing-in-Action" to his parents back home in North Carolina. In the weeks following the attack, Lancaster served as a d iver, tasked with the mission of going down on the sunken Arizona to cut Uuough the bulkheads to retrieve the bodies of shipmates not so fortunate. Though he survived World War TT, James D. Lancaster brought bome memo1ies that would haunt him for decades.

Korea was the war that no one in this country wanted. Most Americans saw no stake in the distant light for us. We had endured a catastrophic second world war and were just beginning to enjoy the fruits of U1e victories won between 1941 and I 945. But the aggression oftJ1e North Koreans and later tJ1e Communist Chinese forced young men and women from this country to once again take up arms in defense of freedom. One such youth was 19-year-old United States Army Corporal Jerry K. Crump from Mecklenburg County, orth Carolina. On the night of 6 Sep­tember 1951, Corporal Cnimp was dug in along a defensive perimeter on Hill 284. Dcginning around 11 p.m. and lasting until well after daybreak, his unit fought savagely to prevent a vastly superior attacking enemy force from over-running their thinly held line. When the force of numbers finally allowed tbe enemy to penetrate the American position, Corporal Crump took it upon himself to prevent his unit's annihilation. Corporal Crump fought fiercely and e>.."J)osed himself to enemy fire frequently to save wounded comrades and to prevent the enemy from seizing the unit's foxholes. When an enemy grenade fell into a position shel­tering several wounded men, Cmmp chose to save his friends rather than himself. lle d ived onto the grenade and smothered its ki lling force with his own body. Miraculously, bis wounds were nol fatal. After rhe enemy was beaten back, he even refused med­ical treatment for himself until the men he had protected were seen. Around h:is lightjng position were the bodies of 39 enemy soldiers. For his selfless act of courage, Corporal Jerry K. Crw11p, a native son of the Old North State, became tl1e 46th recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor.

In tJ1e holdings of tJ1c North Carolina S tate Archives is a mud-spattered letter written by a 20-year-old man from Alamance Cot1nty named Hiram "Butch" Strickland. Army Private First Class Strickland's le llcr is one of the most patriotic, most inspiring fotlers ever mailed by a fighting man of the mili­tary forces of the United Stales. What makes it unique is that he acknowledged it as his last. Somehow, he knew that his time to die in th.e hot, steamy jungles of Vietnam was at band. Ile spoke of the duty we as American have to defend freedom, and of what

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an honor it was to die for such a wonde1fol country and noble cause. He asked bis mother not to mourn for him, because be was proud to die as a soldier of the United States. A couple of days later, PFC Hiram "Butch" Strickland made the supreme sacrifice he bad foreseen in this last leller home to bis molher. Like so many Tar Heels, he died an unstmg hero.

On special occasions during the year, we take time to rec­ognize the service and sacrifices of hundreds of thousands of vet-

erans from tJ1is great state. Let us not forget tJrnt had it not been for U1e Robert Blackwells, the James Lancasters, the Jerry Crumps, the "Butch" Stricklands, and countless other veterans too numerous to mention, we would like not enjoy the freedoms we have today. Our freedom was purchased at a high price. The least we can do is honor those, both living and dead, who paid that price for us.

Tar Heels in Korea 1950 By Lt. Col. K. H. Bailey, Jr.

I n 1950, Battery A of the 64th Field Artillery Battalion, firing in direct support of the I st Battalion, 35th [nfantry Regiment,

25th Infantry Division, was manned by Tar Heels in several impo1iant positions in the Masan Perimeter. Shelled by North Korean mortars late in the evening of 2 September, the Chief of the 3d Howitzer Section, Sgt. Mitchell of Asheville, got tired of receiving enemy band grenades tossed into his gun pil. Unable to take it any longer, he rose up from behind the parapet, shouting, "You SOBs, we got some of those, too!" He began throwing some of the grenades back, including some of his own. His crew­men quickly dragged him back down into the gunpil where be finally simmered dovm. The mor­tar shelling and grenade tossing finally ceased.

But the orth Koreans were not fi nished. The next morning at 0300 hours, 3 September, U1ey launched a company-sized assault against Battery A. Two wiremen, both Tar Heels, Sgt. Herbert L. Rawls, Jr., and Sgt. Joseph R. Purselcy, were splicing wire to insure the passing of fire com­mands and the maintaining of contact with ballalion headquar­ters, including the FDC, with the battery executive officer, Lt. K. II. Bailey of Zebulon.

fi re their small anns at the enemy and, at the same time, load his howitzer with Fuze Time set for 2.2 seconds. Bailey knew he could not fire the usual point-detonating fuze since rounds not smashing the enemy would continue their flight and land amongst friendly infantry at the front. These time rounds landed just beyond rhe 1orth Koreans, so Bailey fired successive rounds at Time 0.0! These rounds burst 50 feet in front of Uie muzzles, scattering the North Koreans.

When dawn broke, it was found that the North Koreans had scrawled some gobblydegook on rhe shields of three howitzers. Nol comprehending the ~Jortb Korean language, Bailey did not

know but what the scrawls indi­cated boobytrapping. So, in the best tradition of officer-EM rela­tionships, at least in the Field Artillery, Bailey had foxholes dug behind the lanyards of each of the three pieces and, laying them to fire to the rear at an unoccupied hill, he j umped into each hole and fired the pieces. The pieces were not boobytrapped, so Bailey sur­vived to fight another day.

Gen. Barth, Division Artillery Commander, and some of his staff inspected Battery A's position. An interpreter on his stalT stated the scrawls listed the platoon and squad of the North Koreans who had "captured" the howitzers. Instead, their clumsy scrawls became their epitaphs. Battery A was saved this day with the help of brave and ski lled Tar Heels.

Sergeants Rawls and

With Sgt. Francis and his assistant control operator at the firing chart standing by for possi­ble fire missions, Lt. Bailey ran outside to see what was holding up firing. The North Koreans had overrun three howitzer positions, and MJSgt Rufus Cole of Chapel Hill was crouching with his 2d Howitzer Section crew awaiting an attack on his section. Lt Bailey stood in the gun pit of Section 3 and directed the Chief of Section, Corporal Cecil Meares of Richmond, Va., lo have his crew

Lt. K. IJ. Bailey pauses 111lli/e loading a 105111111 howtizer with ll rou11d 011 which is inscribed: "To Wu from Tommye Lou."

Purseley received posthumously Bronze Stars. Bronze Stars also were awarded to the battery's two medics, Attikouzel and Beaton, for their skilled medical care of the wounded under fire.

WINTER 2000 PAGESEVllN

My Friend Laura's Great Grandfather By Wayne Campbell

Past President, North Carolina Military Historical Society

John Wilson Crowell was born in Union Coullty, North Caro­lina, on a beautiful Spring day, 9 April 1819. John Wilson was

tbe fourth of eleven children born to Catherine and John Crowell, who themselves were born in the late 1700s in rural North Carolina farm country. John Wilson bad an ordinary childhood, as ordinary as one could be with six sisters and four broU1ers. On I January 1852, John was married to Eliz.a Jane Price when he was aged 32 and she was aged 22. This union produced seven children, four girls and three boys, born between December 1852 and August 1862.

Their children were named Mary Elizabeth, Margaret Drucilla, David Monroe, Elias Hampton, Martha Jane, Melissa Catherine, and John Lee.

The last born, John Lee, was the father of nine children, one being Letha Gertrude who was the mother of my good friend, Laura Winslow.

Let's go back to the late 1850s. John Wilson was an excel­lent fanner within his community, a good husband and father, and provided well for his family. He, like thousands of other fellow

orth Carolinians, beard the caU to arms in the early 1860s and so at the not so young age of 44 enlisted into Company D, known as the "North Carolina Defenders." 37th Regiment, at Camp Holmes, not 100 far from Wilmington. The day was 14 November .1863. Probably a ve1y cool and dreary day as days on the coast ofNorU1 Carolina can be that time of year, but the crops were in for the year and it was time to do this duty, his duty. Surely the war would be over by tbc next Spring.

The 37th Regiment, North Carolina Troops, was organized at Camp Fisher near High Point, where it was mustered into state service for 12 months' active duty on 20 November 1861. Shortly thereafter the regiment moved to Camp Mangum near Raleigh, where it was transferred to Confederate service effective I January 1862. The regiment remained at Camp Mangum until I 0 January, when it was ordered to New Bero. At that time tbe reg­iment was reported to be "imperfectly" armed and "considerably reduced in effective men by sickness, principally measles and mumps."

This was U1e unit into wbicb John Wilson enlisted, not much unlike all of the other units in the South needi11g men in the early 1860s. By the time he enlisted and reached d1e 37th Regiment, John was becoming a part of a unit which had already been through much fighting, including tbe Battle of Hanover Courthouse, the Battle of Gaines' Mill, the Battle of Second Manassas, the Battle of Fredricksburg, and, of course, the more infamous ballles at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.

This story is about Jobn Wilson Crowell and the impact he made on his family, his state, and his country dirough the letters he wrote home from the war.

By 4 August 1863, U1c Army of Northern Virginia occupied the Rapidan River line, and the Army of the Potomac bad taken position on the Rappahannock River. At about that time, General Cadmus M. Wilcox was promoted and placed in command of the division of General William D. Pender, who died of wounds

PAGEEIGllT

received at Gettysburg. Tbus the 37th Regiment was a part of James JI. Lane's brigade, of Wilcox's division, of Ambrose P. Hill 's corps. These are names well known in the Confederacy and John's chain-of-command.

It took John no more than seven days from the time of bis enlistment until he was in camp near Orange Courthouse, Virginia, and the writing of his first surviving letter to his wife and family. Even though John was an excellent writer and had beautiful penmanship (for a male and certainly under the condi­tions obvious at the time), some words can not be determined because of the age of the original paper and ink. (Upper and lower case letters remaiJl as written.) Notwithstanding, it reads as follows:

Camp near Orange Courthouse, Virginia 21 November 1863

Jane 1 am well al this time. Hoping these lines may find you at/ enjoying tire same blessing. I am enjoying my _ _ ve1y wet/ to what __ . It is true I miss your company and the Children especiafly them two little ones that was always playing aro1111d my knees. Mary and Margaret are you trying to be smart girls and be nice behaved and people will think more of you. David and Elias I would like to be at home to take you out to the field with me but I can~ soon. I hope you will be smart boys. You must 1101 say nor do any thing that is bad for bad men and bad acts has caused this cruel war and Martha will you be a smart girl too and I hope some time I will get home yet. May God bless preserve y ou at/ no~v. Dear children you must not run about 011 Sunday. You may go to meeting when you can but listen to what the good people are saying and t1y to be good too then if ever 1 gel back it will make me so glad to see you at/ good and smart children but if T never gel back ii wit/ be so much the better/or you no body loves bad children. Jane this is/our letters that I have wrote but I no you have not had time to get more than two of them but 1 mean to write often for a -while. I wrote one day before yesterday stating how T wanted you to do about hiring a hand. it was wrote the 19th of this month if get this and not that when you write lei me know whether you got ii or nol. The letter you sent to Hampton come lo him last night. I was glad to see ii. I am in the __ with Jamina __ with llampton. Thomas J. Muffin, W. Pc1cker Calaway __ Milas __ they are at/ well __ there is no more talk of desertion here but all in good spirits. Jane be sure and write --

General Robert E. Lee had retired to tJ1e Rapidan River, after battles at Rappahannock Bridge and Kelly's Ford. On 26 November, tbe Federal commander, General George G. Meade, began moving his am1y to cross Ute Rapidan below Lee's posi­tion, and Lee shifted his forces eastward to intercept the Federals. By 29 November, Lee's men were strongly entrenched at Mine Run, and Meade, unable to locate a vulnerable point against which to launch an attack, also began entrenching. On the morn-

RECALL

ing of 2 December, Lee sent an attack force composed of Wilcox's and Richard H. Anderson's divisons against what he believed to be an exposed Federal flank; however, when the Confederates moved out they discovered that the Federal army had retreated. A pursuit was undertaken, but Meade recrossed the Rapidan safely. Both annies then went into winter quarters. Lane's brigade returned to a camp it had established earlier at Liberty Mills on the Rapidan. There it spent the winter of 1863-1864. It is not known whether or not John was involved in the action just described. If he were, it was with less than two weeks of training or involvement in the war effort. The second surviv­ing letter from John to his wife and family is as follows:

17 January 1864

Dear Wife. With feelings of gratitude I can tell that I am bless with common health at this time hoping these lines may find you al/ well and doing well. It me much satisfaction to hear that you are gelling along well with your affairs as well as you are. I hope the hand you have got will be a good __ one and will do her work in good order. You will have to keep her employed at what ever you think will be to the best advantage. I have no news to write at this lime. We are living very well at this time. If we by any thing we pay high for it. I bought one pint of molasses and paid three dollars for them. I will not oblige to buy them things but I wanted some new to eat. We had give out seeing William come but we got a letter from your _ _ which said he would come if he was able. Jane if you have a chance to send me any thing I don 1 want you to send me much/or fear it might get lost. You need not send me any clothing at all nor blankets nor any kind of bed clothing. Betsy says she will start home in the morning. If she will I will send another cap for one of the little boys. I want to hear the news from home. Write if there is any sickness or any thing new among the neighbors. I have been looking now a night or two for a letter and will look till/ gel one. I want to hear at least once a week from home. I will state there that Hampton Price is dead __ . The boys here with me is well. There some scattering sickness here in camps. Milas Byron. is expecting to start home in a day or two. 1 wrote you a letter 011 last Sunday and started it on Monday. l wrote some of it for the Children and will not write much to them in this but they must not forget to have their Books and be good and smart Children. You must not get mad at each other and say ugly words and send me all the good news you no. I hear that people is getting out of __ at home about this way. I would like to know if if is so. I have nothing more at present to write but Remains your Husband until Death Farewell. J. W Crowell.

Written wnile still in Winter Quarters arc the next two sur­viving letters:

March the 20th, 1864

Dear Wife I received your letter dated 13th last night. it found me well as common. __ git tis the Children will be __ . There is 110 news here of any importance. times is quiet now but we no 110/ when a movement may be made. I had pabiful sight of seeing a man shot last Friday. I wrote you a letter on last Sunday if I mind right the same day you wrote to and am writ­ing on Su11day to day. I hope you are writing about the same time to me. I do not no the reaso11 why your letters comes to me

sooner than mine goes to you. the mail comes here late every evening and leaves every morning. Your letters gets here from Friday till Sunday eve11i11g after they are wrote. Some limes l write in the week some times on Sunday. It may be that! do not no what day to write to suit the mail from Charlotte to Albemarle. il might I hey have to ly by at Charlotte to suit the Mail. I would like to no if you got salt and how much you got for the money you sent off. I am glad you have paid for the land and got wright/or it and like to hear that you are getting __ so well with the plowing. I hope you may be b/est with health and strength and seasons to make good crops and my desire to him that rules over all is/or me to be there to help gather it. I must tell you that furloughs is stopped but some thinks they will start again but these things is ve1y uncertain. when you write again give me the news of the neighbor hood. Write !f Franklin expects lo get home yet I would like to hear from him again and the times is where he is. I want to know if you will have com and wheat enough to do and roughness enough. Children I want you to remember me and be good children and mind your Mothe1: Martha I want you to get well and be a smart girl. No more but remains your husband. J. W Crowell.

April the 19th, 1864

Dear Wife, I am well as common hoping these lines may find you all enjoying a Like blessing. l have put off writing for two or th1·ee days waiting a letter from you but has-got none si11ce the 3rd of April. I looked for a letter from Friday night until Monday night. So I thought this morning I would write with out waiti11g longer. I have heard that Thomas had been there and that Franklin was at home which made me more anxious to hear the 11ews. Some times I think you have wrote and the letter has failed lo get here but I shall look in hopes until I get one. The weather is cold and unsellled yet we can see snow on the Mountai11s yet and not a bud swelled on the trees yet. I don 'l see furrow run for planting corn yet there is 1101 much sickness here. For army news I can't say much about ii but it appears there is some preparations for a movement some way. Both i1ifantry and cavaltJ' is gathering around this place there may be an a/lack before long. I would like lo know how you are getting along with the farm and how the potatoes held out a11d how the wheat a11d oats is doing and if wheat and corn plenty to till harvest. I want to hear how Franklin got to stay at home and if the Children knew him and many other things. I must say a.few words to the __ children. David and Elias are you sm011 boys? Do you say any bad words? If have not must not begin. If you have you must not say any more. The good man will be angry with you if you do bad and say bad words. Mary and Margaret you must be good too. Don i say any foolish words but behave like nice little women and folks will think the more of you. Study your books all of you and learn to talk nice. Martha you must be smart and talk pretty too. Melissa you are my pretty girl. You must tell John Lee pappy wants to see him. Children when Mother writes again you must tell me if you will mind what I tell you and tell me what you have done and learn to write yourselves. Nothing more at present. Jane my prayer is that we may be blest to meet again. J. W Crowell.

The brigade was still in camp at Liberty Mills on the morn­ing of 4 May 1864, when the Anny of the Potomac, under the strategic direction of General Ulysses Simpson Grant, began

PAGE NINE

crossing the lower Rapidan and entered a thicket and vine choked woods of dense scrub oak and pine known as the Wilderness. When the news of Grant's crossing was received, Lee ordered Hill's corps to move eastward from Orange Court House by the Orange Plank Road while Richard Stodden Ewell's corps, south of Morton's Ford, moved in a parallel direction on Hill 's left on the Orange Turnpike. James Longstreet's corps, near Gordons­ville, was instructed to move up on ll iU's right on the Cartharpin road. On the morning of5 May, Hill's column, with Henry Heth's division in the lead, came upon Federal cavalry near Parker's Store and succeeded in forcing the enemy back. Immediately north of Hill, on the Orange turnpike, Ewell encountered the enemy in corps strength. Hill ordered Heth's division to deploy in line of battle across the Orange Plank Road and directed Wilcox to lead his division to deploy in line of battle across the orange Plank Road and directed Wilcox to lead his division off to the left and make contact with Ewell 's right. Wilcos posted Alfred m. Scales' and Samuel McGowan's brigades on a low eminence known as Chewning Plateau and moved his other two brigades, under Lane and Edward L. Thomas, further to the left to link up with Ewell.

At 4 p.m. on 5 May, elements of the Federal TT Corps assaulted Hcth 's Linc in sucb strength that Heth was forced to commit his reserve brigade and call for reinforcements. Scalcs's and McGowan's brigades were ordered to Heth's assistance and were followed shortly by the brigades of Lane (with the excep­tion of the 37th Regiment). After severe fighting, the outnum­bered defenders were able to stabilize their precarious position. During the battle, the 37th Regiment, in position on the Orange Plank Road, " lay still, watched and listened to the heaviest mus­ketry it bad ever heard; as Wilcox went in, the whole Wilderness roared like fire in a canebrake." At nightfall the regiment rejoined Lane's brigade, which was placed in reserve behind Scales' brigade to the right of the Orange Plank Road.

At 5 a.m. the next morning, Federal columns struck Hill 's line in the center and left flank. Thirteen Federal brigades fell upon Hill's eight brigades with such sudddenness and violence that there was scarcely time for resistance, and the entire Confederate line fell back in disorder. The second line was unable to hold also, and a general rout followed. Only the arrival of Longstreet's corps, moving up at the double-quick to reinforce Hill, prevented the collapse of the right wing of Lee's anny. The Federal assault was blunted and driven back, and Hill 's men, after rcfo1ming behind Longstreet, were dispatched to the vicini­ty of Chewning Plateau to close a gap between Longstreet and Ewell. Late on the evening of 7 May it became apparent that Grant's army was on the march southeastward to Spotsylvania Court House, and through the night Lee's men pushed in the same direction in a race with the Federals to that inlportant cross­road. The race was narrowly won by the Confederates on the morning of 8 May, and "a strong" defensive line was quickly constructed. Hill's corps, under temporary command of General Jubal An.derson Early, was pos itioned on the right of the line; Ewell 's corps was in the center in a U-shaped, convex salient known as the "Mule Shoe;" and Longstreet's corps, under tem­porary command of General Richard II. Anderson, was on the left. Lane's brigade was on the left of Hill's (Early 's) line and in contact with Ewell 's right. Ewell 's "Mule Shoe" position came under abrupt, violent attack on the morning of 12 May and, while

PAGE TEN

the Confederate defenders, aided by reinforcements, held back the Federals in a desperate mclcc, a new line was constructed across the base of the salient. During the night the original line was abandoned and the Federal attacks ceased. The 37th Regiment, in wbat General Lane described as "one of the grand­est sights I ever saw," charged and overran a six-gun Federal bat­tery. ln a clubbed-muskets-and-bayonet free-for-all with the enemy, tl1c regiment captured two stands of colors. For those accomplishments it paid dearly, losing 22 men killed, 33 wound­ed, and 40 missing.

The next letter from John describes some of the above action and his personal involvement in the war effort, certainly at Spotsylvania Court House.

May the 15th, 1864

Through the Mercies of God I am yet alive and well. I lzave been in two fights. One of them lasted the most of the day. The other lasted till late in the evening bur we was not engaged with small arms all the lime but it was a severe fire from a batte1y in the engagement. Our Captain was killed and several others. I saw the captain and three others fall at the same time. We Lejl our camps on the 4th of May and on the sixth early in the morn­ing we got engaged. Hampton got wounded. I got lost off the company at the start and did 11otfi11d it till next evening but fought with other troops that day. I cannot give you much of a hislo1J1 of the flglzt at this time. The fight has been going on for ten or twelve days bw only by portions of the army at a time but I know we have killed a great many more of them than they have of us.

I have 11ot 111uch time to write. I only write you this time to let you k11ow tliat I am still living. If tliis letter does not start today and I live, 1 will finish it out. This is about ten o clock Sunday morning and a fight is expected every minute. Farewell Dear Wife and may God preserve us. J. W Crowell

(The captain referred to above as "falling" was Captain Hcmy C. Grady, a 24-year-old farmer from Union County, North Carolina, who during his short three years served in the "effort" was captured at the Battle of Hanover Court House, imprisoned and exchanged all within six weeks. He was then wounded ten months later at Chancellorsville, returned to duty three months after that, and then died from wounds received at Spotsylvania Court House on 12 May 1864.)

After several more unsuccessful attempts against the Confederate line at Spotsylvania Court House, Grant began mov­ing eastward. Lee then shifted his am1y to the North Anna River al a point just north of Hanover junction, where he blocked the Federal route of advance. At Jericho Mills on 23 May, Wilcox's division was engaged with the federal V Corps under General Gouverneur Kemble Warren as it cross the North Anna. During the battle the 37th Regiment lost one man killed, 21 wounded, and two missi11g.

The center of Lee's line was then anchored on the North Anna with the flanks drawn back so that the line formed an inverted Y. Grant crossed additio11al forces on 24 May and moved against both wings of the Confederate arrny; however, he was unable to push back the Confederate center. With his atmy dan­gerously divided into three parts and separated by the river, Grant found it expedient lo withdraw, and during the night of 26-27 May, 01e F'ederals recrossed the North Anna and moved south-

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eastward to the Pamunkey. Another letter from John reflects these thoughts.

Hanover Courthouse, VA May the 27th, 1864

Dear Wife. I can inform you /hat I am Still among the living enjoyin common health that I received yours of the 15th. I was glad to hear you was all well but was son y to hear Father is so weakly. We have moved 15 or 20 miles nearer richmondfrom where we first came on __ fighting. We are now in a bout 30 miles of richmond. I have wrote two short letters before this. Since I wrote them we have lost one man killed and several wounded. We have been in line of battle about twenty four days. I am getting tired of it but there is not telling when it will end. There is skirmis.fighting going on now. I no not how __ we may be engaged. You must not think hard of my short letters. I am scarce of paper and has 110 stamps. I will have to frank my letters. You will have lo pay the postage. 1 wa11t you still lo write me. I will still keep a little paper to write a few lines on to let you no that I am still living provided I still do live. So Farewell. J. W Crowell.

On 30 May, under orders from Lee, Early moved to allack the Federal left at Bethesda Church. The attack fai led to tum the Federal left but revealed that the enemy was moving once again to the Confederate rig ht.

The two armies began concentrating at Cold Harbor, where new fighting broke out on I June. The next day two of Hill 's divi­sions, commanded by Wilcox and General William Mahone, were ordered to leave their pos itions on the left of the Confederate line and go to the support of Anderson on the right. After taking part witlt two of his brigades in a successful attack on Turkey Hi ll , Wilcox was ordered to extend the Confederate line lo with in a half mile o f the Chickahominy River. On 3 June, Grant launched a massive and murderously unsuccessful general assault against the six-mile-long Confederate position. Only Wilcox's division, on the right extremity of the line, was not engaged in the battle.

The two armies settled into defensive positions, where they remained unti l Grant began moving south toward the James River on 12 June.

Battle lines ten miles east of Richmond June the 12th, 1864

Dear Wife, through the mercies of God I am blest health and strength to write a few lines this Sabbath morning to let you no that I am still on the land and amongst the living __ . the lord has been gracious to you in your troubles and __ put your __ in him and despair not. we have had no general fight s ince I wrote last. 1 wrote on the 6th of J1111e. our lines and the __ are in a short distance of each other. The skim1ishers and shmpshooters keeps a continual firing eve1y day at each other. They are so near our lines that the balls keeps flying over us and among us that have to keep continually behind our breast works. Almost every day some man is killed or wounded by their balls in passing about for water __ . l have looking for a letter from you for a day or two. I hope I soon will get one. I want to no how you are going to get your harvesting done. You don i know how well I would like to change the Battle lines for the harvest field bw lam here and l 110 not how much longer l

WINTER 2000

will have to stay. I pray god to give us peace and let us get home once more. We are faring ve1y well in the way of provi­sions. We get sugar and coffee enough to do us and meat a plenty. Thomas and __ is well. __ Helms is well. 1 wrote in last __ at. the Parker boys as far as 1 knew I have heard since Alexander was gone home and John was pretty bad off.

1 do hope the Children will lly to do well at home and at Sunday school. it does me good to hear they are doing well. I hope the time will come when I can go home and be with them and see how they do but life is mighty uncertain here. it will only be through the providence of God that we will see each other again. I hear all the boys to seventeen has been called. I wants to 110 if ii takes Isiah and how __ Fathers is getting their work done. /fear it is a bad chance about saving wheat so many in the neighbor hood that can not save their own but still 1 hope there will be none lost. l have no __ al present. my ink is bad but maybe you ca11 make out to read it. Jane t1y to keep in good spirits and trust in the Lord and try to bring up the chil­dren in the fear of .. .

The next teller was the last surviving letter written by John to his wife and family.

Battle lines ten miles east of Richmond June the 14th, 1864

Dear Wije. I have just received and read your letter dated the 29th. It found me well as common. We are in line of battle by our breast work. There has been rite smart fighting for several days. Early yesterday morning the yankees made a charge on our men and were drove back. They came in about three h1111-dred of us on __ ever since we are prepared for them to mak.e a charge on us al any time but they seem to be a little __ about coming. They have a great many more men than we have. While I am writing every few minutes a ball sings over our heads but we are behind our breast work. You wanted to know how I was f aring. I have not suffered for any thing to eat yet and I have stood the marches and exposure of the weather bet­ter than I or you expected. we have been moving __ for a

time. John Parker was wounded in the head about the 23rd of May. He went to the hospital and I have not heard from him since. Alexander Parker was wounded on the I 3th of May. lie went to the hospital and! have not heard from him lately. There has been rite smart loss in officers s ince the fight begun. We have a good many in our regiment. Our Capt is killed. Our colonel is take11 prisoner and our general was wounded through the thigh about the 2nd of May. Jane you said you was almost out of heart. it will not do for you lo get out of heart. It will make matters worse and what would the Children do if was to get out of heart and give up. Even if l never get home again it is best to cheer up and look to the Lord. he has promised to be a husband lo the widow and a Father to the orphan. You said you wanted me to try to get detailed to go home to cut wheat but there is 110 chance at al/for that. I hope the Children learn well and behave nice at Sunday school. Tell the friends and brothers abolll Bethel to remember me in their Prayers __ . l remain your lovi11 husba11d and Father until death. J W. Crowell

General Grant has begun his move south on 12 June, and General Lee followed on 13 June and made contact with the enemy at Riddell 's Shop the same day. A defensive line was

!'AGEE.LE.VEN

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established, but no general engagement followed. Grant then crossed Lhe James and moved against Petersburg. Hill 's corps remained north of the James until ordered to move to Petersburg, where il arrived on 18 June and went into position near Globe Tavern, on the extreme right of the Confodcratc defensive sys­tem. On 22 June, Lane's brigade took part io a successful engage­ment on the Jerusalem Plank Road that drove the Federals back in confusion and prevented them from gaining a lodgment on the vital Petersburg & Weldon Railroad.

On 25 June, Lane's and McGowan's brigades of Wilcox's division were sent back north of the James to relieve two brigades ofHeth's division, and the 37th Regiment was engaged at Gravel Hill on 28 July.

On 16 August, the entire brigade was involved in fighting at Fusse ll's Mill (the second battle of Deep Bottom), where the Federals made their second abortive attempt to break through the Confederate defenses. otwithstanding, some 2,000 men from U1e Confederacy were casualties. Some 2,000 men and nine can-

non were captured from the enemy, but the records also simply reflect that Joft11 Wilson Cro111elf, great-grandfather of my friend, Laura, 111as killed ill this battle and died 18 August 1864 just east of Rich111011d, Virgillia. Jolin Wilson Cro111ell 111as 45 years old. His wife, Jane, 111as just 35 years old with seven young children, ages bet111ee11 two and 12.

Had he and thousands more like him only been able to hold on for another year ... :\'lay God continue to rest their souls.

Certain information was used from the following resources: Acmal letters of John Wilson Crowell now owned by Laura Winslow. Tile Photographic History oflhe Civil War, Volume 5, published by The Blue and

Grey Press. The West Point Arias of America11 Wars. Volume I, published by Frederick A.

Prneger, Publishers. North Carolina Troops: 1861-1865, published by orth Carolirut Archives and

History. The CM/ War Ba11/efield Guide, Second Edition, published by Houghton Miffiin

Company.

I The Military Must Revive Its Warrior Spirit I The U.S. military is having a hard time finding and keeping good men. Despite retention bonuses of S60,000 and more, this year the Air Force again will suffer an excessive loss of trained pilots. Naval aviation faces a similar situation. The Army has fai led to meet its recruiting goals for many occupational specialties, including some in the combat arms, even with offers of extreme­ly generous incentives. More graduates of our service academies and military colleges are choosing not to pursue a military career. The mainstream media and professional military journals are fill ed with stories about pervasive low morale affecting the readi­ness and capabili ties of our forces.

The issue is not money, plenty of which has been thrown at the problem. Neither does the prob-lem stem from too many deploy-

targeted as no Longer relevant to accomplishing the objectives of war.

In fact, war itself is losing its meaning among the current crop of both uniformed and civilian leaders. Few of them fought in any of the "dirty wars" like World War II, Korea, or Vietnam, and their vision of U.S. national security regards the possibility of war as a remote one-after all, the U.S. has no "peer competi­tor" against which to tight a war.

The word war bas become a lmost unspeakable. Now it is heard most often in the context of"operations other t11an war." To be sure, many such operations arc valid applications of U.S. mil­itary strength in support of national security objectives. But they

do not fulCill wbal soldiers see as their reason for being.

ments, fam ily separations, or lack of so-called quality-of-life programs. Soldiers like to go and do what sol­diers are trained to do. They under­stand that hardships arc part of the work they have chosen, and most will tell you that the best "quality of

Editor's comment: This is an article written by a retired Army General. The aiticle speaks much trnth. It addresses the question: "What does win mean?" This question was first raised in the Korean War and is unanswered in every war since then.

Soldiers sec their relevance as warriors being questioned. They are told that the technologists are going to give them an easy way to fight, that "situational awareness" is more important than weapons systems,

life" program is to keep their aircraft or tanks running and give them the ammunition and fuel so that they can train and deploy. Nor is it the lure of the economy and all the good jobs out there. The willingness to sacrifice is sti ll an attribute of the soldier 's life. Milita1y families understand what soldiers really need, and although more money and bettei· housing are important, those are not what drives the soldier to want to " be all he can be ."

Part of the problem, in fact, is that many of the current mil­itaiy leaders do not sec the real problem. You can' t fool the troops. They know that U1e military as an institution is being eroded. The American military culture, established through two centuries of rradition, is under attack like it has never been before. The warrior is being overtaken by the technologist, and in the pursuit of opportunity for all, U1e fighting elites are now being

PAGE TWELVE

that simulation is a substitute for field training. Fascination with technology is leading to a silver­bullet mentality and a belief that anyone can be a warrior- just put the cursor on the target on your computer screen and click the mouse. Despite all the rhetoric about all that is being done for the warrior, those who want to be real wanfors feel betrayed. Tbey signed on to be part of the force that clashes with and destroys the enemy. They know the risks of war, but never expected that want­ing to be warriors would pose a risk to their military careers.

Military leaders, it seems, have bcn co-opted by social engi­neers whose agenda is to promote "equality" railicr than to pre­pare forces for the next war. anyone can be a warrior if standards are lowered enough, and silver-bullet technology turns warfare into just another video game anyone can "play." This attitude

Continued 011 page 24

RECALL

Lawrence O'Bryan Branch -Statesman and Soldier

By Thomas W. H. Alexander

Dear Reade1; Picture this. It is 26 September 1862. You are standing on

Fayetteville Street near tlze State Capitol. The Governor is pres­ent as is the mayor of the city. In addition, there is a military escort of 1,200 soldiers and numerous citizens of the Capitol City. In fact, it is probably the biggest public turnoul in Raleigh since a visit by He111y Clay in 1844. The city's stores and busi­nesses are closed and church bells have been tolling/or the past two hours. You walch as this assemblage moves slowly eastward down New Bem Avenue to the city cemetery for !he funeral of Brigadier General Lawrence 0 'B1yan Branch, killed in battle a few days before at Sha1psburg where that terrible battle had just been fought.

A few months late1; in February 1863, the legislature will appoint a "Branch Monumental Association" wilh the mandate to erect a monument to the 111emo1y of the late General Branch at any suitable spot in Capitol Square.

Who was Lawrence 0 'B1yan Branch? Why, in death, was he accorded this outpouring of public respect and admiration? This article will explore briefly his short bu/ eventful life and caree1:

Lawrence O'Bryan Branch was born on a farm near Enfield in Halifax County on 28 November 1820. Ile was U1e youngest of six children and by the age of five his mother was dead. A year later his father, Joseph, moved the fami­ly to land which he had inherited on the Duck River in Tennessee. Jn 1827, his father and his e ldest brother d ied. Shortly thereafter, th e children were brought back LO North Carolina by their uncle and guardian, John Branch. At this time, John Branch was a United Stales Senator from North Carolina.

entered the sophomore class at Princeton University and graduat­ed two years later when he was 18 years o ld. At this time, there was concern about his health which had never been particularly good. Jn 1838, he moved to Florida where he spent U1e winter with his brother near Tallahassee. His health improved and he went to Tennessee where he attended Cambridge Law School for 18 monU1s. It was during this time that bis interest in poLitics began to manifest itself. Jn I 840, he returned to Florida and in 1841 received his license to practice Jaw in that state.

With continuing concerns about his health, relatives and friends urged him to return to Tennessee, but he refused. lie served six months as aide-de-camp for General Lee Reid fighting

the Seminole Indians and became ill. Upon recovery, he practiced law in Tallahassee until 1843.

On a trip to New York Tn June 1843, he met his future wife, Nancy Haywood Blount of Bertie County, North Carolina. He married Nancy in Washington, North Carolina, on 22 April 1844. The couple spent the summer at Jones Springs in Warren County and in U1e fa ll moved to Florida.

During the next several summers, U1e Branches returned to North Carolina. In March 1844, he was appointed a dele­gate from Florida to the National Democratic Convention Lo be held in Baltimore. In September 1848, he pur­c hased a lot in Raleigh. He closed out his bus iness in Florida that winter and moved to Raleigh, whereupon he received his license to practice law. He settled on Hillsborough Street, two blocks from the State Capito l. He soon became actively involved in democratic politics. ln 1852, he was chosen presi­dent of the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad Company by its shareholders.

In 1828, John Branch accepted a cabinet position as Secretary of the Navy and soon thereafter moved the fami ly to

General Lawrence O'Brya11 Bra11cli In 1855, be resigned as president of

the rai lroad and ran for Congress. After winning the Congressional election, he Photo of ponrai1 courccsy of Annistead Jones Maupin

Washington, D.C. John Branch saw Lo it that the cbildren received their education. In Washington, Young Lawrence was tutored by a series of scholars, one of whom was Samuel P. Chase, later to become Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. John Branch ren1med to 1 orth Carolina in 1831 subsequent to which young Lawrence received schooling and tutoring in Raleigh and Louisburg.

ln January 1835, he was sent to the University of NorU1 Carolina where he stayed for one year. Jn October 1835, be

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was commissioned a Representative to the United States Congress on 14 August 1855, and entered the House of Representatives o n 4 December. Branch was reelected to this position in August 1857. Jn 1859, President Buchanan offered to Branch the office of Postmaster General. Realizing that Buchanan's administration wouJd soon end, Branch refused the position. Branch was again elected to Congress in 1859 with the prospects of civil war looming o n the horizon. During these last years prior to the war, Branch worked hard to promote unity within the Democratic Party. Upon his return to Washington in

PAGE THJRTEEN

1860, he wrote his wife that he did not expect to remain there Jong due to pending dissolution of the Union. When Howe ll Cobb resigned in December as Secretary of the Treasury, President Buchanan offered the vacated post to Branch, which was declined upon the grounds that he did not want to vacate bis seal in Congress at such a critical period.

When Congress adjourned on 4 March 1861, Branch returned to Raleigh and actively engaged in the secession move­ment for the first time. The die was now cast for Branch to switch from the role of politician to that of soldier.

Battle of New Bern ln April 1861, Branch had enlisted in the "Raleigh Rifles"

as a private. Less than a month later, he was appointed Quartc1master and Paymaster General with the rank of Colonel in the North Carolina State Troops. By September, he had resigned this position and soon there­afier was commissioned Colonel of the 33d North Carolina State Troops. This regiment trained in Raleigh. l.n November 1861 , Branch was com­missioned Brigadier General to suc­ceed General D. H. Hill as command­er of the defenses of an area in coastal eastern North Carolina which was ultimately to extend from Roanoke Island to New Bern. There was very little to qualify Branch militarily for this command. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, he bad been a prominent Democratic politician with no formal military training. Branch's military training was to turn out to be "on the job experience" complimented by his intellect and personal courage.

Branch. This was not to be Branch's finest hour. To Branch's credit, he had immediately set out to strength­

en the defenses of New Bern. However, appeals to lbe Con­federate government in Richmond for additional troops and sup­plies went unheeded. Efforts to secure laborers and tools to sup­plement work oo defensive positions by appealing to the local populous were only slightly more successful. The result of this was that, as the date of the battle approached, Branch's defensive positions cast of New Bern were incomplete and his main defen­sive position, a series of earth works nicknamed the "Croatan Works," was too long to be occupied effectively by the number of troops which Branch had under his command. As the Union regiments approached, Branch set up his defensive positions

about four miles above the Croatan Works, roughly six miles cast of New Bern.

On the date of the battle, 14 March 1862, Branch's left flank was anchored by a small earth works known as Ft. Thompson on the banks of the Neuse River. IL extended south­ward approximately a mile and a quarter, crossing the Atlantic and North Carolina railroad, Westhersby Road, and ending in a swampy area in the v icinity of Bryces Creek. On this defensive line from left to right was the 27th N.C., 37th N.C., 7th N.C., 35th N.C., a militia unit astride the railroad in the v icinity of Wood's Brickyard, the 26th N.C., and cle­ments o f the 2d Nort11 Carolina Cavalry in the vicinity of Weathersby Road supported by two cannon. The 33d N.C. was placed in reserve fur­ther up the railroad. There was a gap in the Confederate lines in the vicini­ty of an old brick ki ln on the right flank of the militia, and Branch ordered two cannon to be placed in this spot. Unfmtunatcly, this work was not finished before the battle began.

General Ambrose Burnsides departed Norfolk in late January 1862 in command of a large expeditionary force with orders to invade coastal North Carolina. This formidable force consisted of 12,000 men and some 80 ships of varying sizes and desc1iption. His specific orders were to capture Roanoke Island, seize or block the

Grave of General Bnmclt i11 Raleigh City Cemetery. After a rainy evening, Union

forces, which had been advancing over land, were opposite Lhe

Confederate lines. The attack began on the Confederate left by General Foster's regiments but went nowhere. Unfortunately, General Reno was able to exploit the weakness in the center of the Confederate line, capturing t11e two 24-pound cannon which Branch had sent to the brickyard and setting the militia battalion to flight. The collapse of the Coo federate center ul timately forced General Branch to issue orders for a general retreat. Considerable confusion ensued and the 26th North Carolina, which had per­formed well, only narrowly avoided capture. Branch ordered his men to Tuscarora, the nearest railroad depot, where be made arrangements to transport them to Kinston. By the late afternoon of 14 March, Burnsides' army had occupied New Bern. Over the next two days, New Bern was looted and partially burned before

canal system connecting Notth Carolina waters to Norfolk, cap­ture New Bern and Beaufort, capture or neutralize Ft. Macon, destroy as much of U1e Wilmington and Weldon Railroad 'as pos­sible, including the vital bridge near Goldsboro, and demonstrate against Raleigh or Wilmington if the risks involved were not too great.

Dy 4 February, Burnsides' expedition was in Pamlico Sound. Soon thereafter, he had taken Roanoke Island and Elizabeth City and had set his sights on New Bern. By l 2 March, Burnsides anchored at Slocum Creek about 17 miles east of New Bern and began disembarking his men.

Opposing this large and well-equipped force were approxi­mately 4,000 Confederates under the command of General

PAGE FOURTEEN RECALL

.I

•/

Burnsides could restore order. As news of the loss of New Bern spread, an accounting was

demanded, and General Gatlin, Commander in Chief of the Department of N.C., was relieved of his command. Branch sur­vived with less criticism. In fact, had Branch better covered the center of his line, the outcome probably would have been the same, given the wide disparity in num bers of men and equ.ipment in favor of the Union forces.

At this time, Branch's brigade consisted of the 7th, 18th, 28th, 33d, and 37th Regiments, along with Bunti11g's and Latbam's batteries.

Campaigning in Virginia and the Seven Days Battle In May 1862, Branch was ordered with his brigade to

Gordonsville, Virginia, to join General Ewell under the overall command of Stonewall Jackson. Ewell, with his men near Gordonsville, was in a position lo move east to reinforce General Johnston around Richmond or west lo support J~ckson in the Shenandoah Valley as needed.

On 30 May 1862, he received orders from Richmond to pro­ceed to Hanover Courthouse lo join General Johnston. Branch was to protect the Virginia Central Railroad. Besides his own Brigade, Branch had with him two additional regiments, the 12th North Carolina and the 45Lh Georgia. There he was engaged by a large force u.ndcr the command of Union General Fitz John Porter. After heavy lighting, Branch was forced to fall back toward Ashland. F01tunatcly, General Porter's superior force withdrew without pursuing Branch, which might have proved disastrous. Branch's perfom1ance received anonymous criticism which he vigorously resisted Lo the extent of identifying the source and bringing court martial proceedings against the adju­ta11t of the 37th Regiment who ultimately made a public apolo­gy to Branch.

On 31 May, General Johnston attacked McClel'land at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, but Branch's brigade was moved to Chicka­hominy and played little role in the fighting. It was here that General Johnston was so seriously wounded that he would relin­quish command of the Anny of Northern Virginia to General Robert W. Lee.

Joined by Jackson's men, Branch was then involved in heavy fighting in the vicinity of Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill. Subsequent thereto, Branch's brigade also was involved in heavy fighting at Frayser's farm and Malvern Hill.

At the close of what is now known as the Seven Days Battle, Branch had lost every field officer in his brigade except tllree. Illness forced him to rclinqujsh his command at tbe end of the battles, and he was confined to a hospital in Richmond.

Cedar Mountain While still sick with dysentery, Branch received new march­

ing orders in July. With Union General N. P. Banks marching toward Culpepper, Virginia, Jackson 's d ivisions began an advance towards Culpepper from Gordonsville. These opposing forces met in ballle at Cedar Mountain between Orange and Culpepper. Branch was still so sick that he rode in an ambulance until his men actually went into the fight. When Jackson's left gave way, Branch was ordered into the fray and was instrnmcn­tal in driving the enemy from tile field. Branch's men poured heavy lire into the enemy ranks which broke and retreated.

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Branch followed the retreating Federals to the edge of a large field where the Federal cavalry charged his brigade and also the brigade of General W. B. Taliaferro. Combined fire from the two brigades broke the charge and forced it to leave the field in dis­order. Cedar Mountain was one of Branch's finer moments when bis men passed through U1e retreating Stonewall brigade to reLicve the Federal attack on Jackson's left. BrMch had no doubt in his mind at the end of the day and wrote that the victory at Cedar Mountain was due to tl1e action of his brigade. Both Hill and Jackson praised the performance of Branch's men.

Manassas, Harper's Ferry, and Sharpsburg On 25 August, General Jackson marched his men rapidly on

the west side of the mountains and fell upon Manassas Junction, capturing considerable Union supplies. Jackson's men then joined Longstreet's corps in a line of ball le in the vicini ty of the Turnpike Road from Warrenton to Centerville. A. P. Hill 's divi­sion anchored the left of the line with Branch's brigade directly behind that of Gregg's South Carolinians on the extreme left. On 29 August, Union General Carl Schurz's division attacked Jackson's left, and Branch's live regiments saw heavy fighting as they were called upon to repel a number of Union assaults. At one point, Branch's men had to stand in the line of battle with bayonets fixed, having run out of ammunition. Ultimately, an attack on the Federal Oank by Longstreet carried the day, and the Federal army retreated in the direction of Centerville.

Lee ordered Jackson to pursue the retreating Federals, and on l September they were again in contact with the enemy in the vicinity of Chantilly. Agail1, Branch's poorly provisioned men found themselves in heavy combat until the Federals broke off the action. For a week, his men had marched a11d fought and were exhausted. However, Dranch was optimistic at this point and wrote that Washington and all ofMa1yland, "including Baltimore and all of Pennsylvania up to the Susquehanna arc at our mercy." He expressed hopes tllat the war was drawing ro a close.

Shortly tbereaft.er, Lee moved his arrny into Maryland. lt was at this point that A. P. Hill failed Lo stop his division for a rest which had been ordered by Jackson. An ensuing argument with Jackson saw HiU temporarily relieved of his command and Branch was directed to take command of the division. Branch proudly wrote as he crossed the Potomac that he was at the head of six brigades, comprising half of General Jackson's army.

Jackson was given the task of seiz ing Harper's Ferry. General Lee with Longstreet and D. H. Hill's division was to remain near the village of Sharpsburg until Jackson could accom­plish this. General McClellan learned at this time that Lee's army had been divided and marched rapidly towards Lee.

Branch had been relieved by Hill who reassumed his divi­sional command on l l September and was ordered along with Gregg's d ivision to move along the river and seize Harper's Ferry. Branch's men spent most of the night climbing surround­ing mountains and working 1heir way into the rear of the Union fortifications. By the early morning of 15 September, Harper's Ferry had been captured.

While Daniel Harvey Hill was slowing McClellan at South Mountain, General Lee was concentrating his army behind Antietam Creek at Sharpsburg. While McClellan delayed attack, Jackson began moving to support Lee. On 17 September, McClellan's forces crossed Antietam Creek and struck the

PAGE Fll'TflEN

Confederate left. This attack was unsuccessful, and McClellan's troops then attacked the center of Lee's line. Repeated efforts also were made Lo force the bridge over Antietam Creek, and the Federals moved against the right wing of General Longstreet.

Ultimately, the crossing was successful, and the enemy gained the summit of the opposing hill which had been held by Confederate General Jones. It was at this time that A. P. Hill's division arrived from Harper's Ferry and the brigades of Archer, Branch, Gregg, and Pender moved to support Jones. The progress of the enemy was arrested, and the Federals ultimately were forced to retreat.

As General Gregg and Archer conferred with General Branch about a column of Union soldiers advancing on the le ft,

a Federal sharpshooter lired a single bullet which struck Branch in the head and ki lled him instantly. Following the battle, Branch's remains were sent to Ra leigh under a military escort. This ended the short but eventful life and career of a remarkable man.

Sources: Ulndscape 7i1med Red. Stephen W. Sears, Ticknor & Fields, 1983. Staflewall Jackso11 at Cedar Mau111ailr. Robert K. Krick, The University ofNonh

Carolina Press, t 990. La"'tl'11ce O'Brya11 Bra11ch, James Shober Brawley, Master's Thesis at University

of North Carolina, 195 I. Tire News & Obsen-er, Raleigh, N.C., September 25, 1988. North Caro/illa Regi111e111s. Walter Clarie, Stale of North CaroHna, 1901. Ironclads a11d Ca/umbiatls, William R. Trotter, James F. blair, Publisher, 1898.

Longstreet and McLaws A Friendship Tested by War

A paper presented to the "Longstreet Symposium," Brenau University, 8 April 1995

By Sion H. Harrington Ill

War is unmatched in its ability to create stress. When coupled with a high degree of ambition and the sometimes painful

events inherent in life, human behavior can be negatively affect­ed. The War Between the States severely strained the friendship formed in childhood between James Longstreet and Lafayette Mclaws. Due to the intensity of Longstreet's ambition, as well as the effects of the personal and professional stresses he endured, his friendship with McLaws underwent a transformation during the course of the war, resulting in irreparable damage. This paper identifies how and why the controversy occurred, as well as its broader ramifications.

The Longstreet-McLaws relationship had its beginnings in the 1830s in the small town of Augusta, Georgia.' Jn his mem­oirs, Longstreet asserted t'hat McLaws had been "a wann person­al friend from cbildhood."2 Their strong bond of friendship trav­eled with them in 1838 as the two matriculated with the United States Military Academy's Class of 1842. McLaws remained a member of Longstreet's inner circle of friends while at the Academy.3

After graduation, both officers served in the West, as did most soldiers of the ante-helium army. When the Mexican War came, both men saw service. Longstreet, once wounded and twice brevetcd, outshined Mclaws, who experienced neither.4

Longstreet established a pattern that persisted throughout their respective careers.

Following the Mexican War, both men saw additional serv­ice on the frontier. When inter-sectional strife exploded into a national schism, both followed tl1eir hearts with their swords and supported the ir seceded native states.

Soon, lbe paths of the two old friends and comrades-in-arms crossed again, but this time in northern Virginia, and under a new flag. Neither could foresee the momentous events about to unfold

PAGE SIXT1*.!ll

over the next four years or their eITects on their longstanding friendship.

In the first months of the war, Longstreet developed a repu­tation for "poker, liquor and general revelry."5 ln early January of 1862, a tragic epidemic struck the City of Richmond, dampening the pervasive gay, patriotic spirit engendered by Confederate vic­tories in the licld. In the short span of eight days, a scarlet fever epidemic claimed three of Longstreet's young children. James and Louise Longstreet bad already buried two others some years before. "The depth of their sorrow had no Limit."6

Longstreet sobered and became more uncommunicative than ever. O f this unfortunate episode, Douglas Southall Freeman wrote of Longstreet, "From that tragic January he was a soldier and little besides."7 All with whom he came into contact noticed the change. He gave up gambling and turned more to the church.8 The long term effects this sad event had on his relationship with friends and fellow officers became apparent with time.

Lafayette McLaws, a career soldier like Longstreet, earned his commission as a Confederate major gcneraJ in May 1862 afier commendable service in three campaigns.9 Not a flashy commander, he established a commendable fighting reputation early on, based more on his dogged defensive work than on offensive aggressiveness.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1862, James Longstreet strove mightily to establish his place in the Con­federate command structure, with an eye to future advancement. Unfortunately, his deeds failed to match his ambition. His per­formance at Seven Pines proved disappointing. "He did few things correctly and none well. To make matters worse, Longstreet discredited himself by trying to shift the onus for the bungled Confederate attack onto Drigadier General Benjamin Hugcr."10 ln a 7 June letter to the convalescing Joseph E.

RECALL

Johnston, Longstreet attempted to blame I luger for the confusion and problems at Seven Pines. It became a paucm all too often repeated over the next three years.

In spite o f his mediocre showing at Seven Pines, his per­formance during the Seven Days battles won the confidence of the army's new commander, General Robert E. Lee. After a supe­rior performance al Antietam, Lee chose Longstreet over the bet­ter known Jackson as his senior sub-unit commander. 11 Though he stood second in line of succession to Lee for command of Lhe Confederacy's premier army, the appointment did not satisfy Longstreet. He desired independent army command.

llis first opportunity came with the Suffolk Campaign in early 1863. The campaign's primarily logistical focus and mediocre results did little to assuage Longstreet's desires. During the Gettysburg Campaign, he disagreed strategically and tactically with Lee, which led to a con­troversy resulting in Longstreet's inheriting most of the blame for the fai led expedition. The pressure of the resulting criticism from within the army, as well as that from the press and certain government officials in Richmond, convinced Longstreet that he needed to sep­arnte himself from this turmoil. Away from Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, he could more freely pursue his ambition for independent command and, hopefully, vindicate himself in the process for what he perceived as unjust criticism.

The demonstrated incompe­tence and lack of success of General Braxton Bragg in the west gave Longstreet the opportunity he coveted. If he could be detached for service with the poorly led Army of Tennessee, there existed the potential for greater recognition of his talents as a field com­mander and possible command of that army. As long as he remained with the Army of Northern Virginia, he not only served under the tight control of Lee, but in the shadow of other, more flamboyant and better publicized fig­ures, primarily Virginians, the darlings of the powerful Richmond press.

Unfortunately, fate played cruel tricks on James Longstreet. 1-1 is personal ambition, in combination with a series of traumatic personal tragedies, significantly altered his behavior, adversely affecting his own military career, and contributing markedly to a professional and private rift between himself and his old friend, Lafayette McLaws. The resulting controversy spanned more than three decades.

By late August of 1862, after service around Richmond, McLaws found himself under the command of his childhood friend and West Point classmate, James Longstreet. Lafayelte McLaws possessed neither the tactical aggressiveness of Jackson nor the dash of Stua1t. llis contribution to the army lay in his

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steady dependability. In describing McLaws, G. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet's Chief of Staff, said of him that "he was an officer of much experience and most careful. Fond of detail, his command was in excellent condition, and his ground and position well examined and reconnoitered; not brilliant in U1e field or quick in movement there or elsewhere, he could always be counted on and had secured the entire confidence of his officers and men."12 At the bloody Battle of Antietam, after a long forced march, Mclaws committed his exhausted men to combat at a critical juneture.13 McLaws "heads the list of those mentioned by Long­street as making the best tactical moves" during the battle.14

On 6 November 1862, McLaws and his fine division officially became part of the newly created First

Corps, which the recently promoted Lieutenant General Longstreet commanded. The records

arc silent on the question of whether Lafayette McLaws envied his friend's

advancement and coveted promotion for himself.

If any animosity existed between himself and Longstreet, Mclaws did not allow it to affect his performance of duty. After Fredericksburg. Longstreet heaped praise on his subordinate for his '·nntiring zeal and abili­ty. "IS Obviously, as late as the end of 1862, Longstreet remained quite pleased with McLaws' service.

By November 1862, Longstreet's good friend General

Joseph E. Johnston, whom he, at least initially, considered a superi­

or commander to Lee, had recov­ered sufficiently from the wound

received at Seven Pines lo accept an appointment as commander of the

Department of the West. Longstreet enter­tained thoughts of transfer. On 4 February

1863, he corresponded with another friend and former comrade-in-arms, Texas Senator Louis T.

Wigfall, an outspoken critic of President Jefferson Davis. To Wigfall, a powerful member of the Confederate Senate's military Affairs Commiltee, Longstreet expressed his desire to go west because of tl1c "opportunities for all kinds of moves to great advantage."16 Though he may have spoken strict­ly of strategic maneuvers, it can be argued that the phrase expressed his botmdless ambition and desire for greater recogni­tion, as well as the independent command that would surely result from it.

In the west, Longstreet realized he would again be under Johnston's overall command. If Bragg failed again, which Longstreet felt he would, command of the South's other great army could be his. At this point, Robert E. Lee represented the greatest obstacle to his designs. He had to convince Lee to allow him to separate his Corps from the Army of Nortl1em Virginia and take it west to "assist" Bragg.

Longstreet partially realized his dream of independent com-

PAGE SEVE:-JTH~

mand in early 1863 with his temporary appoin tment as Commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. Leaving McLaws' and Richard H. Anderson's Divisions behind, Longstreet proceeded to the Suffolk, Virginia, area to block the expected advance of the Federal TX Corps. The Federals did not march on Richmond as anticipated, however, and after failed offensive efforts against New Bern, North Carolina, and Suffolk, Longstreet's mission became predominately logistical. The Suf­folk Campaign proved frustrating and disappointing to all con­cerned. Alone and uncertain, Longstreet drowned his sorrows over lost opportunities in increased amounts of alcohol.17

Lee's welcomed order to rejoin the main army came in late April. Unfortunately, Longstreet's forces arrived too late to par­ticipate in the decisive victory at Chancellorsville. Again fate robbed Longstreet of the chance for g lory and recognition. While others gathered martial accolades, Longstreet had gathered corn.

The ramifications of the Suffolk Campaign loomed omi­nously for the ambitious Longstreet. His first independent com­mand, a relatively mundane logistical mission, had met with but mediocre success. And, because of Suffolk, he missed a perfect opportunity to showcase his military talents at what many claimed as Lee's greatest victory to date. Worst of all for Longstreet, two of his division commanders had shared in the glory of the victory denied him. Jt is entirely possible that Longstreet's jealousy over McLaws' presence at Chancellorsville played a role in his later treatment of his longtime friend and sub­ordinate.

Following the reorganization of the army in November, Lee expressed concerns to Longstreet regarding the health of Lafayette McLaws, due to his illness the previous winter. Though he had "perfonned capably in the Chancellorsville Campaign,"18 McLaws' performance "had been less than Lee expected."19 Lee questioned McLaws' abil ity to withstand the rigors of the upcom­ing all important second invasion of the North, and preferred he be assigned to some unspecified but less demanding duty.20

To his credit, Longstreet stood up for his old comrade, stat­ing that he could only s upport such an action if McLaws con­sented. When approached about a possible transfer for health rea­sons, McLaws surprisingly reacted favorably. He even suggested that perhaps a swap for Gustave Beauregard, then commanding the coastal defenses in the vicinity of Charleston, could be arranged.21 But, on 3 June 1863, without a final decision on McLaws' future, the Army ofNorthem Virginia began its his­toric trek northward. Lafayette Mclaws accompanied his divisi­ion.

Unbeknownst to McLaws, Lee had admonished Longstreet to keep a close eye on McLaws and his division during the cam­paign. Because of his doubts regarding Mclaws' physical condi­tion, Lee held Longstreet personally accountable for McLaws' performance. The pressure added to Longstreet's every-growing burden of stress.

The Battle of Gettysburg represents a turning point in the war not only for the Confederacy, but in the relationship between Longstreet and McLaws as well. While generally supporting Lee's bold strategic movements, Longstreet remained committed Lo tlrn tactical defensive, in order to preserve the army's finite resources of men and materiel. He felt the meeting engagement at Gettysburg offered Lee the ideal opportunity to disengage and set up a strong defensive position between Meade and Lhc Federal

PAGE EIGHTEEN

Capital. Forced to attack, Meade would suffer unacceptably high casualties. Lee, however, proved uncharacteristically intractable, determined to fight one great war-ending battle, despite the fact that Meade rather than he possessed the lion's share of the advan­tages. Longstreet tried to reason with him, but the nonnaUy saga­cious Lee would not be persuaded. Longstreet could hardly believe it.

Some interpreted Longstreet's visible frustration with the situation as disloyalty, manifested by an uncooperative altitude and slowness of action. Even before the smoke completely cleared the field of action, many, primarily Virginians, had already chosen James Longstreet as the scapegoat for Lee's mis­talces and the anny's lack of success.

Gettysburg greatly depressed James LongstTeet, causing him to lose confidence in his commander. In a 24 July letter to his uncle, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, he squarely placed the blame for the defeat of the invasion on the shoulders of Robert E. Lee, due to his failure to heed Longstreet's advice to fortify South Mountain and make the Yankees bleed U1cmselves to death against strong Confederate positions.

At Gettysburg, too, the rift between Longstreet and McLaws became more pronounced. McLaws, unaware of Longstreet's lack of input into the tactical decision-making process, became openly critical of his Corps commander. His bafflement and frus­tration, possibly exacerbated by Longstreet's misunderstood obligatory extra attention, resulted in his losing confidence in Lieutenant General Longstreet as a commander, and in James Longstreet as a friend. On 7 J uly, McLaws wrote an angry letter to his wife in which he blamed Longstreet for the fai lures of the second day, adding, "I consider him a humbug, a man of small capacity, very obstinate, not at all chivalrous, exceedingly con­ceited, and totally selfish."22 He added, "If [can it is my inten­tion to get away from his command." Then, in perhaps the most interesting comment of his letter, McLaws touched on the gener­al state of morale in the First Corps stating, "We want Beauregard."23 Tfthe unfortunate combination of misunderstand­ings surrounding GettysbtLrg did not initiate the deterioration of the 30-year-old friendship between McLaws and Longstreet, it certainly intensified the process.

Longstreet's mood changed noticeably after Gettysburg. The painful aftermath of the battle fueled Longstreet's desire for independent command, sought as a means of escape and as a means of assuaging his professional ego. The west and Bragg's proven incompetence still offered Longstreet his best hope of vindication for Suffolk, Gettysburg, and other disappointments. Sometime between 5 August and 17 August 1863, Longstreet wrote a private letter to Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon officially requesting a transfer to the west.24

Longstreet, crafiily working the issue from both ends, wrote a letter to Lee dated 5 September 1863, in which he suggested that "If my Corps cannot go west, I think that we might accom­plish something by giving me Jenkins', Wise's, and Cooke's Brigades, and putting me in Bragg's place, and giving him my co1ps." Clearly, Longstreet coveted the western command, to the extent that he wi ll ingly offered his own corps in trade. In terms similar to those written on 18 August to his influential friend, Senator Wigfall, Longstreet added, rather incredulously, " I feel that I am influenced by no personal motive in this suggestion,"25 though he plainly stated bis lack of confidence in Bragg's abili-

RECALL

,,

ties. Longstreet's orders to march west to Bragg's aid did not

come by chance. ln both February and May, he lobbied Secretary of War Seddon for permission to go west. By the fall of 1863, Confederate misfortunes in the field required drastic action. Even President Davis realized the seriousness of the strategic situation. After failing in an effort to convince Lee to take over the western army, Davis supported Longstreet's temporary transfer to the west.

On the event of his departure, Longstreet wrote a farewell letter to Lee. In it, he stated that, " If I did not think our move a necessary one, my regrets at leaving you would be distressing to me, as it seems to be with the officers and men of my command. ... All that we have to be proud of bas been accomplished under your eye and under your orders. Our affections for you are stronger, if it is possible for them to be stronger, than our admi­ration for you."26 Given evidence to the contrary, Longstreet's words appear contradictory, especially in light of bis del iberate efforts to escape Lee's grasp. Sounding like the consummate politician, Longstreet had no intention of burning his bridges.

Longstreet's Corps made an immediate positive impact upon its arrival in north Georgia. At Chickamauga, Longstreet engineered arguably the best tactical break1h rough of the war.27 Bragg's timidity in refusing to follow up the victory, allowing Rosecrans to escape, infuriated Longstreet, confirming his already low opinion of his new commander.

He disagreed with Bragg's subsequent plan to attack Chattanooga, where Union Major General George Thomas' forces had sought refuge following Chickamauga. Bragg rejected Longstreet's idea to outflank the city, forcing its evacuation, choosing, instead, to initiate an unpopular and large ineffective siege.28

TI1e harmony and esprit de corps of Bragg's army began to crumble. Trouble brewed between the largely ine!Tectual Bragg and some of his senior subordinate commanders. Corps com­manders Leonidas Polk, D. H. Hill, and Simon Buckner, having lost confidence in Ilragg as a leader, formed a pact against him and discussed ways to effect his removal from command.29 Bragg's wasted opportunities in north Georgia and southeastern Tennessee played into the hands of James Longstreet's ambition. In Longstreet's mind, Bragg's ineptitude justified the intended actions of the commanders and legitimized h.is own participation. Longstreet became the ir leader.

Jn a 26 September 1863 letter to Secretary of War James Seddon, written by Longstreet on behalf of tbe whole group, Longstreet summed up the feelings of these men, as well as the opinion of many others of all ranks in the Army of Tennessee regarding Bragg's continued presence as commander, stating his belief that "nothing but tl1e hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander .... Can't you send us General Lee?"

The group's petition to the Secretary of War for Bragg's removal did not result in Lee's transfer as many had hoped. Longso·eet knew all a long that Lee would never leave the high morale of the successful Army of Northern Virginia to lead its low-spirited western cousin. He knew, also, that he had to appear as eager as the others for Lee to replace Bragg so as not to be per­ceived as engineering the crisis for hjs own advancement.

Lafayette McLaws disapproved of the group's activities,

IVINTER 2000

and Longstreet's participation, labeling him " the nominal head of [the] cabal.31 Hfa refusal to support Longstreet in the conspiracy is a key to understanding their relationship over tl1e next few weeks. Longstreet's disappointment and anger over his friend and subordinate's lack of support became obvious.

Though the letter to Secretary of War Seddon did not bring Bragg's removal, it did result in a rather embarrassing personal visit by the Chief Executive. Upon his arrival, Davis, a close friend of Bragg's, gathered all concerned in a room where he placed each general on the spot. With Bragg present, he required each officer to publicly explain why he felt Bragg should be relieved of command. The incident proved most disconcerting for all concerned. The collective testimony of the generals spoke to the fact tJiat the morale of the army bad deteriorated to a danger­ously low level because of Bragg's lack of leadership as a com­mander. They testified further that Bragg no longer held the con­fidence of tl1e majority of the army 's soldiers or officers.

In the end, in spite of all of the evidence to the contrary, Davis made the incredible decision to leave Bragg in command. Ou 16 October 1863, ten days after Davis' arrival, Brigadier General William W. Mackall, Bragg's own Chief of Staff and his former West Point c lassmate, requested to be relieved of his posi­tion, reasoning that "if Mr. D [Davis] sustains him [Bragg), be will be too elated to listen to reason."32 His observation proved prophetic.

With Davis' departure, Bragg's vindictive retribution knew no bow1ds. He relieved D. H. Hill of his command, blocking Ute confirmation of his lieutenant geoeralcy;33 reduced Simon Buckner from corps to division command, eventually resulting in his departure;34 tlueatened Polk with a court-martial on an unsup­portable charge leading President Davis, a friend of Polk's since West Point, to transfer him out of Bragg's command;35 took back troops attached to Longstreet's command, thus reducing it to its original size; and dispersed tbe units of other malcontents.36 Longstreet now counted both Bragg and the President as con­firmed enemies.

Because of !lie recently failed coup, Longstreet became dis­tracted from his duties. H is pre-occupation with politico-military intrigues led to a lack of attention to detail. His neglect of duty allowed troops under liis old West Point friend, Ulysses S. Grant, to push the Confederates from several key defensive choke points along the Tennessee River. Most importantly, the 27 October loss of Lookout Valley resulted in the Federal 's capture of Brown 's Ferry. Its loss reopened Federal supply lines into Chattanooga, thereby negating the sicge.37

On 5 November, Longstreet received a mixed blessing: orders from Bragg to detach his forces from the main army and move against Knoxville. For Longstreet, the orders meant anoth­er opportunity for independent command. For Bragg, they repre­sented the departure of another conspirator. He hoped Longstreet, separated from the main an11y and given a difficuJt task, would fail. Longstreet did not disappoint him.

At Knoxville, Longstreet ordered an uncharacteristic futile frontal assault against a strongly fortified position, against the advice of his subordinate commanders, in the face of conflicting reconnaissance information, and under some of tl1e worst weath­er conditions imaginable. When it failed, he reverted to a bad habit p icked up at Seven Pines and attempted to point the guilty finger of blame away from himself. The accusatory digit pointed

PAGE NINETEEN

directly at his boyhood friend, Lafayette Mclaws. The contro­versy between the two comrades came to a head during the Knoxville Campaign.

During Ambrose E. Burnsides' retreat toward Knoxville, troops under Lafayette McLaws lost a foot race with Federals over very muddy roads for possession of the key crossroads at Campbcll 's Station. A sharp action fought in a heavy rain on 16 November prevented the Confederates from cutting off Burn­sides' supply train as it scrambled for the safety of Knoxville. Longstreet displayed visible disappointment with McLaws' fail­ure to take Campbell 's Station and capture the Federal wagons.38

On arrival in front of occupied Knoxville on 20 November, Mclaws recommended an immediate attack against the disor­ganized Federal forces in Fort Sanders. His offer to lead the attack went unheeded by an indecisive Longstreet.39

By the next day, armed with a telegram from Bragg urging an attack to help relieve pressure on his own forces, Longstreet informed McLaws that he must indeed attack. He suggested a moonlight assault during the night of the 22d, but added, " I am loath to put troops at it wl1cn there is a disinclination to it."40 This oddly worded statement seems out of place coming from the nor­mally forceful, take-charge James Longstreet. But, considering all which bad transpired since his ambitious arrival in the west, perhaps it signaled bis growing uncertainty and loss of self-con­fidence. In front of Knoxville, James Longstreet's "military acu­men and composure deserted him"41

Longstreet acquiesced and delayed the attack a second time after McLaws and rus commanders decided they could not prop­erly control their troops in a night assault.42 He postponed a third plan of attack scheduled for the 25th due to the impending arrival of two brigades of reinforcements under Bushrod Johnson and Archibald Gracie. Brigadier GeDeral Danville Leadbetter, Bragg's Chief Engineer, arrived at the same time. Colonel E. Porter Alexander, Longstreet's Chief of Artillery, described him as "tl1e o ldest military engineer in the Confederate service."43 Leadbetter 's presence only added to an already confused situa­tion. Alexander recorded that " there never was a more complete fiasco than the attempt to find a favorable point for attack. Everywhere we saw near a mile of open ground obstructed by a creek and artificial ponds, without cover anywhere, even for skir­mishers."44

Even if assaulting troops managed to reach the, by now, greatly improved ea1thwork, capturing it represented a signifi­cant challenge. One eyewitness described the three-sided fort as "a steep parapet topped by cotton bales that were covered in rawhide to prevent their ig11iting by gunfi re. A d itch tfuat varied in width from eight to twelve feet and in depth from s ix to eight feet edged the base, creating a face of twenty feet in depth at nwnerous spots. In front of the ditch, the Federals bad strung tele­graph wire between tree stumps." Inside, a garrison of some 440 infantrymen and artillerymen with a dozen cannon waited to greet any attacker. 45

On the 24th, on Leadbetter's advice, Longstreet delayed the attack for a fourth time. While the Federals continued to improve their veritable Gibraltar, Longstreet stalled, and his assault troops grew restless. A note in Alexander's memoirs echoed the frustra­tion of many in recorcLing that "all this time the enemy were working, working, working day and night."46 U ltimate ly, Longstreet made the decision to attack Fort Sanders on the after-

PAGE TWENTY

noon of28 November. He based his decision, at least partially, on incorrectly interpreted intelligence. The major point of conten­tion, then and later, revolved around the d itch at the base of the fort's parapet. On a 27 November reconnaissance conducted by Longstreet, Leadbetter, and several others, the group observed a Union soldier walk across the ditch, the lip of which appeared to catch him about the waist. Based on this single observation, made from long distance, Longstreet concluded U1at tl1e ditch present­ed no serious impediment to attacking troops. Although not known until after the attack, the sold ier had apparently used a board to span the chasm.

Longstreet ordered McLaws to make preparations for an assault on the fort 's northwest salient.47 Mcl aws and his officers expressed concerns about the treacherous and wet condition of the ground over which the attacking troops must pass, but Longstreet insisted U1ey continue with preparation for the 2 p.m. assault as originally ordered.48

Despite Mclaws' protests regarding the tactical soundness and potential wastefulness of the coming attack and confinnation of Bragg's defeat at Chattanooga, Longstreet remained as obsti­nate and intractable as Lee at Gettysburg. The irony is perfect. At Knoxville, Longstreet displayed tbe same characteristics that bad so angered him about his own commander five months earlier in Pennsylvania. In a note to Mclaws, he insisted that the army's only safety lay in making the assault as planned, adding the admonishment that "I do hope and trust tl1at I may have your entire support ... in the execution of my vicws."49 Longstreet simply would not be denied. He meant to bave his chance for glo1y. Redemption and vindication would be his, regardless of the cost.

McLaws obeyed bis orders like the good soldier be had a lways been. He based much of the pre-assault planning con­ducted with his brigade commanders on the intelligence analysis of his commander, James Longstreet. His additional reconna is­sance raised serious questions about the width and depth of the ditch. But, like his senior, McLaws could on occasion display a certain "pig-headedness." Lacking the time and materials with which to construct ladders and fascines for spanning the ditch, he resigned lliroself to his situation and adopted a "rather indiiier­ent" attitude toward the whole affair.50 The irony of the parallels between the situation in which McLaws found himself at Knoxville, vis a vis Longstreet, and Longstreet's situation with Lee at Gettysburg amounted to deja vu, but with a twist of poet­ic justice.

In spite of a misty rain which fell in the freezing pre-dawn hours of29 November, SI the attack went reasonably well until the confident troops hit the ditch. To their horror, they discovered it not as they had been told, but quite deep and wide. The sheet of ice covering the inclined sides of the fort's outer walls made scal­ing virtually impossible. A tremendous slaughter resulted in what one veteran of the debacle later described as the "death pit."52

In 011ly 20 minutes, within the terrible confines of the ditch Longstreet and Leadbetter bad said would present no serious obstacle, the Confederates lost 813 men. The Federals lost a grand total of 20 killed and 80 wounded, only 13 inside the fort proper.53

The defeat at Fort Sanders cost Longstreet a considerable number of increasingly hard to replace troops, and forced him to lift the siege of Knoxville. His explanation for the defeat varied

RECALL

over time. Initially, he blamed it on the troops,54 but later on his own failure to send reinforcements and bis ill-advised order Lo withdraw.ss Interestingly enough, in his memoirs he admitted being in a "demoralized state at the time of the attack." The facts surrounding the events of this period in his career bear out is painfully honest sci f-appraisal.

Regardless of the circumstances, the facts remained. Longstreet, acting as an independent commander, after many delays and much indecision, ordered an ill-timed attack of ques­tionable merit. He formulated a battle plan based on incomplete intelligence, resulting in both inappropriate and inadequate plan­ning by his subordinates. McLaws complained Later, and with some justification, that Longstreet issued orders during the Knoxville Campaign with such ambiguity of purpose, and so often countermanded them himself, tbat it became inc reasingly difficult to decipher his true intent.56 The decisive defeat at Knoxville did little to bolster Longstreet's already sagging morale or that of the n·oops in the west.

Al a council of war for commanders called on the evening after the battle, Longstreet gave no indication that be blamed any­one in particular for the defeat, least or all Lafayette McLaws. He decided to withdraw his corps northeast and go into winter quar­ters. On 4 December, Longstreet's anny began its march toward Rogersville, Tennessee.57

After a disappointing de laying action at Bean's Station on LS December, Longstreet ordered McLaws' units into the hills to pursue the Federals and round up stragglers. Mclaws hesitated, arguing that his men had had no bread ration for two days. McLaws had a well known reputation for looking after his men, even to bis own detriment. Though displeased, Longstreet ordered up rations, and gave the mission to his favorite com­mander, Micah Jeukins.58 ln his official report, Longstreet blamed Mclaws fo r tbc lack of eftective pursuit, stating sarcas­tically that "there seemed so strong a desire for rest rather than to destroy the enemy. "59

Two of McLaws' brigade commanders fmther angered Longstreet at Bean's Station: Evauder M. Law, by what Long­street perceived as his grumbling and the slowness with which he moved his units, and Jerome Robertson, by his generally pes­simistic utterances and attitude in response to orders.

The fai lure at Bean's Station provided Longstreet tbe oppor­tunity to divert some of the negative attention garnered by his recent defeats. The slower pace of winter quarters provided time to reflect on the overall campaign's ramifications for his career. He convinced l1imself that his steadfast comrade, Lafayette McLaws, deserved the lion's share of the blame for many of the recent setbacks, primarily Fort Sanders. He decided that the assault had failed because of the inadequate planning of his sen­ior subordinate, and that McLaws had neither cooperated fully with him as his commander nor shown proper confidence in his plans and leadership throughout the entire Knoxville Cam­paign.60

On 15 December as the troops returned from the disap­pointing pursuit effort following Bean's Station, Longstreet shocked everyone by re lieving McLaws from command.61 The incomprehensible action stunned McLaws. "What had he done? he asked hin1self. To his very polite written request for explana­tion, McLaws received word through Longstreet's Assistant Adjutant General, G. Moxley Sorrel, that the general felt the

WINTER 2000

action necessary because Mclaws "had not cooperated cordially with him,"62 that he had displayed a "want of confidence" in Longstreet's efforts and plans, and that he feared the attitude might "extend more or less to the troops" under Mclaws' com­mand.63

The relief order further decreed that McLaws leave the anny and report to Augusta, Georgia, where he should correspond with the Adjutant and Inspector General of the Am1y regarding his sit­uation.64 McLaws did correspond by letter on 29 December, denying all charges and requesting reinstatement of his com­mand.65

The previous three months had been hard on James Longstreet. The mounting discontent with his generalship and his own frustration and disappointment had taken their toll on the once great commander. As Longstreet biographer JcIIrey Wert observed, "The compelling characteristic of the man-his self­confidence-had deserted him." lnstead of accepting responsi­bility for his failures, "he chose denial, attributing the blame to others."66

The most difficult element to understand of this whole unpleasa11t story is why Longstreet chose Lafayette Mclaws as the target of his wrath. McLaws had not disobeyed any direct orders or acted disloyally. Neither had he made any grave strntc­gic or tactical errors. So, why McLaws?

By December of 1863, James Longstreet had suffered a series of traumatic experiences, any one of which was sufficient in itself to produce the behavior-altering stress with which he found himself ill-prepared to deal. Only a year before, he had buried three of his beloved children in little more than a week's time due to a scarlet fever epidemic. His first independent com­mand, the Suffolk Campaign, bad not only met with mediocre success, but kept him from sharing Lee's glory at Chan­cellorsville.Ji-le continued to endure growing criticism and blame, in Lee's stead, for the costly and disappointing draw at Gettysburg. Lastly, he was worried over the long term career effects of his partic ipation in the anti-Bragg conspiracy and his poor performance in the field during the Knoxville Campaign. Frustrated over the events of the recent past, isolated from the mainstream of military operations, confused over his future, and devoid of direction from superiors, Longstreet was emotionally drained.

His loss of morale and lack of success in Tennessee resulted from nearly unbearable pressures that drove him to the brink of irrationality, causing him to mishandle the McLaws, Law, and Robertson affairs.

Longstreet filed fom1al charges against McLaws on 29 December, though strangely ignoring the general lack of cooper­ation whicb had originally seemed of paramount concern. Nothing in the charge or specifications appeared about anything Mclaws had done or failed to do at either Campbell 's or Bean's Stations. Everything revolved around the events of 28-29 November 1863, and McLaws' alleged failures to take adequate precautions dming the assault on Fort Sanders.67

Determined not to take the baffling situation lying down, McLaws circulated a letter among friends in Richmond identify­ing Longstreet's actions as an attempt to shift the blame for his total failure in Tennessee. He stated further that he felt Longstreet's v indictiveness stemmed from McLaws' refusal to jo in the conspiracy against Bragg.68 Not only had Longstreet

PAGE TWENTY-ONE

coveted Bragg's command, he had insisted on the support of his subordinates in his scheme to obtain it.

McLaws theorized U1at Longstreet secretly desired to replace him with Joseph B. Kershaw, and E. M. Law, temporari­ly in command of Ute wounded Hood's Division, with Micah Jenkins.69 Such "political" maneuvering did little to improve morale or reduce the growing number and intensity of disputes within Longstreet's officer corps.

In the same letter in which he charged McLaws with "neg­lect of duty," Longstreet requested a court-martial for Brigadier General Jerome Robertson for alleged delinquency and pes­simistic remarks during the campaign.70 Later, Longstreet had Evandcr M. Law, Jenkins' chief competition for Hood's com­mand, arrested on a charge of having obtained a leave of absence under false pretense.71

Proof of Longstreet's precarious psychological condition is found in a 30 December letter he wrote to Confederate Adjutant and Inspector General Samuel Cooper. In it, Longstreet request­ed to be relieved stating that "If this field is to be held with a view to future operations, I earnestly desire that some other officer be sent to the command." So desperate did Longstreet appear to be relieved from his situation that be expressed his complete will­ingness to serve under an officer junior to him.72 His sad appeal possessed an almost forlorn quality. As if to provide additional justification and incentive for his removal, Longstreet added a strangely contradictory statement in which he accepted full responsibility for the failure of his campaign. He wrote, "It is fair to infer that the faull is entirely with me."73 If he truly believed this, why did he feel compelled to blame those who had so loyal­ly supported him, in particular, his boyhood friend and West Point classmate, Lafayette McLaws?

At this instant, both Longstreet's personal emotional stabil­ity and professional military credibility hung by a fragile thread. His despondency must have rivaled the worst he bad ever felt. Even so, professional disappointments continued to plague a deeply troubled James Longstreet. ln February 1864, the Confederate War Department promoted Brigadier General Charles Field and placed him in command of Hood's old division without consulting Longstreet. Longstreet viewed the move as an affront to bis authority as a corps commander.

ln the same month, the Congress authorized the appointment of another full gcneralcy, which it awarded to E. Kirby Smith. The promotion merely granted Smith the official military and administrative powers he had exercised for a year already in the Trans-Mississippi Department. But Longstreet felt cheated, viewing it as yet another professional insult. Ile seriously con­sidered resigning his commission at this low point in his career, but decided against it.74

There seemed no end to the troubles and frustration of James Longstreet during the winter of 1863-64. With each new pressure, his ability to cope with the demands of independent command in the shadow of failure and his ability to make sowtd decisions eroded a bit more. Longstreet craved peace of mind and the security of the famil iar. His confidence level and sense of security had never been. greater than when he had stood beside Lee. Perhaps, more than anything else, Longstreet wanted to go home-home to tlte Army of Northern Virginia and the calm, reassuring presence of Robert E. Lee.

Though quick to bring charges, Longstreet seemed reluctant

PAGE TWENTY-TWO

to see McLaws' court-martial convene. He granted month-long leaves of absence to Micah Jenkins, a key witness, and to a mem­ber of the court-martial board itself, Brigadier General Benjamin Humphreys. Eventually, these irregularities, the repeated delays, and the continued absences of key personnel, led 10 Cooper's overturning of the court's findings75 at Davis' insistence.

Longstreet realized he had acted in baste. and in his post­war memoirs admitted that he "had no desire to put charges against (McLaws], and should have failed to do so even under the directions of the authoritics."76 Even in this confession, Longstreet could not totally accept responsibility for his own actions, seek ing instead to imply that pressure from unnamed "authorities" might have influenced his actions. The ttuth of the matter is Utat emotions drove Longstreet's actions toward the officers he charged more so than reason. Tt seemed especially so with McLaws.

Given the evidence, it is reasonable to suggest that perhaps James Longstreet acted irrationally during the winter of 1863-64, and that his actions resulted from a temporary breakdown in his otherwise relatively calm and reserved demeanor. His aberrant bebavior resulted from stress, partially spawned by past personal tribulations. The strain of this pressure in combination with the conflict created by lite confrontation of his egotistical drive for independent conunand, with lhe cold shock of reality forced upon him by his repeated failures, proved too much for Longstreet.

Though ordered restored to his divisional command in the First Corps, Lee had McLaws transferred in May of 1864 to the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida in deference to Longstreet's still fragile ego. The transfer robbed McLaws of the chance to redeem himself witlt any doubters within tltc army of Northcm Virginia. Longstreet's trearment of McLaws had been totally unjustified and ut:terly reprehensible.

The two did not see each other again during the war. In May 1864, Longstreet suffered a serious accidental wound at the Wilderness, reminiscent of the tragedy that claimed Jackson almost exactly a year earlier. He did not return to duty until late in the war. McLaws ended his career serving under Joseph E. Johnston, whom Longstreet had hoped would be his salvation. Serving in Lieutenant General William J. Hardee's Corps, McLaws played a key role in the delaying action against Sherman during the Carolina's Campaign.

ln his memoirs, Longstreet wrote regarding President Davis' disapproval of lite decision of Mc Laws• court-martial that the decision to restore McLaws to command "was very gratifying to me, who could have taken several reprimands to relieve a per­sonal friend of an embarrassing position." Obviously, time had mellowed Longstreet's memory, making him more magnanimous in retrospect than at lite time in question.

The friendship spawned as boys in Augusta suffered crip­pling damage during the trying times of the Civil War, primarily because of Longstreet. But true friendship dies hard, and by July 1873, Longstreet and McLaws had begun a reconciliation. In a letter to McLaws at that time, Longstreet admillcd he had relieved his friend "in an unguarded moment," claiming concerns over McLaws' health and the pressure of Lee's accountability as his chief reasons- hardly credible explanations in the face of existing evidence.

Longstreet provided the perfect villain and scapegoat for the absolution of the "Lost Cause." His cooperation with tile

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Longstreet and McLaws Continuedfi'om page 23

Reconstructionists and his alignment with the hated Republican Party added fuel to the already existing fires of his vilification. Despite this, McLaws remained a man of integrity to the end in his dealings with Longstreet. In 1875, he published his account of the controversial Battle of Gettysburg which, suppo11ed by oth­ers, substantiated Longstreet's original assertions and clearing him on several points.77 McLaws' willingness to defend the man wbo had so maligned him is commendable.

Their relationship continued to improve over the years, at least from Longstreet's perspective. In 1894, he wrote, "I am happy to say that our personal relations arc as c lose and interest­ing as they have ever been, and that his heart was big enough to separate official duties from personal relations."78 To the end, Longstreet clung to the rationalization that the demands of duty as a commander had forced him to charge McLaws.

In the final analysis, Longstreet's attempt to shift blame on McLaws for his own strategic and tactical inadequacies v i11ually destroyed the milita1y career of an experienced officer and life­long friend.

Jeffrey Wert provided a wonderful epilogue on the whole ugly affair calling it "a drama propelled by ambition, jealousy, and revenge, a story without herocs."79 Yet Lafayette McLaws summed up the unpleasant episode best in a Jetter to Longstreet written in 1887. In spite of their renewed relationship, McLaws chided Longstreet by reminding him that "you had done me a great injusticc."80 And so he had. !lNDNOTES:

I. Richard F. Welch, "Was James Longstreet 'the man who lost Gettysburg,' or merely the victim of postwar politics?", review of General James Longstreet, The Confederacy~· Most Co111roversial Soldier. A Biography, by Jeffrey Wert, Civil War Times Illus trated, Spring 1994:66.

2 . James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomallox, Memoirs of the Civil War i11 America, ed. James I. Robertson, Jr., Bloomington: lnd iana University Press, 1960:548.

3. Wert 31. 4. Mnrk M. Ooatncr IIJ, CM/ War Dictionary, New York: David McKay

Company, Jnc., 1959:490,538. 5. Longs1rcc1 xiii-xiv. 6. Wert97. 7. LongSlfCCI xiv. 8. Wert 2 10. 9. Wert 209.

10, Welch 68. 11. Welc h 68. 12. Wert 209. 13. Gerald A. Pauerson, Rebels From West Point, New York: Doubleday

Publishing Company, 1987:157-158. 14. Wert 209. 15. U.S. War Departmcnl. The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the

Union and C01rjederate Armies, Washington: U.S. Governmenl Printing Office, 1880-190 I, Series I, Volume 2 1 :57 I.

16. Wert 227. 17. Francis W. Dawson, Reminiscences of C01rfederate Service. 1861-1865,

Charleston: Publisher Unknown, 1882:87. 18. Je!Irey D. Wert, "You Had Done Me a G reat Injustice," Civil War 1imes,

lllus1rated, March-April I 993:42. 19. James Longstreet 10 Lafayeue McLaws, July 25, 1873, Soutbcm Historical

Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel llill, Chapel Bill, NC. 20. Wert, CWT/: 42. 21. Wen, CWT/: 42. 22. Lafayette Mclaws IO l!n1ily Allison Taylor Mclaws, July 7, 1863, McLaws

Papers, Southern llistorical Collection, Universi1y of North Carolina at Chapel llill, Chapel Hill, NC

23. Wen 276. 24. Wen 300. 25. Wen 302.

WINTER2000

26. Donald B. Sanger, James lo11gs1reet, I. Soldier, II. Politician, Officeholde1; and Writer. Thomas R. Hay, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith Company. I 968: 198-199.

27. Longstreet vii. 28. Sanger 2 12. 29. Sanger 212. 30. Sanger 212. 31. Lafayette McLaws to Marcus J. Wright, June I, 1882, Mclaws Papers,

Southem Historical Collection, University o f North Carolina a1 Chapel Hill, Chapel llill, NC

32. Wert 329. 33. Patricia A. Faust, llistorical Times ll/11s trated E11cyclope1/ia of the Civil W01:

New York: Harper and Row, 1986:362. 34. Wert 326. 35. Fausl 590. 36. Wen 326. 37. Wen 334. 38. Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting For the Coefederacy: 77ie Personal

Reco/lectio11s of General Edward Porter Alexa11der, Ed. Gary W. Gallagher, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, I 989:592 note #36.

39. Lafayette Mclaws to E. M . Law, no date, Mclaws Papers, Somhem Historical Collection, University of North Caro lina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC.

40. U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Co1rfederate Armies, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Otlice, I 880-190 I, Series I , volume 3 1 :459,484.

41. Welch 72. 42. 0. R., I, 3 1, pt 1:484. 43. Boatner, 468, 473-474. 44. Alexander 324. 45. Wen 347. 46. Alexander 323. 47. Wert 349. 48. O.R.. I. 31, pt. I :486. 49. O.R .. I. 31, pt. 1:491-492,494. 50. Wen 350. 5 I. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Oucl, eds., Ball/es a/Ill leaders of the

Civil Wai: 4 volumes, Ne1v York: the Century Company, 1887-1888. lf1:748. 52. Wert 352. 53. Boatner 298. 54. 0.R., I. 31, pt. 1:46 I. 55. Wert 352. 56. Wert 353. 57. Boatner 468. 58. 0.R., I. 31, pl. 1:341,464. 59. 0.R .. I. 31, pl. 1:464. 60. Douglas Southall Freeman, lees Lie11te11a111s: A Study in Command. 3 vol-

umes, New York: charles Scribner's Sons, 1942-44, 111:298. 61. Freeman, Ill, 209. 62. 0.R., I. 31, pt. 1:501-502. 63. Longstreet 518. 64. Sanger 243 note /117. 65. Freeman, 111, 300. 66. Wert 357. 67. Freeman, UL, 300. 68. Freeman, Ill , 300. 69. Wert 373. 70. Faust 638. 71. Wert 373-375. 72. O.R., I. 3 1, pt.1:468. 73. O.R., I. 3 1, pt. 1:468. 74. Freeman, rtl, 305. 75. O.R., l. 31, pt. 1:505-506. 76. Longstreet 548. 77. Sanger 4 14. 78. Longstreet 548. 79. Jeffrey D. Wert, .. You Had Done Mc A Great Injustice," Civil War 1imes,

l//11strated. March-April, 1993:40. 80. Wert, CWT!: 48.

Manuscripts and photographs offered for publication in Recall should be sent to the Editor, 4404 Leota Drive, Raleigh, N.C. 27603. You can contact the editor at 919-772-7688 or by e-mail: rmripley@~ateway.net.

PAGE TWENTY-THREE

The Military Must Revive Its Warrior Spirit

Continued ji-om page 12 toward the warrior ethos is pervasive and dangerous.

There is no question that training standards have been low­ered. The Army has discontinued Basic Combat Training for all new soldiers, replacing it with Initial Entry Training, with lcss­demanding physical standards so as to accommodate women. A change like this bothers the warrior, because he wants to be respected as the best in his business and that doesn't start with norming qualifications and selection to the least common denom­inator.

No longer do the best-qualified officers necessarily get pro­moted. The Army's new Officer Personnel Management System, known as OPMS 21, probably removed the last vestige of diat "discriminator." The Anny now bases promotion on its function­al needs rather than picking its best, a system contrary to moti­vating officers to perform to their very highest ability.

And graduation from a service academy no longer affords officers an advantage in appointment to the regular force. This diminishes the motivation to compete for a service academy appointment or earn a distinguished military graduate designa­tion- achievements that should be taken as early indicators of a stronger intent to serve our country. This change sends a very negative message to those who early in life saw soldiers as their role models and were motivated to apply U1at extra etiort required to enter and remain in a program that fonnerly provided a regu­lar commission from the start of their careers.

Warriors join and stay because they know that they are spe­cial and that not everyone can do their jobs. They are leaving now because their leaders have created an environment that doesn't appreciate them as special- as an elite that is not open to every­one. Warriors leave because they don't like the lowering of stan­dards, and iliey are offended al being given the cookie-cutter treatment. They are tired of being told that their unit rituals are outside the behavior "norms" and that in the new workplace some of the traditions of the warrior arc now considered " incor­rect'' conduct. The old airbome and fighter-pilot attitude just doesn't fit anymore, because it is seen as "exclusionary."

The ethos of being a warrior is disappearing- unit esprit built around "bonding" between warriors is now disparaged as an irrelevant concept and one that only serves to rationalize politi­cally incorrect behavior and policies. Toughness and courage are

The North Carolina Military Historical Society 7410 Chapel Hill Road

Raleigh, Nort11 Carolina 27607-5096

PAGE TWENTY ·FOUR

EDITOR'S TACK ROOM By Richard Ripley

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This publication continues with the "variety of articles" approach. Note the articles range from the Civil War, World War Tl, and Korea. We need more articles about all the services. So far, Recall bas had few stories aboul the Korean War and none about Vietnam.

Have you renewed your annual membership? Remember- your annual membership runs from January l to December 3 l each year.

Have a happy and peaceful holiday!

born out of esprit, but that doesn't count for mucb anymore. We as a nation seem to have lost sight of why we "raise,

train and maintain" a military force and that one of the basic pre­cepts of the Constitution is to "provide for the common defense." We've gotten so sophisticated tbal simple truths and principles are always suspect. Our noble military institutions, culture and life have become the targets of cultural warriors. There is an aw·a of self-righteousness about their activities- they arc afraid that there is a broadening gap between "society" and the miLita1y, that some of us are "extremists" and flaunt it by wearing fancy uni­forms, and that if we get "out of touch" we will not be able to serve our country's objectives.

Such arrogance. We withstood scorn dW'ing the Vietnam War and came back lo fight and win the Gulf War. The military has character and strength, and it is going to take a wealth of both to prevail in the attack it is now undergoing. We need soldiers of courage to stand up for the institution and prevent it from becom­ing another laboratory for all the "correct" causes that are con­suming our society. We need warriors with the strength to say l1Q

to those who don't understand the military. It's not about money. It's about preserving the institution

that produces the warriors who have always been there when they were called.

Photos, Interviews Sought of Late 20th Century N.C. Veterans

ln 1998, the N.C. Division of Archives and History began Phase ID of its effort to better document the state's 20th century

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PAID CARY, NC 27511 Permit No. 551

military experience. Previous phases have focused on the period from 1900 through the end of the Korean War. Though still actively collecting and preserving items from this era, the Archives is seeking to honor North Carolina veterans who served North Carolina and the nation from 1954 through the present.

Consider contributing photographs of Norrth Carolinians in uniform along with papers and memorabilia to the Military History Colleclion ProjecL

RECALL

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