The ANSO Report (1-15 February 2011) -...

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Historically, February pre-sents as one of the least ‘kinetic’ months of the year, partially due to the harsh cli-mactic conditions that ham-per all parties to the conflict. However, following an ex-tremely active January, this month will likely break with this trend as armed opposi-tion has accounted for 380 incidents this period alone. Put into perspective, by mid-month, 70% of the February 2010 total has been reached (see graph p.5). This can be attributed to a variety of fac-tors, including the unrelent-ing pace of security force operations, a mild winter season, and the overall maturity of the conflict (as supported by the stable year to year incident growth rate illustrated on p.12). While many of these incidents are low level, inconclusive tacti-cal engagements, it nonethe-less provides a provocative indicator of an extremely active year ahead.

As noted, security force op-erations have continued apace this period, primarily focused on AOG strong-holds in the South and North, though Kapisa also recorded activity. These have resulted in significant num-bers of AOG kill/captures, with IED discovery rates also on the increase. However, the effects of the subsequent

dislodgement of AOG in light of these operations will need to be monitored in the short term.

In contrast, AOG opera-tions, beyond the standard tactical efforts of IEDs and close range attacks, were highlighted by the focus on regional centres this period. The concentrated IED campaign in Jalalabad and the shopping centre suicide attack in Kabul (the 2nd this year), while notewor-thy, were eclipsed by the dramatic daytime siege of the ANP HQ in Kandahar. In general, attacks of this type represent a minimum of tactical investment in return for maximum strategic impact, particularly on perceptions of insecu-rity. As such, they pose an AOG counterpoint to the dialogue on security gains achieved at the conclusion of last year.

In addition, the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process (APRP) is gaining momentum, primarily in the North and to a lesser de-gree in the West. While l a r g e n u m b e r s o f ‘reintegrees’ have been re-ported, the follow up in this initiative remains unclear. In some areas, the APRP is feeding into the Afghan Local Police (ALP) pro-gram, resulting in a very

fluid context where the various groups (arbakis- ALP-AOG) are beginning to clash due to competing interests, and the resulting power struggle is creating a paradoxical destabilising element. It is advised that NGOs monitor the pro-gress of these programs as they will be a defining dy-namic, particularly at a lo-cal level, for the upcoming year.

This period also accounted for 5 NGO incidents, with 2 from Central and 3 in the East. Abductions occurred in Kunar and Wardak, along with the murder of a national staff member in Nangarhar, this accounting for the second NGO fatal-ity in 2011, both of whom were national staff. An in-cident in Logar highlighted the diverse challenges faced by NGO operating in con-tested areas when following the occupation of an NGO run clinic by security forces, AOG forced the ongoing closure of the clinic in retribution.

Lastly, the topic of transi-tion came to the fore this period, with both Herat and Nangarhar hosting meetings whose agendas included the pending transfer of lead security authority to the GoA and ANSF by 2014.

Issue: 67

COUNTRY SUMMARY

1-15 February 2011

Inside this Issue

Central Region 2

Northern Region 7

Western Region 14

Eastern Region 16

Southern Region 19

ANSO Info Page 23

THE ANSO REPORT

YOU NEED TO KNOW

• Security force operations in the North, South, and Cen-tral

• AOG focused attacks within regional centres

• 2nd NGO staff fatality re-corded this period

• Transition planning ongoing

Page 2 THE ANSO REPORT

K A B U L

Unless further investigation or comments by AOG leadership contradict the current findings, it should be assumed that the attack was broadly aimed at hitting an-other soft-target inside the inner security perimeter, posing as the AOG counter-narrative to GOA & IMF discourse on the security gains achieved throughout 2010. The strike also underlined the current AOG focus on selecting tactically simpler missions which result in significant media atten-tion. NGOs should keep an eye on what is to be seen as an extant threat of further attacks against civilian venues which combine the following risk factors: a) high-profile, b) easily accessible, and c) ‘target-rich’ (or perceived as such) - for it may be assumed that this type of attack will be reproduced, adding up to the more traditional portfolio of AOG suicide mis-sions exploring vulnerabilities of ANSF/IMF travel patterns in Ka-bul City. The other AOG attack, an IED in Jade Maiwand (PD 1) on 8 Febru-ary was more typical in its target-ing (ANSF vehicle), but innova-tive when it comes to tactics. A magnetic IED with a time-delay mechanism was stuck and subse-quently detonated against a parked Traffic Police Ranger. The light charge damaged the car but did not result in casualties. The usage of a sticky bomb indicates clear

Whereas the onset of the winter season froze the conflict dynamics in most parts of the Central Re-gion, and was reflected by only 3 AOG initiated attacks in Kabul Province, the capital city wit-nessed the brunt, with two IED incidents including another sui-cide attack inside the city’s secu-rity perimeter as well as a mag-netic IED against an empty ANSF vehicle. The present AOG pat-tern in Kabul City identifies less reliance on larger scale complex attacks and an increased focus on surgical strikes against softer-targets. Shortly after the noon prayer time on 14 February, two armed guards, manning a lateral entry point in the Kabul City Center/Safi Landmark Hotel (PD 4), spotted a BBIED attacker on the street. An exchange of SAF en-sued, resulting in the attacker be-ing shot and injured, though he was close enough to the entrance to kill the two guards when his charge detonated. Three bystand-ers were also wounded in the ex-plosion. The area was cordoned off shortly afterwards, with the ANSF engaging in building search operation, though this search did not result in any further encoun-ters with AOG. The IEA claimed responsibility for the attack in a press-release, but did not com-ment on the target selection, rather praising the attacker for engaging the security forces.

intent for targeting, a willingness to limit col-lateral casualties, as well as an intention to avoid any direct engagement with ANSF. Un-til recently, ‘sticky bombs’ were not a typical tactical method for AOGs in Kabul. How-ever, two recent cases preceded the Jade Mai-wand strike, one in Kabul and another one in Maidan Shahr. Of note, the former attack tar-geted an ANA vehicle in Puli Omomi, PD 1, on 24 December 2010 and featured striking similarities with the latest incident. This occur-rence may also represent a more permanent addition to AOG operational tactics in Kabul City, and is best mitigated by ensuring that NGO vehicles are never left unattended. Altogether, the picture of recent AOG attacks needs to be balanced by acknowledging the active stance of ANSF and IMF in disrupting AOG networks, namely in relation to the se-ries of recent arrests of operatives implicated in previous suicide attacks. These have in-cluded a planner involved in the December 2010 strike in Puli Charkhi as well as in the January 2011 motorcycle-mounted IED in Saraye Alauddin, and a ‘fixer’ who facilitated the transportation of the ‘Finest Market’ bomber to Kabul. Along with Kabul City, Deh Sabz, Paghman, Bagrami and Khaki Jab-bar have also witnessed increased numbers of police operations.

NGO Incidents Year to Date 1

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forces are not common, whereas multiple other cases have been attributed to AOG both in Logar and Wardak provinces. In light of AOG modus operandi, this incident also followed a well-established pattern of AOGs scru-tinizing communities immediately following contact with security forces, with cases of intimidation or retribution against communi-ties accused of ‘cooperating’ with IMF documented in the past. Besides directly impacting access to NGO services, interferences by any armed parties bring about the risk of NGO project sites becom-ing targets in the wider conflict, and pose a direct threat to the safety of NGO staff and benefici-aries. In general, and similar to Wardak, Logar witnessed a period of rela-

On the night of 26 January, a joint ANSF and IMF detachment set their base inside the Basic Health Center (BHC) operated by an NGO in the Shaykhan Village of Kharwar, occupying the clinic until 1 February. When the mili-tary left, an AOG element entered the village and barred physical access into the facility in retribu-tion. The clinic has been effec-tively closed down ever since. NGO-run facilities often repre-sent a community’s primary asset both in terms of access to services as well as of physical infrastruc-ture. In many areas, NGO facili-ties present one of the only ‘hardened’ structures (and usually centrally located), offering a de-fendable position and tactical cover for those who option to occupy it. Nevertheless, similar occurrences involving security

tive calm dominated by reduced AOG activity and occasional IMF & ANSF surgical strikes. These strikes against AOG leadership in the central districts along the Kabul – Gardez Highway were seconded by pre-emptive opera-tions aimed at securing peripheral areas before the on-set of the spring fighting season, as seen in Kharwar and Charkh. Overall, NGO access during this cycle tempo-rarily improved, although the risks of AOG checkpoints & abductions, IED activity and violent political and criminal escalations along the main roads remain extant components of the security environment in the province.



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during which two Kajrani resi-dents (reportedly members of ANSF) were taken hostage on their way to their home district. The news flared up local passions and instigated a Kajrani potentate to detain a Helmandi mullah in the Kajran bazaar, releasing the individual once a promise had been made of intervention in fa-vour of the Kajrani abductees in Helmand. The lack of progress from Helmand prompted further action, this time the ambitious detention of 10 passengers transit-ing in 5 trucks from Kandahar via Uruzgan and Kajran to Helmand on 2 February, apparently to serve as an incentive for his Baghran counterparts to release the two Kajranis. Once again, a local dele-gation of elders intervened on

Typical for the winter season, the NGO operational environment was dominated by an omnipresent risk of avalanches in high-mountain passes and a general reduction in vehicular accessibility on the majority of road networks. Kajran marked the only two en-tries related to man-made inci-dents, which again concentrated on the main roads linking the dis-trict to the southern provinces, and illustrated the uneasy neighbourly relations in the bor-der areas. Roadside criminality, although a perennial concern in the province, did not come to play this period. In late January, reports reached Kajran bazaar of an abduction perpetrated by an AOG com-mander in Baghran (Helmand),

behalf of the ten detainees in Kajran, and man-aged to secure their release. The two Kajrani abductees taken in Helmand, however, remain in captivity. The outlook for the upcoming weeks will un-equivocally bring about humanitarian issues linked to access and snow-related disasters and sporadic escalations in the south will remain a distant possibility; though both being permissi-ble in as much as any other human endeavors are allowed by the weather.



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checkpoints along main roads, as well as the tracking down of AOG elements and materiel. The mo-mentum remained on the IMF & ANSF side, with AOG opting for disengagement from direct en-counters, withdrawing towards safe heavens, and eventual retreat into adjacent districts. The Uzbin Valley in Surobi reportedly ab-sorbed a significant portion of AOG fighters. On the ground, the AOG riposte to the offensive encompassed increased IED ac-tivity in an attempt to secure ac-cess towards the safe heavens and support bases. Anecdotal evi-dence also suggested that the AOG increased financial incen-tives for capturing or killing mem-bers of security forces, including those enrolled in local defence initiatives. Local reporting emphasized that the operations largely concen-trated on a particular network of

Security dynamics in Kapisa were largely dictated by an IMF & ANSF offensive in the districts of Tagab and Alasay, which also en-compassed some of the most in-tensive combat operations seen in the Central Region thus far. On 31st January, IMF initiated a series of surgical strikes in Tagab, which largely took form of Special Force ground operations accom-panied by close-air support, seem-ingly targeting known IEA leaders along the Tagab-Surobi Road (Sheikhel) and Tagab – Alasay Road (Nyazkhel). As a result of the initial push, at least 3 higher-rank IEA commanders were killed and one seriously injured (and detained) in Tagab, while an addi-tional 2 IEA commanders were targeted but managed to escape in Alasay (Chahar Qala cluster). The follow-up operations included temporary IMF bases in cluster villages, increased amounts of

historical HIG commanders, who constitute the core of the current IEA leadership in the province, leaving other elements of anti-GOA networks largely intact. Whether the operation was aimed at securing the main district roads, or rather eliminating the detailed circle of es-tablished IEA commanders, is yet to be seen. While recent adverse weather conditions will likely affect the willingness of both sides to initiate larger-scale engagements, IMF surgical operations may be expected to re-occur in the coming weeks. In such context, NGOs should monitor for possible conflict spill-over in the adjacent areas and along the main roads, and intensive IED activity and increased IMF movements should be anticipated.

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TRAINING NOTICE:

ANSO will be conducting free Basic Guard training and Radio Communications training for NGOs in Kabul City beginning on the 27th of February 2011. Please note that the two training courses are separate, take one whole day each, and will only be available in Kabul

City during this period; however, organisations with staff in the surrounding provinces are more than welcome to bring them in for training if feasible.

Additionally, note that registration for the training will be closed as of 1630 hrs on the 24 of February – NO EXCEPTIONS. And as usual, the ANSO trainer will be rotating

through the ANSO field offices in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat City, Jalalabad City, and Kandahar City at later dates to also provide this training. (ANSO will notify you of these dates at a later

time). If you would like the ANSO Trainer to conduct either of these courses at your office for

your staff, please refer to the registration forms emailed previously or contact the Operations Coordinator National Counterpart, Masoud Habibi, at [email protected].




W A R DA K

2010 and similar to the recent case, 4 of the latter involved tem-porary abductions (lasting usually 1 to 3 days). Besides staff’s local identity and high levels of local recognition for established NGOs in the province, engagement of local elders in negotiations with AOG appears to play a key role in a safe release of the hostages. Equally important, compliance when facing AOG checkpoints, or attempted abductions, minimises the possibilities of weapons use, therefore greatly reducing staff risk. A separate incident high-lighted this reality when a local driver failed to stop at an AOG checkpoint set on an auxiliary road in Saydabad and was subse-quently shot dead. The overall levels of violence re-mained very low in Wardak with less than 20 incident records so far, the overwhelming majority

The recent incident in Wardak denotes a return to the pattern of AOG-initiated kidnappings of NGO staff members. On 27 Janu-ary, an NGO temporary worker drove his motorcycle into an AOG patrol on the Chaki Wardak – Day Mirdad Road. As per the victim’s account, the AOG unit acted based on the allegation that the staff member was a GOA agent tasked with recruiting local men for service in the police force and local defence initiative. Dur-ing questioning, the staff member was beaten, but persistently de-nied the AOG accusations, em-phasizing instead his employment with the NGO. After a day in captivity, local elders along with the victims’ relatives engaged the abductors in negotiations which ultimately concluded in the safe release of the detainee. The inci-dent prolongs the series of 5 NGO abductions recorded in

pertaining to ANSF & IMF operations. The current patterns clearly indicate a lull in kinetic operations by AOG following an intensive fighting season, as well as a persistent IMF & ANSF focus on targeting the AOG leadership in key areas along important routes. The most likely scenario for the coming weeks will up-hold occasional ‘morale-boosting’ but low-intensity engagements by AOGs, and sporadic surgical strikes by IMF & ANSF in areas pe-ripheral to their zones of control. NGOs may anticipate violent escalations to concentrate along the Kabul – Ghazni Highway in Sayda-bad & Nirkh, as well as on major district roads between Jalrez and Maidan Shahr DACs.

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Abdi Bay area. While high-profile killings do happen frequently in Chaharikar, and mostly relate to local power-struggles, this killing is reminiscent of the Jabalussaraj strike against a popular mullah (and an outspoken critic of local jihadi factions) in late 2010, an incident that has yet to be plausi-bly explained. Similarly, the cir-cumstances and motives behind the latest assassination have not been revealed so far. On 30 January in Quli Hir, an IEA detachment largely consti-tuted of former HIG fighters, executed the brother of a local head of the arbaki militia, himself a seasoned HIG figure. The killing recalls a local history of blood feuds, played out against the back-ground of local factional infight-ings and IEA expansion. The arbaki commander’s father, an influential mullah who had fought along the HIG during the 1980s, opposed IEA’s expansion in the area and was killed presumably by the same group last year. This murder then triggered a tribal ven-detta, with the militia commander

In counterpoint to the intensive fighting in Kapisa, and more in line with other provinces of the Central Region, Parwan witnessed a limited number of incidents, mostly of a political and criminal nature, with targeted killings com-ing to the fore. Reports about a late-January escalation also reached out from the Quli Hir cluster in Shinwari, with the event triggering the otherwise antici-pated ANSF operation in the area. Besides the low incident volumes, security developments during this cycle did not represent any signifi-cant changes in the NGO opera-tional environment. While investigations into the re-cent murder of an NGO female trainer in the Sayadan Area have so far failed to elucidate the un-derlying motives of the attack, as well as the identity of the attack-ers, another high-profile killing was reported from Chaharikar during this cycle. This time, a prominent maulawi, member of the Provincial Ulema Council, and a doyen of Islamic education in Parwan & Kapisa, was gunned down by unknown attackers in the

taking revenge and killing a brother of the IEA commander. The latest escalation, although again following the personal level of conflict, preceded an anticipated ANSF operation. In-deed, a two-hundred police force entered Quli Hir, only to encounter a minimal resistance. Yet, two days later, a unit of six AOG fighters presumably on the move from Quli Hir was arrested by ANP close to the DAC of the neighbouring Siyagerd district. For the rest of the period, the situation in the Ghorband Valley remained calm, with NGOs concerns largely oriented towards the heavy snowfalls in the upper part of the valley, which temporarily blocked overland access into Bamyan via the Shibar Pass. Heavy precipita-tions combined with mild temperatures and poor visibility also impacted vehicular traffic in the Salang Pass, with several occurrences of road closures and localized avalanches re-corded during the second week of the period.

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NOTICE: The provincial graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 9th

of February 2011.


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der AOG operations and move-ments throughout the district, whether or not there have been lasting changes in security since that time remains questionable. Chimtal is still considered an inse-cure district with 2 IEDs detonat-ing on IMF patrols as recently as late January. Later in the day fol-lowing this more recent detona-tion, armed men approached the destroyed vehicle in an attempt to pilfer spare parts, but were turned away by gunfire. However, they could not be stopped from return-ing later, and set the detonated remains of the vehicle ablaze. Adding to this district’s insecurity, a former Jihadi Commander was assassinated outside his house in Arab Mazari on the 11th. Chahar Bolak, Chimtal’s neighbor to the north, also saw insecurity on the highway along the widely traveled Mazar-Shibirgan road when, on February 5th, shots were fired at an IMF convoy. Although this stretch of road has had a number of incidents in the past, it has been relatively quiet following recent IMF operations. However, with the approach of spring coin-ciding with a draw down in secu-rity during the “hold” phase, this well traveled route may resurface as a hot point. Like Chimtal, Chahar Bolak is widely considered an insecure re-gion with a significant AOG pres-ence, and was the site of 4 security incidents this reporting period (including the one previously mentioned). Two of the other incidents included the shooting and killing of a pro-government militia man in Timurak Sufla Vil-

Balkh was a particularly active province this reporting period, with AOG activity re-emerging in Chimtal and Chahar Bolak Dis-tricts—both known AOG strong-holds that have been relatively quiet following recent IMF/ANSF operations in the area—and military operations conducted in Dawlatabad and Nahri Shahi. It is especially noteworthy that insecurity in this region has begun to resurface along the roadways, which have been volatile in the past. In Chimtal, the head of the Crimi-nal Investigation Department (CID) in Chimtal was killed on February 8th when an IED deto-nated on his vehicle, killing him and injuring 4 other ANP soldiers. The incident happened on a dis-trict road at 1330 in Nawshahr Naqilin area, a long standing AOG stronghold which had been quiet of late. There have been unsubstantiated reports that the detonation was the result of a RCIED, and that the trigger men escaped by motorcycle immedi-ately after the explosion. How-ever, contrary reports from GOA sources indicate that this was the result of an older IED, and that the head of CID was not the in-tended target. For the time being, it remains uncertain exactly what type of IED this was, and whether the head of CID was the one tar-geted (although this seems prob-able). Nawshahr Naqilin is close to Zig Zig and Ali Zayi, which were also known as prior AOG strongholds within Chimtal. Al-though a larger IMF/ANSF/ANP presence was pumped into the area recently, in an effort to hin-

lage on the 6th, and an IED detonation on the 10th. This latter likely the result of a premature detonation, as the IED detonated while 2 AOG members were emplacing it along the road in Arzan Kar village. The only person wounded was one of the AOG members plac-ing it. Military operations were conducted in two dis-tricts this period, both occurring during the late night/early morning hours of February 10th/11th. One of these took place in Dawlata-bad District, Qaraghujla Village, where IMF/ANA conducted a night raid with helicopters and arrested 3 local civilians who had allegedly just returned from a trip to Iran. The 3 were suspected of being involved in the Islamic Ji-had Group (IJG)—which has known ties to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and were accused of facilitating the movement of AOG members from Iran and Pakistan into Afghanistan. The second operation was conducted in Nahri Shahi District, where 3 arrests pertaining to the operation in Dawlatabad were made (all 3 indi-viduals were later released). Nahri Shahi Dis-trict, which had previously been quiet since an AOG attack on a checkpoint on November 21st 2010, was also the location of a roadside IED discovery on February 1st by ANP, and the discovery of 4 IEDs in jerry cans near Tak-hta Pul Village. It is unclear right now what the individual arrested in this operation was charged with. Finally, Mazar-e Sharif saw criminal activity in the form of drugs and arms related arrests, as well as a SAF attack on a private vehicle, killing 2 local citizens on the 11th Feb in PD#1 Karte Sajadia area.



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had cleared Chahar Dara, along with Archi and Imam Sahib, of AOG presence just days prior to this detonation. It is yet to be determined whether or not the IED that took out the District Governor was an attempt to discredit the IMF reports of the AOG demise and demonstrate their ability to conduct complex operations in Kunduz, or whether it was simply an attack born out of opportunity on a high profile government target. Regardless of this and other incidents in the province, there is no doubt that a significant number of AOGs were destroyed or dislocated as a result of the recent IMF offensive. As a result of these operations, a large number of AOG members sur-rendered between January 27th and February 7th, including 53 from Archi (in 4 different groups) and 71 out of Imam Sahib (also in 4 different groups). The destabili-zation of AOGs in the province could mean that while ANSF/IMF presence remains strong in Kunduz, nearby Takhar Province, and to a lesser extent Balkh and Baghlan, could see a re-emergence of those same AOGs as they mi-grate across the borders.

Kunduz continues to be a focal point for insecurity in the North-east, with significant incidents this period in Chahar Dara, Imam Sa-hib, and Archi. Despite IMF op-erations throughout the province that resulted in a large number of AOGs in Archi and Imam Sahib surrendering to the GOA, the Chahar Dara District Administra-tive Center was the site of a BBIED detonation that killed a high profile GOA Kunduz offi-cial, the second government offi-cial from this province to be killed in the last 6 months. The first assassination took place on Octo-ber 8th, when an IED detonated inside of a Mosque in Taluqan City, Takhar Province, killing the Provincial Governor. Now, a little more than 5 months later, a suicide bomber entered the Dis-trict Administrative Center in Chahar Dara District, Kunduz and killed at least 6 individuals (including the District Governor, a local militia leader, and a local elder) and injuring at least 6 oth-ers. This was the second targeting of the Chahar Dara District Gov-ernor, the first coming on Decem-ber 19th, when his vehicle was ambushed with SAF and RPGs along the Kunduz – Chahar Dara main road. IMF reported that it

In Imam Sahib, AOGs conducted an RPG attack against an ANSF base in Aqmasjed Area late in the evening of February 6th, and a num-ber of IED incidents took place around the district as well. IED incidents often increase as AOG leave an area. This is due to a decrease in AOG ability to conduct complex attacks and the desire to slow down advancing IMF troops in order to buy them time to escape. In February, an IED exploded on a civilian vehi-cle on the 1st - injuring 4 in Archi, 4 IEDs were discovered in the northern part of Kunduz City, and on February 6th an IED was found in the Kharoti area of Chahar Dara). The second most deadly IED incident took place on February 3rd when an IED detonated on a private vehicle killing 3 and injuring 2. This took place in Tape Borida area near Lark-habi on the Kunduz – Gortepa road, and was the first incident in the area for over a year. While the area is currently considered well un-der ANSF control, in the past it was controlled by AOGs, and reports suggest that the area remains littered with IEDs, with AOGs con-tinuing to place more at night in parts of both Larkhabi and Tape Borida.

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As in Baghlan Province, Faryab also witnessed an attack on a girl’s school in Yusuf Merzaiee Village in Qaramqol District. The arson took place late at night on the 4th, when anti-GOA elements entered the school and set it alight. Al-though nobody was injured, it was reported that about half of the school supplies were burnt or oth-erwise damaged. It is noteworthy that this exact same school was attacked last year on the 12th of March during a series of attacks on girls’ schools. At the time of last year’s attack, the school was associated with an NGO, however it is now a GOA school with no NGO ties. An ANSF investiga-tion to the matter is currently un-derway, and whether or not this will spark a new rash of attacks on girls’ schools remains to be seen. Faryab is no stranger to attacks on education related targets. Besides this series of attacks that took place during the first quarter of 2010, there were a number of

In Faryab, there was insecurity in Qaysar and an attack on a girls’ school in Qaramqol, as rumors circulated about the appointment of a new Provincial Shadow Gov-ernor. This latest development coincided with anecdotal warnings about an increased threat of sui-cide bombers in the province. Although this last threat has yet to manifest, the notion that the arri-val of a new PSG would coincide with a temporary increase in AOG activity (and more extreme/violent activity) is a logical one that follows established country-wide trends. Throughout Af-ghanistan, the appointment of new shadow government ele-ments (now often chosen from external areas, so that they will have no ties with the local popu-lace) has often coincided with increased—and more aggres-sive—AOG activities as these elements seek to establish a repu-tation. How things will play out in this particular province remains to be seen.

more violent attacks between 2007 and 2008 that resulted in the deaths of individuals work-ing at the schools. This period’s incident, like those in 2010, seemed to target the school in-frastructure rather than the staff, and while in these more recent instances guards were beaten and tied up, it seemed that nobody who was attacked was intended to be killed. Lastly, Qaysar remained the focal point of AOG activity in the province. There were a total of 8 IEDs found in the New Abad area of the district (5 on the 3rd and 3 on the 5th), as well as AOG attacks on an ANSF/IMF patrol near Shakh Village on the 3rd, and a complex attack featuring an RCIED detonation fol-lowed by SAF on an ANP patrol in the Hazara Qala area on the 10th. Qaysar has been, and remains, an AOG stronghold with high levels of insecurity.



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the new district Chiefs of Police in Takhar coming from Kunduz province. One of these (in Talu-qan), has already been replaced after a demonstration took place earlier this month, due to his al-leged involvement in unethical behaviour from the province. The government met to discuss the situation during the demon-stration, and ultimately agreed that he should be removed. Rounding up the significant secu-rity events in the province, in Bangi, an IED was found outside the residence of a failed Wolesi

While this reporting period was relatively quiet for Takhar Prov-ince, there is a strong chance that this inactivity will not last as Tak-har may be the recipient of an increased number of AOGs who are being pushed out of Kunduz (Archi and Imam Sahib) due to the proliferation of IMF opera-tions in that neighboring prov-ince. Khwaja Ghar, which has a strong existing AOG presence, and shares a border with Archi, would potentially be a natural rally point for fleeing AOGs. The links between Kunduz and Takhar continue, with many of

Jerga candidate, Taluqan saw 4 ACG incidents, and in Chal District an armed individual shot and killed two civilians. Lastly, 10 AOG mem-bers joined the peace process in the District Center Area of Ishkamish District, and in Kalafgan, an Iranian who had been working as a pharmacist and then a doctor was arrested for working illegally.



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This would not be a first for the Northern region, which saw a string of attacks on girls’ school last year in Faryab (see the Faryab section of this report for more details). Baghlani Jadid District continues to be one of the least secure dis-tricts in the province, and saw 5 very diverse incidents this report-ing period. These included 2 rob-beries (one resulting in the shoot-ing of a government employee, and the other the robbery of a private radio station), the killing of a low ranking education official in Jar Khoshk, Firqae Haji Majid Area on the 12th (allegedly by pro-government militia members who claim that the official was at-tempting to attack the militia’s checkpoint), and the discovery of 35 mortar rounds amidst the ru-ined remains of a compound on the 8th. The discovery of a large number of mortar rounds is sig-nificant since these are used not only for mortar attacks, but in the construction of IEDs, and could signal a forthcoming increase in

Baghlan Province saw a wide range of security incidents over this reporting period. Amidst the usual mix of ANP/AOG/ACG clashes, Nahrin District and Bagh-lani Jadid continued a pattern of reduced security, and less com-mon incidents surfaced including an attack on a girl’s school, the shooting of an education official, and the discovery of a large num-ber of mortar rounds. In Banu District, a girls’ school was attacked with RPG fire. This was one of two attacks on girls’ schools in the North this report-ing period (the other occurring in Faryab). On the evening of Feb-ruary 4th, two rockets were fired towards Banu Girl’s school, im-pacting an open area and causing some damage, but no injuries. Although there have been con-flicting reports about whether or not the missile purposefully tar-geted the school or whether it was aimed at an ANP checkpoint a few hundred meters away, initial reports seem to confirm that the attack school itself was the target.

IED activity in the district. In Burka District, an AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint in the District Center on the 3rd, and there are anecdotal reports from this dis-trict that more attacks like this may be forth-coming. While Burka District has seen a num-ber of AOG/ANP clashes, including two at-tacks on ANP checkpoints last month; this was the first attack on the District Center itself since November 2010. Finally, Nahrin District continued to see vio-lence as a result of ACG activity. On February 1st in Bashi Qala Village a clash between 2 ACGs left 3 ACG members dead, and 1 in-jured, while in the same district on February 4th, a group of unknown men attacked and robbed a private vehicle. Nahrin District had only 12 security incidents in all of 2010, but has already seen 4 over the first 6 weeks of this year and 10 over the last 6 months, 9 of which have been attributed to ACGs.



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BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime




J A W Z J A N

Qush Tepa District saw signifi-cant action in the last days of the PRP when, on January 30th, AOG members came to villages in the District and took hostage and tor-tured the relatives of former-AOG members who had recently joined the peace process. The aggressors issued warnings to those present that whomever joined in the peace process needed to either rejoin their ranks, or leave Afghanistan altogether. The incident was reported in the same location as that of a fire-fight which had occurred between ANP and AOG the previous eve-ning. This underscores some of the serious issues arising out of the peace process. AOG have begun to respond more critically to areas where large numbers of the populace are engaging, negoti-ating with and surrendering to the GOA, and often this has resulted in the creation of further insecu-rity. Furthermore, strained rela-tionships between competing AOG groups continue to exist

Headlining analysis of Jawzjan Province (although technically taking place in Balkh), a prestig-ious AOG commander from Jaw-zjan Province was arrested in a joint Jawzjan/Balkh police effort. This commander has been linked to anti-GOA activities, including significant IED activities and ille-gal checkpoints along the main Jawzjan-Sar-e Pul road. It is said that he was supported by an AOG leader who operates in Sayyad District of Sar-e Pul. The details of his arrest—and what it may mean for security along this stretch of road—have yet to come to light, although it is likely that he will be replaced quickly with someone who is just as eager and capable. In the meantime there are anecdotal reports that the ar-rest may have been made while the suspect was riding in a GOA vehicle. In Khwaja Du Koh District, in the Madrassa area, AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint on the 11th. This was only the 3rd attack in that district over the last 12 months.

after one group has been “deputized,” and often it is the family members and villagers who get caught in the middle. This is more of an issue than ever during the harsh winter months when resources are scarce. These con-ditions create a strong temptation amongst farmers and fighters alike to “temporarily” join the peace process in order to gain access to the food and funds (when they actually come through) that are allotted to those who do. However, how many of those who join are previous combatants, are actually interested in supporting the government, or who intend to stick with the program when the spring arrives, is questionable. Worse yet, those who do stick with it are not held accountable for their ac-tions, and have often continued to conduct themselves in the same manner as when they were outlaws. This has caused locals to fear many of these groups and turn to other ACGs/AOGs for protection.

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JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime

Although the first period of Feb-ruary was mostly quiet in Saman-gan, on February 2nd, 20 AOG members surrendered to the GOA at the District Center in Dara-i-Sufi Payin. Dara-i-Sufi Payin has been a source for inse-curity in the region, and has hosted attacks against—and ab-ductions of—construction work-ers in the area (including the re-cent kidnapping of 7 internation-als working on a project in the



S A M A N G A N

area, 5 of whom have not yet been returned). There have been anec-dotal reports from multiple sources that some of the individu-als who surrendered may have been from the group widely con-sidered accountable for incidents against NGOs and these con-struction workers. Whether this group consisted of individuals from the responsible party, and whether or not the group’s sur-

render to GOA will actually result in any sig-nificant changes in actual security (be that an increase or a decrease), or the return of the still missing construction workers, remains to be seen.

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SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime


S A R - E P U L

dotal reports suggest that this large offensive was conducted as retribution against the villages and families of those former AOG members who had joined the peace process, as the large num-bers of AOGs surrendering to the GOA have begun to frustrate AOG elements across the region. These types of retaliatory strikes have become more common countrywide as more alleged AOGs have joined the peace process in places such as Kunduz and Qush Tepa, Jawzjan. A second complex attack took place late at night on February 1st when a group of approximately 20 AOG on motorcycles targeted an ANP checkpoint with SAF and RPGs. The checkpoint was set up close to a returnee camp in Sozma

Although there were few security incidents in Sar-E Pul this report-ing period (and none in Kohis-tanat), there were significant events in the province including a large complex attack in Sayyad and an ANP/AOG clash in Sar-e Pul. Sozma Qala also saw the first attack on an ANP checkpoint since May of 2010. Less than a week after the surren-der of 60 AOG from Sayyad Dis-trict to the GOA in late January, a group of 100-150 AOGs mounted a large scale attack with SAF and RPGs on Aqso Shrqi, Aqso Gharbe, and Nawadar vil-lages in Sayyad District on Febru-ary 4th. ANSF deployed to the area and engaged in a prolonged fire-fight with the group that ulti-mately left 6 AOG members dead, 3 wounded, and 1 arrested. Anec-

Qala District, about 5 kilometers northeast of the District Administrative Center. Although the attack resulted in no injuries, a stray RPG round impacted the camp causing damage to three tents. The AOG withdrew after the ANP engaged them for over 2 hours. This was one of only two such attacks in Sozma Qala over the past year, the first conducted on an ANP checkpoint on May 11th, 2010. Lastly, an armed clash took place between AOG and ANP on Feb 6th in Sar-e Pul Dis-trict around Sar Takhta Village which resulted in deaths to 1 AOG member, 1 ANP member, and injuries to a female civilian.



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February AOG Initiated Incident Volumes: Yearly Comparison 2006-2011

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month and a half of 2011, with 3 occurring in the last 3 weeks. To put this in perspective, there were only 14 total incidents in the district in 2010, and of those 14, only 1 was an attack on GOA infrastructure (a May 20th RPG attack on ANP HQ). Although the nature of these attacks mirror established trends country wide of AOGs assaulting GOA targets, there is an-ecdotal evidence that this could be the work of ACGs who are fearful that police actions could disrupt their drug trade. The district is not known to have a substantial AOG presence, and it has been reported that ACGs involved in the drug trade are unhappy with the newly appointed chief of police. When reviewed in this light, it is very likely that these attacks may be ACGs sending “messages” to the local au-thorities, either warning them against disrupt-ing their “business,” or expressing their dis-pleasure with their current involvement. How this increase in anti-GOA activity plays out as the spring arrives—which has historically spiked AOG activity, also coinciding with the harvesting of opium (therefore increasing drug related crime)—remains to be seen.

B A DA K H S H A N

Less significantly, Fayazabad also saw a demonstration in Chawk Kheyaban Area (PD#3) where locals expressed discontent over the handling of the recent parlia-mentary elections. Locals pro-tested the disqualification of a candidate, and the fact that three other candidates were not allowed to count the votes that they re-ceived, despite official complaints being lodged to the ECC on their behalf. This was the second dem-onstration in the province this period, the first being a slightly smaller demonstration in the Dis-trict Administrative Center of Khwahan District over the gov-ernment’s February 6th killing of an alleged drug dealer. Elsewhere in the province, Ba-harak District continued to see an increase in violence. Following January’s IED detonation inside an NGO compound and an early January attack on a fuel station. There were RPG attacks on ANP HQ in the DAC on both January 30th and February 6th, and then on February 9th unknown individuals hurled 2 hand grenades into an ANBP position. This has brought the total number of attacks in the District up to 5 for the first

While Baharak continued to be the focal point for expressed inse-curity in Badakhshan this report-ing period, Fayzabad—historically a benign working environment for NGOs in the North—witnessed an unpopular change in leadership and a large demonstration. Fayza-bad has seen the presence of hu-manitarian workers in its midst steadily grow as stability in neighboring Takhar has begun to decrease. While these new devel-opments in Fayzabad may not yet have a significant effect on the current security paradigm for NGOs operating in the district, they remain noteworthy. Firstly, the head of municipality of Fayzabad was replaced by a known powerful actor with a his-tory in the province, who pos-sesses an imposing following. Despite this ‘prestige’, anecdotal reports from the region suggest that this change has been an un-popular one among the civilian population. For now, this lack of support for the new “Mayor” is unlikely to lead to civil unrest, as he is generally considered too strong a force to reckon with, but whether this has long term effects on stability in the district remains to be seen.



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BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime


In Herat Province, IED related incidents figured prominently, with five discoveries and three detonations during this reporting period. The discoveries in dis-tricts with a typically higher level of AOG activities such as Shin-dand, Adraskan and Kushk were not unusual. However, the discov-eries in Bande Boghorcha of Kushk, were. This marked the third IED discovery on the main Herat – Turghundi Road since 5 November 2010, in an area which is approximately 1-2 km south from the District Centre. AOGs in Kushk typically concentrate their activities in areas north of the DC and at present it is unlikely these incidents mark a concentrated effort to expand further south – not least because of their lack of influence in the southern areas. Further IEDs were discovered in Injil District and Herat City. Whereas the IED in Herat City was found on a sec-



H E R A T

ondary road in a remote area of District 8, the explosive device in Injil was located on the Herat-Zinda Jan Road between Shahrak-I-Sabz and Pule Rawashan areas. IED related incidents on this road are rare with only three recorded in the last 13 months, including a discovery in December 2010 and an earlier detonation (July) while an IMF EOD team was attempt-ing to defuse it. At present such incidents are expected to remain rare as the usually quiet district of Injil generally reports low levels of support for AOG. Armed clashes between AOGs were reported from Pashtun Zar-ghun and Gulran districts. While the background in the Gulran incident remains unclear, and may be linked to smuggling in the dis-trict, AOG tensions in the village of Rawandan in Pashtun Zarghun are reportedly caused by power struggles between the leading

AOG commander in the district and a compet-ing group. Anecdotal reports suggest that the incident was the result of attempts by the local AOG commander to disarm the other group. Intra-AOG tensions are likely to intensify dur-ing the handover of lead security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF as this transition process may be perceived as an opportunity to disrupt the status quo. Of note, on the 12th of February, representa-tives of ANSF and ISAF Regional Command West agreed on a document defining regional objectives for operations and cooperation, in-cluding security and transition. The ANSF will be in the lead to implement the agreed objec-tives and the document will be the main refer-ence for all operations in RC-West for the up-coming year.

W E S T E R N R E G I O N

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HERAT AOG HERAT Crime

FA R A H

Farah Province, remains to be seen in light of the usually high level of AOG and ongoing migra-tion from the southern provinces. The usually quieter Qala-I-Kah District saw an IED incident as well as a killing. In the afternoon of 3rd of February, a roadside IED hit the vehicle of an ANBP patrol, killing one ANBP officer; with this incident following an ANSF operation conducted in the area 3 days earlier. Of note, the only other recorded IED related inci-dent in the last 13 months took

AOG activity during the current reporting period was lower than usual; however, this does not nec-essarily indicate a change in AOG presence or for the long-term se-curity situation. In contrast to the last cycle, when Bala Buluk saw a number of AOG attacks, reconciliation was the prominent issue this period. In Safarak Area, eleven AOG mem-bers, including a commander, sur-rendered and handed over their weapons to GoA authorities. The sustainability of reconciliation in Bala Buluk, and other districts of

place in December 2010, involving the arrest of AOG members with explosive devices. In addition, ANP found the corpse of a local ci-vilian in Korghi Zard Area on 1st February; though the background of this incident re-mains unclear and it is therefore not necessar-ily connected to AOG activity in the district.



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FARAH AOG FARAH Crime


G H O R

Governor of Ghor are supported by plans to establish reintegration offices in several districts in the province including Chaghcharan, Du Layna, Pasaband and Taywara. Despite these efforts, unspecific, and mainly unconfirmed, threat reports in regard to further AOG attacks have been circulated. In-dications suggest that Charsada District may see more AOG activ-ity, and the north-western parts of Chaghcharan District appear less stable since the assassination of a prominent local commander in December 2010. Efforts to stem possible deterioration in security, as seen in the Murghab Valley last year, will largely depend on the

Ghor Province continued to be stable during the first two weeks of February 2011. The key inci-dents recorded included the ar-rests of criminals in Lal Wa Sar-jangal and Pasaband, as well as a killing of a local due to a personal dispute in Pasaband on 12th of February. Apart from that, reconciliation efforts in Ghor continue. While 25 AOG members from Shahrak reconciled at the end of January, recently 40 AOG members, in-cluding two local AOG com-manders, surrendered to the GoA on the 5th of February in Pasa-band. Previous reports of ongo-ing negotiations between influen-tial local commanders and the

success of reconciliation efforts in both these areas and the Murghab Valley. It is unlikely that AOGs – especially non-local ones – will be able to keep their level of influence if local commanders, who are still perceived as the key to control, reconcile. This will be also a crucial question in the critical southern areas of Tay-wara and Pasaband districts come spring, when non-local AOGs from Helmand are expected to return. If the reconciliation process contin-ues in the southern districts, armed clashes between these two groups are to be expected.



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GHOR AOG GHOR Crime

IED related incidents in Qala-I-Naw continued after an IED strike was reported during the previous period; though the re-cent incidents were limited to dis-coveries. On the 1st of February ANSF discovered a motorcycle rigged as a RCIED in Khaja Tawakkol Area followed by two other IEDs in Qarachaghai Area four days later. Whereas this last discovery in was in a remote area, the Qarachaghai Area has also noted an IED discovery on the main road between Qala-I-Naw and Qadis on the 31st of January. The IED discovery in January was the third one on the main road in Qarachaghai Area since April 2010. The area saw also a direct attack against an ANP checkpoint and a polling centre as well as an armed clash between ANSF and



B A D G H I S

AOG during the last year. In ad-dition, IMF conducted an airstrike targeting AOGs on 1 January 2011, which usually indicates a significant AOG presence in an area. Altogether, IED related in-cidents remain rare in Qala-I-Naw and Qadis though a slight increase is not unlikely due to a generally higher AOG activity in the spring. In addition, 50% of all recorded direct fire attacks by AOGs tar-geting ANSF/IMF in the prov-ince took place in Murghab while IMF conducted an airstrike on 4th of February in Chelanak Area, targeting AOG locations. As a result, four to five AOG members and at least seven civilians were killed or wounded, demonstrating again the risk for civilians of being caught up in the hostilities. Fur-

thermore, intra-tribal tensions were reported from the Morichaq area of Murghab District which turned violent and resulted in an armed clash that killed one and wounded two others. In addition, the corpse of an ANBP officer was found, who was reportedly killed due to a personal dispute one day before. Perhaps re-lated to this find, unconfirmed reports suggest that an ANBP commander is also involved in the recent tribal tensions. While at present the background behind these tensions remain un-clear, they remain unresolved are further such incidents are expected in the short-term.

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BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime


Nangarhar Province reported two NGO incidents involving two separate NGOs this period, mark-ing the first such occurrences this year. On the 1st of February in Khogyani District the body of an NGO staff member was found by local villagers, the victim of what appears to be an execution style killing, as his hands were found bound behind his back. On the afternoon of the 1st of February the staff member had been travel-ling on a motorcycle from the Khogyani DAC towards his home village (after completing a site visit) when he went missing, ap-parently abducted from the same area where his body was subse-quently found two days later. The victim’s valuables and motorcycle were missing, though a note had been written (in ink on the vic-tim’s hand) stating that anyone who wants these items back should contact them. However, no contact details were provided. Investigations into this incident remain inconclusive at this time due to the blend of local and non-local AOG, factionalism, and local



N A N G A R H A R

disputes common to the area. The second incident, on February 9 in Achin district involved an INGO marked vehicle that was struck by an RCIED while return-ing from a daily mission. While this resulted in no casualties, damage was sustained by the vehi-cle as the device detonated an estimated 2 meters in front of it. While it is unlikely that the organi-sation was directly targeted, it is unclear what the initiating factor behind this incident was, be it opportunistic targeting or mis-taken identity. A series of IED incidents within Jalalabad City warranted attention this period, with 4 devices deto-nating over the course of two days. Two of these devices tar-geted the daily commute (a tactic seen in other regions) of staff from the Police Regional Training Centre, and detonated sequen-tially, likely in an attempt to target the first responders following the initial incident. A third device appeared to be targeted at a Pro-vincial Council member and the

4th a religious training centre. It would appear that various factors precipitated these inci-dents, including a pending high level regional conference in the city, along with the funeral of a prominent Hesb-i Islami Maulawi Khalis (HIK) commander. Of note, reports indicate that many AOG members attended this fu-neral, which took a decidedly anti-US/ISAF tone, likely in an effort to rally support, as this commander died (of apparent natural causes) while in captivity at the Guantanamo Bay de-tention facility. The aforementioned conference included both high profile governmental officials from throughout the region along with government Ministers from Kabul. The agenda of the con-ference involved discussions and planning for an ongoing, four month, cyclical development plan as well as the pending transfer of lead security authority from NATO to the ANSF by 2014.

E A S T E R N R E G I O N

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NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime


Kunar was the location of the 3rd NGO incident reported this pe-riod from the Eastern Region. On the 5th of February in Manogai District on Main Asadabad-Pech valley Road an ambulance driver employed by an INGO was ab-ducted following the transport of a patient by ambulance from Manogai to Asadabad that morn-ing. The driver was returning to Manogai along with a guard (also employed with the INGO) when they were stopped by an AOG operating in the area. The INGO guard was immediately released unharmed, while the group ab-sconded with the driver and the ambulance, travelling towards the Shoraik area (located in the same district). As Shoraik is a moun-tainous area, the INGO driver advised his abductors that due to the rough road conditions the vehicle wouldn’t be able to travel any further. However, disbeliev-ing this, the group attempted to operate the vehicle and upon fail-



K U N A R

ing, abandoned the vehicle and continued on foot with the driver remaining in their custody. Upon the guards return, he reported the incident to the INGO office, who subsequently engaged local leader-ship for assistance in securing the safe release of the driver. On the 6th February the vehicle was re-covered and on the same day at 1800hrs the driver returned to duty following the mediation of his release by the local leaders. This marks the first NGO related incident for Kunar Province this year, while in 2010 there were 3 occurrences of AOG abduction of NGO staff, and in 2 of these the staffs were detained temporarily (roughly 1 day); all of which in-volved the engagement of local leadership to secure re-lease. Taken into context with this recent incident, NGO interac-tions with AOG in Kunar have been relatively benign, primarily due to high levels of local accep-

tance (from both communities and AOG), this also playing a key role in staff safety and quick release. Kunar Province remains the most volatile province within the East, contributing the ma-jority of AOG initiated incidents for the re-gion, accounting for almost half of the period’s total. The majority of these incidents were concentrated within the districts of Manogai, Sirkanay, and Wata Pur, with these areas also the focal points for recent security force opera-tions as highlighted by the IMF airstrike in Sirkanay on February 4. This denotes a stan-dard incident distribution pattern, as these ar-eas have been ongoing ‘contested’ areas for a considerable period of time, hosting a volatile mix of a pervasive AOG presence and active security forces.

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NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we

appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us

regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”


K H O S T

Beyond the standard conflict re-porting, of note there were two cross-border clashes between Pakistani military forces and ANSF this period, both occurring in Gurbuz District, on the 2nd and then again on the 3rd. While light casualties to the security forces occurred on both sides, despite the proximity of the engagements to populated areas there were no civilian casualties. Presently it is unclear what the initiating causes of these exchanges were; however, unconfirmed anecdotal reports suggest that in one case mortars fired by AOG resulted in a re-sponse by one side, which forced the engagement, with both sides believing they were being engaged by AOG. Despite requests for escalation by ANBP in one case, their HQ showed restraint and

While Khost demonstrated steady incident growth rates through 2010, AOG attributed incident volumes are poised to reach the levels noted at the height of last year (Sept-Nov) at the beginning of this one, bringing them almost in line with the levels reported from Kunar. The ongoing targeting of GOA leadership came to fore again this period, with the Bak District Gov-ernor (Interim) the victim of a bold daylight small arms attack by a group dressed in ANA uni-forms. He has been the acting DG since the previous one re-signed (in anticipation of his dis-missal) in July of 2010. As with many such incidents, the exact motivations behind this attack remain murky, though it is likely the coalescence of AOG & local political/interpersonal goals.

fortunately denied this request. However, fol-lowing these events, a coalition of local leader-ship from the area in Khost offered their sup-port, apparently willing to provide manpower in the case of further clashes with the Paki-stanis, suggesting a ‘wild card’ element to an already tense environment. The close prox-imity of these two national forces, along with ongoing pressure to deny AOG cross-border transit and safe havens, and an active AOG presence provide the general reasons for these incidents, also suggesting that further occur-rences are possible.



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N U R I S TA N

would be auctioned. The appar-ent timing for these requests is to take advantage of restrictions the winter weather has on IEA capa-bilities, allowing the IMF/GOA to gain a stronger foothold in ad-vance of AOG reinforcement which would follow the spring clearance of cross-border access routes. While this presents a rea-sonable rationale, it is worth not-ing that these efforts (on the gov-ernment side) come at a time when the AOG presence in this province is already both well en-trenched and pervasive, both from a military and political stand-point. The vacuum that followed the reduction of IMF elements in the region previously, along with the generally limited strength and

While the regular dynamics in se-curity remained relatively un-changed for the province this pe-riod, efforts in the political sphere present future implications for the context. The Provincial Gover-nor of Nuristan held meetings with officials of the Ministry of Interior and NATO in both Ka-bul and Nangarhar in order to discuss the situation in Nuristan. The Governor requested the MOI increase the number ANSF per-sonal, in particular the ANBP presence in Barg-e-Matal and the ANP in Kamdesh, while simulta-neously requesting that NATO and the GOA launch clearing op-erations in the same. While the MOI and ISAF both responded positively to the requests, no time-line was given as to when this

influence of GOA/ANSF in this isolated, and isolationist province, gave AOG the opportu-nity to consolidate their control, as noted by their actions reported in past reports. Rather ironically, due to the weather conditions ef-fects on access, no action is likely to occur on the GOA/ISAF side until spring as well they too are constrained by these issues. Nonethe-less, one thing is certain however, this would serve to destabilize the present status quo as AOG would actively contest such efforts, thus resulting in a period of increased instability.



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NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime


This reporting period AOGs in Kandahar were extremely active, initiating a series of attacks against a variety of targets. The most no-table incident occurred on 12 Feb-ruary when AOG carried out a well-coordinated complex attack against the ANP HQ in Kandahar City, using a combination of tac-tics, including BBIED, VBIED and SAF. Besides the six VBIEDs that were deployed in the vicinity of the ANP HQ (of which 3 detonated apparently prior to reaching their target) 4 BBIED attackers managed to en-ter and occupied a nearby wed-ding hall (Zarnegar Saloon). From this location they engaged security forces in a four-hour-long fire fight. As a result of the attack, 21 individuals were killed (including 3 civilians) and a further 55 persons wounded (including 27 civilians). This casualty figure marks this attack (along with the complex attack of 13th of March 2010) as the deadliest AOG action within Kandahar City since the re-



K A N DA H A R

engagement of the Taliban. An-other suicide attack, this time in-side the Customs Compound in District 5 on the 7th, targeted an IMF detachment, killing 3 IMF soldiers and one national inter-preter and wounding one other IMF soldier. The AOG campaign of targeted killings of GOA and ANSF per-sonnel and officials has continued as well throughout this reporting period. On 1st of February in Dis-trict 4, an IED made of explosives placed in a plastic oil container detonated against the convoy of the Chief of Police of Kandahar, causing no casualties. Three days later, AOG attempted once again targeted the said official, this one involving an SVBIED against his private residence, though he was absent during the attack. How-ever, four civilians including one child, and one ANP were wounded as a result of the blast. This recent series of attacks seem to indicate that AOGs are deter-

mined to show that their capacity to lead coor-dinated and sophisticated attacks has not been undercut by coalition efforts and that ISAF’s statement of ‘reversed momentum’ in Kanda-har was premature. Besides attacks on high profile officials, this reporting period saw targeted killings of three civilians associated with GOA and ANSF/IMF in districts 2, 8, 5 of Kandahar City. In addition, 3 ANP officials were killed in differ-ent areas of the city and another one in Panjwayi District. Another well established element of the conflict in this province con-sists of IED deployment. In the past two weeks, there have been around 23 IED related incidents (detonations and discoveries) which were concentrated mainly in Panjwayi and to a lesser extent in Arghandab, Arghistan, Zhari and Kandahar City.

S O U T H E R N R E G I O N

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U R U Z G A N

Tirin Kot District, where as a re-sult of an RCIED targeting an ANP vehicle, one ANP and one tribal elder were killed and an-other two ANP officials were wounded. Similar to other south-ern areas, the AOG campaign of attacks on high profile personali-ties manifested also in Uruzgan, where on 14th of February in Ba-zaar Area of Dihrawud District a motorcycle mounted RCIED detonated against the vehicle car-rying the brother of Char Chino District Governor, wounding him and six civilians. Another incident of targeted killing took place in Tirin Kot, Naicheen Area where an ANP official riding on a mo-torbike was shot and killed by

In Uruzgan Province the overall rate in security incidents remained slightly lower relative to the previ-ous report. During the present period IED deployment contin-ued to represent the main threat in the province, with a total of 20 IED related incidents reported in Tirin Kot, Chora and Dihrawud districts. As noted previously, the large majority of IEDs were dis-covered and defused by the secu-rity forces, but four separate IED strikes reported across the prov-ince accounted for a total of one IMF, one ANP and three civilians killed with an additional one IMF soldier, one civilian and two ANP wounded. The deadliest single incident took place on 11th of February in Khanaqa Area of

AOG. This reporting period ANSF/IMF con-ducted at least 9 operations in Tirin Kot, Chora and Dihrawud districts which resulted in seizure of a quantity of explosive materials and weapons. These operations were often also accompanied by the detention of sus-pected AOG members. The most notable operation was conducted on the 8th in Mirabad Area of Tirin Kot where security forces ar-rested up to 21 suspected AOG members.



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URUZGAN

URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime

The already extremely high rate of security incidents reported previ-ously across Helmand has contin-ued to increase during the present cycle, indicating the strategic and symbolic importance of the prov-ince for the parties involved in the conflict. AOG direct attacks on ANSF/IMF and IED related inci-dents constituted the vast majority of recorded incidents. In total there were around 70 AOG direct attacks reported in the past two weeks primarily targeting ANSF/IMF patrols. In this period these attacks were concentrated in Nad Ali, Nahri Sarraj and Musa Qala



H E L M A N D

districts, which resulted in two IMF soldiers and two ANP re-ported wounded. Furthermore, an AOG initiated ambush that took place in Nad Ali on 10th of February caused the death of two IMF soldiers. This reporting pe-riod saw also 20 IED strikes tak-ing place in Musa Qala, Sangin, Nahri Sarraj, Garmser and Lash-kar Gah districts, which resulted in two more IMF fatalities and another two wounded. As noted in the previous reports, ANSF/IMF continue to conduct numerous operations throughout

the province. During this period security forces launched 13 separate operations and focused their efforts on Nad Ali, Sangin, Marja and Kajaki districts. It is worth noting that ANSF/IMF were particularly successful in the discovery and disposal of IEDs, as an esti-mated 50 devices were disposed of from across the province.

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HELMAND

HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime


G H A Z N I

with security forces, preferring rather ‘hit and run’ tactics in order to avoid protracted fire fights and avoid significant casualties. Con-sequently there were no reported casualties associated with these attacks this reporting period. IED deployment across the prov-ince remained limited, with only five IED related incidents, of which only one device detonated (targeting an IMF vehicle). Also in Andar District, where a signifi-cant portion of attacks were con-centrated, on the 9th of February AOG abducted six local employ-ees working for a private com-pany. Their whereabouts are un-known at present.

Although a downturn in the num-ber of reported incidents has been observed in Ghazni, the province continues to be extremely volatile and insecure. As with the last reporting period AOG indirect attacks played a minor role, with only one recorded incident that occurred in Muqur District, with the bulk of AOG activity consist-ing of numerous direct attacks. In the past two weeks there were at least 13 such occurrences. The majority of these attacks took place in Andar and Muqur dis-tricts targeting IMF convoys and facilities, and ANP checkpoints. As noted previously, AOGs oper-ating in the province frequently avoid prolonged engagements

In line with the previous periods ANSF/IMF operations have continued unabated. Security forces conducted at least 18 operations in Giro, Andar, Dih Yak, Gelan and Muqur dis-tricts. For instance, on the 8th, in Latif Area of Gelan District ANSF/IMF arrested eight sus-pected AOG members. The same day, but in Muqur, security forces killed one AOG and arrested another five.



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GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime

The level of recorded security incidents in Zabul decreased com-pared to the previous reporting period. In line with previously observed trends, ANSF/IMF ac-tivity accounted for the bulk of reported incidents; in this report-ing period ANSF/IMF operations were concentrated particularly in Qalat and Shahjoy districts. In the past two weeks at least six operations were conducted in the aforementioned districts and re-sulted in the reported detention of several suspected AOG members, including two local commanders. In addition, following a raid in the Mirwais Mena Area of Qalat Dis-trict, security forces seized 25 kg of explosive materials from a local shop. Also in Qalat District, Ni-azian Area a suicide vest was re-



Z A B U L

covered during a search operation. IED deployment remains a dis-tinctive concern in the province. Whereas the last reporting period saw four separate incidents that killed a total of 11 ANP, this cycle experienced five IED related inci-dents of which two devices deto-nated. While an IED detonation in Tarnak Wa Jaldak District against an IMF vehicle caused no casualties, in Shamulzayi District a roadside IED caused the death of two civilians. In addition, an IED was located and safely defused in the Gaza Area of Arghandab Dis-trict. Another device was re-ported to have been discovered in Shinkay and finally, two IEDs were located on the road in Zan-zir Area of Qalat District.

Beside IED deployment, this period the issue of security along district roads was highlighted by the presence of armed men stopping private vehicles travelling through Shar-e-Safa and Folad Ghai areas in Tarnak Wa Jaldak District, robbing the passengers of their valuables. As noted in the previous report, motor vehicle accidents continue to result in numerous casu-alties across the province. In the most notable incident, a total of 13 civilians were injured while a local bus turned over in Qalat District.

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ZABUL

ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime


This reporting period the level of security incidents in Paktika con-tinued their decline. Nonetheless, as observed in previous periods, AOGs persisted in leading numer-ous attacks on DACs across the province, in particular indirect fire attacks on DACs in Dila, Barmal and Omna. It is worth noting that AOG efforts were concen-trated particularly on Barmal DAC with at least five such occur-rences. The sole reported AOG direct attack occurred on 13th of February, when an AOG attacked with SAF and RPGs the Yahya Khel DAC. As is often the case, AOG attacks on DACs in Paktika



PA K T I K A

have little effect with these being no exception as no casualties were reported. In regards to IED re-lated incidents, the majority of explosive devices were located and defused. However, on the 10th an IED detonated against a joint ANSF/IMF convoy in Ghaibi Khel Area of Yahya Khel District wounding two IMF sol-diers and one ANA. ANSF/IMF led eight operations which were concentrated mainly on Yahya Khel, Sarobi, Waza Khaw and Urgun districts and resulted in the reported detention of 14 suspected AOG members

and the seizure of explosive materials. Finally, during the second week of this period heavy snowfalls were reported in several areas of Paktika Province, primarily affecting Bar-mal, Gayan and Ziruk where the majority of districts roads were blocked.

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PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime

N I M R O Z

note, an IED was reported to have been located and defused by IMF in Khash Rod District which marks the second IED related incident this year in the district. As seen in the past, the security situation in the Khash Rod is fre-quently linked to the develop-ments in the neighbouring Hel-mand Province as AOG elements active in Helmand had been using the district as a support base to reorganize themselves. Incidents

Nimroz Province has been rela-tively quiet over the past two weeks with only four reported security incidents. The majority were related to ANSF/IMF activi-ties and took place in Zaranj, Khash Rod and Chahar Burjak districts. The most notable inci-dent occurred in the latter district when IMF killed several AOG members and seized an assort-ment of weapons and ammunition during an operation that took place on the 6th of February. Of

along the border remains the concern as on the 10th Iranian border police shot and killed two Afghan civilians as they were illegally crossing the border.



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NIMROZ

NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime

ANSO is managed by an NGO Board. If you have any

feedback, good or bad, let them know on:

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CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252

EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014

SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) Vacant - [email protected] 0796 688 416 Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550

WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118

ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / ANP-Afghan National Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local depu-tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF-International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / PSC-Private Security Company / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre-nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-vised Explosive Device / PDO-Private Development Organisa-tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani-stan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG-District Shadow Governor (IEA)

THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov-inces of:

Bamyan

Panjshir

Laghman

Paktya

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the sig-nificance of the inci-dents occurring there. If you can help us understand the prov-ince better, please contact us.

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