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Brief Report on The Argumentative Indian
The Argumentative Indian is a masterpiece written by Nobel Prize winning Indian economist
Amartya Sen. He won the Nobel prize in economics in the year 1998 His most recent books are
Development as freedom and rationality and freedom not only this his books has been translated
into more than 30 languages.
The book is divided into four sections, each of four essays was written over the course of
the past decade. According to me the best of all of these is the second section, “Culture and
Communication”, which is the most important in defining the book. In “Tagore and His India”,
Amartya sen tries to establishes the work and reputation of Rabindranath Tagore with concerns
related to political and practical likewise he defines both Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma
Gandhi as the two iconic Leaders but both of them have a different Prospective and a different
way toward the life.. In doing so, he reinstates Tagore to his rightful position. As Amartya Sen
points out, Tagore’s reputation has suffered in the west and his talents often ignored. Indeed, he
shows Tagore to have established a reputation for intellectual breadth and depth that made him
the equal in importance of Mahatma Gandhi, who has now become iconic in helping to bring
about Indian independence. Gandhi is, again outside India, often considered to be saint like in his
dedication to peace and justice and these virtues became faults when translated into a political
context. If Tagore shows India in the modern world to be at least in part an upholder of a
practical, secularist and rational mode of thinking,
Then the essay “China and India” demonstrates the roots of this tradition in the distant past.
The stories of the Chinese monks to India to secure Buddhism are well-known; not like the
travels and lengthy sojourns in China of Indian sages and their impact which are not considered
to be the significant part of the history as shown by him in this section. Also The religious
exchanges between the two countries are described and then set in a larger and more modern
context. Religion was not the only subject in which exchanges took place. Practical issues such
as food preparation and health care were also improved by cross-civilization. When Mao and the
Communists got the power, universal healthcare improved many vital indicators of public health
in China and vaulted that country above India. However, with the opening of the Chinese
economy, inequalities in society have hugely increased while public health indicators show
declines, so that India has again taken the lead. There are complex lessons to be drawn from the
totality of this analysis.
In the next chapter “Politics and Protest”, Sen again employs his technique with forensic
precision to skewer the the things which are not possible in the discrimination against women,
low castes and the poor endemic in Indian society. He shows how these factors are deeply
interrelated not only with each other but also with factors such as religion and ethnicity. He
argues that it is not sensible or even possible to try to challenge one of these factors without
simultaneously monitoring and affecting the change on the others. The same argumentative
techniques show how ill-served India has been by its resumption of the nuclear bomb testing
program and the foolishness of religious extremism. and at last but not the least he make out that
Indian students can not only hold their own against the best rivals in Europe on the Latter’s
Ground ,But can beat them hollow.
The Argumentative Indian is a masterpiece written by Nobel Prize winning Indian economist
Amartya Sen. He won the Nobel prize in economics in the year 1998 His most recent books are
Development as freedom and rationality and freedom not only this his books has been translated
into more than 30 languages.
Perceptions of culture, history, and identity are necessarily subjective and selective. There's no
impartial and omniscient chronicler of events, no 'scientific' history. Facts are one thing, their
interpretation another. As in Kurosawa's Rashomon, there are only particular interpretations of
most facts, which may of course coincide at times. In this stirring book on the historical
perceptions of India, Amartya Sen, noted scholar and Nobel laureate in economics,
acknowledges this upfront with disarming modesty, while also signaling his attitude to his
subject:
India is an immensely diverse country with many distinct pursuits, vastly disparate convictions,
widely divergent customs and a veritable feast of viewpoints. [Any talk about its history,
culture or politics must] involve considerable selection ... the focus on the argumentative
tradition in this work is also a result of choice. It does not reflect a belief that this is the only
reasonable way of thinking about the history or culture or politics of India. I am very aware that
there are other ways of proceeding.
Soon enough though, Sen reveals his impatience with certain "other ways of proceeding". The
India Sen presents to us has a long tradition of heterodoxy, openness, and reasoned discourse, a
capacious India that is inclusive, tolerant, and multicultural. This contrasts with at least two
major perceptions of India in modern times: (a) a Western and (derivatively) an Indian elite's
stern view of India as "the land of religions, the country of uncritical faiths and unquestioned
practices", and (b) the Hindutva, or the Hindu chauvinist's idea of India.
To votaries of the first, Sen says, "it would be hard to understand the history of India [without
its tradition of scepticism]". To see India "as overwhelmingly religious, or deeply anti-
scientific, or exclusively hierarchical, or fundamentally unsceptical involves significant
oversimplification of India's past and present." To support his view, Sen marshals evidence
from the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Buddhists and the Carvakas, the Ramayana and the
Mahabharata, Gupta-era science and mathematics, the intellectual links of the first millennium
between India and China, the liberal-plural regimes of Ashoka and Akbar, the egalitarianism of
Hindu Bhakti and Muslim Sufism, men like Gandhi, Tagore and Ray, etc.
The modern West, contends Sen, emphasized "the differences—real or imagined—between
India and the West," focusing on India's spiritual heritage at the expense of the rational one,
partly because the West was naturally drawn to what was unique and different in India.
[Such] slanted emphases has tended to undermine an adequately pluralist understanding of
Indian intellectual traditions. While India has ... a vast religious literature [with] grand
speculation on transcendental issues ... there is also a huge—and often pioneering—literature,
stretching over two and a half millennia, on mathematics, logic, epistemology, astronomy,
physiology, linguistics, phonetics, economics, political science and psychology, among other
subjects concerned with the here and now.
And while India might offer "examples of every conceivable type of attempt at the solution to
the religious problem," Sen submits that they "coexist with deeply sceptical arguments ...
(sometimes within the religious texts themselves)." Among his examples is the 'song of
creation' of the Rig Veda, "the first extensive composition in any Indo-European language"
(Wendy Doniger) and the radical doubts expressed therein.
Who really knows? Who will here proclaim it? Whence was it produced? Whence is this
creation? The gods came afterwards, with the creation of this universe. Who then knows
whence it has arisen?Whence this creation has arisen—perhaps it has formed itself, or perhaps
it did not—the one who looks down on it, in the highest heaven, only he knows—or perhaps he
does not know.
Sen outlines three types of Western approaches to India: the exoticist, the magisterial, and the
curatorial. He contends that these approaches, reinforcing each other, exaggerated "the non-
material and arcane aspects of Indian traditions [over its] rationalistic and analytic elements."
This, in turn, has strongly influenced the formation of the modern Indian identity. Sen's
analysis is bracing and instructive, though he would have done well to add that few Westerners
neatly adopt a single approach, most exhibiting a variable and fluid mix of them.
With incisive wit and logic, Sen also combats the crude, insecure, and bellicose idea of a Hindu
India promoted by the Hindutva movement (a brand of nationalism which at its peak was
supported by less than 30% of all Hindus). He derides their pathetic attempts at rewriting
history and inventing a glorified Hindu past that never was. He notes Hindutva's special appeal
to many in the Hindu diaspora who are understandably "keen on taking pride—some self-
respect and dignity—in the culture and traditions of their original homeland", and how it
receives large remittances from them. In contrast, Sen exults in an India that has also long been
home to Jains, Buddhists, Christians, Jews, Parsees, Muslims, Sikhs, Baha'is, and even atheists.
To Sen, this historical heterogeneity and openness is a far worthier source of national pride.
Indians of any background should have reason enough to celebrate their historical and cultural
association with [for example] Nagarjuna's penetrating philosophical arguments, Harsa's
philanthropic leadership, Maitreyi's or Gargi's searching questions, Carvaka's reasoned
scepticism, Aryabhata's astronomical and mathematical departures, Kalidasa's dazzling poetry,
Sudraka's subversive drama, Abul Fazl's astounding scholarship, Shah Jahan's aesthetic vision,
Ramanujan's mathematics, or Ravi Shankar's and Ali Akbar Khan's music, without first having
to check the religious background of each.
He argues that "the problem with invoking the Ramayana to propagate a reductionist account of
Hindu religiosity lies in the way the epic is deployed for this purpose—as a document of
supernatural veracity, rather than as a 'marvellous parable' (as Tagore saw it)." The Hindutva
brigade clearly shares this penchant with religious fundamentalists from around the world. Sen
points out that even in the Ramayana, Rama is not a god but an epic-hero, "with many good
qualities and some weaknesses, including a tendency to harbor suspicions about his wife Sita's
faithfulness." In the epic, a pundit called Javali "not only does not treat Rama as God, he calls
his actions 'foolish' ('especially for', as Javali puts it, 'an intelligent and wise man')". Echoing
the beliefs of the materialistic school of ancient India, Javali even asserts that "there is no after-
world, nor any religious practice for attaining that", and that "the injunctions about the worship
of gods, sacrifice, gifts and penance have been laid down in the [scriptures] by clever people,
just to rule over [other] people".
Sen highlights a third major perception of India but does not much discuss it. This is the India
of those
keen on showing the strength of the faith-based and unreasoning culture of India and the East,
in contrast to the 'shallow rationalism' and scientific priorities of the West. This line of
argument may well be inspired by sympathy, but it [too] can end up suppressing large parts of
India's intellectual heritage. In this pre-selected 'East-West' contrast, meetings are organized, as
it were, between Aristotle and Euclid on the one hand, and wise and contended Indian peasants
on the other. This ...[while not uninteresting] ... is not pre-eminently a better way of
understanding the 'East-West' cultural contrast than by arranging meetings between, say,
Aryabhata and Kautilya on the one hand, and happily determined Visigoths on the other.
An alluring feature of Sen's writing is that perennially precious thing: commonsense. His
commitment to civility, clarity, and precision is always evident. Most of the sixteen essays in
this collection brim with a moral urgency and represent many of Sen's major thematic concerns
of recent decades; they also reveal his abiding love of India. Still—exhilarating, insightful, and
reasoned as The Argumentative Indian is—it is not balanced in much the same way that
Edward Said's work isn't (many critics see strong affinities in their works, even though Said
consciously avoided offering his own representations of Middle Eastern culture and history). At
times it feels like a thinly veiled "self-respect and dignity" project for cosmopolitan India-
lovers, but it also brilliantly achieves its main goal: to give a sturdy nudge to the leading
perceptions of India and challenge historians and cultural critics to reexamine their
assumptions. This is clearly no mean feat.
2.
Unlike Naipaul—another Nobel laureate and influential interpreter of India—Sen doesn't see
India's Muslim history largely as a wound. "It would be as silly to deny the barbarities of the
invasive history [of the Muslims]," argues Sen, "as it would be to see this savagery as the main
historical feature of the Muslim presence in India ... Muslim rulers, despite a fiery and brutal
entry, soon developed—with a few prominent exceptions—basically tolerant attitudes." He
cites Akbar, the Pathan kings of Bengal, Dara Shikoh, and another Akbar: the son of
Aurangzeb who didn't share his father's intolerance and joined other Hindu kings, including the
son of Shivaji (now a demigod to the Hindu chauvinists). There are nightmarish elements in the
Muslim history of India, admits Sen, but "it also includes conversations and discussions, and
extensive joint efforts in literature, music, painting, architecture, jurisprudence and a great
many other creative activities."
Sen admires Alberuni, the Persian scholar who, a thousand years ago, had mastered Sanskrit
and traveled in India for 13 years, observing, reading, questioning, before writing his
monumental history of India. Sen contrasts his approach with that of James Mill—the
celebrated colonial historian who never visited India. Mill, quips Sen, "evidently didn't want to
be biased by closeness to his subject matter". So it seems fitting that Macaulay—who held that
"a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and
Arabia"—would be the one to discern in Mill's history of India "the greatest historical work ...
since that of Gibbon".
Sen frequently cites "Akbar's defence of a tolerant, pluralist society [and] his focus on the role
of reasoning in choosing this approach." Akbar held that "reason cannot but be supreme, since
even when disputing reason, we would have to give reason for that disputation." It may seem
ironical that Akbar, a monarch who also led brutal wars of expansion, should feature so often in
Sen's book. Ditto for Ashoka, whose edicts on public conduct and morality may well strike the
modern reader as patronizing. Yet, situating them in their historical contexts, Sen makes a
persuasive case that these men were far more enlightened than their global contemporaries.
Sen is also impatient with "contemporary attacks on modernity (especially on a 'modernity' that
is seen as coming to India from the West)". The attackers consider modernity a European
cultural phenomenon—defined by peculiar notions like individualism, progress, secularism,
and democracy—and they question its universality or suitability for the non-Western world.
While at home with concepts like "reason" and "heterodoxy", Sen considers the notion of
modernity "befuddling" and "irrelevant as a pointer of merit or demerit in assessing
contemporary priorities". To those who see a problem with importing modernity in India
(including Ashis Nandy), he responds with characteristic precision:
The point is that there is no escape from the necessity to scrutinize and assess ideas and
proposals no matter whether they are seen as pro-modern or anti-modern. For example, if we
have to decide what policies to support in education, health care, or social security, the
modernity or non-modernity of any proposal is neither here nor there. The relevant question is
how these policies would affect the lives of people ...
To those protective of the Indian masses against the "corruptions" of the West (Gandhi, for
instance), Sen, like Tagore, "cannot bear to see the people eternally treated as a child." Instead,
as Tagore said, it should be that "whatever we understand and enjoy in human products
instantly becomes ours, wherever they might have their origin." For Sen, "the need to resist
colonial dominance is, of course, important, but it has to be seen as a fight against submissive
compliance, rather than as a plea for segregation and localism. The so-called 'post-colonial
critique' can be significantly constructive when it is dialectically engaged—and thus strongly
interactive—rather than defensively withdrawn and barriered."
3.
Acknowledging India's "terrible record of social asymmetry" with respect to gender, class, and
caste, Sen inquires "whether the tradition of [argumentation] has been confined to an exclusive
part of the Indian population", the male elite that is, which would severely undermine "the
social relevance of the argumentative tradition." He claims the answer here "is much more
complex than a simple generalization can capture", and then proceeds to offer examples of
women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups registering their argumentative presence in
Indian history and culture. But will these examples convince those who hold such identities?
The contending words of Kancha Ilaiah loom large: "Nowhere in human history has one group
—the upper castes of India—been able to oppress so many for so long."
A vocal champion of democracy and open markets, Sen has argued elsewhere that "we cannot
really take the high economic growth of Singapore or China as proof that authoritarianism does
better in promoting rapid economic growth—any more than we can draw the opposite
conclusion on the basis of the fact that one of the fastest growing countries in the world,
Botswana [is a democracy]."♣ For Sen, democracy and open markets—combined with rational
social policies—are the ideal means to liberal governance. When instituted from above, he
notes, their success depends on a variety of local factors. He rightly points out the pivotal role
of public reasoning for the success of democracy and claims that India's long argumentative
tradition is strongly relevant to its own enduring democracy. He then adds:
It is very important to avoid the twin pitfalls of (1) taking democracy as to be just a gift of the
Western world that India simply accepted ... (2) assuming that there is something unique in
Indian history that makes the country singularly suited to democracy. The point, rather, is that
democracy is intimately connected with public discussion and interactive reasoning ... And to
the extent that such a tradition can be drawn on, democracy becomes easier to institute and also
to preserve.
Other conditions Sen considers important for the success of democracy include political
equality and substantial social and economic equality. Political equality came one midnight
hour in 1947. Sen believes that India's argumentative tradition is a powerful ally for advancing
the cause of equality in the other two spheres. But almost sixty years later, the actual results,
concedes Sen, have been mixed at best, even disconcerting, given the rise of divisive identity
politics based on narrow affiliations of caste and religion, rising economic disparity (he finds
the evidence on this conflicting), and the stubborn persistence of illiteracy, poverty, corruption,
hunger and malnutrition, as well as caste, class, and gender based inequities. He maintains
though that "what is really needed is a more vigorous practice of democracy, rather than the
absence of it."
But Sen doesn't say how to get Indians to practice democracy more vigorously. And while
plausible, more evidence is needed for the primacy he assigns in its endurance to India's
argumentative tradition. Another plausible theory assigns this credit to the famed tolerance of
Indians—what Sen perceptively calls swikriti, or "'acceptance', in particular the
acknowledgement that [others] are entitled to lead their own lives"—but to the underside of this
good tolerance, the side that has long encouraged too many Indians to accept (rather passively)
perhaps too much in life. This includes any inoffensive political system that came along (such
as democracy), and which eventually fell in line with Indian cultural ways—a far cry from the
textbook model for that system of governance.
Sen also tackles globalization from his unique vantage point as an economist. Some fears about
globalization, he says,
make it sound like an animal—analogous to the big shark in Jaws—that gobbles up
unsuspecting innocents in a dark and mysterious way ... Globalization is neither new, nor in
general a folly. Through persistent movement of goods, people, techniques and ideas, it has
shaped the history of the world. India has been an integral part of the world in the most
interactive sense. The forces of ideological separatism may be strong in India at present, as they
are elsewhere, but they militate not just against the global history of the world, but also against
India's own heritage.
He warns us against the temptation to see globalization as a "one-sided movement that simply
reflects an asymmetry of power which needs to be resisted." Throughout history, "different
regions of the world have [benefited] from progress and development occurring in other
regions." He points out that a millennium ago this movement occurred in the reverse direction
—with "paper and printing, the crossbow and gunpowder, the wheelbarrow and the rotary fan,
the clock and the iron chain suspension bridge, the kite and the magnetic compass," zero, the
decimal system, and advances in mathematics—but he is conspicuously silent about how the
unprecedented scale of today's globalization, with its pace and engine of change, instant flights
of capital, rapid demographic shifts, and powerful corporations, might differ from that of an
earlier age.
Sen acknowledges that economic globalization poses risks to the vulnerable and the
disadvantaged and his prescriptions appear close to the neo-liberal line: It's inescapable, so let's
try to make it more humane and just. Rather than isolating itself or blaming the "shark" of
globalization, India should get behind it and, through smart public policies, tackle specific ills
that arise from it, as well as invest in education, health care, micro-credit, land reforms,
women's education, and infrastructure (like energy, communication, transportation). He favors
safety nets and well conceived social welfare programs that do less harm than good (who can
disagree, but here Sen betrays no awareness that this old problem is known to ensnare even the
best kind of reasoning). He has used part of his Nobel Prize money to fund development
research in India and Bangladesh. He has persuasively argued that development should be
measured not by GDP but in terms of "real freedoms people can enjoy."
But Sen's analysis is not without its flaws. He writes: "Global economic interactions bring
general benefits, but they can also create problems for many, because of inadequacies of global
arrangements as well as limitations of appropriate domestic policies." If (a big if) these were
addressed—Sen seems to suggest—economic globalization should create few problems. This is
simplistic at best. Problems can also come from a culture's unpredictable response to it. What
novel set of beliefs will it provoke? Will they be broadly liberal, rational, and conducive to
economic success? Can we say how the dust will settle? The patient may get worse, or trade
one serious illness for another. This recognition, far from turning us against globalization,
makes us more realistic about its effects. Factoring in culture, Amy Chua, in her World on
Fire, provides sobering examples that contrast with many of Sen's sanguine assumptions about
"the crooked timber of humanity".
4.
Sen's primary objective in this work is to highlight the heterodox and rational aspects of India's
past and present. Yet, he doesn't quite distinguish the 'heterodox' from the 'rational': two
distinct and incidentally overlapping pursuits. For instance, the devotional Hindu and Muslim
mystics he cites were heterodox (also syncretistic and egalitarian) but hardly rational—their
arguments derived from a personal relationship to God rather than from reason. The term
"Argumentative Indian" subsumes them both, but the question here is: besides contributing to
diversity (the extent of which in India, Sen notes, had also baffled Churchill), what is
heterodoxy worth without the underpinnings of reason?
Notably, Sen's examples of rational Indians—outside the modern age and with the exception of
Akbar's court—come to us from over a millennium ago (early texts, the epics, the Buddha,
Carvaka, Ashoka, Aryabhata, etc.). This may fortify a rival claim that sometime in the last
millennium, the rational-creative subculture of ancient India waned as Buddhism and
Brahmanism gave way to devotional Hinduism and Islam, that mystical and orthodox beliefs
fossilized Indian culture, making it appallingly disinterested in "subjects concerned with the
here and now", that the British found an India without a sense of history, or interest in science,
or a culture of disruptive innovation, that sporadic personal mutinies of this era grew into a
million much more recently.
Indeed, as Sen astutely admits, "there are other [reasonable] ways of proceeding" on such
matters. But henceforth, few of them will be able to ignore this impassioned and stimulating
labor of love.