The Attaché

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The NATO Intervention in LibyaConditional Factors, Political Costs and National InterestsBenjamin Abonyi

A Blank CheckNSC 68 and the Militarization of the Cold WarHaley O’Shaughnessy

‘Business as Usual’Canada’s Limited Role in Ending the Sytem of Apartheid in South AfricaJustyna Zegarmistrz

Intentional or Accidental? Recovery from the Great Depression in the United StatesCarson Smulders

The Sino-American Rapprochement (1969-1972) Motivated by Strategy, Made Possible by Ideological InnovationJ. Ahmad

In Association with International Relations Society

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Editor-in-ChiefSarah Wang

Managing EditorChristian Medeiros

Design EditorBen Crase

EditorsHayden Rodenkirchen

Emily Tsui

Reid Dobell

Taha Shah

Kaleem Hawa

Junior Editors

Liam Brister

Tracy Wang

Max Laurin

Alex Cohen

Sarah Harrison

Thank you:Arts & Science Student Union & Trinity College Meeting

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Table of ContentsLetter from the Editor page 4

The NATO Intervention in Libya page 6Conditional Factors, Political Costs and National Interests

Benjamin Abonyi

‘Business as Usual’ page 22Camada’s Limited Role in Ending the Sytem of Apartheid in South Africa

Justyna Zegarmistrz

The Sino-American Rapprochement(1969-1972) page 42Motivated by Strategy, Made Possible by Ideological Innovation

J. Ahmad

A Blank Check page 62NSC 68 and the Militarization of the Cold War

Haley O’Shaughnessy

Navigating the Middle Ground page 67A Book Review of the Bottom Billion

Diana Jisun Lee

Intentional or Accidental? page 75Recovery from the Great Depression in the United States

Carson Smulders

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To our Readers,

As with all previous issues of The Attaché Journal of Inter-national Affairs, we aim to provide readers with the best selection of interdisciplinary writing at the undergraduate level. This year’s edition includes pertinent papers that not only reflect the intensive theoretical and historical approach of the undergraduate curricu-lum of the International Relations Program and related Depart-ments, but also illustrate relevance to contemporary challenges dominating global affairs.

From a thematic perspective, Carson Smulders’ “Recovery from the Great Depression in the United States - Intentional or Accidental?” examines the recovery of the United States from the Great Depression of the 1930s and the respective “unintentional consequences” of economic and political policies. As many students entered the program following the global financial crisis of 2008, concern for the ongoing recession still permeate discourse within our classrooms and lecture halls. Diana Jisun Lee’s book review of Paul Collier’s The Bottom Billion invites discussion anticipating the review of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015. From a re-gional perspective, Justyna Zegarmistrz’s “Business as Usual - Can-ada’s Limited Role in Ending the System of Apartheid in South Africa” is a timely submission critically reinterpreting relations between the two countries in the wake of the passing of former South African President Nelson Mandela in late 2013. Javariyya Ahmad’s “The Sino-American Rapprochement (1969-1972): Motivated by Strategy, Made Possible by Ideological Innovation” provides insight on the ideological transformations that facilitated a warming of relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, prioritizing the East Asian region in American foreign policy agenda still pertinent today as seen in President Barack Obama’s “pivot to East Asia.” The tension between national

Letter from the Editor:

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interest and dissemination of values and norms in Ben Abonyi’s “The NATO Intervention in Libya: Conditional Factors, Political Costs, National Interest and the Relative Unimportance of Values and Norms” is also crucial in understanding the stagnation in the Syrian Civil War. Finally, Haley O’Shaughnessy’s review of NSC 68, that crucial document at the beginning of the Cold War that polarized and isolated the Soviet Union can be quiet interesting-ly juxtaposed with the G7 response to Russia’s militarization of Crimea.

I have had the pleasure of serving on the editorial board of The Attaché Journal of International Affairs for the past three years and worked with many talented individuals with the shared goal of publishing the best original and multidisciplinary content. I would like to thank our Program director Professor Mairi Mac-Donald, Program administrator Marilyn Laville, the International Relations Society, the Munk School of Global Affairs, and Trinity College for the support and advice in sustaining this journal. The editorial team - Alex Cohen, Anneliese Sanghara, Ben Crase, Em-ily Tsui, Hayden Rodenkirchen, Kaleem Hawa, Liam James, Max Laurin, Misha Boutilier, Reid Dobell, Sarah Harrison, Taha Shah, and Tracy Wang - is perhaps the strongest in years, and the amount of commitment and interest from first and second years are prom-ising. Finally, it is necessary to note the tireless commitment of our managing editor, Christian Medeiros, who oversaw the editing and designing stages of this volume. With his leadership next year as Editor in Chief, The Attaché is undoubtedly in excellent hands.

Sarah Danruo Wang, Class of 2014Editor in Chief

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Introduction

On February 22nd, 2011, Muammar Gaddafi addressed his nation in a speech in which he threatened to “cleanse Libya house by house” as part of his militant response to the ‘Arab Spring’ protests which had swept across the Middle East and North Africa and into his country.1 Although rarely communicated so explicitly, the international community has received clear forewarnings of massacre in the past, notably in Srebrenica and Rwanda. Yet, in response to Gaddafi’s words and actions, the United Nations Security Council

1 “The Crisis in Libya,” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya.

The NATO Intervention in LibyaConditional Factors, Political Costs and

National Interests

Benjamin Abonyi

Author: Benjamin Abonyi is a fourth year student at the University of Toronto who is double-majoring in International Relations and Peace, Conflict, and Justice Studies (PCJ) with a minor in Environmental Studies. He has previ-ously worked with the Population and Community Development Association in Thailand as well as the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada in Toronto.

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and international community opted to do act differently than they had in the vast majority of atrocities that have occurred since the UN’s inception. On March 17, UN resolution 1973 was passed, calling for various measures to be taken against Gaddafi’s regime, including the imposition of a no-fly zone.2 Two days later, NATO countries began launching air strikes.3 These actions were taken in the name of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, adopted and legitimized by the UN in 2005.4 Some commentators such as Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the International Commission on State Sovereignty (ICISS) that pioneered the notion of R2P, contest that the driving force behind the military intervention in Libya was indeed the doctrine of R2P; that “ideas matter,” and that the idea of a responsibility to protect was enough to be the principle factor behind the Security Council’s decision and NATO’s actions.5 However, empirically, it appears that this is not the case, and that Libya was a departure from the norm. There have been many instances throughout history in which the international community could have acted—indeed, according to R2P, should have acted—and yet did not. Thus, the moral imperative imposed by R2P (assuming its criteria apply) can be seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for intervention to occur. Rather, other factors were in place that facilitated the intervention. These aspects include factors that did not necessarily provoke the intervention, but rather enabled it, including: the lack of a powerful state opposing intervention, the relative ease of the military mission, the demonizing of Gaddafi’s character, and the complicity of the Arab League. Additionally, there were factors that not only facilitated intervention, but contributed to actively inciting it: these include the protection of national economic interests (chiefly oil), economic turmoil in many of the intervening countries, and the

2 “The Crisis in Libya,” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya..3 “The Crisis in Libya,” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya..4 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2008), 48.5 “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Lessons and Challenges,” Gareth Evans, modified May 5, 2011, http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech437.html.

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opportunity that the mission presented to demonstrate support for the values of the Arab Spring movement. Although the doctrine of R2P was critical in instilling legitimacy to NATO’s mission, it was the ‘perfect storm’ of other conditional and situational factors as well as economic and political interests that enabled and incited the intervention.

Before going further, it is critical that R2P be defined, as relevant to this context. The ICISS report in 2001 softened state sovereignty by asserting that it is a state’s responsibility to ensure the protection of its own citizens, and that when a state fails in fulfilling this responsibility, it then falls upon the shoulders of the international community to prevent, protect, and rebuild.6 For the practical purposes of this essay, ‘R2P’ will be used to refer to paragraphs 138 and 139 as they appear in the World Summit Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly meeting in September, 2005. These paragraphs state that “each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity,” and that “the international community … also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means” to protect populations from the four aforementioned crimes.7 This relevant section also outlines that the international community should be “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council … should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” from the four crimes.8 Also crucial to note is that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, drafted by the General Assembly in 1948, calls for “the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate

6 Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, et al., The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).7 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 48.8 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 49.

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for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.”9 Thus, although R2P has only existed as a framework since 2005, acts of genocide have previously occurred and could have been prevented in accordance with UN regulations. The crucial point to note is that both the Genocide Convention and R2P call on the nations of the world to take the appropriate means—including military intervention if necessary—to prevent or stop the aforementioned crimes.

However, time and again, the international community has failed to use the requisite force to stop such atrocities. These international responses provide context when drawing conclusions on Libya. Since the passage of the Genocide Convention in 1948, clear-cut cases of genocide have occurred in Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda. More recently, the crisis in Darfur has been an example of an atrocity that meets R2P criteria that has continued despite the adoption of R2P by the UN in 2005. There are various stated (and actual) reasons for these non-interventions, some of which will be referenced later, as relevant. But the only instance of multilateral military force that had been used for humanitarian purposes against mass atrocity was the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.10 This simple fact calls into question any notion that ‘norms’ such as R2P and the Genocide Convention are implemented along normative lines; for, if this were the case, interventions should have occurred in each instance in which the criteria of these norms was met. Additionally, other countries experiencing the ‘Arab Spring’ movement—particularly Syria—have seen killings at the hands of their governments that are akin to those of Libya, if not more severe, and the international community has not reacted with the requisite force, although these conflicts are still under way.11 Thus, the notion

9 Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 63.10 Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 63.11 “The Tactics of Intervention: Why Syria will never be Libya,” The Globe and Mail, modified October 31, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opin-ion/the-tactics-of-intervention-why-syria-will-never-be-libya/article2212174/.

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of such norms being now more entrenched in international culture than they were during times of earlier atrocities is a position that does not stand up to analysis. Hence, as the presence of a norm such as R2P does not appear to be sufficient to warrant military intervention, the logical next step is to observe what conditions did enable the intervention in Libya to occur.

Before assessing the factors that led to intervention, it is critical to identify the key actors in the intervention, the UN and NATO. The former being a key actor because of its ability to grant legitimacy to the mission (particularly through the Security Council), and the latter because of its indispensability to the UN in managing military crises, as demonstrated in Kosovo and now Libya.12 This ability of NATO to manage such crises was further enhanced by the update of its Strategic Concept to include “non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations” in 1999.13 However, in spite of the seeming importance of these two institutions, the real decision-making power lies at the state level, as “states remain … the primary actors in international affairs.”14 Indeed, for the Security Council to pass a resolution, it necessitates the support of the requisite national governments, and for NATO to engage in a mission, the support of individual nation-states is similarly needed. Given that national governments are concerned with “the retention of political support from their domestic constituencies,” this means that the key determining factors for intervention will likely be at the state level.15 The states most directly relevant to the issue at hand are those comprising NATO—in particular Britain, France, the US, and Canada, among others—as well as the permanent members of the Security Council. Also of note is the relative unimportance of Libya’s internal politics; so long as the situation within Libya meets

12 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the UN (Columbia, MO: University of Mis-souri Press, 2010), 157.13 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 191.14 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 196.15 Frank Chalk, Romeo Dallaire, Kyle Matthews, Carla Barqueiro, and Simon Doyle, Mobilizing the Will to Intervene (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2010), 3.

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R2P’s criteria, it is the intervening powers that are the decision-makers.

Factors Facilitating Intervention

Aside from factors that actively incited the intervention, there is also an array of factors present in the Libya case that were critical in that they did not present an impediment to intervention. One example is the lack of a major global power that opposed intervention. In the case of Darfur, China is the most oft-cited culprit of impeding action, as its oil imports from Sudan rose by 63% from 2003 to 2006,16 and it has been suspected to have been in violation of the UN-imposed arms embargo on Sudan,17 effectively fuelling the conflict to avoid a setback for its economic interests. Another example of how powerful nations that are opposed to intervention can be important factors is evident in Syria at the moment. Although the conflict is still ongoing, it is clear that the opportunity for swift action in Syria has passed and that the international community (or at least the relevant components of it) is far less eager to use force.

A major reason for this inaction is Syria’s strong relationship with Iran and Iran’s strong relationship with permanent Security Council Members Russia and China.18 Opposition to intervention by a global power with a Security Council veto or a powerful neighbour that can profoundly affect geopolitics has proven to be an obstacle for intervention in the past. However, as “Gadhafi had few friends and no regional strategic significance,” this potentially disastrous roadblock for intervention was not in place.19 This lack of allies who 16 “Oil for China, Guns for Darfur,” Bloomberg Businessweek, modi-fied March 14, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2008/gb20080314_430126.htm.17 “China ‘is Fuelling War in Darfur,’” BBC News, modified July 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7503428.stm.18 “3 Reasons why the Libyan War Model Won’t Work in Syria,” The Globe and Mail, modified, November 3, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/worl-dview/3-reasons-why-the-libyan-war-model-wont-work-in-syria/ article2223743/?utm_medium=Feeds%3A+RSS%2FAtom&utm_source =World&utm_content= 2223743&fb_source=message.19 “3 Reasons why the Libyan War Model Won’t Work in Syria,” The Globe and

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could potentially oppose an intervention allowed for Resolution 1973 to not only be passed in the Security Council, but to be passed without inciting indignation from any politically or economically vital state.

Another facilitating factor for the Libyan mission was its relative ease in terms of military, political, and financial costs. By taking the decision to pre-emptively intervene almost immediately following Gaddafi’s speech, rather than after gross atrocities had been committed, the intervening countries likely saved money as well as lives. Highlighting the excessive costs of “a belated, reactive approach to mass atrocities,” the US government spent $750 million between 1994 and ’96 on humanitarian assistance to Rwanda and $4.6 billion in assistance to the victims of the crisis in Darfur from 2004 to 2009.20 Not only was there a clear opportunity to save money by acting early in the conflict, but Col. Gaddafi’s forces did not pose a particularly formidable deterrent to intervention, and Libya’s geography was also a facilitating factor. This geography enabled NATO planes to depart from nearby Sicily, and the country’s “flat coastal plains” contrast with the mountains of Syria and Afghanistan making airstrikes easier and more effective.21 22 This is especially fortuitous when combined with the fact that Gaddafi’s military was poorly equipped and, in comparison with Syria’s, quite small.23 In addition to the relatively low financial and military costs of intervening, the fact that ‘boots on the ground’ were deemed necessary (indeed any “foreign occupation force” is expressly prohibited by resolution 1973) was a key factor in stunting political opposition.24 Had there been such a heightened risk of NATO

Mail, modified, November 3, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/worl-dview/3-reasons-why-the-libyan-war-model-wont-work-in-syria/article2223743/?utm_medium=Feeds%3A+RSS%2FAtom&utm_ source=World&utm_ content=2223743&fb_source=message.20 Chalk et al., Mobilizing the Will to Intervene, 18-19.21 “The Tactics of Intervention: Why Syria will never be Libya.”22 “3 Reasons why the Libyan War Model Won’t Work in Syria.” 23 “3 Reasons why the Libyan War Model Won’t Work in Syria.”.24 “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Lessons and Challenges.”

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soldiers dying, the political costs of intervention would have sharply increased. The past has seen the ghosts of Vietnam and Somalia deter US use of military force when deemed unnecessary, and in the current era of drawn-out wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is entirely foreseeable that these two conflicts would dissuade proponents of intervention if ground forces were needed.25 Finally, perhaps the most important factor from a practical military standpoint was the formidable rebel force in Libya. This was crucial in rendering air strikes a sufficient tactic from the intervening powers, negating the need for an invasion by foreign troops and allowing for the political costs of intervention to remain relatively low.26

Col. Gaddafi, himself, also set the stage for intervention. Over the course of his 40-year rule, he turned Libya into a virtual pariah, pursuing “confrontational foreign policies,” and involving Libya with international terrorist attacks.27 Such aggressive policies in addition to eccentric international displays, including his repeated attempts to abolish Switzerland, made Gaddafi a figurehead that could be demonized by pro-intervention forces looking to garner political support.28 This circumstance is reminiscent of the vilification of Saddam Hussein leading up the US’ 2003 Iraq invasion, and stands in stark contrast to cases such as Rwanda, in which the lack of a single culpable figure likely acted as a barrier to mobilizing support for humanitarian intervention.

Shifting from the personal to the regional, one undeniably important factor in the intervention was the Arab League’s support of a no-fly zone over Libya.29 Given the League’s importance in that it is comprised of significant oil-producing states, it is entirely likely 25 Samantha Power, America and the Age of Genocide, 374-375.26 “The Tactics of Intervention: Why Syria will never be Libya.”27 “Background Note: Libya,” U.S. Department of State, modified July 7, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm.28 “Gaddafi’s Oddest Idea: Abolish Switzerland,” Time, modified September 25, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1926053,00.html.29 “Canada Welcomes Arab League Resolution on Libya,” International Affairs and Foreign Trade Canada, modified March 12, 2011, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2011/098.aspx?view=d.

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that its opposition to the intervention would have been as significant as the opposition of a powerful country, as discussed earlier. This illustrates two important points, one of which is the importance of regional organizations in assessing the likelihood of armed intervention. The other is that this particular scenario demonstrates the importance of national interest. This is because the Arab League and its influence on oil markets is an important influence on the policies of the Western, oil-importing intervening states. This can be contrasted with the African Union’s position during the conflict, which preached peaceful and diplomatic means30 and was reluctant to recognize the National Transitional Council that opposed Gaddafi’s regime.31 In the end, the Arab League’s views proved to be more influential, clearly highlighting the importance of economic interests in the context of armed intervention.

Factors Provoking Intervention

Although the four factors previously mentioned were crucial in facilitating the intervention to take place, none of them truly incited action from the intervening powers. Indeed, while the ease of the mission, the complicity of the requisite powers and neighbours, and Gaddafi’s persona all allowed for the intervention to occur, other factors needed to be in place in order to raise the political costs of non-intervention such that they outweighed the political costs of intervention. Whenever there are conflicts in the Middle East or North Africa—and especially once Western powers become involved—oil is often cited as a potential reason for the Western involvement. The case of Libya is no different. Although the extent to which concerns regarding oil actually provoked the intervention is uncertain, numerous commentators have pointed to this issue as being a potentially vital one. These include Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, who stated in March that “petrol and who will 30 “Has the African Union got Libya Wrong?” Reuters, modified August 31, 2011, http://blogs.reuters.com/africanews/2011/08/31/has-the-african-union-got-libya-wrong/.31 “Libya: African Union Refuses to Recognize New Libyan Government,” Los Angeles Times, modified August 27, 2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbe-yond/2011/08/libya-african-union-refuses-to-recognize-new-libyan-government.html.

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exploit Libya’s oil fields are to a great extent the interests behind this operation.”32 He added that the many humanitarian crises in Africa in which there are no operations provides further evidence that the Libya mission is not really about values at all.33 Similar allegations have come from the Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez and have been voiced in various publications.34 However, it should be noted that many of these allegations stem from sources with their own agendas, as Arab and Venezuelan leaders that have spoken out regarding this issue are likely concerned that they themselves could be the future victims of what they see as a Western conquest for oil. Nonetheless, if oil was indeed a key determiner of the decision to intervene, it serves to illustrate the realist notion of the profound impact that economic interests have, as compared with the marginal role that values play in such decisions.

Another factor that arguably incited intervention is the 2008 global economic crisis. Political Scientist John E. Mueller has been very influential in his analysis of Presidential popularity in the United States, although his analysis can also be, to a certain extent, applied to other elected heads of state. Two of the principles set forth by Mueller are applicable in the Libya intervention. The first is his so-called “‘economic slump’ variable,” which draws a negative correlation between the economic performance of a country and the popularity of its leader. For this, he focuses on the variable of unemployment.35 The second applicable variable is the,“rally round the flag” variable. In this instance, he associates international crises that involve the United States—specifically those including “sudden American military intervention”—with increasing Presidential

32 “Libya Intervention Driven by Oil Interest: Bulgaria PM,” EU Business, modi-fied 21 arch, 2011, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/libya-conflict.96b/.33 “Libya Intervention Driven by Oil Interest: Bulgaria PM,” EU Business, modi-fied 21 arch, 2011, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/libya-conflict.96b/.34 “Cables Show NATO’s Intervention in Libya is All about Oil,” Arab News, modified July 30, 2011 http://www.arabnews.com/economy/article480491.ece.35 John E. Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson,” The American Political Science Review Vol. 64 (1970), 22.

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popularity.36 In both the US and Europe, the economic crisis has persisted from 2008 to the present. This has caused unemployment rates in Britain, the US, and France to reach 8.2%, 9%, and 9.6%, respectively.37 38 39 Indeed, this economic turmoil has led to political difficulties for many incumbents. According to Mueller’s theory, a logical course of action for such heads of state would be to involve their nations in a sudden, dramatic international crisis such as the one in Libya.40 Yet again, this perspective points to domestic politics as a critical influencer of foreign policy and intervention.

Lastly, the political costs and benefits of intervention must be regarded from the proper contextual standpoint. Given that the Arab Spring movement has been branded by both media and world leaders as a struggle for representative government and rights, principles that Western powers have nominally championed, the rebellions as a whole acted as a potentially salient venue for world leaders to demonstrate their support for these universal values championed by the movement.41 Furthermore, the violent resistance that met these uprisings in Libya and elsewhere also offered an opportunity for the NATO powers, the key intervening powers discussed earlier in this essay, to prove their commitment to the principles of R2P. Indeed, showing support for these values and principles can be politically very beneficial. For example, President Barack Obama clearly asserted his support for these ideals in his 2008 speech in Cairo, stating that, “America is not the crude stereotype of a self-interested empire,” and

36 John E. Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson,” The American Political Science Review Vol. 64 (1970), 21.37 “France Unemployment Rate,” Trading Economics, modified 2011, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/france/unemployment-rate.38 “UK Jobs Market Faces ‘slow, painful contraction,’” The Guardian, modified November 14, 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/14/unemploy-ment-and-employment-statistics-unemployment.39 “United States Unemployment Rate,” Trading Economics, modified October, 2011, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/unemployment-rate.40 Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson,” 21.41 “Obama’s Mideast Speech,” New York Times, modified May 19, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20prexy-text.html?_r=1&pagewant-ed=all.

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that, “when innocents in Bosnia and Darfur are slaughtered, that is a stain on our collective conscience.”42 Given that Obama was unable to deliver on some of his other stated goals from that speech, such as the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, the Arab Spring presented him in particular with an opportunity to show that he and, by extension, the Western world, supported the struggle against tyrannical regimes in the Middle East and North Africa.43 This likely acted as motivation not only to support intervention, but to do so while emphasizing the humanitarian motivations of the mission, which Obama cited this explicitly his speech regarding the Arab Spring in May 2011. In it, he stated that the US “faces a historic opportunity. [It has] the chance to show that America values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of the dictator … opposes the use of violence and repression against the people of the region,” and, “supports a set of universal rights.”44 This may seem to indicate that the Libyan intervention was in fact a product of values and principles. However, a distinction should be made: the importance of these was largely in their political utility. While acknowledging that the US “cannot prevent every injustice perpetrated by a regime against its people,” Obama was still able to support the revolutions in the place where the mission was likely to be, as discussed earlier, relatively cheap and unproblematic.45 In sum, the US and other intervening Western powers likely saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to prove their support for liberal-democratic values and R2P. Libya was a particularly conducive venue for doing so in a way that minimized the possibility of high-cost military failure and its accompanying political repercussions.

Conclusion

When considering the factors that influenced the decision to

42 “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo,” New York Times, modified, June 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all.43 “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo,” New York Times, modified, June 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all.44 “Obama’s Mideast Speech.” 45 “Obama’s Mideast Speech.”

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intervene in Libya, either through facilitation or provocation, distinct trends appear. Aside from conditional factors such as a lack of opponents to intervention, the truly influential aspects regard either political or economic interests—or both. Thus, although many would argue “that the prevention of mass atrocities should be prioritized as a national interest,” it seems apparent that more ‘traditional’ economic and political interests still reign supreme.46 Tthough the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has now been used as an effective rationale for the application of military force, it appears that for the foreseeable future, the use of military force for humanitarian purposes will be governed by state interests rather than norms, responsibilities, or values.

46 Chalk et al., Mobilizing the Will to Intervene, 5.

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“Has the African Union got Libya Wrong?” Reuters. 31 Aug. 2011. <http://blogs.reuters.com/africanews/2011/08/31/has-the-african-union-got-libya-wrong/>.

Hennessy-Fiske, Molly. “Libya: African Union Refuses to Recognize New Libyan Government.” Los Angeles Times. 27 Aug. 2011. <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/08/libya-african-union-refuses-to-recognize-new-libyan-government.html>.

Herbst, Moira. “Oil for China, Guns for Darfur.” Bloomberg Businessweek. 14 Mar. 2008. <http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2008/gb20080314_430126.htm>.

Husain, Syed Rashid. “Cables show NATO’s Intervention in Libya is All About Oil.” Arab News. 30 July 2011. <http://www.arabnews.com/economy/article480491.ece>.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2010.

Koring, Paul. “3 Reasons Why the Libyan War Model won’t Work in Syria.” The Globe and Mail. 3 Nov. 2011. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/worldview/3-reasons-why-the-libyan-war-model-wont-work-in-syria/article2223743/?utm_

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medium=Feeds%3A+RSS%2FAtom&utm_source=World&utm_content=2223743&fb_source=message>.

“Libya Intervention Driven by Oil Interest: Bulgaria PM.” EU Business. 21 Mar. 2011. <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/libya-conflict.96b/>.

Mueller, John E. “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson.” The American Political Science Review. 64.1 (1970): 18-34.

Obama, Barack. “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo.” The New York Times. 4 June 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all>.

Obama, Barack. “Text: Obama’s Mideast Speech.” The New York Times. 19 May 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20prexy-text.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all>.

Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Roff, Heather, and Bessma Momani. “The Tactics of Intervention: Why Syria will Never be Libya.” The Globe and Mail. 31 Oct. 2011. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/the-tactics-of-intervention-why-syria-will-never-be-libya/article2212174/>.

“United States Unemployment Rate.” Trading Economics. October, 2011. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/unemployment-rate>.

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Canadians have always considered themselves examples and proponents of equality. Whether historically accepting slave escapees from the United States or contemporarily legislating gay marriage, Canadians have considered themselves not only as models of freedom but also as crusaders of civil rights. However, there exist some glaring anomalies that contradict this commonly held view in Canadian history. One of these inconsistencies was the Canadian response to the apartheid regime in South Africa, which existed there until 1994. Against commonly held beliefs, Canada, during the long tenure of apartheid, was always reluctant to pursue any strong policies against this state, and especially any unilateral action. Every Canadian government throughout 1948 to1994 primarily acted through international institutions such as

‘Business as Usual’Camada’s Limited Role in Ending the Sytem

of Apartheid in South Africa

Justyna Zegarmistrz

Author: Justyna Zegarmistrz is an undergraduate student at the University of Toron-to, Trinity College. She is studying international relations, history as well as French. She has spent her third year of university studying abroad at the University of Edin-burgh in Scotland. Her academic interests are diverse, but she especially enjoys studying 20th century history focusing specifically on the Cold War.

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the United Nations or the Commonwealth to pursue their foreign policy. Throughout this entire period Canada also remained com-mitted to the principle of national sovereignty and non-interfer-ence. Canada often advocated for a country’s rights to determine its own domestic policies.1 These policies allowed and excused Canada from not taking a firmer stance against apartheid. Another influ-encing factor in the development of Canadian foreign policy were the personalities and personal beliefs of the prime ministers. The different interests of each prime minister provided some modest shifts in Canadian foreign policy; Prime ministers were also always mindful of the policies of its major allies and often did not stray very far from the policies of the United States or the United King-dom. However, this essay will argue that Canadian foreign policy remained largely unchanged throughout the three decades. One of the few factors that influenced Canadian foreign policy was public opinion. It served as one of the main guiding forces in actually im-plementing the few and limited policies that Canada put in place. Media coverage and publicized events often swayed public opin-ion against the apartheid government. The Canadian government responded to these shifts as a way to placate the people and garner political support.

The variety of issues introduced above will be explored in this essay. Through a chronological analysis, this essay will demon-strate that Canadian foreign policy throughout the apartheid peri-od was limited and self-serving. Despite modest periodic changes, Canada was committed to the policies of non-interference, mul-tilateral diplomacy and national self-interest which resulted in a mostly unchanging, and for many an unsatisfying, Canadian re-sponse to South African apartheid.

Existing literature on Canadian-South African relations is surprisingly limited. There are few scholars who have extensive-ly researched the topic. Of the few academics who do discuss it, Linda Freeman is the most recognized and important scholar in 1 Linda Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 5.

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the field. Her most significant book is The Ambiguous Champion- Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years. This book, focuses on the most heightened period of Canadian-South African relations during the 1970s and 1980s. However, she also provides a detailed historical background that gives the reader all the necessary information leading up to this period. Freeman argues that the general view of Canada as a crusader against apart-heid is too simplistic and distorted, and claims of Canadian leader-ship were excessive.2 The majority of the remaining literature tends to focus on the 1980s, which is often cited as the most dynamic period in Canadian foreign policy. Although many issues are ex-plored within this decade, there continues to exist many gaps in the research on this topic, especially pertaining to the early 1990s and late 1960s.

The scholarship that does exist on the subject agrees that the South African implementation of the apartheid system forced Canada to make a very difficult decision. Apartheid was not a system that matched Canadian values, as it calls for the segregation of the population according to race. However, the developments post-World War II created a very unstable international situation. Eastern and Western countries began to divide along ideologi-cal lines, and in a frantic division of allies at the start of the Cold War, South Africa became part of the ‘western alliance’.3 Shared historical experiences served to solidify the relationship Canada with the African country. Similar to Canada, South Africa had contributed to the Allied victory in World War II. It also shared a common British heritage and was now linked to the Common-wealth. Although racial inequality was a policy that the Canadian government disagreed with, the realities of the Cold War necessi-tated Canada to continue its economic and diplomatic relationship with South Africa. Instead Canada decided to restrict itself to only

2 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 5.3 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System (Cambridge: Cam-bridge Studies in International Relations, 1996), 138.

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verbal condemnation of the apartheid regime.4

To prevent an escalation of Cold War hostilities, the exist-ing balance of power needed to be maintained. This consequently necessitated continuing the relationship with South Africa as it provided the West an influence in Africa.5 The country also re-mained an important source for the Western allies to extract key minerals and resources. Collectively, this meant that they could not risk alienating the state.6 In 1948, under the leadership of St. Lau-rent, Canada did not stray very far from the actions of its Western allies.7 Although by no means did Canada endorse the regime, it was most important for Canada to maintain South Africa ‘on our side’.8 St. Laurent did not instruct his diplomats to raise the issue of apartheid, and the Department of External Affairs even con-tinued to support its defense and military ties with South Africa.9 With the haunting memories of the devastation of World War II, Western states preferred to retain contacts with all their allies. This historical context is especially important to understand when ana-lyzing the Canadian-South African relationship during the apart-heid, because this period was critical in the formation of Canadian foreign policy.

In the aftermath of WWII, the United Nations also grew as an important contributor in the development of internation-al politics. With the goal of fostering a peaceful environment in which nations could resolve international issues through discussion, the United Nations became an integral part of Canadian foreign policy.10 Although this tenant will not be discussed in depth in this essay, Canada believed that it could use the United Nations as a 4 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 13.5 Clapham, Africa and the International, 183.6 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 16.7 Brian Douglas Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 131.8 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 16.9 Ibid. 1510 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 131.

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means to further its own international agenda.11 What is important to note is that the Charter of the UN included Article 2, which did not allow for the body to interfere in the domestic issues of a nation.12 This article was very important to the Canadian delega-tion and they believed it to be the essence to international cooper-ation. However, the Canadian commitment to this article quickly limited the scope of action that Canadian delegates could take in condemning the regime. Hoping to maintain friendly contacts with South Africa in the era of the Cold War, Article 2 provided Canadian politicians with an excuse for not pursuing a stronger stance towards the regime.13 For example, Pearson made it clear in his statement in 1952 to the UN that under Article 2, Section 7the UN had no right to intervene or examine the domestic politics of South Africa.14 He went even further, adding that the discussion or consideration of these matters goes beyond the rights of the body.15 This same policy was repeated in 1955 by the permanent Canadi-an delegate to the UN, R.A. MacKay. He reiterated that Canada supported universal human rights, but would not support any resolutions that would intervene in South Africa.16 He also did not support the establishment of any commissions or committees that would review the issue.17 Even when the majority of the General Assembly agreed to form such a commission, Canada abstained.18 11 Ibid.12  “Chapter 1: Purpose and Principles,” Charter of the United Nations, accessed March 8, 2013.13 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 131.14 L. B. Pearson, “The Colonial Issue,” speech, December 8, 1952, in Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954. Selected Documents and Speeches, ed. R. A. MacKay (Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 1970), 159.15 Pearson, “The Colonial Issue,” speech, in Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954., 159.16 R. A. MacKay, “Race Relations in South Africa,” speech presented at Ad Hoc Political Committee in the United Nations, November 9, 1955, in Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954 (Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 1971), 160.17 MacKay, “Race Relations in South,” speech, in Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954, 161.18 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 18.

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Eric Louw, the permanent delegate to the UN for South Africa, even thanked both the Canadian and American delegates in help-ing reconciling South Africa with the UN and for their support of his country.19

Canada’s insistence in following the policy of noninterven-tion and national sovereignty remained consistent in its agenda. The examples illustrated above clearly demonstrated the limited nature of Canadian foreign policy. Canada restricted itself to only supporting general resolutions condemning racial discrimination and continued to avoid the clauses that specifically mentioned South Africa.20 Institutions instead of forcing Canada to a course of action, instead excused its weak stance.

Another important institution that greatly influenced the development of Canadian foreign policy was the Commonwealth. Canada traditionally followed the British lead with regards to foreign policy and in South Africa, this was no different. In the 1950s the members of the Commonwealth were in majority ‘white’ nations.21 All of these nations shared similar policies of not in-tervening within the internal situation of any particular country. Therefore, the Commonwealth enjoyed a period of coordinated policy. However, by the 1960s the Commonwealth flipped from be-ing a white majority to a white minority.22 This in turn had a wider consequence on the decisions and discussions that took place at the various Commonwealth meetings. The non-white majority began demanding the expulsion of South Africa and the reevaluation of the Commonwealth based on the universal values of human rights and equality.

Domestically, Canada elected John Diefenbaker as prime minister in 1957. Although a traditionalist and staunch support-er of the Commonwealth, he was also was a staunch advocate for

19 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 139.20 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 130.21 Ibid. 14022 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 18.

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human rights and equality.23 Diefenbaker seemed to be the perfect person to finally enact change to the Canadian policy and to stand up against apartheid. However, this optimism was falsely placed. Diefenbaker and his foreign affairs minister Howard Green, con-tinued to favour a non-interventionist approach. Holding only a minority in the House of Commons, the prime minister preferred a cautious approach in hope that quiet pressure would prove to be enough to enact some reforms in South Africa.24 Diefenbaker was careful in his policy choices and preferred not to make any deci-sions on non-essential items.25 Once again, the Canadian govern-ment limited Canadian action to immediate political self-interest.

By 1960 Diefenbaker had secured a majority for his conser-vative government, but this time he faced changing public opinions towards apartheid. Diefenbaker hoped to simultaneously maintain a united Commonwealth and satiate the public at home. During the 1960 Commonwealth meeting, Diefenbaker privately implored the foreign affairs minister of South Africa, Eric Louw, to consider making token gestures to the non-white population of his coun-try.26 This proposition was immediately shot down by Louw.27 Any concessions on apartheid were non-negotiable, yet during the same conference, Louw announced that South Africa’s decision to hold a referendum could change South Africa into a republic.28 It is important to note that in the Commonwealth, a precedent existed that if a country is changing its form of government, they must apply for readmission into the Commonwealth.29 The Common-wealth now had to consider whether it would allow South Africa to be automatically readmitted in the Commonwealth. Against the will of many non white states, Diefenbaker initially favoured this

23 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 141.24 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 140.25 Ibid.26 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 19.27 Ibid.28 Ibid, 20.29 Ibid.

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proposal.30 However, any decision was postponed until after the referendum had taken place.

Shortly after this conference in 1960, the Sharpeville massacre occurred in South Africa which was widely publicized by the media.31 In March of that year, approximately sixty-nine black protestors were killed in the city of Sharpeville during a peaceful demonstration.32 After the tragic event, both the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (who was famous for his ‘wind of change speech’ at this time33) and the United States Department of State issued statements condemning the massacre.34 Yet Diefen-baker continued to remain silent on the subject and delayed his response by several days.35 Even after major allies such as Britain and the United States took a stronger stance on the issue, Canada continued to remain elusive despite any private misgivings that the prime minister held.

Public opinion continued to be very negative not only towards the apartheid in South Africa, but also towards the lagging Canadian response. With the introduction of the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960, people continued to question the double standard that existed domestically within Canada and its foreign policy. After the Sharpeville massacre, many groups including academics, the Canadian Council of Churches, the National Federation of Canadian University Students, and the Canadian Labour Con-gress urged the government to take a firm stance.36 Sympathetic to public opinion, Diefenbaker declared in the House of Commons that he was “acutely conscious of the deeply held feelings of the

30 Ibid.31 Ibid, 19.32 Ibid.33 This was a speech in February of 1960 in Cape Town South Africa, during which PM Macmillan that indicated the decolonization occurring in Africa as well as a change in British policy towards apartheid.34 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 172.35 Ibid.36 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada,  23.

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house and, indeed of Canadians generally, over the question and, I need not add of their abhorrence and mine of discrimination.”37 Despite these declarations, Diefenbaker continued to follow a cau-tious approach in his foreign policy and was extremely sensitive to the unity of the Commonwealth. For example, in his report on the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference to the House of Commons on May 16, 1960, Diefenbaker made it known that he conveyed Canada’s abhorrence of policies based on racial dis-crimination, but that Canada was also committed to the practices of non-intervention.38 He stressed that “the traditional practice of these meetings [is] that the internal affairs of member countries are not the subject of formal discussion.”39 Later in his report, he also added that “any departure from this last principle would mean the end of the Commonwealth as we know it.”40 Strongly influenced by the Department of External Affairs and Foreign Affairs Minister Howard Green, Diefenbaker continued to be influenced by the traditional policy of ‘quiet pressure’.

New concerns also began to emerge from within the Com-monwealth. As was mentioned earlier, the proportion of non-white to white countries had changed in the organisation. With an increasing number of non-white states, Canada was hopeful that it could use the Commonwealth connection to its advantage and exert more influence in the African and Asian continents.41 At this time, Diefenbaker also had to consider the implications of the Cold War. With increasing decolonization, the Commonwealth could not continue without announcing their stance towards discrimination, as the West could lose more than it would gain if

37 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 147.38 John Diefenbaker, “The Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference,” address presented at House of Commons, Ottawa, May 16, 1960, in Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-2000: Major Documents and Speeches, ed. Arthur E. Blanchette (Kemptville: The Golden Dog Press, 2000), 183.39 Ibid.40 Ibid.41 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 23.

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it retained the same relationship with South Africa.42 Combined with the domestic pressure following the Sharpeville Massacre and a hope to appease the non-white nations of the Commonwealth, Diefenbaker informed the British Prime Minister that he intended to condemn apartheid at the next Commonwealth meeting. He would also not support automatic readmission of South Africa into the Commonwealth.43 Although this declaration may be interpret-ed as Canada’s definitive stance against South African policy, it is important to note that only domestic considerations compounded with Diefenbaker’s private beliefs led to this illusory change of policy. Despite well intentioned efforts, Diefenbaker’s private state-ment was quickly modified by the British prime minster. Macmil-lan consulted with Diefenbaker and convinced him to reexamine the issue and refrain from quick judgment.44

The initial period spurred the quick change in policy, but once the Commonwealth meeting of 1961arrived, Diefenbaker reduced his criticism of South Africa and argued that it would be premature to answer South Africa’s request for readmission.45 Diefenbaker hoped to establish a compromise between the de-veloping and developed nations by granting South Africa ‘a trial period’ during when it would be given some time to implement at least some basic reforms.46 Throughout the conference, Diefenbaker remained a staunch supporter of including a declaration of princi-ples on human rights into a joint Commonwealth declaration, but he avoided the South African question.47 It is important to under-stand that despite common belief, Diefenbaker was not a leader in the campaign to exclude South Africa from the Commonwealth. Rather it was the leaders of India, Ghana, Nigeria and Malaysia

42 Ibid.43 Ibid. 2144 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 161.45 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 25.46 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 170.47 Ibid.

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that lead the fight in securing South Africa’s withdrawal.48 It was also upon Macmillan’s suggestion that Verwoerd, the South Afri-can Prime Minister, withdraw his application to remain within the Commonwealth once South Africa became a republic.49 Even after the withdrawal of South Africa, Diefenbaker continued to hope that the country would one day return to the Commonwealth.50 As these examples illustrated despite Diefenbaker’s private abhorrence for apartheid, Canada’s foreign policy goals could not allow for a definitive stance.

The South African withdrawal from the Commonwealth was the extent of Canadian disapproval in the region. During this era, Canadian officials would not isolate South Africa any further. Despite the expulsion of South Africa, Canada continued to allow Commonwealth trade preferences to be applied towards South Africa.51 Canadian delegations also continued to oppose any UN resolutions attempting to impose sanctions or expel South Af-rica from the organisation.52 In retrospect, it becomes clear that Canada’s quiet support in expelling South Africa from the Com-monwealth was more out of concern for preserving the unity of the Commonwealth than any disappointment with South African policies.53 Diefenbaker was committed to following British policies and continuing economic relations with South Africa. For Canada, maintain the good Commonwealth relations was a crucial issue and thus this approach continued to be supported by Lester Pearson when he became prime minister in 1963.54

Canadian foreign policy towards South Africa did not change significantly under Pearson. It was only in 1970 after the election of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the release of his Foreign 48 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 25.49 Ibid, 26.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.52 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 179.53 Ibid.54 Ibid.

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Policy Review paper that the South African issue once again received more attaention within Canada. Often called the ‘White Paper’, the review advanced three primary objectives for Canadi-an foreign policy: fostering Canadian economic growth, working for world peace and security, and promoting social justice.55 Of the three objectives Trudeau clearly favoured increasing Canadian economic growth. He even stated that he “expressed a commitment to social justice, but not one significant enough to interfere with the ‘better-than-normal opportunities for trade and investment in its [Canadian] growing economy.”56 These opposing policies would continue to be balanced by the Trudeau government depending on which one more strongly represented domestic interests at the moment.

Economically, South Africa represented a miniscule portion of Canadian trade.57 In 1967 this accounted for less than 1% of total Canadian trade.58 Yet each prime minister stubbornly defend-ed trade with South Africa, and vehemently opposed economic sanctions on the country. The argument that was often used by ministers was that if trade was cut off, the black population would be hurt more than the white, and that another country would simply step in and take Canada’s spot.59 Part of the reason as to why Trudeau continued to support economic relations with South Africa was that despite the small percentage of trade, it imported Canadian finished and semi-finished goods.60 This was important because it enabled the government to diversify its exports, a goal it was desperately trying to achieve in the 1970s.61 When it came to economic sanctions, the Canadian government would not budge.

55 Garth Legge et al., “The Black Paper: An Alternative Policy for Canada to-wards Southern Africa,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 4, no. 3 (Fall 1970): 10.56 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 43.57 Legge et al., “The Black Paper: An Alternative,” 11.58 Ibid.59 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 47.60 Ibid.61 Ibid.

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Its domestic economic interests were more important than the social justice component of its own foreign policy review.

The selfish economic aims of the Canadian government did not please the Canadian public. In response to the White Pa-per, the Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa in 1970 prepared the Black Paper. The Black Paper directly criticizes the government’s stance and argued for a stronger policy against apartheid. It clearly recognized the “strong dichotomy between the strong affirmation of basic policies and the weak and inconsistent implementation of them.”62 While pointing out the inconsistencies in the government’s argument the paper also proposed a different policy that would have been entirely feasible for the Canadian government to implement.63 It suggested that Canada limit its economic involvement with the country and as a crucial first step end the preferential treatment of South African goods.64 Among its other propositions, it also argues for achieving a foreign policy that would reflect Canada’s basic values of equality and harmoniz-ing the declaration of these values with the government’s actions.65 The Black Paper was a moderate and realistic analysis of Canadian foreign policy.66 It clearly reflected a general Canadian view that the government was not acting strongly enough it.

By1976, Canadian public opinion against apartheid was once again on the rise. That year, the Soweto crisis occurred where over a hundred black students were killed for their demonstrations against the introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in schools.67 Similarly to the situation in 1960 with the Sharpe-ville massacre, the crisis resulted in another wave of media furor.68 62 Garth Legge et al., “The Black Paper: An Alternative Policy for Canada to-wards Southern Africa,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 4, no. 3 (Fall 1970): 1.63 Ibid, 13.64 Ibid.65 Ibid.66 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South, 188.67 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 74.68 Ibid.

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Coinciding with the increasing domestic pressure, Canada in 1977 also became a part of the UN Security Council for 2 years.69 The increase in international position and prestige led the Minister of Foreign Affairs to declare an end to Canadian support of trade with South Africa.70 Jamieson announced the withdrawal of the trade commissioners and the end to loans and insurance to the government.71Although it seemed like a large gesture, these mecha-nisms were not in use and the act was interpreted by scholars at the time as an act to only to please voters.72 The Canadian announce-ment was also made in anticipation to a similar one made by the United States Congress the next year.73 Despite these symbols of condemnation, the policy had a minimal effect on Canadian re-lations with South Africa. Canada continued to demonstrate its unwillingness to act unilaterally and remained dedicated to its economic interests.

By 1984, Brian Mulroney, a new Conservative prime minis-ter was in office. Similarly to Diefenbaker, Mulroney personally de-plored the system of apartheid. With increasing violence in South Africa, Mulroney famously made a speech at the UN promising total diplomatic and economic sanctions.74 However, Canada was not unique in its condemnation. By 1985 even President Reagan, who was traditionally a strong supporter of non-intervention was pressured by the public to impose sanctions which were later rein-forced by the US Congress.75 Mulroney’s vigor and quick condem-nation of South Africa surprised many international and domestic

69 Grant Dawson, “Contact Africa: Canadian foreign policy, the contact group and southern Africa,” International Journal, Spring 2009, 524.70 Dawson, “Contact Africa: Canadian foreign,” 525.71 Ibid.72 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 130.73 Ibid.74  Ian O. Cameron, “Canada, the Commonwealth and South Africa: National Foreign Policy-Making in a Multilateral Environment,” Millennium- Journal of Interna-tional Studies 18 ( June 1989): 205.75 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 131.

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actors. However, the emotionally driven statements of Mulroney were reigned back in very quickly by the Department of External Affairs and specifically by Joe Clark, his secretary of state for exter-nal affairs. Several days after advocating fo harsh sanctions, Mul-roney retracted from this position and was forced back into a more cautious role.76 Although the public was pleased with Mulroney’s quick and decisive action, the Department for External Affairs (DEA) remained a conservative traditionalist force. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1985, Clark was willing to introduce some ‘basic changes’ to Canadian foreign policy towards South Africa. In Sep-tember 1985 he released a statement introducing and expanding on some limited measures implemented in the summer of 1985.77 The new resolutions included a voluntary ban on the sale of oil and loans to the government, an embargo on air transport between the two countries, as well as increasing the amount of money allocated to humanitarian aid in the area.78

Before these reforms are lauded for their selflessness, it is necessary to analyze them. Although a symbolic gesture, these actions were not new to the Canadian public. As Ian Cameron remarked, by 1985 when many of these reforms were legislated, many Canadian business and corporations had already began to pull out of South Africa or terminated all business connections with the country.79 Therefore, it was clear that the measures lacked any economic significance and merely mimicked actions that had already been taken in the private sector.80 The bans were also in no way the ‘total sanctions’ that Mulroney promised.81 The majority 76 Ibid.77 Joe Clark, “Canada’s measures against apartheid,” speech presented at House of Commons, Ottawa, September 13, 1985, in Canadian Foreign Policy: Major Documents and Speeches 1945-2000, ed. Arthur E. Blanchette (Kemptville: The Golden Dog Press, 2000), 189.78 Clark, “Canada’s measures against apartheid,” speech, in Canadian Foreign Policy: Major, 190.79 Ibid.80 Cameron, “Canada, the Commonwealth and South,” 209.81 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 149

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of his cabinet remained uncomfortable with this idea especially if the sanctions were to be imposed unilaterally.82 Many of the bans remained voluntary and even the embargo on air transport was an empty promise as there no longer existed any flights from Canada that flew directly to South Africa. Despite Mulroney’s sanctions in the period from 1986-1993, Canadian trade with South Africa amounted to some 1.6 billion dollars.83 The sanctions were very selective and designed to inconvenience as few people as possi-ble.84 Canadian foreign policy continued to be based on economic self-interest rather than social justice.

In 1986, the next Commonwealth meeting took place at Nassau.85 At the meeting, Mulroney hoped that he could get the members to apply Commonwealth-wide sanctions. However, the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher vigorously opposed to the idea.86 With both Mulroney and the Australian prime minister intent on getting Thatcher’s support before imposing any policy, the meeting resulted in only limited economic sanctions that had little or no impact.87 As if this was in reflection to Canada’s history with the organisation, the unity of the Commonwealth was once again chosen over effective action. A smallsummit was called again in 1986 at London that would re-examine the sanctions towards South Africa after the Eminent Persons Group reported a quickly deteriorating and violent situation in South Africa.88 With Thatch-er again uncooperative on the issue, the Commonwealth decided to impose sanctions that would end the import of certain South African goods without Great Britain’s support.89 This policy strong-

82 Ibid.83 Ibid. pg. 26184 Ibid.85 Cameron, “Canada, the Commonwealth and South,” 211.86 Andrew Clark, Mosaic or Patchwork? Canadian Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1991), 46.87 Ibid.88 Cameron, “Canada, the Commonwealth and South,” 211.89 Ibid.

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ly appealed to the Canadian public, as it finally appeared that they were getting the action they wanted to see. However, sanctions continued to be limited in nature. It took the combined efforts of public pressure, pamphlets such as the Trafficking in Apartheid- the Case for Canadian Sanctions against South Africa, as well as the personal determination of Mulroney,to evolve Canadian policy.90 1986 proved to be the high mark of the Canadian govern-ment’s stand against apartheid, but after this year, the movement quickly dwindled.91

The momentum of a strong anti-apartheid stand quickly declined after the London summit of 1986. Without securing the support of some of the Western allies such as Great Britain, Can-ada proved to be unwilling to go further in ending all remaining relations and links with the country. Although it has been often lauded that Canada was the first among nations to impose sanc-tions, as Freeman points out in her book, there were many other countries that imposed sanctions against South Africa before Canada. For example, India did so in 1946. Many countries such as New Zealand and Denmark cut off all diplomatic ties with South Africa which Canada also did not do.92 Canada had also imposed only limited sanctions where as many of the Scandinavian countries imposed full sanctions.93 Interestingly, even the United States sanctions were tougher than their Canadian counter parts.94 Mulroney and his government proved to be unwilling to cut all ties with South Africa. They were quickly fatigued by the issue and Mulroney had lost interest in the policy as he had more pressing domestic issues. This allowed Clark a freer hand in determining Canadian policy which reverted back to the traditional DEA fash-ion of conservative action.

By 1990, the government in South Africa began lifting 90 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 286.91 Clark, Mosaic or Patchwork? Canadian, 47.92 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada, 286.93 Ibid.94 Ibid.

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its ban on anti-apartheid groups marking the effective end of the apartheid regime. The famous anti-apartheid advocate, Nelson Mandela, was freed from jail and in 1994, after much anticipation, he was elected President of South Africa and inaugurated a new phase in Canadian-South African relations.

Canadian-South African relations form the period 1948-1994 were, as this essay has shown, relatively stable. Influenced by its commitment to multilateral diplomacy, Canada was unwilling to distinguish itself from other nations in adopting severe or unilat-eral sanctions against South Africa. The political and especially economic self-interest took precedence over other considerations, while the Cold War also diverted Canadian attention from the focus of the issue. Despite prime ministers such as Diefenbaker and Mulroney who personally abhorred the racial injustice, they could enact only temporary changes in policy and often their views were diluted by the Department of External Affairs. Only public opinion proved to be a significant factor in enacting change in the government’s policy, but this too often turned out to be short-lived and intermittent. Thus, despite the existing legend of Canada as a leader against apartheid, the dominant Canadian policy in this time was ‘business as usual.’

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Works Cited

Cameron, Ian O. “Canada, the Commonwealth and South Africa: National Foreign Policy-Making in a Multilateral Environ-ment.” Millennium- Journal of International Studies 18 ( June 1989): 205-55.

“Chapter 1: Purpose and Principles.” Charter of the United Na-tions. Accessed March 8, 2013. http://www.un.org/en/doc-uments/charter/chapter1.shtml.

Clapham, Christopher. Africa and the International System. Cam-bridge: Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 1996.

Clark, Andrew. Mosaic or Patchwork? Canadian Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s. Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1991.

Clark, Joe. “Canada’s measures against apartheid.” Speech present-ed at House of Commons, Ottawa, September 13, 1985. In Canadian Foreign Policy: Major Documents and Speech-es 1945-2000, edited by Arthur E. Blanchette, 188-90. Kemptville: The Golden Dog Press, 2000.

Dawson, Grant. “Contact Africa: Canadian foreign policy, the contact group and southern Africa.” International Journal, Spring 2009, 521-30.

Diefenbaker, John. “The Commonwealth Prime Minsters’ Confer-ence.” Address presented at House of Commons, Ottawa, May 16, 1960. In Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-2000: Ma-jor Documents and Speeches, edited by Arthur E. Blanchette, 183-88. Kemptville: The Golden Dog Press, 2000.

Freeman, Linda. The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.

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Legge, Garth, Cranford Pratt, Richard Williams, and Hugh Win-sor. “The Black Paper: An Alternative Policy for Canada to-wards Southern Africa.” Canadian Journal of African Studies 4, no. 3 (Fall 1970): 363-94.

MacKay, R. A. “Race Relations in South Africa.” Speech present-ed at Ad Hoc Political Committee in the United Nations, November 9, 1955. In Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954. Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 1971.

Pearson, L. B. “The Colonial Issue.” Speech, December 8, 1952. In Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954. Selected Documents and Speeches, edited by R. A. MacKay, 157-59. Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 1970.

Tennyson, Brian Douglas. Canadian Relations with South Africa. Washington: University Press of America, 1982.

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“Your handshake has come over the vastest ocean in the world- twenty-five years of no communication.” -Zhou Enlai to Richard Nixon, 21 February 19721

“It was the week that changed the world.” -Nixon, Shanghai, 27 February 19722

1 Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 1.2 Ibid., 1.

The Sino-American Rapprochement (1969-1972)

Motivated by Strategy, Made Possible by Ideological Innovation

J. Ahmad

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In February 1972, American President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to the People’s Republic of China became one of the most internationally documented events of the Sino-American rapprochement (1969-1972).3 Since then, numerous scholars have attempted to explain why, after approximately twenty years of mutual hostility and mistrust, the United States and the People’s Republic of China sought a thaw in relations in the late 1960s. Traditional accounts of the Sino-American rapprochement emphasize the logic of balance of power; the United States and China were brought together by a shifting balance of power whereby American military superiority relative to the Soviet Union had diminished, and China had transformed from a Soviet ally to a Soviet adversary who was vulnerable to Soviet military hostility.4 Within the aforementioned context, the United States sought to leverage cooperation with China in order to advance detente with the Soviet Union and pressure North Vietnam to come to the negotiating table with the United States.5 China, for its part, sought to leverage American military strength in order to balance Soviet power in Asia and, thus, deter Soviet aggression against China.6 Although the aforementioned strategic considerations did indeed constitute the primary reasons for ‘why’ the US and China sought rapprochement, strategic accounts fall short of explaining ‘how’ the pursuit of rapprochement for the aforementioned strategic ends became a viable foreign policy option in both Washington and Beijing in the late 1960s. I argue that the transformation of dominant American and Chinese ideological conceptions of each other legitimated rapprochement as a viable policy option in both countries. In the United States, the Sino-Soviet split forced political elites7 to 3 Ibid., 1.4 Ibid., 2.5 Ibid., 3.6 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 33.7 In this essay, “political elites” refers to politicians, academics, and journalists who exercise significant political influence in the American decision-making process due to

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rethink the ideological conception of China advanced by official American policy. By the late 1960s, shortly before Nixon entered office, a critical mass of elite opinion had shifted towards the view that Beijing represented a nationalist regime driven by domestic security interests rather than an ideological expansionist driven by communist revolutionary fervor.8 With this new ideological conception, China’s regime could no longer be seen as an inherent threat to the American-led capitalist postwar international order. Thus, the pursuit of Sino-American rapprochement became a legitimate foreign policy option for the Nixon administration. Similarly, in China, Mao modified official Chinese anti-imperialist communist ideology, which defined imperialism as capitalism, to include the evil of “social-imperialism” which he attributed to the Soviet Union.9 Because traditional Chinese political culture emphasized cooperating with a less dangerous enemy in order to focus on the primary enemy,10 Mao’s redefinition of anti-imperialist communist ideology allowed him to justify his pursuit of a united front with the capitalist United States against its old communist ally, the Soviet Union.

The American Decision For Sino-American Rapprochement Orthodox historiographical interpretations argue that strategic factors constituted the primary motivation for the United States to seek a rapprochement with China. First of all, within the context of an intensification of Sino-Soviet hostility in the late 1960s, the United States aimed to leverage Chinese power in order to facilitate American detente with the Soviet Union. In the late

either: their direct access to the legislative process, their close contact with the Executive branch, their relatively easy access to the general public whose opinions they can influ-ence, and/or through private channels. 8 Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 12, 19, 20, 31.9 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 28-29.10 Ibid., 29.

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1960s, the United States was at an overall weakened position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This reality was manifest most prominently in the military sphere with the closing of the “missile gap.”11 Such a reality had been made possible primarily by America’s protracted involvement in the Vietnam War, which had placed a significant drain on American military and economic resources.12 In an effort to revive American economic strength, the Nixon administration sought an overall reduction of superpower tensions in the international realm13 through negotiation of strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union and political detente in Europe.14 At this time, the United States watched the Sino-Soviet relationship grow increasingly tense, as major Sino-Soviet border clashes erupted,15 Moscow advanced the notion of a pre-emptive strike against China’s growing nuclear capabilities,16 and Beijing launched a major anti-Soviet propaganda campaign domestically.17 China’s weakened and increasingly vulnerable security situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union led the United States to believe that perhaps China would consider reconciliation with America as a means of offsetting the Soviet threat. Washington could then use the semblance of Sino-American cooperation on the Soviet Union’s southern border with China to threaten greater18 and quicker responsiveness from Moscow in the detente process.19 11 The “missile gap” refers to a difference in the number of nuclear missiles held by the United States versus the Soviet Union.12 Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 3.13 Goh, Evelyn. “Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the US Opening to China, 1971-1974.” Diplomatic History. 29.3 (2005): 475.14 Keylor, William. A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 275.15 Xia, Yafeng. “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, Janu-ary 1969-February 1972.” Journal of Cold War Studies. 8.4 (2006): 7.16 Keylor, William. A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 272.17 Ibid., 273.18 Goh, Evelyn. “Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the US Opening to China, 1971-1974.” Diplomatic History. 29.3 (2005): 476.19 Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From

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Moreover, as the Nixon administration desperately sought an exit strategy from Vietnam, the prospect of rapprochement with China, a strong material and ideological supporter of North Vietnam,20 created the possibility of pushing Hanoi towards a negotiated settlement with Washington. The Nixon administration hoped that even if China refused to explicitly pressure North Vietnam to seek negotiations with the United States, a Sino-American rapprochement would raise doubts in North Vietnam about the dependability of its Chinese ally and, thus, convince Hanoi to come to the negotiating table.21 The orthodox historiographical interpretation may be correct in identifying strategic factors as the main motivation behind ‘why’ the Nixon administration pursued rapprochement with China. However, orthodox interpretations fail to pinpoint ‘how’ the United States was politically able to seek rapprochement when it did. As Evelyn Goh argues, in the late 1960s, as Washington watched Sino-Soviet hostility reach a boiling point, it could have chosen to do nothing. The United States had the option of allowing the intra-communist dispute to further weaken its two key international adversaries, in turn increasing the relative strength of the American-led Western camp.22 This was precisely the policy that both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had followed as Sino-Soviet relations grew more tense throughout the 1960s.23 However, what differentiated the foreign policy context of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations on the one hand, and the Nixon administration on the other hand, was that by the time President Nixon assumed office in 1969, a new ideological conception of China had taken hold among a significant portion of “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 3.20 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 27.21 Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 3.22 Ibid., 10.23 Ibid., 10.

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American political elites.

By the late 1960s, a critical mass of elite opinion had shifted towards the view that China represented a nationalist regime driven by domestic security interests rather than an ideological expansionist driven by communist revolutionary fervor.24 With the development of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, American liberals began to vocalize the possibility that perhaps communism no longer presented a monolithic ideological threat. If the Sino-Soviet split was indeed genuine, then perhaps the threat emanating from communist China was based in nationalism rather than communist revolutionary ideology.25 To illustrate, such a view would have led one to believe that Beijing’s support for Hanoi during the Vietnam War was a defensive move on the part of a weak China which was concerned primarily about its national security. According to this perspective, Chinese troops in North Vietnam were designed to act as a deterrent against an American invasion of the region rather than as a tool for expanding communist revolutionary ideology.26 Overall, the new ideological conception of China as a nationalist rather than an ideological expansionist undermined the notion that China was an inherent threat to the American-led capitalist postwar international order. This opened up the possibility that the United States could deal profitably with some regimes that claimed to be communist.27 It is important to note that it was not merely the existence of a new ideological conception of China in the United States that legitimated rapprochement as a viable foreign policy option for the Nixon administration, but the acceptance of the new ideological conception among a significant portion of America’s 24 Ibid., 12, 19, 20, 31.25 Schulzinger, Robert. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 78.26 Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 19, 20, 44.27 Schulzinger, Robert. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 78.

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political elite. Throughout the 1960s, under both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the view that China was a nationalist rather than ideological threat steadily grew roots. This became increasingly evident as prominent Liberal voices began to advocate American reconciliation with China. By the mid-1960s, even though American administration officials refused to discuss the improvement of Sino-American relations,28 members of Congress, academics, and other opinion leaders were no longer so reticent. In March 1966, Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, initiated hearings designed to “bring China into the world community of nations.”29 The initiative aimed to educate both Congress and the public at large about the current state of China, providing a platform for alternative views on US China policy. For example, one of the most popular opinions at the hearings was that of Columbia University Professor A. Doak Barnett who, in arguing for “maximum involvement of the Chinese Communists in the international community,” indirectly rejected the traditional view that China was a nation whose communist political ideology predisposed it to revolutionary expansionism and thus made it an automatic threat to the American-led postwar international order.30 Such open debate on US-China policy, undertaken at a high congressional level, helped to dismantle the relatively hostile political environment created by the Joseph McCarthy era,31 thus facilitating the adoption of a new ideological conception of China among political elites.

28 Ibid., 79.29 Ibid., 79.30 Koepke, Logan. “Determinants of US-China Normalization: How Congres-sional Actions and Influence Shaped the Normalization Process.” Yale Historical Review. (2013): 45-51. Web. 4 March. 48.31 The McCarthy era was characterized by a political environment in which strict containment and isolation was the policy of the day and opposition to containment was viewed as suspicious, politically inappropriate, and even unpatriotic.

Koepke, Logan. “Determinants of US-China Normalization: How Congres-sional Actions and Influence Shaped the Normalization Process.” Yale Historical Review. (2013): 45-51. Web. 4 March. 47, 48, 51.

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In addition to Congress’ role in helping to shift American ideological conceptions of China from communist expansionist to nationalist, the world of academia also played a key role. In 1966, America’s preeminent foreign policy think tank, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), produced an extensive $1.1 million study of “The United States and China in World Affairs.”32 The CFR study advocated that the United States end its policy of isolating China and, instead, pursue reconciliatory relations with Beijing’s communist leadership.33 Of course, this conclusion was premised on the notion that China was a regime driven by mere nationalist desire rather than communist revolutionary expansionism. It would not have been possible for CFR scholars to advocate American reconciliation with the Chinese communists had the scholars espoused the traditional view of China as an ideological expansionist. The traditional view would have led one to dismiss any possibility that China, a country supposedly bent on expanding its communist revolutionary ideology internationally, would ever have been willing to accept cooperative relations with its primary ideological enemy, the capitalist United States. Overall, the CFR, with its wide-reaching influence in American political culture, helped to advance the new conception of China as a nationalist state rather than an ideological expansionist, a foundation upon which a non-isolationist policy towards China could be justified.34 Congressional and academic initiatives on America’s China policy, such as those mentioned above, exemplified the growing acceptance among American elites of a new ideological conception of China. It was also because of such initiatives that, by the late 1960s, acceptance of the new ideological conception among elite opinion had built up to a critical mass. In the late 1960s, if the Nixon administration had been operating in a political context in which the dominant elite view posited China as an ideologically-

32 Schulzinger, Robert. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 79.33 Ibid., 79.34 Ibid., 79.

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driven communist expansionary, the Nixon Administration would have been unable to pursue rapprochement with China, despite the strategic incentives of doing so, because rapprochement with such an ideological enemy would have appeared illegitimate to a significant portion of American elite opinion upon whose support every first-term president strongly relies.35

The Chinese Decision for Sino-American Rapprochement

Orthodox historiographical interpretations argue that strategic concerns constituted the primary motivation for Beijing to seek rapprochement with Washington. According to this view, the security threat emanating from the Soviet Union became so severe that Beijing could not afford to continue to maintain the same level of discord with Washington, thus forcing China to enhance its security situation through rapprochement.36 There is no doubt that China was facing a rapidly deteriorating security situation from 1968 to 1969. At this time, China was occupied with managing challenges to its national security on virtually all sides of its border; while continuing to allocate military resources and strategic attention towards its traditionally hostile neighbours, an increasing military presence of the world’s two superpowers in bordering territory dramatically worsened China’s security environment.

On China’s eastern border, China was occupied with a sustained military standoff with Chinese Nationalists across the Taiwan Strait, as well as the hostile attitudes of Japan and South Korea.37 On China’s western border, India, who had fought a border war with China in 1962 and who was a tacit Soviet ally,

35 The reason why I argue that President Nixon was reliant on the support of elite opinion as opposed to public opinion in general, is because broader public opinion exists within the framework articulated and publicized by elite opinion (ie. the opinions of politicians, media personnel, and academics)36 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 27.37 Ibid., 27.

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forced China to continue to dedicate valuable military resources and strategic attention to its remote Western areas.38 More significantly, on China’s southern border, in response to the United States’ escalation of the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1967, China had provided Hanoi with increasing military support and dispatched a significant number of engineers and antiaircraft artillery personnel to North Vietnam.39 By 1968-1969, the expanded military involvement of both the United States and China in Vietnam heightened the risk of direct confrontation, bringing both powers closer to a Korean War scenario in which American and Chinese troops had been dragged into direct conflict.40 China’s largest border security threat emanated from its former ally, the Soviet Union, with whom Chinese relations had deteriorated over ideological divergence since the late 1950s.41 By the late 1960s, Sino-Soviet hostilities reached a tipping point; each side had amassed several hundred thousand troops along the Sino-Soviet border.42 In March 1969, the Sino-Soviet border region which, less than a decade prior, had been boasted as an area of “peace and eternal safety,”43 twice witnessed the breakout of open conflict between Soviet and Chinese border garrison forces on Zhenbao Island (referred to as Damansky Island in Russian).44 Then, on 13 August 1969, border clashes once again broke out between Soviet and Chinese garrisons, this time in Xinjiang.45

38 Ibid., 27-28.39 Ibid., 27.40 Ibid., 27.41 Ibid., 28.42 Ibid., 28.43 Ibid., 28.44 Ibid., 28.45 Xia, Yafeng. “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, Janu-ary 1969-February 1972.” Journal of Cold War Studies. 8.4 (2006): 7.

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Here, the Soviets obliterated an entire Chinese brigade.46 These major border clashes precipitated a deteriorating security situation along the Sino-Soviet border which, along with Chinese memories of the Soviet Union’s invasion of communist Czechoslovakia under the Brezhnev Doctrine47 a year earlier,48 invoked great fear among Chinese leaders about Soviet intentions.49 This was evident on 27 August 1969 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and Central Military Commission urgently ordered the set-up of a new “National Leading Group for the People’s Air Defence” under Zhou Enlai, and tasked the body with the immediate organization of a large-scale evacuation of citizens and major industry from large cities.50 The next day, the CCP Central Committee ordered a military mobilization in regions bordering the Soviet Union and Soviet-aligned Mongolia which hosted Soviet military forces.51

From 1968 to 1969, the increasing risk for Chinese confrontation with both international superpowers, the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union, combined with Chinese military preoccupation with its smaller hostile neighbours, stretched China’s military and strategic apparatus very thin. Not only were China’s commitments by 1969 likely unsustainable, but a further deterioration in China’s security situation would have made 46 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 33.47 The Brezhnev Doctrine stated that “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.”

Taranto, James. “Leonid Brezhnev Lives:The American left vows to defend the spoils of its revolutions.” Wall Street Journal 30 03 2012, n. pag. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303404704577313750705052134.html>.48 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 31.49 Xia, Yafeng. “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, Janu-ary 1969-February 1972.” Journal of Cold War Studies. 8.4 (2006): 7.50 Ibid., 7.51 Ibid., 7.

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it very difficult for China to maintain territorial integrity, especially with regards to the Soviet Union. Thus, it is clear that between 1968 and 1969, China faced a dramatic deterioration in its security environment.

It was in direct response to the increasingly hostile security context of 1968 to 1969 that Chairman Mao decided to assess new ways to enhance China’s national security environment. On 19 February 1969, approximately six months after the Soviet Union attacked communist Czechoslovakia, Mao ordered four veteran marshals- Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Ye Jianying- to devote greater attention to “studying international strategic issues.”52 Zhou Enlai explained that the aim of the four marshals’ initiative was to assist Mao and the Party leadership53 in “gaining an understanding of new strategic developments” in the world.54 Of course, what Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai sought was a clearer assessment of American and Soviet strategic interests and intentions. Notably, Zhou Enlai told the marshals “not to be restricted by the old frame of thinking” in their deliberations.55 The Chinese premier’s statement indicates that at this point in time, the Chinese leadership had begun to contemplate a possible reevaluation of China’s existing strategic outlook and foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and Soviet Union. Although the Chinese leadership commenced a strategic rethink in February 1969, the four marshals and the Chinese leadership only began to contemplate a rapprochement with the United States after the major Sino-Soviet border clash of August 1969,56 which marked a tipping point in Soviet hostility towards 52 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 31.53 Ibid., 31.54 Xia, Yafeng. “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, Janu-ary 1969-February 1972.” Journal of Cold War Studies. 8.4 (2006): 7.55 Ibid., 31.56 The August 13th border clash was a much more deadly border clash than the two at Zhenbao Island in March 1969.

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China. Neither of the marshals’ two reports from July 1969 (prior to the August 1969 border clash) made even the slightest reference to the possibility of improving Chinese relations with the United States. On 11 July 1969, the marshals submitted a comprehensive report titled, “A preliminary Evaluation of the War Situation,” to Chairman Mao and the CCP Central Committee. In it, the marshals argued that although both the United States and the Soviet Union regarded China as an enemy, they both saw “the real threat [as] the one existing between themselves.”57 Also, because the US and Soviet Union were facing both internal and external challenges, and the focus of their strategic confrontation existed in Europe (eg. Berlin), the marshals concluded that “it is unlikely that the US imperialists and Soviet revisionists will launch a large-scale war against China, either jointly or separately.”58 In this report, the marshals did not explore the prospect of adjusting Chinese foreign policy.59 Rather, in their July 29th report, the marshals discussed the prospect of holding border negotiations with the Soviet Union as a means of strengthening “our position in the struggle against America.”60

However, in the aftermath of the August 13th border clash in Xinjiang, the marshals had a drastic change of mind; they began to elude to the prospect of strengthening Chinese relations with the United States. The Xinjiang clash convinced the marshals that Beijing should prepare itself for a potential Soviet invasion.61 Within this context, Ye Jianying and Chen Yi proposed that in order to effectively prepare itself for a large-scale confrontation with the Soviet Union, China should play “the card of the United States.”62 Chen Yi also suggested that the Sino-

57 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 32.58 Ibid., 32.59 Ibid., 32.60 Ibid., 29.61 Ibid., 33.62 Ibid., 33.

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American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw should be resumed “when the timing is proper” and that China should “take the initiative in proposing to hold Sino-American talks at the ministerial or even higher levels, so that basic and related problems in Sino-American relations can be solved.”63 Thus, it is clear that Beijing’s re-evaluation of its strategic and foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union was motivated by the dramatic deterioration of China’s security environment between 1968 and 1969. However, the idea of a rapprochement with the United States only surfaced in response to the major border clash with the Soviet Union at Xinjiang because it was this clash that made the Soviet Union appear as a bigger and more immediate threat to the security of the People’s Republic of China than the United States. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that strategic factors, namely China’s security dynamic vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, constituted the primary motivation for Beijing’s pursuit of rapprochement with the United States.

So, although I agree with orthodox interpretations that present strategic concerns as the driving motivation behind China’s decision to seek rapprochement with the United States, the orthodox interpretation overlooks the key role played by ideology in making rapprochement possible. Ideology, or more precisely the modification of Mao’s anti-imperialist communist ideology, served as the mechanism through which China’s security interests could be translated into a viable foreign policy option. Mao’s anti-imperialist communist ideology was based in Vladimir Lenin’s definition of imperialism, which saw imperialism as the “highest stage” in the development of capitalism.”64 The United States, the leading capitalist country of the time, was thought to have reached the highest stage of capitalism due to its high economic development domestically and its attempts to expand its presence and influence abroad (eg. in Europe). Thus, according to Mao’s conception of communist ideology which advocated

63 Ibid., 33.64 Ibid., 29.

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struggle against the forces of imperialism, the United States was the prime target of China’s anti-imperialist efforts. For two decades since the founding of communist China in 1949, Beijing’s leaders had viewed the United States as China’s main enemy.65 Mao’s “continued revolution” (in the post-1949 era) had aimed to end the “old” world order (ie. capitalist world order) led by the ‘American imperialists.’66 The theme of “struggling against US imperialism” was often invoked by the CCP Central Committee in order to mobilize millions of Chinese to participate in Mao’s revolution, including the Cultural Revolution.67 Thus, under the existing Chinese anti-imperialist communist ideology, moves towards rapprochement with the United States appeared contradictory, and risked undermining the legitimacy of Mao’s revolution. Even though, as US intelligence claimed, by the late 1960s, Mao came to regard the Soviet Union as China’s primary security threat,68 the popular Chinese view, based in Mao’s anti-imperialist communist ideology, still regarded the United States as the primary enemy.69 It was only through a modification of Mao’s anti-imperialist communist ideology that Beijing could seek a cooperative relationship with the capitalist imperialist United States without undermining Mao’s revolution. So, Beijing’s leaders expanded the definition of imperialism to include “social-imperialism,” an activity attributed to the Soviet Union at the height of the Cultural Revolution (1967-69) and especially in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) under the Brezhnev Doctrine.70 This revision in anti-imperialist communist ideology allowed Chinese propaganda to slowly replace 65 Ibid., 28.66 Ibid., 28.67 Ibid., 28.68 Keylor, William. A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 273.69 Schulzinger, Robert. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 80.70 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 29.

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“US imperialism” with “Soviet social-imperialism” as the primary enemy of the global proletarian revolution. Once Beijing redefined imperialism, a change in the primary enemy of China’s proletarian revolution was justified by a traditional Chinese political culture, which advised “borrowing the strength of the barbarians to check the barbarians.”71 According to this logic, it was always appropriate to pursue a “united front” with a less dangerous adversary as a means of facilitating greater focus on the primary enemy.72 As Beijing now viewed the “social-imperialist” Soviet Union as the most dangerous of all imperialist countries, a rapprochement with the United States, a country now seen as relatively less dangerous, became ideologically justifiable, and thus a viable foreign policy option for Beijing.

Conclusion

Overall, traditional accounts of the Sino-American rapprochement are correct in their emphasis of strategic factors as the primary motivators of Sino-American rapprochement. The United States and China were brought together by a shifting balance of power whereby American military superiority relative to the Soviet Union had diminished, and China had transformed from a Soviet ally to a Soviet adversary who was vulnerable to Soviet military hostility.73 Within the aforementioned context, the United States sought to play the “China card” in pursuing detente with the Soviet Union, and use a cooperative relationship with China to pressure North Vietnam to come to the negotiating table with the United States.74 China, for its part, sought to leverage American military strength in order to balance Soviet

71 Ibid., 29.72 Ibid., 29.73 Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 2.74 Ibid., 3.

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power in Asia and, thus, deter Soviet aggression against China.75 Although the aforementioned strategic considerations did indeed constitute the primary reasons for ‘why’ the US and China sought rapprochement, strategic accounts fall short of explaining ‘how’ the pursuit of rapprochement for the aforementioned strategic ends became a viable foreign policy option in both Washington and Beijing at the time that it did.

Here, it is important to note that it was the transformation of dominant American and Chinese ideological conceptions of each other that legitimated rapprochement as a viable policy option in both Washington and Beijing. In the United States, the Sino-Soviet split forced political elites to rethink the ideological conception of China advanced by official American policy. By the late 1960s, shortly before Nixon entered office, a critical mass of elite opinion had shifted towards the view that Beijing represented a nationalist regime driven by domestic security interests rather than an ideological expansionist driven by communist revolutionary fervour.76 With this new ideological conception, China’s regime could no longer be seen as an inherent threat to the American-led capitalist post-war international order. Thus, the pursuit of Sino-American rapprochement became a legitimate foreign policy option for the Nixon administration. In China, Mao modified official Chinese anti-imperialist communist ideology, which defined imperialism as capitalism, to include “social-imperialism,” which he attributed to the Soviet Union.77 Because traditional Chinese political culture emphasized cooperating with a less dangerous enemy in order to focus on the primary enemy,78 Mao’s redefinition of anti-imperialist communist 75 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 33.76 Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 12, 19, 20, 31.77 Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 28-29.78 Ibid., 29.

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ideology allowed him to justify his pursuit of a united front with the capitalist United States against its old communist ally, the Soviet Union.

A primary reason for the significant emphasis placed on strategic motivations in the literature on the Sino-American rapprochement is that for a large part of the last several decades, the only authoritative texts on the Sino-American rapprochement were President Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s memoirs. Both of these men tended to view the international system and foreign policy through a relatively realist lens.79 It was only with the declassification of American government archives from the Nixon era that greater details regarding the rapprochement came to light.80 In recent years, limited Chinese archival documentation has also been made available to scholars.81 As more archival information is released in the years ahead, much more scholarly analysis will likely focus on factors other than strategic concerns in motivating the historic Sino-American rapprochement of 1969 to 1972.

79 Bell, Carol. The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era. London: Martin Robertson, 1977. 17.80 Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 6.81 Xia, Yafeng. “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapproche-ment, January 1969-February 1972.” Journal of Cold War Studies. 8.4 (2006): 3.

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Works Cited

Bell, Carol. The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era. London: Martin Robertson, 1977. Print. Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Print. Goh, Evelyn. “Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the US Opening to China, 1971-1974.” Diplomatic History. 29.3 (2005): 475-502. Web.

Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Print.

Keylor, William. A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print.

Koepke, Logan. “Determinants of US-China Normalization: How Congressional Actions and Influence Shaped the Normalization Process.” Yale Historical Review. (2013): 45-51. Web. 4 March.<http://www.yale.edu/yalehistoricalreview/The_Yale_Historical_Review/Current_Issuefiles/Determinants of U.S.-Chna Normalization.pdf>.

Schulzinger, Robert. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. Print.

Taranto, James. “Leonid Brezhnev Lives:The American left vows to defend the spoils of its revolutions..” Wall Street Journal 30 03 2012, n. pag. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303404704577313750705052134.html>.

Xia, Yafeng. “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 1969-February 1972.” Journal of Cold War Studies. 8.4 (2006): 3-28. Web.

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For the Truman administration, American foreign policy was the definition of a national security state. In the creation of such a state, one of the most noteworthy security documents was the National Security Coun-cil document 68, or NSC 68. A report in response to the Soviet Union’s attainment of the atomic bomb and the “loss” of China to communism, it became the foundation for American cold war policy at the dawn of the Korean War until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. The rhetorical force behind the militarization of the cold war was Paul H. Nitze, director of Policy Planning for the State Department from 1950 to 1953 and for-mer head of the United States Strategic Bomb Survey team.

Nitze used three principal excursive tactics: an implied apocalyptic narrative which warned Americans of the end to the Republic and free civilization; binary constructs of Soviet-American relations; and the exem-plification of America’s responsibility as the global police force for liberal

A Blank Check

NSC 68 and the Militarization of the Cold War

Haley O’Shaughnessy

Author: Haley O’Shaughnessy is a second year student studying History, American Studies, and Sexual Diversity Studies. Her academic interests include constitutional history, the intellectual and historical foundations of the cold war, and the impact of American militarism on gender and sexuality. Haley also volunteers for the Canadian Lesbian and Gay Archives and writes on her blog, Albertan in Toronto.

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democratic values. Such tactics, whether or not empirically legitimate, used the authority of history to accentuate continuity of tradition and purpose. This invented continuity demeaned third-way policy alternatives and po-larized public knowledge on the Soviet Union. In obscuring the past, the NSC 68 report placed America’s future foreign policy under the frame-work of unrestricted military resources.

To appreciate the context of this document, it is important to rec-ognize that the cold war was still new to the public. Although the Soviet Union and the United States were allies only five years prior, during World War Two, their relationship was based upon strategic necessity, with the-times of prewar non-interventionism and economic depression well within American memory. Moreover, before 1950, American Cold War strategy was chiefly economic and political. The Marshall Plan and subsequent re-structuring of the global economy were underway by 1947. In fact at the same time that NSC 68 was being drafted, Truman asked for a thirteen billion dollar decrease in military spending, citing the need to implement his “Fair Deal” domestic programs without a budget deficit.1 Although public anti-communism was certainly present during World War One and the interwar period, an aggressive and reactionary consensus had not yet been established in American foreign policy. For this reason, a dramatic shift of American strategy towards the Soviet Union – from wartime allies to polarized enemies within five years – would be have felt shocking, if not threatening, to the American public.

The NSC 68 authors posited the repercussions of deteriorating American-Soviet relations in the document, regarding the world in a state of urgent peril. The authors framed the consequences of American inaction in apocalyptic terms, as they remarked that the defence of the free world “will not wait our deliberations.”2 They encouraged the continuation of total war mentality by stating a proposed military buildup may require the American people to sacrifice some of the material benefits associated with their economic freedoms. Indeed, the call for national discipline in or-der to save “civilization” built upon propagandist narratives seen in World War Two. The main difference however, was that this time there would be no final victory in the greater pursuit of democracy; the postwar sacri-1 Ernest R. May, “Bedford Books in American History,” American War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, ed. Ernest R. May (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1993), vii. 2 US National Security Council, “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Pro-grams for National Security,” Truman Papers, April 14, 1950, 4 (corrected). http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf

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fice would be sustained and perhaps become perpetual. “For a free society there is never total victory, since freedom and democracy are never wholly attained…but defeat at the hands of the totalitarian is total defeat.”3

In Nitze’s persuasion for an immediate and militarized Ameri-can response to the threat of the Soviet Union, the document located its recommendations within historical tradition. In doing so, the principal di-lemma of American strategy was how to advocate for liberty while broad-ening the state’s capacity to pursue an interventionist foreign policy. Citing both the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence under Ameri-ca’s “fundamental purpose,” eighteenth century ideas of freedom were used to obscure NSC 68‘s break from past American policies of non-interven-tionism in peacetime. The NSC 68 outline of intensive militarization, of-ficial foreign alliances, expansionary federal budgets, and propaganda in the form of “information campaigns” was in stark contrast to the warn-ings against “entangling alliances” and “overgrown military establishments” made by George Washington in his Farewell Address.4 Nevertheless, NSC 68 sought a connection to the Founding Fathers as a means to validate a new, interventionist role for America in peacetime. This role was in fact a break from Washington’s conception of America as a ‘city upon a hill’ responsible to “light the path to peace and order” throughout the world on “the strength and appeal of its ideas.”5

NCS 68 relied upon binary constructs of the postwar world to help create this interventionist role for America The document consistent-ly uses the word we , placing readers in an “us” versus “them” perspective. This perspective was strengthened by the use of exclusive definitions and symbolism throughout the text. Opposing terms such as “freedom” and “slavery,” “good” and “evil,” dominated the cold war discourse and disabled third-way alternatives. Moreover, an “individual” and “mass” paradigm, by separating Russian individuals from the Bolshevik apparatus and their de-sire for freedom, personalized the cold war and made it identifiable with-in American historical tradition. In creating dichotomies like these, the authors of NSC 68 framed American interests in relation to the oppos-ing, subversive, and monolithic reality of the Soviet bloc.6 These binary

3 Ibid, 34. 4 US National Security Council, “NSC 68,” 23, and George Washington, “Washington’s Farewell Address 1796,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://ava-lon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp5 US National Security Council, “NSC 68,” 64.6 Ibid, 7.

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opposites stripped the world of human shading, relational modifications, and complexities, and forged a militant national consensus through the creation of a symbolic “other.”

The established rhetoric of American nationalism with good-evil dichotomies contrived policy “alternatives”. These included two straw op-tions of isolation and war,. one unacceptable choice of maintaining the sta-tus quo, and the obviously preferred solution of a rapid political, economic, and military buildup.7 In so doing, the authors deliberately avoided empir-ical estimations of cost for such a buildup despite their belief that it would be necessary. From a pragmatic standpoint, estimates would have recog-nized the necessary “deferment of certain desirable programs” which was a euphemism for the abandonment of Truman’s Fair Deal. Stalling domestic economic programs only a couple years after a disastrous 1946 Democratic congressional defeat , however, would not have convinced Truman to sign a blank check.8 Therefore, the document needed to reflect a time where budget deficits were a political consideration. In fact, upon Truman’s first reading, he asked economic advisors to review the proposed budget of the NSC 68 report before his approval.9

Certainly, Nitze’s binary justifications for a militarized stance against the Soviet Union had implications beyond Truman’s Fair Deal. In portraying Marxist-Leninist ideology as an instrument for world dom-ination, NSC 68took the burden of proof upon itself. Not surprisingly, however, NSC 68 revealed no Soviet master plan. The concept of a mas-ter plan is ignorant in itself, as it overlooks indigenous communism and the independence of communist nations apart from the Soviet Union. Si-no-Soviet relations exemplified this fact. Chinese and Soviet advisors, for example, were suspicious of each other, and Mao Zedong was reportedly frustrated by Stalin’s pull back on his reluctant commitment to Korea.10 Indeed, the Soviet Union was not as in control of worldwide communist agencies as was believed by the NSC 68 authors. Nevertheless, the belief that the Soviet Union commanded the North Korean attack contributed mightily to Truman’s signature of the report on September 30, 1950 and the subsequent militarized ‘police action’ of the cold war.11

7 Ibid, 44-54. 8 Ibid, 57.9 Ibid, 1. 10 Ernest R. May, American War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, 191.11 Ibid, 156.

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In defining the world order to the public, such beliefs had become conditional to perceived notions of the balance of power than what it ac-tually was. These perceptions were not just from state policy. They reflected mass opinions of the “red scare”: foreign or domestic, educated and unedu-cated, logical as well as illogical. Evaluations based on economic potential, military capability, and geography interrelated with its global status, image, and authority. The effect of promoting “information” to the public was to vastly increase the diversity of interests deemed relevant to national secu-rity and to blur divisions between them.

NSC 68 was the foundation for the militarization of the cold war that continued until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and argu-ably revived itself in the war on terror. It was also a profoundly flawed document. The international dealings it recommended demeaned the goals it was trying to accomplish. The expansion of the military coincided with the expansion of American security interests, with the agenda to secure the nation only making it more insecure. To frustrate Communist “design” would eventually mean to confront such a perception. Accordingly, to use Soviet “design” and American historical traditions as interventionist ratio-nale, the more reactionary the Soviet Union became in both its political and military strategy. Indeed, such notions questioned America’s interna-tional credibility as it fictionalized its policies at home and abroad. Among the increased legitimate Soviet threat and militarization of the American strategy, the world under NSC 68 became the world of James Bond and “Duck and Cover”.

Works Cited

May, Ernest. “Bedford Books in American History.” American War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68. Edited by Ernest R. May. Boston. Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press. 1993.

US National Security Council. “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.” Truman Papers. April 14, 1950. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/ coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf

Washington, George. “Washington’s Farewell Address 1796.” The Avalon Project. Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_centu ry/washing.asp

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Paul Collier’s The Bottom Billion attempts to improve our understanding of the causes of poverty in the bottom billion population and to advocate for globalization as a means of over-coming this isolation. While Collier claims to occupy a middle ground between the left wing opponents and right wing support-ers of globalization, this proves not to be the case given that he views the former group as being driven by passion, thus lacking the ability to critically evaluate empirical data without prejudice.1

1 This conclusion is derived from the assumption that he is referring to left wing opponents when he states that: “Politically motivated academics have piled in with their own hobbyhorses, which usually cast rebels as heroes?” (Collier, 18), “…people attracted to the academic study of conflict tend to be politically engaged and are sympathetic to

Navigating the Middle Ground

A Review of the Bottom Billion

Diana Jisun Lee

Author: Diana Jisun Lee is a second year student studying international development and economics. Her research looks at how the power relations of the international actors and their self interested driven development practices come together in undermining the political representation of developing countries. She is keen on learning about local capacity building practices such as microfinance, social entrepreneurship, and about the means of culturally appropriate development in practice.

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He further displays his perspective in the litany of examples that is meant to demonstrate that the conditions of poor nations today result from internal political and economical strife brought on by the personal greed of groups within respective nations. Showing poor governance by “bottom billion nations” in politics, resources, and resource governance leads the reader to conclude that the only means for these nations to escape their present realities is through globalization and its strict controls of which left wing opponents of globalization are highly critical. He is dismissive of any role that multinational companies play in perpetuating poverty in the global South. In fact, Collier explains their presence as being beneficial to these nations. In this respect, Collier does not tread a middle ground in his work.

According to Collier, slow economic and income growth are largely due to a government’s weak power, making it relatively easy for the rebels to mobilize and instigate a civil war (Collier 2007, 36)2. While he details the activities of different rebel lead-ers and their ambitions driven by greed (Collier 2007, 22-25)3, he completely ignores the lasting effects of colonialism on the present socio-economic and political conditions of these nations. Colonial-ism politicised and heightened ethnic differences, creating condi-tions that bred volatility and disorder, a fact left wing opponents of globalization do not ignore. European powers reversed any progress made before and during conquest, namely, with the destruction of pre-colonial civilizations causing the drastic decline in population, the exploitation of bullions resulting in inflation, the introduction of race superiority, and finally the emergence of a mixed blood

the acute grievances enunciated by various rebel movements, who often adopt extreme measures to oppose governments that indeed may be unsavory…people attracted to the academic study of conflict tend to be politically engaged and are sympathetic to the acute grievances enunciated by various rebel movements, who often adopt extreme measures to oppose governments that indeed may be unsavory” (Collier, 19).

2 “The two big risk factors are low income and low growth…”(Collier 2007, 21)3 Flagrant grievance is to a rebel movement what an image is to a business, gives cases of: Sierra Leone, Fiji, Somalia, Congo (Collier, 2007, 22-25)

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population 4 (Teichman 2013a). For Collier, the colonial history and the period of time since the decolonization of the particu-lar country have no relation to the risk of civil war. In portraying colonialism in this manner and going so far as to state that “during colonialism many countries experienced decades of enforced peace…” 5 (Collier 2007, 19), he shifts blame for the instability of these nations to internal forces, namely rebels. It would have been more reasonable for Collier to consider that both rebel activities and the effects of colonialism contribute to the present state of af-fairs in these developing countries. In respect to Collier portraying these nations as being incapable of maintaining order themselves, he leads the reader to conclude that these countries are in need of external intervention to bring about stability, as witnessed during colonialism. This type of intervention comes into conflict with Collier’s left wing opponents, whose work he labels as “hobbies”6 (Collier 2007, 27). For this group independence is important to the improvement of the Global South, something that Collier does not appear to agree with given his penchant for colonialism.

According to Collier’s scheme, civil wars are self-inflicted and are driven by the “flagrant grievance” of rebels whose sole pur-pose is to fulfil their ambitions for political gains and primary com-modity ownerships 7 (Collier 2007, 24). To demonstrate, Collier refers to numerous rebel groups including the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, and the Long March of the Chinese Revolution that deceive themselves about their goals. As well, he dismisses those joining rebel groups as being motivated by “a small chance

4 Teichman, Judith. 2013a. “Pre-colonial societies and the impact of coloniza-tion.” POLB90, Comparative Development in International Perspective. October 22, 2013.5 …during colonialism many countries experienced decades of enforced peace…” (Collier, 2007, 19)6 Collier sees the root causes of civil war such as income inequality, social injus-tice, authoritarian government ethnic discrimination as being the “hobbyhorse of the of the speaker” (Collier 2007, 27). 7 Deduced from the example of Sankoh, very strong rebel group in Sierra Leone, Sankoh did not want two power positions in athe country, and he made it “clear that his goal was to be in charge of the part of the government that managed Sierra Leone’s lucrative diamond concessions.” (Collier 2007, 25)

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of riches” 8 (Collier 2007, 20) without having any real concern for social justice.

The same disdain is not shown for the multinational companies who lobby the same rebels for the protection of their revenues by securing the mines and oil pumps. Multinational com-panies knowingly operate in corrupted political settings, but Collier does not reprimand their actions. In this way, both the rebels and the oil companies are one and same as they are both motivated by personal greed. Collier, though, does not see it in this way. As mul-tinational companies become richer through pressuring the politi-cal economy of the bottom billion countries, they also contribute to the instability of these nations. Their activities create social inequal-ity gaps among the local populations, denying the marginalized individuals’ their rights and restrict them from social mobility. It also prevents their freedom to achieve, against Sen’s human capa-bility development9 (Teichman 2013b) approach.

While multinationals are earning significant revenues stemming from the exploitation of raw materials and cheap labour, and also from lobbying the parties that protect its interests10 (Te-ichman, 2013c). People in the country are busy labouring earn-ing below average salaries, and languish under the weak, corrupt government. They try to extricate their situation by expressing their grievance and eventually igniting the civil war. According to Col-lier, the solution to escape from the conflict trap is through external military intervention with these forces remaining in place for a decade11 (Collier 2007, 177). While he details the external military intervention’s role in maintaining post-conflict peace and its contri-8 People join rebel movements for money. “Life itself is cheap, and joining a rebel movement gives these young people a small chance of riches” (Collier 2007, 20).9 Human Capabilities Approach, proposed by Amartya Sens defines one mea-surement of development. Capabilities denote a person’s opportunity and ability to gener-ate valuable outcomes, freedom to achieve to a person’s well being. (Teichman 2013b)10 MNCs get their power from their control of the most economic activity in the country, that is creation of jobs especially for the export processing zones, and from their enormous political clout with home governments(Teichman 2013b)11 “Since around half of all civil wars are post conflict relapses…Security in post conflict societies will normally require an external military presence for a long time” (Col-lier, 177).

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bution to development, with the example of Sierra Leone12 (Collier 2007, 128), he deliberately ignores the lasting effects of military interventions and subsequent neocolonialism impacting the in-digenous populations and governments of these bottom billion countries as outlined by left wing opponents of globalization. In return for the external security guarantee brokered by the Britain, the government of Sierra Leone, and the rebel group had to sign the Lome Peace Agreement, which obliges them to disarm, and to demobilize (Collier 2007, 177). While the Lome Peace Agreement was meant to usher in peace, the rebel group who had commit-ted many atrocities against the civilian population were forgiven13 (Abdul 1999, 30). Tension between the search for peace in Sierra Leone and the need for accountability for human rights abuses fervently sought after by left wing opponents of globalization. Be-ing dismissive about human rights provisions and the importance of sympathizing the civilians’ loss will bring anger and abhorrence toward the international community and foreign armies, thereby development and maintenance of peace through globalization may not be readily accepted. Under the terms of agreement, the govern-ment must rule by consent, and thereby during a decade of western forces present in the post-conflicted situation, international com-munity will do every means to create an enabling business environ-ment14 (Teichman, 2013c). Most of the great powers will decide an area or people are allowed to have elections, whether the elections are legitimate, when allowed, and when to send in the military. Affirming the globalization produces neo colonialism subsequently in which the politics and economics of bottom billion countries will be under the control exercised by globalization15 (Teichman, 2013a), starting with the military intervention. At the end of the day, multinational corporations will benefit and the sovereignty

12 Collier describes British intervention in Sierra Leone as an ideal case. 13 Committed crimes targeted marginalized people, including the rape of young girls, and murder of innocent civilians were never held accountable for their actions (Ab-dul 1999, 3)14 Promote domestic and foreign investment especially in mining, improve infra-structure, promote export (Teichman, 2013c)15 ìEconomic imperialism/neo colonialism: the continued control exercised by outside forces over the economies and politics of the Global South” (Teichman, 2013a)

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of the conflicted nations is lessened and they have to conform the Western government’s development agenda. By portraying the military intervention as “cheap, sustainable, and confident”16 (Col-lier 2007, 128), and he leads the readers to see it as only effective solution to low income, slow growth which are the ‘real’ causes of conflict trap in his belief.

Given that his premise is that a country at peace will have an improved economy, allowing the “bottom billion nations” to extricate from the risk of civil war encourages the reader to accept that market regulated governance is cardinal, and thereby econom-ic globalization must be embraced by these nations. Even though Collier acknowledges that the role of western banks in assisting the political corruption of the governments of bottom billion, he at the same time is quick to point at corrupt individuals, not the banking system (Collier 2007, 137). Central bank blindfolded the deposits corrupted political leaders in bottom billion make, and the brib-ery transaction between public political officials and multinational companies. For Finance ministry being the most powerful amongst other government ministries and that development ministry and left wing activists can’t order them what to do about it17 (Collier 2007, 178), so in order to transform the latent opposition into effective pressure, he makes the international charter appear as an effective instrument with which to berate poor governance and is laid out the standards that companies adhere to it18 (Collier 2007, 145).

He does not blame the international community for neglecting corrupt relations formed in Central Bank as a prob-lem because it will place the companies disadvantage in winning

16 It serves as a model for military intervention in the bottom billion: cheap, confident, and sustained. It was welcome, the people of the country were truly thankful. (Collier 2007, 128)17 “Expecting the development ministry to persuade the central bank to do some-thing about repatriating corrupt bank deposits is like expecting the general staff to adopt a battle plan drawn up by the catering crops” (Collier 2007, 178)18 “If there was an international charter on standards along the line s of five points laid out, NGOs could start to demand that companies adhere to it.” (Collier 2007, 145)

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contracts19 (Collier 2007, 137). While he admits that resource extraction and construction sectors are the worst offenders, he only details the corrupt in construction the sector. This can be construed as an attempt to cover up the lack of infrastructure and minimizing spending on infrastructures in Africa because of ‘dirty secret’20 (Collier 2007, 138), for the concern of undermining governance and corruption. Also Collier tries to make the readers think that bribery, and the repatriated corrupted deposits made by the multinational companies is a part of economic development21 (Teichman, 2013c), and in larger context, a way to lift the bottom billion out of poverty. As mentioned, the natural resource extract companies’ bribery in purpose for freely exploiting its raw materials and the consequences were not discussed in the book, and claiming in fact the bribery is beneficial to the bottom billion countries. For example, in Collier’s scheme, when addressing the issue of extract-ing diamonds, by introducing the smart technology…”to be smug-gled”22 (Collier 2007, 144), De Beer’s radical change was imple-menting new smart technology. This technology and the diamond certificate system in fact protect De Beers in monopolizing the diamond market, but it still does not address the problem that De Beers engaged with corrupt government.

Although Collier claims to be in middle ground, his bias are shown through case selection that are meant to demonstrate that the languished conditions of bottom billions today result from their poor governance. He delivers detailed descriptions on corruption of rebel leaders, the poor governance of bottom billion

19 “No Western government wanted to force its companies to behave properly because there was a reasonable fear that this would disadvantage its companies in winning contracts.” (Collier 2007, 137)20 “By contrast, corruption in the construction sector has been a dirty secret- a crooked construction company colludes with public official to win the contract with an artificially low bid, but they reconstruct on points of detail that crop out during colonial-ism”. (Collier 2007 138)21 Because foreign exchange earnings are gained by the MNCs, the government makes best measures for the MNCs (Teichman, 2013c)22 De Beers is promoting a new smart-card technology that can be used to make it far harder for alluvial diamonds dug up from riverbeds by individual prospectors, to be smuggled. (Collier 2007, 144)

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countries, yet he does not acknowledge the role that multinational corporations play in contributing to the activities of rebel groups. As well, Collier is dismissive about the colonial history of the bot-tom billion countries that have been weakened as a result. Further-more, he belittles how the world order and operations of MNCs are also a substantial part of the traps. While Collier acknowledges that globalization has not worked out for the bottom billion na-tions because of the four traps they are stuck in, he impresses upon the reader to conclude that globalization they will overcome these traps.

Works Cited

Abdul, Tejan-Cole. “Painful peace: Amnesty under the Lome Peace Agreement in Sierra Leone.” Law, Democracy & Development 3 (1999): 1-15. Print.

Collier, Paul. “The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done about it.” Oxford University Press (2007): 209. Print.

Teichman, Judith. 2013a. “Pre-colonial societies and the impact of colonization.” POLB90, Comparative Development in Interna-tional Perspective. October 22, 2013.

Teichman, Judith. 2013b. “Modernization.” POLB90, Comparative Development in International Perspective. September 23, 2013.

Teichman, Judith. 2013c. “Multinational Corporations.” POLB90, Comparative Development in International Perspective. December 12, 2013.

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The economics of recovery are vital to understanding any downturn. The Great Depression of the late 1920’s and early 1930’s is no exception. There have been varying assessments of the origin of the Great Depression. Along with these have come assessments of how economies, and in the case of this paper, the United States, recovered from the slump. Ultimately, those who have analyzed the causes of the downturn have perceived remedies that could have fixed the initial problem. It is, however, widely accepted that in the US the abandonment of the Gold Standard system of foreign exchange was a pivotal turning point in the nation’s recovery. The gold standard, once seen as the pinnacle of economic stability, is now highly regarded by economic historians as a bane to economic growth. There are however variances in opinion as to the extent to which the US’s abandonment of gold re-inflated the economy. These variances reflect differing opinions

Intentional or Accidental? Recovery from the Great Depression in the

United States

Carson Smulders

Author: Carson Smulders is a fourth year student studying International Relations and History at Trinity College.

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as to the causes of the depression, falling in line with both the monetarists, and those who believe that real factors played a larger role. What many economic historians have failed to touch upon directly however, is whether the policies initiating economic recovery in the US were clear cut, pre-meditated decisions to lift the economy out of the slump or accidental in nature. This is an important consideration given that the response to the 2008 crisis was borne out of reactions to the Great Depression in the 1930’s. If for any reason that the recovery in 1930’s was in part accidental, or an unintended consequence of other policies put in place to stem the bleeding, then policies to enact a full recovery of the US may or may not have unintended positive or negative effects on the economy in the future. This paper will argue that ultimately the nature of the economic recovery of the US in the 1930’s was, in part, due to unintentional consequences of other policies put in place in an attempt to limit the contraction, and exogenous reactions to decisions that may not have occurred under certain political and economic environments. This is not to say that all of the recovery was accidental and in fact a large part of the recovery was due to intentional policy decisions. However, this paper will demonstrate that the increase in the money supply which followed the abandonment of the Gold Standard was initially not foreseen by policy makers and initiated in large part by capital flight from Europe in the growing fear of continental conflict. Furthermore, it will show that certain policies such as the New Deal Stimulus had unintended effects upon recovery through its ability to allow monetary stimulus have an effect on real interest rates. Along with the unintended positive effects on the economy, this paper will also argue that certain policy decisions had unintentional negative effects on the economy which in turn led to the sluggish nature of the recovery. Primarily, this played out through the New Deal regulations such as the National Industrial Recovery Act which limited the ability of wages to adjust properly in order to increase output and employment.

This paper will address how the initial recovery occurred

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according to the entrenched view of economic historians. It is recognized that many disagree on the strength of the recovery, with many economists agreeing that expansionary monetary policy alone, exogenous of real factors in the economy could have lifted the US back to its pre Depression output trend. This summation of the original recovery will cover the abandonment of the Gold Standard in the US. This strategy was crucial to economic recovery because it allowed for exogenous monetary effects on the US economy to take root and began to re-inflate the economy. Following this will be an explanation how the re-inflation of the economy, due to the abandonment of the gold standard, would have done little without the huge inflows of gold from Europe which increased the money supply. This would have been an unforeseeable, and therefore somewhat accidental, positive effect on recovery. Also, changing expectations due to New Deal policies, rather than the original goal of increasing employment, contributed to the transmission mechanism. This mechanism allows for money supply increases to lower interest rates . On the unintentional negative side of the recovery, the paper will address the concept of sticky wages, in part a consequence of policy decisions which hoped, at one point, to increase consumption. This paper will rely on the work of other prominent economic historians in order to effectively demonstrate the unintentional consequences which affected of the nature of the recovery.

Understanding the Initial Recovery

The concept of the international trilemma is crucial in understanding the developments regarding economic recovery in the US in 1933. This “impossible trinity” simply states that a country can only have two of fixed exchange rates, capital mobility, and unrestricted monetary policy. In the case of the US during the Great Depression, the economy had both fixed exchange rates and capital mobility but as a result monetary policy was not under compete control of policy makers. Monetary policy was ultimately at the whims of maintaining the gold standard. During 1928, the

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US, in reaction to a possible stock market bubble, started to raise interest rates. The subsequent outflow of gold from Europe into the US threatened European exchange-rates, and therefore forced the European countries to raise their interest rates. (Eichengreen 1996). Economies were being smothered by their own attempts at maintain gold. In order to recover from the Depression, as will be demonstrated, the ability to actively control monetary policy is crucial in an economic recovery.

Evidence strongly suggests that economic recovery was correlated with countries leaving the Gold Standard. Eichengreen and Sachs, in their influential paper on exchange rates and there effect on international recovery, demonstrate that there is a negative correlation between the level of the exchange rate in 1935 compared to 1929 levels and economic recovery (1985 p.936). They note that the countries of the Gold Bloc, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium had been unable to restore their pre-slump levels of industrial production. (Eichengreen Sachs 1985 p.936). On the other hand, countries such as the UK and Denmark expanded much more rapidly after their turn away from gold. The UK, which was operating at 41% depreciation in 1935 had grown its industrial production by over 10% from 1929 to 1935 (Eichengreen Sachs 1985 p.936). In contrast, France in 1935 was still pegged to gold and its industrial production suffered an almost 30 percent decline. It is quite evident that the abandonment of the gold standard was a crucial factor in any recovery.

The abandonment of the gold standard was so important because it changed the landscape of the impossible trinity. The US left gold on April 19th 1922 and almost immediately the US had the ability to enact expansionary monetary policy and re-inflate the economy. An expansion in the money supply, originally argued by Friedman and Schwartz to be a crucial factor in the downturn was feasible and the ability to lower interest rates and promote investment and consumption could take place without threatening the fixed exchange system (1973)

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Immediately following the devaluation of the dollar on April 19th 1933, the stock market quickly rebounded followed by an increase in investment. (Eichengreen 1996 p. 342). However, recovery was not ensured at this point in time. In fact, consumption suffered from sticky wages, which meant that the eventual inflation would hurt the employed because prices were still high (Eichengreen 1996 p.342). The US, also did not experience an expansion in trade as would be expected from cheaper exports. According to Eichengreen in Golden Fetters, exporters expected continued depreciation and therefore held off from selling their goods abroad (1996 p.343). Importers did the exact opposite and sold their goods in order to avoid being hit by further depreciation. (1996 p.343). Therefore, initially, the abandonment of the gold standard had little effect in lifting the US out of a slump. In order to understand why, it is imperative to grasp the monetary realities following the depreciation of the dollar.

According to Eichengreen, output initially jumped in expectations of increased monetary policy. However it quickly slid when the realization that the Federal Reserve was doing little to expand the money supply (Eichengreen 1996 p.342). Although minute buybacks of securities occurred, it did little to alleviate the situation (Eichengreen 1996 p.342). The devalued dollar did not, in fact, lead to increase demand because the absence of credit rendered demand useless. (Eichengreen 1996 p.342). What then increased the money supply and slowed stagnation? Ultimately it was a massive flow of gold from Europe to the United States. As Christina Romer recognizes, this inflow of gold was due to political instability on the continent and panic based outflows of capital (1992 p.774). What is exceptional is the realization that the US did not consciously increase its money supply through open market operations by the Federal reserve. This has been linked to fears of inflation that lingered in policy makers minds as specters from the early 1920’s. Whether or not, the Federal Reserve, in absence of capital inflow from Europe would have initiated expansionary

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monetary policy is up for debate. This is an important consideration for the recovery of the US as it implies that policy-makers were still unsure of how to re-inflate the economy after leaving the Gold Standard.

The effect of this large import of foreign gold, as mentioned played a prominent part in raising the money supply. The M1 money supply in fact increased by 27% from late 1933 to late 1936 (Romer 1992 p.775) However, if prices and wages had risen equally, there would have been little to no pressure on nominal interest rates (Romer 1992 p.775). In a traditional transmission mechanism, an increase in the money supply decreases nominal interest rates. This in turn fosters expectations of future inflation and therefore a decrease in real interest rates sparking investment and growth (Romer 1992 p.775). The key to this transmission mechanism is the expectation of future inflation. Romer notes that, due to the fact that nominal rates were already low at during 1933, that only the fear of future inflation could have enabled a fall in real rates (1992 p. 775) Luckily, for this transmission mechanism, the expectations of inflation were something fairly familiar to the public in the early 1930’s. After a period of hyper-inflation in Germany and to some extent France in the 1920’s, the mental image of inflation would no doubt have been quite vivid in people’s minds. It will be demonstrated how expectations of inflation were also due to unintentional consequences of the New Deal later in the paper. Romer shows that the inevitable fall in the real interest rate demonstrated a negative relationship with both fixed investment, consumer expenditures on durable goods, and the re-ignition of construction contracts. (1992 p.779, 780). For Romer, these monetary developments were the saving grace for the US economy. According to Crafts and Fearon however, this analysis is incomplete without an explanation on how the United States escaped the liquidity trap (2010 p.304). They conclude with a a paper by Temin and Wigmore that the event of leaving gold signaled to the nation that the period of intense deflation had ended (2010 p.304). Furthermore Eggertson suggests that even

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though it is accepted that the New Deal had little to no positive supply side shocks, the policies put in place further suggested that the period of deflation had ended, therefore spurring economic recovery (2008 p.1476)

Unintended causes of Recovery

The developments in the increase of the money supply and its transmission mechanism suggest that in some ways recovery was unintentional. As is evident the Federal Reserve did not pursue its own aggressive open market monetary policies. Instead, it failed to increase the money supply endogenously. This is supported by Eichengreen who noted that,

In fact, Bloomfield suggests that, “[t]he growing threat of a European war created fears of seizure or destruction of wealth by the enemy, imposition of exchange restrictions, oppressive war taxation. Huge volumes of funds were consequently transferred in panic to the United States from Western European countries likely to be involved in such a conflict.” (1950 quoted in Romer 1992 p.773). Consequently, the political developments in Europe which saw gold rushing into the United States would have undoubtedly had the opposite effect on the domestic level. Clearly, the expectation of political instability would have made investments in Europe quite unattractive, thereby stemming capital outflow from the US. Therefore the increase in the money supply was due in a large part to exogenous factors outside of US policy makers control. Monetary expansion in the US was still feared because of the perceived repercussions of inflation ( Eichengreen 1996 p.347). As evidence for this, Eichengreen notes the large amount

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of excess reserves in banks which were held in order to limit the chance of excess inflation. (1996 p.347). Accordingly, Eichengreen supports the idea that the Treasury could have printed 3 billion dollars without breaking existing gold cover restrictions (1996 p.346). This passivity would ultimately limit the potential recovery. This suggests that in terms of increasing the money supply endogenously US policy makers had little idea of how much they really had to work with without inducing a highly inflationary environment. Romer suggests that, “it is possible to conclude that independent monetary developments account for the bulk of the recovery form the Great Depression in the United States.” (Romer 1992 p.774) The question remains as to whether or not the US would have increased the money supply endogenously in absence of these gold inflows. For the money supply increase to be effective, a transmission mechanism needed to be in place in order to have an effect on interest rates. The New Deal unintentionally assisted in making this mechanism work. The New Deal, now vastly regarded by economic historians as having a negative effect on the economy in part by artificially raising wages, actually had an unintentional positive affect on the economy. The concept of the New Deal suggests that a Keynesian fiscal stimulus would have an effect on the economy by affecting aggregate demand. As mentioned, this did not turn out to be the case. Nicholas Crafts and Peter Fearon suggest that with Roosevelt’s New Deal, among other things, suggested to the public that there would be a major change in inflationary expectations (2010 p.304) Eggertson referred to Roosevelt’s rise to power as well as some of the actions he took in office as ‘regime change.’ (2008) Eggertson uses a model to demonstrate the effect of a regime change. Crafts and Fearon suggest that this model, which estimated that the recovery in the US due largely in part to regime change, makes the New Deal important for recovery. This, however, was not because of its attempted fiscal stimulus (2010 p. 304) As Romer notes, for the transmission mechanism to be successful, a change in expected

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inflation needed to occur (1992 p.775 ). Crafts and Fearon agree by concluding that in part because of the New Deal spending, it amounted to policy which enabled a massive shift in inflationary expectations and lowered real interest rates (2010 p. 304). Therefore, due in part to unintentional consequences, the New Deal helped to spur economic recovery by changing expectations about the future Although these unintended, and perhaps accidental factors helped to spur economic growth, it is important to consider that many policies had unintended negative effects on the economy. As noted earlier, the failure of the Federal Reserve to increase the money supply played a role in limiting the recovery. Fears of inflation had a detrimental effect on stimulating growth. The active decision by the Federal Reserve, despite pressure from Roosevelt to not increase the money supply by printing money left the US facing a sluggish recovery. More importantly perhaps, was the unintended consequence of New Deal policies. The policies were meant to raise wages in order to increase consumption spending. The most prominent of these was the implementation of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Bordo, Erceg, and Evans explore this aspect of sticky wages. They conclude through model simulations that following the increase in the money supply, the economy should have recovered much more than in did in the absence of NIRA policies (2000). Importantly, real wages needed to fall substantially due to the large decline in capital stock during the depths of the Depression. (Bordo et. Al 2000 p.1460). The NIRA ultimately impeded with the equilibrium mechanism in place, which required wages to fall (Bordo et al 2000 p.1461). Therefore, although the NIRA, intended to initially alleviate employment woes it in fact had a debilitating effect on economic recovery and contributed to its sluggishness.

There are undoubtedly counter arguments to the thesis that at least in part, the nature of the the recovery in the United States was unintentional. The most prominent counter assessment

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to this argument is offered by Temin and Wigmore in their paper on regime change (1990) . They argue that the dollar’s devaluation was the largest sign suggesting that the deflationary tendencies of the Gold Standard had ended. This caused a change in expectations about economic reflation by suggesting that prices would undoubtedly go up in the future. (1990 p. 483). They state that Roosevelt parted from the ideology of the Gold Standard that had plagued Hoover by, “devaluing the dollar within 6 weeks of inauguration, promoting fiscal expansion, and championing the virtues of inflation.” (Temin and Wigmore 1990). Although this regime change undoubtedly played a part in recovery, it is important to remember that the dollars devaluation would have done little in the absence of the monetary expansion caused by gold inflows from Europe. Romer does note that following the gold inflows from Europe, the administration could have chosen to actively sterilize these gold inflows and that the decision to not sterilize gold coming in from abroad was an active policy decision based on Roosevelt’s belief that it would have an inflationary effect on the economy (1992). It would be hard to dispute this, however, Roosevelt’s attempts to persuade the Federal Reserve into printing money seemed futile following devaluation (Eichengreen 1996 p.343). The consequence of this is that recovery from the Depression may have began and lasted longer due to the inevitable battle that would have occurred over a cry to print money. This would have spurred on fears of 1920’s style inflation. Therefore, even despite a change in regime which led to the abandonment of the gold standard, the fate of recovery would undoubtedly have been altered without the unintended consequences of exogenous forces.

What does this mean for the economic recovery of 2008? Clearly, policy makers in 2008 faced a different set of circumstances than those in the 1930’s. Primarily, their actions were not constrained by the Gold Standard. The Federal Reserve was able to pursue open market activities in order to stem the extent of the slump. This coupled with a large fiscal stimulus have seemingly

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prevented the US from falling into a protracted and drawn out economic slump. However, it should be noted, as evident in this analysis, that both outside political considerations and domestic policy decisions can have both positive and negative effects on the outcome of any economic recovery. Just as the Great Depression has shaped the decisions made in the Great Recession, it is hoped that decisions made in the Great Recession will have a positive impact on any future downturn.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to address how the nature of the US recovery was in some respect due to unintentional positive and negative factors. First of all, despite actively leaving the Gold Standard, there is reason to believe, due to the Fed’s inability to raise the money supply endogenously, that the increase in M1 because of gold inflows from Europe was unforeseeable and therefore somewhat accidental. Secondly, the transmission mechanism which allowed for the money supply increase to affect the real interest rates worked because of the unintentional effect of the New Deal which signaled that the period of deflation, and ultimately upward changes in price were bound to occur. Thirdly, the unintentional nature of legislation such as the NIRA to increase consumption through higher wages had the impact of lowering the ability of the labor market to reach equilibrium. This had the affect of elongating the period of unemployment experienced by the US as well as stemming the strength of the initial recovery. It is important to note in the conclusion that the decision to leave the Gold Standard was instrumental in recovery, however certain unintentional developments help to explain the nature of the sluggish revival.

Works Cited

Bordo, Michael D. et al. “Money, Sticky Wages, and the Great

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Depression.” The American Economic Review. Vol. 90, No. 5: 2000 p1447-1463

Crafts, Nicholas and Fearon, Peter. “Lessons from the 1930’s Great Depression.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Vol 26, No. 3: 2010 p. 285-317

Eggertson, Gauti B. “Great Expectations and the End of the Depression.” the American Economic Review. Vol. 98, No. 4: 2008 p. 1476-1516

Eichengreen, Barry. Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939. Oxford Scholarship Online: 2003

Eichengreen, Barry and Sachs, Jeffrey. “Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930’s.” The Journal of Economic History. Vol. 45, No.4: 1985 p. 925-946

Friedman, M. and Schwartz, Anna. A Monetary History of the United States1867-1960. Princeton University Press. 1963

Romer, Christina D. “What Ended the Great Depression?” The Journal of Economic History. Vol. 52, No. 4: 1992 p. 757-784

Temin, Peter and Wigmore, Barry A. “The End of One Big Deflation.” Explorations in Economic History. Vol. 27: 1990 p. 483-502