The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force

The AU in Sudan:Lessons for the African Standby Force

International Peace Academy

Catherine Guicherd, Rapporteur March 2007

The International Peace Academy (IPA) is an independent, international institution dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of

armed conflicts between and within states through policy research and development.

IPA initiated its Africa Program in 1992 to draw attention to the particular issues surrounding Africa’s conflicts and provide research and

analytical support to efforts at political and economic transformation. Some 15 years later, the program remains a vital bridge between the

United Nations (UN) and African organizations and leaders. The Africa Program gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the

Governments of Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the family of Ruth Forbes Young; and the Ford

Foundation. Additional support is received from IPA’s core funders, including the Governments of Denmark and Sweden.

This report stems from the discussions held among more than fifty senior police and military officers from African countries and partner

nations and organizations at a seminar in Accra, Ghana from 10-12 October 2006. The seminar aimed to help shape the way forward for the

establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF), the African Union’s flagship program for the development of its peacekeeping capacity.

It was organized by the International Peace Academy and hosted by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC),

one of Africa’s leading centers of excellence in training and education for peace support operations. The discussions benefited from the

active involvement of several former and serving senior Ghanaian diplomats and military officers. The event was generously supported by

the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada.

Cover Photo: AMIS officer and troops in North Darfur. ©Refugees International.

The views expressed in this paper represent those captured by the rapporteur during the meeting and not necessarily those of IPA. IPA

welcomes consideration of a wide range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in interna-

tional affairs.

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Abbreviations i

Summary of Recommendations 1

Introduction 2

Planning 4

Mission Structures and Command and Control (C2) 5

Mission Field StructureMission C2

Managing Relations with Third Parties 11

Host Country and Local ActorsHumanitarian ActorsWestern PartnersThe United Nations

Logistics 16

Communications and Information Systems 18

Mission Staffing and Training 18

Job Definitions and RanksSenior LeadershipPolice ComponentSpecialist Domains of ExpertiseCivilian and Expert HiringLanguage

AU Multidimensional Missions: What Level of Ambitions? 21

Strategic Level Ambitions and AU-UN SynergiesOperational Level Ambitions and StandardsMobilizing the AU Commission as a WholeIncreasing AU-RECs SynergiesThe Need for High-level Engagement of Member States

Annex I 25Annex II 27Annex III 27List of Participants 28

CONTENTS

Abbreviations

The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force

i

APCs Armored Personnel Carriers

APSA African Peace and Security Architecture

ASF African Standby Force

AU African Union

C2 Command and Control

C_IS Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems

CEWS Continental Early Warning System

CFC Ceasefire Commission

CIMIC Civil-military Coordination

CIS Communications and Information Systems

CISSA Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa

CIVCOM Civilian Committee

CIVPOL Civilian Police

COE Contingent-Owned Equipment

CONOPs Concept of Operations

CT Country Team (UN)

DDR Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration

DITF Darfur Integrated Task Force

DPA (I) Darfur Peace Agreement

DPA (II) Department of Political Affairs (UN)

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

DSS Department of Safety and Security (UN)

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States

ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

EUMC European Union Military Committee

EUMS European Union Military Staff

GoS Government of Sudan

HCFA Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement

HoM Head of Mission

HQs Headquarters

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IDP Internally-displaced Person

IFIs International Financial Institutions

IPA International Peace Academy

JLOC Joint Logistics Operations Centre

JOC Joint Operations Centre

KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

LG Liaison Group

MAPEX Map Exercise

MILOBs Military Observers

MSC Military Staff Committee (MSC)

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PCRD Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development

PSC Peace and Security Council (AU)

PSC Peace and Security Committee (EU)

PSOs Peace Support Operations

PSOD Peace Support Operations Division (AU)

PTSG Partners’ Technical Support Group

RECs Regional Economic Communities

SADC Southern African Development Community

SML Senior Mission Leaders

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement

SOMA Status of Mission Agreement

SOPs Standard Operating Procedures

SRCC Special Representative of the Chairman of the Commission (AU)

SSR Security Sector Reform

TCC Troop Contributing Country

ToR Terms of Reference

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan

Summary of RecommendationsIn 2003, African Chiefs of Defense Staff began workon setting up the African Standby Force (ASF), a keycomponent of the African Union’s (AU) “AfricanPeace and Security Architecture” (APSA). Muchprogress has been made at the conceptual level duringPhase I of the work plan (2005-2006). As Phase IIbegins, the experience of the African Mission inSudan (AMIS) offers useful lessons that should be builtinto ASF development.This experience demonstrates,first, that determined action will be required from avariety of stakeholders if the AU is to be able torespond effectively to challenges of the magnitude andcomplexity of the Darfur conflict. Second, the AMISexperience raises the question of the level of ambi-tions of the ASF: can and should the AU undertakemissions of such magnitude and complexity, and if so,what would be a realistic sequencing to move towardthat goal? What would be a meaningful division oflabor with partners, in particular the United Nations(UN) in this context?

The recommendations summarized below derivefrom an October 2006 exchange of experiencesamong some 50 military, police, and civilian represen-tatives from African and partner nations/organizationswho have directly participated in, or supported AMIS.Recommendations (a) to (c) elaborate on the politicalimplications of the AMIS experience and point to theneed for a fundamental conceptual and politicaldebate on the level of ambitions of the AU and itsrelations to the UN. Recommendations (d) to (t) aremore directly based on that experience itself asreflected at the seminar, and on the assumption thatthe AU would want to reiterate multidimensionalmissions of the size of AMIS. The observations andanalysis underpinning all recommendations aredeveloped in the ensuing report.

1.To the AU and the UN jointly :

a) The AU needs to define precisely its level ofambitions in terms of multidimensionalmissions.This requires the coordination ofcurrent work on the ASF and the Frameworkfor Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Develop-ment (PCRD) within the AU and furthercoordination with the UN in the context of theUN “10-year Action Plan” to support thedevelopment of African Peace SupportOperations (PSO) capacity;

b) In this context, it is recommended that theAU seek in a first stage to reach a capacity tocarry out “minimally multidimensionalmissions,” without aiming for full integration of

all potential components of PSOs; existingfunctional competencies of the UN, its agencies,and associated bodies (World Bank, IMF)should be duly taken into account.Consequently in many PSO and post-conflictareas, the AU should seek to acquire a capacityto provide strategic guidance, liaise, andinteract, but not to implement;

c) Assumptions about UN assistance underpin-ning the ASF Policy Framework should bechecked with a view to sustainability. AUmember states may have to examine alternativecourses of action, including an increased Africancontribution and a major diplomatic engage-ment with large UN financial contributors tomake possible direct financial assistance to ASFdeployments.

2.To AU Member States :

d) National capitals of AU member states mustengage in ASF work at the highest politicallevel. If it is to succeed in tackling complexcrises, the ASF cannot be left only to functionalexperts and/or the military;

e) Member states will have to revisit the APSAstructures endorsed in 2002 in order to ensurethat the Peace and Security Council (PSC) canreceive guidance from bodies endowed withexpertise encompassing key components andinteractions of future ASF missions, particularlypolicing;

f) The ASF Policy Framework should be up-dated, and ASF documents reviewed, to specifythe requirements for the police and civiliancomponents of missions at the tactical,operational, and strategic levels; and also tosequence their incorporation according to avariety of multidimensional ASF missionscenarios;

g) As PSO are becoming a permanent featureof the AU’s agenda, member states have toreview the size, composition, and workingmethods of their representations in Addis toensure that the AU Secretariat is supported by asolid body of expertise in all the dimensionsintended for ASF missions;

h) Each AU member state should review thecurriculum of its military and police trainingprograms, in particular at the senior level, inorder to reflect the multidimensionality andliaison functions of modern PSOs;

i) Over time, the AU and the RECs should seekto reduce their technical and financial depend-ence on partners by (i) increasing Africa’s ownfinancial efforts for PSOs; (ii) increasing Africanpeacekeepers’ capacity in technical areas in

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which African expertise is insufficient for therequirements of modern PSOs (contracting,communications, medical, aviation, fuel andmobility management, etc.).There will be no“African ownership” without a degree of self-sustainment.

3. To the AU Secretariat and Regional EconomicCommunities (REC)s :

j) The AU Peace Support Operations Division(PSOD) should be endowed with the capacityto plan, and lead on the conduct of ASFdeployments at the strategic level; AU memberstates should actively support this reinforce-ment, taking advantage of the experienceaccumulated by the Darfur Integrated TaskForce (DITF);

k) Appropriate linkages should be establishedbetween the PSOD and other divisions anddepartments of the AU Commission so as tofacilitate synergies in support of ASF deploy-ments; this includes not only other divisions inthe Peace and Security Department but also thePolitical Department; the Social Affairs andEconomic Affairs Departments; theProgramming, Budgeting, Finance andAccounting, as well as Administration andHuman Resources Development Departments;

l) Training and education, beginning with thesenior leadership level, must reflect, at best, therequirements of multidimensionality of ASFmissions and, at minimum, their interactionwith a large range of humanitarian and otheractors;

m) The ASF Doctrine needs to be clarified asregards the chain of command for ASFoperations, including when operations areconducted by the RECs, and additional work isrequired on the development of the operationallevel command, in terms of SOPs, andcommand and control relationships between thetactical, operational, and strategic levels;

n) Studies planned during Phase II of ASFdevelopment on the requirements for Logisticsand Command, Control, Communication, andInformation Systems (C_IS) should be informedby a detailed analysis of the AMIS experiencein those areas.

4. To the RECs :

o) regular consultations with the PSOD; RECsoffices in Addis should be staffed with a rangeof expertise reflecting the functional scope of

the cooperation in PSOs envisaged betweeneach REC and the AU.

5. To International Partners :

p) International partners have a shared responsi-bility with the AU to ensure that the develop-ment of the ASF is guided by sustainabilityconcerns;

q) Partners have a responsibility to anticipatethe impact of their political discourse on ASFmissions;

r) As the AU undertakes Phase II ASF develop-ment work on logistics, partners shouldcritically examine their experience in providinglogistics support to AMIS in view of improvingformat, timeliness, coordination, andpredictability;

s) Current partner coordination mechanisms inAddis should be retained and partners shouldmake full use of those mechanisms in order toavoid gaps and complications in AU manage-ment of partners’ assistance;

t) Particular attention should be given to thecoordination of EU and UN assistance efforts,the EU being the single main provider offinancial support, and the UN the key technicalstandard setter for AU operations; all effortsshould be made to avoid mismatches betweenresource allocation and technical advice.

Introduction1. Over the past three years, Peace Support Operations(PSOs) have become a major area of endeavor for theAfrican Union (AU) and its member states. AUmonitors started arriving in Darfur in June 2004, in aprelude to a much larger deployment of peacekeepersin October of that year and the near doubling of theforce by the following summer. By early 2006, theAfrican Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had almost 6000military and 1500 police in the field.1 Stepping intothe Darfur conflict was a bold step reflecting the AU’spolitical determination to follow through on itscommitment to non-indifference to intra-stateconflicts on the continent. In May 2003, AfricanChiefs of Defense Staff endorsed a “Policy Frameworkfor the Establishment of the African Standby Force(ASF),” later refined and complemented by aRoadmap for the development of the ASF (March2005). With the completion of seven of the ASF

1 For details on the deployment of AMIS, see the chronology in Annex I.

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Workshops2 and their harmonization in October2006, Phase I of the Roadmap is coming to an end.

2. The two strands, however—the operational and theconceptual—have interacted only informally, andthere is little sign that the experience of AMIS inDarfur has been used to inform ASF work.This leavesan important gap in the process for several reasons:

• ASF development has been primarily militarily-driven, whereas the experience of AMISdemonstrates that PSOs can be complexendeavors, also requiring the contribution ofpolice and civilian experts, and recourse topolitical decision-makers;

• The ASF Workshops have focused largely onthe tactical level of PSOs, whereas, as AMISshows, PSOs cannot succeed without properplanning and guidance at strategic andoperational levels;

• Over the duration of AMIS, fundamental lessonsrelating to planning, command and controlstructures, and logistic support have beenidentified by various actors, including AMISmilitary and police contingent leaders and

partners.These lessons would be lost for ASFdevelopment if not drawn upon quickly.

3. The main weaknesses of AMIS appeared to lie inthe following fields:

• A lack of planning in the initial stages of themission and insufficient remedial action takento develop planning capacity in the course ofthe mission;

• The lack of clarity in the mission structure atthe field level, and the inadequacy of thatstructure for the purpose of managing theinteraction between the military, police andcivilian components of what quickly became amultidimensional mission;

• Weaknesses in strategic management capacity,encompassing both the AU Secretariat andmember states’ advisory bodies;

• The absence of effective mechanisms foroperational level management;

• The lack of tools and know-how to handle therelations of the mission with a variety ofexternal actors, including local communities, theGovernment of Sudan (GoS), external partners

2 Five original Workshops on Doctrine, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Logistics, Command, Control, Communication and InformationSystems (C_IS), and Training and Evaluation; additional Workshops on Legal aspects, Medical, the Civilian Dimension, and a Workshop on Financeplanned for January 2007.

Seminar participants in front of the main conference center at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

6. The lack of planning has had a number of negativeconsequences, many of which continue to affect themission:

• Lack of clarity about the division of laborbetween different components, e.g., the policeand military observers, or Civil-MilitaryCoordination (CIMIC) and Humanitarian andHuman Rights Officers; insufficient mutualinformation; and a lack of mechanisms toachieve coherence;

• Lack of agreement on mission structures at fieldlevel (see para. 11-15);

• Particular difficulties affecting the policecomponent (Civilian police or CIVPOL);CIVPOL was a late addition to the mission(October 2004), had difficulty establishing itsrole in a pre-existing structure, and sufferedfrom a lack of logistic support;

• Deployments being driven by logistics, ratherthan by mission objectives, e.g., CIVPOL wasunable to co-locate with camps of InternallyDisplaced Persons (IDPs), as originally foreseen,as there was no accommodation or protectionavailable; deployment of CIVPOL wasdetermined by availability of support from themilitary component, rather than by theirConcept of Operations (CONOPs);

• Insufficient guidance from the top, which leftmuch space for the blossoming of personal andnational rivalries, to the detriment of overallaims;

• The inadequacy of the mandate and the toolsto fulfill it (logistics, communication andinformation systems, intelligence), due to thelack of a proper pre-deployment assessment—several seminar participants noted the manydifficulties involved in the rapid transition froman observer to a PSO mission (lack of prepared-ness, lack of acceptance of some localcommunities);

• Gaps in the Status of Mission Agreement(SOMA), which did not cover the CIVPOL,and delays in signing the Status of ForcesAgreement (SOFA), resulting in peacekeepersbeing deployed without proper legal cover;

• More broadly, the inability to anticipate some ofthe difficulties later created by the GoS, whichlimited the capacity of the mission to carry outits mandate, e.g., the ability of the police tomonitor and verify, or to carry out trainingactivities of the GoS police;

• The absence of benchmarks, with the

and agencies;

• Insufficient logistic support and ability tomanage logistics;

• Insufficient capacity in the key area ofcommunication and information systems,compounded by unclear reporting lines fromthe field to the AU Secretariat;

• Problems in force generation and personnelmanagement;

• A quasi-total dependence on external partnersto finance the mission, and over-dependence onpartners’ technical advice, with attendantconstraints, delays, and political ambiguities.

4.This report aims to provide a detailed presentationand analysis of the weaknesses listed above, and tomake a series of recommendations intended to assistthe development of the ASF.

Planning5. In the words of one of the seminar participants,“AMIS was never planned: it just happened.” It isgenerally accepted that the AMIS deployment as ofAMIS II (October 2004) was put together in a rushbecause of political imperatives and that there waslittle time for proper planning. Staff, whether military,police or civilian, were given minimal guidance; andstrategic level goals were not clearly articulated. TheSpecial Representative of the Chairman of theCommission (SRCC), responsible for overall coordi-nation of the mission, was nominated several monthsinto the operation. Logistics constraints also had amajor impact on the pace and format of the deploy-ment.This was due largely to the fact that there wasno structure for strategic guidance in place when themission was initially launched in May-June 2004: theAU PSOD had hardly been formed at the time andthe DITF was only created in January 2005.The gapwas bridged by a fluctuating planning team that didhave some African members, but was “partner heavy.”Later, successive changes were made in the mandatewithout proper examination of the availability ofresources or agreement with partners.The fact that themission deployed at all, and was able to expand from aforce of less than 400 to over 7000 in a short time, isa credit to the AU. But the consequence was that thesetting of goals, the integration of police, civilian andmilitary planning, the sequencing of deployment, theprovision of logistic support, and the overall coherentdevelopment of the mission tended to be allundermined.

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consequence that commanders and missionleaders have been unable to know whether theyhad reached their goals;

• Lack of clarity on the role of internationalpartners and what they could contribute to themission financially, in-kind and via technicalassistance; and this further prevented AMIS atthe strategic level to communicate a clearmessage to field actors on this role, leading to adegree of mistrust that durably hamperedcooperation.

9. Lessons to be drawn include the following:

a) A proper planning process is necessary, based on asolid assessment, which enables the mission to takeinto account the situation on the ground, includingcultural, political, and institutional features of the hostpopulation and government, and, if necessary, regionaldifferences within the host country;

b)The planning process needs to be multidimensionalfrom the beginning, reflecting the complexity antici-pated for the mission (i.e., involving, as required,political, military, police, civilian, and humanitarian

representatives), as well as taking into considerationkey outside players, particularly national authorities,UN agencies, major donors, and the internationalfinancial institutions (IFIs);

c) Under the assumption that in the short to mediumterm ASF deployments will be heavily supported bypartners, they need to be involved early in theplanning, so that a clear and transparent agreementcan be found between them and the AU on howresources will be sourced and distributed to match thestrategic aims;

d) Particular attention needs to be paid to the policecomponent of the ASF.This is a lesson not only fromAMIS but from about every PSO carried out by theUN, the EU, NATO, and various coalitions in thepast 15 years, who have systematically had to step upthe police components of their operations;

e) There is an urgent need to build the capacity of theAU PSOD to plan missions and to enhance itscapacity to support mission strategic management(the latter is addressed in more detail at para. 16-18);

f) Planning should begin prior to the formalmandating of a mission, so that political decisions onthe shape and ambition of deployments are informedby a realistic assessment of what is achievable givenconditions on the ground and available resources.This, however, requires that AU financial provisionsfor PSOs include a “pre-mandate commitmentauthority” allowing the Secretariat to begin planningmissions ahead of mandate adoption;3

g)Mission leaders—political, military, police—shouldbe chosen as early as possible to be able to participatein the planning of the mission that they will have toimplement;

h) Validation exercises should, as much as possible, beincorporated into the planning for ASF missions;

i) The AU (and the RECs) should develop thecapacity to undertake contingency planning to coverpotential mission scenarios so that subsequentplanning can be more effective once a particularoperation is being launched or if planning assump-tions change in the course of the mission.This wouldpreserve the comparative advantage in rapid deploy-ment demonstrated by African missions, while at thesame time improving preparation.

Mission Structures and Commandand Control (C2)10. AMIS command and control structures were, andcontinue to be, problematic.The two main issues are

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3 This was recommended for UN operations by the Brahimi report in 2000 and implemented in the form of a $50 million Pre-mandate CommitmentAuthority granted to the UN Secretary General.The arrangement has significantly improved the planning and deployment of UN missions.

Aide-mémoire: A Few KeyCharacteristics of Planning• A properly developed plan states the mission’s objectives

and how it seeks to achieve them. The plan does notpreclude changes in the mission level of ambitions, scope,tasks, structure, etc., as the situation develops, but itensures that such changes result from a consciousdecision made at the top, clearly articulated and communi-cated to all those concerned, and consequently acceptedby them, rather than those changes occurring by default.Default changes are a dangerous path to “mission creep.”

• Planning includes benchmarks, i.e., elements that allowcommanders and mission leaders at various levels toassess whether they are making progress in achieving theaims of the mission in particular areas or overall. In theabsence of benchmarks, it is impossible to rate success.

• Planning makes the distinction clear between componentsthat are integral to the mission, and should be channeledtoward a common effort, and external elements with whichparticular relationships have to be established (e.g., thenational government and local authorities, the interna-tional financial institutions, non-governmental organiza-tions, etc.). For the ASF, it should also clarify the role ofbilateral and multilateral partners (UN, EU, Westernnations, etc.) which will presumably be assisting AUmissions for the foreseeable future; this will also make iteasier to explain the role of partners to field staff.

one, the structure of the field presence and therelationship of the military with the othercomponents of the mission in the field; and two, theweakness of the strategic level guidance setup,negatively impacting on the Secretariat’s ability todirect the mission and to establish the proper connec-tions between the political process and the PSO.

Mission Field Structure

11. In any country as large and as lacking in infrastruc-ture as Sudan, any mission would be notoriouslydifficult to organize. AMIS recognized—althoughbelatedly—the imperative of a solid presence inKhartoum, in order to keep lines of communicationsopen with a particularly uncooperative host govern-

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ment. At the same time, it faced the difficulty ofexercising effective command and control at theoperational and tactical level in a territory almost thesize of France. Juggling between these two require-ments led to the stationing of the Force Commanderand the Police Commissioner in the Forward HQ(formerly Force HQ) at El Fashir, while the Head ofMission (HoM) was shuttling between the MissionHeadquarters in Khartoum and Addis. Combinedwith the lack of planning, this arrangement hasprevented the proper integration of decisions at theoperational level.

• Lessons from AMIS demonstrate the impor-tance of a strong integrated operational levelHQ, endowed with an appropriate politicalcomponent, in future ASF missions.Thematter must be put on the ASF developmentagenda and appropriately elaborated in theASF Doctrine.

12. One of the key misunderstandings between themilitary and the rest of the mission has revolvedaround the concept of a Joint Operations Centre(JOC) and, to a lesser extent, of a Joint LogisticsOperations Centre (JLOC). The creation of both aJOC and a JLOC was recommended by the twotechnical assessment missions of March and December2005, as well as by the MAPEX (Map Exercise) whichpreceded the reinforcement of AMIS in August 2005.4

However, by autumn 2006 the JLOC was just aboutfunctional, while the JOC still was not. The creationof a JOC met strong resistance from successive ForceCommanders, who have seen it as a tool to deprivethem of their control of the mission and its assets tothe benefit of the senior political leadership in thefield and the police.While more keen on the concept,the police staff has also expressed misgivings, fearingthat a JOC might somehow subordinate it to themilitary component. In the absence of clear politicalbacking at the strategic level, the HoM, and hispolitical Deputy in the field, have been unable toimpose the joint structure on AMIS officers. Thelatter, it has to be recognized, were exposed to theconcept of a JOC for the first time.

13. Several problems have arisen concerning therelationship between the different components of themission. Many of these problems, but not all, arerelated to the role and place of the police. Forexample, there was a degree of overlap between some

4 Joint technical assessment missions of March and December 2005, and UN-AU technical assessment mission of June 2006.

A Few Benefits of Planning inGeneral:• It supports a long term approach in which all elements

focus on their part in the achievement of the strategicobjective, thereby helping to ensure that the causes ofconflicts are addressed as well as immediate symptoms.

• It helps to avoid gross mismatches between the ends andthe means of missions.

• Provided it is accompanied by a solid field assessment, ithelps to avoid basing the mission on the wrong assump-tions regarding the behavior of local actors and govern-ments.

• It helps to establish clear lines of accountability, i.e., statesclearly who is responsible for what, avoiding unsolicitedinitiatives from staff as well as key gaps in decision-making and action.

• It protects the mission against the vagaries of personal,national, or political preferences, which may detract fromthe mission aims, be detrimental to the quality of its work,and possibly lead to resentment.

And a Couple Benefits ofIntegrated Planning inParticular:• It enables, and, to a large extent, compels political

decision-makers to define what they mean by the successof the mission beyond the simple military component,looking at a long term perspective of security and stability.Generally, it is wrong for the military to seek an “exitstrategy” independently of whether other aims of themission have been achieved or not.

• It greatly facilitates the integrated conduct of operations.

of the roles of CIVPOL and the Military Observers(MILOBs), e.g., in the monitoring of developmentsand investigations of certain incidents. In addition, theabsence of the police from the Ceasefire Commission(CFC) remains a lasting source of dysfunction—butnot an easy one to remedy, as this would implyrenegotiating the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement(HCFA).5 Furthermore, there was no undisputedauthority to arbitrate resource allocation or re-alloca-tion in response to needs, and the CIVPOL often sawthemselves as the “poor parent” of the military in anenvironment of scarce resources (e.g., for mobility orcommunications). Moreover, no systematic effortswere made to prevent “grey zones” appearing in thecoverage of the mission, e.g., at times when rebelcontrolled-zones were no-go areas for CIVPOL,while IDP camps were no-go areas for militarycomponents. Occasionally, police and military reportshave offered conflicting accounts of single incidents,leaving the DITF at a loss on what course of action torecommend. Yet another area of conflict was thedecision to place the position of the PoliceCommissioner on an equal level with that of theForce Commander who has authority over a muchlarger contingent and has a sizeable park of militaryhardware under his control.

14. Relations between the CFC and the ProtectionForce were a further area of contention at field level,with grievances on both sides and relations growingincreasingly tense as AMIS was enhanced. At thebeginning, the Vice-Chairman of the CFC (a jobentrusted to an EU partner) was authorized to guidethe conduct of MILOBs patrols in the Sectors; butafter the first enhancement of AMIS in October 2004provided for a stronger role for the Protection Force,the Force Commander requested and obtainedcommand of the MILOBs. The decision wasappropriate but its consequences not properly antici-pated. As a result, the CFC appeared more and moreas a parallel operation to that of the military and laterCIVPOL, and the CFC felt sidelined. Conversely, asMILOBs were first on the ground, they were calledto staff the Field HQ, a role for which many membersof the Protection Force deemed them unsuited. Inthe absence of an agreed structure at the field level,with clear lines of authority to the HoM, there wasno process to ensure coordination or resolve disputes.This led to several types of weaknesses: a decrease ofmotivation of aggrieved CFC personnel and theconsequent loss of a vital tool for the mission; an

inadequately manned Field HQ; and the lack of amechanism to coordinate CFC and CIVPOL activi-ties. Such a mechanism would have, among others,permitted the screening of complaints, separatingceasefire violations falling under CFC remit fromcriminal issues relevant to CIVPOL competence.

15. Steps that could be taken to avoid contention overthe structures and lines of authority at field level infuture ASF missions include the following:

a) The creation of clear generic modalities for theestablishment and operations of the JOC, JLOC,as well as a Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) inthe ASF Doctrine and Standard OperatingProcedures (SOPs), with a view to facilitatingefforts of future ASF missions toward a commongoal; these generic modalities could then befurther detailed according to the specific needs ofeach mission;

b) As soon as it is anticipated that a mission willhave more than just a military component, a JOC,a JLOC, and a JMAC should be included as keycomponents of field level structure of the mission.This can help to avoid the need to reviewstructures in mid-course and to preclude resist-ance to integration from components with vestedinterests in keeping their autonomy;

c) The early nomination of the HoM is alsoimportant. In principle, the HoM could be eithermilitary or civilian, but as most missions willrequire serious engagement in political anddiplomatic mediation/negotiation, the HoMshould in most cases be a civilian well-equippedwith the required skills;

d) SOPs specifying delegations of authority invarious branches of the mission can help to avoidgaps in decision-making during absences ofcommanding officers and personnel;

e) An intensive program of integrated training formission leaders which could be inspired from theUN Senior Mission Leaders (SML) model shouldbe instituted. Such training should be tailored tothe needs of the ASF but could be delivered in ageneric manner, once the AU has identified apool of suitable candidates among potential futuremission leaders, and in any case, prior to any newdeployment;

f) Efforts by each AU member state to emphasizethe multidimensionality of modern PSOs and theneed for integrated efforts in the curricula ofnational military and police training programs, inparticular at the senior level.

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5 See chronology in annex on the origins of the CFC.

Mission C2

16. Command and control (C2) of a PSO, and therelationship between the strategic, operational andtactical levels of the mission is always a difficult issue.Traditional military operations, usually under nationalC2, have a relatively strict definition of the role ofeach level and precise SOPs to direct relationsbetween them. This is not so in PSOs, which areusually multinational, increasingly multidimensional,and require a much more sophisticated horizontal(across the different actors involved, some of themnational, others supranational) and vertical (strategic,operational, tactical) articulation of decision-making.Different models are possible (see box). Two overallrequirements need to be met for a multidimensionalPSO to be effective: structures that are mandated andequipped for direction at the strategic level; and clarityon the relationships between the strategic andoperational levels. One of the main weaknesses ofAMIS is that none of its possible centers of directionand guidance have been strong.

17. The DITF does provide elements of strategic leveldirection to the mission, but the set-up has had twoweaknesses. The first stemmed from the fact thatDITF action has been insufficiently linked to thepolitical level management of the Darfur crisis (Abujaand other negotiations). The consequence has beenthe inability of AMIS to anticipate the consequencesof political developments, with a recurrent negative

impact on the mission. Examples cited at the seminarincluded the worsening of the conditions of access ofthe police, AMIS Humanitarian / Human Rightsofficers, and, to some extent, humanitarian agencies, toIDP camps after the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)(5 May 2006), as non-signatories associated AMISwith an agreement to which they were hostile; and afurther deterioration of the situation after the AUdecided to expel the non-signatories from the CFC inAugust. Similarly, participants described how the morethe PSC signaled its willingness to allow for a UNtransition, the more uncooperative the GoS became,with a detrimental impact on the mission’s day-to-daylife (political signals coming from some Westerncapitals did not make matters easier). Finally, theystressed repeatedly the misunderstandings that aroseout of the fact that AMIS was originally deployed asan observer mission, as this is all that was acceptable tothe GoS. However, it went on to carry out PSO tasksas of October 2004, armed with a much largermilitary contingent and a new police force endowedwith intrusive powers, without the basic “contract”being renegotiated.This explains much of the obstruc-tion of the GoS.The main lesson to learn here is thata disconnect between the political process and thepeace operation is not sustainable, since, at best, itwastes opportunities for synergies between thepolitical effort and the deployment, and at worst, itundermines the role of the peacekeepers and putstheir physical security in danger.

18. The Special Representative of the Chairman ofthe Commission had overall responsibility over themission; however, his role in the Abujamediations/negotiations was rather limited.That rolewas played by a Special Envoy and the AU MediationTeam, but also largely discharged at times byindividual AU member states/leaders, and at times(although much more briefly) by partners. TheMediation Team itself lacked preparedness andcohesion. Given the political complexity of the Abujanegotiations, the SRCC could not possibly have ledthem and run the mission simultaneously. In that light,one may have to review the definition of the SRCC’srole as currently envisaged in the Draft PolicyFramework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. Atpresent it would seem to put an unbearable burden onthe shoulders of the SRCC in situations with thecomplexity of Darfur by entrusting him/her with theresponsibility for both the mission and the politicalnegotiation.6 Should the mission and the political

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The Benefits of a Well-Functioning Integrated Structureat Field Level• Ensures the concurrence of efforts of all components of

the mission toward a single goal

• Facilitates decision-making on the allocation of resourcesacross the different components of the mission (in partic-ular rare resources like mobility assets) and their shiftingin response to gradual or sudden changes on the ground

• Provides a locus for resolving conflicting interpretations ofevents on the ground, ensuring that a single, unifiedmessage is relayed to the strategic level

• Encourages synergies between the police and militaryeffort and facilitate military support to the police (protec-tion) when this is needed (particularly in crisis situations),as well as make it possible, as necessary, for onecomponent to compensate the operational limits of theother

6 The document reads, “The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) has the overall responsibility for the

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Different Models of Command andControl (C2) in PSOsUnited NationsC2 arrangements for UN missions are idiosyncratic and have beenbuilt up in the course of the rather organic development of UNpeacekeeping over the years. Only recently have more systematicefforts been made to improve UN missions’ C2. In practice, theabsence of an immediately available capacity at the operational andtactical levels of missions causes a blurring of the distinction betweenthem, to the detriment of effective C2. This can be compounded ifstrategic guidance is unclear or weak, a problem that tends to result inthe concentration of control at the operational level under thedirection of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, whois also the Head of Mission (HoM). Clear guidance has been issued inthe past few years (most recently in December 2005) to ensure thecohesion of the mission under the authority of the HoM, and in therevised Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) endorsed by theSecretary General in June 2006.

UN member states in the form of national representations to NewYork have little involvement in the planning of UN missions, althoughthe Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has made aneffort over the past few years to involve presumed Troop ContributingCountries (TCCs) at an early stage. Many Western nations consider C2arrangements for UN missions unsatisfactory, partly explaining theirreluctance to contribute to such missions. The establishment of aStrategic Cell within DPKO in the context of the reinforced UNoperation in Lebanon over the Summer of 2006 is a novel developmentpartly aimed at mitigating the lack of C2 at the strategic level.

European Union The EU has put in place sui generis arrangements for the C2 ofmissions, reflecting its aims, resources, and what the consensus of themember states can bear. The EU has a fairly strong structure forstrategic level decision-making: at the top, the Council of Ministersapproves Crisis Managements Concepts and CONOPs, and formallyappoints the HQ and Operations Commander (no mission has beencomprehensive enough at this stage to require the appointment of apolitical Head of Mission). The Political and Security Committee (PSC)exercises the strategic control and political guidance on a daily basis.The PSC receives advice from the EU Military Committee (EUMC) forthe military component of operations (itself advised by the MilitaryStaff (EUMS)), and the Civilian Committee (CIVCOM) for the civiliancomponent (including police). Both the EUMC and the CIVCOM arecomposed of representatives of all member states, facilitating closepolitical follow-up of missions at the strategic level.

Unlike NATO and the UN, the EU does not have a standing commandor planning structure. The EU tailors its chain of command to therequirements of the mission, using either an arrangement with NATO(a complex formula called “Berlin Plus”) or one of the five declarednational Operations HQs that can be multi-nationalized forautonomous EU Operations. The former is the case for the current EUAlthea mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina, the latter for EUFOR DRCongo (election support to the UN), where the HQ is provided byGermany and the mission co-led by France and Germany. A new CivMilCell will facilitate coordination of strategic planning for integrated (civ-mil) crisis response. It will have at its disposal a small OperationsCentre facility that can be rapidly augmented with 90 trained staff,should EU member states decide that this could help plan and run aparticular operation.

NATONATO has a strong structure for strategic level decision-making in theform of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which receives advice formilitary operations from the Military Committee (MC). The MC iscomposed of representatives of all member states; on the strategiclevel, this ensures the close follow-up during missions with respect tothe military while the NAC maintains political oversight. The NAC-approved direction and guidance for a mission is then forwarded toSupreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) which is NATO'sstrategic command. SHAPE, along with one of the three operationallevel Joint (Forces) Commands, carries out the planning and executionof the mission. NATO nations provide the actual forces for the mission.These forces are subdivided into component commands (Land, Air andMaritime) operating most often under a lead nation at the tactical level.

There are similarities between the NATO and the AU-envisagedstructures. For example, the AU PSC exercises a similar role to theNAC’s and NATO’s MC serves a similar function to the AU's MSC. Inaddition, like the NATO Joint Commands, the RECs or lead nations areexpected to carry out the operational level planning and execution ofmissions in some scenarios. However, the description above makes itclear that NATO is tooled for the strategic and operational planningand C2 of military, rather than multidimensional missions. For its part,the AU lacks a SHAPE equivalent, i.e., the structure to turn a politicalrequirement into an operational plan at the strategic level.

African Experience So Far and Future Concepts African multilateral operations have been carried out in a variety offormats, but none of them had clearly predetermined SOPs forstrategic planning and operational conduct. ECOMOG operations inLiberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s were actually “coalitions of thewilling” under ECOWAS auspices and Nigerian leadership. As anorganization, ECOWAS had neither an undisputed legitimacy among itsmembers, nor the planning capacity to conduct the missions. Therewas no political Head of Mission in either Liberia or Sierra Leone. Inthose conditions, the forces obeyed more directly instructions fromtheir national capitals, than either the Force Commander himself or acentral ECOWAS political/military strategic guidance. From thisperspective, the 2003 ECOWAS deployment in Côte d’Ivoirerepresented clear progress as it directly derived from the organiza-tion’s engagement in the mediation of the conflict. The first AU multilat-eral operation, AMIB, in Burundi (2003), was largely conducted in alead nation format, whereby South Africa led both the military planningand operational conduct of the mission, while political direction fromthe AU was conveyed by an SRCC. In neither of those deploymentswas the financial burden clearly apportioned, with the result that thosecountries that carried the bulk of the operations also bore a large partof the costs, the remainder being covered by external partners.

The ASF Policy Framework is largely based on the premise that theRegional Economic Communities (RECs) will provide the planning andoperational HQs of ASF operations, with the PLANELM in Addis actingas the center of gravity for strategic planning and the Peace andSecurity Council (PSC) giving strategic guidance. It also foresees theuse of the “lead nation” option for Scenario 6 (intervention) of ASFoperations. However, at this point, whether in REC-led missions or leadnation arrangements, the ASF Doctrine does not yet clearly distinguishresponsibilities between the strategic and operational levels inpolitical or military terms. In addition, ASF documents are short ofspecifics on financing arrangements in either case. It has to beremembered that EU and NATO operations are largely financed underthe “costs lie where they fall” rule, whereby each country covers thecosts of its own deployment.

management remain distinct, on the other hand, thisputs the onus on the AU Secretariat to ensure aseamless flow of information and communicationbetween the direction of the mission (DITF andSRCC) and its other components constituting themediation team. This is likely to require work atseveral levels:

a) The constitution of a strategic level manage-ment capacity, endowed with the necessaryexpertise, know-how, and the leadership abilityand authority to direct complex missions.The AUPSOD should constitute the core of this capacity,in addition to its planning function;

b) AU Secretariat bodies should be reinforced andstructured to assist the AU leadership (Presidentof the Commission, Special Representatives,Mediators) in conflict mediation/negotiations inorder both to be less dependent on member statesin such endeavors and to provide them with thecoordinated staff support and expertise they needas they take the lead;7

c) Cohesive strategic direction requires thatprocedures to organize the division of labor andcommunication flows must be put in placebetween the AU PSOD and the mediation teamto allow seamless communication and coordina-tion every time there is a parallel PSO andpolitical effort;

d) The assumption of the Draft Policy Frameworkfor the Civilian Dimension of the ASF should bereviewed in order to re-dimension the responsi-bility of the Special Representative of theChairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) inpeace processes accompanying ASF missions.

19. The second set of weaknesses is of a moreoperational nature, partly linked to the staffing of theDITF and partly to the lack of clarity of the rules(SOPs) spelling out the respective roles of the DITFand the Mission and Forward HQs in the field.This islargely due to the pressure under which the missionhad to be deployed with no time to define arrange-ments, and the fact that the DITF was only formedsome seven months into the mission. Consequenceshave been multi-faceted: First, military commanders,who had been deployed earlier, have set their ownpatterns of C2 at the field level and resisted receivingdirection from a higher authority. Commanders foundit particularly difficult to respond to guidance

communicated from civilians and/or more juniorofficials coming from the strategic level. Second, adhoc decisions were made on both sides with insuffi-cient consultations, for example the DITF issuedguidance for the drafting of logistics contracts withoutsufficiently taking into account the need for protec-tion of the field; conversely, military and policecommanders made up procedures that did notnecessarily correspond to the integration sought bythe DITF. In regard to staffing, one major gap has beenthe absence of a DITF’s own Chief of Staff (CoS) whocould translate political requirements into operationalobjectives.The dual-hatted Head of the UN AssistanceCell has done an outstanding job but cannot have thesame leeway as an AU-nominated CoS. The AUshould recruit an individual of equivalent stature towhom knowledge could be transferred to establish ahome grown capacity over the long term.

20. The need for clear “rules of the road” at theoperational and tactical level is well articulated in ASFWorkshop documents. However, it is less clear that thesame applies to the strategic level and its relationshipto the operational level.The experience of AMIS leadsto these recommendations:

a) The ASF Doctrine be clarified as regards theAU chain of command, and further work be done

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implementation of the mandate of the mission.This implies responsibility for the AU’s role in the peace process, as well as responsibility for the overallmanagement and integration of the PSO” (para. 31).

7 Close working relations should be established with the UN Secretariat’s new Mediation Support Unit whose task, precisely, is to become a reposi-tory of best practice in matters of mediation and negotiations.

PSO / Diplomatic Efforts: IsThere a Good Division of Labor?The straightforward answer is “no.” The structure of the UNSecretariat, for example, has evolved by iterations, leading,in the early 1990s, to the distinction between the Departmentof Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (DPKO). In theory, DPA is respon-sible for “political” work and DPKO for “operational”engagement. In practice, the distinction is less clear, withDPKO often engaged in political work at the mission level. Arecent attempt to bridge the gap between DPA and DPKO isthe creation of the “Policy Committee” under the directionof the Secretary General (the Committee also includes theheads of other Departments).

National governments are facing the same type ofproblem, rendered even more complex by the expansion ofcabinets surrounding the top leaders in several countries.This creates an additional requirement for division of laborand coordination.

on the development of the operational level ofcommand as well as its relationship with thestrategic level via clear SOPs;

b) Particular efforts be made in training allcomponents of the mission in strategic andoperational level SOPs so that all understand andaccept agreed lines of C2.The difficult culturaladjustment this represents for militarycommanders should be recognized and givenparticular attention in training programs;

c) In addition, the AU should groom a fewindividuals of equivalent stature to the currentDITF acting Chief of Staff to play that role infuture ASF missions.

21. Another key problem resides in the lack of consul-tative bodies to advise the AU at the strategic level.The Military Staff Committee (MSC), the onlyadvisory body legally provided by the DurbanProtocol,8 is not competent to guide DITF work andPSC decisions beyond the military realm. Severalseminar participants stressed that it was no longeracceptable for decisions on AMIS police deploymentsto be made on the basis of advice from the MSC, aswas the case, for example, in April 2005, when thePSC decided that police should be deployed not onlyin zones under GoS control, but also under rebel

control. In addition, even existing bodies do not havethe necessary strength.At present, less than half of AUmember states have military advisers in Addis, withonly a handful of those fully active, meaning that, inpractice, the DITF draws its advice from no more thantwo or three countries among the 15 constituting thePSC at a particular time. Police advisory capacity iseven more insignificant, and capacity to advise onmore specific areas such as rule of law, DDR, andSSR, which are key in conflict and post-conflictmanagement, is even more wanting. National capitalshave to face the need for remedial action urgently—amajor task which will require political will, resources,and a major undertaking in training. The problem,therefore, requires remedial action at two levels:

a) AU institutional reform: the AU will need torevisit the structures endorsed in 2002 to ensurethat the PSC can receive guidance from bodiesendowed with expertise encompassing all keycomponents of future missions;

b) Member state representations in Addis: as PSO arerapidly becoming a permanent feature of the AU’sagenda, member states will have to review thesize, composition, and working methods of theirrepresentations in Addis to ensure that the AUSecretariat has at hand a solid body of expertiseon which it can rely for the planning and conductof missions, whether the expertise is available onsite or can be rapidly obtained from nationalcapitals.

Managing Relations with ThirdParties22. Just like any PSO,AMIS has to manage its relationswith a large group of partners, including the GoS andthe various factions in conflict, humanitarian agenciesof the UN family and non-governmental organiza-tions (NGOs).The requirement would not disappear,and may even increase, if the AU were to provide onecomponent within a broader mission led, for example,by the UN. In addition, by contrast with PSOs that areself-sustaining, just like AMIS, in the short run all ASFmissions will bear the burden of handling a broadrange of Western partners that are supporting itfinancially and technically. Any African PSO will alsomost likely be in a particular relationship with theUN, which acts both as a provider of assistance and apossible successor. Let us examine these categories ofactors in turn.

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8 Protocol establishing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the Peace and Security Council (PSC) at its apex and the support ofthe Panel of the Wise, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

Maj. Gen. Henry K. Anyidoho, Head of the UN Assistance Cell inAMIS, with Col. Awwal Mohammed, Assistant Director of Training(LAND) at the Defence Headquarters, Nigeria Ministry of Defence.

Host Country and Local Actors

23. The GoS has been a particularly difficult counter-part for the AU and the mission.This was confirmedby the personal experience of many at the seminar.This experience points, first, to the necessity of anengaged strategic and operational level leadership,with sufficient manpower and authority, able to takeon the national authorities whenever necessary (seeabove para. 17-18).

24. Second, a strong civilian component of themission at field level is also essential in establishing thenecessary contacts to engage relays of the centralgovernment in the field (regional or local authorities,etc.). In this respect, the disregard of Darfur’s adminis-trative jurisdictions in the structuring of AMIS did themission a disservice; and it was especially a hindrancefor the CIVPOL component. Again, a proper pre-deployment assessment would have identified theimportance of those jurisdictions and a solid politicalcomponent would have advised on the managementof relations with the local authorities. Further, a moreenergetic civilian presence, via more and better trainedCIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation), Human Rights,and Humanitarian Officers9 and Public InformationOfficers would have helped “sell the mission” to thelocals—including explaining changes in its roles at keyjunctures—and avoided the obstruction and evenoutright hostility experienced by its members asrumors were being spread that AMIS was a coerciveforce acting in the name of an evil power. Similarly, astronger civilian or CIMC presence would haveenabled the mission to establish links with the manytribes controlling different parts of Darfur (one partic-ipant counted 116). This would have helped buildconfidence with those actors, and therefore facilitatedthe implementation of the mandate.

a) Future ASF missions must make provision for asustained liaison capacity with the nationalgovernment and the main factions in theaters ofdeployment.This implies that such missions willrequire a substantive Political Affairs section, withthe Head of Political Affairs working very closelywith the SRCC and his/her senior managementteam at mission HQ level;

b) An energetic and sustained public informationcampaign is a must in any PSO and must be partof the ASF set of tools.

Humanitarian Actors

25. It is important to distinguish between two types ofhumanitarian actors: First, UN agencies and associates,coordinated by the United Nations Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in thefield of humanitarian relief and by other major UNagencies (UNICEF,WHO, UNDP, etc.) in other fieldsunder the umbrella of the Inter-Agency StandingCommittee (IASC), and second, independent NGOs,which can be foreign or national. UN and largehumanitarian agencies consider themselves bound bya number of principles governing their relations withmilitary components of missions, including the so-called “Oslo Guidelines” and OCHA Guidelines onthe Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets toSupport UN Humanitarian Activities (see Annex II).In addition, they have a long practice of working sideby side with military, police, and political missions, andwell-established processes to manage their relationswith such actors. NGOs, on the other hand, come inall shapes and forms. Local NGOs—and sometimesforeign ones—can have a political agenda hiddenbehind a humanitarian cause. Besides, they do notnecessarily understand the role and constraints of aforeign police or military deployment, and theirattitude will go from trying to exploit their presence(for example, for escorts) to shunning any contact, thesame organization sometimes alternating between thetwo modes depending on temporary aims.

26. Evidence shows that managing contacts withNGOs has been a new and particularly trying experi-ence for many AMIS peacekeepers, especially the

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9 On the distinction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Officers, see below para. 26, 28.

What Should Be the Aims of aPSO Public InformationCampaign?• Convey to the local population the aims, limitations, and

format of the mission so as to dampen expressions ofunjustified enthusiasm as well as hostility

• Explain changes in the mandate and tools of the mission inreaction to changing circumstances in the local or generalpolitical environment

• Communicate the aims of the operation to all componentsand members of the mission, ensuring that the entire staffconveys a unified message to the local and national actors

military, but others as well, and that the mission as awhole has been poorly prepared for this task.This wasindicated, for example, by the MAPEX of August2005, which demonstrated that CIMIC was poorlyunderstood by mission commanders. In the event,AMIS has few CIMIC officers; among those few, a stillsmaller number have been trained in CIMIC duties,whereas among the few officers who have beentrained, many do not work in the CIMIC area. Inaddition, there has been a certain degree of overlapbetween the roles of CIMIC and Humanitarian andHuman Rights Officers, which has made it difficultfor target groups to understand their respective roles.The confusion has been compounded by the decisionto entrust the same individuals with humanitarian andhuman rights tasks, which are two fundamentallydifferent disciplines and require different expertise andmandates.

27. The confusion of roles and lack of experience hasled to an overload of senior commanders in the field,who became the obvious recipients of multiplerequests that should have been directed to theappropriate components of the mission. It has alsomeant that AMIS has deprived itself of access to awealth of detailed information in the hands of NGOsand other civil society actors. Beyond the role ofparticular local civilian actors, many observers havenoted a lack of understanding of the role of the majorUN agencies and of International Humanitarian Lawon the part of AMIS staff.This is entirely understand-able, as this is new territory for the AU, but since mostfuture ASF operations are likely to intervene inenvironments marked by a strong presence of humani-tarian agencies and NGOs, it is worth putting in placestructures and processes to increase mutualunderstanding and manage relations.

28. Several steps could help enhance the capacity ofASF missions to manage their relations with humani-tarian agencies, NGOs and other civil society actors:

a) The provision for, and training of, a muchlarger number of CIMIC officers, whose primarytask would be to interface with the militarycomponent of the mission and civilian agencies,whether these are host government agencies,10 orlocal NGOs, or humanitarian agencies;

b) The provision for, and training of, a largernumber of Humanitarian Officers (in particularfor missions such as AMIS with a strong humani-tarian assistance mandate) whose primary taskwould be to interface with the mission as a wholeand humanitarian agencies;

c) The provision for, and training of HumanRights Officers as needed, depending on adivision of labor agreed upon with the UN11; inany event, a distinction between the HumanRights and the Humanitarian function is essential;

d) Terms of Reference (ToR) for CIMIC, HumanRights and Humanitarian Officers have to beclear for the staff concerned, other components ofthe mission, as well as the local actors; action tocommunicate those ToR should be incorporatedin the public information campaign recommendedabove;

e) AU ranking officials and selected personnelshould be trained in understanding the basicrequirements of International Humanitarian Law,the fundamental principles of humanitarianism—humanity, neutrality, impartiality—as well as thetested techniques for the management of PSOrelations with humanitarian actors; competenceacquisition in those fields should be included inany future Senior Mission Leaders’ training.

Western Partners

29. Partners have played a key support role in AMIS,technically and financially.This was amply recognizedat the seminar, where one of the participants half-jokingly remarked that “at times, donors appear moreanxious than African leaders to get into Darfur.”Thedownside of this extensive engagement by partners,however, is that it has created a lasting dependence,making the prospect of African “ownership” ofAfrican operations ever more remote. Partners havepolitical agendas and domestic and financialconstraints that cannot but influence their support ofthe mission. Several senior African representatives atthe seminar were clear that this situation wasunacceptable in the long run, arguing that “you don’tgo to war on somebody else’s money.”

30. Negative consequences of a heavy reliance onpartners, coupled with the weaknesses of the AU,include the following:

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10 This applies only at the local level, however.At higher levels, it should be the task of Political Affairs officers to engage with host government author-ities, because such engagement will inevitably be highly politicized and should be beyond the purview of CIMIC officers who are per definitionmilitary personnel.

11 See further para. 55.

• Partners occupying key long-term positions inthe mission that should be filled by African staff;as the case when sensitive posts such as intelli-gence, logistics, procurement, communicationsat the DITF level or in the area of air mobilityare occupied by a civilian foreign contractor;

• Conversely, advisory positions remainingunfilled as partners experience force generationproblems (in October 2006, only 60% of EUpartners’ military positions were filled, and 50%of police positions);

• Financial or in-kind support not being availablewhen the AU expects it, as domestic politics orbureaucratic red tape in donor countries andorganizations lead to delays in disbursements orequipment being delivered piecemeal;

• Poor timing of training, as trainers are onlyavailable at specific dates and for a specificduration and developments in the field respondto different dynamics (e.g., delay in the deliveryof the Canadian APCs, resulting in their beingused not by the drivers trained for that purpose,but by untrained ones); or due to insufficientcoordination among partners (ideally, the stafftraining provided by NATO in Summer 2005should have come prior to the MAPEX);

• Decisions being made in order to respond to apolitical priority of a donor—being seen asproviding help—rather than to the logic of themission, e.g., the deployment of a JLOC shouldhave logically followed, rather than precededthe creation of a JOC (although both wererecommended by assessment missions);

• Models of equipment provided by partnersproving inadequate to the conditions in whichthe AU operates or its resource flows,compounded by a lack of know-how anddiscipline of the peacekeepers (for example, theuse of the INMARSAT system or the Thurayamobile phones donated by partners made senseas an emergency solution, but led to cost over-runs as they were used with little restraint;likewise the fuel consumption of the helicoptersand APCs corresponded neither to the fuelmanagement capacity of AMIS, nor to itstransportation capacity);

• Occasional duplications and overlaps inassistance, and provision of conflicting advice,although the coordination mechanisms createdat the strategic level (Liaison Group (LG) andPartners’Technical Support Group (PTSG))have proven effective and should be recorded asa positive lesson of AMIS.

31. There are also sometimes negative political

consequences of an important partners’ presence inthe field in the sense that this presence makes themission vulnerable to political signals coming from thenational capitals of partners or the headquarters oftheir organizations. For example, the GoS becamemuch more obstructive around March-April 2006 asstrong pronouncements came from the BushAdministration, NATO HQs, and the UN SecretaryGeneral himself advocating a transition to the UN anda greater NATO involvement in support of AMIS.Understandably, political pressure is a necessarycorollary of many PSOs, but its use must reflect anunderstanding of consequences:

Partners have a responsibility to anticipatethe consequences of their political discourseon ASF missions.

32. Over time, the AU should seek to reduce itstechnical and financial dependence on partners, eventhough full autonomy of AU operations is still distant.This means the following:

a) Increasing Africa’s own financial efforts;

b) Increasing African peacekeepers’ capacity intechnical areas (contracting, communications,medical, aviation, fuel management, strategicairlift, etc.) in which African expertise is weak,leading to poor use of assistance and/or forcingover-reliance on external partners;

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Col. Peter Stamps of the EU Africa Peace Facility and Lt. Col. BradBergstrand of the Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group,Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada.

c) Increasing the ability of African staff tobecome “intelligent users” of partners’ support interms of contracting, and contract and expertsupervision.

33. Further measures could be taken in order toimprove the quality of partner support and its coordi-nation:

a) Early involvement of partners in the planning ofsupport for future ASF deployments so as to improveresponse, as recommended above (para. 9); this earlyinvolvement would also allow partners to identify AUlimitations in a timely fashion and facilitate theirawareness of sensitive areas of cooperation;

b) Cultural awareness training of partners selected towork with the AU who do not otherwise have workexperience in Africa;

c) Discipline and political will from the partners toeffectively use the coordination structures put inplace, such as the PTSG in the case of AMIS;

d) Clear agreements between the AU and partners onthe limitations and responsibilities of each party forthe provision of financial and expert support;

e) Further partner work to harmonize reportingrequirements on expenditures so as to lighten theburden on the AU—while there is also a continuingrequirement for better financial accountability andtransparency by the AU;

f) Further efforts in the context of the G8 “clearinghouse” to harmonize partners’ assistance in long-termcapacity-building (see further recommendations onlogistics at para. 41);

g) Better coordination among partners to fill gaps inadvisory positions that have been promised to the AUwhen one of the partners fails to deliver on itscommitment;

h) Particular attention should be given to the coordi-nation of EU and UN assistance efforts as [or “since”]the EU is the single main provider of financialsupport, and the UN the key technical standard setterfor AU operations.The practice of joint assessmentmissions, as conducted in March and December 2005,should be carried forward to minimize risks ofmismatch between resource allocation and technicaladvice.

The United Nations

34. As a partner, the UN is in a category of its own.To a limited extent, it provides similar “services” to

AMIS as other partners, for example via logisticalsupport and technical advice and, in those areas, itscontribution has to be coordinated with that ofothers. But the UN is also special because it setsstandards, provides frameworks, and appears as apossible “exit strategy” for AU PSOs, as repeatedlystressed by the ASF Policy Framework. Actually, therole of the UN in support to AU PSOs is closelyrelated to the AU’s level of ambitions and the divisionof labor between the two organizations. This will bediscussed further below. At this point, it is useful toidentify the components of the UN that come intointer-action with the AU in PSOs (leaving aside theUN as a political actor, an important theme which wasnot addressed at the seminar).

35. At the top of the list is the Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (DPKO) as, to a largeextent, the benchmark for AU PSO is UN peaceoperations (rather than operations by NATO or theEU for example).The UN is therefore regularly calledto advise on standards, logistics, equipment, structures,etc. In principle, there is nothing wrong with this, as itcan facilitate an eventual transition to a UN mission,but there are a few risks involved. One is that the AUmay be tempted to emulate higher UN standardswhich it cannot reach at this point because of a lackof resources and know-how; another that AU expecta-tions may be too high in comparison with DPKO’scapacity to deliver on assistance (although this is beingaddressed by the formation of a DPKO AU PeaceSupport Team);12 and yet another that the AU may bedrawn to think in terms of extremely complexmission models which it could not support.This is anissue that deserves attention, as UN-AU cooperationin PSOs develops.

36. The UN also appears, as indicated earlier, in theform of the major humanitarian and developmentagencies, i.e., OCHA, UNHCR, UNDP,WHO,WPF,etc. Here, liaison and awareness-raising programs ofAU peacekeepers are of the essence to facilitatemutual understanding. The AU should not seek toduplicate the work of those organizations. However, asrecommended below (para. 55), the AU must thinkthrough what capacities it needs to interface withthem effectively, including at the strategic level, andensure that they are factored in the planning of itsoperations.

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12 UN DPKO assistance to the AU must also be seen in the context of the 2004 UN Secretary General Report Enhancement of African PeacekeepingCapacity, DPKO’s Peacekeeping 2010 Agenda, and the commitment to a ten year capacity-building plan for Africa endorsed by the World Summit inSeptember 2005.

37.Third, there is the UN as the Department of Safetyand Security (DSS). In principle, there is no reasonwhy the DSS should be involved in AU missions, lestthe AU requests its assistance. Darfur therefore seemsto be the exception rather than the rule, given thepresence of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) inthe south of the country. AMIS experience with theDSS, however, leaves something to be desired, as theDepartment seems to have made decisions on securityaffecting the mission’s capacity to operate (e.g.,declaring the closure of some routes) without eveninforming its leadership. Should the AU decide in thefuture to avail itself of the services of the DSS, this willrequire much better liaison and coordination.

38. Fourth, there is the UN as a human rights actor.The matter is important in a situation such as Darfurin which the fear of massive human rights violationshas been one of the key motivations for interventionin the first place. However, it appears that the work ofUN human rights officers (sent by UNMIS) andinitiatives from Geneva-based UN human rightsbodies have been poorly coordinated with AMIS: attimes AMIS Human Rights and HumanitarianOfficers and the CFC have found themselves investi-gating the same human rights violations as UN staff.This should not be a surprise since, as discussed earlier,the Human Rights and Humanitarian Officers had animprecise mandate and neither they or the CFC hadparticular expertise in conducting human rightsinvestigations, which require a high degree of special-ization.A prudent approach would recommend that

a) For the purpose of PSOs, the AU shoulddevelop a competence mainly to interact in thefield of human rights with the major UN humanrights bodies as well as human rights NGOs,without undertaking major direct human rightswork;

b) Any AU work in the field of human rights inPSOs (education, investigation of violations, etc.)should be coordinated with UN human rightsbodies.This requires both a discussion on thegeneral principles of the division of labor andcoordination, and specific arrangements governingeach mission.

39. Fifth, the UN appears as the Country Team (CT),i.e., the body of UN agencies that have a presence inthe field much before the deployment of the peaceoperation, and possess a wealth of detailed knowledgeon the country.The CT can be particularly helpful tothe AU in the planning phase, feeding informationinto the assessment that must inform the plans.

The AU (PSOD) should seek ways tosystematically engage UN Country Teamsin assessment missions underpinning theplanning of its PSOs.

Logistics40. The element of logistics is the backbone of PSOs.However, it has been one of the major weaknesses ofAMIS.A list of the problems experienced includes:

• The lack of a pre-deployment logistics plan asof the deployment of AMIS II (October 2004)including basic provision of shelter, food supply,medical assistance, communications andmobility equipment for the troops, as well asmaintenance services; insufficient steps takensubsequently to resolve some of thefundamental problems; as a result, the availabilityof basic support in some of those areas has beenand remains deficient;

• The lack of an initial police logistics concept,and arrangements for the sharing of missionlogistics between the police and the military,which rendered the police hostage to ad hocdecisions by the Force Commander to share ornot to share resources depending on themilitary’s own needs and availability ofequipment ; the JLOC concept emerged toolate to provide a solution and its implementa-tion has been delayed;

• Lack of provision of key mobility assets, e.g.,helicopters, and ineffective (including wasteful)use of those valuable assets;

• Negative impact on intra-mission communica-tions as the lack of regular fuel provisioningmeant Groups and Sectors remained incommu-nicado for hours at a time;

• The failure of some troop contributingcountries (TCCs) to supply their soldiers withbasic equipment at the outset of the mission.This was compounded by the lack of clarity onthe Contingent Owned Equipment (COE)reimbursement rates, so that TCCs werereluctant to dedicate major equipments to themission, not knowing whether they would “gettheir money back”;

• A lack of AU staff capacity and experience inmanaging logistics in key areas such as contractletting and monitoring, fuel provision andstorage, maintenance, etc.

• The absence of pre-arranged service contracts,leading to long delays in identifying contractorsand reaching agreement for the actual provisionof services;

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• Delays in the provision of key logisticsequipment due to a combination of red tape inthe providing country and obstruction by theGoS (cf. impounding of communicationequipment from The Netherlands; delay inauthorizing the import of the APCs offered byCanada);

• Delays in troop rotations, as TCCs weredependent on the availability of strategictransport provided by Western countries(although, overall, the coordination of strategictransport worked well, despite the initial EU-NATO competition);

• Insufficient consultation of field staff on theirlogistics needs by the DITF as it was negoti-ating contracts with service providers, withsometimes negative consequences on thesecurity of the personnel in the field;

• Inadequacy of some of the services provided bysome private contractors directly remuneratedby donors, on which the AU had no leverage.

As a result, military and police were unable tofulfill their mandates: the Protection Force couldnot protect, the police could not provide security,investigate or mentor, and neither could they reactto crises with sufficient speed. The powerlessnessexperienced by the mission was well-reflected bymany former AMIS staff during the seminar.

41. It is a positive sign that the ASF development planincludes further work on logistics in the form ofproposals for a study into the logistics depot conceptand another into police logistics. This, however, willnot exhaust the requirement to upgrade the logisticscapacity of the AU (and the RECs) to carry out PSOs.Improvement will require parallel, and to some extentcoordinated, action from the AU member states, theAU Secretariat, and the partners:

a) If AU member states intend to attain a degreeof autonomy in PSOs, as the ASF Framework andthe Roadmap suggest, they will have to consentto a level of financial effort to provide theirtroops (and police) with minimal equipment andlogistic support, and the capacity to maintainthem. No “African ownership” will be possiblewithout a degree of self-sustainment;

b) It is essential that any future ASF logisticswork (depots study, police study, implementationof the Logistics Workshop outcome, etc.) be

guided by the philosophy of integrated logisticssupport.Therefore, experts competent in theassessment of the logistics needs of the police andcivilian parts of AU mission must be involved inthis work, which cannot be left only to militaryspecialists, even though they have the mostextensive expertise;13

c) Provision for a Joint Logistics OperationsCentre (JLOC) should be considered in theplanning of every single AU mission in the futureand the JLOC should be established at the outsetof each mission;

d) Service contracts with key providers must beput in place by the AU Secretariat (PSOD) inorder to minimize delays in the provision ofservices in actual situations;14

e) Troops welfare must not be forgotten as this isimportant in keeping soldiers in high morale andin preventing misbehavior (e.g., sexual exploita-tion and abuse) that brings a bad name tomissions and forces extremely time-consumingdamage control and remedial actions;

f) In further lessons-learned work on AMIS, partners’logistic support needs to be examined in detail withconsideration of four areas:

i) Level: What was the degree of supportprovided in each key logistics area? Are thereareas in which this support could relativelyquickly be replaced by AU self-sufficiency? Whatsteps would this require from the AU and thepartners? Are there areas in which partners’support, on the contrary, should be increasedbecause the AMIS experience has demonstratedthat the AU could not possibly be self-sufficientin the near future, although the missing assets arekey to the success of the mission?

ii) Predictability: How can the reliability oflogistics assistance be improved? Apart from theEuropean Peace Facility for Africa, which seemson a sure footing at least until 2010 (albeit with afunding gap to meet needs in 2007), this is adifficult issue, as it is largely dependent ondomestic politics in donor countries (negotiationsbetween government and parliament, or acrossministries), and the promises of elected govern-ments can only hold, at best, until the nextelections. Lasting commitment can only resultfrom the patient lobbying of groups convinced inthe value of supporting African efforts.Africanpartners must keep this in mind in their outreachto European and North American constituencies;

iii) Coordination: Structures such as the PTSG

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13 The DPKO model of integrated support to UN missions may be a useful source of inspiration.14 Assistance could be sought from the UN and other partners who have extensive experience in such contracts.

are best suited for operational assistance, andpartners must make effective use of it. For thelonger term, coordination efforts should bepursued through the G8++ “clearing house”(also including such partners as the UN and theEuropean Commission).The compatibility ofequipment provided by partners requires partic-ular attention both in direct operational assistanceand long term capacity building;

iv) Nature: What is the best form in which todeliver logistics assistance: provision of directphysical capacity? Support through third partycontractors (e.g., PAE, Skylink, Crown Agents)?Or provision of non-earmarked funds for the AUto acquire the necessary goods and services? It ispossible that a mix of all those options may beadvisable, taking into account the nature of thegoods/services, the financial managementcapacity of the AU Secretariat, and donordemands for accountability.What is important isthat the AU and RECs know how to harnessthese different tools and which is best for whatpurpose and scenario.

Communications and InformationSystems42. The availability of good communications andinformation systems (CIS) has a fundamental impacton the capability of the mission.AMIS CIS have beenunreliable and extremely slow. Sectors have beenlargely isolated from each other, hampering aneffective management of the situation in border areas;not all police sectors have had access to a 24hoperation room; merger of information coming fromthe police and the MILOBS has been partial; andprocedures for the transmission of information havebeen patchy. Finally, both physical CIS capacity andknow-how have not permitted staff to gather andanalyze information in order to produce intelligenceand transmit it to decision-makers in real time. CISproblems have been compounded by delays in thedelivery of promised communication equipment dueto a combination of Dutch domestic politics (TheNetherlands have been the main providers of CISassistance to AMIS) and GoS obstruction.

43. ASF work has rightly identified CIS as a keycomponent of the ASF and proposed that Phase IIinclude a CIS study covering the detailed technicaland process requirements, as well as funding require-ments for equipment, personnel and maintenance. Forthis work to be comprehensive, including in the field

of intelligence:

a) It would be advisable that a study beundertaken to examine how the Continental EarlyWarning Systems (CEWS) and its RECs counter-parts (MARAC for ECCAS, CEWARN forIGAD, ECOWARN for ECOWAS, REWS forSADC)15 could be factored into ASF CIS develop-ment work, including their potential to contributeto an ASF intelligence capacity;

b) In addition, a study should be considered intothe value of establishing an Intelligence Cell atthe strategic level under the auspices of theCommittee of Intelligence and Security Servicesof Africa (CISSA) to support the planning andconduct of ASF missions.The temporary supportto AMIS provided by the Canadian IntelligenceCell in the DITF should be examined for possiblelessons learned;

c) Further work is needed to define intelligencerequirements and processes to generate andmanage intelligence at the operational level; theUN Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) conceptshould be examined for possible import of lessonsinto the development of AU multidimensionalmissions.

Mission Staffing and Training44. Many issues related to the staffing of PSOs, bothat field and strategic levels, have already beenaddressed or can be directly deducted from the above,and therefore are only summarized here.They includethe need to

a) Fully man the PSOD to its agreed establishment sothat it can engage in planning and generally drive theplanning and management of ASF missions;

b) Select field personnel in key domains of expertise(communications, logistics management, intelligence,etc.) early so that positions do not remain durablyheld by partners, whose agenda may or may not alignwith that of the AU;

c) Conduct generic mission management training forpotential senior mission leadership to build a base ofexpertise;

d) Choose mission leaders early so that they canparticipate in planning, and undergo joint trainingprior to their deployment;

e) Seriously address the police requirement in peaceoperations, both in numbers and quality (i.e.,individual specialists, formed units, etc.);

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15 The development of those systems is in train, with important donor funding (EU for the CEWS and MARAC, US for ECOWAS, etc.)

f) Develop the ASF CIMIC function and expertise;

g) Define clear terms of reference for Humanitarianand Human Rights Officers, differentiate their rolesmore distinctly from each other and from that ofCIMIC Officers, and develop a pool of such officers,as recommended by the Workshop on the CivilianDimension of the ASF.16

45. However, a number of other important staffingissues have to be considered by the AU and itsmember states if they want to ensure the success offuture PSOs.

Job Definitions, Ranks and Subordination

46. The lack of job definitions and guidance onposition ranking created serious personnel manage-ment problems for AMIS. Ranking problems arose inparticular for the police because, in the absence offirm guidance, national establishments tended to sendofficers of a higher rank than required (to gaininfluence, or simply because senior officers have moreclout with their hierarchies to obtain posts abroad).This detracted from commanding officers’ main tasks,as they had to spend much time and energy shufflingindividuals around to avoid tensions. Lesser rankingproblems affected the military but such problems havearisen in the past in the context of ECOWAS missionsas officers of a nominally lower rank—generallycoming from a small country with few rankingofficers—were put in command of officers withhigher ranks. Respect for the ranks in-mission,however, should not be confused with C2 relation-ships between the strategic and the operational/tactical levels of the mission, whereby seniorcommanders in the field recognize that more juniorofficers at strategic HQs may speak on behalf of thatHQ. AMIS experienced repeated difficulties on thatfront. Other problems arose from technical shortcom-ings, e.g., as already reported, MILOBs were pulledout in numbers to man the Field HQ whereas theyhad no particular training to do this.There was also asignificant lack of specialists in less prestigious butimportant areas fundamental to operations. Thiscannot but affect the AU’s capacity to run effectivePSOs. Remedial action must be fourfold:

a) The AU PSOD must develop precise jobdescriptions and accompanying personal profilesfor all key positions in PSOs;

b) Member states’ military and police establish-

ments must abide strictly by those descriptions inselecting personnel and shun the temptation toexercise pressure on commanders for them tobypass the rules;17

c) Training at all levels, but in particular of seniormilitary commanders, must be clear about thechain of command of ASF missions;

d) As a possible complementary measure, AUmember states may want to develop an equiva-lence table among military ranks across Africa soas to have an undisputed basis on which toorganize military hierarchies in the field.

Senior Leadership

47. In addition to earlier recommendations onintegrated leadership training, the following should beconsidered:

a) Mission leaders must be appointed anddeployed prior to the appointment and deploy-ment of subordinate officers and staff. Otherwise,they will encounter problems in asserting theirauthority when they arrive to the mission;

b) Situations should be avoided in which theHoM/SRCC is of the same nationality as theForce Commander. Overlaps in the nationality oftheir deputies should also be paid attention to.While it is unavoidable that the mission be drivento some extent by personnel from lead nations

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16 Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, Sept 2006, para. 47.17 Having guidance in the first place should greatly help mission leaders to resist pressure.

Brig. Gen. Francis Agyemfra (Ret.), former Chief of Staff, GhanaArmed Forces.

(this also happens in NATO and at the EU), thedanger of importing domestic alliances or rivalriesinto the mission should be avoided;

c) Member states should give those police andmilitary officers who have served in the field withdistinction the opportunity to build on their skillsthrough appropriate training for future missions;

d) The AU, possibly with the aid of partners,should build a database of African military, policeand civilian personnel with particular skills orleadership capacity, including both individualswho have served in UN and African missions, inorder to identify quickly needed personnel infuture ASF operations.

Police Component

48. Particular attention is required on the police sideof PSOs. This regards not only the numbers andspecialties of police officers but other aspects as well:

a)Ranking: The PSOD should issue clearguidelines as regards the structure of the policeforce, specifying in particular whether ASFdeployments should be ranking or non-rankingmissions.The matter created much contentionwithin AMIS, which was forcefully reflected atthe seminar;

b)Arming: Similarly the PSOD should issue clearguidelines on the carrying of armament by ASFpolice (some national contingents of AMIS policewere armed, others not);

c) Composition: Serious efforts must be made bymember states to recruit and train female police.

This is essential if CIVPOL is to be able to fulfillits mandate in societies where traditions uphold astrong male/female role distinction.

Specialist Domains of Expertise

49. A key weakness demonstrated by AMIS has beenits lack of administrative and financial managementcapacity. This has resulted in delays in donors’disbursements, delays and uncertainties as regardsTCC reimbursements, delays in third partycontracting, and an overall lack of leverage of themission on donors and contractors as the AU did nothave the expertise to put forward counter-proposals.Administering a PSO is a heavy task, for which theAU Secretariat’s departments of administration andaccounting are not equipped. It requires special skillsand such capacity should therefore be hosted by thePSOD.18

a) Reinforcement of the PSOD should includethe creation of a solid financial and administrativecapacity, including the expertise to managecontracts with third parties and interface onassistance with partners;

b) Such capacity should be properly relayed inthe field by adequate staffing at Mission HQlevel.

50. PSOs include a whole range of functions that donot belong to normal military and police roles, such asceasefire implementation, negotiation, mentoring,monitoring, disarmament, etc. Besides, even functionsthat should normally belong to the expertise ofmilitary establishments become more complex inPSOs, and are in any case in short supply in manyAfrican countries. In addition to earlier recommenda-tions, this suggests that

a) Training in all functions specific to PSOs, suchas ceasefire implementation, negotiation,mentoring, monitoring, disarmament, securitysector reform, etc. should be introduced inAfrican national police and military curricula, andcontinue to be developed by the various regionalPSO training centers;

b) AU member states may want to select nicheareas of expertise in PSOs in which they mayspecialize, as a way to rationalize capabilities andresources;

c) Given the high degree of expertise needed in

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18 Once again, UN practice, honed through 40 years of experience, may be worth a serious examination, with particular consideration for the divisionof labor between the UN Department of Management and DPKO.

Pre-deployment and In-MissionTraining, Validation Exercises:• Pre-deployment training and in-mission training are

usually a better return on investment than generic trainingas they are more likely to target individuals who are or willbe accomplishing the tasks for which they are trained:â In-mission training: staff in-mission are more

receptive as they can directly relate the teachingthey receive to the problems they encounter

â Pre-deployment training: volunteer or earmarkedpersonnel are made more aware of hardship andcomplex conditions in the field, ensuring that thosedeployed have the necessary moral fiber

• Validation exercises (example: August 2005 MAPEX)ensure each part is aware of his/her role and processes ofinter-action with other components are in place

some functions, the PSOD may want to introduceStandard Assessment Tests not only for membersof the police, but also for military and civilians inkey specialist areas;

d) The AU and its member states should takeadvantage of the critical mass of African expertisedeveloped in AMIS to help build capacity inspecialized areas as well as in strategic planningand guidance.The experience accumulated byDITF staff should be retained in the form of theirincorporation into the PSOD once AMIS isterminated.

Civilian and Expert Hiring

51. Hiring procedures for civilians in PSOs cannotfollow the regular AU hiring process, which is muchtoo time-consuming. This was a clear conclusion ofthe Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF.The Workshop rightly recommends that the PSODconsider establishing a Rapid Deployment System,notonly for civilians, but also for core military and policefunctions in ASF PSOs, drawing on the DPKOmodel; it also recommends the establishment of acivilian standby roster.19

The recommendations of the Workshopon the Civilian Dimension of the ASFaimed at facilitating the rapid hiring anddeployment of civilians for ASF missionsshould be followed through. Priorityshould be given in that context to corecomponents including administrativecapacity, political affairs, public informa-tion, and humanitarian liaison.

Language

52. The language issue is an important one, and it hastwo components, one related to communicationwithin the mission, and one to communication withexternal (local) actors.AMIS has encountered difficul-ties on both fronts.Within the mission, problems havearisen especially within the police component—thiswas amply reflected at the seminar—as Francophoneofficers had difficulty finding their place in a majorityEnglish-speaking environment, and they felt theirpersonal skills were not being recognized. Vis-à-visexternal actors, the difficulty resided in the lack ofqualified interpreters in sufficiently large number toallow for communication with the locals, although abudget for them existed. However, this communica-

tion is essential to ensure that the mandate of themission is well-understood; it is particularly importantfor police work (for investigation purposes, but also if,like in AMIS, the CIVPOL component has importanttraining and mentoring tasks of the local police); andit is also vital for Humanitarian Officers and forCIMIC whose role it is to liaise with local actors andNGOs. In addition, without the right languagecapability, the mission deprives itself of a key informa-tion gathering tool.Action will be required at differentlevels to remedy language gaps in African PSOs:

a) Any AU PSO must have an official language inwhich guidance and orders are passed, instructionsdescribed, information communicated (whetherfor the purpose of incident analysis or air trafficcontrol), and reports written;

b) Although the official language of AU missionswill vary according to the area of deployment,French-speaking African countries will have tomake an effort to train their senior officers tomaster English if they hope to hold commandingpositions in future missions.This is important forpolice officers who serve individually and forsenior military officers, less so for members of thecontingent and formed police units, should theybe deployed;

c) Any future PSO plan must encompassprovisions for language assistants or interpreters;this requires not only a budget but a process toidentify and recruit the right individuals.

AU Multidimensional Missions:What Level of Ambitions?53. The 2003 ASF Policy Framework sets the AU’slevel of ambitions in PSOs and, to some extent, theway to achieve them. However, against the back-ground of the AMIS experience, a number ofelements of the Framework stand out. First, the sixscenarios considered, overall, reflect the real worldsituations the AU and the sub-regions are likely toencounter, with the caveat that the “low level spoilers”envisaged in scenario 5 (multidimensional PSO) mayrapidly become “high level spoilers,” necessitatingmore forceful action of the type envisaged in scenario6 (intervention). Second, with AMIS, the AU hasundertaken a “Scenario 5 +” type of mission, forwhich it did not anticipate to be ready before 2010.No other component of the international community,either unilaterally or multilaterally, was willing to

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19 Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, September 2006, in particular para. 85-94.

intervene to stop the bloodshed in Darfur, and it is allto the AU’s credit that the mission was undertaken atall. However,AMIS has experienced many operationalshortcomings, as analyzed above, and its effectivenesshas been limited.The experience of AMIS suggests thefollowing considerations:

a) To an extent, the Policy Framework underestimatesthe requirement for an AU capacity for planning andconduct at the strategic level, assuming that rapidreinforcement and extensive assistance from the UNin the deployment of a strategic HQ will beforthcoming—this may or may not be the case;

b) Strategic level pol/mil interactions, involvingrelations among various Departments and Divisions ofthe AU Commission as well as between theCommission and member states, receive littleattention;

c) There is very little in the Framework onoperational command and control, which is assumedto be handled by the RECs, and the distinction offunctions between the strategic and operational levelof C2; operational C2 is also under-developed at thispoint in the ASF Doctrine;

d) Even though the Framework envisages a civilianand police capacity, it gives little sense of the way thiscapacity could or should be integrated in theplanning and conduct of operations—largelyreflecting the military origin of the document;

e) The Framework is premised on extremely highlevels of assistance from the UN in terms of staffingand technical advice—under the assumption that ASFmissions will normally transition to UN operations.Although the UN has provided significant assistancein the case of AMIS, extensive and long term resourceallocation on the part of the UN for operationalsupport to African missions cannot be taken forgranted;

f) The Framework is further premised on the RECsplaying an important part in African operations.Whilethis may at times be the case,AMIS demonstratesthat, for political reasons, the AU will also want toundertake major missions directly. In addition, RECsare progressing at a very different pace in toolingthemselves for ASF deployments, which may makethe assumptions of the Framework applicable in someregions only in the foreseeable future;

g)There is no indication in the Policy Framework ofhow ASF missions would interface with other actors,in particular local populations and humanitarianagencies, which will co-deploy large contingents withany ASF mission.

54. Phase I of the ASF development work has helpedaddress some of those issues. For Phase II to be

successful, however, it seems that an additional numberof steps will have to be considered by the AU and itsmember states. These can be broken down into fivecomponents:

Strategic Level Ambitions and AU-UN Synergies

55. As highlighted earlier, the UN is a multidimen-sional and multifaceted body. At this point, however,two strategic factors seem most relevant in view of theASF Policy Framework and the AMIS experience.First, taking into account resource availability anddepth of practice, the AU (and the RECs) cannot andshould not aim to duplicate functions that are betterperformed by other organizations that have greatercapacity and experience.This applies in particular to awhole range of functions adjacent to, or deriving fromPSOs, e.g., humanitarian assistance, security sectorreform (SSR), demobilization, disarmament andreintegration (DDR), comprehensive rule of lawreform, and the gamut of post-conflict economicrecovery activities led by the World Bank and theUnited Nations Development Program (UNDP). Inthose areas, what the AU needs is capacity to giveguidance and liaise, not to implement. The matter,importantly, is relevant both to the ASF and the AUFramework for Post-Conflict Development (PCRD),a document which spells out in general terms the AU’slevel of ambition in post-conflict countries.

Further work is needed in the context ofASF and PCRD development—whichhave to be considered side-by-side in thiscontext—to define precisely the AU’s levelof ambitions in complex PSOs, taking intoaccount the existing functional competen-cies of the UN, its agencies, and associatedbodies (World Bank, IMF). In many PSOsand post-conflict areas, the AU should seekto acquire a capacity to provide strategicguidance, liaise, and interact, not toimplement. The 10 year Action Plan forAfrican capacity building endorsed by the2005 World Summit could be fleshed outto serve as a framework for this effort.

56.The second element is related to the assumption ofextensive UN assistance to AU operations. Theproposal that the UN should be able to providefinancial assistance to regional organizations for peaceoperations, as well as put at their disposal its StrategicDeployment Stocks (SDS) was made by the HighLevel Panel on UN reform in 2004.20 However, it

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should be remembered that this proposal was vetoedby the major financial contributors to the UNpeacekeeping budget before it was even formallyconsidered. The political difficulties experienced inthe transition from an AU to a UN mission in Darfurhave forced the UN to consider innovative solutions,such as the “AMIS plus” package which would allowthe UN to provide substantive assistance to AMISwhile the mission would remain African-led. This isbeing made possible by the presence of UNMIS,combined with the Secretary General Pre-Commitment Authority (the disbursement of whichis made easier politically by the existence of SecurityCouncil Resolution 1706 mandating a UN mission inDarfur). In parallel, the formation of the DPKO AUPeace Support Team will allow the UN Secretariat toprovide long-term capacity-building assistance to theAU. This, however, does not mean that the assump-tions of the Policy Framework in terms of UNassistance are on a firm and sustainable basis.

The assumptions on UN assistanceunderpinning the ASF Policy Frameworkshould be checked to examine theirsustainability. Should they prove unsustain-able, AU Member States will have toexamine two alternative courses of action:a) foresee an increased African contribu-tion and a reduced UN participation inASF operations; or b) engage with the UNSecretariat and major contributors to theUN peacekeeping budget to obtain achange in financial regulations that wouldpermit major direct assistance (via staff orlogistics) to African (AU or REC)operations.

Operational Level Ambitions and Standards

57. Levels of ambitions also have to be defined at theoperational / technical level. The UN practice andcurrent efforts to plan and manage integrated missionscan be a useful source of inspiration for the AU, e.g.,as regards planning methodology, documentation,coordination between police and military forces, jointassessments, validation, etc. However, UN processes areprobably too complex—also because they seek tocoordinate a larger number of actors—to be copied bythe AU. Similarly, there is a danger that, guided byeager leaders and keen partners accustomed to highstandards of performance and enabling requirements,

the AU may be driven to adopt processes that areexcessively complex and equipments that are toodelicate, complicated and expensive to maintain.

a) The AU and its partners, including both theUN and Western governments and organizations,have a shared responsibility to ensure that thedevelopment of the ASF be guided by sustain-ability concerns;

b) In matters of integration, the AU’s immediatelevel of ambition should be that of “minimallymultidimensional missions” incorporating amilitary and police component, with other civilianelements being limited to the core functions ofadministrative capacity, political affairs, publicinformation and humanitarian liaison.

Mobilizing the AU Commission as a Whole

58. At this stage, the development of the ASF remainslargely a preserve of the PSOD and to some extent ofthe Defense and Security Division, with very limited“buy-in” from the other parts of the Commission.Regrettably, the potential staff growth of the PSOD iscreating internal tensions within the institution. Theproblem needs to be addressed both at the politicallevel by the member states and in administrativeterms. First, member states have to recognize thatwithout sufficient and efficient staff at the PSOD,there will be no effective ASF. Second, ASF interven-tions will be most successful and have longer termstabilizing effect if the efforts of the PSOD are coordi-nated with, and sustained by, first of all, the otherDivisions in the Peace and Security Department, butalso those of other AU Commission Departments,including Political Affairs; Social Affairs;Programming, Budgeting, Finance and Accounting;Administration and Human Resources Development;and Economic Affairs.

a) AU member states have to insist that the AUCommission overcomes its reluctance to recruitstaff for the PSOD: without staff at the PSOD,there will be no effective ASF;

b) The leadership of the Commission should workwith relevant Department Heads to establishappropriate linkages between the PSOD and theCrisis Management Division on the one hand,and other components of the AU Secretariat onthe other to define their role in PSOs, especiallythe Political Department (advice on long termconsequences for political stability / sequencingof PSO with institution-building activities); the

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20 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, December 2004, para. 86.

Social Affairs and the Economic AffairsDepartments (reconstruction); the Programming,Budgeting, Finance and Accounting, as well asAdministration and Human ResourcesDevelopment Departments (support).

Increasing AU-RECs Synergies

59.The regional economic communities (RECs) havebeen closely involved in the ASF Workshops.However, the Workshop process being a mainlytechnical endeavor, and one largely weighted in favorof the military component of PSOs, it appears that theexposure of RECs civilian actors as well as theirpolitical leadership, to ASF development work hasbeen limited. RECs representatives present at theseminar even suggested that in many ways, interna-tional partners appeared to be better informed thanmost African military, police and foreign affairsestablishments on ASF developments. Overall, itappears that AU/REC relations have been addressedonly at a generic level21 and as a largely legal issue inthe ASF documentation work (ASF Workshop onLegal Aspects), rather than at a conceptual levelincorporating the political and operational dimensionof PSOs. However, important questions lie behindAU/RECs cooperation in PSOs: under whatconditions would a REC agree to transfer commandand control over its regional brigade to the AU? Whatkind of liaison / consultation / coordination wouldhave to be put in place between the AU PSC and itscounterparts at, say, ECOWAS, SADC or ECCASprior, during, and after the end of the mission? Whatwould be the political, operational, and financialimplications of a REC serving as planning andoperational HQ for an AU-mandated mission? Thepossibility that different types of arrangements mayhave to be considered with different RECs, althoughnot ideal, should not be ruled out, as whatever isdecided must respond to the reality of divergingdegrees of RECs cohesion and capacity.

a) All RECs should establish a liaison office inAddis Ababa in order to engage in regular consul-

tations with the PSOD; RECs offices in Addisshould be staffed with a range of expertisereflecting the functional scope of the cooperationin PSOs envisaged between each REC and theAU;

b) Pol/mil discussions between the AU and theRECs should be undertaken with a view toclarifying division of roles and responsibilities forthe planning and conduct of ASF missions; thedistribution of roles and responsibilities may varyfrom one region to the next.

The Need for High Level Engagement of MemberStates

60. The ASF is a key component of the African Peaceand Security Architecture (APSA), and has to be seenas one among a set of instruments including the Peaceand Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, theContinental Early Warning System, and the SpecialFund, the efforts of which have to be made comple-mentary to peace and security in Africa. As such, theASF is also a highly political endeavor. However, asdiscussed earlier, it appears that ASF developmentwork has been mainly militarily-driven and has onlymarginally involved the political establishments ofnational capitals so far. As with key decisions onfinance, as well as relationships with external actors(including the UN) and the RECS, the distribution ofroles within the AU Commission need to be made inthe next few years. And high-level national capitalengagement will be necessary in this regard.

a) AU member states committed to the ASF, withthe support of committed partners, shouldconvince the AU to launch an informationstrategy targeting African national political,diplomatic, police and military establishments onthe development of the ASF;

b) National capitals of AU member states have toengage in ASF work at the highest political levelas often as required. Political, institutional andfinancial obstacles to the standing of the ASF willnot be overcome if they are left only to thefunctional experts and/or the military to solve.

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21 A draft MOU between the AU and the RECs has reached its 5th version, but has yet to be adopted.

Annex I

AMIS Chronology

8 April 2004: the Sudanese parties (Government ofSudan, Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement(JEM) sign a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement(HCFA) and a Protocol on the Establishment ofHumanitarian Assistance in Darfur under theauspices of President Idriss Deby of Chad and theChairperson of the AU Commission. Under theHCFA, the parties agree, among others, to

• Cease hostilities and proclaim a ceasefire

• Establish a Ceasefire Commission (CFC)reporting to a Joint Commission (JC)

• Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance

28 May 2004: the Sudanese parties sign anAgreement on the Modalities for the Establishmentof the CFC and the Deployment of MilitaryObservers in the Darfur Region. The agreementincludes modalities for the deployment of 60 AfricanMilitary Observers (MILOBs) and a 300 ProtectionForce, as well as observers from the Sudanese parties

June 2004: AMIS I becomes operational with theestablishment of an embryonic HQ in El Fashir, thedeployment of the CFC and the first group ofMILOBs

27 June 2004: the AU Peace and Security Council(PSC) requests the Chairperson of the Commissionto submit a comprehensive plan on how best toenhance the effectiveness of AMIS

20 Oct 2004: the PSC approves AMIS II.The plansprovides for the transformation of the nature, scopeand composition of AMIS:

• An increase in size to 3,320 personnel,including 2,341 military personnel, amongwhom 450 MILOBs, and a new CIVPOLcomponent of up to 815 personnel

• The establishment of a civilian component

• The nomination of a Special Representative ofthe Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC),to “ensure the overall direction and coordina-tion of the activities of the Mission” and“maintain close contact with the Sudaneseparties, as well as the UN and all otherconcerned actors”

The PSC also authorizes AMIS to perform thefollowing mandate:

• monitor and observe compliance with theHCFA and all future agreements

• assist in confidence building

• contribute to a secure environment for thedelivery of humanitarian relief and the return ofIDPs and refugees to their homes

• contribute to the improvement of the securitysituation in Darfur within the followingconstraint:“[AMIS is] to protect civilians who itencounters under imminent threat and in theimmediate vicinity, within resources andcapability, it being understood that the protec-tion of the civilian population is the responsi-bility of the Government of the Sudan”

January 2005: the DITF is established with the aimof supporting AMIS with “strategic planning andsupport,” scheduling deployment and coordinatingwith international partners

10-22 March 2005: Joint Assessment Mission,including the participation of some AU partners(e.g., UN, EU, US). The Mission concludes thatAMIS should be strengthened initially in two phases:

• to end May 2005,AMIS II should reach fulloperational effectiveness within its existingauthorized strength of 3,320.Achieving this aimrequires:

o full deployment of military, police and othercivilian personnel

o filling the gaps in logistics and administrativesupport

o enhancing structures for organization,management, command and control of theMission, including the creation of a JointLogistics Operation Centre (JLOC) and aJoint Operations Centre (JOC)

• subsequently,AMIS II should be expanded toalmost double the size of its military personneland double the size of its CIVPOL contingent

28 April 2005: the PSC endorses most of therecommendations of the Joint Assessment Missionand congruent recommendations of the MilitaryStaff Committee held on 25 April 2005. It decides to

• increase the strength of AMIS to 6,171 militarypersonnel, up to 1,560 CIVPOL and anappropriate civilian component

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• request the Commission to review AMISCIVPOL CONOPs to enable it to perform itstasks in areas where there is no GoS policepresence

Summer 2005: partners commit and deploy signifi-cant extensive financial, logistical and technicalassistance to AMIS

20 Oct 2005: the PSC extends the mandate of AMISfor 3 months (to 20 January 2006), pending a reviewof all aspects of the situation in Darfur and AMISoperations (i.e., a possible transition to a UNoperation)

10-20 December 2005: Joint Assessment Mission,including the participation of some AU partners(e.g., UN, EU, US). Recommendations include

• the upgrading of the JLOC

• a reiteration of an earlier recommendation thata JOC be created at Forward HQ level tocoordinate operations of all components of theMission

• a reorganization of the Force HQ to place allcomponents, including the CFC, under theCommand and Control of the DHoM

10 March 2006: the PSC extends the mandate ofAMIS until 30 September 2006 and conditions thetransition to a UN operation upon

• the acceptance of the Government of Sudan(GoS)

• a successful outcome of the Abuja Peace Talksand a significant improvement in the securityand humanitarian situation on the ground

• the maintenance, as much as possible, of theAfrican character of the mission

5 May 2006: signature of the Darfur PeaceAgreement (DPA)

15 May 2006: the PSC

• endorses the DPA

• urges those groups that have not signed it to doso by 31st May

• states that the DPA paves the way for the transi-tion from AMIS to a UN operation after 30September

• requires the Chairperson of the AUCommission to submit detailed proposals for

26


the enhancement of AMIS

16 May 2006: UN Security Council Resolution1679 provides for a transition from AMIS to a UNmission

9-22 June 2006: UN/AU joint technical assessmentmission to Sudan and Chad

13 June 2006: launch of the restructured CFC in ElFashir, and 23 June 2006, launch of the restructuredJC (Addis), taking into account the DPA

23 June 2006: the Military Staff Committee approvesa new CONOPS calling for a shift of AMIS from anobserver mission to a more robust peacekeepingoperation, requiring a restructuring of the force, astrengthening of its command and control, andattendant communication and information systems,and an increase in size of both its military and policecontingents

27 June 2006: the PSC

• recognizes those groups that have not signedthe DPA, but have signed the Declaration ofCommitment (DoC) on 8 June [i.e.,AbdulWahid SLM and Khalil’s JEM] and urges themto work towards the effective implementationof the DPA; it requests the AU Commission todevelop practical modalities for their effectiveinvolvement

• takes note of the new AMIS CONOPS and“decides to consider it at the appropriate time,in the light of any decision on a transition tothe UN and the availability of logistical andfinancial support”

• approves the additional tasks proposed underthe CONOPS “including the protection ofcivilians within existing strength and capacity”

20 September 2006: the PSC (Heads of state andGovernment)

• extends the mandate of AMIS until 31 December 2006

• reiterates its commitment to work for a transi-tion to a UN mission

• requests the Commission “to take all thenecessary measures to enhance AMIS on thebasis of the CONOPS” approved by theMilitary Staff Committee on 23rd June,conditional upon UN and other partners’assistance

30 November 2006: the PSC (Heads of state andgovernment)

• endorses a three-phase UN support package toAMIS leading to a hybrid operation

• extends the mandate of AMIS until 30 June2007.

Annex II

Humanitarian Agencies and Principles

• The Geneva Conventions are the bedrock ofInternational Humanitarian Law, available atwww.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions

• The Inter-Agency Standing Committee(IASC) is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance.The IASC is chaired by the UN Office ofHumanitarian Affairs; full members are themajor UN agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, etc.),while standing invitees include organizationssuch as the World Bank and major NGOcoordinations, available atwww.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/

• A number of Guidelines relevant to therelationship between the military component inPSOs and humanitarian agencies have beenissued under the auspices of IASC and OCHA:

â Guidelines on the Use of Military and CivilDefence Assets in Disaster Relief, available atochaonline.un.org/DocView.asp?DocID=871

â Guidelines on the Use of Military and CivilDefense Assets to Support UN HumanitarianActivities in Complex Emergencies, available at

27


www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/products/docs/MCDAGuidelinesMarch03.doc.pdf

Annex III

Training Opportunities in HumanitarianPrinciples and Civil-Military Coordination

Humanitarian Principles

• The International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC) provides both standard trainingprograms and training upon request, available atwww.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/Info_resources:Events?OpenDocument#%3C!--%20d%20--%3ETraining%20courses

Civil-Military Coordination

• UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs) offers training programsin civil-military coordination from the perspec-tive of the major UN humanitarian agencies,available atochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=1004

• Among African institutions, South-Africa basedACCORD (African Centre for theConstructive Resolution of Disputes) offerstraining programs in civil-military coordinationas well as a range of civilian PSO specialties;both the Nairobi-based Peace SupportTraining Centre (PSTC) and the Accra-basedKAIPTC offer CIMIC training based on acommon African approach developed inpartnership with ACCORD.

• Information on further courses can be obtainedfrom the African Peace Support TrainersAssociation, available atwww.apsta-africa.org/information.

www.apsta-africa.org/information

ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=1004

www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/Info_resources:Events?OpenDocument#%3C!--%20d%20--%3ETraining%20courses





ochaonline.un.org/DocView.asp?DocID=871

www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/

www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions

www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions

Co-hosts

International Peace Academy (IPA), New York

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping TrainingCentre (KAIPTC), Ghana

AU Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF)

Lt. Col. O’Fedilis AzintaPlanning Office, Ethiopia

Former AMIS Military Officers

Col. Iliya AbbahNigeria Armed Forces Command and Staff College

Col. Olusegun AdelekeNigeria Armed Forces Command and Staff College;former AMIS Deputy Force Commander and Chiefof Operations, Sudan

Brig. Gen. Anthony AmedohGhana Armed Forces, General HQ; former ChiefMilitary Observer,AMIS

Lt. Col. Peter Ghansah Ghana Armed Forces, Engineer Training School;former Intelligence and Security Officer,AMIS

Brig. Gen. Jean-Bosco KazuraOffice of the President of Rwanda; former DeputyForce Commander,AMIS

Col. Awwal MohammedNigeria Armed Forces; former Sector Commander,AMIS

Col. Paul NdiayeSenegal Armed Forces, General HQ;former Contingent Commander,AMIS

Brig. Gen. Henry Onyango Kenya Air Force; former Team Leader,Force Generation,AMIS

Former AMIS Police Officers

Brig. Sherif El BahaiState Security, Ministry of Interior, Egypt;former CIVPOL Chief of Staff,AMIS

Mr. Godfrey MwanzaZambia Police Service; former Deputy Chief,CIVPOL,AMIS

Police Commissioner James Oppong-Boanuh Ghana Police Service; former Deputy PoliceCommissioner,AMIS

Director Anand Pillay South Africa Police Service,Western Cape;former CIVPOL Commissioner,AMIS

Col. Fadiala Sidibe Mali Police Force; former CIVPOL SectorCommander,AMIS

Former AMIS Civilian Officials

Dr.Wilfred Asombang Freelance Consultant, Zambia; former Head ofAdministrative Control & Management,AMIS

Ms. Meron Kassa Former Humanitarian and Human Rights Officer,AMIS

United Nations

Maj. Gen. Henry Anyidoho (Ret.)UN Assistance Cell in AMIS; Chief of Staff, DITF

Mr. Peter McGhieDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations, New York

Col. Nick Seymour (Ret.) Change Management, Department of PeacekeepingOperations, New York

Humanitarian Actors

Dr. Ahmed El GanainyWorld Health Organisation, Sudan

Mr.Yagoub Osman South Darfur Programme, Oxfam-Sudan

Mr. Kadayapreth Ramachandran UN Children’s Fund, Sudan

Mr. Craig SandersChad and Darfur Special Operations, UN HighCommissioner for Refugees, Switzerland

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List of Participants

Mr. Niels Scott Africa/Middle East & North Africa, InternationalFederation of the Red Cross, Switzerland

International Partners

Mr. Salvator BazimkamweEU African Peace Facility, Belgium

Lt. Col. Brad Bergstrand Peacekeeping and Peace Operations GroupDepartment of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade, Canada

Col. Marc Boileau Office of the EU Special Representative for Sudan,Ethiopia

Brig. Gen. Marc Delaunay Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe,Belgium; former Vice-President, CeasefireCommission,AMIS

Lt. Col. Adrian Garside Royal Logistics Corp, UK; former advisor to AMISunder EU/AU auspices

Lt. Col. Matz JakobssonSwedish Armed Forces Joint Development Center;former Assistant to Deputy Chief, Joint LogisticsOperation Centre,AMIS

Col. Reinhard LinzEU Military Liaison to the AU, Ethiopia

Col. Joseph MartinelliUS Military Advisor to the AU, Ethiopia

Lt. Col. Albert Mollema Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs; formerCommunications Expert, DITF

Lt. Col. David Patterson Canada Military Advisor, Ethiopia

Col. Alberto Serradilla FidalgoPlanning Division, General Staff, Spanish ArmedForces; former EU Military Observer to AMIS

Col. Peter Stamps EU Africa Peace Facility, Belgium

Brig. Gen. Antonius Strik NATO Operations Division, Joint Command Lisbon

CDR John Stubbs NATO Transnational Analysis Division, JointCommand Lisbon

Col. Anne Tjepkema Netherlands Defence Academy; former MilitaryAdvisor to DITF

Brig.Walter Wolf EU CIVPOL Office at DITF; Senior Police Advisorto the AU Peace Support Operations Division andDITF

Regional Economic Communities

Brig. Gen. Hassan LaiECOWAS Standby Brigade,Abuja, Nigeria

Mr. Petros Serame ManyembaSADC Brigade, Planning Element, Botswana

Col. Emmanuel Same Planning, Operations and Training, EconomicCommunity of Central African States, Gabon

Academics and Facilitators

Ambassador James Aggrey-Orleans Former senior diplomat, Ghana

Brig. Gen. Francis Agyemfra (Ret.) F.A.A. Consult, Ghana; former Chief of Staff,Ghana Armed Forces

Dr. Samuel AmooOffice of the President of Ghana

Prof. El Tayeb Hag AttiaInstitute for Peace Research, University of Khartoum

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Dick Baly Private Consultant, UK

Brig. Gen. Daniel Frimpong International Peace Support Operations,Ghana Armed Forces, General HQ

Private Sector

Mr.Tim Newman Procurement and Logistics Support at AMIS,Crown Agents, Ethiopia

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Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping TrainingCentre

Cdr. Albert Addison Deputy Commandant

Mr. Mark Malan Head, Conflict Prevention, Management andResolution Division

Mr. Prosper AddoProgram Officer

Assist. Sup. Fanny AboagyeTraining Development Department

Sup.Vincent Dedjoe Peacekeeping Department

Ms.Trish Chang Intern

Ms. Lindsay Scorgie Intern


Dr. Catherine Guicherd Visiting Fellow

Mr. Mashood Issaka Senior Program Officer

Ms. Kapinga Ngandu Program Officer

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777 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017-3521 p 212 687-4300 f 212 983-8246 www.ipacademy.org


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The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force

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