The Backup Plan Visualizing Disappearing Groundwater Resources on the US-Mexico
Border
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE
INTERSCHOOL HONORS PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
STUDIES
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
By
Adrienne von Schulthess
May 2015
Adviser:
Professor Bruce Cain
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Abstract
The absence of groundwater treaties is a global trend despite the fact that groundwater crosses the majority of international boundaries. Why have property rights over groundwater failed to evolve from the national level to the international level? Given the broad scope of the question, this thesis narrows its geographic focus and asks: What explains the absence of a groundwater treaty for the US-Mexico border?
Visibility is the obvious difference between groundwater and other resources such as surface water, which are regulated by treaties. As a result, current research on groundwater treaties assumes the role of visibility and moves on to look at other issues such as institutional dynamics.1 This is a mistake. This thesis argues that visibility does not play the traditional role it is assumed to have. Its customary role is one that creates ambiguity. For example, negotiators cannot act due to data gaps.
This reveals a critical misunderstanding. These explanations look at groundwater as a singular resource rather than through its relationship with surface water. Within the larger system, groundwater is the dependable resource – it is the backup plan. It lets people know that even in times of a drought they will have water. Groundwater serves as the lack of ambiguity. It lowers the perception of scarcity and with it incentives to manage use on the transboundary level.
To test this argument, this thesis tracks three periods of rapid change in the visibility of groundwater and the reaction on both sides of the border in the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys. These three periods are: the completion of the lining of the All American Canal in April 2010, the 7.2 Sierra El Mayor Cucapah Earthquake in April 2010, and Minute 319 in November 2012. Interviews and written accounts provide an understanding of how visibility, specifically its rate of change, impacted bilateral action on groundwater.
This thesis looks not only at the lack of a groundwater treaty, but also at what will happen if groundwater management does not improve. An analysis of n-level datasets on surface water conflict and cooperation illuminates the role of groundwater in reducing conflict and the implications of its absence.
These findings provide a novel understanding of the roadblocks to a groundwater treaty, and the implications of inaction.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Mumme, Stephen. "Interview." Telephone interview. Mar. 2015. 2 Chinatown. Dir. Roman Polanski. Prod. Robert Evans. By Robert Towne. Perf. Roman Polanski, Jack Nicholson, Faye Dunaway, and John Huston. Paramount, 1974. DVD.
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Acknowledgements
Thank you to my thesis advisor Professor Bruce Cain and my mentor Vanessa
Casado-Perez. Their advice and encouragement was invaluable and without their support I
know this would not be a finished thesis. Working with them through out the year has been
an instrumental part of my Stanford experience. Also, thank you to Francisco Cortes and his
family for hosting me in Mexicali and connecting me to invaluable interviewees. I am also
indebted to la Comisión Nacional del Agua (CONAGUA), my interviewees and past scholars
who compiled the data that I utilized in my thesis. I am also indebted to Parabal Singh and
Iris Hui for their help on data, Professor David Freyberg for consultations on the science of
groundwater and Professor Chip Blacker and Professor Martha Crenshaw for their critical
influence in the direction that this thesis has taken. Additionally, thank you to the Center for
International Society and Cooperation for providing this thesis program and my friends and
classmates for the support throughout this process. Finally, thank you to my moms and
brother. They spent hours talking over theories and looking at my drafts. To my family I owe
everything that has led up to this culminating thesis at Stanford University.
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Table of Contents Abstract 1 Acknowledgements 2 Table of Figures 4 Chapter 1: Introduction 6 1.1 The Sheep Problem
1.2 The Hidden Crisis: Global Groundwater Depletion 1.3 Methods
Chapter 2: Groundwater: A Dangerous and Endangered Resource 12
2.1 Scientific Background 2.2 Groundwater Depletion 2.3 A Changing World 2.4 Data Gaps
Chapter 3: Water Wars? Groundwater in Surface Water Conflict 23
3.1 The Link 3.2 Literature on Resource Conflict 3.3 The Substitution Effect 3.4 Data Analysis 3.5 The Stories Behind the Data 3.6 Conclusions
Chapter 4: The Absence of Groundwater Treaties 48 4.1 The Status of Groundwater Law
4.2 The Treaty Assumption 4.3 Theories for the Lack of Groundwater Treaties 4.4 Lessons from the Past
Chapter 5: Visibility and Bilateral Action 63 5.1 The Visibility Hypothesis
5.2 When Attention is not Enough
Chapter 6: Visualizing Groundwater in the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys 71 6.1 Historical Background 6.2 The Perception of Dependability
6.3 Visualizing the Invisible 6.4 Reaching the Bilateral Level 6.5 The Bigger Picture 6.6 Conclusions
Chapter 7: Conclusion 93 Bibliography 99 Appendices 105
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Table of Figures
Figure 2.1: Groundwater Flow Diagram
Figure 2.2: Types of Transboundary Aquifers
Figure 3.1: Trends in Surface Water Conflict
Figure 3.2: Colorado River Delta Inflows
Figure 3.3: Conflictive and Cooperative Surface Water Events over Time
Figure 3.4: Graph of Water Relations (BAR Scale) and Aquifer Size
Figure 3.5: Lowess Regression of Aquifer Size and Water Relations (BAR Scale)
Figure 3.6: Regression of BAR Scale and Groundwater size
Figure 3.7: Regression of BAR Scale and Groundwater Stress
Figure 3.8: Graph of BAR Scale over Time for Israel
Figure 4.1: International Agreements over Groundwater
Figure 4.2: Table of Literature on the Lack of Groundwater Treaties
Figure 5.1: Trends in Groundwater Coverage in the New York Times (%)
Figure 5.2: Trends in Groundwater Coverage in the El Paso Times (#)
Figure 5.3: Trends in Groundwater Coverage in the El Paso Times (%)
Figure 5.4: Trends in Groundwater Coverage in the U-T San Diego (%)
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“What is essential is invisible to the eye.” - Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little Prince, 1943
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The Sheep Problem
A herd of sheep wandered down the aisle. While this sounds like the beginning of an
entertaining joke, it is anything but amusing. The sheep were disrupting a meeting on a
proposed dam and aqueduct. At this meeting the former mayor proclaimed,
“Today you can walk out that door [and] end up smack in the Pacific Ocean. Now you can swim in it, you can fish in it, you can sail in it – but you can’t drink it, you can’t water your lawns with it, you can’t irrigate an orange grove with it…Without water the dust will rise up and cover us as though we’d never existed! Now the Alto Vallejo can save us from that, and I respectfully suggest that eight and a half million dollars is a fair price to pay.”2 The audience’s claps and hollers of support for the plan turned into gasps of surprise
as the sheep piled in. When a politician called for the animals to be removed, the sheep
owner responded: “Tell me where to take them. You don't have an answer for that. You steal
water from the valley, ruin the grazing, and starve the livestock.”3
This scene takes place at the beginning of the 1974 film, Chinatown. The film finds
its basis in the creation of the Los Angeles Aqueduct. This aqueduct took water from the
Owens Valley for use in Los Angeles, leaving the valley parched, and pitching LA against
the valley. This conflict represents both the scarcity fears and the consumption mentality
surrounding water in California. This mentality is echoed in the real words of the Los
Angeles Superintendent of Water at the dedication of the L.A. Aqueduct: “There it is. Take
it.”4 And Californians have done just that.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2 Chinatown. Dir. Roman Polanski. Prod. Robert Evans. By Robert Towne. Perf. Roman Polanski, Jack Nicholson, Faye Dunaway, and John Huston. Paramount, 1974. DVD. 3 Ibid. 4 Bartholomew, Dana. "100 Years of Water: Los Angeles Aqueduct, William Mulholland Helped Create Modern L.A." Los Angeles Daily News, 11 Jan. 2013. Web. 22 May 2015.
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In 2014, California was dealing with the impact of this consumption mentality as well
as increasingly volatile hydrologic cycle resulting from climate change. As President Obama
said, “Droughts have obviously been a part of life out here in the West since before any of us
were around and water politics in California have always been complicated, but scientific
evidence shows that a changing climate is going to make them more intense.”5 That year,
California Governor, Jerry Brown, declared a State of Emergency. This action was not the
reaction to an earthquake, tsunami, wildfire or disease outbreak. Instead this proclamation
was the result of California running out of water. “We can’t make it rain, but we can be much
better prepared for the terrible consequences that California’s drought now threatens.”6
By 2014 California was in its 4th consecutive year of drought.7 By early 2015, the
California snowpack was the lowest on record,8 only a year’s worth of water was left in
reservoirs,9 and farmers were drilling wells to depths that mined water from 20,000 years
ago.10
In response to this danger, California even began regulating groundwater. California
has a long history of surface water legislation on ownership and infrastructure. However, it
took until 2014 for the state to begin regulating aquifers at which point 62% of California’s
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5 The White House Press Office. "Remarks by the President on the California Drought." The White House. 14 Feb. 2014. Web. 22 May 2015. 6 Office of Edmund Brown. Governor Brown Declares Drought State of Emergency. CA.gov. N.p., 17 Jan. 2014. Web. 22 May 2015. 7 Rice, Doyle. "California's 100-year Drought." USA Today. Gannett, 03 Sept. 2014. Web. 22 May 2015. 8 Ibid. 9 Schlanger, Zoe. "NASA: California Has One Year of Water Left." Newsweek, 13 Mar. 2015. Web. 22 May 2015. 10 Knudson, Tom. "California Is Drilling for Water That Fell to Earth 20,000 Years Ago." Mother Jones. 13 Mar. 2015. Web. 22
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wells had already seen declining water levels.11 When Governor Brown signed AB 1739 on
September 16, 2014, State Senator Fran Pavley said, "California will no longer be the only
Western state that does not manage its groundwater.”12
1.2 The Hidden Crisis: Global Groundwater Depletion
While the crisis in California is dire, the state is not alone. California’s water
resources are shared with neighboring states and countries. Water is inherently an
international problem with rivers and aquifers crisscrossing borders. The next section puts
the late adoption of groundwater regulation measures in California into a global context.
Shared surface water resources have been the focus of attention for thousands of years, while
groundwater has been comparatively ignored. Ignored, but not unused.
The results of this neglect are noticeable. Maps of transboundary aquifers from 2012
show worrying levels of overdraft worldwide.13 For example, the Hueco Bolson aquifer on
the US-Mexico border has experienced years with over 60 meters in drawdown.14
Drawdowns at this level leads local well to go dry and if sustained to the collapse of the
aquifer. A study of US aquifers found recharge rates ranging from 2-1,500 mm/yr.15 While
recharge rates are fixed by climate, withdrawal rates have seen increases as technology has
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11 James, Ian, and Valerie Gibbons. "With Many California Aquifers Declining, Calls Grow for More Oversight of Groundwater." The Salinas Californian. N.p., 10 Jan. 2014. Web. 22 May 2015. 12 Office of Sentator Fran Pavley. "Legislature Tackles Groundwater Regulation." Legislature Tackles Groundwater Regulation. Web. 22 May 2015. 13 Gleeson, Tom, et al. "Water balance of global aquifers revealed by groundwater footprint." Nature 488.7410 (2012): 197-200. 14 Bliss, USArmy-Fort. "Simulated ground-water flow in the Hueco Bolson, an alluvial-basin aquifer system near El Paso, Texas." (2003). 15 McMahon, P. B., et al. "A comparison of recharge rates in aquifers of the United States based on groundwater-age data." Hydrogeology Journal 19.4 (2011): 779-800.
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allowed humans to more effectively exploit these resources. The long-term persistence of
groundwater resources relies on controlling current rates of withdrawal.16
However, even as aquifers become more stressed, international responses to manage
them are muted. The world still has only a handful of groundwater treaties. This puzzle leads
to the central question of this thesis: Why have property rights over groundwater failed to
evolve from the national level to the international level? This broad question is focused
through explaining this absence on the US-Mexico border.
Traditional explanations for the lack of such an evolution are institutional. Scholars
cite large bureaucracies, institutional asymmetries between countries and sovereignty
concerns to explain the lack of groundwater treaties. These institutional arguments are also
paired with the view that the size and heterogeneity of interest groups prevents action on
groundwater within governing institutions.
The institutional theory fails to explain why this problem is unique for groundwater.
If the problem is institutional, such as asymmetrical organizations, why does surface water
not suffer from similar problems? While the institutional explanation may be applicable to
specific cases, evidence demonstrates its inability to link this explanation to a viable
comprehensive theory. Nor do the interest group theories serve as useful guides as the
majority of them fail to explain the source of the obstructive distribution of interest groups.
There exists one theory that addresses a unique characteristic of groundwater, namely
that lack of data available on groundwater due to its underground nature. This thesis rejects
the data explanation. The role of groundwater’s invisibility is to lower ambiguity, not
increase it. Invisibility leads people to see groundwater as a dependable resource. This
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16 There are also efforts on the technological level to create systems for artificial aquifer recharge, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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dependability lowers the perception of scarcity, inhibiting action from escalating to the
international level. The theory therefore posits that as the rate of groundwater visibility
increases, bilateral action on groundwater will also increase.
Understanding the root of groundwater inaction is not only a conservation priority,
but also a security priority. This is highlighted by the fact that “96% of the world’s
freshwater is stored as groundwater and half of this straddles borders.”17 As freshwater use
reaches capacity, not only domestic use of groundwater, but also the ability to divide and
regulate it across borders, will become essential to stability. In recent decades, intensive
groundwater use has allowed countries to keep up with increasing surface water demands.18
Groundwater provides a dependable water source in a world where climate change is shifting
not only the amount of rainfall, but also its distribution and variability.19 As groundwater
levels drop, the viability of groundwater as a backup plan wavers. Yet, the literature lacks an
examination of the role groundwater has been playing in tension over surface water. This
thesis fills the gap by asking: What role has groundwater played in conflict over surface
water resources?
1.3 Methods
To tackle both the lack of treaties and the implications of continued misuse, this
thesis combines qualitative and quantitative methods. To address the lack of treaties, this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17 The Economist. "Deep Waters Slowly Drying Up." International Print Edition. N.p., 7 Oct. 2010. Web. 22 May 2015. 18 Villholth, Karen G., and Mark Giordano. "Perspective—Can It Be Managed?." The agricultural groundwater revolution: Opportunities and threats to development 3 (2007): 393. 19 Feng, Xue, Amilcare Porporato, and Ignacio Rodriguez-Iturbe. "Changes in rainfall seasonality in the tropics." Nature Climate Change 3.9 (2013): 811-815. And Milly, Paul CD, Kathryn A. Dunne, and Aldo V. Vecchia. "Global pattern of trends in streamflow and water availability in a changing climate." Nature 438.7066 (2005): 347-350. (Provides regional predictions)
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thesis hones in on the US-Mexico border. It employs interviews and data from border
communities in the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys, to illustrate the role of invisibility. It also
uses these interviews to link the resulting perception of dependability with low levels of
action to manage groundwater bilaterally. This paper tracks three key periods of rapid change
in the visibility of groundwater and the reaction in the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys. The
three cases are: the completion of the lining of the All American Canal in April 2010,20 the
7.2 Sierra El Mayor Cucapah Earthquake in April 2010,21 and Minute 319 in November
2012.22
Meanwhile, to address the conflict potential of groundwater, this paper uses n-level
datasets on surface water conflict and cooperation along with data on groundwater stress to
understand the role of groundwater in reducing conflict and therefore the implications of its
absence.
These findings provide an original understanding of not only the roadblocks to a
groundwater treaty on the US-Mexico border, but also the implications of inaction. 23
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20 San Diego County Water Authority. "Canal Lining Projects." Canal Lining Projects. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. 21 Orr, Katie. "7.2 Earthquake Rocks Mexicali, San Diego Region." KPBS Public Media. KPBS Public Media, 5 Apr. 2010. Web. 22 May 2015. 22 The International Boundary and Water Comission. "Minutes between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC." IBWC Minutes. IBWC, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. 23 This thesis does not claim to test the role of visibility on a global scale, but uses the case study method to provide preliminary findings for the viability of this explanation. The data analysis provides initial findings for the role of groundwater in surface water conflict and cooperation. However, the dataset can be improved through additional control variables. What these findings do provide is an original understanding of not only the roadblocks to a groundwater treaty on the US-Mexico border, but also the implications of inaction.
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Chapter 2: Groundwater - A Dangerous and Endangered Resource
2.1: Scientific Background
Groundwater is water stored underground, while surface water is water stored above
ground in bodies such as lakes and oceans. Historically, scientists characterized groundwater
as a vast resource fully independent from surface water.24 However, groundwater’s role in
the hydrologic cycle is now apparent. This role necessitates a groundwater management
regime based on an understanding of the larger water system. The hydrologic cycle consists
of the movement of water through evapotranspiration (evaporation from surface water or
transpiration from plants), precipitation (such as rain or snow) and the interaction of water on
land (surface water, groundwater, and runoff).
Groundwater enters the subsurface in recharge areas. A permeable top layer allows
for higher volumes of water to leech into the ground instead of becoming runoff. Water first
flows down through the unsaturated zone, an area with both air and water and separated into
the intermediate and capillary fringe areas. In the top of this zone, water sticks to the rocks
above the water table filing the pores through the influence of tension saturation. Tension
saturation is the result of intermolecular forces such as surface tension. Water moves through
the intermediary zone to the saturated zone where the hydraulic pressure becomes positive.
This zone’s pores are filled in with water. Water flow is directed by gravity, molecular
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24 Groundwater - Manual of Water Supply Practices, M21 (3rd Edition). American Water Works Association (AWWA). 2003. Hall, Robert E., and James E. Rogers. "Transboundary groundwater management: Opportunities under international law for groundwater management in the United States-Mexico border region." Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 21 (2004): 873.
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interactions, and pressure from overlaying water and air. 25 The flow is further controlled by
the material’s porosity (amount of space between the rock material) and permeability (ability
for water to flow between the pores). Given these inputs, it is evident that aquifer flow
follows land gradients, or simply put, water moves downhill. Finally, groundwater is released
through seepage in locations such as the bottom of a river or a spring.
Figure 2.1: Groundwater Flow
Source: Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry, The Center for Disease Control, “Groundwater” Picture.
Groundwater is stored in reservoirs known as aquifers. The basic definition of an
aquifer is “an underground layer of water bearing rock,”26 which includes “rock, sand or
gravel.”27 Aquifers are constrained by aquitards. Aquitards are layers made of less porous
and permeable material. This material constrains the aquifer by blocking flow.28 Other
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25 University at Austin Texas. "Groundwater Hydrogeology." Groundwater Hydrogeology. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. 26 National Geographic. "Aquifer." National Geographic. Encyclopedia, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. 27 Merriam Webster Dictionary. "Aquifer." Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. 28 This term is used interchangeably with the term aquiclude.
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aquifer definitions add caveats to this basic understanding. For example, some require an
aquifer to contain an economically feasible quantity of water for extraction.29
The variety of aquifer definitions arises from the fact that an aquifer is a relative term.
An aquifer in one context is an aquitard in another.30 For example, in comparison to
surrounding sand, shale is an aquitard, but it would be an aquifer if it were confined by low
permeability, un-fractured rocks. This highlights just one of the difficulties faced by
scientists when mapping aquifers.
Aquifers are also understood through structural characteristics. Aquifers are separated
through their confined or unconfined status. In an unconfined aquifer water seeps down
through a porous and permeable surface layer. This type is close to the surface and varies
directly with precipitation. By contrast, in a confined aquifer water cannot flow directly
down due to a confining layer and flows from another location, where a recharge area lacks
the upper confining layer.31 These aquifers are constrained by a layer such as clay that has
very low transmissivity.32 In this case the water may have a piezometric surface above the
clay layer. This means that when a well is drilled the water will flow up above the confining
layer, as seen in the case of flowing artesian wells.
Several divisions complicate this initial grouping of aquifers. While many aquifers
recharge annually from “rainwater, runoff, rivers and lakes,” fossil aquifers were created
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!29 Ouakili, Zoubeir, and Chippo, Habib. Environmental Science, Engineering and Technology: Aquifers : Types, Impacts and Conservation. Hauppauge, NY, USA: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2012. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 22 January 2015. 30 An aquitard is a layer of low permeability material such as clay, which constrains the aquifers. It is also known as an aquiclude. 31 USGS Water Science Glossary. "What Is an Aquifer?" What Is an Aquifer? USGS, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. 32 The ability of water to flow through the substance. USGS Water Science Glossary. "What Is an Aquifer?" What Is an Aquifer? USGS, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015.
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thousands of years ago under different climatic conditions. 33 Their water was deposited in
areas that are now arid or semi-arid. Withdrawal from fossil aquifers is irreplaceable as the
recharge is either nonexistent or irrelevant in comparison to withdrawal rates. Aquifers can
also be categorized by rock type. Karst aquifers are those in carbonate rocks where water
flows through cracks and passages. Clastic aquifers meanwhile transmit water through pores.
Volcanic rocks have their own type of aquifers that can be highly permeable. Finally, sorted
by location, Eckstein and Eckstein (2005) define six types of transboundary aquifers.34
Figure 2.2 Types of Transboundary Aquifers
Type Link with River
TBA TB River Example
Unconfined (1)
Yes Yes Yes (forms border)
Hueco Bolson (US-Mexico), Rio Grande border aquifers (US-Mexico)
Unconfined (2)
Yes Yes Yes (intersects border)
San Pedro Basin Aquifer (US-Mexico)
Unconfined (3)
Yes Yes No Mimbres Basin Aquifer (US-Mexico)
Unconfined (4)
Yes No Yes Mesopotamian Basin (Iraq-Turkey-Syria-Saudi Arabia-Iran)
Confined (5)
No Yes N/A Guarani Aquifer (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay)
Confined (6)
No35 Yes N/A Nubian Sandstone Aquifer (Chad, Egypt, Libya and Sudan)
Based on this underlying understanding of aquifers, the next section will focus on
changing pressures on the groundwater system.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!33 Martin-Nagle, Renee. "Fossil Aquifers: A Common Heritage of Mankind." Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. 2 (2011): 39. 34 Also could add: Davies 2013 – adds socio-economic factors, environmental issues and institutional elements. 35 This type is completely separate from the hydrologic cycle.
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2.2 Groundwater Depletion
In the years leading up to 2005 saw increasing populations, rising per capita water
use,36 and more than half the global population relying on groundwater for basic needs.37
Wada and Heinrich (2013) provide the first quantitative global assessment of the human
influence on transboundary aquifers (TBAs). Their study evaluated changes in aquifer stress
from 1960-201038 and found that stressed aquifers are located mainly in arid and semi-arid
areas such as in the Middle East and Asia. Certain TBAs on the US Mexico border saw stress
levels increase by 41%-114% due primarily to expansion of irrigation.39 While only 8% of
aquifers fall in a high stress category, many of the remaining aquifers are moving in that
direction.40 As a 2013 USGS report found for the US, the rate of groundwater depletion has
increased markedly since 1950, with maximum rates occurring during the most recent period
(2000-2008).”41
Groundwater depletion, namely the decrease in water stored in aquifers, most directly
impacts the long-term availability of water, but it also has several immediate negative
externalities. Groundwater depletion causes land subsidence. Pumping groundwater
decreases the underground pressure and leaves pore space open. This decrease in pressure
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!36 Dellapenna, JW. 2001. The evolving international law of transnational aquifers. In Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: An Israeli-Palestinian Case with an International Perspective, ed. E Feitelson and M. Haddad, 209—257. Kluwer Academic. 37 UN 2003 ‘Water for People, water for life; the United Nations World Water Development Report, UN Sales No. 92-3-103881-8. Barcelona, Spain: UNESCO/Bergahn Books. 38 Aquifer stress: Aquifer Stress Indicator (AQSI) – Calculated by groundwater abstraction, natural groundwater recharge, additional recharge from irrigation as return flow and groundwater contribution to environment flow (such as when it adds to base flow for a local stream). These are compared to get at “how much fraction of the available groundwater recharge us used for human water use.” AQSI greater 1 = stressed. 39 Wada, Yoshihide, and Lena Heinrich. "Assessment of transboundary aquifers of the world—vulnerability arising from human water use." Environmental Research Letters 8.2 (2013): 024003. 40 Ibid. 41 Konikow, Leonard F. Groundwater depletion in the United States (1900-2008). US Department of the Interior, US Geological Survey, 2013.
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causes the surrounding material to compress (especially in unconsolidated rocks such as
sand), leading the ground to drop. Once the decrease in pressure exceeds what is known as
preconsolidated stress, the aquitards, which form the structure of the aquifer, compress
releasing water in an irreversible process.42 Land subsidence damages infrastructure
including bridges, private buildings and canals. While subsidence is generally a slow process,
it can also lead to quick and catastrophic change in the form of sinkholes which form in rock
types such as evaporates and carbonates.43
The overuse of groundwater also leads to saltwater intrusion and contamination of
aquifers, which may force the abandonment of wells. Under normal conditions freshwater
flows towards salt water. However, when large scale pumping takes place, saltwater is drawn
into the freshwater portion of the aquifer. This causes contamination and decreases the area
available for future freshwater. Saltwater intrusion can take place horizontally as the
boundary between the salt and freshwater shifts. 44 Saltwater can also be drawn up through
upconing, which consists of saltwater previously in a deep zone rising.45 The processes that
spread saltwater can similarly draw in other contaminants to the aquifer.
Finally, due to its role in the water cycle, reductions in groundwater impact surface
water flow and wetland survival.46 “Groundwater development depletes the amount of
groundwater in storage and causes reductions in groundwater discharge to streams, wetlands,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!42 USGS. "Land Subsidence." Land Subsidence, USGS Water Science School. USGS Water Science School, May 2014. Web. 22 May 2015. 43 Land Subsidence in the United States USGS Fact Sheet, Dec. 2000. water.usgs.gov 44 Barlow, Paul M. Ground water in freshwater-saltwater environments of the Atlantic coast. Vol. 1262. Geological Survey (USGS), 2003. 45 Ibid. 46 Konikow, Leonard F., and Eloise Kendy. "Groundwater depletion: A global problem." Hydrogeology Journal 13.1 (2005): 317-320.
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and coastal estuaries and lowered water levels in ponds and lakes.”47 This final externality of
groundwater depletion illustrates the danger of relying on groundwater as a replacement for
fully appropriated surface water.
2.3 A Changing World
Groundwater management plans dealing with overuse require a consideration of
external pressures on the system. Many transboundary surface water agreements assume that
water supply and pressures on demand remain constant.48 However, this does not reflect
reality. Understanding the changes and growing pressures on water systems is critical to
constructing management regimes that are viable not only today, but also into the future.
Below is an overview of the pressures facing aquifers in the coming century.
Population growth adds to the demand for groundwater resources.49 As mentioned
above, the global population continues to increase along with per capita water use. Certain
areas will feel this pressure more acutely. A helpful example is the US-Mexico border region.
The advent of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provided economic
incentives to live and work on the border.50 This increased demand for groundwater and links
to the next pressure point: economic growth.
Examining the impact of economic growth highlights the problems with how water is
used. Economic growth on the border is spurred in part by cash crops. NAFTA led to an
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!47 Barlow, Paul ‘Gorudnwater in Freshwater-Saltwater Envrionments of the Atlantic Coast Circular 1262 – if need a picture to illustrate this process see this site ch 1 48 Gleick, Peter H. "Climate change, hydrology, and water resources." Reviews of Geophysics 27.3 (1989): 329-344. 49 Vorosmarty, CJ, Green, P., Salisbury, J., & Lammers, RB (2000). Global water resources: Vulnerability from climate change and population growth. Science, 289,284–288. 50 King, Amanda. Ten years with NAFTA: A review of the literature and an analysis of farmer responses in Sonora and Veracruz, Mexico. Vol. 6. No. 1. CIMMYT, 2006.
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increase in water-intensive crops being cultivated in arid/semi-arid areas. Factory agriculture
and water intensive activities come with development. When predicting areas that will face
water stress, it is critical to understand the paths of development.51
Finally, climate change will have an undeniable impact on the water cycle.
Unfortunately there are still many unknowns in relation to specific impacts. The leading
source on climate change science is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The 2007 IPCC report finds that climate change will shift precipitation patterns.52 This will
impact groundwater recharge through the effect on the permeability of soils; “temporal
variability of precipitation is also likely to lead to soil crusting and hydrophobe soils, such
that overland flow increases and groundwater recharge decreases.”53 In addition to
variability, Dail (1998) found indications of an intensification of hydrologic cycle, namely
worse storms and droughts.54
In the face of rising sea levels, severe weather, changing snowmelt and precipitation
patterns, groundwater can play two roles. “Unchecked, groundwater depletion can exacerbate
the impacts of these changes; conversely, controlled management of groundwater depletion
can contribute to their mitigation.”55 Aquifers can serve as storage to avoid detrimental
impacts of flooding and save up for droughts. Groundwater management will become more
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!51 Vorosmarty, CJ, Green, P., Salisbury, J., & Lammers, RB (2000). Global water resources: Vulnerability from climate change and population growth. Science, 289,284–288. 52 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. "Spatial Patterns of Precipitation Trends." Chapter 3: Observations: Surface and Atmospheric Climate Change. IPCC: Climate Change 2007: Working Group 1, 2007. Web. 22 May 2015. 53 Döll, Petra, and Martina Flörke. "Global-Scale Estimation of Diffuse Groundwater Recharge: Model Tuning to Local Data for Semi-Arid and Arid Regions and Assessment of Climate Change Impact." (2005). 54 Dore, Mohammed HI. "Climate change and changes in global precipitation patterns: what do we know?." Environment international 31.8 (2005): 1167-1181. 55 Konikow, Leonard F., and Eloise Kendy. "Groundwater depletion: A global problem." Hydrogeology Journal 13.1 (2005): 317-320.
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valuable with climate change but will also become more complicated. Climate change is
shifting “the baseline in terms of what is ‘normal’ for drought, water availability and
temperature.”56 For example, “Sea level rise leads to the intrusion of saline water into the
fresh groundwater in coastal aquifers.” 57
A valuable case study for the interaction of groundwater and climate change is
California. California has experienced rising temperature and sea levels along with snowpack
loss. Predictions are that these trends will only get worse. Droughts are more likely when
“lower precipitation and warmer temperatures coincide” meaning that a rise in temperature,
even without losses in rainfall, will increase the likelihood of droughts.58 The example of
California also highlights the ability of climate change to increase the likelihood of extreme
weather events. A high-pressure ridge, known colloquially as the ridiculously resilient ridge,
off of the coast of California explains the current drought. It creates a high-pressure
environment off of the California coast, diverting storms coming from the Pacific to higher
latitudes.59 The occurrence of this phenomenon is three times more likely under climate
change scenarios in comparison to business as usual.60 Across the border in Baja California,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!56 J Peel and J Choy. Water in the West. ‘Water Governance and Climate Change: Drought in California as a Lens on Our Climate Future’ Dec. 2014. 57 Pachauri, R. K., and A. Reisinger. "IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I." II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In: IPCC 104 (2008). 58 Touma, Danielle, et al. "A Multi-model and Multi-index Evaluation of Drought Characteristics in the 21st Century." Journal of Hydrology (2014). 59 Miller, Craig. "‘Ridiculous Ridge’ May Be Back to Prolong California Drought." KQED. KQED Science, 23 Jan. 2015. Web. 22 May 2015. 60 Swain, Daniel L., et al. "The extraordinary California drought of 2013/2014: Character, context, and the role of climate change." Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 95.9 (2014): S3-S7.
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residents similar pressures from drought, and are looking farther and farther afield for new
water sources.61
To conclude, as pressures grow on water sources, their transboundary nature becomes
salient. Suddenly transboundary aquifers are no longer unlimited sources to be exploited by
both countries. Instead, one country’s gain is another’s loss. As aquifers become more
important, their management also becomes more difficult, compounded by feedback loops
created by climate change, and growing demand due to population and economic growth.
2.4: Data Gaps
With increasing pressures, many areas still lack the ability to track the effect on
aquifers. As the IPCC notes, not only is there a dearth of knowledge of the future relationship
between climate change and groundwater, but “even knowledge of current recharge levels in
both developed and developing countries is poor.”62 The US Transboundary Aquifer
Assessment Act attempts to fill in data through research on specific border aquifers. It
attempts “to address the lack of national consensus regarding the source and availability of
future water supplies.”63 This study was motivated by the “piecemeal” studies in the past and
“relatively little information on the Mexican side of the border.”64 The studies that do exist
present results that are site specific. Jarvis (2008) bolsters the problem of a lack of data by
arguing that groundwater agreements cannot move forward without further knowledge as to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!61 Replogle, Jill. "Mexicans Are Dealing with the Same Drought as Their Northern Neighbors, but with Less Water." Public Radio International. PRI World, 26 May 2014. Web. 22 May 2015. 62 Pachauri, R. K., and A. Reisinger. "IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I." II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In: IPCC 104 (2008). Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability 63 214, 109 Cong. (2006) (enacted). Print. 64 Ibid.
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aquifer characteristics. Many scholars find that without a full understanding of groundwater
itself, creating successful management plans is extremely difficult.
The next section will examine the trend of increasing stress on groundwater resources
and assess the impacts of this trend1 for international security.
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Chapter 3: Water Wars? The Role of Groundwater in Surface Water Conflict
3.1 The Link
This chapter analyzes the link between groundwater and surface water conflict, an
area that is underserved in the literature. The first section of this chapter draws on the
literature of resource conflict, honing in on specific theories about surface water. The key
question emerging from this section is: Why has increased scarcity not led to higher levels of
conflict over the resource? The second section addresses this question and provides evidence
for the increased use of groundwater in times of surface water scarcity. This substitution
effect of groundwater for surface water suggests that the presence of groundwater has
mitigated conflict over surface water in the past. The implication of this hypothesis is that as
groundwater sources become increasingly depleted, their ability to delink surface water
scarcity and conflict will weaken, leading to a future where water conflict is increasingly
likely. This hypothesis is first tested with n-level dataset regressions comparing groundwater
characteristics with conflict levels. In the final section, the trends from the initial regressions
are analyzed at the country and event level.
3.2 The Literature on Resource Conflict
Hardin’s seminal paper, The Tragedy of the Commons, introduced the problem of
common pool resources.65 This paper developed the idea that when a resource is open to all,
users will race to use it first. There are inadequate incentives to save for the future due to
fears that others will take the resource first. In the arena of international law, the lack of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!65 Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162.3859 (1968): 1243-1248.
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agreements between countries creates an unregulated commons. An extensive literature has
developed from this paper. Fisheries, which share many characteristics with groundwater,
have been one focus of this literature.66 In addition to focusing on specific resources, the
literature looks at characteristics across resources that exacerbate the problem. Specifically,
Ostrom (1999) argues that it is more difficult to create property rights for complex resources
that are hard to track.
Writings on shared resources look not only at their overuse, but also at their conflict
potential. There are two key concepts linking natural resources and conflict. The first links
resources to conflict through abundance.67 The second proposes a variety of mechanisms
arguing that conflict results from resource scarcity
Abundant resources can create inequalities that cause resentment in adjacent areas.
Dashwood (2000) posits that states encourage conflict within a state, such the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, because they want access to its resources. Similarly, Fearon and
Laitin (2003) propose that in resource rich areas the stakes are higher for controlling
territory. Potential benefits induce fighting. The high stakes also make it difficult to trust
other groups. Ross (2004) finds that higher potential benefits increase the likelihood that a
government will renege on a peace deal. Protecting these benefits also entails risk.
Anticipating attacks, the government will at times deploy forces to areas with major resource
extraction projects. These forces may intimidate the population, commit abuses, or provoke
retaliation.68 These abundance based explanations provided mechanisms for how natural
resources both impact general conflict and conflict over the resource itself.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!66 See an example in Feeney et.al. (1990). 67 Examples include: Collier (2000), De Soysa (2000), and Le Billon ( 2004). 68 See examples in Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (2002) and Renner (2002).
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Thomas F. Homer-Dixon provides the pioneering work for the resource scarcity
argument. He presents three hypotheses: 1. Resource scarcity itself drives conflict, 2.
Scarcity induces population migration, which in turn induces conflict, and 3. Scarcity creates
economic deprivation, which leads to conflict.69 Other scholars find support for these
hypotheses. Westing (1986) uses a set of 12 cases, including WWI and II, to underscore how
natural resource competition can lead to war. Even more drastically, Ehrlich (1970) proposes
that increasing population strains resource availability, which in turn increases the likelihood
of nuclear war.
The scholarly focus on resources and conflict coincided with increasing concerns of
environmental degradation. Several works linked this degradation to increased conflict
occurrence.70 More recent studies examine the impact of climate change on resources and
therefore the likelihood of conflict.71
A subset of resource conflict literature specifically examines surface water. The
literature on surface water conflict is split into two groups: one sees a future where water
becomes a growing source of conflict; the other predicts that disagreements over shared
water resources will be resolved through cooperation. This split arises from both local case
studies and global data sets.
The purely case study-based literature comes from the 1990’s. This literature is
characterized by a focus on water as a source of conflict and tends to gloss over the
cooperative effects of transboundary water resources. For example Remans (1995), Starr
(1991) and Homer-Dixon (1994) focused purely on the conflict driving elements of water.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!69 Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. "Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases." International security (1994): 5-40. 70 For example: Galtung (1982). 71 For example: Homer-Dixon (2007), Salehyan (2008).
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This emphasis on conflict is epitomized in the literature’s frequent use of a quote by former
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, predicting: “The next war in the Middle East
will be over water, not politics.”72 Those who link scarcity and conflict are following a
Malthusian line of thought that believes as resources diminish and populations grow, conflict
is the inevitable result. Peter Gleick and Matthew Heberger, who compile their own data on
the total number of conflictive water events, support this conclusion. They find a trend
towards increasing conflict over water over time.73 This data may be skewed however, due to
better reporting of water events in general, and the trend in increased conflict events may
only reflect an increase in water events overall.
Figure 3.1: Trends in Surface Water Conflict
Source: Gleick and Herberger ‘The World’s Water.’
The relative agreement on the coming water wars was complicated in the 2000s with
the creation of other global data sets. The first was the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!72 Butts, K.H., 1997, ‘The Strategic Importance of Water’, Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Spring. 73 Gleick, Peter, and Matthew Heberger. "The World's Water Volume 8." Water and Conflict: Events Trend And Analysis. 2014. Web. 21 May 2015.
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Database (TFDD) created by Professor Aaron Wolf of Oregon State University.74 This
dataset codes all water events by dyad (a set of two countries) based on,!the Basins at Risk
scale, the level of conflict to cooperation, known as the Basins at Risk scale. The events are
then put in a GIS system to compare with variables such as GDP. Of the 1,831 water
incidents between 1948 and 1999, 67% of incidents were cooperative, 28% conflictive and
5% neutral.75 However, the researchers were unable to find a conclusive explanation why
these incidents fell into these three classifications. No variable on its own predicted conflict.
Friendship-hostility relations was the most predictive variable but only had a !!!of only .12.76
From this data set Wolf (2003) uses a confluence of factors to categorize 17 world basins as
at risk for conflict. Explanations for conflict risk included the incidence of unilateral
development and the internationalization of the basin due to changing borders. This dataset
did not find that the incidence of conflictive compared to cooperative events over water was
increasing.
A second global set by The Pacific Institute is more limited than TFDD because it
only tracks conflict and not cooperation events. This data set, “The Water Conflict
Chronology,” maintains events published every two years.77 The most recent analysis finds
increased conflict over water, but mainly at the subnational level.
Another leader in global water research is Professor Ken Conca at the University of
Maryland. Conca and his fellow researchers focus on the development of international
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!74 Wolf, Aaron. Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. Oregon State University, Web. 75 Wolf, Aaron T., Shira B. Yoffe, and Mark Giordano. "International waters: identifying basins at risk." Water policy 5.1 (2003): 29-60. 76 Ibid. 77 The Pacific Institute. The Water Conflict Chronology. Web.
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agreements over water.78 Conca used the TFDD and a legal treaty database (FAOLEX) to
create a dataset of basins and their official agreements surrounding water. He finds that
agreements are more likely in basins spanning more than two countries and that historical
cooperation prevents future conflict.
Recent developments in the field include a data set published in 2012 by Anna
Kalbhenn and Thomas Bernauer for the years 1997 to 2007.79 In comparison to TFDD, this
data set better distinguishes between years of no water events and years of neutral events.
The dataset also uses different algorithms for finding water events. The development of each
new dataset is an important addition to the field because they help researchers find
misconceptions from previous data sets.
Both case studies and n-level data sets have some results linking scarcity and conflict
and others finding cooperation as a more significant factor.80 A wide range of results on
water scarcity arises even from analysis of the same data set. The Toset (2000) data set finds
a correlation between shared water resources and likelihood of conflict between states.
Using this same data, Gleditsch (2005) found no significant evidence of water scarcity
influencing conflict levels, but reversed this conclusion in his later 2006 study. The lack of
agreement regarding the causes of conflict and cooperation over surface water, calls for
alternative hypotheses to explain the disparate results and further analyses to test these
hypotheses.
The current literature proposes a myriad of theories to explain why surface water
scarcity does not always correlate with conflict. Wolf, Stahl and Macomber (2003) propose !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!78 Conca, Ken. Governing water: contentious transnational politics and global institution building. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. 79 Kalbhenn, Anna and Bernauer, Thomas. 2012 Water Event Database. Web. 2012. 80 Conflict: (Hensel and Brochmann 2007, Gleditsch et al. 2006) and Cooperation: (Kramer 2013, Wolf 1998).
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that precipitation variability causes this inconsistency. Instead of absolute scarcity, they
propose that the changing levels of scarcity and abundance that stress governments to the
point of conflict. This point is especially salient because climate change is expected to shift
rainfall patterns, impacting variability.81 Another prominent theory argues that conflict
results from the rate of change in water resources overwhelming the institutional capacity
(such as water management bodies or treaties) to deal with these changes.82 Another body of
literature looks at the role of treaties and their components in reducing conflict over water.83
The list goes on with various authors finding evidence for mechanisms including overall
friendship hostility (Wolf 2003), balance of power (Soltes 2010) and basin size (Song and
Whittington 2004). Interestingly, many of these studies find that some country dyads (two
countries sharing a water resource) have both high levels of conflictive and cooperative
interactions over water.84
However, there are very few sources that look at the role of groundwater in conflict.
To begin, the large datasets analyzing water conflict do not include groundwater events.
Llamas and Martinez (2005) have looked into connections between groundwater and conflict,
but their approach addresses the need for management as groundwater use increases without
in-depth analysis into the link between groundwater and conflict. Meanwhile, Weezel (2009)
links the presence of groundwater sources to conflict by using the findings of Gleditsch et al
(2006) that found as water resources increased, the opportunity for conflict increased. Along
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!81 Fowler, H. J., C. G. Kilsby, and P. E. O'Connell. "Modeling the impacts of climatic change and variability on the reliability, resilience, and vulnerability of a water resource system." Water Resources Research 39.8 (2003). 82 Wolf, A. T. "Hydropolitical Vulnerability and Resilience Among International Waters." Nairobi: UNEP (2009). 83 Stinnett and Tir 2009 and 2011. 84 Zeitoun, Murumachi and Warner (2010), Zawari and Gerlak (2009) This appears at least initially to rule out several hypotheses such as geography, which do not change over time or are slower to change than water relations (Kalbehenn and Bernauer 2012).
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with these authors, Zeitoun (2007), Jarvis (2008) and Blomquist and Ingram (2003) refer to
the potential for conflict over groundwater due to problems such as information gaps.
However, none of these sources place groundwater into the larger context of general water
conflicts and cooperation. This is a dangerous oversight due to groundwater’s increasing role
in global water provision.
3.3: The Substitution Effect
As surface freshwater use reaches capacity, domestic use of groundwater as well as
the ability to divide and regulate it across borders will become essential to stability. “96% of
the world’s freshwater is stored as groundwater and half of this straddles borders.”85 In recent
decades, intensive groundwater use has allowed countries to keep up with increasing water
demands.86 Groundwater provides a dependable water source in a world where climate
change is altering not only the amount of rainfall, but also its distribution and yearly
variability.87
As noted above, a thorough examination of the literature on surface water and conflict
fails to conclusively link these two factors.88 This failure is best explained by institutional
resilience. The Basins at Risk Global Dataset suggests conflict over water arises when the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!85 The Economist. "Deep Waters Slowly Drying Up." International Print Edition. N.p., 7 Oct. 2010. Web. 22 May 2015. 86 Vilhouth, Karen G., and Mark Giordano. "Perspective—Can It Be Managed?." The agricultural groundwater revolution: Opportunities and threats to development 3 (2007): 393. See also Shah 2000 and Llamas and Martinez Santos 2005. 87 Feng, Xue, Amilcare Porporato, and Ignacio Rodriguez-Iturbe. "Changes in rainfall seasonality in the tropics." Nature Climate Change 3.9 (2013): 811-815. And Milly, Paul CD, Kathryn A. Dunne, and Aldo V. Vecchia. "Global pattern of trends in streamflow and water availability in a changing climate." Nature 438.7066 (2005): 347-350. (Provides regional predictions) 88 Many qualitative papers and data sets lead to this conclusion: Gleditsch (1998), Gordon (2008), Schwartz, Deligiannis and Homer-Dixon (2001), Dinar (2004), and a data set finding: Wolf, Kramer, Carius, Dabelko (2006) and the Oslo Data Set. Some see a link but not total such as UNEP (2004). Others such as Gleick see a connection.
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rate of change in water sources exceeds the institutional capacity to deal with the changes. It
is not absolute scarcity but variability causing conflict.89 Why then has the world not seen a
significant increase in water conflict as climate change has begun to change rainfall
patterns?90 This paper proposes that the explanation comes down to groundwater.91 As the
2014 report by California Department of Water Resources found, groundwater provides 40%
of water in average years and 60% of water during drought years in the state. A recent report
by The Pacific Institute affirms this trend for the Colorado delta.92 The graph below
demonstrates that between 1991-1998, years with higher levels of flows from the Colorado
River, also experienced lower levels of groundwater extraction.93
Figure 3.2 Colorado River Delta Inflows
Source: Cohen, Hanges, Jeck “Missing Water: Uses and Flows of Water in the Colorado Delta Region” The Pacific Institute, 2001.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!89 Wolf, Stahl, and Macomber (2003) among others examine how variability in water sources and not the pure amount of water or per capita allocations are correlated with conflict. See also Wolf (1999). Note: I should look more closely at events in data set to ensure I agree with their conclusions. 90 Dore, Mohammed HI. "Climate change and changes in global precipitation patterns: what do we know?." Environment international 31.8 (2005): 1167-1181. 91 Other scholars on water and conflict have proposed a wide variety of conflicting explanations. See the end of this document for a short literature review on the water and conflict literature. 92 Cohen, Hanges-Jeck “Missing Water: Uses and Flows of Water in the Colorado Delta Region” The Pacific Institute, 2001. 93 Figure: Cohen, Hanges-Jeck “Missing Water: Uses and Flows of Water in the Colorado Delta Region” The Pacific Institute, 2001.
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Tina Shields, a water manager for California’s Imperial Irrigation District, provided a
qualitative confirmation of this substitution effect. She noted that, “Up north when they get
zero allocation [of surface water], everyone turns their pumps on…. down here water is
religion and its people and families get uptight about it.”94 Shields conveys an understanding
of how groundwater changes the calculations of water users. Groundwater serves to dampen
the pains of variable surface resources.
However, when examining the potential for conflict arising from water, most water
scholars have overlooked the likelihood that conflict could arise in areas when they start
losing their groundwater resources.95 Scholars and politicians are ignoring the critical time
when countries will be forced to deal with their transboundary water issues and make the
decision between conflict and cooperation. While scholars have ignored the role of
groundwater in mitigating potential surface water conflicts, they have recognized the
potential for conflict over groundwater itself as sources dwindle without management and
apportionment agreements. For example, Eckstein and Eckstein (2005) note that the lack of
groundwater treaties has led to this resource being left out of consideration when evaluating
infrastructure projects. This omission can lead to destabilizing changes in resource
availability.
Gilbert Anaya of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) spoke
about the dangers of stressing groundwater resources. In California, “drought hit and put an
immediate impact on surface resources so communities relied on surface were having to rely
on groundwater.” However “if you pump the elevation lower and lower you create a
disconnect between surface water and groundwater…if you are continuing to draw because !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!94 Shields, Tina. "Interview." Telephone interview. April. 2015. 95 Chapter 3 provides a quantitative assessment of what level of groundwater stress leads to an increased likelihood of surface water conflict.
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you need water, it’s going to take longer to recover.”96 Mining groundwater in the present
endangers the future.
3.4 Data Analysis
Given the current gaps in the literature as to the role of groundwater in conflict, this
section uses several tests of groundwater availability and stress to analyze its role in surface
water relations. The first step in data analysis identified the unexpected findings in the
literature section that rejected the water wars hypothesis.
H1: Water Wars Hypothesis
Findings: The Basins at Risk (BAR) study did not find support for this hypothesis.
The Basins at Risk study notes, “arid regions were not found to be substantially more
conflictive than other climate zones, excepting humid mesothermal regions.”97 (See
Appendix 1 for Graph)
Not only is there a weak correlation of water scarcity and conflict by region, but also
over time. The ratio of conflictive events versus cooperative events in the BAR database does
not increase over time. This is surprising given that the world has seen increased pressures
on surface water resources as population growth and economic development have increased.
Figure 3.3 Conflictive and Cooperative Surface Water Events over Time
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!96 Anaya, Gilbert. "Interview." Telephone interview. April. 2015. 97 Yoffe, Shira. “Basins at Risk” Dissertation. Oregon State University.
Increased!Surface!Water!Stress!
Conflict!over!surface!water!resources!
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Source: Yoffe, Shim, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano. "Conflict and cooperation over international freshwater resources: indicators of basins at RISR1." (2003): 1109-1126.
This failure to find a correlation between surface water scarcity and conflict gives rise
to this study’s hypothesis, which states that groundwater may have inhibited conflict levels in
the past, but will fail to do so in the future. (See next section for detailed hypothesis)
3.4.1 Methods
Adding groundwater variables from the International Groundwater Resources
Assessment Center (IGRAC) aquifer map and Wada (2013) into the Transboundary
Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) tested the hypothesis.
The first test compared the TFDD data to the IGRAC data. The TFDD Basins at Risk
(BAR) dataset places international events over surface water on a scale of -7 (war) to +7
(treaty) (See Appendix 2 for BAR Descriptions). The TFDD dataset was modified to serve as
the dependent variable (DV) for this study. All of the events that did not fit into the
categories of ‘y’ and ‘y-other’ were removed. ‘Y’ includes “events between riparian nations
concerning an international basin they share where water is involved as either a consumable
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resource or a quantity to be managed.”98 Y-other fits the same definition as Y, but in these
cases, a country can be a third party choosing to get involved in a dispute between two other
countries. The categories removed from the dataset pertained to events either between
countries that did not share a border, pertained to objectives other than the water itself such
as navigation or were missing data. To obtain data for the independent variables (IV), this
study used an IGRAC map, version 2014, to evaluate the size in square kilometers of
aquifers shared by each dyad. If a dyad has multiple aquifers, the values are summed.
The second test uses data from Wada (2013) and the years 2005-2008 from the TFDD
dataset. The years 2000-2008 were missing category designations in the TFDD dataset.
Therefore, this study replicates the BAR method for designating events into categories for
2005-2008.99 As above, only the events categorized as y and y-other were included. The
independent variable was the Aquifer Stress Indicator (AQSI), which is used to measure
aquifer stress.100
The US-Mexico dyad’s AQSI was a significant outlier, given the lower number of
events for the years 2005-2008. Because of the long border between the US and Mexico and
to adjust for the AQSI outlier, this study separates US-Mexico events by basin with one
designation for events that affected the whole border area. This provided a better
understanding of how the local stress impacts results. While this is not repeated for other
events, future research could repeat these tests with the DV as basin instead of dyad. Events
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!98 Yoffe, Shim, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano. "Conflict and cooperation over international freshwater resources: indicators of basins at RISR1." (2003): 1109-1126. 99 Only categories to 2005-2008 were added because this was the range that fit best with the Wada (2010) dataset, which would later be combined with the BAR dataset. 100 Aquifer Stress Indicator (AQSI) – A comparison of groundwater abstraction, natural groundwater recharge, additional recharge from irrigation as return flow and groundwater contribution to environment flow. An AQSI greater than one indicates that withdrawals are exceeding recharge rates.
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in TFDD were also eliminated if they pertained to dyads without aquifers, as the goal is to
understand how the aquifer stress level impacted relations.
Both tests also incorporated a control variable. This variable controls for the levels of
overall friendship/hostility in the dyad. This accounts for situations where countries may be
fighting over surface water for reasons unrelated to decreases in groundwater. The variable
used to proxy for levels of hostility/friendship is trade. Many studies have demonstrated that
the level of trade signals the level of hostility between nations.101 The trade data was sourced
from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Data Set.102 The level of trade
dependence was calculated through averaging the percentage of exports in each direction
(Country A to B and B to A). Due to a lack of data for some countries or years, 1024 of the
BAR dataset observations were eliminated for the first test, leaving 1,648 observations to
analyze in the final data set. For the second test, 40 observations were eliminated, leaving the
dataset with 291 observations.
There were three key data problems and potential sources of error. The first is that
Europe has a new data management policy for groundwater. This led to the listing of many
EU countries as not sharing aquifers when they, in fact, do share aquifers. These cases were
removed from this study’s data set unless it could be determined with certainty if the
countries did or did not share an aquifer. The second source of error was in matching the
datasets. The BAR dataset covers events from 1948-2008. However, the IGRAC map used to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!101 For example: Gartzke, Erik, and Quan Li. "Measure for measure: Concept operationalization and the trade interdependence-conflict debate." Journal of Peace Research 40.5 (2003): 553-571. And Polachek, Solomon William. "Conflict and trade." Journal of Conflict resolution 24.1 (1980): 55-78. 102 International Monetary Fund (2014-12-26). Direction of Trade: Exports | Country: Afghanistan, 2013. Data-Planet™ Statistical Datasets by Conquest Systems, Inc. [Data-file]. Dataset-ID: 056-002-001
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designate the size and number of the aquifers is from 2014.103 Each iteration of this map has
substantial differences. This suggests that not all aquifer designations are correct. Finally, the
trade data was skewed towards missing observations in less developed countries. This has the
potential to add bias to results as it restricts types of cases present in the regressions.
3.4.2 Results
The data was used to test key hypotheses on the role of groundwater in
conflictive/cooperative relations over surface water. This section is organized by the
hypotheses. Each hypothesis is explained and then a findings section presents the equation,
regressions and graphs pertaining to this hypothesis.
H2: The Substitution Hypothesis
Findings:
The Substitution hypothesis was tested by comparing dyads with and without
groundwater. A t-test confirmed the null hypothesis, rejecting H2.
However, this is a simple test and the next hypothesis adds nuance to the initial
hypothesis by allowing an analysis of smaller trends within the data that is not possible with
a dummy variable. H3 posits that areas with smaller groundwater resources will experience
higher levels of conflict because groundwater will not be significant enough to decrease
tensions through the substitution effect.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!103 IGRAC. "IGRAC Publishes New Transboundary Aquifers of the World Map." IGRAC. N.p., 2015. Web. 22 May 2015.
Presence!of!Groundwater! The!SubsituDon!Effect!
Decreased!Surface!Water!Stress!/Variability!
Lower!Levels!of!Surface!Water!Conflict!
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H3: Amount of Shared Groundwater Resources
Findings:
The first test of the hypothesis, graphing conflict levels and aquifer size, confirmed
H3. An r2 value of .452 was found – as seen in the graph below. This is a significant result
especially when compared to the Basins at Risk study which tested dozens of variables
hoping to explain the variance in surface water relations and the highest value these tests
obtained was an r2 of .12 for the overall level of friendship and hostility between the two
countries. Therefore the groundwater variable ranks among the highest variables tested to
date.
Figure 3.4: Graph of Water Relations and Aquifer Size
This comparison was followed by a Lowess non-parametric regression to better
understand local trends. The small aquifers are concentrated below 46,000 square kilometers
Higher!amounts!of!shared!groundwater!
Strengthens!the!subsDtuDon!effect!
Decreases!surface!water!conflict!
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39!
and the large aquifers are above 1,345,000 square kilometers. The regression revealed a
shifting relationship between size and conflict. The clear trend shows an initial positive
correlation, transitioning to negative in the middle zone and then back to positive. This
suggests that increased cooperation only correlates with increased aquifer size for small and
large aquifers.
Figure 3.5: Lowess Regression of Aquifer Size and BAR Scale
The next step takes this initial graph of the trends and proposes an equation for this
relationship.104
!"!!"#$% = !∅ + !! !"#$%& + !! !"#$%&2 + !! !"#$% + !""#"!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!104 Variables Defined: SizeGW – The size of the aquifers shared by each dyad in hundred thousand square kilometers. This was created by summing the size of all the border aquifers. Data source: International Groundwater Resources Assessment Center (IGRAC) 2014 Aquifer Map. SizeGW2 – SizeGW squared. Trade – Average percentage of trade within the dyad. Data source: International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade dataset. !∅ - The constant, y-axis intercept.
-50
5
BA
R_S
cale
0 1000000 2000000 3000000 4000000Total Area of Shared Aquifers (km2)
bandwidth = .8
Lowess smoother
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Figure 3.6: Regression of BAR Scale and Groundwater size
BAR scale (1) (2) (3) (4)
SizeGW .130** (.054)
-.662*** (.172)
-.200** (.084)
-2.062*** (.252)
SizeGW2 .263*** (.054)
.645 (.085)
Trade .721* (.370)
1.130*** (.385)
N 2720 2720 1664 1664 R2 .002 .010 .005 .043
Constant 1.855 1.958 1.759 1.130 *,!**,!***!denote!significant!at!the!10,!5!and!1%!level.!The!robust!standard!error!is!in!parentheses.!
As seen in the regression above, the size of shared aquifers is not initially significant
(1), but once the trade control is added to the regression (3), there is a significant negative
correlation. This rejects H3, suggesting that increasing aquifer size leads to increasing
conflict. However, the significance of the SizeGW2 variable suggests that this is not a linear
relationship, and local trends should be examined (2).
Regressions are then repeated for small (aquifer area below 46,000 square
kilometers), medium and large (aquifer area above 1,300,000 square kilometers) sizes of
aquifers (See Appendix 3 for Regressions).!Small levels were defined as total aquifer sizes at
or below the 25th percentile, and large as at or above the 75th percentile of SizeGW. The
results suggest that within the small category, increased aquifer size is negatively correlated
with conflict (this denotes a positive relationship between size and BAR scale). This subset
confirms H3 and follows a logarithmic instead of linearly positive correlation, given the
significance of SizeGW2. Large aquifers also confirm the H3 hypothesis, but follow a
positive linear relationship. The overall negative relationship, is therefore, the result of the
middle section, which has a strong negative relationship between BAR and Size, rejecting
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H3. This discrepancy may be due to the fact that the stress on the aquifers is not controlled
for in this test. The next hypothesis looks into the role that the stress and not just the aquifer
size may be playing in levels of surface water conflict.
H4: Groundwater Stress
Findings:
This test compares the levels of aquifer stress as measured by AQSI with the dyad’s
level of conflict/cooperation for the years 2005-2008. The proposed equation is:105
!"!!"#$% = !∅ + !! !"#$ + !! !"#$2 + !! !"#$% + !""#"!
This equation represents the proposition that the level of hostility/cooperation is
determined by the level of aquifer stress, with the variable of trade to control for overall
relations. The variable AQSI2 is added to improve the fit.
Figure 3.7: Regression of BAR Scale and Groundwater Stress
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!105 Aquifer Stress Indicator (AQSI) – A comparison of groundwater abstraction, natural groundwater recharge, additional recharge from irrigation as return flow and groundwater contribution to environment flow. An AQSI greater than one indicates that withdrawals are exceeding recharge rates. 105Data Source: Wada (2010). AQSI2 – AQSI squared. Trade – Average percentage of trade within the dyad. Data source: International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade dataset. !∅ - The y-axis intercept, or the level of relations at zero water stress.
Increased!Groundwater!Stress!
A!weakenened!subsDtuDon!effect!
Increased!Surface!Water!conflict!
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Bar Scale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AQSI -.154*** (.024)
-1.005*** (.181)
-.170*** (.028)
-1.005*** (.177)
AQSI1 (without outliers)
-.917*** (.170)
-2.404*** (.457)
-.918*** (.165)
-2.402*** (.464)
AQSI2 .046*** (.009)
.045*** (.009)
.926*** (.286)
.923*** (.288)
Trade .008 (.006)
.005 (.007)
.005 (.007)
.0004 (.006)
N 291 291 290 290 286 286 285 285 R2 .051 .133 .056 .134 .109 .142 .111 .142 Constant .868 1.264 .816 1.228 1.248 1.427 1.211 1.425 *,!**,!***!denote!significant!at!the!10,!5!and!1%!level.!The!robust!standard!error!is!in!parentheses.!
1.!AQSI!(without!outliers):!While!all!the!observations!were!below!an!AQSI!of!3,!the!US\Mexico!dyad!was!at!an!AQSI!of!just!over!19.!An!understanding!of!trends!was!difficult!as!this!variable!alone!shifted!results.!Therefore!two!regressions!were!run,!one!with!and!one!without!this!dyad.!
The results demonstrate that the AQSI- BAR Scale relationship is not linear as (1)
was improved in (2) with the addition of the significant AQSI2 variable. This pattern holds
for AQSI with and without outliers - Regressions (4) and (8). The negative value for the
AQSI constant and the positive value for the AQSI2 constant reveal that as stress levels
increased from zero to the beginnings of stress, the relationship with BAR was negative,
suggesting that increased stress was correlated with more hostile relations. However,
interestingly, once stress levels hit a high enough stress level, stress was positively correlated
with BAR and therefore negatively correlated with conflict. This suggests that after a tipping
point in stress level, cooperation would be expected.106
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!106!One potential mechanism for this shift is that the resource is no longer worth fighting over as it will soon be gone.!
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These results suggest that as the majority of observations that are unstressed at
current levels move to medium stress levels, incidence of conflict will increase. However at a
certain point, if conflict does not lead to lower stress levels, cooperation will arise. This has
two implications. First, it means that water conflict is closer than expected. Secondly, the
aquifers that need to be watched, unlike the previous Basins at Risk study findings, are not
the ones that are the most stressed, but those on the edge of stress.
3.5 The Stories Behind the Data
This quantitative analysis provides initial insight into the correlation between
groundwater characteristics and surface water conflict. The following examination of the
individual event data helps illuminate the dynamics at play in both events that conform and
do not conform to the observed n-level trends.
A part of the data that merits further consideration is error. For example two both
Bulgaria/Romania and Egypt/Israel have high level AQSI variables. However,
Bulgaria/Romania has the expected cooperative relations, while Egypt/Israel have negative
relations despite the high scarcity. The Egypt/Israel result is misleading. There is only one
event between 2005-2008. This event is -2 on the BAR Scale and states, “Egypt has refused
to share water with Israel, sighting local and regional shortages as rational. Egyptian Minister
of Irrigation Dr. Mahmud Abu-Zayd warned that the Middle East’s need for water will only
grow and urged for negotiations to avert future conflict.”107 This is a very misleading event.
While it is negative it also confirms the findings of cooperation at high stress levels. While
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!107 Wolf, Aaron “TFDD Basins at Risk Dataset” Oregon State University.
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Egypt is not sharing in this case, they are also calling for broader cooperation on surface
water issues. There also may be other unaccounted for variables at play in this one case.
The areas with violent conflict were focused in the middle AQSI range, as the
hypothesis would predict. Below are two cases of middle stress levels and conflict. These
more in-depth descriptions of the events provide an understanding of the dynamics at play in
the BAR events.
This first event took place in 1991 between India and Bangladesh. By 2010, these
countries had a medium AQSI at .105. The event is described as “A spokesman for India's
Border Security Force (BSF) said two Bangladeshi troopers were killed in a three-hour
shoot-out with Indian paramilitary police over an argument about where an irrigation channel
should be dug. The spokesman said shooting began when Bangladeshis refused to stop
digging a ditch that the BSF said was on the border. He said three BSF men were wounded
in the incident which took place between the Indian village of Rangmadi in the northeastern
state of Tripura and Sigiura in Bangladesh.” This event clearly signals a high value on water
and tensions over surface water use.
The second case is between Mali and Mauritania. “Thirteen people died in communal
clashes in June 1999 along border between Mauritania and Mali. Conflict started when
herdsmen in Missira-Samoura village in west Mali refused to allow a Mauritania horseman to
use watering hole. The horseman returned with some of his clansmen, attacking the village
on June 20, causing 2 deaths. In the retaliation that followed, 11 more died.” The
transboundary aquifer is AQSI is .22, which is a middle value. However, other factors may
be at play in this case. There are rapidly changing demands on the water in the border area.
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To start, the basin’s population in 1999 was growing at a rate of 3%.108 Additionally there
was an influx of refugees in Mauritania from Mali, stressing resources. This was the result of
ethnic conflict in Mauritania from 1989-1990, leading to 15,000 Mauritanians living in Mali.
While only 5,000 refugees were left by 1998, this shifting population, would have stressed
resources and potentially led to the protectionism on the part of Malians to prevent outside
Mauritanians from using their resources.109
The other interesting trend in the data is the presence of both cooperative and
conflictive relations in several dyads. One significant occurrence of this trend is with India
and Pakistan at AQSI 1.31. The events center on several themes. One is that the two
countries repeatedly claim that one or the other is violating the Indus water treaty. The
second is that the issues of the Bagilar hydroelectric plant and construction of several dams
are very contentious with regards to their effect on downstream water levels. This link with
energy gets at the emerging trend of an energy water nexus, which suggests that water
conflict may not only be the result of future agricultural, but also, energy demands. There is
also a focus in these events on how water issues are fitting into the larger peace process. This
signals that relations in this dyad may be significantly linked to trends in overall
friendship/hostility, decoupling surface water relations from groundwater. However, a
regression of BAR Scale events between India and Pakistan with the Friendship/Hostility
variable (trade), does not find a significant relationship. This suggests that the variance is not
driven by the historic animosity in this dyad. To understand, if shifting scarcity or an
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!108 Priscoli, Jerome Delli. Managing and transforming water conflicts. Cambridge University Press, 2009. 109 US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. "U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1999 - Mauritania." N.p., 1 Jan. 1999. Web. 22 May 2015.
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alternate variable is causing dyads to have both positive and negative relations, further study
is needed to track scarcity over time for dyads.
The case of Israel provides a classic example of both negative and positive relations.
It supports the key conclusion of this chapter, namely that groundwater scarcity poses the
greatest threat as scarcity begins. The history of relations between Israel and surrounding
countries over water involves both cooperative and conflictive events. Israel in the late 2000s
faced stress levels in the high bracket of the AQSI. This recognizes that it has already passed
the most conflictive time in surface water relations. The transition to high stress levels took
place in the 1960s.110 The situation has only gotten worse. BAR data from the 1948 to 2008
show that the average level of conflict first increases (moving from low to medium stress)
but then decreases (moving from medium to high stress). The mid-1950s to 1970s on the
graph below represent the time with the most conflictive surface water event. This fits with
the evidence that the transition to medium stress took place in the 1960s.
Figure 3.8: Graph of BAR Scale over Time for Israel
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!110 Weinthal, Erika, et al. "The water crisis in the Gaza strip: prospects for resolution." Groundwater 43.5 (2005): 653-660.
\8!\6!\4!\2!0!2!4!6!8!
DATE!
2/16/2007!
5/4/1951!
9/2/1953!
2/16/1955!
4/20/1956!
2/26/1957!
5/13/1957!
9/2/1957!
11/6/1958!
11/6/1961!
3/17/1965!
2/19/1967!
8/23/1991!
4/30/1992!
5/9/1993!
4/16/1994!
6/22/1995!
7/27/1995!
12/15/1995!
4/15/1996!
8/14/1996!
8/24/1997!
6/17/1998!
5/2/1999!
12/10/1999!
Time%
Trend%in%Israel%BAR%Scale%over%Time%
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This data is also supported by qualitative evidence. In 1979 Israel and Jordan began to
secretly cooperate on water issues. This suggests that cooperation on water issues was
independent of general relations, as tensions between the two countries meant that these
discussions needed to be kept private. Israel saw high levels of cooperation over water
resources in the 1990s with a treaty concluded with Jordan in 1994 and Palestine in 1995. At
this point groundwater levels maintained significantly high levels of stress.
The case study of Israel and the quantitative tests in this section provide strong
backing for the hypothesis that groundwater is serving a role in mitigating surface water
conflict and the overuse of groundwater at present is a threat to security. The tests also
provide a complex perspective, finding that this will not be a linear relationship. While these
results are robust they leave room for other variables to serve roles in surface water relations.
3.6 Conclusions
In conclusion, the quantitative analysis provides initial support for the role that
groundwater serves as a substitution for surface water with the effect of decreasing conflict
over surface water. This analysis also suggests that groundwater may no longer play this role
in the future and this will change sooner than expected. This chapter suggests that the areas
that are most in danger of surface water conflict are not the areas with the highest aquifer
stress levels, but instead those transferring from low to medium stress levels. This creates an
imperative to understand why there is a lack of action to create groundwater treaties to
preempt this threat to security. The next chapter will address theories regarding the lack of
treaties and provide an alternative explanation for this trend.
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Chapter 4: The Absence of Groundwater Treaties
Even without considering the conflict potential, scholars are increasingly recognizing
the importance of action to conserve groundwater. Once an aquifer hits a critical stress level,
it will become unusable into the future leading to social and economic impacts on local areas.
Despite these scholarly calls for action, the world still lacks groundwater treaties. The
challenge is therefore to understand why the world has not seen action to control
groundwater depletion.111 This chapter describes the progress that has been made on
international groundwater law and the value of this body of law (treaties) to address
groundwater depletion. The chapter then reviews the scholarly literature that explains the
lack of treaties. Finally, this chapter concludes by applying these scholarly theories to the
groundwater treaties that are present around the world
4.1 The Status of Groundwater Law
While there is a general lack of groundwater law there has also been limited progress
in the last few decades. The FAO Office of Director General compiled a list of international
agreements mentioning groundwater up to 2005.112
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!111 Why have property rights over transboundary groundwater not evolved from the domestic to international level despite an increased understanding of interdependence? 112 Burchi, Stefano, and Kirsten Mechlam. "Groundwater in International Law Compilation of Treaties and Other Legal Instruments." Food and Agriculture Organization. FAO Legislative Study, 2005. Web. 22 May 2015.
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Figure 4.1: International Agreements over Groundwater
Type of International Agreement
Number of Agreements in this Category
Example Agreement
Groundwater Agreements
2 (+1 Franco Swiss Agreement)
Programme for the Development of a Regional Strategy for the Utilization of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS) October 2000.
Global Conventions containing provisions on groundwater
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses May 1997.
Regional Treaties containing provisions on groundwater
8 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources July 1985.
Basin Specific Treaties!containing provisions on groundwater
6 Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube June 1994.
Bilateral Treaties!containing provisions on groundwater
7 Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan October 1994.
European Community Law
3 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Groundwater Against Pollution September 2003.
International Non-Binding Instruments
8 United Nations Water Conference - Mar del Plata Action Plan 1977.
Non-Governmental Instruments
3 International Law Association (ILA) - The Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters 1986.
Total 40
As seen above, there are agreements that address groundwater. However, it is
significant to note that only three agreements are purely focused on groundwater. This result
is repeated in the Transboundary Freshwater Treaties Database (TFDD), which finds of the
495 water treaties surveyed, only 37 of these even mentioned groundwater.113 Professor
Utton and Mexican Ambassador Sepulveda created the Bellagio Draft Treaty in 1989, which
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!113 Wolf, Aaron “TFDD Basins at Risk Dataset” Oregon State University.
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laid out specific best practices for groundwater specific treaties.114 Yet, until the 2000s the
only dyad treaty was the 1977 Franco-Swiss treaty. 115 This remains the first, and to date, the
most successful and detailed, bilateral groundwater treaty. This Franco-Swiss Arrangement
on the Genevese Aquifer deals with overdraft after the aquifer had hit critical stress levels.
As a result of the agreement, the Swiss built and ran an aquifer recharge project with joint
French funding. Five million cubic meters per year of groundwater were allocated for French
use with the first three million cubic meters provided for free. This agreement was replaced
by a convention in 2008.116
In the late 2000s two more groundwater specific agreements were created. In 2009,
the Iulldemeden aquifer states created a joint management structure and in 2010, the Guarani
aquifer in South America reached an agreement, which was received as significant progress
given past agreements.117
There are several agreements that while not specifically focused on groundwater go
past information sharing and allocate groundwater. One of the more extensive examples is
Israel’s Peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 and Palestine in 1995.118 The 1994 agreement lays
out general restrictions based on the principle that neither country should act in ways that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!114 Hayton, Robert D., and Albert E. Utton. "Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio draft treaty." Nat. Resources J. 29 (1989): 663. 115 There were two very specific agreements in the early 1900s. There is not much know about these and they were well specific: Convention between Great Britain and Sultan Abdali (1910), and Ramla Well (1925 Egypt and Italy). 116 de los Cobos, G. "The transboundary aquifer of the Geneva region (Switzerland and France): successfully managed for 30 years by the State of Geneva and French." ISARM 2010 International Conference on Transboundary Aquifers: Challenges and new directions. Paris, 2010. 117 Villar, Pilar Carolina, and Wagner Costa Ribeiro. "The Agreement on the Guarani Aquifer: a new paradigm for transboundary groundwater management?." Water International 36.5 (2011): 646-660. 118 Wolf, Aaron “TFDD Basins at Risk Dataset” Oregon State University.
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“appreciably reduce yields or quality of these wells and systems.”119 The treaty also limits
Israel’s yearly abstractions from wells in Jordan’s territory to 10 million cubic meters above
1995 levels. The Palestinian agreement goes further by estimating and allocating for the
future needs of the Palestinian population.
This summary does not suggest that groundwater is being adequately addressed on
the international level. The number of agreements is extremely low especially considering
that groundwater straddles the majority of borders in the world and during the past 50 years
surface water has been the subject for over 150 specific treaties.120 Groundwater cooperation
remains at initial stages allowing for continued depletion of the resource.
4.2 The Treaty Assumption
The international concern regarding the lack of groundwater treaties assumes that this
is the most effective solution to limit aquifer overdraft. This section provides an overview of
the other possible mechanisms to control depletion and their limitations.
One set of scholars calls for local instead of national level agreements.121 For
example, Evans (2005) argues for the need to delegate groundwater agreements to the state
level. Evans suggests that states are allowed to engage in transboundary aquifer agreements
when the federal government fails to act. Furthermore, state level action is desirable because
local actors who are most directly affected should be the ones to regulate groundwater. As
Evan’s points out, US states are unwilling to cede control to the national government due to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!119 Text of Agreement from Burchi, Stefano, and Kirsten Mechlam. "Groundwater in International Law Compilation of Treaties and Other Legal Instruments." Food and Agriculture Organization. FAO Legislative Study, 2005. Web. 22 May 2015. 120 UN Water. "Water for Life, 2005-2015, UN-Water, United Nations." UN News Center. UN Web. 22 May 2015. 121 Mumme and Pineda (2002), Eckstein and Hardberger (2008), Eckstein (2011).
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worries that at the federal level there are different incentives and preferences on groundwater
use. The other argument brought up by proponents of local agreements is the varied nature of
aquifers, which makes it difficult to create one regime for the whole border. While these are
legitimate concerns, they ignore critical pitfalls to local agreements over transboundary
natural resources. Local or state agreements are not binding due to the US Federal
Government’s control of treaty ratification. While Evans (2005) attempts to provide a legal
argument for the ability of individual states to enter into treaties, any binding agreement
without federal government approval would be extremely controversial and potentially
unconstitutional. Both the lack of enforcement and lower monitoring abilities has the
potential to undermine local agreements.
Another option for regulating groundwater focuses on market incentives. Solutions
include increasing the price of water (Mumme 2005), and creating a water cap and trade
system (Colby 2000). While these solutions could have benefits on one side of the border,
bilateral coordination would be needed or disparate polices could allow for continued
overdraft and unequal benefits. Market mechanisms therefore face many of the same barriers
as a treaty. Additionally, when countries have widely different levels of development, this
can create complications for market based polices across borders. Therefore these solutions
would be better if placed under a treaty. The next section looks at current explanations for
barriers preventing the realization of a treaty based solution.
4.3 Theories Regarding the Lack of Groundwater Treaties
The literature investigating the lack of transboundary groundwater agreements can be
divided into institutional arguments, and resource characteristics arguments. Two separate
bodies of literature provide valuable insights with respect to the lack of treaties on
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transboundary groundwater. The first body of literature comes from scholars of political
science. The political science literature is heavily weighted towards institutional
explanations. Despite its important contributions, the political science literature has failed to
develop some of the most intriguing explanations for the lack of treaty development
worldwide. This may be due to the relatively new interest in groundwater.
The second subset of relevant literature comes from legal scholars focused on
property rights evolution taking both a top down and a bottom up approach. This literature
comes to many similar conclusions on factors that inhibit the evolution of property rights.
This subset can help conceptualize how to shift the status quo of domestic property rights to
the conception of property rights spanning borders. This literature points to the failure of the
political science literature to look at how shifts contributed to the current dynamics leading to
the current composition of water institutions. However, property rights theory does not map
perfectly onto understanding transboundary groundwater dynamics. This literature works
under the assumption of a government presence to enforce and create property rights. This
creates an overemphasis on the purely national scale, and misses unique characteristics of
property rights when looking at the international scale.
The next section lays out current explanations for a lack of groundwater treaties by
pulling from both the political science and property rights scholarship. The political science
literature highlights several specific characteristics of groundwater that make it a difficult
resource to manage. One central argument is data availability. Milman and Ray (2011) argue
that uncertainty over groundwater availability and the impact of abstraction, lead water
managers to different predictions about its impact and benefit to their respective countries. In
a specific case study, Evans (2005) notes that the US Transboundary Aquifer Assessment
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Program’s (TAAP) accompanying documents argue that a lack of information has led to lack
of movement on groundwater. While, TAAP has attempted to fill this information gap, some
authors cite not the increased data but instead Mexican fears over the unilateral character of
TAAP as creating some impetus towards an agreement. Jarvis (2008) bolsters the problem of
a lack of data by arguing that groundwater agreements cannot move forward without further
knowledge as to aquifer characteristics. Additionally, Jarvis (2000) coins the term
hydroschitophrenia to describe the mistaken focus on surface and groundwater as separate
systems. In this work he calls out the lack of good science in the area. These concerns are
valid. However, the Bellagio Draft Treaty lays out how the US and Mexico can make a treaty
at the present time. The fact that model agreements do exist hint at the fact that while data is
a problem crafting agreements, it is not insurmountable.
The most prevalent set of explanations for the difficulty managing groundwater is
based in institutional dynamics. This line of reasoning argues that the composition of each
national government is not conducive to inducing leadership on water issues. Mumme (2005)
argues that there are too many government agencies dealing with water which leads to
bureaucratic inertia. Shah (2003) and Theesfeld (2010) further examine the problem of
inertia in relation to the costs of building and implementing new policies. In the case of
groundwater, this bureaucratic inertia is exacerbated by water agencies’ subservience to
Congress, where 96 House members come from border states with constituencies positioned
against action on a national agreement. The institutional argument can be further
disaggregated. McCarthy (2011) looks at institutional failings on the level of a single agency.
He cites both employees and Inspector General reports on mismanagement and
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ineffectiveness at the International Boundary and Water Commission to explain the lack of
movement on a groundwater treaty.
The next set of scholars does not reject the impact of the institutional arrangements,
they cite the inherent characteristics of groundwater as creating the institutional systems that
make it difficult to negotiate treaties to manage groundwater. The key argument here pertains
to the wide variety of stakeholders involved in water issues in comparison to other resources
(Eckstein 2013). Feitelson (2006) makes an argument for the role of special interests. He
claims that the way groundwater is used in society leads to special interests that are small
subsets of the population. He cites past blockages of treaties by special interests in Israel but
argues that given an understanding of which parties have interests in groundwater, deals can
reached. He specifically compares pumpers versus water managers in explaining how to
reach an agreement. This argument is broad enough to work for many transboundary
groundwater situations and roots itself in specific groundwater characteristics, namely, how
interest groups are distributed around the issue of groundwater. Similarly, Wolfe (2013),
coming from a history based perspective, examines the role of interest groups. This work
looks into the knowing depletion of Mexico’s groundwater from 1930’s-1960s. He uses
historical records to determine how scientists both warned of dangers of depletion and
profited from the business opportunities that depletion created. This contradiction stood in
the way of groundwater conservation.
The literature on the evolution of property rights also takes this bottom up
explanation of interest groups. This literature looks at how the size and heterogeneity of
interest groups limits the evolution of property rights. Despite an obvious benefit to society, a
change in property may not take place if important actors will lose out. Libecap (1989)
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argues that property rights change based on the strength of interest groups and conflicting
economic interests. Therefore property rights change with shifts in relative prices, changes in
production and swings in preferences or other political principles. Meanwhile, North (1990)
points to another set of actors, arguing that property rights are the result of leaders making
choices based on their own potential to gain. Demsetz (1967) defines an evolution of
property rights through individual actors and groups’ adjustment to changes in economic
incentives. The specific incentive he points to is the change in transaction costs relative to
resource value. The mention of economic incentives is also present in the political science
literature. Mumme (2005) and Utton (1978) point out the impact that low prices have on the
lack of awareness of scarcity and therefore limit the possibility for a conservation push.
These low costs are themselves a result of the political incentive structure enumerated in past
paragraphs.
One argument that emphasizes the different focus between political science and
property rights theory is that of utilization levels. Utilization level theory examines when
resources reach conditions of scarcity conducive to agreement. Scholars vary widely.
Libecap (1989) argues that private property arises late in exploitation because by this point
there are only a medium number of participants and costs are low with private property in
comparison to open access. On the other hand, Wyman (2005) sees the greatest potential for
change during middling exploitation because of decreased collective action costs and only
middling entrenched interests. Finally, those arguing for early adaptation of rights find that
the lack of historical claims is critical but worry about the lack of collective action due to low
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issue salience.122 The debate surrounding utilization is especially relevant to groundwater
given that high levels of use have taken place only in the most recent decades. It is however
possible that the debate over groundwater utilization levels is misplaced because there are
aquifers at all levels of depletion with and without movement forward on treaty creation.
One critical factor that is not accounted for by these domestic theories of property
rights evolution is the nature of the international system. These theories assume the existence
of an overarching system of government and therefore have mainly focused on the domestic
level.123 Unlike on the domestic level where for example the US Supreme Court can set a
precedent for groundwater division,124 there is no binding actor on the international scale.
This adds a complexity that cannot be overlooked when understanding why a division of
property has not developed. There are several explanations presented by the political science
literature that attempt to look at problems with how groundwater fits into the international
context.
A common argument cited by this literature is that institutional asymmetries across
boundaries prevent agreements regulating groundwater use. Eckstein (2011) explains the lack
of a treaty governing the US-Mexico transboundary aquifers as stemming from the federal
versus local management mismatch. He cites not only the mismatch, but also the sheer
number of legal and regulatory systems governing groundwater. In Mexico the federal
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!122 As utilization levels change this will also affect perception on the individual level. For example farmers will have to deal with land subsistence and increased costs of pumping due to lowering water tables. 123 Finger, M., Tamiotti, L., and Allouche, J., 2006, Introduction: conceptual elements, in: The Multi-Governance of Water: Four Case Studies, M. Finger, L. Tamiotti, and J. Allouche, eds., State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, pp. 17. Check Common Property Resource management theory.
124 Tarlock, A. Dan, and Darcy Alan Frownfelter. "State Groundwater Sovereignty after Sporhase: The Case of the Hueco Bolson." Okla. L. Rev. 43 (1990): 27.
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government controls water, mainly through CONAGUA. This requires all users to conform
to the same permitting process. Meanwhile in the US, water is managed by the individual
states which each have their own rules. Texas governs groundwater under the law of capture,
which entitles landowners to take water from underneath their land no matter what the
consequences are for surrounding lands.125 New Mexico in contrast follows the prior
appropriation doctrine whereby the state issues permits based on ‘first in time, first in use’
theory. Use is restricted to beneficial uses but courts interpret this definition leniently.
Arizona uses reasonable use to distribute water, which permits landowners to use underlying
water for reasonable uses. Arizona also has other restrictions on groundwater use including
Groundwater Management Areas. Finally, California has a series of doctrines combining
prior appropriation and correlative rights, which gives equal rights to a fair and just portion
of water. These widely varying regimes across Mexico and the US border states are seen by
several authors to create insurmountable obstacles to creating a cooperative transboundary
agreement. Mumme (2005) and the Good Neighbor Environmental Board echo the
difficulties of working with disparate legal and management systems.
While these authors succeed in proving that there are disparate systems of
governance, they do not prove the causal link. Instead they assume that the link between
disparate systems and a lack of groundwater agreements is self-evident. This assumption is
dangerous when taking analysis out of the level of a specific case and looking at the larger
picture of action on transboundary groundwater. It is unclear why the institutional mismatch
in groundwater would not apply equally to preventing surface water treaties.126 This calls into
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!125!Eckstein (2011) finds that even the exceptions to rule of capture, such as wasteful uses, are rarely enforced by the courts.!126 There is however the argument that the institutional have shifted over time and if a surface water agreement needed to take place in current times it would also not be implemented.
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question the inability to reach agreements dues to a federal – state mismatch. While this may
be impacting the US Mexico case, it may not be the main driver in the lack of treaties
worldwide.
Additionally, in the international context, sovereignty issues surrounding groundwater
become salient. Groundwater flows back and forth across borders. The water would have to
be managed in a way that a country cannot does not have free reign over the resource under
its land. This requires relinquishing some sovereignty. Eckstein (2005) found that the best
way to proceed towards a groundwater agreement is to focus first on data collection and
sharing because it avoids the difficult issue of sovereignty included in division of waters.
McCaffrey (2001) similarly argues that the need to relinquish sovereignty required for
bilateral groundwater governance has limited states’ willingness to negotiate.
The table below provides a summary of the key arguments appearing in the literature
on the lack of groundwater treaties:
Figure 4.2: Literature on the Lack of Groundwater Treaties
Disciplines Institutional Characteristics
Political Science Bureaucratic inertia, Institutional asymmetry, Impact of special interests, Intra and inter agency dynamics
Data gaps, Impact of groundwater characteristics on the distribution of interest groups
Property Rights/Legal
Interest group impact on government Impact of groundwater characteristics on the distribution of interest groups, utilization levels
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4.2 Lessons from the Past
Despite their rarity, current groundwater agreements can provide insights into which
of the above theories work out in practice. De Los Cobos (2010) looks at the development of
the Franco-Suisse agreement, which is by far the most successful. The Genevese aquifer was
rapidly depleted in the 1960s and 1970s. De Los Cobos notes that when dried out wells had
to be closed, “that was when the warning bell was sounded.”127 This lends support to
arguments about the need for visibility to see action on groundwater. The situation also
weakens the argument for a data shortage limiting negotiations because the negotiations took
place while data was still being collected. While the agreement was initially to share costs of
the project, the French decided to rely on other water resources using this aquifer only as
backup. This led them to push the full financial burden onto the Swiss. This development
indicates a unique aspect of the agreement, namely the financial resources available to both
the parties. The initial agreement included a committee to meet a couple times a year to deal
with any problems with management. The institutional asymmetries argument gains credence
here because Swiss cantons are specifically given the power to independently conclude
international agreements, something many local governments and US states lack.
Israel’s agreement with Jordan is also a valuable comparison. Israel and Jordan share
the Jordan River, the Yarmouk River and their accompanying aquifers. Both countries
overdraw groundwater resources. In 1994 both surface and groundwater apportionments
were included in the peace treaty between the two countries. The agreement laid out amounts
each country could extract, storage locations and desalination technology. It also created a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!127!De los Cobos, G. "The transboundary aquifer of the Geneva region (Switzerland and France): successfully managed for 30 years by the State of Geneva and French border communities." International Shared Aquifer Resource Management (ISARM) 2010 International Conference on Transboundary Aquifers, Paris. 2010.!
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joint committee to deal with future uncertainties and ambiguity left in the treaty due to
political sensitivity. Fischhenlder (2008) looks deeply into the role that ambiguity held in
allowing these two countries to reach an agreement. He argues that the ambiguities in the
Israeli-Jordanian treaty left room for each side to present the treaty in a way that would avoid
unmanageable domestic opposition and that allowed for future allocation adjustments during
times of crisis. The Israeli-Jordanian agreement provides an example of political
considerations that might be holding back politicians from beginning a negotiation process.
Susskind and Islam (2012) look at sticking points in the lead up to negotiations. They
note how negotiations in the 1950s failed because both countries looked at water negotiations
as a zero-sum game where they would apportion a fixed amount of water resources. Later
negotiations worked because creative, instead of zero sum thinking dominated. For example
Israel received groundwater rights in exchange for helping Jordan with desalination
technology and supply. Additionally, both countries’ work to improve water conservation
technology has framed the problem as situational instead of pure scarcity. Another aspect is
that the agreement is part of a larger peace agreement. For example Israel gave up land near
Lake Tiberias in exchange for the right to continue extracting groundwater from the land.
The Israeli-Jordanian agreement also emphasizes the need for trust. In this case trust was
built through bilateral commissions and gathering scientific information. This situation lends
credence to the idea of working through the International Boundary and Water Commission
(IBWC). The IBWC has a long history on both sides of the border and it works on a variety
of projects such as wastewater plants that can be combined in a treaty to escape the zero sum
game. It is relevant to note that despite the Israeli-Jordanian treaty, overdraft of shared
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aquifers continues, with the lower Jordan groundwater resources being withdrawn at 121% of
renewal rates.128
Finally the most recent groundwater agreement provides an example of dynamics
over groundwater in the current era. The Guarani Aquifer system is shared by Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. The 2010 agreement between these countries is the first
shared management agreement for Latin America. The Guarani Aquifer project raised
awareness for six years starting in 2003, concurrent with efforts by the Southern Common
Market, MERCOSUR, which was working to create a treaty. The eventual agreement follows
the principles from the UN’s Law of Transboundary Aquifers (sovereignty, equitable and
reasonable use, no harm principle and exchange of information). Uniquely, the basin has not
been the subject of conflict in the past.129 This is valuable when thinking about what sorts of
situations lead to action on groundwater. It should also be noted that the agreement is signed
but not ratified. Concerns have also been raised as to the broad provisions in the agreement
such as the fact that the commission created under the agreement has no specified duties or
authorities (Casutto et al. 2013). The Guarani aquifer agreement, along with the other
agreements, provide context for the theories attempting to explain the general lack of
groundwater treaties.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!128 Jones, J. Anthony A. "Groundwater in peril." Sustaining Groundwater Resources. SpringerNetherlands, 2011. 1-19. And: Venot, Jean-Philippe, François Molle, and Rémy Courcier. "Dealing with closed basins: The case of the Lower Jordan River Basin." Water Resources Development 24.2 (2008): 247-263. 129 There has been some low level conflict such as the pulp mills dispute but it has generally been a peaceful basin. Cassuto, David N., and Romulo SR Sampaio. "Hard, Soft & Uncertain: The Guarani Aquifer and the Challenges of International Groundwater." Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, Forthcoming (2013).
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Chapter 5: Visibility and Bilateral Action
5.1: The Visibility Hypothesis
The past chapter noted the inherent characteristics of groundwater as one category of
explanation for the lack of groundwater treaties. Theesfeld (2010) summarizes the unique
characteristics of groundwater.130 The first characteristic is time lag. The effects of
groundwater contamination or over-extraction may take years to become apparent. This
complicates responses to groundwater problems because attribution is unclear. Theesfeld
also highlights the problem of indivisibility. Groundwater cannot be fenced off and protected.
Groundwater’s decentralized withdrawal structure creates management problems due to the
difficulty tracking abstractions.131 Finally, the limited knowledge of the size of the
groundwater resource creates management problems due to characteristics such as fuzzy
boundaries,132 hydrogeological uncertainties, and information asymmetries, all characteristics
likely to have some influence on groundwater management.
However, more useful than a long list of likely characteristics is an examination of
which characteristic has substantial explanatory power. The choice of the invisibility
characteristic does not exclude other explanations, but suggests that visibility is the most
important aspect and once addressed will shift countries towards agreement on groundwater
sharing.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!130 He points to Schlager (2007), Puri and El Naser (2003), Jarvis (2006) and Moench (2004) as making relevant resources characteristic arguments. 131 Illegal withdrawals are also a worry. 132 A lack of knowledge of exact boundaries leads to an inability to define stakeholders and determine the impact of withdrawal regimes.
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The underground and therefore invisible nature of groundwater distinguishes it from
many other common pool resources.133 Several researchers connect groundwater’s
invisibility to spoilers such as insufficient data. However, no study looks deeply into how the
invisibility of groundwater impacts action over transnational groundwater management due
to its effect on public perception. McCaffrey (1999) argues that the invisibility of
groundwater in comparison to the visibility of surface water leads to inattention. However,
this is just a passing comment without analytical backing. Several other authors including
Jarvis (2008) and Puri (2001) point to, but do not analyze, how the hidden nature of
groundwater influences treaty creation. This literature lacks an attempt to understand exactly
how the hidden nature of groundwater impacts low levels of action, which in the case of this
study, is the dearth of treaties.
H5: The Visibility Hypothesis
This work hypothesizes that the lack of action on a groundwater minute134 between
the US and Mexico is the result of groundwater’s invisibility. Specifically, as the rate of
change in the visibility of groundwater increases, this will translate into action.135 The
mechanism linking this input and output is that the invisibility creates a perception of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!133 There are some exceptions to this statement such as land subsidence. I will use these exceptions to test the role of visibility on action surrounding groundwater. 134 While a treaty on groundwater would be plausible, the easier process would be to proceed to regulate groundwater through a minute added to the 1944 Water Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of 1944 Treaty the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande) to delineate groundwater rights. This would be simpler and feasible on a shorter time scale given use of existing institutions and processes. Therefore my paper refers to a groundwater minute, but this can be seen as a treaty, just in a different format while including the same specifications. 135 The focus on rate of change comes from property rights evolution literature.
CharacterisDc:!Invisibility!
PercepDon!of!Dependability!
Lowers!Future!Scarcity!Fears!
Inhibits!AcDon!(Local!to!
Transboundary)!
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dependability (lowers ambiguity), decreasing fears of scarcity in the public and interest
groups along with decreasing the pains of increasingly variable surface water resources. It is
this impact on scarcity and variability that inhibits action to push groundwater issues to the
international level.
This thesis contradicts the classic understanding that visibility factors into
groundwater use through creating ambiguity. Past theories on visibility claim that data
uncertainty hinders the ability to divide the resource in a treaty. Alternatively they
hypothesize that unknown quantities open up negotiations to misunderstandings. However,
this thesis suggests instead that it is the way in which invisibility shifts potential interest
groups and the general public towards a perception that water resources are dependable, that
impacts treaty creation.
Visibility in this context is the actual ability to see physical changes in the
environment due to groundwater depletion. This visibility variable is operationalized with
changes in well depth, rate of land subsidence, and crisis events. Visibility does not mean the
level of awareness or knowledge of groundwater.
5.2: When Attention is Not Enough
A key claim of the visibility hypothesis is that the lack of physical manifestations of
scarcity, not a lack of attention, is preventing action on groundwater. An analysis of
groundwater news coverage demonstrates that the increase in attention to groundwater has
failed to spur action towards a groundwater minute. This analysis examines trends in news
coverage to understand if groundwater is still suffering from what some scholars deem
‘insufficient attention for action.’
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This analysis first identified three key news sources with respect to groundwater in
the US and Mexico. For each of these sources, newspaper archives were used to locate past
articles. The archives were searched for the yearly number of articles including the word
‘groundwater.’ Each year’s count of stories mentioning groundwater was recorded. These
numbers where then divided by the total stories published for that year, providing a control
for the varying number of articles written each year. These percentages are then compared on
the graphs below. The graphs are fit with a trend line to illustrate general patterns in
coverage. Graphs with the total count of groundwater articles published each year are
included in Appendix 4.
The first source examined was The New York Times. Unlike smaller newspapers, it
has extensive historical archives reaching back to 1960. It also consistently produced a high
volume of articles, lowering uncertainty levels in results and allowing for a better analysis of
trends.
Figure 5.1: Trends in Groundwater Coverage in the New York Times (%)
Data Source: New York Times Archives
R²!=!0.78727!
0!0.02!0.04!0.06!0.08!0.1!0.12!0.14!
2014\2015!
2012\2013!
2010\2011!
2008\2009!
2006\2007!
2004\2005!
2002\2003!
2000\2001!
1990\1991!
1988\1989!
1986\1987!
1984\1985!
1982\1983!
1980\1981!
1978\1979!
1976\1977!
1974\1975!
1972\1973!
1970\1971!
1968\1969!
1966\1967!
1964\1965!
1962\1963!
1960\1961!
Percen
tage%of%S
torie
s%Pre%Year%
Year%
Trends%in%Groundwater%Coverage%in%the%New%York%Times%(%)%
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As seen in the graph above, the percentage of stories mentioning groundwater each
year shows a trend of growth since the 1960s. A key observation from this graph is that while
there is a trend of increased coverage, the large jumps in coverage take place in the late
1970s and the early 2010s.136
The second test looked at the El Paso Times. This is the largest newspaper near the
Mexican border in Texas. El Paso is critical to action on a groundwater minute because the
city not only uses water from a severely depleted aquifer, but it also serves as headquarters
for the International Boundary and Water Commission/Comision Internacional de Limites y
Aguas (IBWC/CILA), which would likely be in charge of negotiating any such minute. As
seen below, the El Paso Times has a similar trend to the New York Times, with total
groundwater coverage increasing over time. However, this trend is not as strong when
looking at percentages.
Figure 5.2/3: Trends in Groundwater Coverage in the El Paso Times
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!136 There is a gap in the 2005-2006 period. This is due to a technical problem with the New York Times archives in 2015. This may be fixed in the future.
R²!=!0.42556!
0!
5!
10!
15!
20!
25!
30!
35!
Num
ber%o
f%arDcles%on%grou
ndwater%
Year%
Trends%in%Groundwater%Coverage%in%El%Paso%Times%(#)%
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Data Source: El Paso Times archives
Lastly, a key newspaper in the California border area, The U-T San Diego, was
examined. This source is valuable because it provides an understanding of the level of
attention paid to groundwater in the case study area.
Figure 5.4: Trends in Groundwater Coverage in the U-T San Diego (%)
Source: Archives of U-T San Diego Editions
R²!=!0.09328!
0!0.02!0.04!0.06!0.08!0.1!0.12!0.14!0.16!0.18!0.2!
Percen
tage%of%S
torie
s%Men
Doning%
Grou
ndwater%
Year%
Trends%in%Groundwater%Coverage%in%El%Paso%Times%(%)%
\0.0005!
0!
0.0005!
0.001!
0.0015!
0.002!
0.0025!
0.003!
1900! 1920! 1940! 1960! 1980! 2000! 2020!Percen
tage%of%T
otal%Storie
s%men
Doning%Groun
dnwater%
Year%
Trend%in%Groundwater%Coverage%by%the%UJT%San%Diego%Newspaper%(%)%
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For the U-T San Diego, the coverage of groundwater was negligible until the mid-
1980s. While the coverage dipped in the late 1990s the general trend since then has been
increased coverage. This is surprising given that the biggest breakthrough in groundwater
relations remains Minute 242, which limited groundwater pumping near Mexicali in 1973.
This signals that not only is attention insufficient for action, but action can take place without
high levels of attention.
The data supports the conclusion that attention to the presence of groundwater has
increased. Along with increased attention, the level of scientific understanding has also
increased. The increase in scientific understanding is measured by searching for the number
of yearly articles published that mention the word groundwater in Google Scholar, a database
that compiles scholarly literature. This search reveals that the number of articles on
groundwater is growing exponentially.
Year Number of Articles on Groundwater
2015 (April 15) 24,500
2010 72,000
2000 32,300
1990 12,400
1980 4,780
1970 1,750
1960 304
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Early adoption is also delinked from scientific knowledge in the series of interviews
performed for this study in the Meixcali and Imperial Valleys. One farmer from Mexicali, for
example, adopted water conservation early on, but superior scientific knowledge was not a
strong factor in his decision. While he knew that CONAGUA measured water levels he said,
“I don’t understand this methodology.”137
In conclusion, this section reveals how attention to groundwater has been increasing
at least since the 1980s. However, there has not been an associated uptick in groundwater
treaties and aquifers continue to be mined at unsustainable rates. For example, CONAGUA
reporting found that the number of overexploited aquifers in the country went from 32 in
1875 to 105 in 2010, 38 of which were located in border states.138
This section’s analysis of large-scale trends suggests that a lack of scientific
knowledge and attention are not blocking a groundwater minute. Given the lack of
correlation between knowledge and action, there is a need to look for alternate explanations.
In the following chapter, I use a case study analysis of the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys on
the US-Mexico border to demonstrate that the invisibility of groundwater lowers ambiguity
over future availability of water. As a result, this lack of ambiguity of future availability
leads to the dependability factor. The assumption of dependability presents problems due to
the incentive created for overuse without reaction.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!137 Quintara, Roberto. "Interview." In person interview. Mar. 2015. 138 CONAGUA Atlas De Agua 2011
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Chapter 6: Visualizing Groundwater in the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys
6.1 Historical Background
Historically, only the Cocopah Indians populated the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys.
Today, Mexicali’s city has grown to over 935,000 residents with a growth rate of 3% per
year.139 The mix of industry in the agricultural and maquiladora sectors fuels this growth. On
the US side, the Imperial Valley County, which includes Calexico City, has a smaller
population at just over 175,000 residents.140 The Mexicali and the Imperial Valleys are both
key agricultural hubs for their respective countries. Mexicali is known as the “center of
export agriculture”141 and Imperial is known as America’s “winter salad bowl.”142 (See
Appendix 5 for map)
The aquifer underlying the Mexicali area is the Cuenca Baja del Rio Colorado aquifer
(CBRC).143 The use of this aquifer goes back to 1925 when the first wells were sunk in
Mexicali. The CBRC is defined as “a 250-foot-thick shallow unconfined alluvial aquifer, a
130-foot-thick aquitard at intermediate depths, and a 350-foot-thick deeper semi-confined
alluvial aquifer.”144
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!139 "Baja California." Industrial Development Commission Mexicali Baja California Mexico. Industrial Development Commission Mexicali Baja California Mexico, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. 140 "United States Census Bureau." Imperial County QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau. Census Bureau, 2014. Web. 22 May 2015. 141 Judkins, Gabriel LaMar. Mexican produce agriculture and land degradation: a study of soil salinization in the Mexicali Valley, Mexico. ProQuest, 2009. 142 Barton, K. "Challenge, promise for nation's “winter salad bowl”." California Agriculture 51.3 (1997): 4-6. 143 Eckstein (2013) also calls it by another common name: Mexicali Valley – Imperial Valley aquifer. While there are several variations such as this in name, this paper will use the above name only for clarity. 144 Transmissivity of the aquifer varies between 100 ft2/day in the Salton Trough to 40,000 ft2/day in East Mesa. Tetra Tech Inc. "Study on Seepage." Canadian Journal of Public Health / Revue Canadienne De Sante'e Publique 87.1 (1996): n. pag. US Bureau of Reclamation. July 1999. Web. 22 May 2015.
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This aquifer derives its recharge from All American Canal (AAC) seepage. Of the
AAC seepage, 83% goes to Mexico, 9% to East Mesa and Imperial and 8% is lost as
evapotranspiration. Before construction of the canals the CBRC aquifer was recharged by the
flows of the Colorado River and the Alamo River.145 As of 2010, this aquifer was highly
stressed with an Aquifer Stress Index (AQSI) of 5.02.146 In total, the aquifer has been
depleted of 3.426 cubic kilometers, which for context is 1.2% of the global depletion.147
In the 1990s, urban areas from Mexicali to the Imperial Valley constituted only about
2% of total regional groundwater use.148 For the agricultural sector, the Mexicali Valley has
federal wells which use 500,000 million cubic meters of water and private wells using
200,000 million cubic meters per year.149 The valley is split with some areas relying on both
groundwater and surface water and others on only surface water. Groundwater use reached
intensive levels by 1957 and has continued into the present.150 This groundwater seeps over
from the American side. The Imperial Valley, while actively exploring for groundwater
deposits and the possibility of storing water in a constructed aquifer, does not currently have
useable groundwater.151 Available groundwater is not good enough quality for either
agriculture or human consumption.152
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!145 Milanes Murcia, 2011 Presentation “The AAC: A Conflict with an International Solution.” 146!Wada, Yoshihide, and Lena Heinrich. "Assessment of transboundary aquifers of the world—vulnerability arising from human water use." Environmental Research Letters 8.2 (2013): 024003.!147 For further discussion of Wada (2013) aquifer stress measures see Chapter 3. 148 This groundwater drains into the Salton Sea Cohen, Hanges-Jeck “Missing Water: Uses and Flows of Water in the Colorado Delta Region” The Pacific Institute, 2001. The city of Mexicali, along with Tecate, Tijuana, Ensenada and San Luis Rio Colorado, obtain groundwater from the wells of La Mesa Arenosa in San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora. Mexicali City uses 82,000 m3 per year of groundwater. (CONAGUA Presentation, slides obtained during visit to Mexicali.) 149 CONAGUA Presentation, slides obtained during visit to Mexicali. 150 Hernández, Jorge Ramírez. Una visión de la problemática ambiental de Mexicali y su valle: elementos para su gestión. Uabc, 2006. 151 Shields, Tina. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015. 152 While the East Mesa of Imperial does have producing wells, these are used for cities and not agriculture.
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Agriculture began in the Mexicali Valley before the discovery of the aquifer.153
Similarly, across the border, the California Development Company first attempted to link the
Colorado River with the Mexicali/Imperial area of the Sonoran Desert in 1901 with the
Alamo Canal.154 When the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) was formed in 1911, it was
unhappy with the canal situation; “Because its main canal and levees were located in Mexico,
giving Imperial Valley little security in its water supply or against flooding, the IID realized
the need for an ‘All-American Canal’ north of the international border.”155 In 1928 the
Boulder Canyon Project authorized the All American Canal (AAC), which began operating
in 1940. The AAC is gravity flow based and stretches for 80 miles (See Appendix 6) and
delivers the Colorado River water to the area.156
In 1988 the US Congress passed a bill allowing for the lining of the AAC. This bill
began the decades long controversy that has continued over the lining. The lining is predicted
to decrease seepage by 70,000 acre feet each year.157 This bill however, required funding for
the project to be provided at the local or state level. The funding only became available under
the 2003 Quantification Settlement Agreement, which stipulated that California stay within
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!153 Agriculture began with the tilling of 15 hectares in the year 1912. It quickly grew to 105,000 ha in 1942 and 207,935 ha in 1955. This area is now called El Districto de Riego 014 (Irrigation District 14), which includes the Mexicali Valley and San Luis del Rio Colorado. 154 The canal started in the US and passed into Mexico before returning back to the US side. Imperial Irrigation District. "All-American Canal." Imperial Irrigation District :. IID, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. 155 Imperial Irrigation District. "All-American Canal." Imperial Irrigation District :. IID, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. 156 California receives 4.4 million acre feet per year from the Colorado River and Mexico receives 1.5 million acre feet per year. Mexico’s allocation was set out in the 1944 Colorado River Treaty between the two nations. For the US, all of this water is delivered through the All American Canal. Mynster, T. (2013). Colorado River Supply - NCSE-NASA. Retrieved from http://www.camelclimatechange.org/view/teachingunit/170549 157 Imperial Irrigation District. "All-American Canal." Imperial Irrigation District :. IID, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015.
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its 4.4 million acre-feet allocation of the Colorado, which it had been exceeding by 600,000
acre-feet.
Over the course of the lining dispute, the opposition used several mechanisms
including “informal protest through the IBWC (1998), an IBWC Discussion (2000), a letter,
a discussion at other meetings (2005), a lawsuit (2005), and a stakeholder meeting.”158
Despite these efforts, several sources characterized the response from the Mexican
government as lacking intense pressure due to the need to balance other priorities in US
relations. To the Mexican State Department, “there were higher priority items on the bilateral
agenda.”159 When representatives of the Mexican government visited to Washington for
bilateral negotiations, “the U.S. government had not been advised about any kind of
negotiation on the lining, because time was not enough due to several other [issues].” The US
ultimately prevailed and after years of lead up, the project began in 2007 and was completed
three years later.
While the AAC is a point of contention, this area of the border also experienced the
most significant breakthrough in bilateral groundwater relations. In 1973, the US and
Mexico reached a groundbreaking agreement, Minute 242, which added to the 1944 bilateral
surface water treaty, containing a section stating:
“Pending the conclusion by the Governments of the United States and Mexico of a comprehensive agreement on groundwater in the border areas, each country shall limit pumping of groundwaters in its territory within five miles (eight kilometers) of the Arizona-Sonora boundary near San Luis to 160,000 acre-feet (197,358,000 cubic meters) annually.”160
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!158 Neir, Alyssa M., and Michael E. Campana. "The peaceful resolution of US-Mexican transboundary water disputes." The Economics of Peace and Security Journal 2.2 (2007). And Elenes, Roberto “Aguas Enturbiadas Murky Waters” CDEM. 2009. 159 Elenes, Roberto “Aguas Enturbiadas Murky Waters” CDEM. 2009. 160 Text, Minute 242, “Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River.” IBWC/CILA, 1973.
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This Minute not only apportions groundwater, but calls for a comprehensive
agreement. Furthermore it lays out a standard of cooperative management:
“With the objective of avoiding future problems, the United States and Mexico shall consult with each other prior to undertaking any new development of either the surface or the groundwater resources, or undertaking substantial modifications of present developments, in its own territory in the border area that might adversely affect the other country.”161
In 1973, the expectation was that future unilateral action impacting groundwater
would invoke prior consultation with the other country. Forty years after Minute 242, not
only is there no treaty or minute, but actions, such as the All American Canal lining, have
called into question the ‘consult’ clause.
A series of interviews conducted in the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys provide insight
into how groundwater water is perceived by stakeholders who would be the key actors in
pushing for movement on a groundwater minute. These interviews reveal that the invisibility
of groundwater causes it to be seen as a dependable resource, inhibiting action by lowering
the perception of scarcity and with it the incentive to act quickly to manage use.
6.2 The Perception of Dependability
The interviews with farmers reveal different opinions on the dependability of local
water sources. Roberto Quintara is a vegetable farmer in the Mexicali Valley. He has farmed
800 acres since 1996 with about 50% of his water coming from groundwater sources. “We
prefer to use underground water rather than the channel water because the administration of
water in Mexico – its corrupted.”162 He notes that, “the well you manage yourself, the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!161 Ibid. 162 Quintara, Roberto. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.
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channel is the district, and in every district the guys who manage the water rob a lot of it.”163
In this case, the dependability of groundwater is due to the inability of the government to
effectively regulate surface water.
Quintara is an exception in his community with respect to his view on water. “I
started to use drip irrigation in the 1990s and people thought I was nuts; they think you
should only use [it] in a place that does not have enough water.”164 In choosing to switch to
drip irrigation, Quintara focused on costs. His unusual perception of scarcity led to increased
valuation. “I saw it coming – water is the gold of the future – its going to get less everyday
and the US is going to be stopping more.”165 Quintara acted because he saw a flaw in the
dependability of groundwater. He understood that groundwater could be stopped like surface
water. While to Quintara, “they give us enough water [translated]” farmers “now need to
prepare use for the near future.”166 In the coming years he is more worried about surface
water than groundwater. Therefore, despite his early action on conservation he still falls into
the ‘dependability’ trap with groundwater.
Across the border, Tom Brundy is an all American farmer relying on the All
American Canal to grow his alfalfa. At the beginning of the interview, he premised his
statements with the fact that, “You are going to get a perspective of someone who believes in
God.”167 Brundy urges people to focus on a longer timeframe. “Our time on earth is minimal
and ultimately God is on our side.”168 He sees the California drought as natural. “This is
normal, look at tree rings, it is global we know these cycles existed, in the past this [land]
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 Brundy, Tom. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015. 168!Ibid.!
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was at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean.”169 Right now to get more water we are, “going to
take water from somewhere else” but “hope Mother Nature and the heavenly father provide
rain and life gets back to normal.”170
Despite his optimism, he not only places a high value on water, but also sees its
potential to create panic. “In order to maintain life, water is number one.”171 He sees the
scarcity of water in a global context given that people from as far away as Saudi Arabia have
approached him for water rights. While he started using more efficient methods of irrigation,
“in the last 10-15 years” with the current drought he thinks we need to step back to take a
deep breath.172 He sees the current panic as manufactured, “By creating a panic this opens the
door of opportunity.” People now “can charge money for water.”173 As a metaphor he spoke
of a power outage. Electricity you “take for granted until the switch does not work.” Then,
we “change our lives for a little while but soon get back to normal, it will be the same with
water.”174
Despite having no access to groundwater resources, Brundy characterized
groundwater as a vast untapped resource, a solution to surface water problems. “Arizona
claims it’s out of water, but some claim there is enough water under Arizona to last for many
years and an aquifer so full there is no place to put any more water so Arizona lets it
evaporate.”175 While Brundy did say this was a “rumor” he brought it up as something he
believed held credence. To Brundy, in California, “We need to be able to control all this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!169!Ibid.!170!Ibid.!171!Ibid.!172!Ibid.!173!Ibid.!174!Ibid.!175!Ibid.!
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[ground]water running out into the ocean.”176 In his opinion, groundwater is an abundant
resource just waiting to be exploited. Brundy demonstrates how an area without groundwater
can overreact to surface water scarcity, while concluding that groundwater is the untapped
solution.
While farmers reveal how local interests perceive the dependability of groundwater,
officials clarify the government perspective on its dependability in areas with and without
groundwater.
The head of the Mexican Irrigation district, Ingenerio Gamez, was late for the
interview. He came in apologizing. He had been in San Diego speaking with American
officials about future water agreements. With respect to groundwater, Gamez, sees that “it is
needed for plants such as trees.”177 As with the Mexican farmer above, Gamez was more
worried about the future of surface water resources than groundwater. Surface resources are
more desirable because “groundwater is more costly [to extract].”178 Groundwater is seen as
the backup plan, used after surface water due to cost and long-term dependability.
On the US side, Tina Shields is a water manager for the Imperial Irrigation District.
She explains how groundwater impacts action through reducing fears of future scarcity and
allowing areas to adjust to variable rainfall; “Up north when they get zero allocation,
everyone turns their pumps on. I always say down here water is religion and its people and
families get uptight about it.”179 There is more value put on water because there is nothing to
turn to when the surface water is gone.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!176!Ibid.!177 Gamez, Marco Aurelio. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015 178!Ibid.!179!Shields, Tina. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.!
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The Chief of the International Boundary and Water Commission’s (IBWC)
Environmental Management Division, Gilbert Anaya, agreed. “A few cities, such as Laredo,
rely almost exclusively on surface water…coming from Mexico to provide water year in and
out. Due to the continued use of groundwater [in other areas] and surface water, the surface
water supply is becoming less.”180 This comes at a time when Laredo and its twin city across
the border are both experiencing population growth. Lacking groundwater, the increasing
scarcity is obvious, prompting action; “they have a planning group…to come up with
strategies that they elevate to state level.” The IBWC sees that areas without the groundwater
cushion are pushing action on water from the local to the state level.
At the same time action on groundwater remains mired below the bilateral level. As
revealed in the above interviews, groundwater is seen as dependable, and areas with this
resource do not fear that it will disappear, decreasing worry and therefore willingness to take
action on a bilateral agreement. To address this problem it is necessary to understand that the
root of the problem lies with the invisibility of groundwater.
6.3 Visualizing the Invisible
The All American Canal runs right along the US-Mexican border, a sliver of blue
rising out of dusty banks. A rusted fence of sheet metal lies only a few meters away dividing
the US and Mexico. However, those meters between this flimsy looking fence and the canal
define the distribution of water and the water politics in the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys’
border area. While you could “throw a rock” from the canal to the rusted fence, proximity is
in this case deceiving.181
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!180 Anaya, Gilbert. "Interview." Telephone interview. April. 2015. 181 Shields, Tina. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.
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The Mexicali and Imperial Valleys obtain surface water from the same source and are
equally susceptible to droughts and years with low rainfall. There is a critical difference in
their water resources however: groundwater. Only the Mexicali Valley has useable
groundwater resources. When speaking to water users and officials on both sides of the
border there was one other crucial differentiation: the perception of future availability of
water resources. Groundwater is a backup plan. Its invisibility cuts out ambiguity, lessening
fears of scarcity and variability, even at a time when climate change is making future water
availability more ambiguous than ever.
This section examines three key points when the role of visibility was heightened
with respect to groundwater, namely the completion of the lining of the All American Canal
in April 2010, the 7.2 earthquake in April 2010, and Minute 319 in November 2012. This
examination supports the viability of the central hypothesis that increased visibility of
groundwater spurs action and is therefore key to motivating a minute delineating
groundwater apportionment on the border.
The first period of increased groundwater visibility is the lining of the All American
Canal. Prior to the lining in 2007, there were low levels of subsidence in the Mexicali
Valley.182 In the lead up to the lining, despite the media attention, the Mexican Government
did not present high levels of disagreement on the issue. This thesis argues that the lack of
visibility leading to the lining limited the pressure from interest groups that would have
forced the Mexican federal government to take robust action on the bilateral level. By
contrast, as described in my interviews, subsidence and dropping well levels were obvious
after the lining was completed in 2010. This visibility was paired with the 2010 earthquake,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!182!CONAGUA, Well Water Level Data from 1950-2014. Obtained during visit to Mexicali.!
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which provided the visual confirmation for the possibility of a groundwater crisis. The result
of this later visibility is bilateral action through Minute 319 in 2012.
Before the AAC lining, low visibility levels limited the strength of action resisting
groundwater depletion. This weakness is obvious in Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de
Mexicali v. United States, a 2005 lawsuit attempting to block the lining of the canal. The
case was split into 8 counts, which focused on the impacts on farmers in Mexicali and on the
environmental impacts such as violations of the Endangered Species Act. These counts were
all initially rejected and appealed to the US 9th Circuit Court.183 However, before the US 9th
Circuit Court had time to consider the appeal, the US Congress passed a rider in The Tax
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 that undermined the plaintiffs’ claims. California Senator
Diane Feinstein, Nevada Senator Harry Reid and Arizona Senator John Kyl led this
movement.184 They were indirectly supporting the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), San
Diego County Water Authority, Central Arizona Water Conservation District, State of
Nevada, Southern Nevada Water Authority, State of Arizona, Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California and the Western Urban Water Coalition. These defendants were up
against El Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali (CDEM), a non-profit composed of
community groups from Mexicali devoted to promoting sustainable development; Citizens
United for Resources and the Environment, a California non-profit focused on research on
resource use; and Desert Citizens Against Pollution another California nonprofit focused on
health and environmental justice.185
The power balance is obvious when considering the list of plaintiffs and defendants.
On the US side, this lining was critical as the only other water source from the Colorado !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!183 Elenes, Roberto “Aguas Enturbiadas Murky Waters” CDEM. 2009. 184 The San Diego County Water Authority lobbied for the rider. 185 Consejo de Desarollo Economicio de Mexicali v. United States. 2007.
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River was over apportioned.186 The lining was an attempt to claim a portion of groundwater
for the US side. High-level action is present where there is no groundwater. However, at a
time of low visibility of groundwater depletion on the Mexican side, the high-level
government response needed for bilateral action is conspicuously absent on the Mexican
side.
“Murky Waters,” an unpublished book written by CDEM, demonstrates how
visibility, through its impact on the perception of dependability, affected the pressure exerted
by both sides in the All American Canal case.
This book uses primary sources from the case to illustrate the pressure dynamics. It
explains that the decision to pursue the 2005 lawsuit arose from the “maddening impassivity
of the [Mexican] federal and state governments.”187 While the Mexican government helped
fund the lawsuit, this action had ulterior motives. Funding the groups prevented the Mexican
government from participating directly in the lawsuit: “during the execution of such legal
procedure, the government could not participate as a direct affected because they were
financially supporting a group of dissatisfied citizens [bringing the] trial in US Courts.”188
Therefore, “[the] Mexican Government, through its Secretariat of Foreign Affair, was willing
to testify only as a ‘friend of the Court.’”189 Furthermore, the government blocked the release
of documents helpful to the case, stating “those documents could not be delivered with the
excuse of considering them as confidential.” If actions were taken, “it�wasn’t until April 24,
2007 –too late–, when Congresswoman Maria�de Dolores Manuell-Gomez
Angulo…managed to take the lining issue along with its�consequences up to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!186 Shields, Tina. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015. 187 Elenes, Roberto “Aguas Enturbiadas Murky Waters” CDEM. 2009. 188!Ibid.!189!Ibid.!
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aforementioned Full Meeting.”190 The ambivalence of the government reached the pint that
lawyers worried, “that the public opinion and the media would detect a certain antagonism or
clash of positions between the plaintiff citizens and the government.” The government was
willing to give in to the canal lining; “The undersecretary suggested then that what CDEM
should actually do was to socialize the problem and raise awareness among the population on
the mitigation alternatives.”191 The lack of interest on a bilateral level led to the local level
action on groundwater.
However, CDEM does not only place the blame on government inaction. They note
that, the citizenship was “uninformed, apathetic, unable to confront organized a major
problem like this.”192 CDEM also noted that it faced backlash from the community; “some
members of the Mexicali Economic Development Council (CDEM) had to face a moral
public indictment, organized from a certain sector within the communication media that
influences the poorly informed population.”193 This portrayal demonstrates the isolated
position from which the plaintiffs in the 2005 lawsuit negotiated.
In contrast on the US side, “the water contractors were stopping at nothing in order to
win, mobilizing an army of lawyers along with representatives, senators and even the
President himself, all focused in only one objective: rescue 83.4 millions of cubic meters of
seepage water from the Colorado River into Mexico through an apparently legal option.”194
While CDEM has an obvious bias, their report is still a valuable look into the disparity in
pressure exerted by the US and Mexican government with respect to the lining dispute.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!190!Ibid.!191!Ibid.!192!Ibid.!193!Ibid.!194!Ibid.!
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Furthermore, the interview with the IID official, Shields, revealed the willingness of
Mexico to bend on groundwater. “At one point there was an idea that instead of concrete
lining we would put in seepage recovery wells and they went ballistic over that. I remember
when that got proposed some of my old management got summoned back to Washington to
meet with the State Department because Mexico had expressed a concern at very high
levels…they were afraid it would withdraw even more water and potentially mine the system
a little. So we ended up with a lining project I don't think they are thrilled to death with it
…but they don't get to make those decisions its out of our entitlement.”195 When Mexican
officials paid attention the issue was pushed up to the binational level and the wells idea
ended there. This demonstrates the weak level of pressure put on the US by the Mexican
government with respect to the lining.
The Mexican farmer, Quintara, revealed the source of this ambivalence. It came from
the lack of ambiguity and security felt around groundwater resources. To Quintara the All
American Canal is a non-issue. “[The Americans] want to exploit it, it's their canal these
Mexicans are stupid, it's the All American Canal, if they want to explode it they can do
so.”196 To Quintara the effects are overblown. “I have wells right at the border near the canal
and I still get the same water level. It is more an issue of politics, which is a poor choice by
the Mexicans because is the All American Canal.”197 However, his understanding of
groundwater still had significant gaps. “I’m not a scientist but a little channel is not going to
change the underground water level.” Without visual effects, Quintara is willing to allow for
an All American Canal, believing that these actions will not affect the water level.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!195!Ibid.!196!Quintara, Roberto. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.!197!Ibid.!
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Unlike these Mexican farmer, the CONAGUA official, Gamez, noted the negative
effects of the lining of the All American Canal. While he did find the “the lining of the all
American canal is very normal. It reduces the volumes in the aquifers.”198 Gamez noted how,
“There are ejidos on the border near where the all American canal was lined. Those ejidos
are either asking the government to send them more money or they have already been forced
to migrate to other locations…they lost everything because they cannot sell their land
without water on it.” 199 As visual cues, abandoned farmland and migrating populations are
strong. Given the presence of visual cues for part of the population, the visibility hypothesis
would have predicted subsequent action on groundwater.
This action arose in the form of Minute 319 in 2012. Minute 319 is an agreement
between the US and Mexico agreeing to release water down the dried up Colorado River in
Mexico for environmental purposes.
The American farmer, Brundy spoke about the connection between lining the AAC
and Minute 319. The willingness to give up groundwater with the AAC impacted Mexico,
and with it groundwater negotiations. It led to action to share groundwater. “The truth of why
Mexico released the water [in Minute 319] was because they needed to replenish the aquifers
because of the lining of the All American Canal. It was not really for the environment.”200
CONAGUA also saw the Minute 319 decision in light of groundwater. When asked
about the pertinence of groundwater in Minute 319 discussions, they said, “It was important
[Translated].” Ing. Gamez said that our “water was not sufficient so they turned to subsurface
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!198!Gamez, Marco Aurelio. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.!199 Ejidos are “village lands communally held in the traditional Indian system of land tenure that combines communal ownership with individual use.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 200!Brundy, Tom. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.!
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water.”201 This is critical. Despite high attention with the AAC no strong action was taken to
prevent the lining. However, once the effects are seen, with migrating populations and
dropping well levels, bilateral agreements started to appear that included groundwater
considerations.
Karen Schlatter of The Sonoran Institute, noted that after the water release due to
Minute 319; “groundwater recharge was a big deal and that area has a drawdown due to
agriculture and this was big benefit to agriculture.”202 This comment suggests that in recent
years, namely after the AAC lining, the drawdown was significant. The drawdown led to the
hypothesized action, given that Minute 319 is one of the most influential minutes since
Minute 242 in 1973.203
While the lining of the AAC led to action on groundwater, a natural occurrence in
2010 also had a major impact on groundwater by visualizing the insecurity of groundwater
and weakening its assumed dependability. The Sierra El Mayor Cucapah Earthquake on
April 4, 2010 was centered in the Mexicali Valley and registered at 7.2 on the Richter scale.
It caused $500 million in damages in northern Baja California and $50 million in damages in
the Imperial Valley.204 The earthquake also had long-term consequences:
“Mexico is looking at 25,000 hectares (nearly 62,000 acres) of farmland that may never be
productive again because of groundwater tainted with salt or other chemicals coming to the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!201!Gamez, Marco Aurelio. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015!202!Schlatter, Karen. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.!203 Another interesting part is that it is like Minute 242. It is linked to a crisis in surface water not a stand-alone provision or issue. 204 Agency, Natural Resources, and Edmund G. Brown Jr. Governor. "Earthquakes May Pose Unexpected Threat to Agriculture." (n.d.): n. pag. Department of Conservation. Public Affairs Office, 11 Sept. 2011. Web. 22 May 2015.
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surface, or because of subsidence that lowered farmland below the water table or otherwise
impacted the irrigation canals and drains.”205
Suddenly Mexico was given a visual cue of sinking land and upended groundwater, paired
with damaged canals causing ambiguity over the availability of any water source in a time of
crisis. As Quintara noted his own visual cue was that “the land went to water” during the
earthquake.206
The result of this earthquake was cooperation over water in general. In 2010 the
IBWC/CILA published two minutes on water cooperation: Minute 317 and 318. As
Schlatter: noted “Mexico was allowed to store water in Lake Mead as a result of the Mexicali
earthquake.”207 Shields agreed noting that “We’re on the border. We are a border state and
we are going to always help a neighbor out if we can and with the earthquake their system
their canals were devastated…so we worked hard with the seven basin states and the federal
government to allow them to have storage opportunities under surge conditions.”208 Anaya
also noted the importance of the precedent set by aid during the earthquake, this “good
gesture, that led to minute 319.”
Yet, the opportunity for action on groundwater requires coordination for
implementation. Unlike the 2005 lawsuit, those pushing for Mexican groundwater
management, created a strong and organized front. Minute 319 demonstrated that interest
groups are forming behind groundwater conservation. The Minute, noted IBWC Official
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!205 Agency, Natural Resources, and Edmund G. Brown Jr. Governor. "Earthquakes May Pose Unexpected Threat to Agriculture." (n.d.): n. pag. Department of Conservation. Public Affairs Office, 11 Sept. 2011. Web. 22 May 2015. 206!Quintara, Roberto. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.!207!Schlatter, Karen. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.!208!Shields, Tina. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015!
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Anaya, was intended “to extend improvement to Mexican infrastructure due to the
earthquake but at same time we have to do other things and environmental groups were part
of this effort in terms of trying to make the whole system better. They said we need to
include a component for environment…they had already been meeting and discussing these
issues.”209 He noted that. “the main players were the environmental groups.”210 The
discussions were there, but not the action until 2010.
However, Minute 319 was not only the result of increased visibility, but also the
initiator of another visual impact. Anaya noted that “People living [in the Mexicali Valley]
felt better seeing water in the river. A lot of young kids had never seen [the river]. It gave
that connection back to them if only for a little while. As we are continuing to have dialogue
with local stakeholders, it is gaining importance that we do need to at least try to have that
quality of life where they continue to grow crops, but still give something back. We do feel
lots good support at local level.”211 Now connected by the visual of surface water,
community groups were exerting influence in the upcoming Minute 320.212 While
unconnected to groundwater, this further emphasizes the value of visuals to action in bilateral
negotiations.
The visual implications of the All American Canal lining mesh with the earthquake
visuals to define action on bilateral cooperation. As Shields noted, the US started to
brainstorm backup plans for water delivery in times of crisis, just as Mexico “is worried
about not being able to get water through its infrastructure.”213 Insecurity becomes communal
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!209!Anaya, Gilbert. "Interview." Telephone interview. April. 2015.!210!Ibid.!211!Ibid.!212 Ibid. 213!Shields, Tina. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015.!
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as officials are forced to see just how easily water supply can be cut off and damaged. This
earthquake came just as the All American Canal was finished, linking together visual impacts
and adding urgency to the bilateral minute negotiations.
The Mexicali/Imperial case study illustrates the link between action and groundwater
visibility. It weaves together the events of the minute, earthquake and lining, to provide a
picture of the dynamics of action on groundwater. It also provides a perspective into how
visibility manifests in movement towards a treaty through its creation of interest groups on
the border. The interviews back up this historical narrative with recent perspectives on the
lack of ambiguity and dependability groundwater provides to regions, impacting how they
negotiate for and value water resources.
6.4 Reaching the Bilateral Level
This optimistic take on the increased visibility leading to recent action on
groundwater, leaves open the question, if bilateral action is beginning, why is a
comprehensive groundwater minute still missing?
The simple answer is that not all bilateral action is equal. While the agencies and
IBWC are talking about this issue, “we need something more.”214 The IBWC official sees
that the situation is going to have to be seen as a crisis by Washington DC and Mexico City:
“Otherwise we do not have the high level leadership to give us the authority to take action.”
For example, the US President needs to point to groundwater as an issue to address. “We
have managed to get by droughts so far. Everyone is still managing to grow crops, cities
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!214 Anaya, Gilbert. "Interview." Telephone interview. April. 2015.
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provide water. We haven’t hit that crisis level.”215 The crisis is there, it is just taking place
underground, limited by visibility.
Anaya noted the continuing problem that dependability resulting from invisibility
creates for groundwater action. “Everybody is still afraid to engage. There is a lack of trust.
In the past nobody has shown an ability to control its use you see that…there is a lot of
conservation efforts in most communities, but the emphasis is not on conservation, it’s on
continued development and prosperity with the hope that someone come up with a
solution.”216 There is still this optimism that “something is going to change – they are going
to get out of the drought, reservoirs will fill and aquifers replenish.”217
6.5 The Bigger Picture
This role of visibility creating dependability is not restricted to the Mexicali and
Imperial Valley areas of the border. A variety of surveys have found that the public perceives
groundwater as a dependable resource.218 In this case study, interviews link to a larger trend
that is valuable for understanding action in other areas of the border and potentially other
country dyads.
Anaya from the IBWC brought the historical perspective to the importance of visuals
for action. He stated that in 1944:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!215!Ibid.!216!Ibid.!217!Ibid.!218 For example: Bekkar, Younes, et al. "On the difficulty of managing an invisible resource: Farmers' strategies and perceptions of groundwater use, field evidence from Morocco." Irrigation and Drainage 58.S3 (2009): S252-S263, Calabria, Jon. "Water Issues in Georgia: A Survey of Public Perceptions and." 2011. And Salman, Amer Zahi, and Emad Al-Karablieh. "Measuring the willingness of farmers to pay for groundwater in the highland areas of Jordan." Agricultural Water Management 68.1 (2004): 61-76.
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“When they improved the technology to pump groundwater there was not a good handle on how much you can withdraw without harming the aquifer. It wasn't until you noticed changes in hydrology on the surface that they realized maybe they can’t pump as much because it was affecting surface water supply. This was very evident in artesian flow where you didn't have to pump; the water would just come up. But once they started to over pump they realized that there no longer was artesian flow.”219
Anaya focused on how action relied on the visual effects of sinking groundwater levels
paired with impacts on surface water. “When their pumps stopped working and they were
having drill even further…and then the [wells] were empty and not only was the aquifer
going dry, but all of a sudden lakes they had before were going dry.”220 Specifically, in New
Mexico and Texas, “all of a sudden more wells were needed and they had to go deeper and
then they realized some surface water also disappearing.”221 At this point, people at the local
level reacted.
With this visual connection, the IBWC saw increased contact from officials and the
public on groundwater issues. The IBWC has “seen communities be more proactive and
more protective… they are worried they’re going to run out.”222 Anaya noted that even in
Texas, where government regulation is hated, there are now groundwater conservation
districts. While this is a constructive reaction, other areas are “so aggressive. One community
wants to take water from your basin so [they are] fighting with each other.”223 The status quo
is changing, but the question remains: will visuals prompt bilateral legal action or will the
water run out before action can take place?
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!219!Anaya, Gilbert. "Interview." Telephone interview. April. 2015.!220!Ibid.!221!Ibid.!222!Ibid.!223!Ibid.!
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6.6 Conclusion
The above sections demonstrate the links between groundwater, visibility and
dependability. However, given these conclusions, the policy implications are challenging.
Shields recounted a recent trip to the IID’s Salton Sea, which has seen drastically dropping
water levels. “I don't go to the Salton Sea, you take it for granted, and I went on a tour
recently and that's water gone away and lots of and it did not smell so good and we took
people from DC there and wasn't the best smelling day and that was good. You see the dried
fish bones…The visual and what you can see and smell brings things home.”224 Of course
this is not available with groundwater. Therefore the next chapter examines how visibility
can be increased with respect to groundwater, so that bilateral action takes place before the
groundwater runs out.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!224!Shields, Tina. "Interview." In person interview. April. 2015!
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
“We’re going to have to stop looking at these disasters as something to wait for.”225
-President Barack Obama
On a trip in 2014, President Obama spoke with Californians about water scarcity.
After seeing the impact of the drought, he concluded, “The entire Western region [is] going
to have to start rethinking how we approach water for decades to come.”226 Water insecurity
is not only a future risk, but a current challenge. The time to act is now. As the President
noted, the ramifications of a changing environment are coming, and as Rubeus Hagrid once
told Harry Potter, “It’s changing out there. There is a storm coming, Harry, and we all best be
ready when she does.”227
This thesis is valuable in that it suggests, at least in the case of the US and Mexico,
how to most effectively promote action on a treaty or groundwater minute. Interviews of
stakeholders in the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys reveal that action intensifies towards the
bilateral level as the visibility of groundwater increases.
The implication of the visibility hypothesis is instrumental for policy. Recent policy
surrounding groundwater, such as the US initiated Transboundary Aquifer Assessment
Program (TAAP), is based on the premise that data availability is the key factor limiting
action on groundwater. Under the purpose section, the act states “[to] provide the scientific
foundation necessary for State and local officials to address pressing water resource !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!225 The White House Press Office. "Remarks by the President on the California Drought." The White House. 14 Feb. 2014. Web. 22 May 2015. 226 The White House Press Office. "Remarks by the President on the California Drought." The White House. 14 Feb. 2014. Web. 22 May 2015. 227!Harry!Potter!and!the!Order!of!the!Phoenix,!2007.!Movie.!!
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challenges in the United States-Mexico border region.” TAAP focuses on improved surveys
and modeling of priority aquifers. This is undeniably valuable.
However, this thesis suggests that increasing the physical visibility of groundwater is
the most effective use of resources and time. This is not an easy task. An advertising
campaign would be an effective way to magnify the visibility of groundwater loss. In the
case of the US and Mexico, the environmental groups that pushed forward Minute 319 are
potential candidates to lead the campaign. The ads could feature images of land subsidence,
crisis events and wistful residents next to out of service wells. This visibility would be
intended to shift perspectives on groundwater’s dependability and incite locals and officials
to push for a groundwater treaty as a bilateral priority instead of an afterthought.
However, even with efforts to spur action on groundwater management, it is highly
likely that global groundwater resources will face increased stress in the coming decades.
This thesis finds that dwindling groundwater resources will have implications for security.
The US-Mexico border region sits at a precipice. A confluence of demographic pressures,
economic dynamics and climate change is increasing the pressure on already stressed
resources. Given current trends, preparations are needed to preempt surface water conflict.
Preparations can include actions such as improving lines of communication between officials
and locals at key border points. The way in which the US and Mexico tackle dwindling
resources will determine not only future economic prosperity, but even national security.
This thesis provides a strong first foray into groundwater issues. However, future
scholarship is needed in this area of study. The preliminary finding linking groundwater
depletion to surface water conflict only has one control variable: trade to proxy for the
overall level of friendship/ hostility in dyads. This is a critical variable because it controls for
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the fact that some areas may experience poor surface water relations that are independent of
groundwater, but instead are due to general animosity between the countries. However, to
improve on the results, the addition of variables such as GDP would be valuable to test the
salience of the groundwater and conflict relationship. Further study can also illuminate if the
visibility hypothesis is constrained to the US-Mexico border region. New case studies can
help illuminate this question.
The key implications of this thesis comes down to the question: Will visibility
increase fast enough to achieve bilateral management of groundwater, or will sources hit the
critical scarcity level first, leading to surface water conflict?
In one direction, increasing visibility pushes areas towards controlling groundwater
resources through a treaty, and therefore avoiding reaching stress levels that would induce
conflict over surface water. In the other direction, groundwater stress is pushing countries
towards conflict. The outcome (conflict or cooperation) depends on whether or not visibility
leads to the control of water resources before they reach groundwater levels that have a
higher risk of conflict over surface water resources. At present, the most volatile situations
are areas with low visibility and groundwater stress levels transitioning from low to medium
stress levels. In these areas, this thesis predicts that low levels of action to control
groundwater on a bilateral level will be paired with stress levels nearing the turning point
where conflict becomes increasingly likely (See Appendix 7 for Outcomes Table).
Visibility! Groundwater!Stress!
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These conclusions can be applied on the US-Mexico border to determine areas with
the potential to spur bilateral action, and areas with the potential to create conflict.
Pinpointing these areas is meant to mimic the Basins at Risk (BAR) study. BAR was created
to highlight the basins in the world facing the highest likelihood of conflict in order to best
focus resources and preparations. The analysis below analyzes the conflict and action
potential for four transboundary basins. These four US-Mexico basins are all of the
transboundary basins mentioned in the BAR dataset, namely the Tijuana River Basin, the
Colorado River Basin, the Rio Grande River Basin and the Yaqui River Basin.
The first area, the Colorado Basin, incorporates the case study area of the Mexicali
and Imperial Valleys. The narrative presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates that visibility has
increased to the level that disruptive actions such as the lining of the AAC are now spurring
increased bilateral cooperation to conserve groundwater. Furthermore, the groundwater
scarcity levels have already reached the category of high stress, which Chapter 3 found
lowers the conflict potential.228 This area is therefore deemed a low priority area for conflict
before cooperation. As Tina Shields, the IID Water manager noted, “Every now and then
folks try to tie” issues over the Rio Grande into Colorado River negotiations, but “we always
say no, no, no, you guys are on your own. We are all getting along. It might take along time
to do things, but we get things done whereas you guys are still in more legal battles and
looking at who is going to pull that trigger first.”
This quote illustrates the safety of the Colorado basin, but also the dangers involved
in the Rio Grande Basin. This basin is at a short-term risk for conflict. It is at a much lower
stress level, which is the period with the highest probability of surface water conflict. This is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!228!These stress levels are based on the Wada (2013) AQSI data.!!
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backed up by the BAR Scale, which shows positive relations in the 1950s and 1960s over
surface water, but a shift to slightly negative events in the mid-1990s. The area continues to
see conflict over surface water with tensions over Rio Grande deliveries to the US. This
conflict fits with the hypothesis that middle levels of stress will lead to conflict.
The Hueco Bolson, a key aquifer on the border, has higher stress levels than the
average for this basin. The average volumetric rate of depletion of the Hueco Bolson between
1900 and 2008 increased each decade.229 This means that, from the 1980s to present, the drop
in groundwater levels saw a high rate of change in visibility as wells struggled to reach
dropping resources. This shift is correlated with action on groundwater including a
Memorandum of Understanding between El Paso and Tijuana to cooperate on groundwater in
1999. This progress however, takes place in the context of continued movement in the basin
towards middling stress levels, putting the area at risk for conflict.
The next basin of interest is the Tijuana Basin. This basin has one small aquifer with
extremely high stress levels (AQSI of 14). This leads to the prediction that this basin will
have low conflict levels, because it has passed the conflictive medium stress levels. This
plays out in the data, where the more conflictive events were in the 1950s and 1960s as
groundwater levels declined, while more cooperative events were in the 1980s when stress
was at its worst. Declines on this aquifer have been paired with local action to manage
groundwater starting in the 1970s. This action has decreased stress levels but has yet to
influence national level action.
Finally, the Yaqui Basin has no significant groundwater resources. Furthermore, the
BAR events associated with this area are limited to the 1950s. The analysis in Chapter 5 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!229 Konikow, L.F., 2013, Groundwater depletion in the United States (1900−2008): U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2013−5079, 63 p., http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2013/5079. (Available only online.)
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found that areas without groundwater had higher fears about future water availability and had
a backup plan in times of surface water variability. Without groundwater playing the role of
the backup plan, this thesis predicts that there is potential for conflict in this basin. However,
this thesis does not provide an explanation as to the timing of conflict in areas without
groundwater. This is, therefore, an area to be further explored.
This analysis of areas at risk of conflict on the border provides an initial
demonstration of the value of this thesis for preempting insecurity. The conflict potential of
groundwater along with the slow progress toward bilateral treaties, calls for more scholarship
and work to help prevent the long predicted future water wars.
As first mentioned in the introduction, the iconic movie Chinatown reveals the power
of water. “Can you believe it? We're in the middle of a drought, and the water commissioner
drowns. Only in L.A.”230 The quest for water pushes individuals to the point of murder and
cities to the point of disaster. Groundwater is crucial to the future. It is essential to life.
Understanding the lack of transboundary action to preserve this valuable resource becomes
more critical each day.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!230!Chinatown. Dir. Roman Polanski. Prod. Robert Evans. By Robert Towne. Perf. Roman Polanski, Jack Nicholson, Faye Dunaway, and John Huston. Paramount, 1974. DVD.!
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99!
Appendices
Appendix 1: Scarcity and Conflict Graph
Source: Yoffe, Shim, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano. "Conflict and cooperation over international freshwater resources: indicators of basins at RISR1." (2003): 1109-1126.
Appendix 2: BAR Event Descriptions
BAR SCALE EVENT DESCRIPTION
-7 Formal Declaration of War
-6 Extensive War Acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic cost: Use of nuclear weapons; full scale air, naval, or land battles; invasion of territory; occupation of territory; massive bombing of civilian areas; capturing of soldiers in battle; large scale bombing of military installations; chemical or biological warfare.
-5 Small scale military acts: Limited air, sea, or border skirmishes; border police acts; annexing territory already occupied; seizing material of target country; imposing blockades; assassinating leaders of target country; material support of subversive activities against target country.
-4
Political-military hostile actions: Inciting riots or rebellions (training or financial aid for rebellions); encouraging guerilla activities against target country; limited and sporadic terrorist actions; kidnapping or torturing foreign citizens or prisoners of war; giving sanctuary to terrorists; breaking diplomatic relations; attacking diplomats or embassies; expelling military advisors; executing alleged spies; nationalizing companies without compensation.
-3
Diplomatic-economic hostile actions: Increasing troop mobilization; boycotts; imposing economic sanctions; hindering movement on land, waterways, or in the air; embargoing goods; refusing mutual trade rights; closing borders and blocking free communication; manipulating trade or currency to cause economic problems; halting aid; granting sanctuary to opposition leaders; mobilizing hostile demonstrations against target country; refusing to support foreign military allies; recalling ambassador for emergency consultations regarding target country; refusing visas to other nationals or restricting movement in country; expelling or arresting nationals or press; spying on foreign government officials; terminating major agreements. Unilateral construction of water projects against another country’s protests; reducing flow of water to another country, abrogation of a water agreement.
BAR SCALE EVENT DESCRIPTION
!!
100!
-2
Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction: Warning retaliation for acts; making threatening demands and accusations; condemning strongly specific actions or policies; denouncing leaders, system, or ideology; postponing heads of state visits; refusing participation in meetings or summits; leveling strong propaganda attacks; denying support; blocking or vetoing policy or proposals in the UN or other international bodies. Official interactions only.
-1
Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction:
Low key objection to policies or behavior; communicating dissatisfaction through third party; failing to reach an agreement; refusing protest note; denying accusations; objecting to explanation of goals, position, etc.; requesting change in policy. Both unofficial and official, including diplomatic notes of protest.
0 Neutral or non-significant acts for the inter-nation situation: Rhetorical policy statements; non-consequential news items; non-governmental visitors; indifference statements; compensating for nationalized enterprises or private property; no comment statements.
1 Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions-- mild verbal support: Meeting of high officials; conferring on problems of mutual interest; visit by lower officials for talks; issuing joint communiqués; appointing ambassadors; announcing cease-fires; non-governmental exchanges; proposing talks; public non-governmental support of regime; exchanging prisoners of war; requesting support for policy; stating or explaining policy.
2 Official verbal support of goals, values, or regime: Official support of policy; raising legation to embassy; reaffirming friendship; asking for help against third party; apologizing for unfavorable actions or statements; allowing entry of press correspondents; thanking or asking for aid; resuming broken diplomatic or other relations.
BAR SCALE EVENT DESCRIPTION
3 Cultural or scientific agreement or support (non- strategic): Starting diplomatic relations; establishing technological or scientific communication; proposing or offering economic or military aid; recognizing government; visit by head of state; opening borders; conducting or enacting friendship agreements; conducting cultural or academic agreements or exchanges. Agreements to set up cooperative working groups.
4
Non-military economic, technological or industrial agreement: Making economic loans, grants; agreeing to economic pacts; giving industrial, cultural, or educational assistance; conducting trade agreements or granting most favored nation status; establishing common transportation or communication networks; selling industrial- technological surplus supplies; providing technical expertise; ceasing economic restrictions; repaying debts; selling non-military goods; giving disaster relief. Legal, cooperative actions between nations that are not treaties; cooperative projects for watershed management, irrigation, poverty-alleviation.
5 Military economic or strategic support: Selling nuclear power plants or materials; providing air, naval, or land facilities for bases; giving technical or advisory military assistance; granting military aid; sharing highly advanced technology; intervening with military support at request of government; concluding military agreements; training military personnel; joint programs and plans to initiate and pursue disarmament.
6 International Freshwater Treaty; Major strategic alliance (regional or international): Fighting a war jointly; establishing a joint military command or alliance; conducting joint military maneuvers; establishing economic common market; joining or organizing international alliances; establishing joint program to raise the global quality of life.
7 Voluntary unification into one nation: Merging voluntarily into one nation (state); forming one nation with one legally binding government.
Appendix 3: SizeGW Regressions
Small -
Bar scale (1) (2) (3) (4)
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101!
SizeGW <.046 1.151 (6.689)
74.652*** (25.313)
23.834*** (6.599)
63.259** (27.000)
SizeGW2 -2059.624*** (688.43)
. -1133.159 (744.525)
Trade .440 (.557)
.329 (.564)
N 1365 1365 862 862 R2 .000 .006 .018 .021
Coefficient 1.959 1.890 1.975 1.945
Medium -
BAR scale (1) (2) (3) (4)
SizeGW >.046 and <.367 -10.635*** (.710) -5.744 (3.694)
-11.253*** (.699)
-10.945*** (3.969)
SizeGW2 -10.839 -.667 (-8.243)
Trade . -.010 (.559)
-.017 (.562)
N 759 759 556 556 R2 .192 .194 .282 .282
coefficient 4.083 3.635 3.984 3.957
Large -
Bar scale (1) (2) (3) (4)
SizeGW >.367 .418*** (.087)
.259 (.291)
.580*** (.107)
.839** (.391)
SizeGW2 .041
(.072) -.070
(.095) Trade 2.068***
(.716) 1.954***
(.742) N 596 596 246 246 R2 .036 .036 .154 .155
coefficient 1.267 1.363 .210 3
!!
102!
Appendix 4: Groundwater Newspaper Coverage Graphs
R²!=!0.38534!
\20!
0!
20!
40!
60!
80!
100!
120!
140!
160!
1900! 1920! 1940! 1960! 1980! 2000! 2020!
Num
ber%o
f%arDcles%m
enDo
ning%groun
dwater%
Year%
Trends%in%Groundwater%Coverage%in%The%UJT%San%Diego%(Number)%
R²!=!0.68782!
\50!
0!
50!
100!
150!
200!
250!
300!Num
ber%o
f%arDcles%m
enDo
ning%groun
dwater%
publishe
d%each%year%
Year%
Trends%in%Groundwater%Coverage%in%the%New%York%Times%(Number)%
!!
103!
Appendix 5: Map of Districto de Riego 014
Source: http://distritoderiego.com.mx/historia/
Appendix 6: Map of All American Canal
R²!=!0.7623!
0!10!20!30!40!50!60!70!80!90!100!
Num
ber%o
f%arDcles%m
enDo
ning%groun
dwater%
publishe
d%each%year%
Year%
Trends%in%Groundwater%Coverage%in%the%New%York%Times%(Number)%
!!
104!
Source: http://www.parsons.com/projects/Pages/all-american-canal.aspx
Appendix 7: Table of Paired Outcomes
Visibility Groundwater
Stress
Predicted
Action in
Groundwater
treaties
Predicted
Conflict
Levels
Low low Low Low
Medium Medium Medium High
High High High Low
Low Medium Low High
Medium High medium Low
High Medium High High
Low High Low Low
Medium Low Medium Low
High Low high Low
!!
105!
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