Thebarenecessities:
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments
SonjaBlum,UniversityofMuensterECPRGeneralConferenceReykjavik,25‐27August2011Section:ThePoliticsofRetrenchmentandWelfareStatePolicy–Revisitingtheory,evaluat‐ingevidencePanel:WomenandChildrenFirst?TheImpactoftheFinancialCrisisonFamilyPolicyPanelchairs:AnnetteHenninger,AngelikavonWahl
WorkinProgress:Pleasedonotcitewithoutauthor’spermission!Commentsverywelcome:sonja.blum@uni‐muenster.deAbstractFamily policies in Germany and Austria have undergone interesting developments during the lastyears:Startingfromfamilialisticpositions,far‐reachingchangesseemedunlikelyforseveralreasons(e.g. due to thembeing conservativewelfare states, governedby grand coalitions).However, pro‐foundreformsastheintroductionofincome‐relatedparentalbenefitsortheexpansionofchildcarefor under three‐year‐olds in both countries have run counter to these expectations and attractedattention.Withthesereforms,familypoliciesinGermanyandAustriaremovedfromthecomprehen‐sive‘retrenchmentagenda’inwelfarepolicies.Severalexpansionarymeasureshavebeenintroducedafter the startof theglobal financial crisis in2007and someevenafter ithit the realeconomy in2008. However, since both countries enacted radical austerity packages in 2010, the question iswhetherthesehavecontinuedwiththenewlystruckfamilypolicypathsorwhethertheybrokewiththem.
Bringingtomindthatthepre‐crisisconditions,whichframedthe2006enactmentoftheGermanincome‐related parental benefit, were clearly different from the 2009 one’s framing the Austriancounterpart,spotlightsthetimingofpolicyprocesses.Whiletheoreticalapproachestypicallyabstractfrom‘time’and‘space’,PaulPierson(2004)prominentlyarguedthatthesignificanceofcausalvari‐ablesisfrequentlydistortedwhenrippedfromtheirtemporalcontext.Againstthisbackground,thispaperstudiesrecentfamilypolicyreformsinGermanyandAustriaandtheirpost‐crisisamendmentsfrom a time‐sensitiveperspective: This contains, amongst others, a view to decisionsmade in thepast,contingenciesinpolicyprocesses,andsudden‘windowsofopportunity’.
Taking a preview, the paper finds that the post‐crisis reactions have enforced rather than de‐celeratedtheparadigmaticfamilypolicychangesinGermanyandAustria:Althoughfamiliesexperi‐encedharshsavingsmeasures, itseemsthatthecrisishelpedpolicymakersto legitimatethetakenpathsas‘barenecessities’.
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 2
1.Introduction
In recent years, family policies across Europe removed from the comprehensive ‘retrenchment
agenda’inwelfarepolicies:Unlikee.g.pensionorhealthpolicies,theyhavebeenlargelymarked
byexpansionofbenefitsandservices.Inparticular,manycountriesfocusedonenhancingwork‐
lifebalance,childcarefacilitiesandparentalleaves.ThisisnotablyvalidforGermanyandAustria,
which–despitebeing traditionally, as conservative‐corporatistwelfare states (Esping‐Andersen
1990), ascribed a very low reformpotential – have undertaken quite far‐reaching,modernising
familypolicyreforms.However,whatstartedasaUSfinancialcrisis in2007,since2008opened
outintoaneconomiconeandaglobalrecession.Stilltoday,“theroleofthewelfarestateinthis
storyismuchlessclear”(Kaaschetal.2010:2):Nationalsocialpolicyreactionstothecrisisseem
to vary substantially and notmuch is knownonwhy they do so.One self‐evident factor is the
nationaltimingandseverityoftheoveralleconomiccrisis.
Following theact to stabilise financialmarkets1ofOctober 2008,Germanyenacted two
economic stimulus programmes in November 2008 and in January 2009, which together com‐
prised64billionEuros.2 InAustria,alsotwoeconomicstimuluspackagesandataxreformwere
enacted inOctoberandDecember 2008, comprisingabout twelvebillionEuros. Table 1depicts
GDPgrowthratesinpercentagechangeonthepreviousyear:ItshowsthatallcountriesbutPo‐
landexperiencedanegativegrowthoftheirGDPvolumein2009.However,somecountrieswere
hit particularly hard – namely the Baltic countries Latvia (‐18%), Lithuania (‐14.7%) and Estonia
(‐13.9%)–whileothershadonlylimitedslumps.Germany(‐4.7%)andAustria(‐3.9%)wereonabout
EU‐27‐average(‐4.3%)positionsconcerningnegativeGDPgrowthin2009.Aviewtotheforecasts
for2011showsthatforallcountriesbutPortugalandGreeceapositiveGDPgrowthispredicted–
though,ofcourse,toverydifferentdegrees.Germany(2.6%)andAustria(2.4%)hereareinabove‐
averagepositions.Theseandotherfiguresshowhowtheeconomiccrisishassettledbynowand
economicforecastsenhance.This isagoodsituationtolookbackandstudyfamilypolicydevel‐
opmentduringthetimesofcrisis.
Lookingat the literature, there is actuallyground toexpecteither:a terminationof the
expansionaryfamilypolicyreformpath(uptoevenretrenchment)oritsenforcement.Foronthe
onehand,particularlyin2009thenationalrecessionsputsocialpoliciesunderpressure:National
agendaswerewidelydominatedbytheissueofreducingpublicexpenditure.Ontheotherhand,
Fink(2009)haspointedtothepossibilitythattheeconomiccrisisisusedasa‘windowofoppor‐
tunity’(cf.Kingdon1995)toovercomethelowreformpotentialofconservative‐corporatistwel‐
1TheFinanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz,comprisingavolumeof400billionEuros,wasenacted insummaryproceedingsbytheGermanBundestagon17October2008.2Forshort,theywerecalledKonjunkturprogrammI (‚Savingemploymentby increasinggrowth‘)andKon‐junkturprogrammII(‚Determinedinthecrisis,strongfortheeconomicrevival‘).
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 3
fare states and support policies against new social risks (cf. Bonoli 2007).3 Furthermore, there
seemstobea temporalorder ingovernments’ familypolicy responses to thecrisis:Richardson
(2010:495)identifiedafirststageof“stimulusfollowedbyamovetowardsausterity”.Amongthe
national reactions, hemost commonly finds changed amounts in cash benefits (e.g. child and
familyallowances),followedbymostlystimulus‐orientedchildcarereformsandmostlyausterity‐
oriented leave policy reforms. Summing up, these studies give hints, but are also unclear on
whetherandwhenexactlyweshouldfindexpansionorcutbacks.
Againstthisbackground,thispaperspecificallyaskswhetherGermanandAustrianfamily
policies havemaintained their newly‐struck path in family policies during the times of crisis or
whether they brokewith them. Family policies are a cross‐cutting issue,which – from a broad
perspective–mayinclude“topicsasvariedasemployment,transport,food,andeducationpoli‐
cies”(Gauthier2002:456).Thispaper,however,focusesonleavepolicies4andinstitutionalchild‐
care,astheyhaverisenhighonpoliticalagendasacrossEuropeinthepursuitofhigherwork‐life
balance.At times, other relevantmeasures (as e.g. child and family allowances) are integrated
into the analysis.Germany andAustria aregood cases to comparehere, because theyhad just
initiatedtheirfar‐reachingandcostlyreformpathsbeforethecrisis.Whatismore,withregardto
welfare state structuresandalso familypolicies,GermanyandAustria can“becalledbirdsofa
feather”(Alber1998:57):Comparingtheresponsesofsuchsimilarcasescanhelptounderstand
the dynamics and identify respective determinants. The case studies build on the literature,
documentsandnewspaperarticlesaswellas30qualitative interviews,conductedwithexperts
whotookpartinthereformprocessesinGermanyandAustria.5
Typically, theoretical approaches identify independent anddependent variables, but ab‐
stract from the concrete ‘time’ and ‘space’, underwhich they apply. Paul Pierson (2004), how‐
ever, prominently argued that the significance of causal variables is frequently distortedwhen
ripped from their temporal context. However, the discussion of ‘crisis policy‐making’ (see e.g.
Boin/’t Hart 2003) spotlights the timing of policy processes prominently. In the context of this
paper,thepre‐crisisconditions,whichframedthe2006enactmentoftheGermanincome‐related
parental benefit,were clearly different from the 2009 one’s framing the Austrian counterpart.
Therefore,thispaperappliesatime‐sensitiveanalyticallens(developedinChapter2)instudying
3Newsocialriskspolicies“aimatprotectingindividualsfromtheconsequencesofpost‐industrialsocioeco‐nomictrendsinthelabourmarketorinthefamilyfield”(Bonoli2007:508)ande.g.includefamilypolicyoractivelabourmarketpolicy,asopposedtoindustrialsocialrisks(e.g.oldage,unemployment).4Therearedifferenttypesofcare‐relatedleave(Kamerman/Moss2009):maternity leave,paternity leave,parentalleaveandchildcareleave,leavetocareforelderlydependentsandleavetocareforsickchildren.5The interviewswereconducted inthecontextof thePhDprojectof theauthor(cf.Blumforthcoming).Interviewed experts represent four groups, i.e. policy‐makers, administration, social partners, family andwelfareorganisations.AsinterviewswereconductedinGerman,quotationsaretranslatedinthispaper.
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 4
thepre‐ andpost‐crisis reformprocesses inGermany andAustria (Chapter 3). Chapter 4draws
somegeneralconclusionsandgivesanoutlook.
2.ATime‐sensitivePerspectiveonPolicyReforms6
Policy analysis spotlights thepolicy‐making as a continuousprocess of ‘problem‐solving’ (Schu‐
bert/Bandelow2009:16).Itthusendogenouslytakesatime‐linkedviewinstudyingandexplaining
policyprocessesandtheirresults.However,policyanalyses–aswellaspoliticalscienceingeneral
–exhibitsasurprisingneglectofthe‘timefactor’,whichismorepronouncedthaninneighbour‐
ingdisciplines (e.g. sociology).SchedlerandSantiso (1998:5)argued that:“Timewith itsmany
rolesandfacesisamajorplayerinthefieldofpolitics.Butuptonow,neitherpoliticalsciencein
general nor studiesof democracy in particular have taken explicit and systematic noticeof it.”
Againstthisbackground,Gohl(2008:200)reviewstheoften‐usedstageheuristic:Hearguesthat
thepolicycycle7–althoughbeingprocess‐oriented–expelsallconcretechronologyfromlegisla‐
tiveprocedures until there is a flattened, one‐dimensional cycle of the ‘sameold thing’.He ac‐
knowledges thepolicycycle’sadvantages for theorybuilding,butcriticises that itdoesn’toffer
orientationforpracticalpurposes.Whatismore,alsofortheorybuildingafocusonthenon‐cyclic
andnon‐regular,buttime‐specificdimensionseemsfruitful.Thisraisestwoquestions,namely:To
whatextentdocurrenttheoreticalapproachesalreadyincludethetimedimension?Andhowcan
ahigherlevelofabstractionbereachedonthisbasis,exceeding‘singularconstellations’.
Withinthefieldof‘politicsandtime’,thehighestattentionhas–atleastexplicitly–been
paid to thepolitical‐institutional time (e.g.Riescher 1994; Schedler/Santiso 1998;Rüb 2006). To
thisdimension,Rüb(2011:72)assignsthequestionunderwhichtimerhythmspoliticaldecisions
are prepared, taken and implemented. Riescher focussed on this institutional inherent time of
politicsinher1994bookandarguedthattheinherenttimeofpoliticsdifferswiththeinstitutional
contextandmakesitsdeepest impactintheconstitutionally‐definedlegislativeperiods,bute.g.
also in legislative or parliamentary time rules (e.g. speaking time). Building up on Luhmann’s
worksonthedifferentiationofsubsystems,8Riescheridentifiesa‘politicaltime’,whichappertains
tothesubsystemandisreliantonacommonchronologywiththeenvironmentaltime.Thepoliti‐
cal timestructurespoliticalevents, it functionallyapplies to thepolitical system(Riescher 1994:
223)andframespoliticalaction.Morethantheothertwotemporaldimension(seebelow),itisof
6ThisChapterlargelybuildsontheargumentationdevelopedinBlum(forthcoming).7Thepolicycycleinitsmostpopularform(cf.Jones1970;Jann/Wegrich2009)distinguishesbetweenfivestagesof thepolicyprocess: problem formulation, agenda setting, policy formulation (andpolitical deci‐sion), policy implementation and policy evaluation. This is then followed by either termination or re‐formulationoftherespectivepolicy.8Luhmann1979:33)emphasizesthattimedoesnotnecessarilytakethesameformandstructuralrelevanceinboththesubsystemandtheenvironment,sincethedifferentiationofsubsystemsincludesthedifferenti‐ationoftimeinthesubsystem(butnotintheenvironment).
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 5
cyclicalnature:9Differentdemocraticconstitutionsprovidedifferenttimerules,buttheyallfulfil
the function of limiting power in time (Riescher 2010: 1242). This dimension of political‐
institutionaltimerules–which,inthefollowing,willbecalledpoliticaltime–primarilyhasanim‐
pactonpoliticsandpolicies,but–likeallinstitutions–itcanbemodifiedaswell(e.g.byshorten‐
ingorextendinglegislativeperiods).
SchedlerandSantiso(1998:6)pointtothepolitical‐institutionaltimeruleswhenarguing
thatthese“definethetemporalstructuresorthetimetablesofdemocraticpolitics,itstimebudg‐
ets,itspointsofinitiationandtermination,itspace,itssequencesanditscycles”.However,their
argumentalreadypointstoanotheraspect.Thepoliticaltime,whichhasoftenbeenfocusedon
amidstthefewexplicitstudiesofpoliticsandtime,takesasystemicview,whilethestudyingof
policy processes requires an action‐oriented perspective, i.e. how the political time (and its
chronological environmental time) restrains policy‐making, but is also used (strategically) as a
resource. Of course, temporal patterns are not only shaped by the political time and strategic
action,bute.g.alsobyformandcontents:Forinstance, itrequiresmoretimetodealwithcom‐
plexproblemsandbuildingconsensus ismoretime‐intensive, ifvarious interesthavetobe inte‐
grated(Rüb2011:75).Thenagain,itisstrikinghowoftenpoliticaltacticsandstrategiesrelateto
thetimefactor:Forexample,policymakersare ‘playingfortime’,theysitan issueoutoracton
thespur‐of‐a‐moment(Blanketal.2011).Rüb(2006:4)evenconsidersallpoliticalactionasafight
forcontrolorthemanagementoftime,whichtherebylosesitsunswayable,continuouscharacter
andratherbecomesanobjectofpoliticaldecisions.
Gohl(2008:198)alsopointedtothefactthat‘time’isintentionallyusedinpolicy‐making
processesandthatthisintentionalityinshapingtemporalproceduresinfluencesonthe‘temporal
design’ (Zeit‐Gestaltung), which can be read in ‘temporal gestalts’, similar to that observed in
space‐time(Dörner2002:156ff.).Astemporalgestaltsdescribethecharacteristicsintheflowof
time aswell as the quality of succeeding situations, Gohl compares them to acoustic temporal
gestaltsofsongsorsymphonies(cf.Dollaseetal.2000).SchedlerandSantiso(1998;cf.Santiso
1996),whilenotusingthesevocabularies,distinguishedbetweenfivesuchqualitiesoftemporal
gestalts:namelytheduration,tempo,10timing,sequenceandperiodicityofactionsandevents.In
asimilarway,thepunctuatedequilibriumtheory–whichwantstoexplaintemporalpatternsof
policyprocesses–focusesonthistemporaldimension:“[P]oliticalprocessesaregenerallychar‐
acterized by stability and incrementalism, but occasionally they produce large‐scale departures
9Riescher (1994: 230)points to the fact that limitedpoliticalpower is structured into legislativeperiods,terms inoffice,coalitionnegotiationsandtimesofgovernmentformation.Thenagain, legislativeperiodsarestructured intosessions,annualbudgetpreparationsandrepeatingagendas.Policiesareclassifiedbytherhythmoflegislativeperiodsandpoliticalcareersliabletothecycleofaffirmationanddecline(ibid.).10SchedlerandSantiso(1998:19)definetempoasarelationalmeasure:“Itindicateshowmuchtimeittakestoperformagivenactivity,or,inotherwords,itmeasurestheratiobetweentimeandaction.”
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 6
fromthepast”(Trueetal.2007:155).Thistemporaldimension,whichcanbecharacterisedbythe
different parameters identified by Schedler and Santiso (1998; cf. Santiso 1996), will here be
calledtemporaldynamics.
Previousresearch,however,hasaddressedafurtheraspect,whichcannotbeadequately
graspedbythetemporaldimensionsidentifiedsofar:Firstandforemost,thisaspectwasemphas‐
isedinthecontextofthegarbagecanmodel(Cohenetal.1972)andthemultiplestreamsframe‐
work (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007).According to theseapproaches,policywindowsopenat
criticalpoints intimeandoffertheopportunitytopolicyentrepreneurs“topushtheirpetsolu‐
tions,or topushattention to their specialproblems” (Kingdon1995: 165).Policyentrepreneurs
havetousetheseshort‐datedwindowsofopportunityinordertoachievepolicychange.Without
goingfurtherintothedetailsofthemultiplestreamsframework,theideaof‘criticalmomentsin
time’, which may have a deep impact on politics and policies, can be taken up here and con‐
sideredinamoregeneralway.Thistemporaldimensionshallbecalledtemporalmoments,tobe
consideredinadoubleway:firstly,asapointorshortperiodintime,whichcanimpactonpolitics
andpolicies.Andsecondly,asatemporalmomentum,e.g.accelerating,delayingorextenuating
thepolicyprocessandthusinfluencingthetemporaldynamics.Tokeepaconceptualdistinction,
temporalmomentsshouldnotbeconsideredtobedeterminablebythepoliticaltime(e.g.elec‐
tions).As itseems, theymayormaynotbecreatedbypoliticalactorsthemselves(whileactors
candefinitelyusethem):Apparently,somemomentsaremuchmorepronetothat(e.g.focusing
event)thanothers(e.g.serendipity).
The following tables summarises the threedimensions,whichhavebeen identified, and
givesexamplesforaccordingparameters.
Table1:Temporaldimensionsandparameters
Dimension Primarydirectionofeffect Parameters(exemplary)Politicaltime Politicaltime
⇒Politics,Policies• Legislativeperiods• Termsofoffice• Legislativetimerules(e.g.
fixedtimelimits)• Parliamentaryspeakingtime• Plenarysessions
Temporaldynamics(cf.Schedler/Santiso1998;Santiso1996)
Temporaldynamics⇐Politicaltime,Politics
• Duration• Tempo• Timing• Sequence• Periodicity
Temporalmoments Temporalmoments⇒Temporaldynamics,Politics
• Serendipity• Coincidence• Focusingevent• Courtruling• Scientificdiscovery
Source:Ownlisting
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 7
Itwasshownthat the literatureandtheoreticalapproachesso farhavediscussedand included
differentaspectsoftherelationbetweentimeandpolitics.Inpursuitofahigherlevelofabstrac‐
tion,onecandistinguishbetweenthethreedimensionsofpoliticaltime,temporaldynamicsand
temporalmoments.Temporaldynamicsandtemporalmomentsapplyto(anumberof)individual
policiesorsubsystems,whilstthepoliticaltimeiscomprehensive.Inthefollowing,theconceptof
thesethreedimensionsoftimeinthepoliticalspherewillbeappliedasananalyticallensincom‐
paringpre‐andpost‐crisisfamilypolicyreformsinGermanyandAustria.
3.Pre‐andPost‐crisisFamilypolicyReformsinGermanyandAustria
Especially theGermanreformshavegainedquitehighattention(e.g.Henninger/vonWahl2010;
Ostner 2010; Erler 2009; Gerlach 2006), while, admittedly, only very few studies exist on the
Austrianones(forexceptionssee:Kreimer2011;Leitner2010;Blumforthcoming).Thereforeinthe
following, the contents and policy processes of these reformswill only be shortly summarised
andratherbepaidattentiontotheroleofthetimefactor,asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter.
3.1Pre‐crisisReforms
Germany
InGermany,thetwomostprestigiousandcomprehensivefamilypolicyreformsintheyearspre‐
cedingthecrisisweretheintroductionofanincome‐relatedparentalbenefit(Elterngeld)in2007
and the 2008 lawproviding for themassive expansionof childcare facilities, theKiföG (Kinder‐
förderungsgesetz).
The parental benefit replaced the childcare benefit (Erziehungsgeld), which had been
introduced in1986andrenderedmoreflexible in2001:This formermodelprovidedfora rather
longleaveofthreeyears,twoofthesewereaccompaniedbyamonthlyflat‐rateamountof307
Euros.11Bothparentswereentitledtotheleaveandcouldworkpart‐timefor19hours(until2001)
and 30hours (from2001) respectivelywhile beingon leave. Thismodelwas in linewith ‘male‐
breadwinnernorms’,asitsupportedlongleavesandsetnoincentivesforfatherstogoonleave.12
Thenewparentalbenefitintroducedin2007hasbeenratedasaparadigmaticpolicychange(e.g.
Ostner2010;Blum2010),sinceitfollowednewgoalsandsetalteredincentives:Thebenefitwas
transformed into an income‐replacement of 67 percent of the former net income, granted for
twelvemonths.Theminimumamount–i.e.mainlyforformerlynon‐employedparents–wasset
11Thisbenefitwasgraduallyreducedwithincreasingincome.12In2006,only3.3percentoffatherstookparentalleave.
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 8
at300Euros13andthemaximumamountat1800Euros.Nexttoincentivesforshorterleavesand
aquick return intopaidemployment, theparentalbenefitalsosupports sharedparenthood,as
twoadditionalpartnermonthsaregrantediftakenbytheotherparent,i.e.generallythefather.14
Nowhowdidthis far‐reachingpolicychangecomeaboutanddidtime‐relatedfactorsmatter in
thisprocess?
After being suggested by several experts’ reports for the family ministry (esp. Rürup/
Gruescu2003),theincome‐relatedparentalbenefitwasputonthepoliticalagendaforactionin
July2004byRenateSchmidt(SPD),familyministerofthethengoverningcoalitionoftheSocial
DemocratsandtheGreenparty.Sheorderedafeasibilitystudy,butpointedoutsimultaneously
thatthereformwouldonlybeintroducedafterthenextgeneralelections,scheduledforautumn
2006. Several reasons can be identified for this ‘delay’: Firstly, especially in face of the partner
months,Schmidtmighthavebeenafraidoftheconservativeopposition(Leitner2008:218).Sec‐
ondly,inlaterstagesoflegislativeperiods,thereismostlynofinancialscopeforsuchcomprehen‐
sivereforms.Andthirdly, theSPDmaybewantedtotreasurethereform ideafortheupcoming
electioncampaign,since itwasverypopularwiththepublic.The latter factorsappertaintothe
political‐time‐dimension, and so does the development, which brought the introduction of the
parentalbenefitabout.
Following an election defeat in Germany’s most populous federal state, North Rhine‐
Westphalia, Chancellor Schröder announced re‐elections for September 2005. The SPD cam‐
paignedwiththeElterngeld,whiletheCDU/CSUstronglyopposedthisidea.However,theconser‐
vativeshadowfamilyministerUrsulavonderLeyenstatedintherun‐uptotheelectionsthatshe
likedthepolicy,but itwasunaffordable.Then inthecoalitionnegotiations, laterfamilyminister
von der Leyen agreed on introducing the parental benefitwithRenate Schmidt: She even suc‐
cessfully lobbiedfor introducingtwoinsteadofonlyonepartnermonthandpushedthereform
throughagainstconservativeresistancefromwithinherownpartyduringthefollowingmonths.15
Thus,there‐electionsopenedapolicywindowfortheElterngeld,tobeaccomplishedbyconser‐
vativefamilyministervonderLeyen,supportedbyotherpoliticalactors(ChancellorMerkel,the
socialpartners)andNixon‐goes‐to‐China‐logics16(Henninger/vonWahl2010).
13Thus,thebenefitfornon‐workingparentswashalvedbynowonlygrantedfor12insteadof24months.14Indeed,theproportionoffatherstakingparentalbenefitincreasedupto20percentin2010.Parentsarealsoeligible,however,tosharethe14monthsinotherways,e.g.bothtaking7monthsparallel.15EspeciallytheBavarianCSUrefusedtoendorsethepolicyinitscurrentform.VonderLeyengainedtheirsupportbyofferingthecompromiseofputtingthetwopartnermonthsontopofthebasictwelvemonthsandnotreducingthemfromthese,asoriginallyplanned.16Asanexpertemphasized:“VonderLeyeniscontinuingSchmidt’sfamilypolicy[…],butitwouldn’thavebeen implemented under Schmidt – or at least not as successfully ‐, because Schmidt had to push thistroughinsideherownpartyandagainsttheCDU.ThiswasmucheasierforvonderLeyen:TheCDUcouldn’tdismountitsownminister.AndtheSPDcouldn’tresist,becauseitwastheirownpolicy.”(Interview16)
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 9
On7February2007,familyministervonderLeyenwentpublicwiththeambitiousgoalto
create 500.000 new childcare places and thereby for 35 percent of under three‐year‐olds until
2013,withanestimatedcostofthreebillionEuros(SZ,7.2.2007).Thesedemandscameasahuge
surpriseandseemtohavenotevenbeenagreeduponwithChancellorMerkelbefore, letalone
withherpartyorthefederalstates,whichareresponsibleforinstitutionalchildcare(cf.Interview
18).TheinternalresistancefromtheCDU/CSUagainsttheseplanswasenormous,whiletheSPD
andtheirfinanceministerSteinbrücksupportedvonderLeyen–however,onlyonthetermsof
firstlycuttingbackfinancialbenefitsforfamiliesinreturn17andsecondlyintroducingalegalright
tochildcarefromtheageofoneyear.VonderLeyenopposedboth.InApril2007,thefamilymin‐
ister met with representatives of the German Länder and the municipalities and they actually
agreedtocreatechildcareplacesforonethirdofunderthreesuntil2013.18VonderLeyenreferred
tothehightempoof thepolicyprocessbystatingthateightweeksearlier, ‘therewasonlyNir‐
vana’concerningthechildcareexpansion(SZ,3.4.2007).Thus,theagendasettingprocessofthe
Elterngeldshowsspecifictemporaldynamics,affectedbya‘going‐public’‐strategyoffamilyminis‐
tervonderLeyen.
However,thefinancingdisputebetweenvonderLeyenandSteinbrückwasstillsmolder‐
ing.Against this background, it came as a surprisewhen the familyminister cancelled a target
dateinmidApril,whereshehadwantedtoannouncehercompromisewiththefinanceminister
(SZ,25.4.2007).Thiscanbetracedbacktoaserendipity,towhichanintervieweerefers:
Theyear2007wassuchastrokeofluck,sinceSteinbrückhadthesefourbillionEuroscash,outsidethebudget.UnexpectedreturnsfromIdon’tknowwhere.AndthatiswhytheKiföGcouldonlybepushedtrough in2007.Even if theeconomiccrisishadnot set in, theywouldneverhavegottenthisbudgeted.Thiswastheonlyyearwhereitworked–2007/2008.(Interview26)
This isaclearexampleofatemporalmoment,whichenabledthe introductionofthereform.Fi‐
nanceministerSteinbrückcouldtheninterchangethisaceuphissleeveagainstthelegalrighttoa
childcareplacefromtheageofoneyear(Interview28),whichwillcomeintoeffectin2013.Con‐
servativeforcesintheCDU/CSU,however,onlyacceptedthisrighttochildcareinexchangefora
childcareallowance:Thiswillalsobeintroducedin2013forthoseparents,whocarefortheirchil‐
drenathomeanddon’tmakeuseofinstitutionalchildcare.Nevertheless,themassiveexpansion
ofchildcareandtheintroductionofthelegalrightfrom2013representamajorpolicychangein
Germanfamilypolicies.
17TheSPDarguedthatGermanfamilypolicyspenttoomuchonfinancialbenefits,accountofservices.18ThefederalstateagreedtoprovidefourbillionEurosforthecreationofnewchildcareplacesandoperat‐ingcosts,whichtheLänderneedtoreduplicate.
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 10
Austria
InAustria,thetwoimportantfamilypolicyreformsintheyearsprecedingthecrisiswerethere‐
formofthechildcareallowance(Kinderbetreuungsgeld)andthelawprovidingfortheexpansion
ofinstitutionalchildcarefrom2008to2010,bothimplementedin2008.19
In2002,thegoverningcoalitionofconservativeÖVPandright‐wingFPÖhadreplacedthe
employment‐relatedleavebytheKinderbetreuungsgeld(inthefollowing:KBG):Itwasgrantedto
allparentsindependentofaformeremployment(e.g.alsohousewives,students)foraperiodof
30+6‐months20andaccompaniedbyamonthlyflat‐ratepaymentof436Euros.Thismeasurewas
harshly criticized by the opposition as familialising and they searched for an opportunity to re‐
formulate it. InNovember 2005, a pact of the family organisationKinderfreunde aswell as the
women’s organisations of the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the trade unionwent publicwith a
reformproposaltorendertheKBGflexible,i.e.makingitavailableforanoptionalperiodbetween
15and30months,thenaccompaniedbyadjustedmonthlypayments:
At first, we discussed this internally: How should we operate? In effect, we want the income‐relatedleave,butnowthere isthischildcareallowance.Weagreed:Asafirststep,prospectsarebetterforflexibilization.Thatis,sotospeak,toattacktheoppositionwiththeirownargumentsbysaying:Okay,wewant‘freedomofchoice’,parentsshouldbeabletochoose.[…]Andthisworkedout.Andwemanaged,withinsocialpartnership,towinemployersforthis.(Interview2)
ThestatementoftheAustrianintervieweeclarifieshowthereformcoalitionchoseatime‐related
salamitactic inpursuitoftheirlong‐termgoalofanincome‐relatedbenefit, i.e.theytriedtoma‐
nipulatethereformsequence.Andindeed,afterthe2006generalelections,theSPÖandthecon‐
servativeÖVPintheircoalitionnegotiationsagreedonintroducingtwonewversionsnexttothe
traditional30+6‐versionoftheKBGfrom2008:Onemediumvariantof20+4‐months(624Euros)
andoneshortvariantof15+3‐months(800Euros).Thus,thesalamitacticofthereformcoalition
preparedthegroundandthegeneralelections,onthepolitical‐time‐dimension,offeredtheop‐
portunitytoimplementthereform.
WhileduringtheyearsoftheÖVP‐FPÖ‐government,noeffective initiativeswerestarted
toexpandthedeficientchildcarefacilities,theissueenteredtheagendaintherun‐uptothe2006
generalelections.Nexttothetradeunions,nowalsotheFederationofAustrianIndustries21(IV)
called for the creation of childcare places (Standard, 9.11.2005). After the elections ofOctober
2006,thegroupnegotiatingfamilyandwomen’sissues–ledbySPÖ‐secretaryBuresandthefor‐
19Thoughthesetwo lawswere introducedafterthestartofthefinancialcrisis, theiragendasettingtookplaceearlierandtheywerenotyetaffectedbyit.20InAustria,partnermonthswerealreadyintroducedin1995,butratherasapurecostcontainmentmeas‐urethanasanincentiveforsharedparenthood(Interview15;Obinger/Tálos2006:160).21TheIVisnotmemberofAustriansocialpartnership,asaretheTradeUnionFederation(ÖGB),theFederalEconomicChamber(WKÖ),theFederalChamberofLabour(BAK)andtheChamberofAgriculture(LK).
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 11
mer ÖVP minister for women Rauch‐Kallat – agreed to create 30.000 new full‐time childcare
places: However, this agreementwas nixed by the financial negotiatorsMatznetter (SPÖ) and
Grasser (ÖVP) forbudgetary reasons(Standard,8.1.2007).Then in2007,spurredonby theGer‐
manKiföG (Standard, 30.5.2007), familyminister Kdolsky (ÖVP) andminister forwomenBures
(SPÖ)brought the topicon thepolitical agenda foractionand itwasdecidedatagovernment
conclave in July that the federal statewouldprovide60millionEuros from2008to2010 toex‐
pandchildcarefacilities(Standard,25.7.2007).Theaimwasformulatedtocreatebetween6.000
and8.000newplacesuntil2010,mainlyforunderthree‐year‐olds.
Since,asinGermany,theresponsibilityforchildcarefacilitieslieswiththeAustrianLänder,
thefederalstatethenhadtonegotiatea 15a‐agreement22withthem.Buresconductednegotia‐
tionswith the SPÖ‐governed Länder; Kdolskywith those governed by theÖVP. The Council of
Ministers23decidedonatextofthe15a‐agreementinNovember2007,butincontrasttotheSPÖ‐
ledLänder, theÖVP‐ledones refusedtosign thiscontract.Theyarguedthat thecreatedplaces
wouldoutnumberdemandsandcriticizedthatprivatechildminderscouldnotbesubsidized.Bu‐
resthreatenedthattheSPÖ‐Länderwouldgetthewholemoney,shouldtheÖVP‐Ländernotsign
thecontractby31May2007(Standard,21.3.2008).Nevertheless,theydidthisdeadlinepass. In‐
stead of only subsidizing the SPÖ‐Länder, however, familyminister Kdolskymetwith theÖVP‐
LänderrepresentativesinInnsbruckon28Aprilandmadesome(veryminor)concessions,sothat
theyfinallysignedthecontractinMay2008.
Summingup,aconsiderableexpansionofchildcarefacilitieswas implementedinAustria
andthusaclearshiftinfamilypolicies.However,itstoodbehindtheGermanKiföG‐reform,since
no specific place‐child ratiowas formulated as a goal and since no legal right to childcarewas
introduced. This can, amongst others, also be traced back to a temporal factor, namely to the
reform sequence: In Germany, the implementation of the 12+2‐months parental benefit sharply
increased the pressure to install sufficient childcare places after this period. In Austria, on the
other hand, the childcare expansion was decided on before implementing an income‐related,
12+2‐monthsKBG(cf.Chapter3.2)andthusacorrespondingpressurewasmissing.
3.2Post‐crisisReforms
Germany
SincethegrandcoalitionofCDU/CSUandSPD(2005‐2009)had–withtheElterngeld(2007)and
theKiföG(2008)–introducedfar‐reachingandveryprestigiousfamilypolicyreforms,newissues
22ThatisanagreementbetweenthefederalstateandtheLänderunderArticle15aofAustria’sConstitution.23Thisisaweeklymeetingbyallgovernmentmembers,whichreformbillshavetopassunanimously.
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 12
and own priorities seemed hard to find for Kristina Schröder, the new family minister of the
CDU/FDP‐coalition.InApril2010,Schröderwentpublicwithherfirstrealreformdemand,namely
expandingthesuccessfulpartnermonthsoftheElterngeld,bygrantingfourinsteadofonlytwo
of them. As the newspaper Süddeutsche (3.4.2010) commented, however, that came at a time
whenthefirststageofeconomicstimuluspackageswas justswitching intotheausteritystage:
Againstthatbackground,financeministerSchäubledirectlystalledSchröder’splans.InMay2010,
CDU‐vicechairmanKochevenquestionedwhetherthechildcareexpansiondecidedonwiththe
KiföGcouldstillbeupheldinfaceofthepressuretomakesavings(SZ,12.5.2010).Schröder’stim‐
ingthuswasverysuboptimal,asthebudgetpreparationprocess–infaceoftheeconomiccrisis
and the ‘debt brake’24 – foresaw savingsof tenbillion Euros for 2011.Against this background,
Schröderswitchedfromexpansiontocutbacks:InJune2010,sheannouncedthattherewouldbe
no additional partner months for the time being and that she rather prepared a cost‐saving
amendmentoftheElterngeld‐reform.
On7June2010,thegovernmentreleaseditsausterityprogramme,whichcontainedtwo
amendmentsoftheparentalbenefit.Ontheonehand, long‐termunemployedwouldno longer
be eligible to the Elterngeldminimum amount of 300 Euros.25 An on the other hand, for high‐
income earnerswith amonthly net income ofmore than 1240 Euros, the income‐replacement
wouldbedecreased from67 to65percent.Thenatureof theseausteritymeasuresshowsthat
theeconomiccrisisdidnot leadtoamodificationofthepathenteredwiththeElterngeld:Actu‐
ally, it hadoriginally not beenplanned to introduce aminimumamount for non‐employedpar‐
ents, since this ‘contradicted’ the income‐replacement logics: This measure had been pushed
throughby theSPDandtheConfederationofGermanTradeUnions.Now,however, the family
minister stated thatgranting theparentalbenefit to long‐termunemployedwasdetrimental to
the system and that thereby, the benefits of long‐term unemployedwould be too close to in‐
comesfrompaidemployment(SZ,8.6.2010).
Ashermostprestigiousreformissue,Schröderhadcalledforacare leave(Pflegezeit) in
March2010,i.e.thelegalrightforemployeestoshortentheirweeklyworkingtimebyhalfovera
periodoftwoyearstocarefordependants.Duringthistime,theyshouldstillreceive75percent
of their earnings, as theywould for the two years following the leave,whileworking full‐time
again. The reactions to Schröder’sproposalweremixed: Family andwelfareorganisationswel‐
24 Inthefaceoftheeconomiccrisis, thefederalismcommissiondecidedto introducea ‘debtbrake’ from2011,limitingthestructuralannualnetborrowingto0.35percentofthegrossdomesticproduct.25Thiswasplannedtobeappliedalsotoworkingparentswithverylowincomes,whoadditionallyreceiveachildsupplementorthebenefitforlong‐termunemployed(HartzIV).Aftersharpcriticismsfromtheoppo‐sitionandevenfromwithinthecoalitionparties,however,anElterngeld‐allowanceoftheirformerincome(but300Eurosatmost)was introduced for thoseof theseparents,whohadbeenemployedbefore thebirthofthechild.
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 13
comedthegeneralidea,butarguedthattheconceptwasnotfar‐reachingenough,e.g.because
carerswould have to dispense one fourth of their earnings. The SPD and the Green party dis‐
missed the ideaas conservative and re‐familialisingandargued for expanding institutional care
instead.Ontheonehand,thisproposalhadamuchbettertiming,since itwaspopularwiththe
public and very low‐priced (SZ, 21.5.2010): Since Schröder knew that therewouldbenomoney
available, she found a fitting concept tobecomeactive in reconciliationpolicies and shapeher
personalprofile.Butontheotherhand,theprivateeconomycouldusethecrisis‐situationtoar‐
gue that a legal right to take care leavewould threaten the economic recovery. For example,
DieterHundtaspresidentof theAssociationofGermanEmployersparried:“In faceof thecon‐
tinuing economic and financial crisis, theremust not be any furtherburden on labour and em‐
ployment”(SZ,4.3.2010;owntranslation).
In the faceof these twoconflicting, temporally‐bound factors,Schröderhadelaborated
herreformproposalfurtherbyMay2010.Theprivateeconomyhadcriticisedthattheywouldface
incalculabledangersiftheiremployeeswentoncareleave–thusreceiving25percentadditional
earnings– anddidn’t return towork afterwards. Itwas thusplanned to cushion these risksby
granting smaller firms an interest‐free loan from the government‐owned development bank
(Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau). Furthermore, leave‐takers should acquire additional pension
claimsoutofthecompulsorylong‐termcareinsurance.Inautumn2010,Schröderhadtabledthe
ministry’sdraftbillforthePflegezeit–whichshewantedtointroduceby2011–,butobviously,the
governmentchoseatemporaldelayingtactic.OnlyinFebruary2011,thetopicwasontheagenda
again,butnowwithadecisivemodification:Thecareleaveshouldnolongerbealegalrightfor
employees,butonlyanoptionalofferingoftheirfirms.Thiscanmainlybetracedbacktotheop‐
positionof the private economy, but also of the coalition partner FDP. The federal cabinet ap‐
provedofthisdraftlawon24March2011anditisplannedtobeineffectfromJanuary2012.
ThePflegezeitinitsoriginaldesignwouldhavemeantaslightalternationinthefamilypol‐
icy reform path implemented by the grand coalition, since it was less focused on re‐
commodificationand rathercomprised re‐familialisingelements.While the introductionofboth
theElterngeld andtheKiföGwasenabledby thesupportof theprivateeconomy, thePflegezeit
couldnotbeenpushedthroughagainsttheir interests.Therefore, thepurelyoptionalPflegezeit
remainsofrathersymboliccharacterandhasnotsignificantlychangedthenewre‐commodifying
andde‐familialisingpathwayinGermanfamilypolicies.
Austria
The twomost important familypolicy reforms introducedafter the startof theeconomic crisis
were yet another reformof the childcare allowanceKBG (2010) and another 15a‐agreement to
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 14
makethe lastpre‐schoolyearcompulsoryandfreeofcharge(2009).The latterwaspartof the
economicstimuluspackageandthusasameasureagainstthecrisis.Apartfromthese,benefits
forfamilieswerecutbackinthecontextoftheconsolidationactivitiesfrom2011to2014.
Asdescribedabove,thereformcoalitionofthewomen’sorganisationsfromtheSPÖand
thetradeunionsaswellastheKinderfreundefollowedtheKBG‐flexibilisationasatemporalsalami
tacticinpursuitofthelong‐termgoalofanincome‐relatedbenefit.However,theirorganisations
didnotmakethisamission.Hence,anotherreformcouldnotbeexpected inthis legislativepe‐
riodandthenextgeneralelectionsweredueinautumn2012.On7July2008,however,thevice‐
chancellorMolterer (ÖVP) foreclosed thegrandcoalitionand re‐electionswere set forSeptem‐
ber. In theelection campaign, theÖVPmaintainedanoticeable close contactwith theGerman
CDU:At theendofAugust,Moltererwent toBerlin tomeet theGerman familyminister (Stan‐
dard,21.8.2008)andafewdayslater,theÖVPsurprisinglywentpublicwiththedemandtointro‐
ducean income‐dependentKBG.AsMarek,statesecretary intheeconomicsministry,argued,it
shouldbemodelledaftertheGermanyElterngeld–i.e.beingpaidfor12+2‐months,at80percent
offormernetearnings,withaminimumof1000andamaximumof2000Euros–butincontrast
tothatbeonlyintroducedinadditiontothepre‐existingKBG‐versions.Intheircoalitionnegotia‐
tions,theSPÖandÖVPquicklyagreedonintroducinganincome‐relatedKBG.Thus,thebrought‐
forwardre‐elections,attributabletothepolitical‐time‐dimension,openedapolicywindowforthe
introductionofanincome‐dependentKBG.
Afterthisquickagendasetting,thepolicyformulationstagewasmoreconflict‐laden.The
negotiators–familystatesecretary26MarekandtheministerforwomenHeinisch‐Hosek(SPÖ)–
differedonsomeissues:Inparticular,Heinisch‐Hosekdemandedtograntthepartnermonthsalso
tosingleparents,whileMarekdismissedthis.TheycouldneitheragreeonMarek’squitecompli‐
catednoronHeinisch‐Hosek’sproposalonthisissue27andceasednegotiationsinJuly2009.When
theytookupnegotiationsagaininAugust,theywerehighlypressedfortimetointroducethere‐
forminJanuary2010andagainstthisbackgroundagreedonamergerofbothformerproposals.
The timepressure seems tohavepromotedaquickcompromise solutionand the reformcame
intoeffect inJanuary2010.Whilenegotiatedathightimesof theeconomiccrisis, thiswasvery
rarelyreferredtointhepolicyprocessofthisrathercost‐intensivereform.
Righttothecontrary,the15a‐agreementonintroducingacompulsorylastpre‐schoolyear
freeofchargewaspartofthestimuluspackageagainsttheeconomiccrisis.Theideaitself,how‐
ever,was older: After SPÖ‐chairmanGusenbauer had already produced it in 2004, the SPÖde‐ 26After2008elections,anewFederalMinistryforEconomy,WomenandYouthwasfounded.Undereco‐nomicsministerMitterlehner,ChristineMarekwasresponsibleforfamilyissuesasastatesecretary.27MareksuggestedgrantingtwopartnermonthsineachKBG‐variantonlytothosesingleparents,whosepartneriscriticallyill,deceased,inprisonorgotviolent.Infaceofthis,Heinisch‐Hoseksuggestedtograntthemtoallsingleparentswithaformerincomeoflessthan1200Euros,withoutanyfurtherinspection.
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 15
mandeditwithinthenegotiationsofthe15a‐agreement(2008),butitwasrefusedbytheÖVPand
laternotincluded.Thenintherun‐uptothe2008elections,theÖVP‘captured’thisdemandfrom
theSPÖ–fishingforvotesandcarriedbythethreateningeconomiccrisis.FromMarch2009,Ma‐
rekwasnegotiatingwiththeLänderrepresentativesonhowtodistributethefederalfundsof70
millionEurosforeach2009/2010and2010/2011andontheconcretedetailsoftheobligatorykin‐
dergarten‐visit.TheagreementofApril2009wasthatchildrenhadtovisitthekindergartenforat
least 16hoursandat least fourdaysaweek,while theycould takeaholidayof threeweeksat
most (other than general kindergarten holidays). From autumn 2009, the obligatory last pre‐
schoolyearcameintoeffect.
The two reforms show how cost‐intensive measures were introduced during the eco‐
nomiccrisis,but in the firstphaseof stimuluspackages.Richardson (2010:506) finds inaEuro‐
pean‐comparativestudythatthereisnoevidenceofabroadausterityapproachinAustrianfamily
policies,asopposede.g.toEstonia,FranceorHungary,allofwhichcutbackmeasuresdecisively.
However,hispaperwaspublishedlate2010andconsolidationactivities,whichweredecidedonin
October2010,arepartlynotincluded.Thus,wasthereformpathenteredinAustriaquitormodi‐
fiedinthesecondstageofausteritypackages?
Indeed,whenSPÖandÖVPleakedtheirplansforthebudgetaryframework2011to2014in
May2010,itbecameclearthatharshausteritymeasureswereplannedforfamilypolicies,i.e.sav‐
ings of about 235million Euroswere discussed for 2011 (Standard, 24.5.2010).Next to the eco‐
nomiccrisis,thiswasalsoferriedbythehighlevelofdebtofthefamilyfund(FLAF).28Manyactors
werearguingfortheseausteritymeasuresbypointingtothefamilypolicychangesconductedin
theprecedingyears,e.g.arepresentativeoftheFederationofAustrianIndustriesstated:
Today,thereareanumberofbenefits,whicharerarelydrawnon,butwhichaccumulatedupto8.5billionEurosjustfor2008.Weachievetoolittlewiththesepublicexpenditure.Neitherisfertilityin‐creasing,norwomen’sparticipationinthelabourmarkettoasignificantextent.Ialsodoubtthattheyenhancewellbeing.(Standard,1.8.2010;owntranslation)
Thatis,hereferredtothetargetingoffamilypoliciesandtriedtolegitimatesavingmeasuresby
arguingthatbenefits in‐kindwereneeded,not in‐cash. InOctober2010,thegoverningSPÖund
ÖVPfixedthebudgetaryplansandthefearsofoppositionpartiesaswellaswelfareandfamily
organisationswereevenexceeded:Notonly235,buteven350millionEurosshouldbecutdown
onfamilypoliciesin2011,e.g.byrestrictingfamilyallowancestothe24thageofthechild(before:
26th)andabolishingtheadditional13thfamilyallowance,whichhadonlybeenintroducedin2008
(before theelections).Thenagain,policy‐makersargued thatpartsof thesavingsshouldbe in‐
28OutoftheFLAF,whichrestsonemployees’andemployers’contributions,familybenefitsarefinanced.ForecastsshowedthatitsdebtswouldreachfourbillionEurosbytheendof2010(Standard,24.5.2010).
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 16
vestedinafurtherexpansionofchildcarefacilities.Inthefollowingweeks,however,particularly
students were demonstrating massively against the cutbacks, and gradually, also opposition
withinthegoverningpartieswasrising.
Againstthatbackground,theministerforwomen,Heinisch‐Hosek,andtheeconomicmin‐
ister,Mitterlehner, suggested to re‐negotiate thebudget inNovember 2010.At the same time,
Mitterlehnerarguedthatashiftfromin‐cashtoin‐kindbenefitswasnecessary:“Thecostsofour
systembearnorelationtoitsresults.Ourfamilypolicy,whichfocusesprimarilyoncashbenefits,
broughtaboutaverylowfertilityrate”(Standard,6.11.2010;owntranslation).Followingameet‐
ingwith familyorganisations inmid‐November, thegovernmentundertook someminor correc‐
tionsoftheausterityprogramme.29Thecriticsoftheausterityplanwerenotsatisfiedwiththese
marginalchanges,but thebudgetcame intoeffect inJanuary2011.All inall, this showsthatal‐
though families had to experience hard savingmeasureswith the austerity package, it did not
quitwith the family policy reformpath initiated before, but rather took the economic crisis to
legitimatetheabolishmentofin‐cashbenefits,whichwereincreasinglyregardedasnon‐efficient.
4.Conclusions
In the introduction, it was argued that there were grounds to expect either in the post‐crisis
familyreformsinGermanyandAustria:Cutbacksinthecontextofausterityprogrammes,orthe
crisis to be taken as a window of opportunity to invest into policies against new social risks.
Studyingthemainreformsintroducedinbothcountriesbeforeandafterthecrisis,actuallyboth
wastobefound.Especially inAustria,cost‐intensivefamilypolicieswereintroducedinthepost‐
crisisera,namelythe income‐dependentversionofthechildcarebenefit(Kinderbetreuungsgeld)
andthe15a‐agreementto introduceacompulsory lastpre‐schoolyearfreeofcharge.The latter
wasanexplicitpartof theeconomicstimuluspackage.Ashort time later,bothcountries intro‐
ducedharshsavingmeasuresinfamilypolicies.InGermany,theminimumamountoftheparental
benefit (Elterngeld)was abolished for formerly non‐employed parents and the income replace‐
mentwas reducedfrom67to65percent forhigh‐incomeearners. InAustria,not less than350
millionEuroswere cutdownon familypolicies in 2011, abolishing the 13th family allowanceand
restrictingittothe24th(insteadof26th)birthdayofthechild.
Asking, however, to what extent the post‐crisis reforms broke with the rather cost‐
intensivereformpathtowardsre‐commodificationandde‐familialisation,itwasshownthatthey
rathercontinuedwithit.InGermany,familyministerSchröderarguedforthecutbacksbycharac‐
terisingtheminimumamountforformerlynon‐employedparentsdetrimentaltothesystem.She
29Theydecidedthatthelimitationofthefamilyallowancetothe24thageofthechildshouldonlybeintro‐duced inJulyandnot inJanuary2011andthatexceptionsbe introduced(e.g. foryoungpeople,whodidcivilianserviceorwhosestudyprogrammeisofsurpassinglength).
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 17
alsostatedthatitwastooclosetotheincomefrompaidemployment,thusloweringincentivesto
work–anargumentationclearlytargetingtowardsre‐commodification.InAustria,notonlywere
theincome‐dependentKBGandthe15a‐agreementintroducedafterthecrisis.Alsodide.g.family
ministerMitterlehnertrytolegitimatethecutbacksbythecrisis,arguingthatintimesofausterity
Austrianfamilypoliciescouldnolongeraffordtospendmoneyonnon‐efficientcashbenefits.
Table2:Temporaldimensionsandparametersinthereforms
Dimension Parameters Examplesfromthereforms• Legislativeperiods Elterngeld,eKBGPoliticaltime• Legislativetimerules(e.g.
fixedtimelimits)eKBG
• Tempo KiföG(goingpublic)• Timing 15a‐2009;Pflegezeit
Temporaldynamics
• Sequence KBG2008(salamitactics)
Temporalmoments • Serendipity KiföGSource:Ownlisting
Thefocusonpre‐andpostcrisisreformsputattentiontothetimingofthereformsandtotempo‐
ralfactorsassuch,whichwerethentakenasananalyticallensinstudyingthereformprocesses.
Itwasshownhowthecrisiscontextmattered,butthattemporalfactorsinfluencedthereforms
invariousregards,attributabletothethree identifieddimensionsofpolitical time,temporaldy‐
namics and temporal moments. Table 2 summarises the respective findings. For instance, the
brought‐forwardelectionsof2008openedawindowofopportunityfortheeKBG,whosepolicy
formulationwastheninfluencedbytimepressuresofthelegislativeprocess–bothonthepoliti‐
cal‐timedimension.TheKiföGwassupportedbytheacceleratedpolicyprocess(followingfamily
ministervonderLeyen’sgoing‐public‐strategy),whichcanbeattributedtothetemporaldynam‐
ics.ItwasfurtherenabledbytheserendipityoffinanceministerSteinbrück’sunexpectedreturns
offourbillionEuros,andthusbyatemporalmoment.
Comingtoconclusions,timeinitsdifferentdimensionshasturnedoutasarelevantfactor
in the family policy reform processes in Germany and Austria. Indeed, as Schedler and Santiso
(1998)argued,itissurprisinghowlittlesystematicnoticetothetimefactorhasbeenpaidwithin
politicalscience.Especiallyforpolicy‐analyticalstudies,e.g.thoseinterestedinthepolicy‐making
process, focusing studies on timewith its different facets like temporal dynamics (e.g. timing,
sequence)couldmakeanimportantcontribution.
FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 18
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AppendixTable3:GDPgrowthratesinpercentagechangeonpreviousyeargeo\time 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU27 2,5 2 3,3 3 0,5 ‐4,3 1,8 1,8 f
EU15 2,4 1,8 3,1 2,7 0,2 ‐4,3 1,8 1,7 fBelgium 3,2 1,7 2,7 2,9 1 ‐2,8 2,2 2,4 f
Bulgaria 6,7 6,4 6,5 6,4 6,2 ‐5,5 0,2 2,8 fCzechRepublic 4,5 6,3 6,8 6,1 2,5 ‐4,1 2,3 2 f
Denmark 2,3 2,4 3,4 1,6 ‐1,1 ‐5,2 1,7 1,7 fGermany 1,2 0,8 3,4 2,7 1 ‐4,7 3,6 2,6 f
Estonia 7,2 9,4 10,6 6,9 ‐5,1 ‐13,9 3,1 4,9 fIreland 4,6 6 5,3 5,6 ‐3,5 ‐7,6 ‐1 0,6 f
Greece 4,4 p 2,3 p 5,2 p 4,3 p 1 p ‐2 p ‐4,5 p ‐3,5 fSpain 3,3 3,6 4 3,6 0,9 ‐3,7 ‐0,1 0,8 f
France 2,5 1,8 2,5 2,3 ‐0,1 ‐2,7 1,5 1,8 fItaly 1,5 0,7 2 1,5 ‐1,3 ‐5,2 1,3 1 f
Cyprus 4,2 3,9 4,1 5,1 3,6 ‐1,7 1 1,5 fLatvia 8,7 10,6 12,2 10 ‐4,2 ‐18 ‐0,3 3,3 f
Lithuania 7,4 7,8 7,8 9,8 2,9 ‐14,7 1,3 5 fLuxembourg 4,4 5,4 5 6,6 1,4 ‐3,6 3,5 3,4 f
Hungary 4,5 3,2 3,6 0,8 0,8 ‐6,7 1,2 2,7 fMalta 1,8 4,2 1,9 4,6 5,4 ‐3,3 3,2 2 f
Netherlands 2,2 2 3,4 3,9 1,9 ‐3,9 1,8 1,9 fAustria 2,5 2,5 3,6 3,7 2,2 ‐3,9 2,1 2,4 f
Poland 5,3 3,6 6,2 6,8 5,1 1,7 3,8 4 fPortugal 1,6 0,8 1,4 2,4 0 ‐2,5 1,3 ‐2,2 f
Romania 8,5 4,2 7,9 6,3 7,3 ‐7,1 ‐1,3 1,5 fSlovenia 4,4 4 5,8 6,8 3,7 ‐8,1 1,2 1,9 f
Slovakia 5,1 6,7 8,5 10,5 5,8 ‐4,8 4 3,5 fFinland 4,1 2,9 4,4 5,3 0,9 ‐8,2 3,1 3,7 f
Sweden 4,2 3,2 4,3 3,3 ‐0,6 ‐5,3 5,7 4,2 fUnitedKingdom 3 2,2 2,8 2,7 ‐0,1 ‐4,9 1,4 1,7 f
Iceland 7,7 7,5 4,6 6 1,4 ‐6,9 ‐3,5 1,5 fNorway 3,9 2,7 2,3 2,7 0,7 ‐1,7 0,3 2,7 f
Switzerland 2,5 2,6 3,6 3,6 2,1 ‐1,9 2,6 1,9 fUnitedStates 3,6 3,1 2,7 1,9 0 ‐2,6 2,9 2,6 f
Japan 2,7 1,9 2 2,4 ‐1,2 ‐6,3 4 0,5 f:=Notavailablef=Forecastb=Breakinseriesp=ProvisionalvalueSource:Eurostat