GHQ, 28100 Woodside Road, Shorewood, MN 55331 USA • (612) 374-2693 • www.ghqmodels.com May–June 2015 Modeling Excellence Since 1967 THE BATTLE OF IMJIN RIVER The opening rounds of the Korean War were characterized by a series of lightning offensives and counteroffensives running the length of the peninsula. On June 25th 1950, the North Koreans invaded and corralled a feeble South Korean and US coalition army into a tiny pocket centered around the port of Pusan. Reinforced by a multi-national UN force the Pusan Pocket held while US Marines struck back with a brilliant end-run amphibious assault at Inchon. Inchon shattered North Korean morale and their army disintegrated as it fled north. In a frenzied hot pursuit, UN forces swept past the 38th Parallel and raced north to the Yalu River. There, despite ample warning, they were caught flat-footed by a massive Chinese intervention. It was now the UN’s turn to run and the Chinese steamrolled them back to the 38th Parallel. There the Chinese offensive ran out of steam and the UN counterattacked, pushing the front back to the Imjin River. After eleven months of see-saw campaigning and tens of thousands of casualties, the front was now roughly astride the original boundary between North and South Korea. The spring of 1951 saw a brief period of relative calm as both armies drew a collective breath. In the US I Corps’ sector stood the British 29th Brigade, com- manded by Brigadier Tom Brodie, occupying a front extending some six miles along the Imjin River. The 29th counted on its muster a battal- ion of Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, a battalion of the Ulster Rifles, the Centurion equipped with 8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars, the 45th Royal Artillery, an attached Belgian battalion, and the 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. James Carne. Brodie’s front seriously extended his command, yet he opted for a 1
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GHQ, 28100 Woodside Road, Shorewood, MN 55331 USA • (612) 374-2693 • www.ghqmodels.comMay–June 2015 Modeling Excellence Since 1967
THE BATTLE OF IMJIN RIVERThe opening rounds of the Korean War werecharacterized by a series of lightning offensivesand counteroffensives running the length of thepeninsula. On June 25th 1950, the NorthKoreans invaded and corralled a feeble SouthKorean and US coalition army into a tiny pocketcentered around the port of Pusan. Reinforcedby a multi-national UN force the Pusan Pocketheld while US Marines struck back with abrilliant end-run amphibious assault at Inchon.Inchon shattered North Korean morale andtheir army disintegrated as it fled north. In afrenzied hot pursuit, UN forces swept past the38th Parallel and raced north to the Yalu River.
There, despite ample warning, they werecaught flat-footed by a massive Chineseintervention. It was now the UN’s turn to runand the Chinese steamrolled them back to the38th Parallel. There the Chinese offensive ranout of steam and the UN counterattacked,pushing the front back to the Imjin River. Aftereleven months of see-saw campaigning andtens of thousands of casualties, the front wasnow roughly astride the original boundarybetween North and South Korea.
The spring of 1951 saw a brief period of relativecalm as both armies drew a collective breath. In
the US I Corps’ sector stood theBritish 29th Brigade, com-manded by Brigadier TomBrodie, occupying a frontextending some six miles alongthe Imjin River. The 29thcounted on its muster a battal-ion of Royal NorthumberlandFusiliers, a battalion of theUlster Rifles, the Centurionequipped with 8th King’s RoyalIrish Hussars, the 45th RoyalArtillery, an attached Belgianbattalion, and the 1st Battalionof the GloucestershireRegiment, commanded by Lt.Col. James Carne. Brodie’sfront seriously extended hiscommand, yet he opted for a
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forward deployment and “hedgehogged” hisbattalions atop a series low hills on the banks ofthe Imjin, rather than consolidating his men onthe dominating bulk of Kamak-san hill just afew hundred yards further back from the river.
The 29th languished for several weeks on theImjin as the UN elsewhere consolidated itsfront. The British considered their position onlytemporary and as such failed to lay theminefields and barbed wire necessary for aproper defense. This complacency speltdisaster. The disciplined Chinese had expertlycamouflaged an army-sized redeployment andnow lay poised to strike.
On the night of April 22nd, 1951, a patrol ofsixteen Glosters from “C” Companyencountered a vanguard from the Chinese 187thDivision wading in the waist-deep Imjin. Aftera fierce firefight, the patrol disengaged with thetrumpet-blowing Chinese hard on their heels.This initiated six hours of hard battle for theGloster’s “A” and “D” Companies. Manning thesteep secondary hills bordering the river, theysuccessfully weathered repeated massedChinese human-wave attacks. Unfortunatelyfor the British, the victory bled “A” and “D”Companies sufficiently to force them back to thefortified battalion HQ on Hill 235.
This attack was just part of a three-divisionassault against 29th Brigade. Swamped with anattacker-to-defender ratio of 6:1, Brodie’sforward deployment was revealed as a criticalblunder. Though his men held the hilltopsbordering the Imjin, their strong points werenot mutually supportive and the Chinese easilyfiltered through the porous British front. Thuseach rifle company was left to battle indesperate isolation as the Chinese streamedaround and trapped them. The situationworsened as infiltrators seized the undefendedKamak-san hill in the British rear.
At this juncture a linguistic “snafu” occurredbetween brigade and corps headquarters.Brigadier Tom Brodie reported his situation as
“a bit sticky.” In British Army parlance thismeant “critical,“ but American staff officers didnot read it as such. The Chinese were hittingthe entire corps’ front and staff officers,ignorant of Brodie’s predicament, shuffled theirmeager resources elsewhere. Though Brodiewas in dire straits, he was ordered to holdwithout the benefit of air-support or additionalsuccor. Furthermore, as luck would have it, thebrigade’s American 155mm artillery liaisonteam had been withdrawn just days previousforcing Brodie to make due with the brigade’sorganic 4.2 mortars and 25 pounder artillery. It was an impossible task.
Even so, supported by nothing save militarytradition, the 29th exacted a fearsome toll.Daylight hours saw the Chinese withdrawingthe decimated 187th Division and resumingattack with the fresh 188th and 189th Divisions.As these forces slammed into the brigade on thenight of April 23rd, the Glosters saw action ontheir right flank. “B” and “C” Companies wereslowly forced back onto Hill 235 (now dubbed“Gloster Hill”) and formed with the rest of thebattalion. For the next two days the Britishrepelled repeatedly human-wave assaults.
Hill 235 - “Gloster Hill”
The situation steadily deteriorated even thoughI Corps, now aware of the 29th’s predicament,sent in relief and supply columns. These efforts were too little and too late. For the Glosters, air-dropped supplies fell wideof their perimeter, and attempts to evacuate thewounded by helicopter were beaten off byChinese ground fire.
Amidst the failedrelief attempts andincreasing enemypressure, Lt. Col.Carne and his staffmaintained moraleand discipline byplacing themselvesin harm’s wayamongst the troops.During a Chinesenight attack, the
battalion adjutant raced to restore a crumblingtrench line. He noticed a soldier leaving his postand ordered the man back into the trench. Afterhis shouts and then curses were ignored, the lividofficer collared the man only to discover hisuniform was quilted. Recoiling in horror, theadjutant fumbled to unholster his sidearm. TheChinese charged andwrestled him to the groundwhere the two men grappleduntil a subaltern raced in,pressed a pistol to theattacker’s temple and fired.
As this latest attack wasrepulsed, supporting Britishartillery fire inexplicablyslackened and then stopped.The 45th Royal Artillery,under direct Chinese assault,was forced to quit the battle.The unhindered Chinesenow freely assembled,amidst a chorus of bugle andwhistle blasts, just outside ofrifle range. As the Glostersreadied themselves for the
coup de grace, their plucky Drum-Major stood toattention on the parapets, put his bugle to hislips, and derisively blasted his entire repertoiresave “Retreat.” This nose-thumbing infuriatedthe Chinese and they rushed the hill; but as theyneared the summit, a flight of F-80 “ShootingStars” came screaming down the river valleyand blanketed them with napalm. Carneattempted to contact the jets but his drainedradio batteries failed. Unable to directlycoordinate the air support, he ordered friendlypositions marked with purple smoke.
Finally, on April 24th I Corps allowed Brodie toretreat. Reinforcements counterattacked andfreed the surrounded Belgians, Ulsters, andNorthumberlands who then withdrew back tothe brigade’s fortified headquarters. Howeverthe counterattack to free the Glosters, consistingof a Filipino infantry battalion supported by asquadron of Centurion tanks, was beaten back.Although his battalion was out of ammunitionwith no hope of relief, Lt. Col. Carne stillrefused surrender. He ordered “every man forhimself,” but the breakout was an utter disaster.On the morning of April 26th as 29th Brigadecalled roll, only 169 of the 850 Glostersanswered muster.
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Lieutenant Colonel James Carne
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