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The British Army Review Number 148

Contents

03 Editorial

Articles

06 At Last. Obama's Vision OffersHope for all SidesClare Lockhart

08 Pointing The Way Out: TheUtility of Force and The BasraNarrative January - August 2007Colonel Ian Thomas

13 Talking To The “Enemy” -Informal Conflict Termination In IraqBrigadier Sandy Storrie

27 We Learn from History that WeLearn Nothing from HistoryBrigadier J K Tanner

36 The Practice of StrategyProfessor Colin S Gray

39 After Action Report – Visit to Afghganistan and Kuwait – 10–18 November 2009General Barry R McCaffrey USA(Retd

46 The Great Game: The Role ofIntelligence in the Failure of the1st Afghan War 1839 - 1842Major Brian Elliott

53 Governance and State BuildingPerspectiveClare Lockhart

55 Achieving Unity of PurposeHQ ARRC

57 Winning Friends and InfluencingPeopleColonel Duncan Barley

63 A Chronology of the HigherControl of Defence

69 Keep the Army in the Public EyeJohn Wilson

75 The Celebration of an IdeaWilliam Barlow

78 Manning the Loop - The futureutility of the FormationReconnaissance SoldierMaj A N B Foden

82 The Peninsular War - An AlliedVictory or a French Failure?Colonel Nick Lipscombe

90 Boer IEDsLieutenant Colonel IP Mills

96 Intelligence Lessons FromHizballah's Ground Campaign2006James Spencer

BAR Thoughts

106 Recovering the DeadJohn Wilson

108 A Fortunate SoldierDavid Benest

110 FH 70 in a FOBJohn Wilson

111 How Myths Are MadeJohn Wilson

113 What Future for the TA?Major Gerry Long

Books

117 Ian RobertsonA Young Gentleman at WarGareth Glover (Ed)

118 Geoff TillGalliopli - The End of the MythRobin Prior

Gallipoli: Attack from the SeaVictor Rudenno

119 Geoff TillMaritime Dominion and theTriumph of the Free World Peter Padfield

120 David BenestThe Children Who Fought Hitler -A British Outpost in EuropeSue Elliott with James Fox

121 Christopher JaryDambusters: A Landmark of OralHistoryMax Arthur

122 Gerry LongAustralian Battalion Commandersin the Second World War Garth Pratten

122 James SpencerClinton's Secret Wars - theEvolution of a Commander inChiefRichard Sale

123 David BenestOman's Insurgencies - TheSultanate's Struggle forSupremacyJE Peterson

124 David BenestDanger Close - Commanding 3PARA in AfghanistanStuart Tootal

124 John WilsonImmediate ResponseMark Hammond

126 Eric MorrisThe Making of the British ArmyAllan Mallinson

128 Iain StandenThe Scientific Way of Warfare:Order and Chaos on theBattlefields of Modernity Antoine Bousquet

129 Bruce PennellOn Art and War and TerrorAlex Danchev

THE BRITISH ARMY REVIEWNO 148 WINTER 2009/2010

We have all got a lot to learn and we have all got something, which, out of own experience and study, we can teach.This magazine is to enable us to share the results of that experience and that study.

From the Foreword to the first issue (as the British Army Journal), January 1949 by Field Marshal The ViscountSlim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff

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Contents

130 John Wilson18 Platoon – 6th EditionSydney Jary

132 David BetzThe Insurgent ArchipelagoJohn Mackinlay

134 David BenestNorthern Ireland – The Politicsof War and PeacePaul Dixon

134 Hugh BoscawenCavalier and Roundhead SpiesJulian Whitehead

Afghan Soldier (Alexander Allen)

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The British Army Review Number 148

Editor ia l

AfghanistanOver the last few months there has beenmuch comment on the nature andconduct of the campaign in Afghanistan.The criticism started with theadvisability of intervening at all.Although the advice on that decisionwas a matter for the chiefs of staff, wewill all have our views. We are helped toform those views by the Chilcot Enquiryinto the Iraq war which is beingtelevised now, because it gives us theopportunity to see and hear those whogave the advice on that occasion. Somewitnesses, like Major General Tim Cross,have written on the subject in BAR.Others will be less known to BAR readersbut all are fascinating in their own way –revealing more about themselves thanthey had, perhaps, realised.

Part of the significance of the ChilcotEnquiry is that the decision-makingprocess for Afghanistan was likely tohave been very similar to that used to gointo Iraq, which gives us a good insightinto the origins of Op HERRICK. The oneclear similarity which we need to dwellon is that we got off on the wrong footon both occasions. That we did so wasdue to over-optimistic assessments ofthe situation. In the last issue (147), wecarried articles analysing Op TELIC andwe continue that exercise in this issue.This is not done as a theoreticalexercise; it is to help us get Op HERRICKright - indeed, on 6 and & 7 January, themost senior officers in the Armyassembled at the Land Warfare Centre toanalyse Op TELIC with that express aim.

We know, too, of the considerablecounter IED effort that is building up in theatre. That effort is part of a largerprogramme to put the Army onto a fullwar footing – Op ENTIRETY. For example,COs from HERRICK regularly comment onthe time that has to be devoted in pre-

operational training to those specialskills which are not part of our adaptivefoundation (general training). So, basiccounter-IED skills, amongst others, willfeature in recruit training. Such a movewill allow time for more advancedcollective training prior to deployment.

More importantly, this programmerepresents a major change in attitude.No longer are operations like HERRICKand TELIC regarded as aberrations; theyare the norm. The implications for such achange are huge and are not withoutrisk. Quite properly the Army has takenthe view that the morally correct thingto do is to get the current operationright, if necessary at the expense of theresponse to a future but unknown threat.Hence the understandable concern of theRoyal Navy and the RAF.

This is not the time to take counsel ofour fears; it is the time for controlledboldness1. We have lost over 240servicemen, mainly soldiers and marines,in Afghanistan – but we cannot use theargument that their sacrifice wouldotherwise be in vain. The big argumentsare to do with stopping internationalterrorism from harming Britain, securingAfghanistan for peace and NATOcredibility – the national interestarguments. Our more down to earthargument is that having been told to gothere and do the best we can, we haveeducated ourselves in a way that wehave not previously done and are slowlygetting it right.

There is a real desire to put right themistakes. And we can see that from JDP3-40 – Security and Stabilisation – TheMilitary Contribution. JDP 3-40 builds onthe good bits from past UK COINdoctrine and the US Army’s FM 3-24. Italso takes guidance from many currentwriters foremost amongst them GeneralSir Rupert Smith (The Utility of Force). Itputs COIN doctrine into the context of

stabilisation operations. We can seetoday that we have barely moved out of the kinetic phase in HelmandProvince, but, at last, with the aid of thethoughts that guided 3-40, we can see away ahead. And that is what this majorshift in the British Army’s approach isabout. We have built useful experiencefrom bitter battles, now we can expectto put that experience more fully intouse. We should be demanding in everyarea: good equipment (well underway);good training (post operational reportsare largely complimentary in this areawith some exceptions which are beingaddressed); good conditions of service(see next section); good leadership –improvements needed in strategicthinking (see Chilcot testimony), soundtactical leadership – probably never beenhigher across the board; and broughttogether by carefully planned andcoordinated operations – muchimprovement needed in cross-agencypractice.

Rewarding the Goal-ScorersJunior soldiers, especially juniorinfantrymen, bear the brunt of thecasualties and hardship on operations. In 2008/9, 38% of soldiers who left theArmy left between the ages of 20 and 25(DASA - Table 9 - Outflow of Male OtherRanks from UK Regular Forces by Age andService). So, those that get hurt most are also those who receive the poorestreward – a recent Parliamentary answershowed that up to 20%2 of soldiers ininfantry battalions were unable to deploy for various reasons. Now, ofcourse, like many organisations wereward on a seniority scale – those thatstay longest are deemed to be the betterones and are better rewarded for theirloyalty. Yet, should we not find a way of also better rewarding those 38% who do the difficult bit on operationsand do not stay to reap the reward of the higher pay of long service andpension?

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Not all organisations rewardhierarchically. City traders get more thancity bosses – they burn out earlier andget the bonus to compensate. Theirbosses get lower but longer term reward,and status. Footballers get pay which isclosely linked to performance. Clubofficials get much less - officials don’tscore goals. Reliable goal scorers in thePremier Division can almost name theirprice. As an army we need goal scorers –those who give tactical success. Withoutthe players on the pitch (younginfantrymen) the officials (most officers)would not get tactical success. We giveour lowest rewards to the players. Justlike football clubs did 50 years ago whenplayers arrived at the ground on thesame corporation bus as the fans.

If we try to re-structure the pay systemwe are likely to create distortions andmeet our old chum – unintendedconsequence. Any conventional reformwould face so many challenges that itwould never get beyond the firstcirculation of the paper. There is oneremedy – operational pay. The scale ofthe danger and discomfort and generaldisruption to normal life of service inIraq, and even more so Afghanistan,justify a re-think on our traditionalopposition to an operational reward. On Herrick 11, battlegroups weresignificantly reduced by enemy actionand injuries – a company from 3 PARA onHerrick 1 was down to under 40 men atone stage. £100 per day does not soundtoo much for these men, recalling thatthe FCO staff in Basra each received onaverage about £32,000 as extra rewardfor the year.

However, and it is a big however, thenation cannot afford extra money – sowhat we face is re-distribution. Not allsoldiers go to Afghanistan, and of thosewho do, not all face the rigours of theFOB. So, we have to draw some lines:

The sharp distinction between thosewho risk their lives in actual battlewith the enemy and those who donot must not be blurred3.

Now FM Montgomery meant somethingwhen he wrote those words. They were to be acted upon. Life in Camp Bastioncan be unpleasant but not as nasty as aFOB, so operational pay for them will bemuch less – and less again for those inKandahar and Kabul. That’s what wemean by drawing a distinction. It maynot be simple to find the rules to makethis work – but we should be able as anarmy to agree the basic principles of thisone. There will be unfairness – and wehave to live with it. We need a culturewhich sneers and jeers at those who try to obtain a reward that they shouldnot get.

The other part of the ‘However’ is that we have still to find the money. All soldiers get the ‘X-factor’ every daybut we know that not everyone earns itquite as harshly and justly as those inFOBs. A reduction in the ‘X-factor’ acrossthe board is the fair solution – the sharp distinction – to fund thisoperational pay.

Post operational reports and othercommentaries invariably reflect on thecourage and commitment of youngsoldiers – ‘humbling’ is the usualdescription of the effect that theseyoung soldiers have on the reporter. Thewords are good to hear but they are stillonly words – deeds matter more. Here isan opportunity to put good thoughtsinto practice. Over a career, officers arelikely to lose out; young soldiers willundoubtedly gain, which is the object ofthe exercise: rewarding the goal-scorers.

Why Do Only Officers Get Honours?There were 53 awards to soldiers in theNew Year’s Honours List. 45 went to

officers, 6 to warrant officers, 1 to astaff sergeant and 1 to a sergeant. Tocorporals and below – zero. The non-operational awards system is brokenbecause it sees no merit in anyone belowthe rank of warrant officer. Yet theoperational reporting from Afghanistanconstantly praises in the highest termsthe performance of junior ranks. Are theyso different in barracks that they arenever worthy of an award? Surely not.For in the 1980 New Year’s Honour List,Her Majesty The Queen was graciouslypleased to approve the award of theBritish Empire Medal to 62 soldiers, ofwhom 14 were corporals or below. Thisyear she was asked to approve honoursto just 2 soldiers who would, under theold rules, have qualified for a BEM.BAR has been commenting on thisoversight for years, it really is time thatthis was corrected. And we can correctit; it merely takes some interest and alittle time by commanders to agree aquota for ranks below warrant officer. Ifwe judge that expenditure as unworthy,then let us abandon the system for it iswrong to honour officers only. Morallywhat is the difference between officersdecorating each other and those MPswho granted themselves undeservedallowances?

1 The founder of this journal, FM Slimgives, as ever, good advice: It Pays To BeBold was reprinted in BAR 134.

2 11.5% were unable to deploy for variousreasons (medical, discipline, pendingdischarge, welfare and under 18) andthen a further 9% had limiteddeployability.

3 Morale In Battle, BAOR, April 1946 – forthe full context see the reprint of thispamphlet in BAR 145.

New Editor Needed for BARThe current editor, Colonel John Wilson, will leave the job in Spring 2010 after 8 enjoyable years in post.

The post will be formally advertised in time but anyone interested is welcome to contact him to discuss the nature of the job:01985 223050; 94381 3050; armyreview@armymail.mod.uk; CGS-BAR-Editor

or Colonel Rupert Wieloch – Defence Studies (Army):rwieloch.dds@defenceacademy.mod.uk; 01793 314845.

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The British Army Review Number 148

Christmas has been celebrated in some of the most remote, unlikely and inhospitable places on the planet. Away at Christmas draws on the journals,

diaries, reminiscences and memoirs of many of the world’s best-known explorers, adventurers and travellers. In their own words, these brave people describe how they and their companions spent the festive season, whether they were seeking the North

West Passage, attempting to reach the North or South Poles, canoeing down the Niger rapids or crossing the deserts of Australia. It is truly impressive that, however

challenging the circumstances, Christmas was never forgotten.

“This is a book for life, not just for Christmas.” Michael Palin

“… a thoroughly enjoyable book.” Sir Ranulph Fiennes

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Winter 2009/2010

Artic les

At Last.Obama’s VisionOffers Hope forall Sides

Clare Lockhart

This article first appeared in The TimesDecember 3, 2009 and is reprinted hereby kind permission of the Editor and ClareLockhart.

Now the emphasis is away from fighting,Afghanistan can start raising billions ofits own revenue and educating its youth.

President Obama has got it right. After taking his time to wrestle with the enormous challenge of defining the US national interest in Afghanistanand its region, he has provided acredible vision of ending the war,stabilising the country and handing over responsibility to Afghan self-rule.His move away from fighting, endorsingGeneral Stanley McChrystal’s analysis,will protect the population and provide a security bridge while Afghan forces are trained.

No country can be run by an army alone.Lasting security in Afghanistan will beprovided when Afghans can governthemselves. Mr Obama’s speech balancesnurturing Afghan governance at all levelswith a tough stance on accountability.

This provides a framework for restoringAfghan self-rule. It learns the lessonthat bypassing Afghan institutions andspending billions of dollars on a parallel

set of organisations run by UN agencies,NGOs and contractors that leach capacityaway from core Afghan frontline servicesdoes not work.

In my years on the ground inAfghanistan, I witnessed thecatastrophic under-resourcing of civilianrule. In 2001, there were 240,000 civilservants in place in Afghanistan, staffingschools, clinics, irrigation departmentsand ministries across Afghanistan’sprovinces. The decision taken in 2002was to ignore these public servants andthe services they ran, by putting only$20 million in the Afghan Government’sfirst-year budget.

This barely paid fuel costs for a month,let alone salaries of $50 per month orthe costs of schools and clinics. Instead,billions went into a parallel aid systemand into supporting warlords to runmilitias that daily undermined the rule of law. The net result was to dismantlefunctioning Afghan institutions; teachersand nurses left their jobs in droves tobecome drivers, assistants andtranslators. I had the privilege to workinside the Afghan Government with agroup of dedicated Afghan ministers andtheir teams; daily they struggled to buildup services to provide for a populationtraumatised by decades of war.

The key conundrum now is that aneffective counter-insurgencystrategy requires a legitimategovernment.

In the 2001 to 2005 period, a broadmeasure of trust was created betweenthe Afghan citizens and theirGovernment. This initial stability wascreated through a political frameworkthat consulted the people, and through a series of national programmes: thehealth programme provided a basicpackage of health services in every

province; the National Army’s first unitgraduated six months after the Servicewas created; block grants of $20,000 ormore were provided to each village, nowin 28,000 villages; a public worksprogramme provided jobs to young men,and a microfinance programme providedsmall loans. These programmes should beexpanded and new ones established.

The key conundrum now is that aneffective counter-insurgency strategyrequires a legitimate government. Inrecent years, the Afghan Government haslost the trust of both the internationalcommunity and its own citizens.Requiring a set of strict accountabilitystandards is an important way to restoreintegrity. Rather than proclaim theexisting Government as legitimate, abetter approach is to recognise thatlegitimacy is earned. Trust should berestored through deeds, not words.

Change needs to come not only from theAfghans, but the way that internationalactors operate. The aid system requires athorough revamping, so that it no longerundermines the very institutions itclaims to support. This will requiremeasures such as limiting the wages paidto Afghan staff working in the aidsystem to the same level they wouldearn in Afghan ministries.

It will also require choices about whichAfghans the international actors chooseto consort with. A senior Afghan officialdescribed to me with dismay how, at animportant national meeting, threesignificant figures walked straight pastlegitimate representatives who had beensent from their districts, and made abeeline for three warlords standing inthe corner. This casual slight was deeplysymbolic; the representatives left themeeting crestfallen.

There are three steps that remain: first,

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Afghanistan needs a peace-buildingframework. There is already areconciliation effort under way, aimed at bringing insurgents back within thepolitical fold. A broader approach wouldseek to build on the broad consensuswithin Afghan society already expressedthrough the series of Loya Jirga (tribalcouncils) and the recent publicdiscussions on the need for a restorationof rule of law and just governance.

Second, the fastest and cheapest way to create stability is to engageAfghanistan’s youth with the skills theyneed to manage their own futures. Thereis a lost generation of Afghans, whoseeducation was sacrificed to 20 years ofjihad against the Soviet Union and civilwar. The new generation — the 60 percent of Afghans under 25 — fare nobetter.

Leaving school under-educated at 11,

poor pre-teens make rich pickings formadrassas, the Taleban and the opiumeconomy. The most cost-effective way tostabilise Afghanistan would be to investin the secondary and advanced educationand training of the next generation andfind out how many medics, teachers,engineers, accountants, lawyers,construction workers and farmingspecialists are needed.

Third, Afghanistan can and should payfor its own nation-building. The richpotential of the Afghan economy offersnot only the basis for millions of jobs forAfghans, but the means for it to collectthe revenue to pay its own bills. Therecent US Geological Survey report showsthat Afghanistan has hundreds of billionsof dollars of mineral wealth. It hassignificant agricultural potential and athriving textiles and constructionindustry. It could also collect severalbillion dollars a year in revenue from

trade passing through as well as taxes onbusiness and land. Instead, this money isbeing collected illegally, furnishing theinsurgents’ and warlords’ coffers instead.

Yet the most inspiring aspect ofPresident Obama’s speech is his pictureof America maintaining its moralauthority in the world through the waythat it ends wars and prevents conflict.He speaks of an America seeking not toclaim another nation’s resources ortarget other peoples, but one that is heirto a noble struggle for freedom. And thisoffers hope to American citizens, theirallies and the Afghan people.

Clare Lockhart is director of the Institutefor State Effectiveness and co-author ofFixing Failed States. She served as anadviser to the UN and the AfghanGovernment from 2001 to 2005. �

Rhodesian Guerrillas holding AK 47s, December 1979 (RAF)

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Pointing TheWay Out:The Utility ofForce and TheBasra NarrativeJanuary –August 2007

Colonel I N A Thomas OBECOS MND (SE) (Jan – Aug 07)

“There is no period so remote as therecent past”.

Alan Bennett, The History Boys.

The NarrativeAll of the inquiries into the conduct of,and lessons from, Operation TELIC (OpTELIC) will need to study the evolvingcontext during the campaign and thenthe resulting narrative before coming tojudgements. The danger of the series ofarticles begun in the last British ArmyReview (BAR) is that they encouragereaders to leap to conclusions withneither the context nor the narrativeproperly understood. This article sets thecontext, as understood by those presentin Basra at the time, and explains thenarrative for a critical period of thecampaign, from Jan – Aug 07, a periodcharacterised by just shy of a quarter ofthe total UK campaign deaths, OpZENITH (the reposturing from Basra), andthe so called “deal”.

In January 2007, Iraqi, UK and USnarratives were running on divergentlines. Cohering them fell to thedivisional HQ in Basra. The major taskfacing the HQ was to understand thesenarratives and drive a divisional course

of action that kept within the tolerancesof each.

Iraq in 2007 was still rebuilding itselfafter the destruction of its official organsof state by Saddam and then theCoalition. It was re-building itselfbottom up, consistent with the Arabcultural dynamics of loyalty, wherebyloyalty is to blood not institutions; itgoes from the inside out andofficial/state allegiances attract theweakest loyalty. In this context, militiaswere potentially a cohering force insociety, being a primary source ofloyalty, a form of urban tribe, in anotherwise incoherent society. Everymilitia had its political party (more thanvice versa) and also its violent wing,forming a three layered polity of thestate institutions (the official state), andthe militias split between their socialorganisations (the shadow state) andtheir violent henchmen (the dark state).

The Shia-dominated Government of Iraq(GoI) was in permanent internalcompetition between factions, withPrime Minister Maliki at that time weak,constantly juggling allegiances andcutting deals to stay in power, and henceunable to stand up to the powerfulmilitias, the Jaiysh al Mehdi (JAM) andthe Supreme Council for the IslamicRepublic of Iraq (SCIRI). This hadparticular relevance for MultinationalDivision (South East) (MND (SE)) with anessentially Shia area of operations (AO);the internal GoI power politics wereplayed out on a daily basis here unlikeanywhere else in Iraq. In simple terms,whilst the GoI was clear that the job of

the Coalition was to solve the securityproblems, it could not always agree whoposed the problems. In the US AO, thesecurity problem was clear: theexistential threat was (Sunni) Al Qaedain Iraq (AQ-I). The problem in MND (SE)was that the Shia polity was notcoherent enough to agree who thesecurity problems were amongst the Shiamilitia; and even if authorisation for eg.a strike operation was gained inadvance, whether the GoI stuck to thisagreement after the event dependedupon the local political reaction. The GoI wanted the Coalition out of the Shiasouth as soon as it judged it couldcontain the situation on its own; and yetnervousness about their ability to do thiscreated an uneasy dependence theyresented and which hampered everythingthe Division did in the south.

By January 2007, two provinces in Iraqhad achieved Provincial Iraqi Control(PIC),1 both in MND (SE). Al Muthannaand Dhi Qar represented politiesdominated by an alliance between theSCIRI militia, the rural tribes and thelocal ISF whose personnel came fromthese tribes and militias.External/official/state loyalties werebased on coherent internal/bloodloyalties. This accommodation dominatedlocal power, worked to the intent of theGoI and suppressed JAM activity. This‘deal’ with local militias, based on themacting in accord with GoI intent, wasrecognised and accepted at GeneralPetraeus’ first Multinational Force Iraq(MNF-I) conference in February 07.

This pragmatism was eventually extendedto Maysan in May 2007. Maysan was, as

Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki greets Col.Philip Battaglia, commander of the 4th BCT (USArmy)

A QRL patrol heads towards one of the manyborder forts which are dotted along the Iraq Iranborder (Cpl Ian Forsyth)

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it had historically been, a sparselypopulated open flank that was out of GoI/Coalition control. The trooprequirement to seal the border and cut suspected supply lines of explosively-formed projectile,improvised explosive devices (EFP IEDs)and other warlike materiel from Iran wasbeyond the Coalition, even after thesurge. The border had no relevance tothose who lived there, a 1920s Britishline on a map they did not recognise,cutting across their ancient tribal andcommunication links to their fellowArabs and co-religionists in what the rest of the world labelled SW Iran(Arabistan). Without local Iraqi activeparticipation, Maysan would remainuntreatable. The pragmatic judgementmade by MNF-I about Maysan was thatgranting it PIC would still allow surgicalstrike ops to take place as agreed byMNF-I and GoI but put the onus ofgovernance on GoI. PIC was granted in May 07 and the last UK BG withdrew.

BasraBasra represented the major obstacle to progress in MND (SE). Its shattered polity, reflecting thedisparate sources of its population,provided no leadership to its people and the provincial council refused official contact with MND (SE) HQfollowing the destruction of theJamee’at2 over Christmas 06 (agreementto this destruction having been given by the Basra Provincial Council security chiefs in advance but renegedon afterwards in the light of thelocal, JAM-orchestrated, uproar). Every local Baswari source of influencewas represented in the GoI in Baghdad,making every military strike conductedby MND (SE) a political hazard, thuslimiting what could be achieved bymilitary means. This divided loyaltycharacterised and permeated the BasraIraqi Security Forces (ISF); as GeneralJalil, the Police chief, said in May 07,“[the problem] is not about training or equipment, it’s about loyalty – and MNF can’t touch that”. Loyaltyremained something only the Shia polity, in Baghdad as much as in Basra, could resolve.

Meanwhile, January 2007 saw MND(SE)hand over primacy to the ISF;henceforth, MND(SE) theoreticallyoperated in support of the 10 Iraqi Army(IA) Div. Yet this same force was, by itsown admission, riddled withsympathisers from every militia factionthat might need to be confronted; someof the 10 IA Div ‘jundi’ were drawn fromthe same communities as the militiasand were their kith and kin. Sharing ofintelligence was impossible, detentionoperations were curtailed and the ISFwas reluctant, and sometimes refused, tohave joint Coalition/ISF patrols on thestreets of Basra City. The Coalitionpresence drew fire onto the ISF; and theimage of the ISF as the puppets of the‘Occupying’ Coalition undermined theirattempts to be seen as the legitimateexpression of Iraqi/GoI nationalism. Inthis context, the presence of the MNF onthe streets of Basra City was seen asworking against the long term ISF goalof gaining the loyalty of the people. (Incontrast, UK troops did embedsuccessfully with 10 IA Div battalionswhen they deployed to Baghdad: theSunni opposition clarified Shia loyaltiesand allowed UK mentors to be seen aswelcome allies against a common foe.)Having said that, the evident popularityof the work of Operation SINBAD incleaning up areas and injecting moneyinto Basra seemed to have earned somepolitical credit with the politicians; butthe popular approval of Coalition activityseen on the ground did not alwaystranslate into political support andprogress. What it seemed to buy in early2007 was a relative freedom to conductstrike ops at an unprecedented tempoand scale for 19 Brigade amid ever risingattacks by improvised explosive device(IED), indirect fire (rockets/mortars)(IDF) and casualty rates on all sides.

UK Support for Op Telic ReducesFor the UK, domestic support forOperation TELIC had reduced rapidlysince the 19 Sep 05 kidnap and rescue ofthe two British Servicemen in Basra hadlaid bare the extent of JAM and othermilitia infiltration of the ISF and Basrapolity; and revealed the scant control ofMND(SE) over Basra. The view from Basra

was that by then, UK had alreadycommitted to Afghanistan, and UKpolitical opinion and resourceprioritisation increasingly favouredAfghanistan. We understood that anincrease in force levels in one theatrenecessitated a reduction in the other; akey consideration. Seen from Basra, itseemed that by 2007 there was anational convergence between decliningpolitical support for the Iraq operationand rising political appetite for theAfghan operation. The UK could not doboth. In addition, as explained already,it was not clear that increased Coalitiontroops were necessarily the answer to aproblem rooted deep within the Shiapolity. Furthermore, the UK had deployedits reserve (the Theatre Reserve Battalionfrom Cyprus) in support of Op SINBAD(intended to be a “clear–hold-build”operation for Basra), and the sense wasthat UK had showed the Iraqis how to doit and now it was time for the Iraqis toshow the will to do it for themselves.

...Op ZENITH was conceived with amoral forcing function, to leave asecurity gap the ISF would have tofill..... by forcing them to confronttheir internal political and hencesecurity issues.

Accordingly, Op ZENITH was created in November 2006 to execute the re-posturing from Basra to the ContingencyOperating Base (COB) at the Basra AirStation. It must be noted that theoperation was endorsed by headquartersof the Multinational Corps- Iraq (HQMNC-I) and its execution wassubstantially underwritten by Corpsresources. In part, Op ZENITH wasconceived with a moral forcing function, to leave a security gap the ISF would have to fill, so reducing Iraqidependence by forcing them to confronttheir internal political and hencesecurity issues. The UK necessity was to demonstrate sufficient success in Iraqto keep the domestic political supportsufficient to sustain the UK commitmentto Op TELIC and the US Coalition. OpZENITH was to be the metric of success;and it was imperative that it shouldsucceed. It would have to be (and,

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importantly, be portrayed as such ininformation operations (IO) terms) arelief in place with the ISF, not awithdrawal in contact. The HQ wastasked to work within US tolerances butreduce to certain force levels by certaintimes, in accordance with Op ZENITH.These orders remained extant throughoutthe build up in 2006 and into pre-deployment briefings in January 2007.

The SurgeThe US, meanwhile, had changed tack.2006 had been dominated by a risingsectarian conflict in the US AO anddecreasing US political support for thewar. This culminated in the cross-partyIraqi Study Group report (which includedconsultation with Coalition, includingUK, allies) that recommended in autumn2006 an accelerated transition to Iraqicontrol across Iraq. Yet over Christmas06/07, the President opted for a surgeinstead, to prevent the total collapse ofIraq and the defeat of US hard power inits attempt to create political change inthe Middle East. The US not only plannedto inject more troops into Iraq, but alsodeclared they would stay there until thejob was done.

On arrival in January 2007, the HQ found itself trying to cohere whatappeared to be three diverging andincompatible strategies working to three different clocks (to use GenPetraeus’ memorable term); on each of the components of strategy, the GoI, US and UK were incoherent.

Policy. US policy was to stay aslong as it took; UK policy was totransition to the ISF as fast ascould be agreed; GoI policy wasto get rid of the UK from thesouth - but only when it couldsurvive without it.

Resources. UK had already“surged”. US and GoI werefocussed on the intense sectarianconflict centred around Baghdadwith the ‘minor irritant’ of JAM(to quote a Corps’ operationorder (OpO) low on the prioritiesfor Corps, ISF or MNSTC-I3 assets.

No ‘surge’ was on the cards forMND (SE).

Reality. The violence in the Shia Basra AO differedsignificantly from that in thesectarianly-divided US AO. UStroops were a valid response to a war between opposed peoples.The target of the violence therewas largely the opposingsectarian population; so therewas a population to protect. Itwas not clear from the evidencein Basra that this logic appliedthere: 90% of the violence wasagainst MNF, with residualviolence based on financialmotives; flares of violencebetween competing Shia entitieswere centred on control ofresources, not motivated bynihilism (the energyinfrastructure remained largelyundamaged through the period).The conclusion drawn was thatinter-Shia violence was self-limiting: fear of Sunni revivalunited all Shia leaders in limitingthe amount of damage eachfaction would do to the other;the competing factions in Basrawanted a bigger slice of theeconomic cake, not to destroythe cake itself; the goal was for an Iraqi end state, no matterthat Iranian sponsorship wasaccepted pragmatically as ameans to an end in the shortterm. Unlike further north, thedynamics in the south appearedfundamentally constructive, ifonly the polity could be broughtto recognise it. Basra’s problemsappeared deeply culturallyengrained and it did not seemclear that foreign, Christiantroops, with all the distortinginfluence these had on Iraqiloyalties, were the answer toBasra’s problems. In any case, as explained, a surge was not an option; another way had to be found to deliver a course ofaction each country could validly claim was ‘success’.

Military GoalsIn January 2007, the HQ saw Basra as a fundamentally political challenge(foreshadowing General Petraeus’ oftrepeated comment that summer, “It’s allabout the politics!”) and influence wasidentified as the primary objective; withkinetics in a supporting role. Intelligenceefforts were re-tasked to prioritisepolitics over target acquisition. Theapplication of force only had meaning inso far as it contributed to progresstowards the political end state – an Iraqiself-reliant polity in Basra; this becamethe governing rationale for strikeoperations. Military goals were set as:reducing the influence of forces (broadlydefined) working against the Basrapolitical process, countering malignIranian influence, training the ISF,executing Op ZENITH; with forceprotection recognised as being anenabling function, necessary to createthe freedom of action to carry outactivity essential to achieve the mission.Notwithstanding the constraints of theShia polity, it was the absence of anypolitical process that gave 19 LightBrigade (19 Lt Bde) such freedom tostrike during their tour; but that resultedin UK forces having the highest percapita casualty rate in the Corps withconsequent rising political concernsdomestically. UK troops were mostcertainly up for the fight; the challengewas to give it purpose.

At one level, success was beingachieved: Op ZENITH’s reliefs in placewere proceeding well. 19 Lt Bde’s highintensity of strike operations paiddividends and appeared to be achievingthe desired effects of: disrupting JAM;and demonstrating that MNF held theinitiative and was reposturing from Basraat its own volition and not being“bombed out”. This effort was capped bythe killing in May of the commander ofJAM in Basra, Wissam Abu Qadir. Thisspectacular success against a charismaticand extremely security-aware leadershocked and palpably hurt JAM, affectingits morale and throwing the organisationinto some turmoil, diminishing its abilityto launch coordinated attacks againstMNF. After a brief, but intense and

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ultimately futile, spasm of retaliatoryviolence, which was absorbed anddefeated by both the outgoing 19 Lt Bdeand the newly arrived 1 Mech Bde, JAMentered a month long period of mourningand wrangling over who should succeedWissam. This gave the movement muchto think about, created room formanoeuvre and contributed to theenergisation of the political process setout below. Furthermore, lessons hadbeen learnt from the sacking of CampAbu Naji in 2006 by JAM shortly after itsvacation by UK troops and its handoverto the ISF. MND (SE) plans, underwrittenand resourced by the US Corps andclosely integrated with the ISF, allowedthe transition to the ISF of the Shaat alArab Hotel, the Old State Building andShaibah Logistic Base without a shotbeing fired, a credit to 19 Lt Bde, 1Mechanised Brigade and 102 then 101Logistic Brigades. Meanwhile, Maysanhad been granted PIC in April 07 amidmuch Iraqi fanfare and MNF sucking ofteeth but acceptance of reality. Progresscould be said to be taking place, apartfrom within the Basra polity. It was onlyin May 07 that a Basra political processbegan and the means to assist itappeared: Mohan and the deal.

General Mohan was appointed in May 07as Maliki’s security supremo in Basra,taking charge of all agencies of the ISF.He was also charged with resolving theunhelpful status of Governor Wahili as agovernor of marginal legitimacy, withoutthe support of the people or even that ofhis own council. Furthermore, the GoIdenied his legal status as Governor yetdid nothing to remove him, therebycreating a political impasse with anembattled figure primarily concernedwith his own enrichment and politicalsurvival. He was thus emblematic of Shiapolitical ineptitude and inability totackle its shadow and dark states, inwhich Wahili had considerable ‘wasta’.General Mohan began a process ofpolitical engagement across the officialand shadow states, inevitably - butunadmittedly - dealing also with the darkstate. His goal, which was shared by theDivision HQ, was to cohere the factionsaround the unifying draws of Basra’slatent wealth, its fear of Iran, its desirefor self-government and its fear of aSunni revival. In the absence of clearpolitical guidance from Maliki to thecontrary, he chose to attempt to includeall parties in an accommodation, theclassic ‘big tent’ approach common to

Arab tribal customs. In this context, herecognised that the presence of MNF inBasra not only provoked violence but wasused to justify it: it distorted localloyalties by allowing the militias tomobilise popular support under thebanner of resistance to the MNF“occupation”. So Mohan endorsed OpZENITH and was keen to see Basra Palacevacated. Yet he recognised theCoalition’s worth as the ultimate bigstick, so necessary in the Iraqi politicaltradition to be called on in extremis, abig stick he knew the ISF at that timecould not be trusted to supply. The moveof MNF to the COB would retain this bigstick but, equally importantly, it wasexpected to reduce the level of violenceon the streets of Basra to levels Mohanfelt the ISF could handle. His target datefor his schemes was the promised butunscheduled provincial elections.

The move of MNF to the COB wouldretain this big stick

This gave a political context and purposeto the operations of the newly arrived 1Mech Bde. MNF operations had to beconsistent with this new-found politicalprocess. Operations began to be clearedthrough Mohan to ensure consistency.This remained subject to MNF judgementnot Mohan’s veto; but the Iraqi politicalfall-out, and rebukes from the Corps,from previous contraventions of Iraqipolitical sensitivities, gave weight toMohan’s preferences. Mohan recognisedthat some sort of confrontation withJAM would be needed, and this would bebest done by the ISF rather than MNF,but he recognised the currentshortcomings of the ISF. So he wished tobuy time and space to build up ISFcapability; this provided the focus forMND(SE) activity – training andmentoring the ISF.

Dealing with JAMCoincident upon Mohan’s arrival, aninterlocutor in JAM was found whooffered to contribute to GoI, UK andhence US goals, by taking the majority ofthe violent opposition to MNF out of thefight. This created the possibility of

General Sir Richard Dannatt (then Chief of the General Staff) speaks to General Mohan a whilst on avisit to Basra in 2008 (Cpl Martin Coleman RAF)

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buying Mohan’s political machinationstime and space. The interlocutor andmany of his followers were in the COBdetention centre; that gave the Division‘hard power’ over him. More importantlyfor the long term, and the Iraqi end-state, was the ‘soft power’ of attraction.He was a known anti-Iranian with astrong following within JAM, whoappeared to share the same aspirationsfor Basra as the MNF and GoI – increaseddevelopment, prosperity, education,religious moderation, and Iraqi control.His motivation for attacking the MNF wasthat they were “the Occupiers”; thecounter argument was that the MNFwould leave when Maliki ordered them to- the Iranians wouldn’t. The objectivewas a cessation of violence between theMNF and his members on the basis thatthey undertook to support the politicalprocess and development in Basra,oppose Iranian influence – especially theIranian backed JAM Special Groups(terrorist cells who accounted for asignificant number of lethal attacksagainst coalition forces) - and, onmeeting those conditions, gain release.

It is important to note that it was notthe intent that MNF operations should inany way be circumscribed by, orbeholden to, the interests of the JAMinterlocutor. Any concessions made were on the strict conditionality that he delivered his side of the bargain;otherwise, his group was subject to MNF action as before. The package wasnegotiated by MND (SE), agreed by GoIrepresentatives including Mohan,authorised by the US chain of command,

and cleared through Her Majesty’sGovernment (HMG). It was agreed inmid-August 07.

Others must pick up the narrative fromthen on. From UK, it appeared that theviolence fell off, MNF were successfullyrelieved in place in Basra Palace inSeptember, development improved andPIC was granted to Basra in December2007, a US/GoI endorsement ofimprovements in conditions in Basra; asone Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO)observer was heard to say, “At the startof 2007, we couldn’t wait to get out;now we’re wondering how long we canstay.” Critically, the UK political supportfor Op TELIC was sustained and theCoalition continued. UK, US and GoInarratives seemed to have been aligned.Neither the radicalisation that took placein early 2008 in Basra, nor the Charge ofthe Knights (CotKs) was foreseen inAugust 2007. But both would have beenconsidered within the likely parametersof any Iraqi resolution of internal Shiadivisions. Basra, of all places in Iraq,was never seen as having an extremereligious bias; indeed, its fleshpothistory from the 1950s suggested quiteotherwise. It seems possible, if notlikely, that the taste of radicalisationlost the radicals the hearts and minds ofthe population. This will undoubtedlyhave been played into the Shia politywithin the GoI and it would beconsistent with the 2007 analysis tosuggest that this provided Maliki withthe unifying focus for Shia elementswithin the GoI to give him the mandateto identify what they were all against. AsSaint-Just said in 1791 in the context of

exporting the French Revolution, “If you want to create an Us, [first] create a Them!” From afar, it appeared that theCotKs succeeded due to a clear decisionby the GoI as to what Basra’s problemswere, a firm commitment to resolvethem, and the support of the populationfor the ISF who themselves were notdrawn from Basra and were therefore not compromised by diffuse localloyalties. For Iraq and the Iraqi endstate, and indeed for the Coalition endstate of a self-reliant Iraq, the results ofCotKs were unequivocally good – a Basrathat appears to be flourishing and withviolence containable by its own securityapparatus. The GoI had finally addressedits own Shia demons, as only it could.

The complexity of factors depicted in this narrative show that counterinsurgency (COIN) is not a discretemilitary activity; it is a pan-, and inter-government, objective that requires the whole of government tosucceed. The inquiries will need to lookbeyond just the military tactical level ifthey are to understand and improve theway UK does its business. The recentcriticisms by Professor Hew Strachan andSir Christopher Meyer and the precepts of the earlier analysis of “War amongstthe People” by General Sir Rupert Smithneed to be seriously addressed. Similarcomments were made after the Boer war100 years ago, in fear of a futurecalamity nearer to home. Now, thelessons that must be learnt from Iraqhave immediate relevance to our currentdepartmental main effort (ME), thecampaign in Afghanistan. �

1 Handing over responsibility for thesecurity of a province to the Iraqiswith the MNF acting in support ofthe ISF.

2 The HQ of the Iraqi Serious CrimesUnit (SCU) – ironically named sincesome of its members were suspectedof committing, rather than solving,serious crimes.

3 The organisation responsible fortraining, organising and equippingthe ISF.

Major Hancock, The Royal Anglian Regimentcommander of the UK MITT Group attached to 50Bde, Iraqi Army during Operation Charge of theKnights-14 in Basrah City, 18-19th June, 2008.Op TELIC 12 (Cpl Rob Knight)

British Mastiff armoured vehicles on patrolduring Operation Charge of the Knights-14 inBasrah City with the UK Military Transition Team(MITT) Group attached to 50 Brigade, Iraqi Armyin June 2008.

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Talking To The “Enemy” –InformalConflictTermination In Iraq(This piece was written as BrigadierStorrie’s dissertation whilst at RCDS in 2009)

Brigadier Sandy StorrieCommander 7 Armoured Brigade,2007-2009

“The single clenched fist lifted and ready/Or the open asking hand held out andwaiting / Choose: / For we meet by oneor the other.” 1

IntroductionIn the wealth of literature on war in its various forms, surprisingly littleattention is given to the complexproblems of conflict termination.Counter-insurgency (COIN) in particularpresents difficulties. With few exceptionsCOIN campaigns are drawn-out, confusedand ambiguous; decisive military victoryis elusive, and other means of conflicttermination come into play. Militarycommanders can find themselves inunexpected roles, influencing and evendriving national strategy through theiractions at the operational and highertactical levels.

This paper considers two such instances in Iraq. In 2006 a series of local agreements between US MarineCorps (USMC) commanders and Sunnisheikhs produced the Anbar Awakening(AA), a switch in tribal alignment whichturned the COIN campaign in the Westdecisively against al-Qa’eda in Iraq(AQI). Over the following year, thismodel was extended to other parts ofIraq as the Concerned Local Citizens(CLC) programme, with equallyspectacular results.2 And in Basra,

a separate deal between Britishcommanders and the Sadrist Jaish al Mehdi (JAM) enabled UK to cutcasualties, reposition its forces, andtransfer security responsibilities to theIraqi Security Forces (ISF), in return for a structured programme of detaineereleases. The first of these deals beenwidely lauded, the second widelycriticised. But both judgments may be incorrect, or at least premature.

This paper considers these informal deals and their implications. It firstreviews some relevant academicthinking, and then examines andcompares the deals, assessing theireffectiveness as tools for conflicttermination and resolution in Iraq. Itconcludes that current judgments aremisleading: that the much-malignedBasra deal has already proved to be asound foundation for long-term conflictresolution, while the tribal strategycontains elements that may yet proveantithetical to Iraq’s future as a unitarystate. Finally, it suggests some genericguidelines for military officers engagedin informal conflict termination, anddraws some wider conclusions on COINfrom the Coalition experience in Iraq.

Conflict Resolution or Victory?Already two terms have been introducedwhich require definition. Michael Handeldescribes conflict termination as “thediscontinuation of hostilities, which doesnot necessarily indicate positive progressto a lasting peace”3: which is hisdefinition of conflict resolution. ChrisTuck emphasises the relationshipsbetween the two, considering that“effective conflict termination is wider,and is about ending conflicts in ways thatbest support the political end states set.”4

The distinction between termination andresolution is often taken to be thatbetween the cessation of armedhostilities and the settlement of theunderlying disputes, but Tuck views thetrue picture as non-sequential: conflictresolution is not a distinct phase thatfollows conflict termination, but anumbrella term: “…if conflict resolutiondescribes the overall objectives sought,conflict termination is one of the ways inMap Iraq Provinces

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which these objectives may be achieved.”5

Conflict resolution objectives provide theend-states to which conflict terminationshould be directed, and it is therelationship between the two thatdefines the ultimate value of any militarycampaign.6 For the purposes of thispaper, Tuck’s key point is that theconditions for a conflict’s long-termresolution are affected by the way inwhich it is terminated: a sub-optimaltermination can lead to difficultiesdownstream.

Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteynhave grappled inconclusively with theproblems of understanding victory anddefeat in modern wars – in particularwars between unequal opponents – andin defining the utility of force in theseconflicts.7 Duyvesteyn is sceptical of thecontinued relevance of the Clausewitzianidea of decisive victory,8 while Angstromconcludes that there are now multipleunderstandings of victory and defeat,some of which are contradictory.9

Johnson and Tierney use the examples ofMayaguez and Somalia to argue thatpopular judgments of success and failurein war are not always informedaccurately by the objective outcome.Rather, public perceptions are formedinstead by a number of psychologicaland informational biases – aphenomenon they term “match-fixing” –whereby rather than weighing upmaterial gains and losses objectively,observers fix the results in their mindsso that one side is seen to win or lose,irrespective of what actually happens onthe ground.10 Victory and defeat, theauthors argue, are essentiallyperceptions.

In the same volume, Ivan Arreguin-Toftargues convincingly for the highlydiscriminate use of force in any counter-insurgency,11 while Gil Merom considersthat intervention with ground forcesagainst markedly weaker protagonistshas an inherent potential to regress intoprotracted insurgency, and that even aneffective military COIN campaign maynot deliver the political outcomessought. He posits three broad options forWestern powers engaged in such

campaigns, “none of which is thrilling”:first to insist on total military victory atthe risk of discovering that even soundbattlefield performance leads nowherepolitically (Algeria, Vietnam, Lebanon,the second intifada); second, uponrealization that the military effort ispolitically unsustainable, cut losses andrun (Somalia): and third, accept andsupport the least unpleasant indigenousauthority without expecting that it willobediently serve Western interests. “Inessence, aim low, possibly lower.”12

Finally, William Zartman has consideredin depth how and when internal conflictscan be resolved. He suggests that partiesin conflict decide to negotiate when theyperceive a Mutually Hurting Stalemate(MHS); a deadlocked position whichimposes significant but not necessarilyequally pain on both. Decisive victoryhas proved unattainable, otherpossibilities have been exhausted and ahigh level of intensity has been reached.The MHS prompts the parties to look fora better alternative: if they then sensethe possibility of a negotiated solutionor Way Out a “ripe moment” is created,in which talks can begin. In summary,negotiations occur when both partieslose faith in their chances of winningand see an opportunity for cutting lossesand achieving satisfaction throughaccommodation: they adjust their aimsand settle for “…an alternativesomewhere between unattainable triumphand unlikely annihilation…rather amuddy field to play on.13

This brief survey suggests that conflicttermination in COIN is not likely to beblack and white, but grey, and with thatbackground in mind, the paper will nowconsider the deals.

The Anbar Awakening (AA)The Anbar Awakening (AA) began inearly 2005, when Sunni tribes near theSyrian border started to resent the influxof AQI to their area, and the resultantcompetition in their lucrative smugglingoperations, and decided to resist.14

Sensing the potential threat, AQI openedits own campaign of murder and coercionagainst them,15 and the tribes turned to

the Multi-National Force (MNF) for help.But the Government of Iraq (GOI)initially withheld its support, and bySeptember the tribes had beenoverwhelmed. Co-operation resumed inmid-2006, centred on Ramadi, andSheikh Sattar abu Risha of the Dulaimifederation. Although himself a relativelyminor sheikh, Sattar provided a focus fortribal opposition to AQI; MNF’senthusiasm prevailed over continuingGOI reluctance, and Sattar’s tribesmenwere co-opted in large numbers into theIraqi Police (IP). A blind eye was turnedto his extra-legal streams of revenuegeneration.16 Sattar’s success inresisting, surviving and making moneyproved exemplary; more sheikhs broughtmore men, and by the end of 2007 theforces ranged against AQI had doubled in size.

The results were striking. In September2006, a USMC intelligence officerassessed that “AQI is the dominantorganisation of influence in Al Anbar,surpassing the nationalist insurgents, theIraqi Government and MNF in its ability tocontrol the day-to-day life of the averageSunni.”17 A year later the situation hadbeen transformed. In December 2007,the Commanding General (CG) of MNFWest was able to report 10 straightmonths of decreasing incidents and a fallin attacks of some 90 per cent, and toclaim credibly that “…we have kicked AlQa’ida out of Anbar.” IP numbers hadmore than doubled, from 10,600 to25,800: with thousands more candidateskeen to join.18 AQI strength had fallenfrom some 12,000 in mid 2007 to 3,500in early 2008.19 Sattar’s eventual

Governor Maamoon Sami Rasheed al-Awani metwith local tribal sheikhs and city governmentleaders at a U.S military outpost in Husaybah,Iraq, July 3, 2006.(US Marine Corps - Cpl AntonioRosas).

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assassination by AQI caused a temporary hiatus, but the overallmomentum of AA was maintained by hisbrother, who inclined it further towardsmainstream politics.

One of AA’s first successes was to re-establish the Anbar Provincial Council(PC), and since then it has progressivelystrengthened its links with mainstreampolitics and the GOI. In the PC electionsof February 2009, the AA’s candidateswon the most votes and the most seats,and were the power-brokers for theelection of the Governor. “The Awakeningis an economic and political entity now,and our strategy is financial andeconomic”,20 said its leader Abu Risha:there are still occasional veiled threatsto “…transfer our entity from a politicalto a military one…”21 to counteropponents, but essentially the AA nowhas an effective working relationshipwith the GOI. In fact, some of its mainrecent difficulties have been with seniorSunni elements of that Government, whosee it now as a serious politicalcompetitor.22

The AA was not simply an imprompturejection by Sunnis of AQI’s brutalmethods and radical rule. Austin Longsuggests that the switch was based onthree incremental realizations by tribalsheikhs:

● first that the political process mightconfer more benefit than continuedfighting,

● second that AQI’s transnational andfundamentalist goals were at oddswith their own local or nationalobjectives,

● and third and most importantly, thatAQI was competing for control ofrevenue sources, such as banditryand smuggling, which had previouslybeen the exclusive province of thetribes.23

Reasserting Tribal AuthorityThe tribes were thus essentially re-asserting their authority and businessrights. AQI’s insistence on intermarryingwith local tribes – an imported practice

from Afghanistan – also inspired deep resentment.24 Former USMC officer Gabriel Leeden gives credit alsoto MNF’s behaviour, seeing the AA not asa spontaneous uprising against insurgentbrutality, but a response to conditionscreated by the USMC, by means ofdynamic security operations, complexrelationships with tribal leaders, andconsistent moral authority.25 British Maj Gen Paul Newton supports this view, seeing the USMC’s operation as an outstanding example of missioncommand and risk-taking, on a scaleunprecedented in Iraq.26 So while AQIbrutality undoubtedly played a part,27

it was not the sole or even the prime driver.

Lt Gen Graeme Lamb echoes theseanalyses but adds other elements; thefirst being the increasingly precise use offorce.28 From insufficiently discriminatebeginnings, MNF-I became increasinglyaccurate in its operations against AQI,changing the relative balance ofstrengths in Anbar, and emboldening and empowering the tribes to risk theextreme coercive violence levelled by AQI at any that chose to resist its rule.Adjusting Gallieni’s metaphor, Lambintroduces the idea of “reverse ink-spotting” – dismembering an initiallycoherent insurgency by killing orcapturing its mid-tier facilitators and co-ordinators to break it up into itsconstituent parts.

Lamb is warm in his praise of the USMC, recalling that their behaviour ledinfluential Sunni imams to conclude thatMNF did not intend to threaten eitherthe tribes’ way of life or their religiousfreedom, and therefore to reject anyreligious obligation to continuedefensive jihad, and to co-operate withCF to oust the interlopers of AQI. Herecalls the AA not as a negotiation but a dialogue: not a grand bargain but as a discussion of a mutual problem inan attempt to find some common groundand an alignment of interests.

General Lamb stresses also theimportance in achieving a solution oftime and will; that, “…certain things

were possible in 2006 that would nothave been possible in 2004 or 2005.” AQIhad exacted severe retribution on thoseSunnis who participated in the 2005elections, and with continued coalitioncommitment uncertain, many tribalsheikhs were undecided over which horseto back. This can be seen as a simpleHobbesian calculation of self-preservation, which deters the generalpopulation from committing to eitherside during a violent insurgency.29 TwoUSMC officers have described how theycountered this ambivalence by tellingthe sheikhs “…that we would stay aslong as necessary to defeat the terrorists.That was the message they had beenwaiting to hear. As long as they perceivedus as mere interlopers, they dared notthrow in their lot with ours. When theybegan to think of us as reliable partners,their attitudes began to change.”30 TheUSMC thus persuaded influential sheikhsthat it intended to remain a significantactor in the medium term, and that theyshould align themselves with “thestrongest tribe.” The announcement inJanuary 2007 of the intended US troopsurge undoubtedly assisted this process,though its military effect was not feltuntil much later in the year.

But Lamb also cites a further reason forthe tribes’ repositioning; the historicSunni fear of Iranian influence, anddistrust of the Shi’a dominated GOI. Insimilar vein, is the view of a prominentimam who said that the people ofFallujah were fighting a Persianoccupation: in the form of the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Army (IA).31 One Sunnisheikh saw it as “… just a way to getarms, and to be a legalized security forceto be able to stand against Shi’a militiasand to prevent the Iraqi Army and policeforce from entering the areas.”32 Thisdemonstrates graphically the possiblelong-term weakness of a tribal strategy:while it has proved an admirable vehiclefor the achievement of one strategic end,the defeat of AQI, it may well beantithetical to another, the creation of astable, unified and democratic Iraq.33

A comparison can be made with the USArmy’s training and equipping ofMontagnard tribesmen in Vietnam, who

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were enthusiastic in fighting theinsurgents, but only slightly less hostileto the government of South Vietnam: asituation which came to a head in late1964, when several groups of tribesmenrose in open revolt.34 The tribal strategyis similar, with the inherent tensionsbetween the GOI and the Sunni tribescontaining the seeds of potentialsectarian conflict or even the break-upof the fledgling Iraqi state. Thissituation would actually be morechallenging than Vietnam: the Sunnitribes of Anbar are not a small ruralmajority like the Montagnards, whichmakes it harder for MNF to exert leverageover them. Whereas Saddam Hussein wasgenerally able to exert some central orco-confessional leverage over the tribes,the current GOI may soon face asituation where powerful sheikhs carve up and control their fiefdoms like feudal lords.35

Concerned Local CitizensThis tension is still more apparent with the wider manifestation of theAwakening Councils, the CLC. The successof the AA sparked an understandabledesire to repeat the model in the otherSunni provinces, and even to extend itto the Shi’a south, and led to a US-ledprogramme which recruited, trained andequipped some 103,000 Iraqis, over 80%Sunni, many of whom were formerinsurgents. CLC manned checkpoints

and conducted static guards and“neighbourhood watch” type tasks, with similar success to the AA. InBaghdad, 2007 saw a 90% reduction inmurders, an 80% fall in attacks oncitizens, and a 70% decline in vehicle-borne explosive devices.36 But althoughmany CLC groups have termed themselvesAwakening Councils, they are verydifferent in nature to the original AA.Where most AA volunteers wereprogressively incorporated into the IP,and thus employed by the Ministry of theInterior (MOI), the CLCs were US-fundeduntil October 2008. And where the AAhas consistently had a relationship withthe GOI – albeit initially a fractious one– many of the CLC groupings remainambivalent towards it, even hostile.In several areas, the refusal of CLCgroups to recognize the legitimacy orauthority of the GOI has prompted it toact against them. In March 2009, theBaghdad suburb of Rusafa saw two daysof serious fighting, as the ISF and MNFpursued CLC leaders wanted by the GOI.37

The transfer of funding responsibilityfrom MNF to the GOI has added furtherfrictions, and bureaucratic inertia andgovernmental unease have meant thatCLCs have been paid either late, or notat all.38 A falling oil price hasexacerbated the GOI’s difficulties, as hasits need to reintegrate detainees andrefugees returning from abroad. There isintense suspicion on both sides, and theGOI’s tolerance of all militias appears tobe hardening. “The State cannot acceptthe Awakening”, said one leading Shi’iteMP. “When the Government attacked theMahdi Army it sent the message to all themilitias including the Awakening that

their days are numbered.”39 It thereforeintends to incorporate only some 20% of CLCs into the ISF, and the future forthe remainder is unclear. Violence,meanwhile, is trending upwards: from275 civilian deaths in January, to 343 in February, 408 in March and 485 inApril.40 With CLCs funded only until theend of 2009, the GOI seems ready to let them wither away: whether it will be able to do so peacefully remains to be seen.

Responses to the tribal strategy fall intotwo broad camps: the sceptical and thepragmatic. The sceptics concede thebenefits of the deals in terms of fightingAQI, but highlight the tensions created,and the potential longer-term problemsfor the Iraqi state and its institutions.The tribal strategy is a temporaryalignment of interests rather than aresolving formula, and Coalitiondrawdown, a resurgence of AQI and/or agovernment shift towards Shi’itetheocracy could all lead the tribes toreview their position, possibly evenswitching sides, like Dostum inAfghanistan. This would be a particularlybad outcome for the Coalition as itwould then have helped to train, equipand sustain forces that would workcounter to its interests, while for the GOIit would mean de facto partition, civilwar, or both. Using tribal power to securea modern state is at best a stop-gapmeasure, and at worst, a source ofeventual state failure.41

The latter is hardly optimal, butoptimal is no longer a luxury the

United States can afford.

The pragmatists recognise many of theseobjections but contend that the tribalstrategy was the only practical course ofaction at the time. The US had a choice:either to continue to press for a nationaland unified state, and risk allowing theinsurgency to go unchallenged, or torelax ties to the state in order to counterAQI with local police forces, at the costof formalising sectarian divisions andweakening democratization. “The latter ishardly optimal, but optimal is no longer aluxury the United States can afford.”42

Montagnard Irregulars (US Army Center ofMilitary History)

An Iraqi soldier leads the way during a combinedcordon and search of the Rusafa area of Baghdad(US Army)

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Lamb is also a pragmatist: whilst acutely conscious of the potentialpitfalls “…given the difficulties we werefacing, the absolute inability of the Iraqisto cope themselves, and a violentinsurgency that was approaching thetipping point, we really didn’t feel we had much choice.”43 The pragmatiststherefore regard the tribal deals as thelesser of two strategic evils: an enforcedreversion to an earlier social model inthe interests of short-term stability.

This argument is compelling. If allpolitics is local, then so is muchinsurgency, and MNF’s embrace ofbottom-up solutions should come as nosurprise. The tribal strategy has been apragmatic stop-gap, ensuring the short-term survival of the Iraqi state in theface of a vicious insurgency, though ithas in the process empowered forceswhich may yet threaten that state’sexistence in its current form. Its successwill be defined by where it goes fromhere. The AA in particular hassuccessfully redirected Sunni nationalistinsurgents towards mainstream politics,and even the less well-structured CLCshave provided an honourable means forformer insurgents to realign theirloyalties without admitting defeat.44

Their emerging relationships with theGOI could provide the foundation forlonger-term stability; not least sinceIraq’s central government relationshipswith its provinces have historically been fluid.

But this is not a guaranteed outcome.Some feel that “…all the Americans didwas buy the Iraqi government sometime…the fact that fewer people aredying now does not change the realitythat this is a dysfunctional state that caneasily slip back into civil war.”45 Toparaphrase Rupert Smith, the tribalstrategy has thus created a conceptualspace for diplomacy, economicincentives, political pressure and othermeans to create a desired politicaloutcome of stability and if possibledemocracy,46 and has given Iraqis anopportunity to determine their internalgovernance through discussion ratherthan secession and/or civil war. But it

has not resolved the conflict: at leastnot yet.

The Basra “Accommodation”

Senior officers including the Chief ofthe General Staff had started to re-define the Army's presence as partof the problem, not the solution.

The deals in Anbar and Basra areoutwardly similar and there is no doubtthat events in Anbar opened the eyes ofCF leaders elsewhere in Iraq to thepossibilities of a less kinetic approach.47

But the “accommodation” with JAM wasborn of very different demographics andstrategic needs, and was substantiallydifferent in its aims. Some context istherefore required.

In late 2006 there was an increasingsense that British military presence inSouthern Iraq had run its course. UKtroops were fighting bravely andinnovatively but the situation wasdeteriorating. Senior officers includingthe Chief of the General Staff had startedto re-define the Army’s presence as partof the problem, not the solution.48 Afinal, under-resourced effort to “win”Basra through conventional COINtechniques had ended inconclusively:Basra did not want to be won.49 Instead,from early 2007 on the Army becameincreasingly embroiled in a self-fuellingcycle of violence with the JAM. In thefirst six months of the year, UK lost 29killed and nearly 160 injured. Theincoming brigade commander in May

2007 recalls; “We walked into a war.”50

These difficulties were partly due tocritical weaknesses in governance, bothnational and local. Basra has a history ofdetachment from Baghdad, based on itsdistinct economy, demography andgeography, and a record of autonomousand even secessionist ambitions.51 Theresults of the 2005 PC elections wereunhelpful: the Sadrists declined to stand(and thereby excluded themselvesindefinitely from mainstream politics),and the victorious Islamic coalitionfailed to agree on a Governor, allowingthe election by default of Muhammad al-Wa’ili, whose Fadhila party had gainedonly 13 of the 41 seats. For the next fouryears, Wa’ili deftly circumvented allpolitical and legal attempts to unseathim, consolidating his position at theheart of a black economy based on oil-smuggling, overseen by his militia withinthe Facilities Protection Service.52 Othermilitias - notably the JAM - carved outsimilar fiefdoms in electricity generationand the ports. A weak GOI could do littleto stop them: preoccupied with theplethora of more serious threats to itsexistence, it showed little sustainedinterest in Basra until early 2008. Theeffect was to turn the deep south into akleptocracy, where well-armedpolitical–criminal Mafiosi were able tolock both the central government andthe people out of power.53

None of the militias wanted to bringthe South to the point of collapse:they simply wanted as large a slice

of the cake as possible.

The conflict in Basra was thereforefundamentally different to that in Anbar.The AQI-inspired violence in the centralbelt was essentially nihilistic: escalationwas open-ended, with total collapse anacceptable, even desirable end-state forAQI. The Shi’a South, on the other hand,was absolutely not nihilistic. Even at theheight of the violence in 2006/07 the oiland energy infrastructure remainedlargely undisturbed, though its key nodes had long been identified ascritical vulnerabilities by MNF. None ofthe militias wanted to bring the South to

Members of C company 1st Battalion TheYorkshire Regiment (1 Yorks) who are part thethe 2nd Battalion The Duke of Lancaster’s (2Lancs) Battlegroup conducting a arrest andsearch operation within the Al Jameat district ofBasra (Cpl Russ Nolan)

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the point of collapse: they simplywanted as large a slice of the cake aspossible. So the British Armyincreasingly found itself as a de factoactor in an intra-Shi’a power-struggle:through its obligation to support alegitimately-elected but corrupt andunpopular Governor, it was slowly butinexorably drawn into confrontation withthe JAM.

By early 2007 the Army's legitimacyhad expired.

By early 2007 the Army’s legitimacy hadexpired. It faced MNF’s ubiquitousproblem of “…finding a way to create asustainable security architecture that doesnot require the ‘coalition in the loop’,thereby allowing Iraq to stabilise and theCoalition to withdraw in favourablestrategic circumstances.”54 UK thereforesought to change the conditions of thecampaign through early transition toIraqi leadership: to hand off its ForwardOperating Base (FOB) at Basra Palace(BP) to the ISF, consolidate forces at theairport Common Operating Base (COB),transfer security responsibilities to theISF under Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC),and then draw down and releaseresources for Afghanistan. If this soundslike an abrogation of responsibility, itwas not: more a recognition of lost andirrecoverable legitimacy, and an activeeffort to empower the ISF as a moreappropriate force. The General OfficerCommanding (GOC) charged withimplementing this strategy was Maj GenJonathan Shaw.55

Shaw viewed Basra as “Palermo,rather than Beirut”

Shaw viewed Basra as “Palermo, ratherthan Beirut”: a violent but essentiallyself-limiting competition for power andresources rather than an ideologicalstruggle. He saw the militias as apotentially useful vehicle of socialcohesion in a fragmented society wherecentral government authority was weak:a primary form of organising force, a sortof urban tribe. Their power was notdangerous per se: it could be harmful ifmisapplied, but if harnessed correctly, he

felt that it could be productivelyemployed. This chimed with the views ofthe competent and determined new Iraqisecurity chief, Maj Gen Mohan, who hadarrived to head up the Basra OperationsCommand (BaOC). Mohan assessed thatthe UK presence in the city wasdistorting normal politics and promptingnationalist Basrawis to fight simply to befree of occupation: early PIC wouldtherefore help to clarify their loyaltiesand undercut public support for the JAM.

Shaw therefore hit on a twin-trackapproach: increasing the tempo of strikeoperations to ramp up the pressure onJAM, whilst simultaneously beginning asearch for effective interlocutors;essential to both was a less monolithicunderstanding of JAM. The first track ledto the killing or capture of severalleading figures in Basra JAM, amongstthem Wissam Abu Qadir, its then leader.The second led to a series of discussionswith high-ranking JAM member SheikhAhmed al-Fartusi, who had been indetention since 2005. In thesediscussions, Shaw sought to re-channelFartusi’s intense sense of Iraqinationalism for productive ends, awayfrom attacks on MNF and towardscountering malign Iranian influence inthe city. Shaw felt that “…he and Iwanted the same things for Basra –prosperity, self-rule, religious moderation,education etc…” and sought to persuadehim that “…he should co-operate withredevelopment instead of attacking it.”56

These were ambitious aims. Where theAA sought to restore security by

reverting to an earlier social model, theBasra deal sought to promote a moreinclusive politics at a supra-tribal level.Shaw’s successor Graham Binns hoped to“…get to the point where the mainSadrist strain will support the Iraqisecurity forces – that’s the goal.”57 Nopolitical solution to Basra could ignorethe Sadrists, and the Northern Irishpeace process had demonstrated thevalue of an inclusive approach. Just asthe AA had countered AQI in the West,malign Iranian influence in Basra mightperhaps be offset by the JAM.

Shaw’s discussions with Fartusi led to aprovisional “accommodation” betweenthe two parties.58 JAM would ceaseattacks on the Army and facilitate itsextraction from BP; the Army wouldsuspend its strike operations andprogressively release 120 internees,including, late in the process, Fartusihimself. (All were likely to have beenreleased anyway on the expiry of UNSCR1723, then scheduled for the end of theyear). And although not explicitly stated,there appears to have been anunderlying understanding that UK forces,once redeployed outside the city, wouldhave little reason routinely to return:security responsibilities within the citywould be discharged by the ISF. In thisrespect the deal was a conscious effortto empower Mohan and the IA.The benefits of this deal were feltimmediately, mainly by the British butnot exclusively so. Indirect fire (IDF)attacks dropped from a campaign peak inthe preceding months to minimal levels,total attacks on UK forces fell by some90%, and there were no further UK

General Mohan (Cpl Martin Coleman RAF)

Quitting Basra Palace for the COB (Cpl IanFellows)

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deaths from IDF in 2007. The Army wasable to hand BP to the ISF and relocateto the COB – potentially a highlycomplex and hazardous operation -without a shot being fired, and refocusits efforts on training the IA. With IDFattacks sharply down, re-developmentwork at the airport was able to resume,paving the way for its handover to theIraqi authorities, and local politicianswere content to resume their visits tothe COB to engage with British consularstaff. The building of the Basra Children’sHospital – suspended over accessdifficulties for Coalition staff andcontractors – was able to resume, andwith British forces no longer in the city,Baswaris were less likely to be caught upin any crossfire. As one sheikh told Binnsin the autumn of 2007, “Things are bad –but they’re a lot better than they were.”59

Critically, the fall in violence in the citysatisfied MNF that the conditions fortransition had been met, and Basra wentto PIC on 16 Dec 07: the last ofMultinational Division SE’s four provincesto do so.

...in the three months prior to PIC,some 40 women were killed in Basrafor wearing make-up, not veiling, or

otherwise failing to observe thenarrow rulings of the repressive

local militias.

Yet the accommodation was not anunqualified boon. The ISF proved unableto impose itself on the city with anyauthority (although Mohan came tovalue the accommodation both as ameans of buying time to build up hiscombat power, and as a useful channelof communication with the JAM, whichhe was subsequently able to use to hisown advantage),60 and therefore theunintended consequence was toconsolidate JAM control over much ofthe city. The extent of their depredationsis difficult to judge objectively, but thereis some anecdotal evidence that theyranged from widespread dressrestrictions, through the forced closureof alcohol outlets and music shops, toethnic cleansing, brutality and murder.61

All had featured pre-deal, of course, butBritish withdrawal removed the one real

remaining constraint. Basra IP chief MajGen Jalil later claimed that in the threemonths prior to PIC, some 40 womenwere killed in Basra for wearing make-up,not veiling, or otherwise failing toobserve the narrow rulings of therepressive local militias.62 MND (SE)should perhaps have foreseen this, butmany felt that JAM control was unlikely,and were satisfied by Mohan’s air of

confidence and assurances of the futurecapability of the ISF: despite its evidentlack of effective units at that time.Others were less sanguine, but felt thatthe UK’s ability to influence had in anycase expired, and that the increasing airof Islamisation was a price worth payingfor PIC.

The struggle for control of Basrapersisted until March 2008, when PrimeMinister (PM) Maliki chose to confrontBasra JAM, moved personally to BP, anddirected Mohan to begin CHARGE OF THEKNIGHTS (COTK), a British-drafted planfor the recapture of Basra due to beimplemented later in the summer. Thepremature launch produced some initialincoherence, but when reinforced byadditional Iraqi units and US support –both a first – the IA prevailed. Maliki’spersonal investment was also highlysignificant: by taking such a public standagainst the JAM he explicitly re-definedBasra’s turf wars as an insurgentchallenge to the GOI, forcing Basrawis todecide where their loyalties were goingto lie. As COTK developed, UK forces wereable to re-engage with their roleclarified, not as occupiers but as directsupporters of the IA, and enjoyed a sea-change in public support as a result. Ahighly successful mentoring mission

Militia activity during Op COTK (HQ 4 Armd Bde)

IA troops giving aid (UK rations) and Info Ops leaflets to Basrawi citizens at a VCP during Op COTK (HQ4 Armd Bde)

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throughout 2008 and early 2009 hasrestored at least some of the UK’smilitary reputation with the US and IA(though not perhaps with Maliki), andhas enabled final withdrawal, with somesense of sufficiency in what wasachieved.63

The accommodation is seen in somequarters as a cynical sell-out to preserveBritish lives: this was not its principalmotive.64 The cessation of IDF inparticular was viewed mainly as a metricof Fartusi’s ability to deliver: it was notthe central objective but a very welcomeby-product.65 The benefits of the deal forthe British were threefold:

● First, it allowed the Army to extract from a force-sapping tactical laydown, and to stem a flow of casualties which was erodingdomestic support and reducing UKpolitical will to a mission-threatening level.

● Secondly, by dramatically cuttingthe level of violence, it created thebreathing space in which PIC couldbe credibly declared at the end ofthe year. Without a reduction in IDFthere could be no PIC – “…how canyou declare PIC in the middle of awar?”66 - and without PIC there could be no progress: in that sensethe “by-product” of Shaw’s goals was more significant than the goals themselves.

● Together, these gains – a manageable casualty rate andsuccessful transition to PIC – weresufficient to preserve UK strategicappetite to remain alongside the USin force throughout 2008 and wellinto 2009. Pre-deal, the politicalrisks to the Brown government fromstaying in Iraq were coming tooutweigh the consequences for thetransatlantic relationship fromunilateral withdrawal: post-deal the reverse was true.

Therefore, although the deal with the JAM did not resolve or even fullyterminate the conflict in Basra, it setstrong conditions for conflict resolutionin three ways:

● First, by enabling PIC it transferred responsibility for resolving theconflict to the Iraqis, since only they could resolve it – and they did.

● Secondly it restored UK appetite toremain in force: and therefore toretain sufficient combat power toprovide worthwhile support to the IAduring and after COTK.

● And finally, it gave JAM the rope tohang itself, since JAM’s completeinability to provide reconstruction orpublic services, and its air ofoppressive Islamisation, resulted instrong popular support for PM Malikiand the ISF during COTK.

This was maybe not quite what the deal’sarchitects intended, but it was necessarynonetheless. As Shaw put it, “…they hadto go through this. Somehow we had topersuade the population that JAM was theenemy and not us.” 67 Subsequently, the2009 Provincial elections saw Maliki’scoalition gain 35% of the vote in Basra,with independent Sadrists winning onlytwo of the 41 seats, and Fadhila reducedto a humiliating 3%, and failing to win aseat. 68 Shaw still contends that theextremists showing their real hand andlosing their legitimacy was the bestthing for Basra, albeit painful at thetime.69

The “abandonment” of Basra to the JAMis the aspect of the deal which hasprobably caused most unease, evenwithin the Army,70 and this papersuggests that the British consistentlyoverestimated the legitimacy and publicsupport enjoyed by Basra JAM. Misled bySadrist strength in Baghdad, and by theorganisation’s roots as a social provider(pace Hamas), some British officerscompared the JAM to the Orange Order; arelatively unthreatening body with wide-ranging public support. In fact, as JuanCole warned as early as 2003, the Sadristmovement is “…highly puritanical andxenophobic, and characterised by anexclusivism unusual in Iraqi Shi’ism. Toany extent that it emerges as a leadingsocial force in Iraq, it will provepolarizing and destabilizing.”71

Even in Basra – traditionally a relativelysecular and cosmopolitan port city,inherently more liberal than JAM’sheartlands of Maysan and east Baghdad– these Islamist and sociopathictendencies emerged fiercely. SomeBritish officers are thus now sceptical ofthe extent of Fartusi’s enduringinfluence,72 and although his power inmid 2007 was clear enough, hissubsequent threats to the British,delivered from Lebanon in 2008, elicitedno response from his former colleagues-in-arms.73 In retrospect, the British viewof JAM appears rose-tinted: in seeing itsprime motivation as criminal and self-interested, they neglected its religiousleanings, and thus underestimated itspotential antipathy towards thosesecular and progressive elements ofBasra’s population that refused toconform to its strictures.74

Those that were there find this harsh,and point to the reality of JAM control,and the lack of realistic alternatives. By2007 the Army had Gil Merom’s choice:escalate, get out, or lower your sights.75

It could have persevered: fought its wayout of BP, and continued to bear asimilar level of IDF casualties for the restof the year: perhaps another 50 UK dead.This view had some advocates withinWhitehall, who saw it as the blood-priceto be paid to sustain the transatlanticrelationship, but it is doubtful that thepolitical appetite for this course existed:and more doubtful still that PIC couldhave been declared in such a visiblyunstable environment.

A second alternative was simply todeclare success – whatever suspension ofdisbelief this might involve – and leave.That would have triggered a range ofpossible consequences, all involvingsome degree of national humiliation:opposition from a bemused US, theprobable replacement by a US Brigade, acontested withdrawal to Kuwait, lootingreminiscent of the withdrawal fromMaysan, the complete loss of militaryreputation, and the most severe hiatusin the transatlantic relationship sinceSuez.

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A third and more palatable alternativewas to reinforce: to mirror the US surgeand to seek a decisive military victoryover the JAM. But where would theforces have come from? Even had thisbeen politically deliverable, UK was by2007 operating well above DefencePlanning Assumptions to sustain itsburgeoning commitment to Afghanistan,and national forces simply were notthere. There was also a marked nationalreluctance to request reinforcement fromthe Corps,76 and it is by no means certainthat any such request would have beenmet: US forces were fully committedelsewhere and there was a widely-heldUS view that having carved out adiscrete Divisional area, the UK ownedthe responsibility for resourcing it.77

In that sense the Basra deal also servedUS interests, since it enabled the Corpsto concentrate its resources elsewhere.

Nor is it axiomatic that reinforcementwould have been useful. It is undeniablethat UK never committed sufficientresources to defeat the JAM,78 but it isalso far from certain that more militaryresources could by 2007 have producedthe desired outcome. Certain assetswould undoubtedly have been helpful –helicopters and ISTAR for example – butground troops might not. There is acritical distinction between mass andlegitimacy, and despite the overallsuccess of the US surge, it is far fromclear that more troops can of themselvescompensate for a lack of legitimacy, inthe absence of a credible external threat.As John Nagl has pointed out, it is“…perhaps only a slight exaggeration tosuggest that, on their own, foreign forcescannot defeat an insurgency: the bestthey can hope for is to create theconditions that will enable local forces towin it for them.”79 So it is by no meansclear, given the Army’s travails insustaining BP, that additional FOBs inthe city would have been helpful, orsustainable. Additional, capable ISF unitswould have been both, but priorities layelsewhere, and 2007 in any case was thenadir in British relations with the IA.The locally-raised 10th Division wasweak, with JAM influence strongly

apparent in its Basra-based brigades.Embedding UK mentors – to prove sosuccessful in 2008 – was unattractive: 10Div were unwilling to partner because UKtroops drew fire from the JAM where theydid not, and there were several instanceswhere 10 Div units would not fight.80 AtBP, effective co-operation had ceased,81

although some still feel that this was amissed opportunity; that the lack ofwelcome went both ways.82 Overall therewere few good options and the situationwas essentially Zartman’s MHS.

The Basra deal in fact exhibits manyaspects of Zartman’s analysis.83 There waspalpably an MHS, and (for the British atleast) a perception of impendingcatastrophe: an opposed withdrawal fromBP, which was likely to producesignificant casualties and a publicperception of failure. Neither side anylonger possessed the ability to escalate;they “…were like two battered boxers: wecould have kept slugging it out, but towhat end?”84 And the deal also had manyof the effects that Zartman’s analysispredicts: it did undercut the identity ofJAM,85 and did remove the confusionover Shi’a nationalism, just as Mohan

had hoped.86 It did not resolve theconflict because that was essentiallyover resources: an intra-Shi’a power-struggle in which the British were nolonger prepared to take a stake. So asZartman hypothesised, both sides sawthe potential for achieving theirstrategic aims (which in the British casehad reduced significantly) by alternativemeans. Senior British officers were stillwilling to fight it out, but few saw anyuseful purpose in doing so.87

They chose instead a variant of Merom’sthird way, and found an accommodationwith a de facto indigenous authoritywithout expecting that it wouldobediently serve their interests.Admittedly this requires a fairly liberalinterpretation of Merom’s “leastunpleasant indigenous authority” – sincesuch authority as JAM possessed camepurely from its organisation, its arsenal,and its illegal control of electricity andthe ports. Perhaps the UK should simplyhave thrown its military power behindthe GOI and its representative in Basra -the corrupt Wa’ili - and accepted thecontinuing cost in lives that this wouldhave entailed.88 But given the

UK MiTTs supporting an IA search operation during Op COTK (note IA troops carrying sacks ofammunition) during Op COTK (HQ 4 Armd Bde)

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implausibility of this and other options,and the benefits that were gained, theBasra deal does not look a bad one.Those that struck it remain unanimousthat, given the resources and politicalsupport available, they took the bestcourse available to them; the “leastworst” option.

Restricted by a shortage of resources and an imminent failure of national will,faced with an imperative to transition toPIC, to enable both UK drawdown andIraqi progress, they found a creative wayforward, and cashed in their onlyremaining leverage on JAM while it stillhad value. Though the deal’s most far-reaching ambitions for Sadristintegration were never achieved, itsprincipal failing – the abandonment ofBasra to its fate – was also relativelyquickly redeemed by the GOI and the ISF:who, as Nagl implies, were probably theonly people ever able to do it.

Comparative AnalysisMany points of comparison have emergednaturally in the above discussion, but itis worth highlighting some keydistinctions between the deals. The firstis the strategic context. The US public’scommitment to Iraq has occasionallywavered, but even in 2006 theAdministration was resigned to stayinginto the medium term, and in 2007 thishardened into a commitment not only tostay but to surge. UK strategic intent, onthe other hand, was to transition to PICas early as possible. There was thereforea strategic dissonance between Coalitionpartners, which affected the negotiatingposition of each of the parties, and thusthe deal that each was able to strike.

“Your ways are defined by yourmeans - and we didn't have

enough!”

A second distinction concerns therelative strength of the parties. In Basra,UK forces no longer had a widespreadpower to compel: they were capable ofachieving local tactical superiority intime and space, and thus inflictinglocalized pain on the JAM, but theylacked the combat power to sustain the

effort, or expand it across the city. As Bashall put it, “Your ways are defined by your means – and we didn’thave enough!”89 The position in Anbarwas better; the USMC could not force an outcome, but it was stilldemonstrably “the strongest tribe.” It could therefore make fewerconcessions, reflecting the US’ greatercombat power and political will.

A third distinction is that the Anbar dealwas made with the tribes, that in Basrawith a militia. This is less significantthan it may seem. The resettlement ofMarsh Arabs into Basra’s sink estates hasdismembered previous tribal structures,and seen them replaced by political-religious Islamic groupings like theJAM.90 Both deals were therefore madewith the de facto local non-stateauthority, neither of which was an“enemy” in the conventional sense, andboth sought to mobilize Iraqinationalism against external forces ofdifferent kinds. In Anbar, AQI wasmanifestly an interloper, but Basra’s linkswith SW Iran go back centuries, andmany of its tribes straddle the border.Iranian influence was therefore morewidespread and less overtly hostile thanthat of AQI, and JAM was in a moreambiguous position, and less likely tomake a dramatic shift. Arguably thischanged only when PM Maliki came torecognise the extent of malign Iranianinfluence, and its hostility to hisGovernment: too weak to act in 2007, hecountered effectively only in 2008. ButIranian influence never offered the sameexistential threat to the locals as AQI,and the Basra deal was thus inevitably aharder one to strike.

“Why would you take crocodiles as pets?

A fourth distinction is the relationshipbetween the parties, which in each casewas tripartite, with MNF and the GOI astwo of the elements, and the tribe /militia as the third.91 Arguably in Anbar,USMC commanders were easierinterlocutors for the Sunni tribes thanthe Shi’a-led GOI: the USMC thereforefostered an engagement by proxy which

had utility for both the GOI and thetribes. In the South, by comparison, the GOI had no such need of the MNF as go-betweens: it could talk to the JAMwhenever it wished to, and did. Indeedit questioned the need, asking frequently“Why would you take crocodiles as pets?”92

This distinction is reflected in the keyissue of transparency. The key to theUSMC’s success in Anbar was theircontinuous engagement of the PM andhis ministers: they linked the bottomand the top of the process in a highlystructured fashion, with each proposedrecruitment of tribal militias into the IPstaffed in detail with the GOI. Frictionsonly arose with the less structuredexpansion of the AA into the CLC, incircumstances where the GOI felt it hadlittle influence or control.93 Similarly,Lamb ensured that his discussions withformer regime elements were completelytransparent, even pulling out from onepotentially rewarding meeting because itwas considered by the GOI to be “beyondthe pale”.94 The Basra deal was a littlemore opaque: while undoubtedlysocialized with the key figures in the GOI(although there now seems to be someselective amnesia on that count), it wasnot widely briefed beyond. There wasperhaps an element of not pressing anissue where Iraqi opposition would haveleft the UK with nowhere to gostrategically. Thus Mohan learnedformally of the deal late in the day andthrough Iraqi channels, and although hesubsequently came to value many of itsaspects, this unpleasant surprise was thestart of a breakdown in his workingrelationship with the UK, and fuel on thefire of the PM’s mistrust.95

The final distinction between the deals isthe extent to which they supported thefledgling structures of the Iraqi state.The AA was the most successful in thisrespect, since its members were drawnprogressively into the ISF and GOI. CLCswere not, but were to a degree“socialized” by routine operationalcontact with the ISF and CF. But theBasra deal contained no such linkage,96

and even those Iraqi commanders well-

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disposed towards the British found theirdialogue with the JAM difficult to bear:particularly when combined later with aninitial (perceived) hesitancy insupporting COTK. Indeed, the mostdamaging legacy of the British deal isperhaps PM Maliki’s continuing hostilityto a long-term UK engagement, which islikely to inhibit the benefits to UKbusiness from the blood and treasurewhich the nation has committed.

The transatlantic relationship is probablyless dented: the most senior UScommanders understood the thinkingbehind the Basra deal, and while theymay not all have liked it, they wereprepared to make tactical concessions forthe strategic gain of Coalition coherence.Conceptually the deal reflected Petraeus’own aims; “We’re not after Jeffersoniandemocracy – we’re after conditions thatwould let our soldiers disengage.”97 USstaffs were less understanding, althoughtheir opposition was based on a moremonolithic view of the JAM than Shaw’snuanced approach. But the break has notbeen irreparable, and UK’s militaryreputation was at least partly restoredthe following year by its vigoroussupport for the later stages of COTK. UKremains likely to be the USA’s firstpartner of choice for futureinterventions, though perhaps with alittle more scepticism than of yore.

Generic Principles

...this paper has probably investedall of the deals with a coherence

they did not in fact possess.

Finally, does this analysis revealanything useful generically in terms ofconflict resolution in intervention andCOIN? It may, but with two importantcaveats. First, all COIN campaigns are suigeneris – of their own kind - makingproblematic the transfer of lessons fromone to another.98 Secondly, in packagingcomplexity for easy presentation, thispaper has probably invested all of thedeals with a coherence they did not infact possess. The proliferation of CLCs inparticular was uncontrolled, evenanarchic: in the prevailing mood of

strategic opportunity, effects werecreated first and explained to the GOIlater.99 Tribal and militia dynamics arecomplex, and JAM in particular embracesa wide range of nationalist, criminal andreligious motivations, impossible toreflect fully in a paper of this length. Allof the commanders interviewed felt thatthey were improvising to some degree,and in dissecting the deals forexamination, this paper rather over-tidies an intensely complex picture.

But with those caveats, the genericconclusions are as follows:

● Military commanders negotiatingtowards conflict termination mustnot overlook the pre-conditions forconflict resolution, though it may betempting to do so to solveimmediate and pressing securityproblems. This is important, becauseit is the relationship betweenconflict termination and conflictresolution that determines theultimate value of any militarycampaign.100 In practice, thisprinciple will inevitably be difficultto operationalize, and will requiresome difficult judgment calls.

● Informal deals are best negotiatedfrom a position of strength: or atleast, not of weakness. This may beself-evident, but then so isClausewitz’ prescription that “thebest strategy is always to be verystrong…”101 In retrospect, neitherthe US nor the UK committedsufficient resources to the campaign,and this is reflected in the bargainseach was compelled to strike. TheBritish Army has belatedlyrecognised the importance ofpersistent presence and mass inoperations designed to secure thepopulation, and the need for a moreflexible approach to force levelsthrough the course of a campaign.102

One hopes that this thinking willinform the upcoming DefenceReview, though mass of itself is oflittle use without legitimacy.

● Similarly, time and will are importantin creating the conditions in whichsuch deals can be struck. Burton and

Nagl conclude that counterinsurgentsmust demonstrate staying power ifthey are to break the grip ofmilitants over the population, sincewithout the promise of protection,civilians will support the insurgencyin order to survive. Prematuretransition to indigenous forces canthus be a “rush to failure”103 This is afair position, but it conflicts withanother lesson from Iraq, which isthat the legitimacy of an occupyingforce declines progressively –Petraeus speaks of a “half life”104,and endures only for as long as thatforce is perceived as beneficial andnon-oppressive. And since eachcitizen makes that calculationindividually, the loss of legitimacycan be sudden, catastrophic andirrecoverable. Balancing thecommitment to stay with acorresponding commitmenteventually to leave is another finecall: each case will be sui generis,even in different parts of the sametheatre. This will be a key judgmentin Afghanistan.

● Next, kinetic activity is importantand a high level of intensity appearsto be required. Both deals supportZartman’s analysis that “…to ripen aconflict one must raise the level ofconflict until the stalemate is reachedand then further until it begins tohurt…the ripe moment becomes thegodchild of brinkmanship.”105 Pressureon the Anbar tribes came from bothsides – AQI and the USMC – andforced them to choose; UK strikesagainst JAM had a similar effect; infact they were one of the few reallevers the Army still possessed.Thomas Schelling has written of thebargaining power that comes fromthe capacity to hurt,106 and thisfeatured in both deals. Kinetic forcemay not produce a decisive result,but must at least generate theperception of MHS: the necessary butnot sufficient condition fornegotiations to begin.

● That said, this is not a carte-blanche for unselectiveviolence: CF behaviour is critical.107

One of Lamb’s key lessons from Anbar

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was the highly discriminate use offorce, and this accords with theauthor’s own experience in Basra in2008, when weapons had utility indirect relation to their precision.There is still a view that successfulCOIN demands a willingness toescalate violence to extreme levels,with the Philippines and now SriLanka cited as examples. There islittle evidence that this worked inIraq, at all. On the contrary, Iraqsuggests that successful COIN is “afunction of legitimacy first andviolence second.”108 Occupiers get nolatitude: they have to get theirtargeting right.

● Relationships with the hostgovernment are critical, and any lack of transparency between theparties, perceived or real, can lead to a fundamental breach of trust. In the factional and conspiratorialpolitics of Iraq, the most successfuldeals were also the best-socialized.Since the host government will haveto bear the consequences ofwhatever is agreed, it seems only appropriate to cut it in from the outset.

● Finally, a successful deal is likely to draw reformed insurgents intosome kind of relationship withindigenous security forces orgovernmental structures. Ideally thiswill see their formal inclusion (as inAnbar): failing that some form ofsocialization through jointoperations (as with the CLCs). Anydeal which does not create such alinkage risks recidivism, as in Basra.

ConclusionThe tribal strategy and the Basra“accommodation” were therefore notquite the resounding success or thecraven sell-out they might initially haveappeared. As has been shown, in a littleover 8 months the Basra deal achievedthe desired end-state: allowing theBritish to withdraw from the city,removing any lingering confusion overShi’a nationalism, setting the conditionsfor COTK, and leading to a militaryvictory over the JAM which has sincebeen ratified in the Provincial elections

of 2009. It did not work out quite as itsarchitects intended but in war littledoes. Although the Sadrists remainlargely excluded from mainstream Basrapolitics, the intra-Shi’a conflict haseffectively been resolved: just as Shawpredicted it would be, once the Britishwere removed.

The consequences of the tribal strategyare less certain. Having removed aBa’athist regime at least declaredlyinimical to sectarianism, racism andtribalism, the US has been forced to allyitself with tribes which are largelyxenophobic and sectarian, in order toavert strategic failure.109 Its Faustianbargain has delivered spectacular short-term success, but has set the conditionsfor a potentially problematicconfrontation downstream. The AA hasbeen the most successful element, andits integration has reinforced theposition of the Sunni bloc within the GOIas an effective counterbalance to theShi’a parties. But the success of the CLCsis less clear, and the GOI still faces aserious challenge in terms of theirdisarmament and reintegration, with afalling oil price limiting the sweetenersit is able to offer.

Yet few in either the US or the UK would subscribe to such a view. Perhapsnotions of victory and defeat are indeedlargely perceptive:110 the US has decidedthat it “won” in Anbar, the UK that it“lost” in Basra. In both cases the truthis less clear-cut, but neither public isinterested in the detail. In Britain inparticular, the Iraq war suffers from such a lack of popular legitimacy thatthe country is not yet prepared toentertain the view that it could havebeen anything other than a massivemistake.

And the Army remains locked in acorporate cringe, preferring renewedaction in Afghanistan to any rigorousexamination of what went wrong, orindeed right.

This paper suggests that the true verdicton the Basra deal should be much lesscritical, and that the current

embarrassment is both misplaced andunhelpful. There are legitimate reasonsfor national unease over the performancein Iraq, including the lack of resourcescommitted, the failure to apply COINdoctrine, the lack of continuity in keyappointments, the occasional arrogancewith Coalition partners, the inability tomeet the aspirations of the Iraqi people,the failure to regenerate and activelymentor effective ISF, and the extremedissonance between ends, ways andmeans, particularly since 2006.

If these mistakes had not been made,perhaps a deal with JAM would not havebeen necessary, but they were, and itwas. UK commanders found animaginative and pragmatic way ofescaping a strategic cul-de-sac: COIN isno place for absolutist thinking, and theBasra deal looks much better now than itdid in early 2008. Although its ambitiousgoal of creating an inclusive politics inBasra did not work out as intended, itdid set the conditions for effectiveconflict resolution, and thus perhaps forsome long-term strategic benefit. Thetribal strategy cannot claim as much, atleast, not yet.

1 Carl Sandburg’s poem “Choose”; taken asthe informal motto of the Force StrategicEngagement Cell (FSEC) by Maj Gen ChrisHughes, who headed the cell from Nov07–Sep 08. Hughes, interview, 10 Jun 09.

2 CLC were later re-named Sons of Iraq(SOI) – this paper uses the earlier term toavoid confusion with other acronyms.

3 Michael Handel, War, Strategy andIntelligence, p 456.

4 Christopher Tuck, “Conflict Termination inIraq”, p 17.

5 Ibid, p 18.

6 Ibid, p 18 & p 21.

7 Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn(eds), Understanding Victory and Defeat inContemporary War.

8 Ibid, p 227.

9 Ibid, p 109.

10 Ibid, p 58.

11 Ibid, p 153.

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12 Ibid, pp 183-184.

13 I William Zartman, Negotiation andConflict Management, p 120 and p 234,and Elusive Peace, pp 8-9 and p 18.

14 This paragraph draws on Austin Long’s“The Anbar Awakening”, and on aninterview with Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb,Deputy Commanding General (DCG) MNF-ISep 06 - Sep 07, 11 Jun 09.

15 AQI’s violence towards the tribes has thusmainly been an effect of shifts inallegiance rather than a cause. Long, opcit, p 78.

16 Carter Malkasian, “A Thin Blue Line in theSand”, p 55.

17 Ibid, p 51.

18 Maj Gen Walter Gaskin, CG MultinationalForce West, Department of Defense NewsBriefing, 10 Dec 07, available online athttp://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4103

19 Amit Paley, “Shift in Tactics Aims toRevive Struggling Insurgency”,Washington Post, 8 Feb 08.

20 Liz Sly, “In Iraq’s Anbar Province, theAwakening grapples with a new role”, LATimes, 4 May 09.

21 Ned Parker and others, “Absent electionresults, Iraqi parties stake claims”, LATimes, 4 Feb 2009.

22 Sam Dagher “Rift threatens US antidoteto Al Qaeda in Iraq”, Christian ScienceMonitor, 13 Feb 08.

23 Long, op cit, p 77.

24 Dick Couch, The Sherriff of Ramadi, p 44.

25 Gabriel Leeden, “(Re-) Creating Anbar’sAwakening”, Huffington Post, 26 Mar 09.

26 Maj Gen Paul Newton, Head of FSEC May-Nov 07, interview, 12 Jun 09.

27 Gaskin, op cit.

28 Lamb, interview.

29 Raymond A Millen, “The Hobbesian Notionof Self-Preservation Concerning HumanBehaviour during an Insurgency”, p 5.

30 Niel Smith and Robert MacFarland, “AnbarAwakens: The Tipping Point”, p 43.

31 Malkasian, op cit, p 53.

32 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Meet Abu Abed,America’s new ally against Al-Qaeda”,Guardian, 10 Nov 07.

33 Long, op cit, p 68.

34 Long, op cit, p 72.

35 Long, op cit, pp 82-84.

36 MG Joseph Fil, CG MND Baghdad, DODNews Briefing, 17 Dec 2007, availableonline athttp://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4107

37 “Awakening Group in Baghdad Battle”;available online athttp://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/03/200932917620568226.html

38 Charles Levinson, “Toll Rises as Iraq SlowsSurge”, Wall Street Journal, 9 May 09.

39 Richard Oppel, “Iraq takes Aim at US-tiedSunni Groups’ Leaders”, New York Times,21 Aug 08.

40 http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database

41 Long, op cit, pp 86-87.

42 Malkasian, op cit, p 58.

43 Lamb, interview, 24 Jun 09.

44 Emma Sky, “Iraq 2007 – Moving beyondCOIN doctrine”, p 32.

45 Dagher, op cit.

46 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, p 270.

47 That said, UK commanders wereconsidering talking to Basra JAM wellbefore the modalities of the Anbar dealsbecame known. Maj Gen Graham Binns,GOC MND (SE) Aug 07 – Feb 08, interview,1 Jul 09.

48 Sarah Sands, “Sir Richard Dannatt: a VeryHonest General”, Daily Mail, 13 Oct 06.

49 Op SINBAD: a classic “clear hold andbuild” operation, under-resourced andeventually neutered by the GOI.

50 Brig James Bashall, Comd 1 Mech Bde,interview 22 May 09.

51 Michael Knights and Ed Williams, TheCalm Before the Storm; The BritishExperience in Southern Iraq, p 1.

52 Ibid, p 23.

53 Ibid, p 33.

54 David Kilcullen, “Anatomy of a TribalRevolt”, Small Wars Journal blog, 29 Aug07, online athttp://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/

55 Paragraphs 23-27 draw on Maj Gen Shaw’sunpublished lecture “Basra 2007: theRequirements of a Modern Major General”delivered to All Souls’ College, Oxford, on12 Nov 08, and on a lengthy interviewwith Shaw’s Chief of Staff (COS), Col Ian

Thomas, 4 Jun 2009.

56 Shaw, op cit.

57 Richard Norton-Taylor, “British Officialshold talks with Mahdi Army”, TheGuardian, 17 Nov 07.

58 Toby Dodge, “If we move in, we have tostay committed” Independent on Sunday,3 May 2009.

59 Binns, interview.

60 Col (now Brig) Andy Bristow, BaOC MentorAug-Dec 2007, interview, 3 Jun 09.

61 As told to the author during his time inBasra, May to Dec 2008.

62 Charles Tripp, “Iraq, the politics of thelocal”, 25 Jan 08, available online athttp://www.opendemocracy.net

63 See, for example, CGS’ letter to the DailyTelegraph, 25 Jun 09.

64 Shaw, op cit.

65 Thomas, interview.

66 Bashall, interview.

67 Shaw, conversation with the author, 24Jun 09.

68 Reidar Visser, “No Longer Supreme: AfterLocal Elections, ISCI becomes a 10 PerCent Party South of Baghdad”, 5 Feb2009, available online atwww.historiae.org

69 Shaw, e-mail to the author, 15 Jul 09.

70 James Hanning, “Deal with Shi’a prisonerleft Basra at mercy of gangs, coloneladmits”, Independent on Sunday, 3 Aug08.

71 Juan Cole, “The United States and Shi’iteReligious Factions in Post-Ba’athist Iraq”,p 554.

72 Bristow, Binns, interviews

73 Hala Jaber, “We will spill British blood,warns Sheikh Ahmad Fartusi”, SundayTimes, 14 Sep 2008.

74 See also Reidar Visser, “Britain in Basra:Past Experiences and Current Challenges,”11 Jul 2006, available online(www.historiae.org).

75 See para 6.

76 David Betz and Andrew Cormack, “Iraq,Afghanistan and British Strategy”, p 324.

77 A view frequently and robustly expressedto the author in his time as CDS’ LO tothe Joint Staff, Sep 06 – Feb 07.

78 Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, speech to RUSI,

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23 Jun 09, available online athttp://www.rusi.org. See also Betz andCormack, ibid, p 328.

79 John A Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with aKnife, p xiv.

80 Thomas, interview.

81 Colonel Patrick Sanders, CO 4 RIFLES,interview, 4 Jun 09.

82 Bristow, interview.

83 In 2000 Zartman was sceptical thathurting stalemates could apply insituations of nationalist resistance“...since breaking down and agreeing tonegotiate are a denial of the very idealsthat inspired resistance in the firstplace…” Basra seems to disprove thatview. “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemateand Beyond”, p 240.

84 Col Rob Rider, COS MND (SE) Aug – Nov2007, interview, 21 May 09.

85 Zartman, Enduring Peace, p 5.

86 Bristow, interview.

87 Rider, Bashall, interviews.

88 Bristow points out that not all saw Wa’iliin that capacity, and that Mohan, as thePM’s man in Basra, certainly didn’t.

89 Bashall, interview.

90 Faleh Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq,pp 65-69.

91 Newton, interview. Sky, op cit, footnote4.

92 Newton, interview. The usual responsewas “Because then you know where theyare.”

93 Newton, interview.

94 Lamb, interview.

95 Bristow, interview, though there are alsosuggestions that Mohan was informallybriefed earlier.

96 Cynics would say that there was littleneed to incorporate the JAM into theBasra Police: they were already there.

97 Testimony to the House Committee onForeign Affairs, 8 Apr 08, quoted ThomasShanker, “Iraq’s Military Seen asLagging”, New York Times, 10 Apr 08.

98 Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, “Learning aboutCounter-Insurgency”, p 19.

99 Newton, interview.

100 Christopher Tuck, “Conflict Termination inIraq”, p 21.

101 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p 240.

102 Dannatt, op cit.

103 Burton and Nagl, “Learning as we go”, p 323.

104 Gen David Petraeus, “LearningCounterinsurgency”, p 4.

105 Zartman, Negotiation and ConflctManagement, p 235.

106 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, p 74.

107 Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”, p 24, and Arreguin-Toft, op cit p. 143.

108 Ibid, p 161.

109 Original communiqué of the Ba'ath party,July 1968, quoted Long, op cit, p 70.

110 See para 5. �

Contribute to the Army’s New Capstone Doctrine: ADP Operations in the Land Environment

Do you have an opinion about the British Army’s doctrine and the way that it is developed? Do you wish to contribute to the development of the Army’s new capstone doctrine?

An agile Army continually strives to capture experience and lessons from operations in order to assess andimprove our understanding of both current and future operations. To ensure that the Army’s capstonedoctrine remains accessible, timely and fit for purpose, your input is sought. Your view is sought by theLand Team at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), to inform the development of theArmy’s new higher-level tactical doctrine.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations, the Army’s capstone doctrine was published in 2005.This publication is being superseded by ADP Operations in the Land Environment produced by the LandTeam at DCDC. The new doctrine explains the Army’s approach to operations and is the primary source ofUK higher level tactical doctrine for forces operating in the land environment.

ADP Operations in the Land Environment builds on ADP Land Operations 2005, reflecting experience from recent operations, newjoint doctrine and our understanding of the future character of conflict. It is aimed at Army sub-unit, unit and formationcommanders and their staffs, however it also has utility for both the Royal Marines and the RAF Regiment. It also provides jointstaffs and civilians working in the land environment with an understanding of how the British Army operates.

ADP Operations in the Land Environment is now being taught at ICSC(L) and is being used by the Land Warfare Centre to informthe development of lower-level tactical doctrine. The final version will be published in Jun 10; comment on the 2 Star Trial Draftwill be accepted by the Writing Team up to 30 Mar 10. You can access the 2 Star Trial Draft electronically at the DCDC Teamsite(This can be accessed by searching for DCDC on the RLI Search Engine). along with links to further direction on how tocomment, the Land Team’s contact details and Commander Force Development and Training’s direction on its development.Alternatively, you may comment directly to the Land Team at DCDC by sending an email to ‘DCDC-Land Ops in LE Comment.’

27

The British Army Review Number 148

We Learn fromHistory that WeLearn Nothingfrom History

Brigadier J K Tanner OBECommanded LWCTG(G) and itsField Training Group offspringbefore and during TELIC 1. COSMND(SE) TELIC 3 and 4. Currently SBA, Saudi ArabianNational Guard.

George Bernard Shaw’s remark abouthistory was not intended to highlight itspointlessness; it was to highlight theimportance of learning from history. Andfor an Army that is, ostensibly at least,imbued with a deep notion of its past,one might think that the British Armywas good at learning from it. If this is atruism and one accepts that the BritishArmy is the main repository ofknowledge in dealing with conflict of thetype faced in Iraq then it should, surely,have done better. Well: yes and no. Yes,because the Army should haverecognised what it would be facingbefore it committed forces to theCoalition of the Willing. And no,because, once into the inevitableinsurgency, the British Army was left tocarry the can (but perhaps this issomething else the Army should havelearned from the past). Ultimately, amidany debate about victory and defeat inIraq (not military victory or militarydefeat), it was not only “no way to win awar”, it was no way to start a war.

Iraq is, of course, yesterday’s war as faras the British Army and the UK ingeneral are concerned. But before the OpTELIC medal (with or without clasp)shifts too far along the chest, like thatof Op BANNER, the tale might be told ofthe British Army’s struggle to achieve

success. Because, despite what might bealluded from the introductory paragraph,‘failure’, as far as the British militaryeffort within South East Iraq wasconcerned, is an altogether unfair andunwarranted conclusion given thecircumstances of this six-year war. Itwould be like blaming the British Armyfor the loss of Aden in 1967 or for thepolitical disaster of Suez in 1956.Notwithstanding the impact of the so-called ‘strategic corporal’, there are fargreater forces at play in counter-insurgency than any manner or numberof soldiers can influence in the longterm.

Notwithstanding too the enduringprinciples of counter-insurgency; theycan be intimately understood, butapplying them is often unique to theprevailing circumstances. Ashley Jacksonand Colonel Alex Alderson, while neitherare that specific about Iraq, have bothgone some way to show how tacticallessons cannot fit every situation1. It isthe over-riding principles that prevail,but these must not be taken at facevalue. A glib repetition of the principlethat there must be ‘a clear andachievable political aim’ might beassessed as a principle too far in thecase of Iraq. That it is ‘all about thepolitics’, to quote General Petraeus, andthat “Fighting insurgencies is a long-termproposition”, to quote General Caseybefore him, must put whatever any armycan achieve in a counter-insurgencycampaign into context. So, if fingers areto be pointed at the British Armyregarding Iraq, Multi-National Division

(South East) is not the place to pointthem.

“It is easy to conquer any Arabcountry, but their natural inclination

to rebellion makes it difficult andexpensive for the invader to

maintain his control.”

South East IraqPerhaps the overall outcome in South-East Iraq can be seen at best asambiguous, and certainly persistenttactical successes did not a strategicvictory make. But, given the conditionsfrom the outset, the UK should not haveexpected anything different and, in notappreciating this, the British Army mightbe viewed as culpable as its politicalmasters and other involved governmentdepartments. Once the Iraqi Army hadbeen kicked into touch – as inevitable atthe hands of the original warfightingmembers of the Coalition as nightfollows day – then, without a trulymassive, politically led, all-governmentdepartment effort to secure Iraq’s future,strategic failure was always going to beon the cards. Never mind that slowly andwith some horrendous violence still tocome, security in Iraq has been said tohave improved since the terrible days of2005-2007, strategic failure has been amuch wider matter. The Arab and Muslimworld had been assaulted by an army offoreigners and kufaar and Iraqis did nothave to be in any way ‘extremists’ to beopposed to their occupation by foreigninfidels. Perhaps the first lesson frompast experience that might have beenborne in mind ahead of the invasion of2003 was that provided by Glubb Pasha:

“It is easy to conquer any Arabcountry, but their natural inclinationto rebellion makes it difficult andexpensive for the invader tomaintain his control.”2

But the point of this article is not toramble on about learning from the pastin general; it is to try to learn somethingspecific to the British Army’s experiencein South-East Iraq in the early days ofthe war against the insurgents in thehope that that experience is at least

Iraq Medal (MoD)

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recorded and that something good mightcome of it.

1 Armoured Division PlanningIt is a simple fact that, in training forthe war in Iraq, the 1st ArmouredDivision and its main constituent parts(7 Armoured Brigade, 16 Air AssaultBrigade, 3 Commando Brigade) did not atany stage consider any post-warinsurgency or how to deal with it;indeed, in all the weeks before crossingthe Iraqi border, the very broad area of“post-conflict operations” was barelydiscussed. It was not totally ignoredbecause ‘Phase IV’ was an obviousconcern, but no Coalition plan was everissued during this period and well after.So it was in an entire vacuum that theDivisional Headquarters – a tactical levelheadquarters – conducted what planningit could and under the general beliefthat, once the hurly-burly was done,divisions of civilian aid agents wouldquickly assume all responsibility for theundefined but presumably considerabletasks required. These tasks were, afterall, not military ones and, while theinvading military forces would clearlyhave a lot to do in the business ofstabilisation, it was also generallyassumed that the very grateful people ofIraq, especially the Shi’a in the South,would be benign and happy in theirattitude towards the foreigners now intheir midst.

So – should 1st Armoured Division haveprepared itself better and, indeed,Headquarters 3rd Division, whichfollowed in the early summer of 2003?1st Armoured Division could not. It isvery correct to be enormously impressedby the Division’s preparation and moveto be ready for the ground war, for injust about seven weeks the whole forcehad been transported from the UK andGermany and was ready in its assemblyareas. But the very few weeks precedingthe move had allowed for no more thancomplete dedication to the task oforganising and preparing an army forwarfighting operations. The holding backof the political order until after theChristmas of 2002 prevented anymeaningful reorganisation and training

until the very start of the New Year,despite it being blatantly obvious, giventhe sabre rattling that had been goingon since the summer of 2002 that wewere going to war.

Headquarters 1st Armoured Division hadenough to do in sorting out the force itwas given – for that was also notconfirmed until the New Year – let alonein planning the actual operation. Upuntil the week before Christmas not onlywas the make-up of the brigades vastlydifferent from those committedeventually to operations, but the wholedecision-making process was predicatedon an attack south out of Turkey3. Thesuccesses and failures of the preparationand conduct of the war – of Op TELIC 1 –have been examined in some detail andthe findings published4. But someinformation, which would help furtherexplain the Division’s predicament, ismissing from that analysis. No fullexplanation of what then transpiredpost-war can be considered completewithout this further context.

It was very fortunate that each allocatedbrigade was well up to the tasksimmediately ahead for no sooner hadlower level training begun in earnest inearly January 2003 than vehicles andequipment had to be prepared for thelong move. By the end of the monthcommanders and their staffs were alreadymoving too, removing the chance of anyDivisional integration. There were fewconcerns with operating at brigade leveland below but, while Headquarters 1stArmoured Division was a well worked-upheadquarters, the Air Assault andCommando Brigades had never operatedwithin the Division’s framework and

there were also divisional leveloperations that were extremely rusty.Divisional level transitional operations,such as forward passage of lines, had notbeen practised in the field in years andmovement in the combat zone hadbegun to assume the aura of anadministrative task, so little had it beendone since the end of the Cold War5.

The point of all this is not to finger theDivision for its weaknesses; they wereknown and understood and the brigadelevel and divisional level CPXs (not FTXs)and the small amount of integration withthe US Marines that took place in lateFebruary and early March in the Kuwaitidesert helped to iron out some creases.The point is to demonstrate that, givenwhat the Division faced (and, even ifanyone had read Glubb, the last thing tobe assumed was that the whole thingwould be a walkover), there was simplyno time to think very long about theaftermath, about what to do withBasrah, the Marsh Arabs, the rest of theSouth East or whatever the Brits foundthemselves in possession of. That it wasa walkover6 and that the trulycomplicated stuff of warfighting –getting things in the right place at theright time – was not overly tested, wereblessings. The Divisional Headquartershad the chance to hold just one majorplanning session to consider theperceived aftermath before launching theattack into Iraq and then, as we know,the very rapid collapse of Iraqi forcesmeant that the aftermath descended alltoo rapidly upon the Coalition.

Of course it was too late, even inFebruary 2003 and a month ahead of theattack, to be putting together a concreteplan for stabilisation and for securingIraq’s future. But, late as it might havebeen, opportunities were then missed touse troops already in theatre and fullyembedded in the Division to lead theplanning and preparation forstabilisation operations while the mainDivisional staff effort was focussed onthe Iraqi Army7.

The bulk of Land Warfare CollectiveTraining Group (Germany), including the

Royal Engineers hurry to deploy a bridge from anadvanced ABLE bridgelayer vehicle (MOD)

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CAST team, had deployed with theDivisional Headquarters to run the in-theatre training. Once this wascompleted a number of its officersaugmented the Divisional Staff, such asSO1 CAST, who set up the new and muchneeded Ops Support team. A number ofofficers took the GOC’s TacticalHeadquarters into 1st US MarineDivision’s Forward Headquarters for theattack into the Ramaila Oilfields and theremainder reorganised themselves inKuwait ready to form the UK’s liaisonteam to the surrendered Iraqi Army, oncethat occurred8. Rather ignominiously, allof these troops were ordered home (notby the GOC) at the beginning of April asthe Division sat on the edge of Basrah,in order to train 1st Armoured Division’sreliefs which, subsequently, they werenever asked to do.

Post Invasion IraqJump forward about nine months toDecember 2003. British troops were stillin Iraq but now as part of a coalition offorces in occupation of the south-east ofthe country. The situation had settleddown and was relatively quiet across allfour of the Provinces of Basrah, Maysan,Dhi Qar and Muthanna. 3rd (UK) Divisionhad replaced 1st Armoured that summerand, while the frustrations of thepopulation had boiled over in the heat

and amidst shortages of all essentialservices, the Iraqis in the south-east stillseemed cautiously hopeful that thetemporary occupation by foreign soldierswould lead to better times. By lateDecember Headquarters 3rd Division hadcompleted its handover to HeadquartersMulti-National Division (South East)9, ledby the British but now including another12 nations’ officers, although theAmericans always called MND(SE) “thoseBritish guys” – a remark that wasinvariably unhelpful when constantlysurprised US officers in Baghdad got aDane or a Rumanian or an Aussie on theother end of the telephone. The greaterimpact of this will be described later.Through the second half of 2003 theMain Effort for the South-East had beenthe improvement of essential services; tomove the situation, in a phrase, from‘Fragility to Stability’.

Map - SE Iraq (MoD)

Rioters burn the Ice Factory, Nasiriyah – 2003

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Winter 2009/2010

This seemed to be working, if onlybecause the deteriorating securitysituation in the rest of Iraq was nothappening in the South East. The attack on the Italians in An Nasariyah in November 2003, which left 19 Italiansoldiers and Carabinieri dead, seemed an aberration. So, while considerablemilitary effort was still focussed onessential services, about the same time HQ MND(SE) stood up, Main Effort shifted to Security Sector Reform,the avowed aim being to establish:

the plan had established four enduring,mutually supporting and concurrentLines of Operation: Security, EssentialServices, Economy, Governance. Whilejust one of these – Security – was thedirect responsibility of the military,without the military lead across theboard, the rest would have beenstillborn.

“A sufficiently credible and capableSecurity Sector accountable to thepopulation and working to effectiveand representative provincialgovernments within the MND(SE)AOR to allow Coalition Forces towithdraw.”10

...the plan had established fourenduring, mutually supporting and

concurrent Lines of Operation:Security, Essential Services,

Economy, Governance. While justone of these - Security - was the

direct responsibility of the military,without the military lead across the

board, the rest would have beenstillborn.

Subsequently, Main Effort would shift within four months to enablingtransition of political authority to the Iraqis. All of this was within thecampaign plan which, albeit focussedrather locally on the South-East, was inline with the overall Coalition aim andthe aims of the UK. But it was at mostan operational level plan, worked up by Headquarters 3rd Division, as still no clearly defined strategy existed.Nevertheless, the plan had establishedfour enduring, mutually supporting andconcurrent Lines of Operation: Security,Essential Services, Economy, Governance.While just one of these – Security – wasthe direct responsibility of the military,without the military lead across theboard, the rest would have beenstillborn.

There is a good exposé of what wentwrong and why between Op TELIC 2 and5 in the Army’s published analysiscontained in ‘Stability Operations inIraq’11. Some of its language is perhapssomewhat guarded but it clearlyidentifies the “failure to plan the militaryand non-military Phase IV tasks for Iraqin timely fashion and in sufficient breadthand depth”12 as the prime source of allthe trouble that eventually followed. Theanalysis also clearly absolves 1stArmoured Division of the responsibilityfor this failing.13 There was not only notime afforded for such planning butoutside the military there was also verylittle effort; no concept that a national,cross-government approach was requiredfrom the outset and through to the end.One has to ask why and, if time was theonly problem, why no more time wasallowed? To say that, as a result, “localsupport for and confidence in the

Coalition ebbed”14 is to put it mildly. Thesituation noticeably worsened in SouthEast Iraq from the latter part of Op TELIC3 onwards and the story is well known,but as the dust has settled since thefinal withdrawal of British troops on 31July 2009 – the last of what was left ofMND(SE) – there is arising a tendency topoint the finger of failure at the Britishmilitary effort in Iraq.

General Jack Keane, former Vice-Chief of Staff of the US Army,

declared of the British in Iraq thatthey were “a regular pain in theass”, and maybe he was right...

Winston Churchill said that “Coalitionwarfare is a tale of the reciprocalcomplaints of allies”15 and thedifficulties, especially between the maincomponents of the post-war Coalition,were certainly manifold. It was readilyidentified in MND(SE) that “Suchmultinationality has inherent frictions,difficult enough in a purely militaryoperation but conceivably greatlyexacerbated in the politico-militaryenvironment of counter-insurgency.”16

They have barely been mentioned in theBritish Army’s literature, except in thecase of the perceived difficulties createdby US military NOFORN procedures duringthe war. But never mind the very factthat the US leaders of the Coalition,including those at CFLCC in Baghdad, didnot prepare for Phase IV. US attitudestowards ‘those British guys’ wasinvariably at odds with the situation inthe South East and the way MND(SE) wasdealing with it. General Jack Keane,former Vice-Chief of Staff of the US Army,declared of the British in Iraq that theywere “a regular pain in the ass”17, andmaybe he was right, but next to noattempt was made by CFLCC to properlyunderstand the different conditionsinherent in the southern Provinces.

The Insurgency EmergesNever mind the fact too that, initially,the Americans in the centre and north“wasted a year by usingcounterproductive tactics … inunprofessional ignorance of the basictenets of counter-insurgency warfare”18

Ammo everywhere

Burning Cash

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before they started to ‘get it’ (and get itthey did). There was simply littledialogue. Until certainly into Op TELIC 5not one single senior staff conference,such as for the collected Divisionalchiefs of staff, was called by CJTF-7.Planned staff visits to Baghdad wereinvariably met by blank looks on arrival,with senior American staff absent atother meetings, and attempts to set upeven a weekly conference call on securetelephones all failed.19 Passage ofinformation from CJTF-7 was largelyconfined to a tortuous daily conferencecall comprising lengthy summaries ofthat day’s activities from each Division20

and the daily FRAGO frenzy, requiring HQMND(SE) simply to “concur” or “non-concur”.21

“some Americans in Baghdad …chafed at what they saw as Britain's

failure to grasp the nettle.”

It must be said that CJTF-7 wasbecoming entirely consumed by therising intensity of an insurgency at atime when it was still relatively quiet inthe South. But MND(SE)’s whole pointwas that there already appeared to be aminimum of consideration of thepolitical context of the situation acrossIraq and a poor understanding of thevery different conditions prevailing inthe South. A point was made to Baghdadin the late summer of 2003 that ‘OneSize Does Not Fit All’ and that planningconsiderations in other Provinces mightnot be appropriate to the South. This didnot make MND(SE) easy or particularlycompliant allies, especially whenconcerns were voiced about the impacton the political scene in the South of USmilitary operations elsewhere. A goodexample was HQ MND(SE)’s resistance in

February/March 2004 to the US plan toseize the Shi’a cleric Moqtada Al Sadrbecause, with the Shi’a entirelydominating southern Iraq, his arrestcould seriously destabilise the region.His arrest might or might not haveprevented the subsequent Shi’ainsurgency, but the Americans just didnot engage with MND(SE) (or withMND(Central) for that matter – and theirproblems were becoming acute). Theresult was that “some Americans inBaghdad … chafed at what they saw asBritain’s failure to grasp the nettle.”22

This was bad enough but next to noconsideration was given by the UStowards Britain’s other Coalitionpartners, and their presence also goesalmost entirely unmentioned in thevarious British post-operational reports.It has already been alluded to, but thereaction of CJTF-7 to finding a Rumanianor Lithuanian staff officer on the end ofthe telephone in Basrah was often tohang up. This was not just a minorinconvenience, for J3 Operations inMND(SE) was a Danish lead, and J5 Planswas an Italian lead. There were up to 13nations represented in MND(SE) in 200423

and each had, apart from the Danishbattalion embedded in the Britishbrigade, a very different approach tooperations. None of them, apart from theBritish, had any experience of counter-insurgency operations and only theBritish and the Danes could operateoutside specific, nationally defined,areas of operation. None of them wereinclined to accept direct orders fromwhat they saw as a British Headquarters,whether or not the order had originatedin Baghdad. This implies harsh criticismof other Coalition partners and some –

the Dutch and Italians for instance – had made significant contributions toMND(SE). The point is that all thesedifferences had to be understood andworked with if the Coalition was going to be held together, let alone if anyinsurgency was going to be defeated.The Italians, the lead nation in Dhi Qar

Province, came in for some particularlyhefty criticism, and some of it fromwithin the MND(SE) military hierarchy.Rory Stewart, the CPA deputygovernorate coordinator at the time the‘Sadr insurgency’ erupted in early April2004, has given a particularly criticalaccount of this period.24 His immensefrustrations at apparent lack of Italianwill to engage with the enemy and withHQ MND(SE) for seemingly doing little tosupport him must be well appreciated.But what was never properly factored inwas the enormous political pressure theItalians were under not to have any morefatalities. Great efforts had to be madeto keep the Coalition together at thisstage,25 and with pressure from CJTF-7growing (CPA reports from Dhi Qar wentstraight to Baghdad and, unhelpfully, notto Basrah), MND(SE) pulled together aBritish battlegroup to move against theinsurgents in An Nasariyah. It was notRory Stewart - The Prince of the Marshes

Iraqi Boys - NasiriyahCentaur Tank Iraq (Italian Army)

Japanese Self-Defence Forces Iraq (AustralianArmy)

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required as the Italians, whose pragmaticagreements with local Iraqi leaders hadclearly broken down, went on to theoffensive, and with their Centaurwheeled tanks cleared their way into thecity. It was the first time Italian troopshad fought a battle since the SecondWorld War and the judgement from HQMND(SE) was that “The Italians kept usinformed of their intentions throughoutand in their own measured way appearedto us to deal with the situation effectively… the Italian response, just like ours,must be measured by balancing risk andeffect.”26 Stewart acknowledged sometime later that Dhi Qar Province didactually settle down in the followingyear, although he ascribed this to Iraqiexasperation at Italian efforts ratherthan the effort itself.27

And then there were the Japanese,massively disadvantaged by lack of anyrelevant experience and the constraintsof domestic politics, but neverthelessanxious to work on civil engineering andmedical projects. The battalion from theJapanese Self-Defence Forces, deployedwithin the Dutch area of operations in AlMuthana Province, had over 80% of itstroops fixed to force protection andsupport tasks. But this was probably animprovement on their original plan,which was to hire a private securitycompany to protect their soldiers! TheJapanese might be considered naïve andwere certainly, eventually, daunted bythe task they had taken on. But nonation committed to MND(SE) refused tosoldier, like the Ukrainians in WasitProvince, or simply turned tail for home,as the Spanish did during this period.This is no intended slur on the Spanishmilitary, forced home by domesticpolitics after the appalling attacks by AlQa’ida in Spain in March 2004, but theirdeparture was preceded by seriousplanning at very short notice by MND(SE)to move British troops into the Spanisharea.

No force in history has ever beforecountered an insurgency within such adisparate Coalition. And no counter-insurgency had ever been attemptedwithin the political chasm that prevailedin the Coalition in Iraq and the resultant

lack of overall, let alone correct,strategy. It is difficult to understandwhy, given the knowledge and resourcesof the Coalition, that this could not beachieved. Professor Eliot Cohen’sconclusion is particularly damning:

“From the outset of the Iraq war much ofour difficulty has stemmed not so muchfrom failures to find the right strategy,as from an astounding and depressinginability to implement the strategic andoperational choices we have nominallymade.”28

It might be all very well being critical orotherwise of the tactics used by anyparticular nation but this is as irrelevantas US tactical victories in Vietnam for, asColonel Bob Killebrew, a Vietnam SpecialForces veteran, commented on Iraq: “Ifyou get the strategy wrong and the tacticsright at the start, you can refine thetactics forever but you will still lose thewar.”29

Troop levels in South East Iraq didcontain the insurgency and terrorismthat erupted in April 2004 and thenintensified over the following two years,but MND(SE)’s military leadership couldnot hope to reach its Centre of Gravity –defined as “The support of the majority ofthe people within each Province of [the]AOR”30 – without a fully wound up effortfrom other Government departments andagencies: “Cross-Government team effortsare vital to strategic success”.31 There isno space here to delve into the lack ofBritish cross-Government coordination inthe South East, and the added difficultyand confusion when other Coalitionpartner’s efforts were thrown into thismuddle must be imagined. Tom Rick’s‘Fiasco’ paints a graphic picture from theUS angle and Mark Etherington’s ‘Revolton the Tigris’, albeit from MND(C), shinesa light on this from the Britishperspective, concluding that:

“I believed that our leadershipstructures were flawed on the Britishside, and that what we needed wassomeone capable of satisfactorilycombining diplomatic and militarystrategies.”32

One of the fundamental principles ofcounter-insurgency, re-learnt countlesstimes, is unity of command at thehighest level. It is also outside the scopeof this article to comment on the messthat was the higher leadership of theCoalition Provisional Authority and thedivision between its Director andCommander CJTF-7. But neither wasthere any unity at the lower levels and,while locally, CPA heads and theirmilitary counterparts often did theirutmost to tie their activities together,without a fully integrated approach andunity of political and military command,efforts will founder and fail. The geniuswho physically separated the British ledCPA (South) from HQ MND(SE), theformer in Basrah Palace and the latter inBasrah Airport, should surely stepforward and explain his logic. So, too,should the genius who established thateach governorate would report directlyto Baghdad and not to the regionalmilitary commanders, which furtherhampered proper coordination of effort.When the CPA then folded in June 2004this effectively removed in-countrypolitical direction, contravening perhapsthe most fundamental of the counter-insurgency principles – that civil primacyreigns and the military role issubordinate to it. Had Thompson andKitson and many others taught usnothing?

This was all very well understood withinMND(SE) even in the first half of 2004but, as this article has tried to portrayso far, understanding the situation wasall very well; being able to do somethingparticularly coherent about it wasanother matter. Additionally, thesituation did not seem all that bad andthere was genuine confidence that,certainly as far as the South East wasconcerned (an attitude which might havebeen at least selfish), the delivery of theFour Lines of Operation was stillachievable. For Security this meant a“Secure and stable environmentmaintained by Iraqi security structures”33.The timeframe for the overall goal of anIraq run by Iraqis by July 2004 nowseems, but in hindsight, hopelesslynaïve.

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Moreover, it must be appreciatedthat dealing with the majority of

these threats was not in the gift ofthe military alone, although themilitary alone was increasingly

being held responsible.

It is another unfair judgment to accuseMND(SE) of not preparing for aninsurgency in the South East. In itsCONPLAN, HQ MND(SE) had identified theseven threats it faced and the nineeffects required to overcome them34 and,aside from measures to defeat terrorismand what were somewhat ill-defined‘non-compliant forces’, filled its time tofull measure and more with all its othertasks whilst maintaining the Coalition.Moreover, it must be appreciated thatdealing with the majority of thesethreats was not in the gift of themilitary alone, although the militaryalone was increasingly being heldresponsible. MND(SE) was notcomplacent and in its planning had longrecognised that its Centre of Gravitymeant – and this was unique to theSouth – maintaining the consent of themajority of the Shi’a; “we did not needthem all and could afford to lose thesmall Sunni population in the South East,but we had to have the majority of theShi’a. We had long recognised that ageneral Shi’a insurgency directed againstthe occupying power – us – would makeour position rapidly untenable.”35 Inproviding fertile grounds for aninsurgency, the people are the threat.

Within the paucity of military, politicaland economic resources available, itcould do no more and when the SadrInsurgency bit MND(SE) on the backside,it came as a shock. HQ MND(SE) was atthat time planning for British troopreductions and a withdrawal from someof the Basrah city locations, includingBasrah Palace,36 and clearly did not seethe insurgency coming. Perhaps it shouldhave, but the point here is that MND(SE)was doing its level best to forestall anyinsurgency from developing and thoughtit was succeeding. In many ways it was,but Iraqi expectations ran very high

(‘surely the nation that put a man on themoon can give us electricity’) and theCoalition had failed to meet the overallneed of ‘security’ – security in its verywidest sense: “It had little to do with themilitary situation but made us understandthat the vast majority of common men inIraq, just like anywhere, are driven bysecurity of family and home and wishedto lead their lives free of fear.”37

As it was, the insurgency was not as wasfeared – a large-scale rising of thepeople – but a minority, urbaninsurgency with a military flavour.Feeding off the frustrations of the Shi’aand the masses of unemployed youngmen, many of whom had been soldiers,Moqtadr Al Sadr had an easy audience.But, despite the severity of thesubsequent violence, the insurgents wererelatively easy to defeat militarily andtactical success for MND(SE) was alwaysachievable. It was achieved entirelywithin the principles of countering aninsurgency and force, when it wasapplied (for military force is, of course, akey part of counter-insurgency) wasapplied under the principle of minimumforce. Hereby hung a further dilemma.There are lessons from the past that tellus that the Arab respects force and thatto show weakness is to invite a wholeheap of trouble: “Arabs … areaccustomed to be ruled by the stronghand. Indeed, there is no denying thatthey respect force, and force alone.”38

This quotation from the Britishcommander in Iraq at the time of theShi’a uprising in 1920 is from anotherage and its imperialist arrogance cannotbe denied. But the same lesson wasevident in Iraq in 2004.

In trying to define the potentialinsurgent, MND(SE) was facing myriadgroups amongst the Shi’a and even Shi’atribes that had supported Saddam,having placed their bets on the strongestman. The town of Qal at Salih wasparticularly notorious for its triballawlessness and an incident in February2004 rapidly escalated when local policeand members of the Badr Corpssuspected the British were about to seizetheir weapons. The day long battle that

followed left a number of Iraqis dead,but local leaders were then convincedthe Coalition would punish the town asSaddam would have done, and we wouldhave done in the 1920s, by bombing. In1926 a British officer remarked that:

“These people ... best understand a.303 bullet. The Turk beat them attheir own games [and] they arerather apt to regard our leniencyand straight dealing as a sign ofweakness.”39

Should MND(SE) therefore, inanticipation of an insurgency of somesort, have bombed the living daylightsout of the place? Perhaps the rules ofengagement used in the South East werealso seen as a sign of weakness andthere is certainly a recognisable dilemmabetween employing “firm and timelyaction”40 and using minimum force. Avery real concern arose when theNorwegian contingent commanderrevealed his nation’s very tight RoE tothe newspapers as it was feared thesecould be very easily exploited by any‘non-compliant’ group, as they probablywere in the case of British troops lateron. But MND(SE) was simply and rightlynot in the business of deterrence byfirepower, whatever the consequenceswere a month or so later. This led tofurther battles with Baghdad. The UKhad often to argue to persuade CJTF-7that groups of Iraqis clad in black andarmed to the teeth did not necessarilyconstitute insurgents and could not be‘taken out’ unless they engaged theCoalition first. This reached the limits ofabsurdity when Baghdad sent a team toBasrah, led by a retired British officer, toimpose protection measures on theelectricity power lines being cut down bycriminal gangs. The measures –helicopter gunships that would ‘whack’anyone seen within five kilometres ofthe power lines – ignored the fact thatthe bulk of the population lived alongthem. The suggestion that local tribesshould be encouraged to protect thepower lines, perhaps being paid to do so,was met with derision.

And finally, of course, good intelligence

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would give MND(SE) the answers itrequired. Intelligence drives operationsand this is more important in counter-insurgency than in any other form ofconflict, but quite how an efficient anduniversal intelligence service was goingto be established and in the timeavailable is an unanswered question.Iraqi society, deeply suspicious of itsneighbour after decades of attention bySaddam’s own intelligence services, isvirtually impenetrable by outsiders. Theintense tribalism often encounteredactually helped to deter terrorist acts inthe South East but it made the quest forintelligence almost impossible, certainlyin the short term.

No matter that the HUMINT teams werepoorly resourced as well, if this veryclosed society also views the occupier,no matter how altruistic that occupier’sintentions might be, as merelytemporarily in residence, then a foreign-led counter-insurgency campaign isgoing to stumble and fail. The occupierwill eventually depart, so there is littleto be gained by supporting him.

The Strategic PerspectiveAny criticism of MND(SE)’s effort in itsoccupied territory misses the pointentirely if it does not view the wholestrategic perspective: occupied Iraq wasjust that. To occupy an Arab/Muslimstate by western/infidel troops hasalways and will always invite a shed-loadof trouble. Compound that occupation bynot resourcing stabilisation andreconstruction in any way adequatelyfrom the very beginning leaves themilitary, the very obvious representativesof the occupier, increasingly vulnerable.It is then all too easy to dig into tacticalups and downs, but the solution doesnot and never will lie at this level. Tohave any hope of defeating an insurgentpeople the approach has to be veryspecial and grounded in an underlyingpolitical condition for eventual success.In the British experience only Malayaand Northern Ireland (it is still hoped),and perhaps Cyprus to some extent, haveseen insurgency completely overcomebecause the politics worked. Left to themilitary, the dilemma is unchanged. T E

Lawrence, commenting on his Arabcomrades and their revolt against theTurk, noted the relationship betweeninsurgent and regular soldier:

“… suppose we were (as we mightbe) an influence, an idea, a thingintangible, invulnerable, withoutfront or back, drifting about like agas? Armies were like plants,immobile, firm-rooted, nourishedthrough long stems to the head. Wemight be a vapour, blowing wherewe listed. Our kingdoms lay in eachman’s mind; and as we wantednothing material to live on, so wemight offer nothing material to thekilling. It seemed a regular soldiermight be helpless without a target,owning only what he sat on, andsubjugating only what, by order, hecould poke his rifle at.”41

There can be tactical victories at everystage and even partial strategic success.The occupier might view this as victory,having created a semblance of order butignoring the resulting greater ripples hehas created. Ultimately, might we notlearn from history that there are timeswhen there is no possible way to defeatan insurgency, unless the occupier hasannihilation in mind?

1 Ashley Jackson, British Counter-insurgencyin History: A Useful Precedent?, BAR 139and Col Alex Alderson, Counter-

Insurgency: Learn and Adapt. Can We DoBetter?, BAR 142.

2 Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb,A Soldier With the Arabs, London, 1957, p37. Anyone who has cause to work withArab soldiers, especially Beduin, mustread Glubb’s books.

3 When the ‘mother-of-all-training-conferences’ took place at Herford on 18December 2002 it was attended by 7Armd Bde, 20 Armd Bde and a ‘RearOperations Group’, based on HQ LWCTG(G)and to comprise about three and a halfbattalions. Three days later theconference re-convened, now with 19 Bdein place of 20 Armd Bde. On ChristmasEve planning was halted and by the NewYear the ROG was stood down and 3 CdoBde was in. Then 19 Bde was stood downand 16 Air Assault Bde was included. TheDivision went through more than 80changes to the ORBAT before the forcefinally departed for Kuwait. And, ofcourse, all planning had, until BoxingDay, been focussed on an attack fromTurkey.

4 AC71816: Operations in Iraq – An AnalysisFrom The Land Perspective.

5 Exercise SAIF SARREA II in Oman inSeptember/October 2001 had shown upthese formation level weaknesses andattempts were made, with limitedsuccess, to improve matters procedurallyon Exercise ARRCADE FUSION 2002 andpractically in Poland.

6 Many British soldiers and marines facedfighting locally that was tough andbloody and some company groups andeven battlegroups conducted coordinatedoffensive operations in the couple ofweeks of battle that prevailed. But todescribe this as “significant Iraqiresistance” is drawing the longbow toomuch. The quotation is taken fromOperations in Iraq: First Reflections, DGCCMoD, July 2003, p 11.

7 AC71816, op cit. Much is made of what isperceived as the over-manning of Britishheadquarters, especially that of 1 ArmdDiv. A fairer criticism might have beenthat some of the staff might have beenbetter employed in planning for Phase IV.

8 It is a now forgotten fact that on 16February 2003 the GOC tasked ComdLWCTG(G) with forming a team to take onfaction liaison post warfighting. Thisteam, later called the Divisional LiaisonGroup, had as its main task, liaison withthe surrendered Iraqi Army and wouldcomprise four pairs of Landrovers manned

TE Lawrence (IWM)

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entirely by officers and warrant officersfrom LWCTG(G). Work with US SpecialForces had already begun before the entryof 7 Armd Bde into Basrah, but the DLGwas then stood down and sent home.

9 It is hard to fathom Dr Daniel Marston’sremark in his article in BAR 147 that “therole of MND(SE) divisional HQ was notfully established until TELIC 5” (DanielMarston, “Smug and Complacent?”Operation TELIC: The Need for CriticalAnalysis, BAR 147, p 18). Admittedly, thefounding of the Headquarters was entirelyad hoc. It was ‘set up’ at PJHQ inSeptember 2003 and its established staffconsisted of just three – the COS, GOC’sADC and a clerk – until staff officers fromall contributing nations started to trickleinto Basrah from early December 2003. Ithad managed a three-day ‘training’ periodat PJHQ, attended by about half thenominated British officers and theRomanians, and the majority of theBritish officers attended the OPTAGpackage at Chilwell. During the course ofDecember the HQ MND(SE) staff graduallytook over from the HQ 3 Div staff, thebulk of British officers not arriving untilthe very end of December, when the GOCshanded over. Within the first month HQMND(SE) had produced, largely fromscratch and with no direction fromBaghdad, a full operational plan that,over the highs and lows of the followingcouple of years, stood up to scrutiny. Butas a doctrinal basis for stabilisationoperations and then counter-insurgency,such an ad hoc approach is an absurdity.It was saved by the quality anddedication of many of the officers andsoldiers (many of them ill-qualified) atthe time.

10 MND(SE) CONOPS 01/04 dated 5 February2004.

11 AC71844, Stability Operations in Iraq (OpTELIC 2-5) – An Analysis From a LandPerspective, July 2006.

12 AC71844, op cit, p 2, para 5.

13 While AC71816 states, accurately, that HQ1 Armd Div did not publish its Op Orderfor Phase IV until 21 April 2003, some 15days after Basrah fell, this apparentslowness must be excused. Therequirement did not seem that urgent andany adverse consequences were certainlynot apparent. And, of course, no planswere being distributed from above.

14 AC71844, op cit, p 4, para 10.

15 Quoted in Eliot A Cohen, SupremeCommand: Soldiers, Statesmen andLeadership in Wartime, New York, 2002, p68.

16 Col James Tanner, The British Counter-Insurgency Experience in Iraq,Counter-Insurgency Seminar, JohnsHopkins School of Advanced InternationalStudies (SAIS), Baltimore, December2004.

17 SAIS Seminar, op cit. General Keane hadnot realised a British officer was in theaudience.

18 Ricks, op cit, p 4.

19 This situation did improve markedly lateron and by the time of Op TELIC 8 was amature and informative system. But bythis time British political intent – to pullout of Iraq – was also clear.

20 Except from the Brits! GOC 3rd Divisionstipulated that the summary from HQ 3Div/HQ MND(SE) was never to exceed twominutes in length.

21 Poor passage of information reached anearly nadir on 13 December 2003, the daySaddam Hussein was captured by USForces. HQ MND(SE) discovered thecapture that lunchtime when the Iraqisworking in the cookhouse got suddenlyvery excited as they saw Sky Newsbroadcast the fact. The ‘celebratory firing’of weapons across Basrah that morning,which could so easily have turned tosomething else, was then explained.

22 Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris –The Al Sadr Uprising and the Governing ofIraq, London, 2005, p 96.

23 In February 2004 these were, in additionto the UK: Italy, the Netherlands, Japan,Romania, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, theCzech Republic, Lithuania, New Zealandand Iceland. Soon after, the Australiansarrived.

24 Rory Stewart, Occupational Hazards – MyTime Governing in Iraq, London, 2006.

25 The declared Coalition Strategic Centre ofGravity was defined as “The maintenanceof international support.”

26 COS MND(SE) to CPA Dhi Qar, quoted inStewart, op cit, p 384.

27 The Spectator/Intelligence Squared, TheGreat Iraq Debate, 11 December 2007, atwww.spectator.co.uk.

28 Cohen, op cit.

29 Quoted in Ricks, op cit, p 195.

30 MND(SE) CONOPS, op cit.

31 AC71844, op cit, Para 17.

32 Etherington, op cit, p 117.

33 MND(SE) CONOPS, op cit, Annex E. Theother three Lines of Operation and theirgoals were: Essential Services (“deliveredto acceptable standards”); Economy(“Stable market economy established”);Governance (“Democratic andrepresentative Iraqi national andprovincial government established”).

34 MND(SE) CONOPS, op cit. The threats inFebruary 2004, in no order of priority,were: Terrorism, Criminality,Environmental, Economic, Cultural,Religious and Political. The effectsrequired were: Defeat Terrorism, ForceProtection, Reduce Criminality to anAcceptable Level,Improve/Maintain/Secure EssentialServices, Neutralise Non-CompliantForces, Maintain and Improve Consent,Establish Effective New Iraqi SecurityForces, Secure Environment for PoliticalProgress and Maximise Iraqi Control.

35 Tanner, op cit.

36 Subsequently not handed over to theIraqis until 3 September 2007.

37 Tanner, op cit.

38 Lt Gen Sir Aylmer Haldane, The ArabRising in Mesopotamia, 1920, RUSIJournal, Vol LXVIII, Feb-Nov 1923, p 65.

39 Sqn Ldr CH Keith, quoted in LawrenceJames, Imperial Rearguard – Wars ofEmpire 1919-85, London, 1988, p 77.These were the years of RAF primacy andthe policy of ‘Air Control’ in Iraq andTransjordan in an attempt to provideimperial policing on the cheap.

40 Maj Gen Sir Charles Gwynn, ImperialPolicing, London, 1934, p 15. Theprinciples of ‘imperial policing’ thatGeneral Gwynn identified would berecognisable today but his advocacy ofnipping any insurgency in the bud (henever uses the word “insurgent”) must betaken in the context of the time. Asunderstanding as British and Imperialforces were in the 1920s and 1930s of theuse of minimum force, this was still theage of the punitive expedition.

41 T E Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom,quoted in Malcolm Brown, T E Lawrence inWar and Peace, London, 2005, p 265. �

The Practice ofStrategyPresentation atthe Conferenceon – “TheImportance ofStrategy”Norwegian Defence University College,Oslo, 18 August, 2009

Professor Colin S Gray

What is Strategy? BasicsIf this were a sermon and I had a text asa theme, it would be the followingquotation from the American strategist,Bernard Brodie. He said that:

Strategic thinking, or theory if oneprefers, is nothing if not pragmatic.Strategy is a “how to do it” study, aguide to accomplishing somethingand doing it efficiently… Above all,strategy is a theory for action.1

My current definition asserts thatstrategy is the direction and use made offorce and the threat of force for the endsof policy. There cannot be a correctdefinition. But there can be definitionsthat do what they need to do by way ofspecifying closely what it is that you aretalking about. My definition here refersnarrowly to military strategy, hence thespecification of the instrumentality offorce. This definition easily can berendered more inclusive so that it coversgrand strategy. Put tersely, strategyconnects ends purposefully with means.The classic explanation of the strategicfunction states simply that strategy isabout the relations among ends, ways,

and means. Strategy is the bridge thatshould bind political goals coherently tomilitary (et al) power. Strategy’s productis strategic effect, admittedly a ratheropaque phenomenon.2 Strategic effect ismade manifest in the course of eventsand appears in the form of some measureof control over the enemy. It may bebrute physical control or, much moreoften, it appears as acontrolling/influencing factor overenemy thought and behaviour.

The Practice of TheoryThe only purpose of strategic theory isfor the education of the strategist.Theory has no other value. It may beelegant, even entertaining, and perhapsuseful for those who are immersed inintellectual/cultural history. But, thejustification for strategic theorizing is itseducational utility to the practisingstrategist. So, what do we mean by thepractice of strategy? Commonly it isclaimed, I believe misleadingly, thatwhile one “has a strategy, one doestactics”. Capt. Wayne Hughes, USN,states that

At the most fundamental level, it isaccepted that the strategist directsthe tactician. The mission of everybattle plan is passed from thehigher commander to the lower.There is no more basic precept thanthat, and no principle of war isgiven greater status than theprimacy of the objective. This is notthe same as saying that strategydetermines tactics and the course ofbattle. Strategy and tactics are bestthought of as handmaidens, but ifone must choose, it is probably morecorrect to say that tactics comefirst, because they dictate the limitsof strategy.3

All of which is mainly correct, but, alas,misleading. It is a mistake of largedimension to take the formal hierarchy ofpolicy, strategy, and tactics, tooseriously. In practice one does not justhave a strategy, which is implemented bytactics in pursuit of military objectivesthat somehow miraculously shouldcorrespond to political goals. Instead, in

practice strategy is done by tactics andas tactics, and everything that we rightlyconsider tactical is, basically, strategic inaddition (and effect for purpose). AsAntulio Echevarria has written, ‘all eventsin war have some weight’4 I translatethose words of wisdom to mean that alltactical behaviour has strategic value,and I would add that that weight can benegative, given that our subject musthave the nature of a net consequence.Competition, rivalry, enmity, war andwarfare, are duels.

Complexity and ConfusionIn minds that are competent and honest,strategic theory can only be animportant source of assistance. But,when deployed by the incompetent, thecareless, and the evil-intending,strategic theory is a source of seriousperil. T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) famouslywrote in his war memoir, Seven Pillars ofWisdom, about “the whole house ofwar”.5 He conceived of war as a buildingcomprising strategy, tactics, psychology,and command. This is useful, but notalways readily explained to students. Itis tempting to present a PowerPointedarray of marvellous trinities: policy,strategy, tactics; ends, ways, means; fire,manoeuvre, shock; fear, honour, interest(Thucydides); intellect, wealth,psychology (Kautilya); passion, chance,reason (Clausewitz) – and so on. But,nothing in practice about our subject isquite as simple as an elegant briefingcan make it appear. Yes, policy islogically superior to strategy, as strategyis to practice. But, each is meaninglesswithout the others. They are trulyinterdependent, and more. The Germanand French languages are wonderfullyindecisive about politics and policy. OurEnglish usage, which distinguishesclearly between the two, is actuallymisleading. In principle, politicsproduces policy, but the “policy process”is both continuous and inherentlypolitical. It is a serious mistake tobelieve that policy begins when politicsconcludes. Similarly, if actually morepoignantly, surely nothing could beclearer than the distinctions betweenpolicy and strategy, and betweenstrategy and tactics? Strategy is the

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agency for policy, while tactics is theagency for strategy. QED: quod eratdemonstrandum. But, but, just as policycannot be viable without ongoingpolitical enablers, so it cannot be madesensibly except with the most carefulreference to strategic feasibility. Can it be done by strategy? And, strategycannot answer that vital question exceptby interrogating tactics. Can the troops,will the troops be willing to, do it? It isimportant to distinguish purpose frommethods and means. However, the threeought to be a trinity, that is 1 in 3 and 3 in 1. Clarity in a conceptual (vertical)hierarchy is prone to mislead the unwary.

Difficulty and PossibilitySo many and varied are the impediments to good strategicperformance that it can be something of a mystery why strategists sometimessucceed. I can suggest that there are at least three major reasons why thepurposeful practice of strategy ispossible, why sometimes it succeeds.

First, the very complexity of thestrategist’s domain, the sheer variety of factors that interact to generatestrategic performance, paradoxically is a great help, as well as a hindrance, to high quality strategic outcomes. Why? Because complexity and varietytend to allow for fungibility, forcompensation, for substitution withwork-arounds. And there is usually meritin mass. One reason why navies havebeen highly vulnerable in recent times is because their major combatant unitshave been very few in number. You mighthave a 600-ship fleet, say, but how manyfleet aircraft carriers are there? It is hardto lose air superiority in an afternoon or to suffer irreversible defeat on land in a matter of hours. Of course, it can be done, if you try hard enough. But, air and land warfare in modern historygenerally have been attritional, becauseof the resilience of numbers. Decisivevictory has been difficult to achieve, but by the same token decisive defeat is not usually readily conceded.

Second, to the safety (imperfect, Iadmit) in complexity, I must add the

security that resides in the nature ofcompetition and warfare as a duel. Theenemy, who usually is the greatestsource of difficulty for the strategist,also is the largest source of assistance.His errors and the friction that mustafflict him provide my opportunity.

Third, to succeed as a strategist it isfortunate that I do not need to beexcellent, or even competent necessarily,though I do have to be lucky – Napoleonwas right, on this matter at least. Manyan incompetent strategist has beenrescued by a wise policymaker, goodenough subordinates, outstandingfighting power on the part of his troops,and – to repeat – by the follies of theenemy and the fall of the iron dice ofwar in his favour.

Genius and Talent: The StrategistAlthough we refer casually to “thestrategist!”, in fact the label can, andprobably should, cover an inclusive jobdescription. If you like the biblicaladmonition: “by their deeds shall ye knowthem,” what are the deeds of thestrategist? Let me suggest what thestrategist must do if he is to “do”strategy. The strategist must:

(a) conceptualize for the overallmatching of ends, ways, and means;

(b) plan how to translate the highoverall concept into attainableadvantage;

(c) command both the continuousprocess of adaptive planning and theactual “doing” of the plan in actionby, and in support of, the troops;

(d) and both items (b) and (c) require acommand performance that needsleadership.

If you prefer a much narrower identityfor the strategist, that is your choice.But, I am taking my cue from the factthat strategy is a pragmatic endeavourand that it has to be done, or it isnothing.

An American classical scholar onceobserved that the Roman Republictypically was blessed with generals whowere only talented.6 He noted that JuliusCaesar was a rare exception: he was agenius who thought strategically. Ishould hasten to add that it is notsufficient only to think strategically,unusual though that may be. Rather is ithelpful if you are able to think bothcreatively and soundly, strategically. Itis, perhaps, a source of some relief torecognize that few countries, and then

Eastern Island, then the site of Midway’s airfield,is in the foreground. Sand Island, location ofmost other base facilities, is across the entrancechannel. (US Navy)

Scene on board USS Yorktown (CV-5), shortlyafter she was hit by three Japanese bombs on 4June 1942. (US Navy)

Churchill (National Archives)

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hardly ever, truly have need of militarystrategic genius. Talent typically is goodenough. And talent can be helped bysome formal education, whereas geniusis apt to be more damaged than assistedby attempts at improving instruction.7

For once, history (which is to sayhistorians) is firm in the opinion thatgenius has a downside as well as anupside. People with great gifts and

competencies, tend also to have greatdeficiencies. Genius can be hard to livewith, even if it may save the country.Military genius can even lead you todisaster. For a modest example of thedistinction, I could argue that whereasEisenhower and Montgomery certainlyhad talent, Patton was a genius.Churchill too had genius, for good andill. Professional military education canimprove those with talent to fit thembetter for high command, but there is alimit to what can be taught. To expressit brutally, you cannot put in what Godleft out. It is useful to ask the question,what makes a strategist? The answer, Isuggest, is the following: the strategistis the product of

(1) nature/biology; (2) psychology/personality; (3) opportunity and experience; (4) education (formal).

I am sure that many an Alexander-the-Great “might have been” lurksunder-tested and hence unrevealed inthe pages of history. Fabulous generalswhose skills in strategy their country didnot need when they were ready and ableto perform. Occasionally, I run across atrue strategic talent that is wastedbecause it is wearing the uniform of acountry that does not need that talentto be exercised.

ConclusionAs a social scientist I am generically lesschallenged by theory than are most ofmy historian friends, but I have my skillbiases, as do they. I subscribe to thetheory of “historical permanence”, toquote Eliot Cohen.8 This is to say that Ibelieve the strategy function to beeternal and universal and inescapable.Also, I believe that there are no newimportant ideas about statecraft, war,and warfare. The details are alwayschanging. Some scholars whom I respectargue that a large change in war’scharacter can mean a change in war’snature.9 I do not subscribe to this belief.I think that there is but one general

theory of strategy, covering all periodsand characters of conflict. But I believealso that mastery of this general theoryof strategy is a tool so to educate thepractising strategist that he can copewith the challenges for the strategy heneeds for today, whenever that is.

1 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (NewYork: Macmillan, 1973), p.452.

2 Strategic effect and the otherconcepts employed in this paper aredeveloped in detail at length in mybook, The Strategy Bridge: Theory forPractice (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, forthcoming).

3 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., ‘The Strategy-Tactics Relationship’, in Colin S. Grayand Roger W. Barnett, eds., Seapowerand Strategy (Annapolis, MD: NavalInstitute Press, 1989), p. 47.

4 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “DynamicInter-Dimensionality: A Revolution inMilitary Affairs”, Joint Force Quarterly,No. 15 (Spring 1997), p.36.

5 T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom:A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books,1991), pp. 191-2.

6 F.E. Adcock, The Roman Art of War Underthe Republic: Martin Classical Lectures,Vol. VIII (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1940), p. 124.

7 I explore this subject at length inSchools for Strategy: Educating Strategistsfor the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA:Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, forthcoming).

8 Eliot A. Cohen, “The Historical Mindand Military Strategy”, Orbis, Vol. 49,No. 4 (Fall 2005), pp. 575-88.

9 For the leading example, Antulio J.Echevarria II, Clausewitz andContemporary War (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2007), p.56. BothEchevarria and Clausewitz claim thatwar’s nature, as well as its character,is dynamic. With no littletrepidation, I persist in believingthat they are unwise in theirjudgment. �

General George Patton (USMA)

General Dwight Eisenhower giving orders toAmerican paratroopers in England 1944 June.(Prints and Photographs Division, Library ofCongress)

HM King George VI visiting the headquarters ofthe Commander of the 21st Army Group, FieldMarshal Sir Bernard Montgomery. (IWM)

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We are most grateful to General BarryMcCaffrey for his permission and that ofColonel Michael Meese, Professor andHead of Department of Social Science, USmilitary Academy West Point, to publishthis report. Editor

After ActionReport –General Barry R McCaffreyUSA (Retd)1

VISIT TO KUWAIT ANDAFGHANISTAN – 10-18November 2009December 5, 2009

Memorandum For: Colonel Michael Meese, Professor andHead Dept of Social Sciences

1. Purpose: This memo provides a strategic andoperational assessment of securityoperations in Afghanistan. Be glad toconduct a Faculty Seminar and CadetClass lectures based on this reportduring this spring semester.

2. Context: This report is based on a series ofbriefings at the United States Embassy inKuwait, ARCENT HQS at Camp Arifjan,Kuwait —-and then subsequent fieldtactical observations in Afghanistan(ISAF, Afghan Government officials,UNAMA, USFOR-A, US Embassy Kabul, RC-South Kandahar, RC-East Bagram) at theinvitation of General David Petraeus,Commander, USCENTCOM and GeneralStanley McChrystal, Commander,International Security Assistance Force(ISAF) and US Forces – Afghanistan(USFOR-A).

It was an honor to again assess thecurrent challenges in Afghanistan. Thisreport is based on personal research,data provided in-country during this trip,and first-hand observations gainedduring my many field visits to Pakistan,Kuwait, and Afghanistan during theperiod 2003 forward to the currentsituation.

The conclusions are solely my own as an Adjunct Professor of InternationalAffairs at West Point and should beviewed as an independent civilianacademic contribution to the nationalsecurity debate. No one in CENTCOM orthe ISAF Command in Afghanistan hasvetted this report.

These observations focus on Afghanistanand the way forward. They do not centeron Pakistan or the US domestic politicalchallenge.

The President’s Afghanistan StrategySpeech at West Point was coherent,logical, and sincere. It was the endresult of a very deliberative andthoughtful analytical review of thesituation in Afghanistan and our severalunpalatable options. It was anappropriate political statement whichdelivered resources to his fieldcommander and explained why theCommander-in-Chief would not downsizeor withdraw—-and face the short termpolitical and military disaster that wouldimmediately ensue.

There is precious little support for theAfghan operation among the Americanpeople. 66% say it is not worth fightingfor. Only 45% of Americans and fewamong his political party approve ofPresident Obama’s handling of the war.This was not a speech on militarystrategy. We are unlikely to achieve ourpolitical and military goals in 18 months.This will inevitably become a three toten year strategy to build a viableAfghan state with their own securityforce that can allow us to withdraw. Itmay well cost us an additional $300billion and we are likely to sufferthousands more US casualties.

One of the most important concerns ofAmerican national security policy in theshort run is arguably the stability ofPakistan. Pakistan is four nations underone weak federal government. Only thePakistani Army is a load bearingbureaucracy. The Pak Army is disciplined,under-resourced, and courageous. ThePak Army is also the Frontier Corps, theIntelligence Service (ISI), and the mostrespected and trusted institution in thecountry. They are also the guardians ofPakistan’s 70-90 nuclear weapons. Theyhave only tenuous control over much ofthe country.

We are very vulnerable in ourAfghanistan operation. 90% of ourAfghanistan logistics comes through the Port of Karachi and runs a dangerousthousand miles of wild country on “jingle trucks” headed to the Bagram or Kandahar Logistics Bases. Pakistanisuccess in maintaining internal stabilityand economic growth is vital to ourcontinued operations in Afghanistan. The present Zadari government and theeconomy are tottering on the edge. The Pakistani Army is fighting their own Taliban for the future of the nation.It is not clear if Pakistan will regress to fundamentalism or become a modern,unified state. There is little questionthat Pakistan offers de facto securesanctuary in both Baluchistan and theFATA regions to the Quetta Shura and the Hekmatyar Taliban factions.

MG McCaffrey - Comd 24 Inf Div, Desert Storm

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3. General: Afghanistan and her 28 million peopleare trying to build the basic elements ofa civil and Islamic society whiletraumatized by 35 years of cruel violenceand chaos. The country is a giant andbeautiful land of great contrasts. Thenatural leadership of the tribes has beenslaughtered (one million murdered) ordriven into exile (three million) first bythe Soviets during their terrible invasionand repression of the people—-then bythe Taliban as an antidote to clanresistance to their unwelcome andpoisonous rule.

The Afghans are such impressive, devout,generous, and energetic people. Theyhave an acute sense of humor in the faceof relentless misery and adversity. Theyare superb, courageous soldiers andenergetic, creative businessmen. Theyhave deep respect for learning andteachers—-and a thirst and gratitude foreducation and knowledge even at themost elemental level. They are intenselyfocused as students at any age and quickto learn and adapt.

4. The Military Situation — TheBottom Line: The Taliban believe they are winning.The Afghan people do not know who willprevail—-their government or theTaliban. The populations particularly thePashtun are hedging their bets. MostAfghans are also dismayed at theinjustice and corruption of thegovernment (in particular the ANP)compared to the more disciplined andIslamic Taliban. Taliban open internetcommunications among themselves andtheir propaganda to the Afghan peopletake into account their slogan that “theWest has the clocks…but the Talibanhave the time.”

The Taliban think they have the moralhigh ground. They are richly funded withdrug money. They are well equipped andheavily armed. They have perfectedmassive anti-armor IEDs. They are goodat rapid and effective informationoperations. They deal in recent monthswith the Afghan people in a carefulmanner to avoid the cruel images of

their past oppression.

The Taliban now have a serious presencein 160 Districts of 364—- up from 30Districts in 2003. They have a ShadowGovernment at Province level and mostDistricts throughout the country.Insurgent attacks have increased 60% inless than a year. In July alone theyemployed 828 IED attacks againstfriendly forces. We should expect 5,700IED attacks in total by year’s end 2009.We must guard against tactical arroganceby US and Allied ground combat forces.

Twice in recent months we have seenbattalion sized units of Taliban fightersconduct highly successful (not-withstanding catastrophic losses by theattacking insurgents) complex attacksemploying surprise, reconnaissance, firesupport, maneuver, and enormouscourage in an attempt to over runisolated US units. This is not Iraq. TheseTaliban have a political objective toknock NATO out of the war —-backed upby ferocious combat capabilities. Wemust ensure that ISAF forces follow thetactical basics of: fire support to alwaysinclude supporting artillery, intelligenceoversight, OP/LPs for early warning,adequate reserves, and operate withappropriate tactical mass against thesevery clever enemy fighters. Only theincredible small unit leadership, fightingskill, and valor of these two small USArmy units —-which suffered very highcasualties at Wanat and COP Keating —-prevented a humiliating disaster.

US, Allied and ANA (Army)/ANP (Police)casualties have gone up dramatically.(The ANP take the overwhelmingpreponderance of the losses. Apparentlythe Taliban take them very seriously as apotential threat to their night control ofvillages.) As of 25 November UScasualties are 922 killed and 4565wounded. (Eight + battalions killed orwounded). During the expected Talibanand ISAF simultaneous springoffensives—- we may well encounterISAF casualty rates of 300-500 a month.

ISAF is reinforcing just in time to rescuethe deteriorating tactical situation.

Currently 42 nations provide 35,000 Non-US NATO troops (many with severe ROEconstraints or military competenceissues). The current US force level of68,000 troops will increase per order ofPresident Obama on 2 December by asmany as 33,000 additional troops. TheAllies may well provide an additional7000+ reinforcements. However, only thecourageous Brits will have both robustROE and an aggressive ground-air-logistics-SOF combat capability. TheCanadians and the Dutch will withdraw.The political support in Germany for theirBundeswehr (extremely weak capabilitiesbecause of very restrictive ROE) is on theverge of collapse. The French areextremely capable but in the field insmall numbers.

The Afghan National Army is a growingsuccess story. All five Maneuver CorpsHeadquarters have been fielded alongwith 14 of 19 Brigade Headquarters, and82 of the 132 authorized ground combatbattalions. (Kandaks). 46 of thesebattalions are rated as capable ofindependent operations. Plans are totake the ANA from 90,000 to 240,000 by2013.

One of our most capable combat leadersUS Army LTG Bill Caldwell has beenrecently given the task of building theANA and ANP Afghan security force. Hehas already been assigned two USbrigade training teams from the 82ndAbn Division and the 48th BCT of the GANG. He will now command all NATOTraining establishment forces. As theunits graduate from institutional trainingand deploy to the Regional Commands tooperate—they will then fall under ISAFoperational command. More trainers willsoon follow from elite US and NATOunits.

The Afghan National Police ANP (now92,000 officers) are a work in progress.They are six years behind the ANA indevelopment. The police are badlyequipped, corrupt (7,300 fired in lasttwo years), and untrained (64 of 365Police Districts have gone throughtraining.) The US Department of Defensewill now take total charge of this

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program from State Department. It willtake a decade to create an AfghanNational Police Force with adequateintegrity which can operate at villagelevel in a competent manner. It will alsorequire 1000 trained and protectedjudges—- and a competent force ofprosecutors and defense lawyers. Finally,we must create a correction system sothat convicted prisoners can beincarcerated in a humane manner.

We have now mostly fixed thedisorganized NATO/US/Afghan militarycommand and control system. Thankfully,Secretary Gates, Generals Dave Petraeusat CENTCOM and General Stan McChrystalthe ISAF Commander (with the deftpolitical-military support of US AdmiralJim Stavridis the NATO Supreme AlliedCommander in Europe) have unscrewedthis mess. We now have a unifyingtheater strategic ISAF headquarterscommanded by General McChrystal. Thenext level of control is the tactical-operational direction and coordination ofall allied and Afghan forces in all fourRegional Commands which is now in thehands of the very experienced US combatleader LTG Dave Rodriguez with the NATO(IJC) Intermediate Joint Command.Petraeus and McChrystal are the mosteffective counter-insurgency strategistsand counter-terrorist fighters we haveproduced in nine years of war.

We now have finally rationalized andmade coherent US and NATO airpower inAfghanistan. This war would beimmediately unsustainable without themassive employment of US Air Force,Navy (Carrier Battle Group dedicated onstation in the Indian Ocean), Marine,and Army aviation power:

The air power numbers are huge: ground

attack (22,931CAS sorties year to date);UAV, ISR, medevac, re-fueling (15,438tanker sorties year to date), andtransport assets (11,984 C17 sorties and31,871 C130 sorties year to date). Nearly100% of troop personnel, ammunition,sensitive items, and armored vehiclesmoved by air. (We flew 2830 MRAP lightarmor vehicles into Afghanistan in lessthan a year. Now flying 7,000 MATVs).Casualties move in and out of the battlezone by air—three days time to returnwounded soldiers to US with a 95%survival rate. Isolated Army, Marine, andSOF units are resupplied with food,water, fuel, building materials, andhumanitarian aid by precision airdropfrom altitudes in excess of 15,000 feetwhich land inside a 100 foot circle with95% precision. Air power is the glue thatholds together the war effort.

Afghanistan and Iraq are an immenselycostly war running in excess of $377million a day in FY10 Constant dollars.(WWII was $622 million per day.). USDefense outlays for 2009 are $657 billion(or 4.6% of GDP…the highest since1992.) In FY 2009 the war inAfghanistan cost $55.9 billion in regularappropriations with an additionalsupplemental of $80.73 billion. ClearlyAfghanistan will run with a burn rate inexcess of $9 billion per month by thesummer of 2010.

American military values which were put at such risk during the Rumsfeldleadership era of Abu Ghraib have nowbeen restored by our senior military andcivilian leadership. My visit to the newBagram Detention Facility wasenormously moving. 500+ detainees.Most are released after 24 months. Theygain 46 lbs in confinement. They learnto read in their native tongue at the 4thgrade level. They are given the option ofalso learning English and almost all do.They receive vocational training andhave access to a distinguished AfghanIslamic scholar. The US prisoncommander is a Texas National Guardfemale Lt Colonel who is a lawyer, an MP,a mother and a grandmother. She meetsunguarded each day with the seniordetainees, sitting cross-legged in a circle

(Shura) to hear their views. The 18thAirborne Corps Military Police BrigadeCommander who has oversight commandof the facility talks to each detainee asthey are released. He is a hard nosedcombat soldier. Invariably he tells me –the detainees thank him and hug himgoodbye.

All three of our superb senior US-NATOdual-hatted combat leaders – GeneralStan McChrystal, LTG Dave Rodriquez,and LTG Bill Caldwell have called uponthe best and the brightest of the militaryservices and the inter-agency operators(FBI, DEA, AID, Border Patrol, etc.) torally to this Afghanistan campaign. Wenow have the absolute best leaders inuniform, the CIA, law enforcement, andState/US AID headed into Afghanistan torun this operation.

5. The Problems Facing 40,000 AfghanVillages: Afghanistan is still in the 14th Century.It is the fifth poorest nation on the faceof the earth. Basic services arerudimentary or non-existent. TheAfghans lack infrastructure, justice,resources and the most basic forms oflocal and national governance. Only 12 %of the land is arable and they facegrossly inadequate potable water, soildegradation, massive deforestation, andsevere overgrazing.

Afghanistan is the second most corruptnation in the world after Somalia. Theiradherence to tribal and Islamic valueshas been shattered by endless civil warand foreign oppression. There is almostno civil or criminal justice. Court trialslast only minutes in many cases and lackjuries. Human rights violations areendemic: extrajudicial killings, officialimpunity, restrictions on freedom of thepress and religion, and severe andwidespread child abuse. The nation’s 34provincial prisons and 203 detentioncenters are appalling. Prisoners areconsistently subject to torture and policefrequently rape female and maledetainees.

Five million children live in desperatepoverty. 70% of the country is illiterate.

General McCaffrey - Aghanistan, Nov 2009

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Unemployment is widespread. 40% of thecountry literally does not know wheretheir next meal will come from. Peoplestarve or freeze to death in the winter.

The lot of women is dismal…87%complain of violence… half of itsexual….60% of marriages are forced.The education level is at four years. Froma Western perspective —-in theconservative rural areas (80% of thenation) —- women are in many casesmerely abused property with lessopportunity than a donkey.

General life expectancy is under 45years. Tuberculosis and drug addictionare widespread. The country is infestedwith 5-7 million land mines which havedisabled more than 200,000 Afghans.

Terrorism and lack of basic physicalsecurity is widespread. The Talibanenforce a parallel system of justiceinvolving hangings, torture, beheadingsand beatings. Criminality and extortionon the nation’s road network isomnipresent. Decades of warfare haveleft property issues in great disorder.

The land is mired in endless bloody civilwar among the Pashtun (42%), the Tajiks(27%), the Uzbeks (9%), the Hazaras(9%), and the many others who speakDari, Pashto, and a polyglot of disparatelanguages. The frontiers withAfghanistan’s six neighbor states areuncertain and divide intensely felt tribaland ethnic affiliations.

6. Afghanistan Now Has Hope: The Afghan nation has an electedPresident —Hamid Karzai —who is:brilliant, well educated, non-violent, apolitically astute deal maker in a nationwhere murder not compromise is thenormal political tool; a man who deeplycares for his people; and who is apersonally courageous Afghan patriotwho is constantly at risk of assassination(several near successfulattempts…probably from the GulbuddinHekmatyar insurgents in the FATA regionof Pakistan.). His popularity with hisown people has fallen dramatically as theTaliban have surged to greater power in

part because of the ineffectiveness of his government.

Karzai is also a national leader in adeeply divided nation who has thelegitimacy that comes from being part of the dominant ethnic group (42% ofthe nation is probably Pashtun) and themost prestigious tribe. President Karzaiis also committed to earning his place in history as a transformer of his nationto a peaceful place in the civilizedworld. He is under enormous personallydestructive and contradictory pressurefrom his Allies, the Afghan people, and US representatives. (Underweight,sick, nervous facial tic.) He is clearlyimperfect. However, there is no evidence I have seen that he ispersonally corrupt in any way. LikePresident Grant following the US CivilWar, he has a collection of ruffians in his inner circle. Some of the ProvincialGovernors are murderous felons. We in the international community have handled him very stupidly and arrogantly at times.

Hamid Karzai is trying to govern the transition of Afghanistan with aleadership cadre which is a mixture ofworld class expatriates (to include thecurrent MOD and MOI and several othercabinet level officials), many politicaland bureaucratic and military leaderswho are courageous and devout butilliterate; and a collection of warlords,thugs, and rascals —-which includesome of his own family (brother AhmedWali Karzai is reputed to be the strawboss of Kandahar and a de facto drugking pin.) —-and also a smattering ofdishonest international contractors.

The overwhelming percentage of124,000+ US and Allied NGO’s andcontractors in Afghanistan (to includeDynCorp whose Board of Directors I amproud to be with) are men and women of integrity, energy, and talent who arethere at great personal sacrifice andperil. They care deeply aboutAfghanistan, they want an adventure,and they need a paycheck. Without them the entire war effort —-and mosteconomic and political development

would grind to an immediate and totalcollapse.

The recent Afghan Presidential electionin this fragile, violent nation (with nohistory of democracy or the rule of law)was deeply flawed. The 30,000+ Talibanare mostly Pashtun. They terrorized thePashtun plurality into not voting.Karzai’s dishonest campaign electoralmachine then manufactured three millionballots to make up for the missingvoters. However, given the realities ofthis troubled nation no one else couldpossibly have won. The US and the UNproposed a runoff Presidential electionwith the number two runner-up Mr.Abdullah (seen as the Tajik candidate).This course-of-action would haveproduced another delayed, murderous,freezing, expensive, and equallyunconvincing political charade.

We (the US, UN, and EU) forced on this primitive country a constitution that has some form of national electionEVERY YEAR EXCEPT THREE until the year2023. Could Florida handle this surfeit of democracy? We do not find manyexamples of operative democracy within 5000 miles of Kabul.

Afghanistan has an elected bi-camerallegislature, a constitution, a growingroad network (90% of the Ring Road iscomplete), and the rudiments of adisciplined and courageous Army.(90,000 troops.) When we enteredAfghanistan on a punitive militaryexpedition following the murder of nearly3000 Americans on “911” —the Afghannation was in a shattered condition.People were living in caves in the rubbleof Kabul. There were nearly noinstitutions left standing except theTaliban. Five million refugees have nowreturned since 2002 demonstrating withtheir presence hope for the future...

The Taliban are politically rejected bynearly the entire non-Pashtunpopulation. Even among the Pashtunthey command polling support of lessthan 6%. The Taliban were the spirituallypure, they held the moral high ground,they dispensed immediate dispute

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resolution, they normally weredisciplined and anti-crime. They were also a malignant virus in this sick society. They were the uneducated,murderous, rural hicks who destroyed the culture and invented a cruel form of Islam not normal to this devout buttolerant society. They were anti-history.They turned Afghanistan into anightmare for women, for other ethnic minorities, and for the ShiaHazaras. They were senselessly cruel and destructive. Only the Soviets were worse.

The Afghan’s are generally extremelygrateful for US and internationalpresence. US/NATO forces have a 60%+favorability rating in the polls. (US pollnumbers are lower in the UK, SouthKorea, Germany and Japan.) All fourrecent Afghan Presidential candidatespublicly endorsed and supported the US presence. However, the Afghans are extremely apprehensive that we will leave again…sinking them back to the chaos of endless civil war.

Social indicators have dramaticallyincreased for the better since the end of the Taliban’s cruel era. Access to basichealth care has rocketed from 8% in2001 to 79%. 83% of the children areimmunized. Child mortality has beenreduced by 25%. TB deaths are down by 50%. Seven million children are inschool to include three million girls —up from one million students and zerogirls during the Taliban rule.

The repression of human communicationand thought during the Taliban has beenreduced dramatically. Eight millionpeople have phones. There are 650 activeprint publications reflecting differingpolitical views. There are 15 televisionnetworks and 55 private radio stations.There are also 150+ private printinghouses and 145 media and filmproduction companies. People andcommerce now move constantly day andnight (albeit at frequent risk of criminalor Taliban attack) across the Afghanfrontiers with their six neighbor states.

The economy is climbing from zero to

rudimentary. The legal economy isgrowing at 10% per year. The Afghanshave rapidly created effective businessesthat do: light manufacturing, crafts,construction, trucking, and roadbuilding. The agricultural system ispainfully trying to repair the damage of 30 years of war and the competitionof opium planting for scarce arable land.The Afghan goal is to feed thepopulation and again become abreadbasket for SW Asia. Educationalinstitutions to include universities and vocational training programs areappearing across the country. Largedeposits of iron, copper, gold, gas, and gemstones are in the initial stages of exploration and exploitation.Hydroelectric power is coming on line.

Violence against the people has been dramatically reduced as the Taliban learned both in Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal areas that theywill have a fatal kinetic encounter withISAF ground combat units if they mass insizable numbers in daylight or dark – ORif discovered by US airpower to includePredator/Reaper armed UAV’s. The deathrate among Afghan civilians is way downsince the new ISAF Commander GeneralMcChrystal instituted extremely soundrestrictive ROE on the employment offirepower in populated areas. FareedZakaria notes that the Afghan death rateis less than a tenth that of Iraqis duringthe terrible civil war violence of 2006.

7. THE DRUG ISSUE – OPIUM:The $3.4 billion opium crop of 7,700metric tons (2008) produces weaponsand supplies for the Taliban and alQaeda, corrupts the police and civilauthorities, diverts land from food (twomillion drug workers) and has addicted asignificant percentage of the population.Left unaddressed — the heroin menacewill defeat our strategic goals in thiscampaign.

Afghanistan is now the most damagednarco-state on the face of the earth.There are at least 920,000 drug userscausing abject misery among widows,orphans, the unemployed, the poor. Anew UN study will soon suggest there

may be as many as two million drugusers.

Afghanistan is the world’s largest grower of opium which is banned underthe 1988 UN Drug Convention to whichit is a signatory. Drug money is a fifth ofthe national GNP. Afghanistan produces93% of the global supply of heroin. Thiscriminal trade funnels $200-400 millioninto the Taliban and the warlords.Increasingly the Afghan criminalenterprises process a larger and largerpercentage of the opium into exportablemorphine or heroin. Production hasoverwhelmed global demand. As muchten thousand tons of stable opium havebeen stockpiled—-enough to providetwo years of the global demand forheroin. (900,000+ US addicts).

Afghan heroin primarily is consumed in neighboring SW Asia nations, Russia,and Western Europe. It causes enormoussuffering and bloodshed. Afghan heroinis estimated to kill more than 10,000people a year in NATO countries…morethan five times the NATO troop lossesfrom combat.

Only in the last 18 months have webegun to seriously address the problem.Secretary Rumsfeld spoke of the issue as one pertaining only to the Europeans.The current notion that we can ignorethe growers as simple farmers trying tosurvive — and focus our counter-drugstrategy only on law enforcement againstthe cartels — is painfully naïve. Thesehuge criminal Afghan heroin operationsif not defeated will corrupt legalgovernance, addict the population,distort the economy, and funnel immense resources to the Taliban and terrorist groups.

The solution is three pronged. First, workon alternative livelihood agriculturalcrops. Second, have the Afghan politicalleadership confront the opium issue asun-Islamic and one that destroys theirculture. Third, destroy the crops. Withoutthe last — nothing will work. Othernations have successfully addressed thedrug issue: Thailand, Pakistan, Bolivia(until Morales), Peru, and to some extent

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Colombia (the traffic moved south tonon-government controlled areas.).

8. SUMMARY: The time for rhetoric and analysis isdone. This operation is now in the handsof the ISAF battalions and SOF elementson the ground. The American people willjudge this on outcomes —-not politicalspin.

There is no inevitability to history. Weare neither the Brits nor the Soviets. Thisis an effort to secure our own nationalsafety and build a stable Afghan state.We can achieve our strategic purposewith determined leadership andAmerican treasure and blood.

The international civilian agency surgewill essentially not happen —-althoughState Department officers, US AID, CIA,DEA, and the FBI will make vitalcontributions. Afghanistan over the next2-3 years will be simply too dangerousfor most civil agencies.

NATO forces are central to our success.They bring resources, politicallegitimacy, and brainpower. With fewexceptions, however, they will notconduct aggressive counter-insurgencyoperations. They will be a huge help withtraining and monitoring the growth andmentoring of the ANA and ANP.

My judgment is that we can achieve ourobjectives in the coming five years:

1st: Create an Afghan security forcethat will operate in defense oftheir people and reduce our ownactive combat role.

2nd: Create governance from thebottom up at District andProvince level that makes the lotof the Afghan people better (andworth supporting the governmentagainst the Taliban).

3rd: Mitigate the corruption of theAfghan transition by having aparallel chain of financialcustody and approval ofresources — until the Afghangovernment is operating unlikean active criminal enterprise.

We now have the most effective andcourageous military forces in our nation’shistory committed to this campaign. The superb leadership from SecretaryGates, Admiral Mike Mullen, General DavePetraeus, and General Stan McChrystal isobjective, experienced, non-political,and determined.

Our focus must now not be on an exitstrategy — but effective execution ofthe political, economic, and militarymeasures required to achieve ourpurpose.

Barry R McCaffrey General USA (Retired)

Adjunct professor of International Affairs Department of Social Sciences

West Point, New York

SOURCES: A. SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS:

1.) General David Petraeus, Commander,United States Central Command(USCENTCOM).

2.) General Stanley McChrystal, CommandingGeneral, International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF) and US Forces – Afghanistan(USFOR-A).

3.) LTG William Caldwell, CommandingGeneral, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.

4.) LTG Jim Dutton (UK), Deputy CommandingGeneral, NATO ISAF Headquarters, Kabul.

5.) MG Mike Scaparotti, Commanding General,ISAF Regional Command (East), CombinedJoint Task Force (CJTF)-82.

6.) MG Dick Formica, Commanding General,Combined Security Transition Command(CSTC)-A.

7.) MG Peter Vangjel, Deputy CommandingGeneral, Third Army/United States ArmyCentral.

8.) MG John Macdonald, Deputy CommandingGeneral, USFOR-A.

9.) RADM Greg Smith, Director of StrategicCommunications, ISAF/USFOR-A.

10.) MG Mike Flynn, Director of Intelligence,CJ2, ISAF.

11.) MG Bill Mayville, ISAF Director ofStrategic Plans and Assessment (CJ3).

12.) MG Nick Carter, (UK), Commander, ISAFRegional Command-South (RC-S).

13.) MG Stephen Mueller, USAF, Director, AirComponent Coordination Element (ACCE),HQ ISAF.

14.) BG Mark Martins, Interim Commander,Task Force 435, US Theater InternmentFacility-Afghanistan.

15.)BG Anne Macdonald, Afghan NationalPolice Development.

16.)BG Ben Hodges, Director of Operations,RC-SOUTH, Kandahar.

17.)BG Guy Walsh, Commander, 451st Wing.

18.)BG John Nicholson, Commander, RC-SOUTH, Camp Leatherneck.

19.)BG Kurt Fuller, Deputy CommandingGeneral – Operations, CJTF-82.

20.)BG Gregory Touhill, USAF, Chief, Office ofMilitary Cooperation – Kuwait.

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21.)BG Thomas Murray, USMC, DeputyCommander, International SecurityAssistance Force, RC-SOUTH.

22.)COL (P) KK Chinn, Deputy CommandingGeneral – Support, CJTF-82.

23.)COL Brian Drinkwine, Commander, 4thBrigade Combat Team, 82nd AirborneDivision.

24.)COL Harry Tunnell, Brigade Commander,5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2ndInfantry Division.

25.)COL Michael Howard, Brigade Commander,4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th InfantryDivision.

26.)COL Eric Kurilla, Commander, RangerRegiment, Camp Alpha, Bagram.

27.)COL Randy Copeland, Task Force-714 J3,Camp Alpha, Bagram.

28.)COL Kimberly Rapacz, Deputy Chief ofStaff, G-3, 335th Signal Command, CampArifjan, Kuwait.

29.)COL Dennis Cahill, Chief, DevelopmentInformation Operations (LOO), CJTF-82,CJ7.

30.)COL Kevin Palgutt, Military Police, SeniorAdvisor to the Minister of Interior.

31.)COL Tom Umberg, CSTC-A (Anti-CorruptionStrategy).

32.)LTC Amy Cook, Commander, Joint TaskForce Lone Star, (Bagram DetentionCenter).

33.)LTC James Coote (UK), DistinguishedService Order (DSO), Military Assistant toCOM RC-SOUTH, ISAF.

B. Intermediate Joint CommandBriefing:

1.) MG Jacques DeChevallier (FR), DeputyCommanding General.

2.) MG Colin Boag (UK), Chief of Staff.

3.) MG Mike Regner, USMC, Chief ofOperations.

4.) BG Alberto Corres (SP), Chief of Staff,Stability Operations.

5.) BG Stephen Bowes (UK), Chief of Staff,Plans and Programs.

6.) RDML (S) Paul Becker, CJ2.

7.) COL Wayne Grigsby, Deputy Chief of Staff.

8.) COL Marty Schweitzer, XO to theCommander.

C. ISAF Strategic Advisory Group:

1.) COL Kevin Owens, Director.

2.) COL Chris Kolenda.

3.) COL Hal Douquet.

4.) CDR Jeff Eggers.

5.) Mr. Greg Ryckman.

D. Afghan Officials:

1.) Abdul Rahim Wardak, Minister of Defense.

2.) Mohamad Hanif Atmar, Minister of Interior.

3.) General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, Chiefof Staff of Afghan National Army.

4.) MG Muhammad Raheem Wardak,Commanding General, 201st Corps,Afghan National Army.

5.) Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Co-Director, Institute forState Effectiveness; former AfghanMinister of Finance.

6.) Shahmahmood Miakhel, former DeputyInterior Minister of Afghanistan.

E. Diplomatic Officials:

1.) Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, USAmbassador to Afghanistan.

2.) Ambassador Deborah Jones, USAmbassador to Kuwait.

3.) Ambassador Frank Ricciardonne, DeputyChief of Mission.

4.) Ambassador Tony Wayne, CoordinatingDirector for Development and EconomicAffairs.

5.) Ambassador Mark Sedwill, UK Ambassadorto the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

6.) Ambassador (Ret.) William Taylor, VicePresident, Peace & Stability Operations,US Institute of Peace.

7.) Core Country Team Brief.

8.) Mr. Robert Watkins, Deputy SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary General,UN Advisory Mission-Afghanistan.

9.) Mr. William Frej, Mission Director, USAgency for International Development(USAID).

10.) Ms. Annie Pforzheimer, PoliticalCounselor, US Embassy, Kabul.

11.) Mr. Mike Spangler, Economic Counselor,US Embassy, Kabul.

F. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS:DEA/FBI/Treasury Briefing – US Embassy,Kabul:

1.) Mr. Jay Fitzpatrick, Assistant RegionalDirector, DEA.

2.) Mr. Bob Jones, FBI Legal Attaché.

3.) Mr. Keith Weiss, DEA.

4.) Mr. Jeff Silk, DEA.

5.) Mr. Kirk Meyer, Afghan Threat Finance Cell.

6.) LTC Joe Myers, USFOR-A LNO.

1 General Barry McCaffery was untilrecently the Director of the WhiteHouse Office of National Drug ControlPolicy. He has also co-chaired theAtlantic Council of the United StatesNATO Counterterrorism WorkingGroup. Prior to confirmation as theNational Drug Policy Director, GeneralMcCaffrey served as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed ForcesSouthern Command coordinatingnational security operations in LatinAmerica. During his military career,he served overseas for thirteen yearsand completed four combat tours. Hecommanded the 24th InfantryDivision (Mech) during the DesertStorm 400-kilometer left hook attackinto Iraq. At retirement from activeduty, he was the most highlydecorated four-star general in theU.S. Army. He twice received theDistinguished Service Cross, thenation’s second highest medal forvalour. He was also awarded twoSilver Stars and received three PurpleHeart medals for wounds sustained incombat. General McCaffrey served asthe assistant to General Colin Powelland supported the Chairman as theJCS advisor to the Secretary of Stateand the U.S. Ambassador to theUnited Nations. �

The GreatGame: The Roleof Intelligencein the Failureof the 1stAfghan War1839 – 1842

Major Brian Elliott

If a power…can command anentrance into India, our tenure ofthis great empire is indeed a feebleone…The country of Afghanistanrather than the fort of Herat is ourfirst defence.’

(Canning)

The development of intelligencenetworks in India influenced thestructuring and processing ofinformation (and intelligence) collectedin Afghanistan. The British intelligencesystems that formed the basis of thosedeployed in Central Asia were developedin the Peninsula and Napoleonic Wars.Throughout this period the use of agentsin disguise behind enemy lines becamecommon place, along with theinterception of enemy dispatches. Thesesystems were allowed to atrophy in theEuropean theatre once Napoleon hadbeen defeated; amongst other things, inEngland there was the perception,highlighted by Ferris, that gentlemen didnot read other gentlemen’s’ mail: ‘Britishintelligence was hampered by a beliefthat gentlemen could not be spies.’ InIndia, the system was in its infancy asthe British tried to develop the systemsthey had used in Europe while exploitingexisting local intelligence networks.

The need for intelligence in India hadbecome apparent early on in the Britishconquest of India. The Mughal Empirehad had a long tradition of politicalintelligence which can be traced back toHindu texts which outline theimportance of spies and informers tostates. This tradition was identified bythe British with both the military andthe East India Company recruiting localstaff to support their informationgathering efforts. The Indian systemrevolved around the exploitation of thesocial and business networks in India’sinformation rich society. Large numbersof the population travelled extensivelybecause of marriage, pilgrimage orbusiness all of which required continuedcommunication between distant townsand villages. Whether this travel was viawheeled transport, horse or boat,whether business or social, there existeda robust means of getting informationover long distances. The challenge forthe British was identifying theappropriate information networkbecause, for example, the various sectors

had their own method of communication.He goes on to cite the differencesbetween merchants, religious officialsand periodic migrants. As a result, theintelligence effort of spies and news-writers focused on gathering together asmuch of this fragmented and disparateinformation and passing it on foranalysis and exploitation.

At the same time the East India Companywas continuing to extend its influenceover the sub-continent, furtheringGovernor General Wellesley’s forwardpolicies. To support this process theredeveloped an efficient system of news-writers and intelligence agents aroundeach of the major residencies at Indiancourts. In addition, the need to fill thepositions of Resident (the officialrepresentative of the Colonial power) andtheir supporting Political Agentsincreased. The posts of Political Agentwere filled by Company men and officersof the British Army. The Political Servicehad been formed in 1820 and wasadministered initially by the Company’sForeign Department. Its early recruits,Morgan suggests, were a very mixed bag.The post of Political Officer appealed tothose bored with life in Indiancantonments, with a taste for adventureand an aptitude for languages.

There were a number of differentlocations where an ‘intelligence officer’might learn his trade; key locations inIndia were at the Residencies of Bombay,Kutch and Ludhiana. These wereperceived as rival schools as the traineepolitical agents came under the influenceof the respective Resident of thatlocation. The outlook from Bombayconcerned the Indus Valley and Persia;those schooled in Bombay generallyfavoured Persia as a buffer againstinterference from Europe. The Residencyat Kutch, under Henry Pottinger, focusedon the western approaches to India;Alexander Burnes, who emerged as a keyPolitical Officer of the period, initiallylearned his trade under Pottinger. Suchearly influence on these political officerswas key in shaping the information theycollected and the decisions that werebased on it.

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Wall painting from the head offices of the BritishEast India Company, 1778 (British Library)

This chromolithograph is taken from plate 48 ofWilliam Simpson's 'India: Ancient and Modern'.Lord Wellesley was Governor-General of Bengalduring the period 1797 to 1805. (British Library).

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To deliver intelligence, a structuredsequence is required to gather theinformation, process it, convert into theappropriate product and pass it on to theuser. Those running the intelligencenetworks in India might have been ableto recognise this type of process as theproduct of the extensive networks beingused across the country. The same couldnot have been said for Afghanistan,despite the number of expeditions andexperience the British had in the region.For that reason the terms informationand intelligence are used inter-changeably here because there is littleevidence of a discrete analysis process;‘interpretation’ might be a moreappropriate term.

Mountstuart Elphinstone had made adiplomatic visit to Afghanistan in 1808during which he was to discover all hecould about the territories west of theIndus. British Army officers were alsoengaged in intelligence work. CaptainGrant was sent to conduct a militaryassessment of Persia in 1809; LieutenantHenry Pottinger and Captain CharlesChristie followed in 1810, also focusingon Persia, but travelling throughAfghanistan. The information from theseexpeditions was collated in order tosupport the plans for the defence ofIndia. In 1812, Macdonald-Kinneirproduced a consolidated report of allsuch data collected in ‘A GeographicalMemoir of the Persian Empire’. Furtherexpeditions followed throughout the1820s, most notably that of WilliamMoorcroft who kept meticulous records ofhis journeys including his view on whichof the Afghan leaders would be mostcompliant to British interests.

One of the more notable PoliticalOfficers, Alexander Burnes, wasdispatched on a mission to Kabul andBokhara in 1832. The aim of this missionwas to establish contact with Kabul andthe Afghan ruler Dost Mohammed. Hewas also tasked with an assessment ofKabul’s defences and local forces, and tomake observations on the KilzilkumDesert en route to Bokhara.Underpinning all this was the perceptionof the Russian threat and the need to

identify possible invasion routes.

Burnes could not have done this withoutlocal, in-country support; in this caseMohan Lal, a Kashmiri who was fluent inseveral languages and experienced withworking with the British. He hadsupported Elphinstone’s 1808 visit toAfghanistan and a previous Burnesexpedition - the ‘eyes and ears’ ofBurnes’ mission to Bokhara. There wereother expeditions to Afghanistan - forexample Leech (Bombay Engineers) andWood (Royal Navy) explored the passesof Hindu Kush for routes practicable forRussian troops. Thus prior to the 1stAnglo-Afghan War, the British hadexperience of operating in Afghanistanand had had the opportunity to gatherintelligence and develop the concept ofusing local networks and contacts for usein the future.

The need for further information onAfghanistan arose out of a request byLord Ellenborough, at this stagePresident of the Board of Control, in1829. With Britain deciding not to go tothe aid of Persia in the Russo-PersianWar of 1826, there was a growingconcern over the extent of Russianinfluence in the region. This led to

Ellenborough asking the Foreign Officefor military, political and commercialinformation about Afghanistan and theCentral Asia states. The perception ofRussia’s role in the region was the keyinfluence in the developments of Britishthought on how best to defend northernIndia. There were a number of schools ofthought which were to play aninfluential role in the way intelligencewas used in the campaign inAfghanistan. The ‘Metcalfe’ school ofthought, which had existed since thetime of Wellesley, proposed that anythreat from the Russians should be facedon the North West Frontier (on the RiverSutlej which had been the boundarybetween British India and the Sikhssince 1809). In 1833 Metcalfe isreported to have stated that anyextension beyond the Indus would leadto ‘embarrassments and wars, expensiveand unprofitable at least, without anyequivalent benefit, if not ruinous anddestructive.’ A development on thistheme was the position of John Malcolm,who set out the ‘forward policy’ arguingthat it was necessary to pre-empt theadvance of Russian influence byexpanding British interest in theintervening areas. This might involvealliances with Afghanistan, Persia,

Dost Mohammed, this lithograph is taken from plate 3 of ‘Afghanistan’ by Lieutenant James Rattray.(British Library)

Iraq or the states in Turkestan forexample. A third school of thoughtrecommended achieving the security of India by investing military effortinto the sub-continent itself; winningthe hearts and minds of the country, in modern parlance. Views of these strategies differed

between London and India. The internalenemy in India (the tribes and various‘princely states’) was not well understoodby those in London, yet the externalenemy (Russia and Persia) took upalmost as much time as theirdeliberations on the threats withinEurope. Palmerston, as Foreign Secretary,saw control of Afghanistan as providinga check on the Persians from the Eastand the Russians from the North.

The British government in London wasconcerned by two key events in CentralAsia in the late 1830s, one Persian, oneRussian. In 1837 the Persians attackedthe city of Herat; the Shah hoped thatthe Heratis would unite with him and hewould lead them against the British inIndia, whose riches they would sharebetween them. There was also Russianintrigue linked to this incident, as aRussian officer – Vitkevich – had beendiscovered on the border with Persia byRawlinson, the political officer in Tehran.The British believed the Russians

were supporting the Shah of Persia’sexpedition to Herat, where they hoped to encourage Kamran Khan (the ruler of Herat) to make a bid for the throneat Kabul.

The second incident is the Russianexpedition to Khiva in 1839. This faileddue to ‘cold, pestilence and famine’without reaching its destination,however, it confirmed the views of theRussophobes in London and India thatthe Russians were prepared to marchthrough Central Asia to threaten India.Operations in Afghanistan were not,therefore, a foregone conclusion, despitethe gathering belief that the threat fromRussia was imminent; evidence wascarefully selected (and edited) in Londonto put before Cabinet to ensure that theposition of the Russophobes was carried.

The decision to take military action inAfghanistan arose out of this continuedfear of Russian activity which convincedAuckland (the Governor General of India)

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Lord Palmerston (GAC)

Country round Cabul 1839 (India Office Records)

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of the need to move from a passive tomore active policy and one of directintervention. It is in these earliest daysthat some of the concerns over the roleof intelligence, or perhaps more correctlyat this stage, information, can beidentified. The first of these was thepolitical decision to back Shah Shujahrather than Dost Mohammed as the rulerin Kabul. This arose out of a number offactors. Firstly it was testament to theinfluence of Wade at Ludhiana in hissupport of Ranjit Singh (the ruler of theSikhs) and their subsequent recognitionof Shah Shujah as the rightful ruler inKabul. Burnes, on the other hand, withconsiderable first hand experience ofAfghanistan, proposed that DostMohammed, the current ruler in Kabul,was the most appropriate leader forAfghanistan and could be trusted to sidewith the British against the Russians.

The results of this debate were in part,the Simla Treaty and subsequent SimlaDeclaration which set out the reasons for the British campaign: to depose Dost Mohammed, replace him withShujah and withdraw British troops oncethis had been achieved. This is the firstfailure of intelligence linked to the warbecause Auckland, Wade and MacNaghten(Secretary to the Secret and PoliticalDepartment in Calcutta and due to bethe Resident in Kabul) believed that the majority of the populations of Kabul and Kandahar would welcomeShujah. This belief may well have arisen, Johnson suggests, becauseBurnes’ correspondence, that had to bepassed via Wade at Ludhiana, was beingdoctored as Wade, an ally of the Sikhs,wished to see Dost Mohammed ousted.

The Army of the Indus which marched on Afghanistan was successful in termsof achieving a military victory. Earlyintelligence reports suggested therewould be a force of 26,000 Baluchopposing the expedition as it camethrough the Bolan Pass; this appears to have been erroneous as most accountssuggest the move was largely unopposed.The diaries of Captain Augustus Abbottsuggest that there was other informationthat the campaign planners might have

considered, yet failed to. Abbott recordsthat on the initial march to Kandahar inMarch 1839, there was no forage in theBolan Pass for the horses and camels,water was scarce in the desert and thatdue to the effect of the environment onthe animals, much of the baggage of theinfantry and cavalry had to beabandoned. The experience of politicalofficers in Afghanistan and thoseworking in the northwest frontierrecorded the environmental conditionson their travels and could have beenreferred to by military planners.Similarly, Abbott notes that by the endof March supplies were running short andrations were reduced for soldiers andanimals and that by the time theyreached Kandahar the cavalry were nearlyunfit for service; he concludes the entrywith ‘fortunately no enemy appeared’.These examples highlight the fact thatthe British were not using theinformation that the political officerswould have gathered and reportedthroughout their expeditions orexploiting the local knowledge of RanjitSingh, Shah Shujah or Burnes who wasdeployed with the Army of the Indus asMacNaghten’s deputy.

These environmental, logistic andsubsequently cultural issues are afrequent theme in correspondence of thetime; an officer of the Queen’s writeswhen on the march from Kandahar toKabul, ‘the first thirty miles across adesert, nearly famished for want of water’

and comments on the ‘shamefulinefficiency of the Commissariat’ whichforced men on to half or quarter rationsfor many days. The same officer reflectsthat since leaving India ‘we have scarcemet with a dozen cultivated fields’.Further lack of appreciation of theterrain, particularly the passes - theBolan and Khyber – which the Army wasto experience, is borne out by the diariesof the officers on the march from Indiainto Afghanistan which note that a ‘fewhundred men judiciously placed on theheights, could have prevented our forcingthe Pass’. Captain Sir RichmondShakespear, a Political Officer of theperiod, noted during his journey fromHerat to Orenburg in 1840 the keyinfluence that religion played in thelives of the Afghan peoples and relatedthe differences with Turkomen peoples;this type of evidence should have beenknown to the chain of command in Kabuland applied appropriately. The lack ofsupport for Shah Shujah amongst theAfghan people is a further example of afailure of intelligence by the British.Burnes, with all his experience of thecountry had consistently suggested thatDost Mohammed would have been a moreappropriate ruler. Abbott notes in hisdiary that everyone is ’surprised at themis-information given us regarding theroads and the resources of this countryand the dispositions of its inhabitantstowards Shah Soojah’.

There were nonetheless, someintelligence successes during the initialinvasion of Afghanistan. Havingoccupied Kandahar, the Army moved on

The Army of the Indus forcing the Bolan Pass,1839. NAM 1971-02-33-481-6

Fighting in the Passes

Ghazni and were able to successfully takethe city due to information from aninformer. This episode is recounted by anumber of publications on the periodincluding Hopkirk who notes that MohanLal made contact with a deserter fromthe fortress, informing the British thatthe Kabul Gate to the city was the leastwell defended. Abbott recounts a similartale in his diaries suggesting thatinformation was received from AbdulReshed Khan, a deserter from the fortressat Ghazni. This was a fortunate turn ofevents for the British as General Sir JohnKeane had left the Army’s siege train atKandahar assuming they would not beneeded – the Army had received reportsthat Ghazni was of no great strength andthe Afghans would not defend it.Through the use of locally sourcedcontacts and Mohan Lal, the Army wasexploiting the same type of system thatexisted in India and the methods thatBurnes had utilised during his travels.Equally, it was clear that by the time theArmy was planning its retreat in 1842that better use was being made of theintelligence that had been gathered.Mackeson writing to Pollack about theroute to Jalalabad suggests that ‘yrcommunications between those places wdbe anything but safe esp along theKhaibar – because our inactivity has givenconfidence to the numerous friends of theBarakhzyais’Throughout the period of this firstBritish expedition into Afghanistan therewas a fundamental lack of understandingof the people and the culture ofAfghanistan, which influenced the way

information and intelligence wasinterpreted. Letters from those inAfghanistan betray the attitude of theArmy to the local people. ‘Truly they area villainous-looking set’ an officer of theQueen’s writes. ‘Any man of whom wouldwhiz you a ball from his matchlock, orstick into your midriff the long knife hewears at his girdle, for the value of yourjacket, if he caught you a mile from thetown unarmed’. Bayly contends thatintelligence from Kabul had, since thetime of Elphinstone’s first expedition,been precarious and not to be reliedupon. Despite this the British continuedto believe their perceptions ofAfghanistan rather than the reports theywere receiving. Rawlinson noted inAugust 1841 from Kandahar that,

‘The feeling against us is daily onthe increase and I apprehend asuccession of disturbances in thispart of the country till the winter.The moolahs [sic] are preachingagainst us from one end of thecountry to the other, and we maynow be said to hold our position bymilitary strength’

This was in part due to the humiliationmeted out to the Afghans by the Britishgarrisons in Afghanistan. It was also dueto the failure to grasp how unpopularthe government of Shah Shujah was withthe majority of the Afghan people. Muchof the opposition manifested itself inreligious terms and Shujah was accusedof heading an infidel government. Thisundercurrent of bad feeling would begin

to show itself through a series ofdisturbances from 1839 to 1841.

In addition it appears that the Britishshowed little regard for the effect thatShujah’s policies were having on thelocal population, economy and politicalstructures. Garrisoning Afghanistan forexample, was expensive and MacNaghtenand his officers had to finance the Armyand their operation. The demands of theArmy had an impact on the Afghaneconomy, pushing up prices; Yapp citesone estimate as five hundred percent. If this caused resistance and attacks on government forces, Shujah enactedreprisals, which often needed Britishsupport. The deterioration of thesituation across Afghanistan saw anexpansion of British influence andcontrol of government structures through the Army and the PoliticalOfficer system, almost a completeshadow government. This led to furtherexamples of the failures of theintelligence process in Afghanistan.

The political officers were remote fromKabul, responsible for their own regions(Jalalabad, Kandahar, Quetta and Ghaznifor example) and developed their ownlocal intelligence networks andadministrative structures. As a resultthey had considerable influence andimportantly, a monopoly of informationwhich they were able to use to furthertheir own policies, uncontested byMacNaghten in Kabul. The culmination ofthis lack of cultural awareness and theeffect of the independence and influenceof the Political Officers came as a resultof the uprisings occurring acrossAfghanistan. The British tried to reformShujah’s Army by disbanding the Afghanfeudal cavalry. This traditional Afghanarmy enabled the tribal chiefs tomaintain patronage over their tribesmen;the creation of the Janbaz (a moredisciplined, readily deployable cavalryformation officered by the British) struckat the heart of traditional Afghan societyby destroying the existing patron-clientsystem and fostered further resentment. In essence, the intelligence process inAfghanistan was outward-looking,focusing on Russia and Persia, not the

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Storming the fort of Ghazni, July 1839 (NAM 1971-02-33-480-4)

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enemy within in Afghanistan. There werenot the networks that had been longestablished in India but the Britishestablished local information networksand were able to gather intelligenceonce they were established in country.Lack of cultural awareness and typicallycolonial attitudes to the local populationmeant that invariably either theintelligence was ignored, or because anyanalysis was being done by the decisionmakers, wrong deductions were made.The intricate politics of the tribal groupswere a closed book.

Intelligence, or the failure of it washowever, not the only factor leading toBritish failings in the first Anglo-Afghanwar. There were other military failings,particularly in logistics. Abbott’s diariesfrequently comment on the logisticproblems brought about by campaigningin Afghanistan. One entry notes,‘Sir John (Keane) declares that he willnot move one mile from Kandahar to thewestwards without four and a half monthssupplies and we have not camels to carryhalf that quantity’

The scarcity of transport made itimpossible for the whole force to moveat once; the 1st Battalion, the 9th JatRegiment recorded on their advance toQuetta, the shortage of rations (whichwas to last for 3 and a half months)would have a severe impact on horsesand camels. The 2nd Battalion atKandahar also highlighted that rationswere scarce and that they had to wait forcrops to ripen. This would of course alsohave an impact on the local economy asthe crops would have been part of thesubsistence needs of the localcommunity, perhaps adding to thefriction. The Army was equallyunprepared for the environment ofAfghanistan, some of which has alreadybeen discussed. The winter of 1839proved particularly challenging whenboth logistic failings and a harsh wintercaused the loss of horses and severeprivation amongst the soldiers. A further cause of the failure of the firstexpedition to Afghanistan might also bespecifically attributed to some of the key personalities involved. Palmerston

for instance was prone to prevarication.This was largely driven by Londonpolitics because as foreign secretary, if a war was fought in Persia, costs wouldfall to London (and greater scrutiny inParliament). Any action in Afghanistanwould fall to the East India Company andattract less Parliamentary attention;hence the prolonged debate over theextent to which a ‘forward policy’ shouldbe employed. For Palmerston theretention of Afghanistan benefitedBritain in Europe. Of course thecontinued debate over which course of action the British should take tosecure the northern frontier of India was influenced by the information andintelligence that was being received inLondon and Bombay and how it wasbeing interpreted by the various factionsinvolved in the debate. MacNaghten andAuckland were also key figures thateventually came to disagree with theintervention in Afghanistan but failed todo anything about it. Both were due tomove to new posts either out ofAfghanistan or away from the Afghanissue and therefore failed to confront thedifficulties the Army was facing. For Yappthe ‘responsibility therefore, for theAfghan disaster rests squarely withAuckland and MacNaughten.’

Burnes should also bear someresponsibility for the ‘Night of the LongKnives’ in November 1841 when theKabul uprising begins. Burnes’ servantsand Mohan Lal had warned him thatthere was a plot against him yet hefailed to heed their advice., Burnes stillbelieved he had the ability to quell anydisturbance; his relationship withMacNaghten however, had been strainedfor some time, perhaps because of thedebate over Dost Mohammed or ShahShujah for the Afghan leadership and hehad begun to refer to himself as ‘a highlypaid idler’ whose advice was neverlistened to by his chief. Davis suggeststhat Burnes had continued to believe anydanger to the British in Afghanistanwould come from the North and that hehad ‘overlooked what was taking placeunder his eyes and at his feet’. Lessons Learned From The 1st Anglo-Afghan War

Following the retreat from Kabul in 1842, Britain abandoned its earlierattempts to implement the ‘forwardpolicy’ through alliances with Persia andAfghanistan; Afghanistan would provetoo troublesome and too expensive tohold. The focus became the ‘internalenemy’ in India and a period of masterlyinactivity (providing influence withoutcommitment) prevailed. From anintelligence perspective, the rightinformation and intelligence wasavailable to the Army and thegovernment structures in Afghanistan.The networks had been established bythe Political Officers but the users failedto understand what the right intelligencewas. This was probably the result of thedecision-makers also being the analystsof the information they were receiving,together with the personalities involvedand their associated personal agendas.

In India the British continued to use the existing traditional systems – thenews writers and spies from their localnetworks. This begins to change in the1840s and 1850s as this useful humanintelligence is replaced by statisticalsurveys, court reports and the localpress. As a result, the successfulintelligence systems operating in Indiaprior to the 1st Afghan War atrophy as a new generation of officers regard thetraditional systems with suspicion. Interms of the development of intelligencestructures, very little is learned from thewar in Afghanistan. In India theintelligence process continues to bedegraded and the British fail to spot thewarnings that might have averted the1857 Mutiny. There are a number ofwider developments in intelligence in the1840s, but it is not clear whether theyare attributable to the lessons from the1st Afghan War. The introduction ofmilitary attachés is one example, theclosure of the Deciphering Branch of theForeign Office another (although theForeign Office does increase itsintelligence handling and processingcapability) and the establishing of theCorps of Guides in 1846, dual roled ascavalry screen and intelligence gatherersare others.

Despite the experience of the first war,Britain continued to underestimate thelocal Afghan population and neglectcultural awareness issues. Morison notesthat the British failed to appreciate theanarchical strength of Pathan fanaticism,a factor that would play a part in thenext adventure into Afghanistan. ‘if thereis a single lesson to be learned from theAfghan war it was that Afghanistan is aland not only of rocks but of men –natural fighters all but unconquerable intheir own valleys’. He goes on to suggestthat Afghanistan and Persia were bothphenomenally difficult campaigninggrounds amidst hostile populations atthe end of long supply lines. Both wereconsiderable barriers to Russianinfluence in India, particularly if theywere strong, independent nations. Goingto war would only weaken them as bufferstates and provide an opportunity for theRussians. This was a lesson the Britishfailed to learn as they would be at waragain in Afghanistan within fifty years.

SummaryIntelligence was a factor in the outcomeof the campaign but it was not key norwas it the only factor. The Army and thePolitical Officers had access tointelligence; it was the way thatintelligence was used (or not) that led tofailures. Equally influential were logisticfailings and a lack of cultural awareness,which could have been addressed byreferring to the reports and utilising theprevious experience of earlier PoliticalOfficers. Prevarication by politicians inLondon over the merits of a ‘forwardpolicy’, the personalities of theindividuals involved and their respectiveinfluence in India and Afghanistan,particularly Auckland and MacNaghten,were to also figure heavily. In this lightthe outcome of the first Anglo-Afghanwar is perhaps not surprising; from anintelligence perspective the British didnot learn from their mistakes, whichultimately lead to them failing to spot

the undercurrents of discontent thatwould culminate in the 1857 Mutiny. Theresult is perhaps appropriatelysummarised by Templar who reflected on‘the impossibility of controlling, by forceof arms alone, a country in which themass of the people are against the“foreigner.”’

BIBLIOGRAPHYBooks

Bayly, CA, Empire & Information.Intelligence gathering and socialcommunication in India, 1780 – 1870(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999).

Ewans, M, Afghanistan. A Short History of itsPeople and Politics (New York: HarperCollins,2002).

Ferris, J, Lord Salisbury, Secret Intelligenceand British Policy toward Russia and CentralAsia 1874 – 1878 in Neilson & McKercher(Eds), Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence inHistory. (Westport: Praeger Publishing, 1992).

Hailes, WL, War Services of the 9th JatRegiment 1803 – 1937. (Uckfield: Naval &Military Press, 1938)

Hopkirk, P, The Great Game. On Secret Servicein High Asia (London: John Murray, 2006).

Johnson, R, Spying for Empire. The Great Gamein Central and South Asia, 1757 – 1947(London: Greenhill Books, 2006).

Macrory, P, Signal Catastrophe. The Story of theDisastrous Retreat from Kabul 1842 (London:Hodder & Stoughton, 1966).

Lowe, C, The Afghan War 1838 – 1842: Fromthe Journal and Correspondence of Major-General Augustus Abbott (London: Bentley &Son, 1879).

Wade, S, Spies in the Empire. Victorian MilitaryIntelligence (London: Anthem Press, 2007).

Yapp, ME, Strategies of British India: Britain,Iran and Afghanistan, 1798 – 1850 (Oxford,1980).

Articles, Periodicals & Other Documents

Alder, GJ, The Key to India? Britain and the

Herat Problem, 1830 – 1863, Part II, MiddleEastern Studies, Vol 10, 1974, pp 287 – 311.

Bayly, CA, Knowing the Country: Empire andInformation in India, Modern Asian Studies,Vol 27, No.1, 1993, pp 3-43.

Biddulph, M, The March from the Indus to theHelmand and Back, 1878, 1879, RUSI JournalVol 24, 1881.

Davis, HWC, The Great Game in Asia (1800 –1844), Raleigh Lecture on History, 10November 1926.

Ferris, JR, Tradition and System, Britishintelligence and the old world order, 1715 –1956.

Fisher, MH, Indirect Rule in the BritishEmpire: The Foundations of the ResidencySystem in India (1764-1858). Modern AsianStudies, Vol 18, No.3, 1984, pp 393 – 428.

Ingram, E, The Defence of British India II, AFurther Examination of the Mission ofMountstuart Elphinstone to Kabul, Journal ofIndian History.

Morgan, G, Myth and Reality in the GreatGame, Asian Affairs, Vol 60, 1973, pp 55 – 63.

Morison, JL, From Alexander Burnes toFrederick Roberts, A Survey of ImperialFrontier Policy, Raleigh Lecture on History, 15 July 1936.

From the Letter of an Officer in the Army ofthe Indus, Assault of Ghuznee, United ServicesJournal, Part I, 1840, pp 145 – 148.

In a Series of Letters, by an Officer of theQueen’s, The Campaign in Afghanistan, LettersI – III, United Services Journal, Part II, 1840,pp 163 – 174.

In a Series of Letters, by an Officer of theQueen’s, The Campaign in Afghanistan, LettersIV – VIII, United Services Journal, Part II,1840, pp 326 – 336.

Shakespear, R, A Personal Narrative of aJourney from Herat to Orenburg, on theCaspian in 1840, Blackwood’s EdinburghMagazine, Vol 51, No 320, June 1842.

Taylor, PJO (Ed), The Army of Retribution:Letters from Peshawar 1842, Journal of theSociety for Army Historical Research, Vol 81,2003, pp 114 – 131.

Joint Warfare Publication 2-00, IntelligenceSupport to Joint Operations, 2nd Edition,March 2003. �

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The British Army Review Number 148

A Governanceand StateBuildingPerspectiveAn extract from Joint DoctrinePublication 3-40 Security andStabilisation: The Military Contribution

Clare Lockhart

Clare Lockhart is a senior Adviser on Governance and state building for the United Nations (UN), NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF). She is co-founder andDirector of the Institute for StateEffectiveness, advising a number ofcountries on their approaches to state-building. Together with Ashraf Ghani,she has written the book:

'Fixing Failed States: a framework forrebuilding a fractured world'.

The Character and Context of Failed Statesand the Impact of Military Intervention;Maximising the Positives and Minimisingthe Negatives.

A stable, sovereign state requireslegitimacy, won and sustained by thetrust of its own citizens in return forfulfilling the legitimate aspirations of

those citizens, and through responsibleinternational behaviour according to agreed rules. A large number of states are now failing to meet this'double compact' to their citizens andneighbours, representing a significantthreat to global security. The ultimateaim of international engagement inthese contexts must be a coherent and integrated process of state-building,through which international and nationalactors seek to enhance state legitimacyand functionality over a long-termtimeframe. It is only through such a process of co-production that a vicious cycle of destructive politics can be transformed into peace andconstructive change.

The counter-insurgency literature, from Galula and Thompson, to the recentU.S. COIN manual (FM 3-24) emphasisesthat the use of force must be part of aprocess of movement towards politicalobjectives, as part of a coherent multi-dimensional effort. A state-buildingapproach, which creates support fromthe population for positive changethrough a reframing of the relationsbetween state, market and citizen, must be central. It is often illegitimateleadership, abuse of power and misuse of resources that results in alienation of segments of the population. Efforts to expand networks of rights andobligations give citizens a stake in the system, rather than outside it, and create widening spheres ofopportunities to underpin peace andstability.

Stabilisation doctrine must provide aclear roadmap for soldiers to understandthe tasks they should be performing,across what timeframes and in whatways, with what resources, and inconcert with which other actors. Theseare not easy challenges, nor are there'generalisable' answers - indeed, a failureto date has been the propensity ofinternational actors to use off-the-shelfsolutions. Furthermore, whileunderstanding of these issues has nowevolved at the strategic level, theinternational community often lacks thetools at the operational level to translate

thinking into practice. That said,analysis of British experience from arange of contexts indicates a number of useful lessons.

First, stabilisation operations mustrecognise that state functions areinterdependent, and that security is only one aspect of state functionalityacross the spectrum of tasks a nationalgovernment must perform. This does notmean that British troops should performmore tasks across a wider variety ofsectors; rather, they should understandthat developing security forces alsorequires understanding the spectrum of functions that underpin andcomplement those services, including a judiciary system, a legal framework, a public finance system and health andeducation services. All functions cannotbe performed simultaneously: the issue is rather to determine which functionsare appropriate to context, at what levelof governance (from village to capital)they should be performed, and how theirperformance should be prioritised andsequenced over time. They must be ableto design an appropriate response to theproblems, understanding which tasksthey, and which others, will beresponsible for, and which tools thedifferent actors will bring to the table.Lastly, they must have the ability to beable to supervise tasks which they aredirectly responsible for.

As the goal of a stabilisation operationis ultimately to return the control of theterritory to a legitimate government,stabilisation operations should be carriedout in such a way as to create andempower legitimate national actorswherever possible, rather than substitutefor those actors. While it is understoodthat the skills base can often be low infragile contexts, it is critical to buildcapacity within national institutions toensure that stability becomessustainable. This requires a long-termapproach - state-building is a 10 to 20year endeavour at a minimum - with acomprehensive mapping of assets at theoutset, and with clear timelines andbenchmarks for the handover ofresponsibilities to the national

Saving Failed States, 2009, OUP, Pbk

government. All local actors are notnecessarily legitimate in the eyes of thepopulation, and so care must be takennot to empower illegitimate actors,without bringing them within aframework of rule of law andaccountability for use of power.

Finally, stabilisation operations shouldrecognise that in the past, aid has notalways been appropriately designed forcontext, and that mere spending ofmoney on thousands of uncoordinated,unsustainable small projects will not winthe population or create stability in thelonger term. Learning is currently takingplace among development actors on howto improve their behaviour andinstruments, including through use oftrust funds, programmatic instrumentsand private sector financing tools.

National programmes which executecritical tasks across state territory are a key component of stabilisationprocesses. In Afghanistan between 2001-

2005, for example, a National Programmefor the Afghan National Army ensured aninstitutional foundation within a law andorder framework, with fair andtransparent recruitment processes; andthe National Solidarity Programmetransferred decision-rights over fundingto locally elected bodies which couldthen identify reconstruction anddevelopment priorities. Support for thistype of programming can enhancestabilisation in such contexts.Ultimately, the key instrument of changeand accountability is the national budgetprocess, and thus the key counterpartsare not western aid agencies, butnational representatives of government,civil society, business and media.

As the result of past experience andforward-thinking, the UK has been betterthan most at developing andimplementing stabilisation processes indifficult contexts. The confidence that aBritish military presence can generate,both within the countries in question,

and among the larger internationalcommunity, is significant. This does not mean, however, that our efforts have always been appropriate orsuccessful, and it is critical that ourthinking evolves as quickly as the threatsand issues that our soldiers face in thefield. This means a movement towardslong-term, coherent, people-centredapproaches, with a clear division oflabour with other stakeholders. It alsonecessitates support for nascent stateinstitutions and capacity buildingwherever possible, and a holistic,programmatic approach that marshalsthe relevant resources and actors behindnational, partner-country objectives. Itis only through thinking of this typethat the UK will be able to withdraw itstroops from these places and leavebehind sustainable state institutionsthat provide for security and stability,which should be the ultimate objectiveat the outset.�

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Beyond the Wire, Sangin (Arabella Dorman)

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The British Army Review Number 148

AchievingUnity ofPurpose inHybrid Conflict– HQ ARRC Capability Experimentation: Part 1

Brigadier Iain Harrison – ChiefJoint Fires and Influence BranchHQ ARRC

This is the first of 2 articles about HQARRC’s operational experimentationthrough 2009. This short articledescribes the underpinning ideas; thesubsequent one – in the next edition ofBAR – will analyse the experiment andseek to draw relevant conclusions for HQARRC’s involvement in operations in ISAFin 2011 and, more widely, for higherlevel multinational HQs of the future.

Based on lessons from current operationsand recent UK and US doctrine, COMARRCdirected that the HQ would experimentwith a number of capability initiativesthrough 2009 – under the banner of“Achieving Unity of Purpose in HybridConflict”. It sought to ensure the HQ’sstructures and processes were optimisedto meet the complex challenges ofcontemporary stabilisation operationswhich need to be conducted in a mannerthat integrates, at worst, unity ofunderstanding and, at best, unity ofaction with civilian partners and thehost nation. To achieve this required 5key changes to the HQ’s thinking andstructure: Influence was placed at theheart of HQ ARRC’s thinking; civilianplanners were embedded across the HQ;the Engineer Branch expanded its remitto incorporate the planning requirementsof Civil Support; the Joint Fires andInfluence Branch increased its

Information Activity capacity; and theTraining (G7) Branch widened its role toinclude Security Force Assistance. Inaddition, a civilian-manned Commander’sInitiative Group (CIG) was formed asintimate command support for COMARRC.These initiatives were developedthroughout 2009, tested on Ex ARRCADEFUSION 2009 in November and debatedduring COMARRC’s annual LandComponency seminar in December 2009;its conclusions will be reported in thenext issue.

Influence at the Heart of the Thinking. Achieving Influence is a contest and iseveryone’s business; all military actionshould be seen for its Influence on keyconflict causes and in shaping theeventual (political) settlement –everything a military force does or sayshas an Influence. We aim to achieve anorchestrated combination of coercion,persuasion and/or reassuranceunderpinned by communication designedto get targets/target audiences to dosomething or believe something or torestore their confidence or sense ofwellbeing. It is all about the message wewant our actions, words and images toconvey; to/through whom we seek toconvey it (using the levers of influence)and how we think it will be interpreted.

The ARRC’s approach to Influence hasdrawn on the model in the UK’s recentJoint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (seeFigure 1) which shows the militaryinfluence tools available to COMARRC in 4 broad areas and assigns one starproponents for each. Given that not allinfluence tools are under COMARRC’simmediate control, some influence mayneed to be achieved indirectly; thisemphasises the importance of anintegrated civil-military effort andstrategic communication. The HQ’splanning process and battle rhythm are the gearing to ensure COMARRC’sdirection and guidance achieves theintended influence. Analysis of superiorcommander’s orders and the operationalenvironment identifies the intendedmessage(s), potential levers of influenceand the best combination of militaryactions and words to achieve desiredoutcomes.

At the heart of the battle rhythm are four boards designed to ensure theInfluence effort is effectively plannedand coordinated:

● The Influence Synchronisation Board (ISB) – chaired by COS or DCOS Ops – synchronises all aspectsof operations, focusing in particular

1

Information

Activities

Public

Affairs

Information

Operations

OPSEC

Fires

Physical

Destruction

Counter

Command Activity

Electronic

Warfare

Manoeuvre

Placing strength

against

identified

vulnerabilities in

time and spaceto gain

advantage

Other

ActivitiesSSR

Infrastructur

e Projects

Support to

Governance

Support to

provision of

basic needs

Ch JFI

Ch JFI DCOS Ops

Ch Engr/Civ Sp

[Ch Trg/SFA]

Military Influence Tools

Target

Audiences

Influence

Influ

ence

Influ

ence

CIMIC

STR

ATC

OM

Targ

etin

g

PSYOPS

Deception

PPP

KLE

SPECAP/CNO

Media Ops

Command Information

Community Relations

Military Influence Tools

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on ensuring there is no gap betweenwhat is being said and what is beingdone.

● The Civil Support Board (CSB) is the principal body for planning andcoordinating the civil support effort.

The Integrated Targeting Board (ITB)plans and coordinates the lethal (kill and capture) and non-lethal (focusedinfluence) targeting effort. And theInformation Effects Board (IEB) plans, coordinates and directs discreteinformation operations and coordinatesthe communication and engagementagenda.

Integrated PlanningThe HQ’s Plans Branches (G5 and G3/5)included an embedded Civilian PlanningElement of 12 specialist civilian planningstaff drawn from the Foreign andCommonwealth Office, Department forInternational Development, StabilisationUnit and US State Department. Workingwithin the Integrated Planning Teams,they brought civilian expertiseimmediately to bear on military plansand also ensured, where possible, thatmilitary planning was synchronised withthe wider civil planning effort. Otherspecialist civilian planners were also

integrated in other branches in the HQ –specifically, within the Engineer and CivilSupport Branch and within the STRATCOMcell within the Joint Fires and InfluenceBranch. With an influence basedapproach, the message that COMARRCwants military operations to convey is at the core of planning. Planning issynchronised through the COS/DCOS Ops-chaired Influence Synchronisation Board.

Engineer and Civil Support (E&CS)Branch. With an expanded remit to provide bothmilitary engineer and civil supportplanning in support of essential services,governance and economic development,the Branch included teams coveringGovernance, Economic Development,Essential Services, Infrastructure andCivil Liaison with NGOs, IOs andHumanitarian Organisations. The Branchwas reinforced by reserve personnel andcontractors with the requisite specialistskills. Chief E&CS chaired the CivilSupport Board.

Joint Fires and Influence (JFI) Branch. As the HQ’s proponent for Joint Fires,Targeting and Information Activity, JFIBfocuses on the lethal and non-lethal firesaspect of influence; close coordination

with the HQ’s assessment staff isessential. Information agility andachieving influence are key and led tonew staff capabilities being exercised,including: a Strategic CommunicationCell, a Counter-Propaganda and Rebuttalfocus, a focus for the military influenceaspects of Reconciliation/Reintegration,and a Key Leader Engagement SupportCell. Chief JFIB chaired the IntegratedTargeting Board (Lethal and Non-Lethaltargets) and Information Effects Board.

Training and Security Force Assistance (Trg/SFA) Branch. The branch is the focus for the HQ’seffort on planning the development ofindigenous security capacity throughpartnering, training and mentoring.Recognising some aspects requireexternal assistance and reach back, theHQ is prepared to define the strategy anddevelop the SFA plan which includespolicy guidance on manning, trainingand equipping indigenous forces as wellas synchronising and integratingoperations at lower levels within thecommand.

Commander’s Initiative Group. The civilian academic initiative groupprovide the commander and HQ withadvice on a broad range of civil-militaryissues and, more specifically, culturaland historic context. They can look and influence beyond tactical andoperational boundaries and also considerthe broader second and third ordereffects over time. A virtual commander’sinitiative group – comprising home-based individuals – expands this networkconsiderably.

Analysis and Conclusions. More considered analysis is underwayfollowing the Land Componency seminarto determine how the momentumestablished through this programme ofexperimentation is sustained –particularly given HQ ARRC’s year-longcommitment to HQ ISAF Jointry andFebruary prior to being circulatedformally in March. The conclusions willalso be published in this journal. �

ARRC Planning Staff

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The British Army Review Number 148

WinningFriends andInfluencingPeople

Colonel Duncan Barley

Experience of contemporary campaigninghas caused more than a degree of flux inthe minds the UK military establishmentas it has struggled to understand thefight it has been in. Now several yearsinto a COIN campaign credible doctrinehas been issued to guide education andtraining but its introduction begins toquestion mindsets and structures forgedin less turbulent times.

A Battle for Minds – Psychology First,Ballistics Second

The title of this article might be a bettermantra for the operations that we areconducting now than ‘clear-hold-build’ or

variations on such a theme. You mightask why? I would argue, with others,that it is the psychological dimension of these operations that is importantalthough less understood in terms of our preparations. If the population is the prize, then the question is not howmany insurgents have been killed buthow many civilians died in the process?Perhaps it has taken us too long to thinkabout the population - their perceptionson what constitutes security anddevelopment - rather than effects on the opposition. Furthermore, our wordsand actions are scrutinized and thenpublicised in a 24 hour globalised newsnetwork empowered by the Internet. In the case of Afghanistan, the Talibanspokesman has equal access to a global population as the UK Helmandspokesman but is less fettered. Criticalaudiences will judge our performance on these sources of information,disinformation and outright propagandathat aims to brainwash the vulnerable.

Our attempts to frame the idea ofinfluencing a population including those who support us, are hostile orsimply ambivalent have led to taking our kinetic capability and providing anantonym. In this binary way, with termssuch as ‘hard and soft’, ‘kinetic and non-kinetic’, ‘lethal and non-lethal’ or even‘fires and influence’, we encourage

oversimplification. We need to frame this subject by viewing the informationenvironment as just as much a part of the battlespace as the physicalenvironment and commanders at alllevels need to plan to operate in bothsimultaneously. Isolating an adversarypsychologically is a skill we and ourallies have found difficult to masteragainst a highly savvy irregular.

Two articles in recent copies of theBritish Army Review reflect on thissubject of ‘influence’: Captain EmileSimpson’s ‘Gaining the InfluenceInitiative: Why Kinetic Operations areCentral to Influence in SouthernAfghanistan’ and Lt Col Mark Wenham’s‘Information Operations – Main Effort orSupporting Effect?’ These articleshighlight the growing pains of theBritish Army as it adjusts to meet the

Photo by Maj Ewan Cameron

An Afghan Child smiles at Members of the OMLTon patrol with the Afghanistan National Army(ANA) around Musa Qaleh in Helmand (Cpl StevenPeacock)

Local people seek to influence 52 Bde’s BRF

Photo by Maj Ewan Cameron

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demands of COIN or any variation onthat theme such as ‘hybrid warfare’ oreven contested state-building. Thestruggle to penetrate the complexity andambiguity of COIN, that is essentially apsychological contest, a battle of ideas,is reflected in the late arrival ofdoctrine. Doctrine is obviously not anend in itself but rather the beginning ofan intellectual journey for the Army anda change in mindset that must start witheducation; whether it is the youngofficer at Sandhurst or soldier atHarrogate. And, as it will be argued later,it has to be investment in life-longeducation. Moreover, as the proof is inaction and not just words and teaching,we need to be structured and resourcedto deliver ‘Influence’ on operations.

What Exactly Do We Mean By Influence?We know and have been told by manypractitioner-theorists that COIN is acontest of perceptions played out in the minds of the many of actors andbystanders. Of course such minds can be influenced by propaganda, images,money and favouritism and byreinforcing prejudice. In terms of a body of knowledge, our latest doctrinecaptures the idea of ‘Influence’ placing itat the very core of our thinking. Suchthinking has been generated bycommanders in the field where there has been much experimentation andinnovation. Essentially, ‘Influence’ is acatch-all term implying that whateveractivity we perform the aim is toinfluence a situation in which theattitudes and behaviour of a myriad ofactors are the objective. At campaignlevel it is an activity that shapes keyconflict relationships moving themtowards a political settlement. It takesthe focus off the enemy and on to thepopulations and communities inquestion: ones in the affected country,its regional neighbours and those of ourown and partner populations. Such amental approach implies ‘we partner andprotect the population in order to harmthe enemy rather than do harm to theenemy and protect the population’. Ofcourse such preferred action impliessufficient forces: that is ‘mass’, but

a subtle change in mindset that seeks to view force through a psychologicallens. This requires an altogethersophisticated approach by relativelyjunior and inexperienced officers who are confronted with combat and themanagement of violence.

Military Influence (that applied in a theatre of operations rather thanstrategic measures from Whitehall) istherefore at the core of the COINbusiness and must be led by thecommander using whatever ‘levers’ he can pull or ‘tools’ at his disposal.Communicating intent and arguing thecounter insurgent’s case, states Kilcullen,must be supported by kinetic and non-kinetic activity such as ‘money as aweapon’ rather than vice versa. Thisimplies that we are savvy at operating inthe information environment whetherthis is traditional word of mouth, a localradio, regional TV or simply throughleaders meeting. Because thisenvironment defies hard boundaries whatwe say in the UK will influence audiencesin theatre.

Taking this idea further, if commandersand their civilian colleagues are to beconvincing communicators they need tounderstand the society in which theyoperate in order to shape both what theysay and also what they do in this battlefor the support of the people. Theinsurgent has the advantage ofunderstanding, access and continuity butalso he can, unrestricted by clearancesand legalities, get his story out first. SoInfluence, in doctrinal terms, impliesthat commanders need to communicateto ‘target audiences’ and synchronisetheir ‘words and deeds’ but also be ‘firstwith the truth’. If there is a disconnectbetween what we say, what we stand for,or our ‘narrative’, and the way we act, orare perceived to act, then we losecredibility in the battle of perceptions.We lose credibility, and then we loseauthority.

The language of Influence draws morefrom the social sciences and commercialmarketing than from bandwidth andballistics and that has implications for

the nature of our military education,careers and mindset. However, at thecoalface of operations, it is a matter ofgetting the balance right, as EmileSimpson is indicating, between usinglethal force and other measures inunison to influence a situation to ouradvantage or at least ‘do no harm’. Thisis a view now institutionalised in ISAF byits new commander. At sub-unit level,however, the junior commander has fewtools in the box other than massinglethal force quickly and that willinevitably affect his mindset.

The Current Understanding andApplication of Influence

In UK military circles it was probably theexperience of 52 Infantry Brigade inHelmand and the thinking and languageused by its commander, BrigadierMackay, which captured the idea ofInfluence. In essence this is the use ofpsychological pressure in a politicallycharged environment with many‘stakeholders’ who have alternative viewsand perhaps conflicting agendas. The useof psychological pressure is not new.British forces in Sierra Leone appliedInformation Operations to great effectduring the early period of ourintervention. Furthermore we alwaysknew that the fundamental character ofthe manoeuvrist approach was to out-manoeuvre opponents mentally and notjust physically. While theory and practiceranging from T E Lawrence to Galula havepointed to information as a weapon, wehave been slow to integrate this ideainto our operational design. IncreasinglyUS and British military commanders havesought to integrate information effect

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and wider military influence (the Britishterm) into their operations although thebureaucratic processes that previouslycontrolled the release of informationtend to remain unwieldy and henceuntimely.

Recent Helmand Task Force commandershave considered themselves as ‘ChiefInfluence’ and have applied, given theirunique circumstances, the general ideaduring their six month tour with someenthusiasm. This declaration hasimplications: it raises the profile of thepreviously niche area of PsychologicalOperations and the slightly broadernotion of Information Operations andassociated Media Operations in terms ofmanaging the ‘word’. It also brings intocore thinking non-kinetic levers such as‘money as a weapon’ and amnesty.

Sometimes such non-kinetic initiativesrun counter intuitive to the militarymind. Moreover, it creates a furtherdilemma, since ‘Influence’ measures maynot yield results within a commander’ssix month tenure. Apart from the issue ofcampaign continuity, it means that theway we organise our formationheadquarters and design their internalprocesses must reflect the new statusgiven to activities previous designated‘operations support’.

Experimentation on operations appearsto have achieved a good balance of staffeffort with formations organised with aChief Fires, Chief Influence, Chief ISTARand no doubt a Chief Military Assistanceto Civil Effect (formally CIMIC). Process-wise J2/ISTAR provides the situationalunderstanding that shapes thecommander’s synchronisation ofactivities; whether the use of force oranother incentive. Important, however,is the ability to deliver the effect on theground and that requires capability. AnInfluence capability requires culturalexperts, educated staff officers, somespecialists and equipment for examplecombat camera and ‘radio in a box’. Iwould ask readers to contrast thelifelong training of CO ‘Guns’ as ChiefFires with that given to a more complexarea dealt to Chief Influence. To shape

the action of these ‘chiefs’ needs a multi-disciplinary team of experts, a ‘prism cell’ rather than just a RedTeam, that views activity through theeyes of others.

It is on the ground, where our troopsreach out to the community, that mostdecisions on the use of force areexecuted by relatively junior officers. Inanother article in this issue of BAR, acommanding officer reflecting on hisexperience suggests that we prepare wellfor kinetic operations but do not thinkpsychologically in terms of their impacton the minds of the population. We arejudged by these contacts, essentiallywhat the locals see and hear, and in thatorder. Consulting a recent Junior Officers’Tactics Course at the Land WarfareCentre, they believed our training isoverly kinetic. Sometimes on operationswe win the fire-fight rather than theperception battle. Perhaps there is stillan attitude of mind that viewsoperations as an enemy-focused testingground for the warrior ethos. Moreover,junior commanders now have directaccess to substantial firepower and theresponsibilities that it attracts. I suspectthat Ross Kemp’s series exemplifies theidea that Afghanistan is a militaryplayground where junior ranks mightprove themselves in a fire-fight. Onemight speculate that military kudos ismeasured in how many scrapes a youngofficer gets into rather than avoids, andthat the weapons he uses indicates theseriousness of the contact.

Undoubtedly, no one wants front lineinfantry to be incapable of aggressionwhen necessary. The warrior ethosremains valid but as General Kiszleywarns in his paper on the ‘post modernwarrior’ that ‘controlling the warriorethos and achieving the right balance inthe right circumstances is one of themost important responsibilities andduties of any military commander at anylevel’. With the emphasis on ‘survivalskills’ in mission specific training it mustalso be remembered that junior officersneed to hone judgemental skills andunderstand the context in which theyuse lethal force. However, this deeper

understanding of the relevance or utilityof force in the contemporary operatingenvironment cannot be left to theatrespecific training. It is a matter ofeducation and this must be engrainedfurther in their psyche in HybridFoundation Training. Arguably, educationprovides understanding for finejudgement and certainly the imaginationneeded today on operations at all levels.Such a sophisticated approach alsorequires company commanders and moresenior officers to set the conditions forthe use of force.

Having learned through bitter experience and drawn heavily on USmilitary thinking, how can we get theideas on Influence entrenched into theinstitutional army therefore into theArmy’s DNA?

Where We Need To GoInfluencing a population requires:

● An understanding of the affected society – the origins ofconflict that will be political andsocial. Understand the role played byneeds, motivations, attitudes, beliefsand aspirations in influencing socialgroups. And this includes thegrievances of the opposition.

● Educated and trained military and civilian practitioners whounderstand the ways and means to influence individuals and social groupings unconstrained by conventional thinking. This opens up a new military lexicon and command ‘style’.

● A capability to influence in the information and physicalenvironments: a means tocommunicate and act with kinetic and non-kinetic ‘levers’.

● An institutional army that is able to deliver the education andtraining that enables an ‘Influence’mindset and creates real experts inthe areas of military assistance tocivil effect and ‘information effect’amongst others.

● I will focus on three areas that

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are currently topical, restrainingcomment to the Army althoughaccepting that information effectsdemand coherence from strategic to tactical levels. After all theseconflicts are by nature ones ofpolitical competition that affect a whole population and regionalneighbours.

● Cultural Understanding and the Role of Intelligence.

There is no question that ISTAR is criticalin avoiding the blind delivery of kineticeffects and associated collateral damage.ISTAR has, not surprisingly, gained a 1*seat at HQLF’s top table and will benurtured as a capability that seeks todeliver situational understanding. WhileISTAR allows us to view the situationthrough our eyes, culturalunderstanding, drawing from the socialsciences and expertise whether academicor from Diaspora, is not as militarilytangible but will provide a perception of deeper motives and attitudes. GeneralLamb summed it up well as ‘warsamongst the people, watched by thepeople, fought for the people, judged bythe people’. There is obviously a limit onhow much cultural immersion can beachieved before a deployment.

Undoubtedly the advent of CulturalAdvisers and cultural awareness shortcourses will help but must not be viewed by the Army as good enough. Thechances are this is the tip of the iceberg:it is not just a matter of understandingwhat motivates a given population butrather how to exert influence as a resultof that knowledge. This can only begained by interaction with an affectedcommunity in which ‘partnering’ withtheir fledgling security forces must offera ‘force multiplier’.

In a similar vein, we know thatintelligence-led operations (as if one would do otherwise) are at the nub of COIN yet our transition from theIntelligence Preparation of theBattlefield to one of ‘the Environment’has been slow. Our understanding of the‘human terrain’ is subject to much

research but seems to lack clear ownership and coherence.Previously understanding the localpeople would have been in the domain of Psychological Operations and target audience analysis drawing on intelligence expertise but now this is core business and a key skill thatdemands greater institutionalisation.

Who is the Army proponent forunderstanding the environment; the society in which we operate? Is it a wider intelligence function, a simple matter of language training andtherefore the domain of our professionaleducators or does it demand more lateralthought? It needs a champion andprobably a Joint/Defence one.Operationally the traditional divisionsbetween psychological operations,CIMIC, J2 and surveillance becomeindistinct. All information needs to be fused and exploited in a moresophisticated way. Moreover HUMINTdepends on a supportive population, so these capabilities are mutuallysupporting.

Mindset, Education and TrainingOf course the Army is adapting.Physically Thetford becomes Sangin, and Land Warfare School courses havebeen progressive in introducing thesubtle approach demanded by currentoperations ‘amongst the people, and for the people’. The issue appears to be one of speed and mindset or maybethe depth at which change takes place.Crucially, is this new way of campaigningnow firmly in the Army’s DNA? I wouldsay the direction is right but theapportionment of effort is out ofbalance. For example, the Army’s plan toplace itself on a campaign footing makeslittle mention of how we need to operatein the information environment, less forsmall enhancements to a single TA unit.Future Army structures work in HQLF thataims to give form and resources to newcapability areas will undoubtedly focuson the larger capabilities that delivermainly kinetic effects.

Of course, modern warfare needs gunnersbut there requires to be recognition that

new areas need to be resourced andprofessionalised. It is not an equipmentcentric area, nor entirely a structuralissue, but more a mindset. Perhaps weview COIN or hybrid threats through thelens of the past. In other words, whatdoes such a change to the operatingenvironment mean for the gunners,infantry and sappers rather than have we got our Information Operations and Media Operations – essentially‘information effect’ – right? Is it that our institutional change mechanisms are overly evolutionary and over-loaded? New capabilities have beenacknowledged, such as MilitaryAssistance to Civil Effect, but otherssuch as Information Operations, MediaOperations and cultural understanding(not just awareness) need to be reviewedand resourced better; as core businessthis means professionalised. In terms of delivering capability now, we cannotafford to view ‘information effects’ asperipheral activity, the domain ofreservists (although granted they bringnecessary niche skills) and the individualaugmentee. I do not imply little hasbeen done; within the LWC there is astrong bottom-up approach particularlyin the training line of development.

To change the institutional mindsetrequires education supported by training.This means education and traininginformed and guided by doctrine. Seniorofficers must use such doctrine as a

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catalyst for change. This is not just the pamphlet but the wider debate inprofessional journals, on-line in variousintellectual forums and fed by analysisfrom various ‘think tanks’. Wider formaland informal doctrine should shapejunior officer thinking within units andformations. More time needs to be spenteducating officers in thinking ratherthan simply perfecting procedures andprocesses. The change at ISCS (L), andits director’s emphasis on reading theseminal works of COIN, is greatlywelcomed but why has it taken so long?We need to understand ourselves better,be reflective and more self-critical. Suchdevelopment skills that are readilyaccepted in academic circles might, I suspect, be less attractive to an army officer judged on exuding selfconfidence and charisma. We might look more closely at how the US Armyadapted so quickly and is now vieweduniversally as on the cutting edge ofthinking and operating in theContemporary Operating Environment.

Reading Mao Zedong, Sun Zu andMachiavelli along with Bernard Fall mightbe too much but General Sir RupertSmith’s aptly named ‘Utility of Force’ andDavid Kilcullen’s ‘The Accidental Guerrilla’are surely a must. General Kiszleyemphasises cultural change in the officercorps through education, but drawingmore from the social sciences and I

would include history and economicshere. While potentially a rich source ofunderstanding the underlying psychologyof operations amongst the people, theseliberal sciences are less applicable toconflict and many theories impenetrable;being far too abstract compared to thehard sciences that feed moreconventional military capability. Moreaccessible social psychology typified byRobert Cialdini in his ‘Yes – 50 Secretsfrom the Science of Persuasion’ appearsto have some utility along with ideasthat underpin social marketing andcivilian Public Relations. But socialscience alone is not the answer; itrequires analysis and research to make it useable for the practitioner andapplicable to the society in question.This idea underpins DGLW’s overhaul of the LWC.

Ensuring that Influence is understoodand resourced, within a wider changemanagement programme, as GeneralKiszley argues, requires ‘buy-inthroughout the hierarchy and leadershipfrom the top’. As COIN is irregular,unconventional, dynamic and calls forimagination, then it would follow thatless conventional voices get a mention.We must take risk on this and allow thedissenters in too.

Information EffectRaising the profile of our InformationOperations, essentially PsychologicalOperations, capability has been slow anddoes not reflect the urgency indicated bydoctrine. Compare this to the significantamount of thinking and writing thattakes place in the US. The book ‘Ideas asWeapons – Influence and Perception inModern Warfare’ edited by two servingofficers has over 20 contributions fromofficers ranking from general to captain.My argument here is one of creating theright balance of investment and focus forchange. COIN requires different skillsthat need to be provided even if theirproponents do not have much internalinfluence themselves in the battle forlimited resources.

Delivering information effect has beenconstrained by the military disciplines of

Media Operations and InformationOperations. Terms developed, like CIMIC,in the Balkan campaigns and used moretraditionally (through PsychologicalOperations) during the invasion of Iraqin 2003 are not necessarily helpful.While it is necessary to make clear thedifference between certain PsychologicalOperations initiatives and the activitiesof Media Operations, such a literaldivision is not useful. Contemporaryoperations require the delivery of‘information effect’ that allows us tooperate in a contested informationenvironment. An environment where the services offered by Media andInformation Operations, with the civiliancomponent’s activities to build andstrengthen local media, operatestogether, holistically. Activities inAfghanistan in Regional Command(South) provide the example to followusing the banner ‘information effect’delivered in partnership with theAfghans that offer a ‘narrative’ tocounter that of the Taliban’s armedpropaganda.

So What?There is no question that the Army isadapting and has to make choices withDefence on capability priorities. My pleain this article has been for thosepreviously peripheral capabilities – todeliver ‘information effect’ - to bemodernised and not overshadowed bymore powerful proponents. ‘Close battle’change is taking place but shaping theArmy’s DNA will require a mindset shiftin terms of the way in whichcommanders balance force with othertools at their disposal.

We might start by looking at thecompetencies of an officer with an eye on the future. He or she must be amentor, negotiator, mediator, more thanjust aware of social sciences, be mediasavvy, have something of thecriminologist, academic but be able tofight too but understanding the utility of lethal force. Then we can do cerebralsoldiering based on education that isthrough military life, with a degree ofself-education, which is positivelyencouraged. Indeed, recognised and

rewarded too. But this must be alignedwith career paths and newspecialisations as well. Life is toocomplex to be less than totallyprofessional in these new skill sets. Themilitary practitioner needs to operate at‘post graduate’ level and this must notbe for a few and limited to technicaldisciplines. We need more think tanks,institutes of excellence in cultural

understanding and ‘strategiccommunication’. After all winning thewar of ideas has often been the decisiveline of operations in successful COIN.Last year Cranfield University started apost graduate certificate in InformationOperations, which is a beginning. TheLand Warfare Centre has established anAfghan Centre as a centre for excellenceand community of practice. These

initiatives need to be resourced to buildcredible institutions - virtual or physical- to support both commanders andspecialist alike. We need a centre ofexcellence for operating in theinformation environment. If theopposition use information as a weaponsystem, then we should too. �

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Arabella Dorman Over the past few years, Arabella Dorman has gained a wide reputation for her portrait paintings, landscapes and, more recently,her studies behind the scenes with the British military in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Arabella’s paintings are an unusual blend of contemporary perception and classical technique. Though in every way anexpression of the modern day, her work demonstrates a rare adherence to classical values, which owes much to both an MA inHistory of Art as well as four rigorous years of training in the old master techniques in Italy, at one of the few remainingschools in Europe in which traditional methods are still taught.

Based in London, Arabella works on portraits commissioned from around the world, and increasingly on paintings for the Britishmilitary. She has also travelled extensively in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East producing portraits and landscapes forseveral successful exhibitions in London and Oman. These painting journeys have added further depth to her work, clearlydiscernable in her recent work from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Drawn from her first hand observations whilst living and travelling with the British army in Southern Iraq (Dec 2006) andSangin, Helmund Province (Sep – Oct 2009) as well as time spent with wounded soldiers upon their return to the UK, Arabella’s

work explores the realities of soldieringtoday, from the courage andcomplexities involved in day to dayduties in theatre, to the psychologicalexperiences of conflict and itsaftermath.

Arabella Dorman has signed limitededition prints available, with 10 %of proceeds going to ABF or CombatStress.

They can be seen at her website:Arabella Dorman – Portrait Commissions www.arabelladorman.com

5 Chelsea Farm House Studios,Milmans Street, London, SW10 0BY

Studio Tel: 0207 376 3925 �Arabella Dorman sketching in Helmand Province

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The British Army Review Number 148

Chronology ofthe HigherControl ofDefenceUsing, in part, House ofCommons Defence Committeematerial

This chronology is a reminder of theevolution of the arrangements to overseethe defence of the United Kingdom. Alittle bit of history may be helpful as weapproach another SDR - it is prepared inconjunction with the next article on therole of the MoD. Editor.

1546 Henry VIII creates the NavyBoard, operational controlremains with the Lord HighAdmiral.

1643 Formation of the New ModelArmy – Cromwell.

1666 Secretary at War’s Officeformed.

1815 Fifteen governmentdepartments oversee the army.

1832 Navy Board abolished, bringingits functions under thesuperintendence of “TheirLordships” - the Board ofAdmiralty.

1854 War Office set up.1895 The Defence Committee of the

Cabinet was established.1904 Elgin Committee and then the

Esher committee set up theCommittee on Imperial Defence(CID) – abolition of theCommander in Chief and reformof the War Office – S of S chairsthe Army Council.

1908 Haldane Committee sets up anational army of a regularexpeditionary force and theTerritorial Army for HomeDefence.

1917 Second Smuts Report - Reportby General Smuts on Air

Organization and the Directionof Aerial Operations - August1917.

1918 January – Air Ministry created.1918 Royal Air Force formed.1924 The Chiefs of Staff Committee

was created.1933 The Defence Requirements

Committee was established toadvise on the deficiencies ofthe Armed Forces relative totheir intended roles, and onhow these might be corrected.

1940 Ministry of Aircraft Productionformed.

1940 Winston Churchill becomes firstminister of defence (and primeminister).

1946 Ministry of Defence wascreated.

1946 Min of AP becomes the Ministryof Supply.

1957 SANDYS REVIEW. It was to someextent a response to the Suezdebacle of the previous yearwhich was a diplomatic disasterand had revealed the poor stateof readiness of British forcesand the obsolescence of muchof their equipment. Theresulting review (conductedover a two month period)placed the priorities on nucleardeterrence and missiles. Itproposed the phased ending ofnational service with the lastcall-up in 1960 (reducingservice manpower from around700,000 to around 400,000 bythe early 1960s. Overseasgarrisons were to bereduced/replaced to an extentby aircraft carriers. One of itsproposals—’that fighter aircraftwill in due course be replaced bya ground-to-air guided missilesystem’ —shows the danger ofmaking premature predictions.It was an error which had someserious consequences for theUK aerospace industry.However, the rebalancing offorces away from East of Suezand toward Europe wasfrustrated by events. By 1960,British Army of the Rhinenumbers had been cut to

55,000 while 100,000 troopswere still stationed in theMiddle and Far East.

1959 Aircraft production moves toMinistry of Aviation.

1963 Peter Thorneycroft as(conservative) minister ofdefence proposes a unifiedMOD.

1964 MOD unified: the Admiralty, theWar Office, the Air Ministry andthe Ministry of Defence itself.

1965 HEALEY REVIEW - The newlyelected Labour governmentlaunched a defence review in1965 under the Secretary ofState for Defence, Denis Healey.The Healey Review was, inessence, a series of separatestudies undertaken by differentbodies using different methods.It initially reported toParliament in a White Paper ofFebruary 1966, but was notcompleted until mid-1967. Theprocess did involve a review offoreign commitments, but thatfollowed after the decisions tomake substantial savings bycancelling major equipmentorders and reorganising andreducing the Territorial Army.Its numbers were halved to45,000, and the dissolved unitswere ‘cadreised’ into nucleifrom which they couldsupposedly be rebuilt—whichin practice meant that theywere reduced to an almostnotional existence. Althoughthe 1967 White Paperannounced continuedcommitments East of Suez(though with 40,000, at halfthe previous manpower levels),it warned— Defence policy cannever be static ... ThisStatement ... describes theframework of policy withinwhich further decisions will betaken in the years ahead.By 1968 a further White Paper,in an attempt to stay within a£2 billion cash limit, proposedaccelerated withdrawal fromSingapore and Malaysia as wellas from the Persian Gulf (all to

be completed by 1971). Thereview also signalled theabandonment of further aircraftcarrier construction.

1967 TA and County Associationsmerged into the TerritorialAuxiliary Volunteer ReserveAssociations (TAVRAs).

1967 Aircraft production moves toMinistry of Technology.

1970 Aircraft production moves tothe Ministry of Aviation Supply.

1971 Aircraft production moves tothe newly created ProcurementExecutive – part of the MOD.

1974 THE MASON REVIEW - The cutsproposed in the Healey Reviewwere slowed only slightly by theConservative governmentbetween 1970 and 1974,although the Prime Minister’sundertaking to rebuild theTerritorial Army was put in toeffect—it took some six toeight years to return itsestablishment to the neweffective levels. In March 1974,the Secretary of State forDefence of the newly-electedLabour government, Roy Mason,ordered a defence review on hisfirst day in office. It was tobegin first with areconsideration of the UK’sdefence commitments, but pre-empting this was a governmentdecision that defence spendingshould drop from around 5% ofGDP to around 4.5% over tenyears, a decision founded onthe presumption that the UK’sspending should move towardsthe NATO average. TheExpenditure Committeecommented in its preliminaryreport on the review that— ...the Ministry’s analysis quicklyestablished that ourcommitments outside the NATOarea were of lowest priority instrictly military terms ... NATOwould remain the first chargeon resources available fordefence ... We endorse thisapproach.Three major commitments weredeemed essential:

● the UK’s contribution toNATO’s front-line forces inGermany;

● the anti-submarine forcesin the eastern Atlantic;

● and home defence.

The three other majorcommitments examined werethe nuclear deterrent,reinforcements earmarked fordefence of NATO’s northernflank and naval forces in theMediterranean. It was decidedto withdraw all British forcesfrom the Mediterranean theatrewith the exception of Cyprus.The overall defence budget wasprojected to fall by 12% overten years, with manpowerfalling by 11% over the sameperiod. The Army’s strategicreserve division was broken up,the RAF’s transport fleet cut byhalf and amphibious forcesreduced. The commitment toairdrop two parachutebattalions and supportingservices was scrapped, and the‘airportable’ capability was tobe reduced from three brigadesto one. The ExpenditureCommittee commented—The period following the 1967-68 defence review and theadoption of the strategy offlexible response by the Alliancehas seen considerably moreemphasis on mobile forces andreinforcement capabilities inNATO. In this field, the UnitedKingdom has hitherto given alead amongst the Europeanpartners. The review proposalswill tend to reverse this trendand therefore reduce the optionsopen to NATO Ministers at thelower levels of strategicescalation. While thecommitment to the Central Frontis to be maintained, the cutsaffecting mobility, support andreinforcement capability willhave a weakening effect on boththe Northern and Southernflanks.

1981 The NOTT REVIEW ran from

January to June 1981. It wasconducted in the internationalcontext of a Soviet militarybuild-up and the domesticcontext of a severe economicdownturn and the introductionof cash planning to controlpublic spending. In the reporton the 1981 Statement on theDefence Estimates (SDE): TheSecretary of State in hisintroduction says that the rightbalance must be re-established“between inevitable resourceconstraints and ... necessarydefence requirements”. In otherwords, the Government’scommitments to spend moneyon defence have outstrippedthe availability of funds …The Nott review confirmed thedecision to proceed with thepurchase of the Trident systemfrom the USA to replace Polarisas the UK’s strategic nucleardeterrent. The Territorial Armyand the other reserve forceswere to be merged and rebuiltto meet the requirement forhome defence, which was alsoto be reinforced by a newfighter aircraft (eventually theEurofighter programme). TheBritish Army of the Rhine wasto be held at the level of55,000 but to be re-equipped.The main cuts under the Nottreview were to fall on the Navywhich, although it took on theTrident submarines, was to losearound one fifth of their 60destroyers and frigates. Despitethe supposed abandonment ofthe carrier programme, threeso-called ‘through deck cruisers’had been built, designated asthe Invincible Class. One ofthese three carriers and the twoamphibious ships Fearless andIntrepid were also to be cut.Out-of-area, or expeditionary,warfare capacity was thereforeto be further significantlyreduced. With Trident, greaterreliance was once again to beplaced on the strategic nucleardeterrent as the counter to theSoviet threat (together with an

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The British Army Review Number 148

increased submarine fleet), andthe overall force structureemphasised the UK’s increasingexpectation of acting only aspart of NATO for overseasexpeditionary operations.These proposals were rapidlyscotched by the experience ofthe Falklands conflict in theSpring of 1982. In the WhitePaper on the lessons of thatconflict, published in December1982, it was announced thatthe 5th Infantry Brigade was tobecome an airborne forceincluding an all-arms assaultparachute capability of twobattalion groups (withdrawnunder the Mason Review);Fearless and Intrepid were to beretained in service. The thirdaircraft carrier (HMS Invincible)was to be retained, and thenumber of destroyers andfrigates held at around 55. TheWhite Paper concluded bysignalling a return to ‘flexibilityand mobility’, but as an extrarather than a central feature offorce structure.

1990 OPTIONS FOR CHANGE – Themain proposals:● to retain four Trident

submarines;

● to reduce the air defencecapability by withdrawingtwo Phantom squadrons;

● to halve the forcesstationed in Germany sothat their reinforcedstrength would be twodivisions rather than four;

● to reduce RAF bases inGermany from four to two,and to end the UK’scontribution to German airdefence;

● to maintain the UK’samphibious capability andair defence contribution toNATO’s northern region;

● to maintain three carriers;to reduce thefrigate/destroyer force to

about 40; a submarineflotilla of 12 SSNs (nuclearpowered submarines) andfour SSKs (conventionallypowered submarines);

● to re-establish a strategicreserve division;

● to reduce servicemanpower by 18% overabout five years to anArmy of around 120,000, aNavy of around 60,000 andthe RAF of around 75,000.

3 Defence Roles:● To ensure the protection

and security of the UnitedKingdom and ourdependent territories, evenwhere there is no majorexternal threat.

● To insure against any majorexternal threat to theUnited Kingdom and ourallies.

● To contribute to promotingthe United Kingdom’s widersecurity interests throughthe maintenance ofinternational peace andstability.

1993 a further ‘mini-review’ tookplace. The Secretary of Statesaid in his introduction to the1993 Statement on the DefenceEstimates that—... changes over the last 12months led me to conclude thata number of furtheradjustments, both enhancementand reductions to the forcelevels and capabilities of thearmed forces, are nowappropriate. These adjustments... include an increase in Armymanpower, improvements to ouramphibious capability and theArmy’s anti-armour capability,and further investment intransport aircraft and supporthelicopters; as well as reductionsin our anti-submarine warfarecapability and the number ofaircraft provided for the airdefence of the United Kingdom.

Although the 1993 Statementon the Defence Estimates did,for the first time, deliver awelcome analysis of thedefence programme and stroveto make clear how the forcestructure related to the militarytasks that flowed from thethree roles, in its report on the1993 Statement on the DefenceEstimates the Committeecommented—Careful reading of SDE 93, whichis subtitled ‘Defending OurFuture’, produces very little ideaof which national interests areto be defended and where, inwhat order of priorities, and inthe face of which anticipatedthreats or dangers ... In theabsence of explicit governmentalarrangements for formulating anational security policy, it wouldbe idle to expect thepresentation of even the barebones of such a policy toParliament ... But experience inthis Parliament, particularly butnot exclusively in relation to theformer Yugoslavia, has alreadyheightened the interdependenceof foreign and defence policy,and the inappropriateness inmany circumstances of theconventional division betweenthem ... some means should befound of providing Parliamentwith an opportunity to debate arounded statement of theGovernment’s security policygoals, as well as the resources itis proposed to devote toattaining those goals.

1994 Front Line First: The DefenceCosts Studies – Mainproposals:● the establishment of a new

Central Staff to replace theDefence Staff and Office ofManagement and Budgetset up by MichaelHeseltine in the mid ‘80s;

● a reduction in the singleservice HQ staff and areduction in MoD HQpersonnel from 5,200 toaround half that number;

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● the formation of aPermanent JointHeadquarters (PJHQ) atNorthwood;

● the restructuring of LandCommand;

● the merging of all researchand development and mosttesting functions into anew Defence Evaluationand Research Agency(DERA)

● the collocation ofProcurement Executive (PE)staff at Abbey Wood;

● reorganisation of financialmanagement;

● reorganisation ofmanagement of the MoDestate, maintenancefunctions and stores andspares;

● the downgrading of theRosyth naval base;

● the establishment of a newtri-Service Joint StaffCollege;

● reorganisation of therecruitment services;

● reorganisation of defencemedical services withfurther integration into theNational Health Service;

● reorganisation of MoDPolice and guardingservices with furthercivilianisation.

Defence Cost Studies: MajorProcurement Decisions:● new nuclear attack

submarines (TrafalgarBatch 2), further Type 23frigates and sevenSandown minehunters;

● two Landing Platform Dockamphibious assault ships(LPDs) to replace Fearlessand Intrepid;

● 259 additional Challenger2 tanks;

● a mid-life update of 142Tornado GR1 aircraft toGR4 standard;

● procurement of submarine-launched conventionallyarmed Tomahawk cruisemissiles, and a possibleconventionally armedstand-off missile (CASOM)for the RAF.

1997/98 Strategic Defence Review –initiated by incoming Labourgovernment. The main changes in forcestructure are summarised in thefollowing table:

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Additions Cuts andReorganisation Confirmation and Enhancement

Army * 3330 more troops to be recruited. * Territorial Army cut from 57,000 to

40,000:

* Airborne Brigade and airmobile brigade to beamalgamated to form new air manoeuvre brigade

* Re-role 2 of the armoured regiments to armouredreconnaissance and NBC roles respectively, and enlargethe 6 remaining tank regiments to full 58-tank units;

* Additional Mechanised Brigade to be created: Re-roledand strengthened from 5 Airborne Brigade which willbe dissolved

Navy * 2 Aircraft Carriers: Decision to planfor 2 medium aircraft carriers, fordeployment after 2012 replacingthe present 3 smaller carriers;

* Royal Navy Reserve: To increase by350;

* 4 ro-ro ships to be acquired; * 3 escort vessels cut: Frigate and

destroyer force to be reduced from35 to 32;

* 3 Mine Counter Measure Vessels cut:Planned MCMV force to increasefrom 18 to 22 instead of 18 to 25;

* 2 Attack submarines cut: Attacksubmarines to be cut from 12 to 10

* Cruise missiles: All Trafalgar classsubmarines to be made capable offiring Tomahawk land attackmissiles.

Air Force * 4 C17 transports to be acquired:C17 large transport aircraft, ‘ortheir equivalent’ to be acquired

* RTAF Reserve: To increase by 270 * 36 combat aircraft cut: 23 offensive

support and 13 air defence aircraftcut, number of squadrons to be cutby two to 18.

* Confirmation of EF2000: The number of Eurofighters tobe brought into service remains unchanged at 232;

* Air-Launched missiles enhanced: * Tornado GR4: Deployability to be enhanced and some

improvements to operations; * Nimrod-R: Improvement in on-board processing

systems for long range reconnaissance aircraft; * Air transport: Confirmation of the need for a successor.

to portions of the ageing C-130 fleet.

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Land Forces - The concurrencyrequirements for the Armed Forces distilto the following requirement for theArmy: in addition to meeting itspermanent commitments in the UnitedKingdom, Cyprus and elsewhere, it mustbe able to –

● maintain a brigade employedindefinitely on a peace keepingmission such as SFOR, and at thesame time deploy an armoured ormechanised brigade for warfightingfor a period up to six months; or

● be capable of deploying awarfighting division.

The Review has concluded that ‘theArmy’s current structure will not meetpost-SDR requirements withoutoverstretch’.

Consequently, in order to meet theserequirements, the structure of the Armyhas been significantly revamped in theSDR. The stated overall purpose of thechanges made is to ‘make existing forcesmore usable and to address overstretch’while retaining ‘a balanced, combinedarms, high capability structure of twodeployable divisions’. At present theArmy has three armoured brigades, twomechanised brigades, an airbornebrigade and an airmobile brigade. Post-SDR, the airborne brigade will be re-roledas a mechanised brigade, with itsairborne role transferred, along with theairmobile brigade, to a new airmanoeuvre brigade.

A new formation readiness cycle hasbeen designed for the two deployabledivisions. Under the new training cycle,each of the six brigades (excluding theair manouevre brigade) will adhere to athree year activity cycle with a year ofin-role training, followed by a year athigh readiness (mostly at thirty days’notice to move) as part of the JRRF pooland a year preparing for, deployed on, orrecovering from, a six-month tour ofpeace support or “operations other thanwar” such as Northern Ireland or trainingsupport in Canada. This cycle is designedspecifically to provide at any one timean armoured and mechanised brigade at

high readiness for warfighting; twobrigades to meet an indefinite non-warfighting commitment such as SFOR;and two brigades able to ‘traincoherently’. Each division will have itsthree brigades at graduated readiness.Changes in Equipment Requirementsunder the SDR:

The SDR proposes the decommissioningof some existing equipment, in particular

● reducing the flotilla of attacksubmarines from 12 to 10;

● reducing the flotilla ofdestroyers/frigates from 35 to 32, bypaying off three more Type 22frigates;

● increasing the flotilla of minecounter-measures vessels to 22,instead of to 25 as originallyplanned, by paying off more oldervessels;

● removing 36 RAF fast jet aircraftfrom the front-line.

Some previously intended procurementswill also be reduced in number orcancelled –

● a second batch of 22 Merlin anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopterswill not be ordered;

● the medium range TRIGAT and theNext Light Anti-Armour Weaponprojects will proceed, but with fewernumbers to be ordered.

February 2002SDR New Chapter:Secretary of State came before the H of CDefence select Committee on 28November 2001, and set out a list ofquestions which the New Chapter work would need to address:

i) …can we base our policy on gettingintelligence of specific threats, withoccasional misses, or do we have toassess our vulnerabilities to potentialterrorist capabilities and counterthese?

ii) How far do we try to defend thehomeland in a collective NATO and

European sense and how should wetry to deal with terrorists, in theirbases or in transit?

iii) In the UK, how far should the ArmedForces play an increased role insecurity? If so, what sort of forcesare best suited for these tasks?Should the Reserve Forces have adifferent or enhanced role?

iv) In the military dimension, is there arole for pre-emption? What is therole of Armed Forces in dealing withproblems upstream, what capabilitiesdo we need? What is clear already isthat we need fast, integratedoperations, involving high levels ofmilitary skill, improved intelligence-gathering capability and a deeperunderstanding of potentialopponents.

v) How do we engage the causes ofterrorism as well as the terroriststhemselves? How do we do so on across-governmental and coalitionbasis and what is the role of themilitary, if any, in this? How do weavoid the use of force becoming ouropponent’s own recruiting sergeant?

vi) How do we deter or dissuade statesfrom support or complicity withterrorism, especially in the chemical,biological, radiological and nuclearactivities? What if the state hasfailed…?

vii) …what is the nature of asymmetricthreats? How does this impact on ourapproach to operations?

The Select Committee commented: Thediscussion paper did not, however, clarifythe MoD’s understanding of asymmetryand specifically how it related to existingdoctrine. Similarly it left unclear howoperations against asymmetric tacticsmight, in practice, be conducted.

March 2008 The Government published The NationalSecurity Strategy of the UnitedKingdom: Security in an interdependentworld (NSS). Although the publicationwas coordinated by the Cabinet Office,the Strategy’s stated aim was “to set outhow we will address and manage thisdiverse though interconnected set ofsecurity challenges and underlyingdrivers”.

The NSS lays out the fundamentalsecurity architecture for its approach to threats to UK security and resilience,acknowledging that the traditionalboundaries between Governmentdepartments, and between concepts of foreign and domestic policy, no longer apply. Equally, the concept of ‘threat’ has changed with thedevelopment of non-state actors such as international terroristorganisations.

“In the past, the state was the traditionalfocus of foreign, defence and securitypolicies, and national security wasunderstood as dealing with the protectionof the state and its vital interests from

attacks by other states. Over recentdecades, our view of national security has broadened to include threats toindividual citizens and to our way of life,as well as to the integrity and interests of the state.”

The definition of national security andresilience now, therefore, encompasses awide range of threats, from traditionalstate-on-state aggression throughterrorist groups to civil emergencies suchas flooding or pandemics. It alsoencompasses a spectrum of capabilitiesand responses—not merely preventing ordealing with attacks or natural disasters(‘security’), but also ensuring that vitalservices are maintained and life can

continue as close to normal as possible(‘resilience’).

March 2009 A central plank of the Government’sapproach to national security is itsCounter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), an updated version of which was published on 24 March 2009. It aims “to reduce the risk to the UK frominternational terrorism so that people cango about their business freely and withconfidence”. The strategy is built aroundwhat are described as the 4 ‘P’s, Prevent,Pursue, Protect and Prepare. The MoDnotes that it “provide[s] a range ofsupport in each of these areas to agreater or lesser extent”.? �

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On the edge of the Green Zone (Alexander Allan).

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Keep the Armyin the PublicEyeJohn Wilson

In the Smuts Report1 of 1917, it says:How shall the relations of the new airservice to the Navy and the Army bedetermined? There is no mention of itsrelation to the Ministry of Defencebecause there wasn’t one. None of uswould argue for the abolition of the MoDbut we might argue that things havecentralised too far towards the MoD andaway from the 3 fighting Services. Andthe basic logic is that what the MoDgets, it can only get at the expense ofone or more of the single Services. Thecurrent arrangement is beyond the pointof justifiable and proper synergy. There are two issues: centralisation andjointery. Both are an essential andproper culture and like any culture it cangrow malignant organs. It is the extentof these two cultures that needsexamining.

CentralisationCentralisation should attack two dangers:inefficiency and anomalies. A joint paysystem makes sense: why have 3 paycorps? And a common rank structure is

logical even if the Army wants lancecorporals, where the other two serviceshave less need for that rank. Similarly,do we really need 3 sets of lawyers? We can have specialist maritime lawyerswithout requiring 3 distinct and separateorganisations. Yet for all the objectionswe might raise about centralisation/jointery, this common-sense approachhas not materialised. A common medicalservice makes sense – it even partiallyexists in practice, medical teams from all 3 Services do wonderful work inAfghanistan, yet each Service keeps its own. But MOD centralisation has not gone down this path, as you might have expected. Just to be clear,I would suggest that, for example, theRoyal Navy runs the medical services – ie all doctors, nurses and dentists wearRN uniform.

We see centralisation in other areas. We have a separate and centralisedprocurement agency absurdly headed upby someone who out-ranks the man whogives him his orders: the operationalrequirements man. You would expect tosee commonality in such areas as fuel,rations, clothing, general stores, andaccommodation.

To take an example, a closer look at accommodation. We have a jointquartering system but do we have acommon need? The Navy has a few main bases: Portsmouth, Devonport,Faslane and Culdrose and their peopleare encouraged and choose to buy theirown house. The restricted number ofbases makes the decision easier andmost sailors with a few years serviceweekly commute from home. So, SFA andeven SLA is less important to the Navy.The RAF is a bit different having a fairspread of air bases across UK – but withmore specialisation and fewer moves therequirement is less demanding than thesoldier’s. We don’t need to go through allthe Army’s needs but we can say thatthey are greater and more complex thanthe other Services’. Creating a commonaccommodation policy for all 3 Servicesis not really possible. Although youmight be able to create arrangementsthat suit all, given enough flexibility –

but that is hardly a policy, just a series of exceptions. In other words,whilst some broad guidelines are a good idea, for example, standardisedrents and building design, the Armyshould set the quartering requirement for itself without having to conform with another Service’s needs.

Doing What You PromiseThe Army has to provide what its peopleneed. As do the Royal Navy and the RAF.It is partly a matter of expectation.Soldiers join the Army, they don’t jointhe Services. They look up to the Armyand they hold the Army to account notthe MoD/Defence.

Identity“It is with sadness that the Ministryof Defence must announce that asoldier from 2nd Battalion The Rifles(2 RIFLES) was killed inAfghanistan”.

The announcement on the MoDwebsite (November 2009) wasaccompanied by this image:

No-one in the Rifles or the rest ofthe Army identifies with that crest -in this sad case, would not thisimage have been more appropriate?

This is not carping on my part; itwas a deliberate decision to use theMoD crest. Why?

FM Jan Smuts (HMSO)

MoD crest

RIFLES Cap badge

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Operationally, we can take the case ofSergeant Roberts RTR. You will recall thatSergeant Roberts was killed in Iraq butthere was a shortage of body armour andSergeant Roberts went without. Thesimple point of this tragic story is thatno-one was responsible. Centralisationhad enabled those who made thedecision not to buy sufficient bodyarmour to avoid accountability. When wehad a Quarter-Master General (a 4*man), he would have answered to CGSand the Army Board. Directaccountability concentrates the mind.If a quarter is sub-standard, a soldiershould get satisfaction from the chain ofcommand and ultimately CGS should beable to answer that soldier’s grievance.But he can’t. It is a matter for a defenceagency – “Vice Admiral Tim Laurence hasbeen in post as Chief Executive of DefenceEstates, the UK military’s propertydepartment” – (MoD Defence Estateswebsite). Vice Admiral Laurence doesn’tanswer to the Army Board, he answersto? A good question, but not one thatthe Defence Estates website answers.The Army’s training estate is no longercontrolled by the Army; it was taken overby an agency: the Defence TrainingEstate. Which in turn has been takenover by Defence Estates – “the UKmilitary’s property department”. And thatis how they describe themselves. So, notonly does the Army not control its owntraining estate but those who do areexactly what they say they are: estateagents; it takes no imagination at all tounderstand that the training estate will

be run to conform to that ethos:

“UK Training Estate. There will be littlescope to reduce the existing UK trainingestate in the near term, as it willcontinue to be required to support thedelivery of military capability, despite theincreasing use of syntheticenvironments2.”

So, this, the first idea in the DefenceEstates Development Plan 2009, is toseek reductions; how inconvenient thatthe UK Training Estate.... will continue tobe required to support the delivery ofmilitary capability. You might have hopedthat the first thought would have beento recognise the urgent requirement forchanges to our training demanded by thefiercest fighting since the Falklands War– only this fighting is lasting for yearsnot weeks. In the 26 pages of the DEDPthe words ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘Iraq’ do notappear. A soldier writing this paper as anarmy plan who did not make directreference to the fighting in Afghanistan,and deductions from that, would havebeen invited to acquaint himself withlife in Sangin without the benefit ofbody armour or colleagues.

How can the Army promise to providethe right training under this regime, andhonour that promise? Now, before youshovel all the blame onto the politiciansand mandarins for this, I have to tell youthat the Army let this happen. Was itignorance? No, because good menworking inside the Army Training Estate

told their bosses that this was not agood idea. So, was it cowardice, idlenessor poor judgement? Take your pick,because I have no other explanation tooffer. Had the Army mounted a strongchallenge, what would have happened? Idon’t know, but I would have liked tohave seen the effort. I guess thatsomeone (not a soldier) got a nice bigbonus for thinking up this scheme, andso it would probably have gone aheadanyway with a few modifications as asop.

JointeryJointery is a good word – a word ofhope: positive and benign. You cannotgo wrong by bunging in words likebalance and joint (but not in the samesentence as ‘Mick Jagger’); they are whatJamie Whyte3 calls ‘Hooray Words’. Hesuggests – ‘justice’ – and points out thatwe are all in favour of justice, althoughwe disagree about what is just and whatunjust. You cannot fail by suggestingjointery as a solution. How could it notbe helpful to have more understanding ofeach other’s service?

And staff college is a good place tostart. When we – (a digression, who was‘we’? who were the people who thoughtjointery was a good idea and who arethey now? – a thought to keep in themind during this article) – when wedecided we wanted a joint staff college,there was the inevitable study todetermine where it should be.

The Weekly Dinner (Alexander Allan)

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The lesson here is that the onlyargument was – ‘jointery’. It wasideological and therefore not susceptibleto rational discussion. So we have spenthundreds of millions of pounds tosustain an ideological point – which inpractice has yielded no measurablebenefit.

Operational JointeryI am in favour of operational jointeryand I was an early supporter of PJHQ –in my time I was one of only 21/2 jointwarfare staff officers in the MoD. But ithasn’t quite worked out as we hadhoped. The idea of a single operationalHQ for expeditionary operations seemedto make sense. In practice it has attimes sat uneasily between Whitehall

and the theatre; uneasy, because it isneither in Whitehall nor in the theatre -where the real decisions are being made.(note that in the first three articles inthis issue - all of which deal withdecision making in Iraq - there is nomention of the PJHQ).

Is it at the operational level or thestrategic? It should be at the strategiclevel but it cannot behave strategicallyand is really a national provider – yetprovider is the description we give toHQs Navy, Land and Air. It tries tocommand from a distance, yet usually UKforces are in a coalition which adds morelinks and complications: and we can seethose complications played out inHelmand, which we treat as a nationaloperation. PJHQ is an annex to the MoD.The real reason why PJHQ stutters isbecause there should be 3 of them.The PJHQ tries to do too much. Inconsequence it overloads the capacity ofits staff and expects those withoutsufficient experience to understand morethan is reasonable. In part this isbecause of the purple approach whichassumes that any serviceman/woman can

do some jobs irrespective of their parentservice. You can call it ‘Buggins turn’. Forexample, it is not reasonable to expectan RAF officer to write the enemy forcesparagraph when the enemy is a shadowyset of Arab insurgents. Nothing in histraining will have prepared him for it.You can expect him to give you ananalysis of the 2003 Iraqi air force; evenif s/he was unaware of the actual details,he would be able to researchintelligently and produce the answer – asoldier shouldn’t be asked to brief onIran’s submarine capability. Moreeducation and training is not the realanswer – people have areas ofcompetence and expertise, stick to them.

3 PJHQsThree rather than one PJHQ seems to beasking for trouble x 3. The logic followsfrom the first point about expertise andit applies to the establishment level aswell as to the individual. Jointery is anecessary quality when we want toconduct joint operations – GBO. And alloperations beyond our shores will bejoint. Maritime always has an aircomponent; any land operation has to

MOD Main Building

Jointerising the Staff CollegesNow an early factor (or driver as factors are now called) was that the junior divisions should be co-located with the seniorversion. Young officers learn about their own arm on the YOs course at their arms school - because at this stage of theircareer that is what they need to know. No-one disputes that it would be good thing for them to know all about the army, butnot at this point. That comes later - we had the Junior Division - JDSC. It was at Warminster; indeed I can see the hut Ioccupied on that course 33 years ago from the window as I write. Warminster was (is) a good location: non-academic, soldiersall over the place, easy access to military kit and training areas. At JDSC, captains learnt about the rest of the army. Anexcellent solution for all, only mildly inconvenient for the Commandant at Camberley who had responsibilities for JDSC - ie theSRO.

The chosen few subsequently went onto Camberley where they continued to learn about the army, war, the nation and othernations and the other Services. Now you can argue about what more joint education was needed at the Camberley level. Butthe need to co-locate the junior divisions with the senior divisions was weak, yet it drove the choice of Shrivenham as thesite for JSCSC simply because it was a big enough greenfield site, and none of the existing sites - Greenwich, Camberley andBracknell could hold a new joint college and the juniors.

It will be so good for all the juniors to be together, they cooed. Today, we have ICSC(L) at Shrivenham on a 30 week course,whilst the RAF and RN have an 8 week course. The junior courses are run separately by their respective Services. No need thenfor them to be on the same site as the advanced course, no requirement to be together as juniors.

You might wonder why the Army's course is 30 weeks and the others are just 8 weeks. The RN and the RAF see a staff collegeas somewhere that teaches 'secretarial' matters - ie equips the officer for employment in the MoD or some other major HQ.They run their warfare courses elsewhere: principal warfare officers are trained at HMS Collingwood, and the RAF run battlemanagement courses at the Air Warfare Centre. Whereas the Army sees staff work at the heart of warfare and how it doesbusiness, combining the 'secretarial' and the operational. Jointery compared a light blue pear and a dark blue peach with arusset brown apple - and produced a lemon.

get there and will almost certainly havean air component. Possibly a UK aircontribution to a coalition operationmight be purely air, for example thebombing programme of Iraq during OpDesert Fox. But environments demand aminimum level of expertise.

Basing a PJHQ on an environment wouldbring us back to where we were when wehad the three JHQs – and that logicdoesn’t quite stand up to analysis. Ourneed is to think in 3 areas – partlygeographical, partly functional:

● Home Front. Home is the air andcoastal defence of UK and itsinternal security. Which mightinclude terrorism, public disorder,disaster relief, CBRN – MACA andMACP tasks.

● Distant Front. The HQ whichconducts operations beyond Europe.

● Near or Europe. Ignoring Europe isnot a sensible option, and linkingourselves closely to European forcesneed not cause any distress to ourAtlantic partners – Canada and theUSA.

No one of these Fronts is obviously apreserve of land, sea or air and that is auseful characteristic.

This is not my original thought. It is theview of General Sir Rupert Smith (ACDS(Ops) MoD 1992-94; CommanderUNPROFOR; DSACEUR) and I hope wemight see an expansion of this idea inBAR in the future. But for the purposesof this article it is relevant because ofthe associated actions and effect. Whichis that Navy Command Headquarters,Headquarters Air and Headquarters LandForces should all disappear. Sorting outour force requirements would be thepreserve of the 3 PJHQs with the COSs.And here is the real point: more power tothe chiefs. Make them responsible fortheir individual Services’ contributions tooperations. Authority is aligned withresponsibility.

And the apportioning between thosecommands, which is where the chiefs willexercise much of their power is donecollegiately with the CDS.

The Services as InstitutionsThe Army (these arguments apply equallyto all 3 Services) is not a business; it isan institution which handles violence onbehalf of the people of this country asregulated by Parliament and owes itsallegiance to the Crown. That it is not abusiness is no excuse to be inefficient orto ignore economy (recalling that

economy of force (and logistics) is aguideline of war) – and it most certainlyshould be effective. The British Army hasan enviable record of staying out ofdomestic politics:

...the English hatred of war andmilitarism ... is rooted deep in history,and it is strong in the lower-middle classas well as the working class. Successivewars have shaken it but not destroyed it.Well within living memory it was commonfor ‘the redcoats’ to be booed at in thestreets and for the landlords ofrespectable public houses to refuse toallow soldiers on the premises. In peacetime, even when there are two millionunemployed, it is difficult to fill the ranksof the tiny standing army, which isofficered by the country gentry and aspecialized stratum of the middle class,and manned by farm labourers and slumproletarians. The mass of the people arewithout military knowledge or tradition,and their attitude towards war isinvariably defensive. No politician couldrise to power by promising themconquests or military ‘glory’, no Hymn ofHate has ever made any appeal to them.In the last war [WW1] the songs whichthe soldiers made up and sang of theirown accord were not vengeful buthumorous and mock-defeatist. The onlyenemy they ever named was the sergeant-major.

And of the last war, the four nameswhich have really engraved

themselves on the popular memoryare Mons, Ypres, Gallipoli and

Passchendaele, every time a disaster.The names of the great battlesthat finally broke the German

armies are simply unknown to thegeneral public.

In England all the boasting and flag-wagging, the ‘Rule Britannia’ stuff, isdone by small minorities. The patriotismof the common people is not vocal oreven conscious. They do not retain amongtheir historical memories the name of asingle military victory. English literature,like other literatures, is full of battle-poems, but it is worth noticing that theones that have won for themselves a kind

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of popularity are always a tale ofdisasters and retreats. There is no popularpoem about Trafalgar or Waterloo, forinstance. Sir John Moore’s army atCorunna, fighting a desperate rearguardaction before escaping overseas (just likeDunkirk!) has more appeal than a brilliantvictory. The most stirring battle-poem inEnglish is about a brigade of cavalrywhich charged in the wrong direction. Andof the last war, the four names whichhave really engraved themselves on thepopular memory are Mons, Ypres, Gallipoliand Passchendaele, every time a disaster.The names of the great battles thatfinally broke the German armies aresimply unknown to the general public4.

Orwell’s essay, written in 1941,continues to strike chords – some thingshave changed and it is worth a shortexamination of public attitudes today.

The public – and here it is impossible todistinguish between media slant or spinand the views of the public – support thesoldiers as people. Public affection forthe ‘soldier’ has probably never beenhigher. Affection and support for theArmy is less, particularly where the armyappears to be acting against theinterests of the ‘soldier’. But there is achange from Orwell’s day at this level:public support for the Army as aninstitution is relatively strong. The armedforces generally and the Army especiallyrank comparatively highly in the publicesteem as a trusted and worthwhileinstitution – esteem for the Army isprobably higher than at any time.Support for ‘Help the Heroes’ shows theextent, as do the many occasions whenthe Army is in the Public Eye (hardly amajor sporting event goes by withoutsome combat-95’d blokes and blokessesleaping around, even if some are ratherless soldierly than we might like) – therecruiting programme of the 1970s –Keep the Army in the Public Eye (KAPE) –could only have dreamt of such levels ofpublicly approved exposure.

Yet that only serves, too, to demonstratethe fickleness of such affection. It is ahigh risk phenomenon which isvulnerable to a change in mood.

Casualties are an emotive issue and whenlinked with perceived neglect – ieequipment shortages for ‘our boys’ – theissue can get out of control. I suggestthat we are close to that point. Contrasttoday with Summer 1972 – the Army waslosing a soldier every other day, mediacoverage of NI was intense and althoughthere was some sympathy for the ‘let theIrish get on with it’ call, and ‘Troops out’was a marginal campaign, the broadBritish consensus was that this was amessy conflict and our soldiers (and theArmy) were doing a good job and shouldsee it through. Soldiers’ bodies werereturned to the United Kingdomdiscreetly, no ceremonies. Neither thegovernment nor the Army was underattack for its handling of the militaryoperation; nor was there any realcampaign for the lot of the individualsoldier.

So, there is a paradox: defence/MoD isregularly excoriated for its failings –fairly and unfairly. Failings which shouldbe jointly shared with the Services itserves. It is not healthy for the commongood for the Services to hide behind theMoD. But this is a situation largely ofthe MoD’s making. In the desire to createa separate identity for ‘Defence’, powerhas been taken from the Services to theCentre, which now takes the brickbats. It is not well-equipped to defend itself.By definition the ‘suits’ (and not all the‘suits’ are civilian) look silly if they standup to defend themselves because thatwould expose their naked power andbring down yet more derision onthemselves. So they are obliged torespond with proxy spokesmen who rangefrom ‘talking heads’ to real soldiers onoccasions; plus the use of the usual pressoffice tricks. It does not go down well.

Over the long run the Services needpublic support based on good practicefor which they are themselvesresponsible. The coroners’ courts are anexample – militarily educated andexperienced soldiers know that militaryoperations are a series of interlinkedactions and reactions. Concentrating onone issue creates vulnerabilities: war isnot just a risky business; it an option of

difficulties. This is a hard point to makein the forensic atmosphere of a court -but since that court also operates intandem with the court of public opinionit makes it all the more important thatthe military argument is heard andunderstood. You cannot conduct warwithout public support; you must takethe people with you. The currentcentralised arrangements in the MoD areunhelpful in this respect.

ReformPart of the malaise is the budgetarysystem: it has gone too far. I am nottalking about accountability, it is utterlyright that the civil service should bedemanding in this aspect; it is publicmoney.

A Small ExampleThe Army's operational and tacticalpublications budget (which includesBAR and ABN) is about £800,000pa. Unknown to the spenders of thatmoney, MoD decided to make theBFPO an agency which will in futurecharge postage to all users. So, outof the blue the tactical publicationsbudget has taken a hit of £37,000for postage, with no compensatingincrease in its budget. What is thepoint of this exercise? The onlyeffect is to reduce the flow oftactical doctrinal information to theArmy. We now have an extra layer ofbureaucracy to price, charge andaccount for this money for noobvious benefit. It is time for theNAO to estimate the costs of theMoD's accounting system - what isthe value of this charging regime?Is it worth it?

The one major point here is that moneyis power. To find the power, follow themoney. The COSs do not have money.Give them the money for their Service sothat power goes with their responsibility. The really extraordinary part of thisdiscussion is why the COSs were by-passed in the first place. And it isdifficult to avoid the conclusion that itsuited (no pun intended) oneconstituency, indeed they (whoever theyare) designed it that way.

Another example is the removal of thesingle Service public relations one stardirectors. Consequently, the singleServices no longer have control overtheir media image – a vital function forany institution. The clear message fromthis measure is that Defence/MoD is theinstitution and the single Services areminor pillars supporting Defence/MoD,not the other way round. In 1946, whenthe MoD was first formed, such an ideawould have been thought preposterous –that is the extent of the reversal ofauthority. I do not argue for a return tothe position in 1946, it is the extent ofthe change that needs discussion.Clearly, I am suggesting that it has gonetoo far and needs correcting.

A current example is the recent reportinto the Nimrod XV230 crash (fuel linesexplosion over Afghanistan). Air Vice-Marshal K A Campbell RAF (Ret’d), asenior RAF engineer, wrote to The Timeson 10 November 2009. An extract:From the formation of RAF StrikeCommand in the early Sixties theengineering branch of the RAF met thesechallenges by co-locating all the specialistengineering staff for each aircraft in asingle office — the Role Office — andrequired each office to prepare an annualreview of its long-term airworthinessplans. By the late 1990s these reviewswere heard by the Chief Engineer himselfso that he could satisfy the responsibilitythat all RAF aircraft were airworthy.

The XV230 report details that early thiscentury the post of Chief Engineer wasdiscontinued, that the chain of delegationnow no longer passes through the handsof properly qualified and experiencedengineers. Instead, it seems to follow thechain of command, which could and didinclude not just non-engineers but alsopersonnel who had no experience ofmilitary aircraft operation. In addition, awhole management layer was removedand with it the capability to supervise theRole Offices — now expanded and re-titled integrated project teams. This was arecipe for disaster. It was akin to giving aGP responsibility for the quality andextent of cancer care — or even givingthe task to a non-medical person.

... Nor does it sufficiently criticise theconvoluted dissipation of airworthinessresponsibility in the new tri-servicelogistic organisation so that the heavyweight of this task is not clearly laid onspecific individuals. The public shoulddemand the immediate restoration ofairworthiness responsibility to those whoare qualified and trained to handle it.

The report showed the extent of theorganisational failures. Now, I suggestthat the plea to the British public iswrongly aimed – the people who shoulddemand the change to this culture arethose in the Services. It is our job tosort these things out, not to leave it tosomeone else. A crash is an obviouscatastrophe, difficult to ignore; theorganisational arrangements I criticiseare less obviously dramatic but are evenmore serious than the Nimrod crash.They are easier to ignore. This is not thetime for good men to do nothing. Powerand responsibility go together, if onegets ahead of the other, trouble follows.We are at that point.

The Power of the National InstitutionDefence/The MoD is no more a nationalinstitution than is the Department forChildren, Schools and Families, whichwas formerly known as the Departmentfor Education and Skills and before thatthe Department of Education and Scienceand before that (with a few other namechanges in between) the Ministry ofEducation. Government departmentschange at the behest of - thegovernment; they are ephemeral,national institutions are not. They canlose their status or can decline – thearistocracy may have some influence butfew outside of them would regard themas a national institution; 70 years agothey wielded power, influence and hadreal status, no longer. There is no meritin trying to give Defence/MoD this sortof status; it’s like having a dredger asthe flag-ship.

The Services can use this status, indeedthey need it. The image (and reality)that the Army wants is that of anorganization which is professional andfocused in its approach to the defence of

the nation, thoughtful, responsible,prudent and which looks after its own.An Army that the people can respect asone of the important institutions of theState, which is not subject to theimmediate whims of government becauseit has continuity of purpose. Yet placesitself unequivocally at the service of thepeople through its loyalty to the Crown.These are images which evoke powerfulemotions. The Army largely meets thesedemocratic expectations of itself, but ishaving increasing difficulty in achievingthem as its ability to determine itsperformance declines.

Taking power away from the Services andplacing it in the Centre has not helpedthe Centre to gain public support.Instead, criticism is aimed at the Centre.Reduction of status from the Three hasnot increased the status of the One –status has not followed power andmoney.

To re-phrase the Smuts Report of 1917...how shall the relations of the Navy, Armyand Air Force to the Centre bedetermined? By a re-distribution of power

1 Report by General Smuts on AirOrganization and the Direction of AerialOperations August 1917 :

Shall there be instituted a real airministry responsible for all airorganization and operations? Shall therebe constituted a unified air serviceembracing both the present RNAS andRFC? And if this second question isanswered in the affirmative, the thirdquestion arises: How shall the relations ofthe new air service to the Navy and theArmy be determined so that the functionsat present discharged for them by theRNAS and RFC respectively shall continueto be efficiently performed by the new airservice?

2 The Defence Estate Development Plan2009 (DEDP 09) dated 9 July 09.

3 Bad Thoughts – A Guide to Clear Thinking,Jamie Whyte, Corvo Books, ISBN: 095432553 2.

4 The Lion and The Unicorn, George Orwell,1941. �

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The Celebrationof an Idea

William Barlow

The Queen’s Birthday Parade increasinglyinterests me. I have been on it twice andwill never forget the impression theQueen made as she inspected us.Magnificent in uniform, with a composedyet obvious pride, she seemed to belooking at us, both collectively andindividually, as if to say, “You are myGuards.” It caught me unawares and myresponse was immediate and true. I felta pride which was without sin andnothing will ever erase the memory.

I have also seen the Parade many timesand noted the reaction of thosewatching. It was obvious that most wereunprepared for what they saw and hadno idea how to interpret it. Nearly allremarked on what they regarded as thecasualness of the participants. Theycould not see this was a relaxed stylewhich came from being natural. Whatthey were expecting was derived frompopular images of sentries atBuckingham Palace not batting aneyelid, something they could notpossibly have known for themselvessince the sentries no longer standoutside the Palace gates. Yet here they

were, thinking this was the key to knowing what was happening.

It was obvious they came to beentertained as though the Guards wereinto show business. Who could blamethem? I recall hearing that a meetinghad been convened at which showbusiness professionals were given theirsay. They wanted to have the GuardChanging Ceremony twice a day becauseof its appeal to tourists. They did notsee the Guardsmen as real soldiers. I alsoheard the then Garrison Sergeant Majorsay, to his great credit, that he wasn’tgoing to stand for the Drum Majorsperforming like prancing horses. This, itseemed, was suggested as being muchmore with it than their customary style.That was seen as dull and unresponsiveto the audience.

Margot Fonteyn remembered theSecretary of State for War consultingFrederick Ashton about re-choreographing of the Parade and beingtold to leave it alone because it couldnot be improved upon. This would seemto confirm what an American professorof cultural studies, who liked themilitary, said when he described theParade, admiringly, as theatre. Itdepends what is meant by theatre.Anyone who attains to the standards of a

Margot Fonteyn will know that thedemands made on their bodies alsoinvolve the mind and this determineshow they see their art. They would neveruse the word ‘theatre’ lightly. Perhapsthis is why an experienced theatreproducer, who saw the Parade, cameaway saying “That is not theatre.”

The spectators also made comparisons,especially between bands, the Guards notthought to be up to much. This is ofinterest given the appeal of musicaldisplays, including military ones, seenelsewhere, not least on TV. What seemsnever to have occurred to anyone is thatthey were seeing something different.

The word ‘different’ is useful here. Onceits importance is recognised, it will beseen that it is more to the point thansaying that standards have got higher orlower. A Drum Major with pre-WWIIservice said he thought the standard hadgone up. He was thinking of the dressingduring the march past which had indeedbeen attracting comment. Photographshad appeared in the Press which wereembarrassing certainly, and there hadbeen an improvement. Did that mean thestandard had gone up necessarily? Whatis the test? Suppose the dressing wasperfect. Is there a price to be paid forthat? Perhaps. What is really instructive,

Her Majesty The Queen Elizabeth riding to theQBP for the last time in July 1986. Her Majestyrode the same horse, ‘Burmese’, originallypresented by Canadian government, from 1969 to1986. (Wikipedia Commons – Sandpiper)

Household Cavalry at the Queen’s Birthday Parade (Sgt Mike Harvey)

however, is how the Guardsmen recovertheir dressing. That is where trainingcomes in and it can say a lot more aboutthe meaning of the parade than keepingthe lines straight since, if that’s all thatmatters, why not call in Riverdance? Much more telling than whether the linesare straight or not is how the arms areswung. Whereas once they were swung towaistbelt level, now they are swungalmost shoulder high. This constitutes adefinite change, discernible for someyears. Now it is obvious and deliberate.This marks a fundamental shift towardsan extrovert style which is at variancewith the Parade as a whole. It has animmediate visual impact which makes nodemands on an audience which has nodifficulty in identifying with what itsees. But at what level? It may matter.

There is a marvellous shot in the film A Queen Is Crowned of the Foot Guardsemerging from Admiralty Arch. It is likea revelation. They are swinging theirarms barely waistbelt high, a stylecontrasting strongly with othercontingents on the Procession. Itsuggests they know something we don’t, or else have forgotten. What may occur to some observers is thatthey are a challenge to think again as to what drill is about.

The Queen’s Birthday Parade has a lot to say about this. It is a parade ofgreat iconographic significance, asindeed it should be. Like any real icon,however, it is in the business oficonoclasm, the smashing of falseimages. What it demonstrates superbly isthat where such an event is concerned,the Drill Book cannot be allowed to havethe last word. The reason is simple andshould be obvious. The Drill Book cantell you how to do a drill movement. Itcannot show you. Only a person drillingcan do that. This does not deprive theDrill Book of its almost biblical status. Itsimply confirms its role in servinggreater ends.

This raises the question, a necessary one,of the relationship between the writtenand spoken word. How are words that areshouted meant to be assimilated by

those hearing them? A lot more isinvolved than what words mean inthemselves. That is the reason the DrillBook should not be allowed to have thelast word. It is the human element, theactual physical embodiment of the wordswhich decides the standard. Where this isdenied, the fulcrum of drill shifts to amore peripheral and less human roleaffecting discipline which becomesexternalised, making it more overt.Hence, the extrovert style. This makes itpossible for orders to be so totallyobjective as to change their function,with possibly sinister implications. Theswinging of the arms shoulder high,therefore, may not be as innocent as itlooks. It could indicate a complete breakfrom traditional standards and style.However, both standards may seem toco-exist comfortably at present but allthat the Queen’s Birthday Parade hasstood for could eventually come underthreat, firstly from within, but then fromoutside the military.

Meanwhile, it is the Massed Bands whichset the standard and tone of the Paradeas a whole. The contribution they makewould be irrelevant were it musical only.It isn’t. A keen observer, not British,remarked with admiration that the musicis not militaristic. This is not accidental.

What one is here witness to, beginningwith the Slow Troop which finds itsperfect musical expression in LesHuguenots, is a credal exposition ofwhat the Parade symbolises and must befaithfully adhered to in what follows. Itis also a statement of identity, byHousehold Troops who are determined tobe true to themselves, made withoutarrogance and with self-confidence.

The Drum Majors are superb, showing thesame unerring purpose in moving thehuge phalanx of musicians in theircharge as enables the later, awesomeSpin Wheel manoeuvre to be carried outin the absence of any writteninstructions. The economy of movementwith which the Drum Majors inform theBands is aesthetically perfect, seemingalso to empower them as though theywere performing a liturgical function

befitting their golden, vestment-likeuniform. No wonder that former IrishGuardsman Patrick O’Donovan couldimagine he had attended “a mostbeautiful ceremony in which 1,500 menand one woman become actors in asolemn masque.”

Besides their Colonel in Chief, theQueen, the other focal point is theColour being trooped and displayed, asO’Donovan says, like a relic of the TrueCross. Indeed, it would not be difficultto accept that the Colour solemnlyparaded by the Irish Guards this year hadbeen presented, only weeks before, atWindsor, by the Emperor Constantine’smother, Helena, recently returned fromJerusalem with her historic Find. Whocould be blamed for thinking that? Thefact is, it is deeply impressive andmoving.

This may seem to set the Parade apart asbeing self-centred and having, perhaps,questionable military significance. Theopposite is true. Certainly it celebratesthe Queen’s Birthday but PatrickO’Donovan went further. He called it the“celebration of an idea.” There is,however, nothing vague about this. Itcan be seen in the sobriety, steadiness,self-confidence and certainty which herecombine to testify to a tradition ofsoldiering originating in, and refined by,a tried and true image of man. Perhapsthis explains another observer’s remarkthat “something happened here today.”What he saw was evidence of a definiteattitude to Society involving anunwavering commitment to values bothcivilised and human. A celebrationindeed and an adornment befitting theMonarchy and an Army with standardswhich come from living in earnest andknowing its true place in Society. Thismakes it also a reproach wherever thatvision is not shared or honoured.

Having begun by remarking on thefailure of spectators to understandwhat’s happening on the BirthdayParade, perhaps I should say that PatrickO’Donovan had the same problem. His isan apophatic response, however, onewhere, having made a stab by choosing

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the “celebration of an idea”, he says, “Idon’t know, but I know that this is amoon’s length away from the May Dayperformance in Moscow. This is innocent.It is not arrogant. And, it is beautiful.”One thing he did know, however, wasthat of all the regiments on parade,“There was not the slightest doubt thatthe ranks of the Irish Guards were thestraightest.” But, then, he was himself aMick. Case explained.

“One rapid but fairly sure guide to the

social atmosphere of a country is theparade-step of its army. A military paradeis really a kind of ritual dance, somethinglike a ballet, expressing a certainphilosophy of life. The goose-step, forinstance, is one of the most horriblesights in the world, far more terrifyingthan a dive-bomber. It is simply anaffirmation of naked power; contained init, quite consciously and intentionally, isthe vision of a boot crashing down on aface. ...Beyond a certain point, militarydisplay is only possible in countries wherethe common people dare not laugh at the

army. ... In the British army the drill isrigid and complicated, full of memories ofthe eighteenth century, but withoutdefinite swagger; the march is merely aformalized walk. It belongs to a societywhich is ruled by the sword, no doubt,but a sword which must never be takenout of the scabbard.

An extract from England My England (TheLion and The Unicorn) George Orwell1941. Ed. �

A woman returning from Windsor with shopping walks through the ranks of Coldstream Guardsmen seemingly without a care in the world. The soldiers wererehearsing for the Queen’s Birthday Parade in Windsor

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Manning theLoop – Thefuture utility ofthe FormationReconnaissancesoldierMaj A N B Foden QRL

“Bear in mind that your telegramsmay make the whole Army striketents, and night or day, rain orshine, take up the line of march.Endeavour therefore to secureaccurate information… Above all,vigilance! vigilance! vigilance!”1

Maj J.E.B Stuart

IntroductionWhilst telegrams and tents may havebeen replaced by full motion video andforward operating bases, the purpose ofthe reconnaissance soldier does notappear too different 150 years later.With a defence review imminent, itseems an appropriate time to consider ifwe are making full use of ourreconnaissance capability, both in theshort term for success on currentoperations and in the longer term forfuture, hybrid operations2. ADP Land Opsdefines Reconnaissance as “to obtain, byvisual observation or other detectionmethods, information about the enemy,terrain or indigenous population of aparticular area”, now often termed as‘understanding’. We can see the directionin which ISTAR is moving, and the rolethat reconnaissance regiments are beingrequired to fill within manoeuvrebrigades. All the pieces are theoreticallyin place for manned reconnaissance todeliver what is required, both now and inthe future. I would question if our

reconnaissance troops are optimised todo this? I submit that they are not andthat we should therefore debate what wewish them to achieve.

The recent history of reconnaissanceoperations and structures has beenhindered by the reverse engineering ofad hoc structures, to wit the BSC/DSC3 inIraq, the BRF in Afghanistan, and thecreation of 2 squadron FR regiments inarmoured brigades which prove thatsmall is not necessarily beautiful. Settingaside the equipment debate, do we havewhat we need in terms of reconnaissancespecialists in ground manoeuvrebrigades, and if we do are we employingthem effectively? Looking at examplesfrom another army, and from a historicalperspective, the purpose of this paper isto pose some questions as to the futureutility of FR Regiments. This is by nomeans about criticising the structuresand training that is in place now, ratheradding to the discussion on how wemight optimise for the future.

OptimisationWhilst Future Army Structures (NextSteps) will set the baseline for SDRsettlement on the future structure andorbat of FR regiments, their concept ofemployment in the battlespace must bethe critical factor. FR is still optimised toconduct linear mobile surveillance andyet operates in the ContemporaryOperating Environment (COE) in anincreasingly non contiguous battlespace.Whilst training focuses in the enemy andterrain from the ADP Land Opsdefinition, the importance of the humanpopulation is now recognised, now oftenreferred to as ‘mapping the humanterrain’.

I am not seeking to go back over thedebate about the composition of theBrigade Reconnaissance Force. I wouldjust make the observation that we areattempting to reverse engineer asolution. The model upon which we arebuilding is 3 Cdo and 16 AA Bdes’ BRFswhich are made up of infantrymen (notquite – 3 Cdo Bde’s BRF was based on148 (FO) Bty and 52 Bde’s was based on4/73 Special OP Bty, both with

increments such as a COP – Ed.);understandably they are comfortableconducting company attacks. The wideranging use of the current force saysmore about the lack of a dedicated TFHreserve than it does aboutreconnaissance operations. However, thatthere was a debate at all justifies mypurpose in writing this paper – thatthere is a perception that FR may not bethe first choice to deliver a Brigade levelreconnaissance capability in the COE.Perhaps rather than debating who shouldcreate this bespoke ‘Force’ for operationsin Afghanistan we could take the viewthat FAS has structured manoeuvrebrigades to provide brigadereconnaissance regiments, and evenaccepting the current force generationnorm of collapsing sub-units to ‘thicken’those deploying it should be possible toprovide a two squadron FR capability todeploying brigades. Recent operationalevidence, such as the performance of theLight Dragoons Battlegroup on OpPANCHAI PALANG, more than serves todemonstrate the utility of thereconnaissance soldier in the COE. As forthe future, whilst the nature of conflictmay be uncertain, its key characteristicsare beginning to come into relief. Thecomplexities faced on future operationswill certainly be no less than are facednow.

“The challenge of identifying anadversary’s future intentions is morecomplex in MASD than in LSDI. Inthe Future Operating Environmentthe find challenge will revolve morearound people than it willplatforms.”4

CVR(T) Commander Afghanistan

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In other words we must focus on theindividual soldier and the skills which wegive him to future-proof reconnaissanceas a combat arm, given the increasingimportance of the FIND function.

The LoopThis paper does not set out to debatethe relative merits of manned versus un-manned reconnaissance, but it may helpto consider why we want the ‘man in theloop’? Put simply, the man in the loopprovides twenty four hour all weatherloiter, has the ability to understandrather than to simply find, can takedecisions knowing the commander’sintent, and is therefore rapidly self-taskable in order to provide the highestquality understanding for thecommander.

Much has been made of the size andstructure of the modern brigadeheadquarters. One only needs to stand inthe ops room of Task Force Helmand inLashkar Gah to understand the potentialfor the overloading of Bde HQ with bothinformation and intelligence. It ispossible that placing the man in theloop before this would reduce thisburden, but we must consider if this isadvisable? Lots of organisations andequipment can find but only the humancan decide what and who to find -finding something withoutunderstanding it or putting it intocontext can deliver a false picture to thecommander.

One feature of our COIN campaigns inIraq and Afghanistan has beenbattlegroup areas of operations that arefar larger than we might otherwise wishfor. This has necessitated a moretechnical solution, having fewer, morespecialised men in the loop at a higherheadquarters – for example relying onimage analysts studying multiple ISTARfeeds in Bde HQ rather thanreconnaissance soldiers always beingable to use an OP overlooking theobjective – which will be an increasinglikelihood as we continue to prosecuteeconomy of force operations. However,“reconnaissance capabilities such as FRhave great utility in both providing

commanders with…actionableintelligence … in this complex,asymmetric and unpredictableenvironment”5. Manned surveillancegives you the persistence to understandwhy the insurgent places IEDs in certainlocations; a non-manned sensor may onlyconfirm the presence of an IED.

The natural culmination of these twopoints is that FR regiments should becapable of operating those equipmentswhich can contribute to the understandfunction, for example an organic UAVcapability. FR soldiers would be wellplaced to both employ its sensors andmanage the information they gather.They could conduct pattern of life UAVpatrols, and coordinate the appearanceof the UAV over the tactical battle,noting that its appearance is often adouble edged sword, conduct screening,acting as a covering force, pursuit andexploitation tasks as well asreconnaissance. This model has provedsuccessful in the surveillance section ofa US RSTA squadron, see below. Inaddition, German reconnaissance unitshave a UAV capability, in the form ofAladin. In May 2006, The Netherlandsbought 10 Aladins for use in Uruzgan,6

thereby setting a precedent for the sortof operations that the British Army isfacing today.

The move to embracing equipments thatwere not traditionally the preserve of FRregiments began with MSTAR – the UAVexample is clearly more relevant to theCOE. Such equipments have traditionallynot been the preserve of the cavalry, sothere would undoubtedly be somenaysayers. However, this is anopportunity to corral multiplecapabilities in order to best deliver theunderstand function to the commander –and is something that FR regimentsshould be optimised to do.

Focus On The Man Or The Platform?If we accept the validity of having theman in the loop, especially given theincreasing complexities that we face inthe land environment, the obviousconcern is to ensure that we have theright sort of person for the job. Whilst

we might accept that “patience, nerveand cunning are the essentialcharacteristics of the reconnaissancesoldier”7, it may be worthwhile lookingat the skills that we give to our soldiersto prepare them for operations. As anRAC Soldier Class 3 the FR soldier willhave completed Basic Close CombatSkills, and as a Class 1 soldier he mayattend SCBC.8 Of note the RAC have 10(to be 15) spaces annually on SCBCequating to 2 per FR regiment; 4 TroopLeaders can attend the Live Fire TacticalTraining phase of PCD9 across 5 FRRegiments per year. SCBC is rightly heldas a gold standard of training by theInfantry - should this be the case acrossthe ground combat arms? The answer tothis depends on what you require fromthat soldier – again recent operations inAfghanistan have highlighted that he iscapable in the COE, but has he beengiven all the training that he could havehad?

This is not a question of mounted versusdismounted close combat – ideally youwant someone who can do both,although the training bill to achieve thiswill be high. Work is ongoing torationalise all surveillance andreconnaissance training in LWC under asingle chain of command, I would assertthat this does not go far enough. Thereconnaissance corporal (of whatever capbadge) will not be considered by many tobe the equal of the Section Commanders’Battle Course qualified Infantry corporaluntil their training is on a par. A CombatReconnaissance Course (in line with theCombat Infantryman’s Course) should

Mounted/ Dismounted Cooperation inAfghanistan

form part of Phase 2 training.Additionally the creation of aReconnaissance School, qualifyingreconnaissance soldiers of all capbadgesto a standard perceived as the equal ofthe Infantry Battle School would be astep in the right direction. Achievingthis in the short term would be achallenge; why not a ReconnaissanceBattle School collocated in Brecon, orelse a single Combat Battle School whichcovers delivers all Combat Arm Trainingand therefore increases rationalisation?It would need to be challenging, butthere are plenty of high qualityinstructors across ARTD who could formthe cadre of a significantly enhancedschool.

US Influence Is this possible? The US Army iscorralling the training for all CombatArms together. The Armor School hasmoved from Ft Knox to Fort Benning tojoin the Infantry School under theumbrella of the Maneuver Center ofExcellence. The Maneuver Center reachedIOC on 1 Oct 09, with more than $3.5billion earmarked for the programme. Theraison d’être of this new centre is totrain ready, adaptive soldiers for an armyat war. As the US Army Chief of Staff saidon 20 Oct 09 “We call that full-spectrumoperations (and) all Army maneuverformations will operate like that… fromconventional war all the way topeacetime operations. This will help uscome together and it will be muchbetter, because all of our maneuverforces are going to maneuver similarly,particularly in the kinds of operationsthat we’re conducting in Iraq andAfghanistan.”10 Indeed evidence suggeststhat the US National Guard are able toconduct a 19D (Cavalry Scout) to 11B(Infantryman) Military OccupationSpecialty conversion for a National Guardunit in two weeks11. Whilst this unit maynot have been ready for operations,there are clearly benefits to grasping theinitiative and taking a unified approachto training across the Combat Arms.

The US have further seen the utility ofthe RSTA battalions12 within the BrigadeCombat Teams, proportionately they

make up a far larger proportion of theBCT than dedicated recce troops (of allcapbadges) do in a UK brigade. One ofthe reasons for reducing the number ofcombat sub units in the BCTs was thefact that the US had proved that theiremphasis on FIND and the resourcing ofthe RSTA Bn enabled them toconsistently win.

PrecedenceIn our own fairly recent history we alsosaw the operational imperative drivinginteroperability between the combatarms. After the disastrous defeat inFrance in 1940 (at the hands of Germanforces with strong recce units mountedin light armoured vehicles) theBartholomew Committee called for theformation of a British equivalent. Thiswas achieved by forming the newReconnaissance Corps, which took theplace of the Divisional Cavalry Regiments(themselves removed in 1940 to createArmoured Reconnaissance Brigades).They were initially formed from InfantryBrigade Reconnaissance Groups; witheach Company (later Squadron)comprised of three Troops of light reccecars and an Assault Troop of lorry borneInfantry.

The concept of employment was toprobe ahead and locate the enemy, andto screen the flanks and rearguard whenunder attack. Troopers fought both fromtheir armoured vehicles and on foot13.Indeed, contemporary accounts point tothe benefit of rapidly converting fromthe infantry to the reconnaissance roles,such as at Eindhoven where “BrigadeHeadquarters…decided from a study of

night patrol reports that the situationhad indeed changed, and at ten o’clockin the morning permitted the regimentto forsake its infantry role and become amechanised reconnaissance regimentagain”14. Whilst their famous motto ‘onlythe enemy in front, every other beggarbehind’ might not suit the 360°battlespace, the idea of a Unit with anenhanced baseline of Infantry trainingthat is able to rapidly alter its role wouldsurely be appealing to moderncommanders?

As precision attack becomes all the moreimportant (given increasing engagementranges and the importance of theavoidance of collateral damage) wemight see a shift in emphasis across theland environment from Strike to Find (ormore importantly in the COE to‘understand’ as we seek to succeed inwhat Gen McChrystal has recently calleda ‘population centric approach’). Whilstthe future cannot be certain it seemsthat in order to maximise utility wecould do worse than adopting theflexible approach we saw in theReconnaissance Corps of WW2. Whenconsidering the utility of the FR soldiernow and in the future we cannot getaway from the principal purpose ofreconnaissance. In a recent think pieceon the utility of the find battlegroupfrom HQ 12 Mechanized Brigade, the roleof the FR battlegroup in initiating enemyactivity was discussed. It concluded that“the presence of manned groundreconnaissance operating in concert withother ISTAR assets encourages theunmasking of the enemy and serves todelineate combatants from civilians aswell as providing the most productiveISTAR to the point of battle –themselves.”15 Combat operations in

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Afghanistan are still seen as light rolecompany business, despite the increasingmechanisation of the force. It isimportant to retain the ability tobattlegroup, but FR needs to deliver the‘understand’ function to the brigadecommander.

Conclusion“…Skilfully reconnoitring defilesand fords, providing himself withtrusty guides, interrogating thevillage priest, quickly establishingrelations with the inhabitants”16.

Napoleon

Whilst Napoleon was talking of theduties of a chief of reconnaissanceduring the Peninsular Campaign, hiscomments have equal utility in the COE.US COIN doctrine reaffirms the utility of“overt reconnaissance by patrolsallow(ing) commanders to fillintelligence gaps and developrelationships with local leaders, whilstsimultaneously providing security to thepopulace”17. It will be difficult to reallyoptimise for this role any further untilwe decide on the focus for the man inthe loop, either on the skill sets requiredfor current and future hybrid operations,or on a specific platform. The future forFR Regiments is probably somewhere inthe middle, rapidly adapting fromtechnical to close combat specialist. Thearmy and the wider reconnaissancecommunity needs to focus on thedevelopment of the ‘understand’ functionto ensure its utility in the future, whilst

continuing to make full use of thelessons from the past.

“We must remember that one man ismuch the same as another, and thathe is best who is trained in theseverest school.18”

Thucydides

There is little doubt that things willchange to reflect the needs of currentoperations. However, the Cavalry has not,in the past, been swift to acceptunglamorous roles and so a move intothe UAV world would be viewed withsuspicion and not a little scepticism bythe Royal Artillery (and others) whichhas done the donkey work ofdevelopment in this area. Just havingthe rights over them would not do. As toarmoured recce soldiers operating ontheir feet – in the days of Saladin andSaracen in the 1960s and 1970s, the RACarmoured recce squadrons had supporttroop which carried 5 or so RAC troops inthe back of the Saracen for dismountedtasks. Ed.

1 Freeman, D.S Lee’s Lieutenants: Gettysburgto Appomattox (Indiana, 1944)

2 As given in HQLF FragO 001/09 OpENTIRETY dated 6 Apr 09.

3 Brigade and Divisional SurveillanceCompany.

4 Future Land Operational ConceptDeductions paper dated Jul 2009.

5 Royal Armoured Corps Tactics Volume 2:The Formation Reconnaissance Regiment.

6 Abbildende LuftgestützteAufklärungsdrohne im Nächstbereich.Typical missions are 45 minutes and areflown over a 5 km range, at an altitude of30 – 200 meter above ground.

7 http://www.army.mod.uk/armoured/role/2044.aspx

8 Section Commanders’ Battle Course -Annex A to Royal Armoured CorpsEmployment Structure 09 dated 4 Feb 09.Clearly he will have to wait forpromotion.

9 Platoon Commanders’ Division.

10 http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/10/21/29069-casey-infantry-armor-merger-boosts-armys-full-spectrum-operations/accessed on 2 Nov 09.

11 http://www.nationalguard.com/forumsaccessed on 26 Oct 09.

12 A dedicated ISTAR battalion containingall organic ISTAR assets - Scouts, UAV, EWetc.

13 Doherty, R The British ReconnaissanceCorps in World War II (London, 2007).

14 Kemsley, W The Scottish Lion on Patrol -15th Scottish Reconnaissance Regiment1943 – 46 (Michigan, 1950).

15 HQ 12 Mech Bde, The Find Battlegroup ina FAS Brigade G3-314 dated 29 May 08.

16 http://modern-warfare.org/philosophy/napoleon/napoleon_04.htm accessed on 12 Nov 09.

17 Dept of the Army, FM 3-24Counterinsurgency (Dec 2006) Para 3-139.

18 Foster Smith, C. Thucydides - The Historyof the Peloponnesian War �

The first squadron of the Federation Armoured Corps in Malaya became operational in 1951 after its passing out parade before His Excellency the HighCommissioner, General Sir Gerald Templer at Resah camp, near Seremban. The Squadron, the first Malayan squadron to go into operation against theCommunist terrorists, has been highly trained in convoy work, communications, maintenance of vehicles and weapon handling. (IWM).

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The PeninsularWar – An AlliedVictory or aFrench Failure?

Colonel Nick LipscombeChairman of Peninsular War 200

‘When you engage in actual fighting,if victory is long in coming, themen’s weapons will grow dull andtheir ardour will be dampened. ….Now, when your weapons are dulled,your ardour dampened, your

strength exhausted and yourtreasure spent, other chieftains willspring to take advantage of yourextremity. Then no man, howeverwise, will be able to avert theconsequences that must ensue.’

Sun Tsu, 5th Century BC

In 1782 a French Jesuit translated SunTsu’s Art of War into French. FatherAmiot’s painstaking work was to have farreaching and rapid consequences. Itstruck a chord with a young andambitious French artillery officer whowas quick to comprehend the value ofGeneral Tsu’s enduring regulations.Within a few years Napoleon Bonapartehad conquered most of Europe, in 1807the Fourth Coalition was dead and at thezenith of his power, he turned hisattention to the Iberian Peninsula.

Following French success in the Prussian

campaign in 1805-6 and subsequently inPoland and eastern Prussia in 1807,Napoleon concluded the Treaty of Tilsit,thereby establishing peace with Russia,dismembering Prussia and releasing hismind to matters of a semi-domesticnature, namely Spain. The disaster atTrafalgar in 1805 had removed a vitalcomponent of his allied foundation,specifically the Spanish navy; deemedessential to the defeat the Royal Navyand the ultimate invasion andsubjugation of Britain. It was this latterobsession, which eventually ledNapoleon to involve himself in theIberian Peninsula. Since 1806, he hadapplied renewed impetus to theContinental System, designed to boycotttrade with Britain and thereby forcedefeat on the nation through economic,rather than military means. This fixation,coupled with the open proclamation inOctober 1806 by Manuel de Godoy, the

Map depicting the main British events of the Map depicting the main British events of the Peninsular War (author’s collection - Nick Lipscombe)

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first minister of the Spanish BourbonKing, Charles IV, which rallied theSpanish people against an undeclaredfoe, so obviously France, was enough toput the two countries on a collisioncourse. Despite Napoleonic impatiencethis impact was to be circumlocutory.

The French Foreign Minister, CountTalleyrand was instructed to deal withone of the principal evaders of theContinental System and a defaulter on her indemnity from the War of theOranges, namely Portugal. Using Spain as a base for offensive operations wouldpose few problems as Godoy had beensuggesting such a move for some time.Thus Napoleon, by soliciting a publicdemonstration from his principal ally,could extend the blockade, satisfy hisprincipal obsession and get more than a foot in the Spanish door. A combinedFranco-Spanish army would descend onthe ill-prepared state, and oncesubjugated, it would be divided up as secretly agreed at the Treaty ofFontainebleau in September 1807.However, the terms of the Treaty weremerely a means to a Napoleonic end; two months later, General Junot enteredLisbon unopposed and, almostimmediately, Napoleon began planninghis next move against an unsuspectingSpain.

Unconnected, but remarkably timely forNapoleon, was the arrest by Charles IV ofhis son and heir, Ferdinand, Prince ofAsturias on the charge of plotting tooverthrow his aged father. Thisdevelopment resulted from Ferdinand’sdisapproval since childhood of Godoy’smanipulative prominence; a sentimentshared by a good number of his fellowcountrymen. Lacking the conviction totackle Godoy head-on, Ferdinand electedto solicit the support of the FrenchEmperor via proposals of marriage to aspouse of Napoleon’s choice. A ploy hefelt sure would cement his claim to thethrone, in due course, at Godoy’sexpense. It was to backfire when one ofthe many spies of the first ministerintercepted correspondence on thematter, which was subsequently dressedup as a plot to oust the aged King.

Charles IV was left with scant room to manoeuvre and publicly vilified theunfortunate Ferdinand. Napoleon was, of course, delighted at this public stately melodrama by the Spanish house of Bourbon.

A few days before Junot entered Lisbon a second Corps, consisting of anothertwenty five thousand men under GeneralDupont, had crossed the Pyreneesdisguised as support to Junot should the British choose to defend Portugal.This caused considerable concern to theSpanish authorities; but concern was toturn to fear some six weeks later whenyet another fourteen thousand men, half French half Italian, flowed intoCatalonia, under Marshal Moncey and two further corps assembled on theFranco-Spanish border. Dupont andMoncey marched south but clearly notto the aid of their colleague in Portugal.Godoy and the King, realising that amilitary response was not an option,ironically suggested a union between a Bonaparte princess and the heir toSpanish house of Bourbon. Napoleontook his time in sending a reply, whichwhen finally conveyed, questioned theadvantage of a liaison to Fernando who,by his father’s own declaration, wastainted. By mid February 1808, Napoleon

tired of the pretence, yet more troopsentered Spain and the frontier fortresseswere seized. Godoy was cornered and ata loss as to how best to proceed. Withno little difficulty he sent word to theSpanish troops under Junot’s commandin Portugal to return to Spain. ‘Themistrust of Junot demanded areservation and a pretence very difficultin its execution of the order…to avoidbeing translated in movements thatwould get the attention of the Frenchgeneral, which would make himsuspicious and provoke contraryprovidence’1. Most got away but those in Lisbon were disarmed and interned;Napoleon accused Spain of bad faith,declaring that he no longer felt bound by Fontainebleau. He did, however,promise Spain the whole of Portugal, butin exchange she would have to surrenderall territory between the River Ebro andPyrenees and sign a permanent andunlimited alliance with France2.

By early March Murat had been placed incommand of the French forces in Spainand had established his headquarters inVitoria. ‘The populations of the transitedcities and towns received Murat with thegreatest cordiality and possibleindulgence, going out to meet him andhailing him as a liberator’3. To the people

Rédition de Madrid 1808 Antoine-Jean Gros (Wikipedia Commons)

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the presence of the French reinforcedtheir view that it was Napoleon’sintention to install Fernando on thethrone and the invaders encouraged thedeception. Godoy lingered over the bestway to proceed and despite havingordered the Spanish garrisons in Frenchoccupied zones not to resist, war lookedinevitable. Direct conflict was not in theinterest of the fernandinos and they nowplotted an uprising to provide Napoleonthe excuse for regime change. On the18th March, with rumours that the Kingand Queen were evacuating the royalpalaces at Aranjuez, the royal guardrebelled and the mob took to the streets.The next day Carlos abdicated in favourof his son.

Meanwhile, Napoleon’s brother in lawMarshal Murat had entered Madrid and,by the end of April, had a considerableforce within the city limits. He refusedto acknowledge Fernando andencouraged Carlos to protest against thecircumstances of his abdication. Thisprovided Napoleon the pretext to lureCarlos and Fernando to Bayonne in orderto consider the issue. However, onarrival, far from discussing theimplications of his recent accession, thehapless young King was presented withan ultimatum to abdicate and confrontedwith confessions from the former kingclaiming that he had vacated the thronethrough coercion. Napoleon settled thematter by claiming the throne forhimself. In Madrid, restless at theproximity of this French force and withnews of the unravelling treachery atBayonne, the mood turned vicious andon the 2nd May (El Dos de Mayo) the cityerupted; the Spanish guerre de laindependencia4 had officially begun.

Napoleon, and the majority of hisimperial advisors, predicted a swiftconclusion to events in much the samemanner as Portugal. This was not to be.The war was to ebb and flow throughoutthe Peninsula over the next six years,culminating in the allied army invadingFrance itself, the final humiliation. Thereasons leading to ultimate failure werenumerous and largely interlinked, beingunderpinned by Napoleon’s

contemptuous failure to appreciate ofthe determination of the Spanish people,the demands of the Iberian topographyand the tenacity of the small Britishexpeditionary force sent to the aid of theIberian nations.

The allied forces consisted of the regulararmies of Britain, Portugal and Spain andthe irregular Spanish guerrilleros5 andPortuguese ordenança6. From 1808,Britain and Portugal combined theirregular forces in an Anglo Portuguesearmy but cooperation and coordinationwith the Spanish regular and irregularforces was, at best sporadic and atworst, non-existent and in some casescounterproductive to the greater cause.The relationship between the Spanisharmies and the local guerrilleros wasconvoluted and troublesome, the latterwere seen (by the military establishmentif not the people themselves) as denyingthe army of badly needed recruits, horsesand supplies. Unfortunately, the Spanishregular forces having been poorlyresourced, trained and prepared in theyears running up to French occupationwere no match for the more developedEuropean armies of the day. Their failureson the field of battle inevitably evokedcriticism; with the previous regimeremoved, the army commandersthemselves took the blame. Theguerrilleros conversely, were elevated tothe status of national heroes. In reality,neither group earned the condemnationor respect thrust upon them.

The Grande Armée, by contrast, was freshfrom legendary victories over Austria,Prussia and Russia; it was arguably thebest-equipped European army of thetime. ‘La Glorie’ and honour were aliveand well, and this seemingly invincibleforce was poised to perform the nextcoup de théâtre. It was not to be.Strategically Napoleon’s plans wereflawed; had he chosen to manipulate theyoung Bourbon King, rather than replacehim, his long term ambitions may wellhave been realised. By installing his ownbrother Joseph, he demonstrated anuncharacteristic misunderstanding of theSpanish populace and, in so doing, lostsight of his strategic aims. There was a

certain irony in this misjudgement; thiswas the first instance since the Frenchrevolution where an entire nation tookup arms against an oppressor. Hiscontempt is best illustrated by the factthat he personally only spent twomonths in theatre of the seventy-eightmonth campaign. As time passed, andthe months turned into years, theIberian campaign became a second frontdraining vital resources and distractingthe Emperor’s focus from his grandestratégie.

Napoleon’s failure to maintain what can be described as a questionablestrategic aim had far reachingoperational consequences. He executed a deliberate policy of fragmented armycommand and control, which fuelled theambitions of many of his armycommanders and crippled the overalleffectiveness of the fighting force as awhole. This was all the more incredibleas Napoleon considered centralisation ofsupreme authority another sine qua nonof successful campaigning. ‘In war, menare nothing; one man is everything,’ oragain, ‘Better one bad general than twogood ones.’7 By refusing to install asingle commander-in-chief he fuelled thesimmering rivalries that existed amongsthis Peninsular lieutenants. For most theywere experiencing independent commandfor the first time and, with the Emperor’sguiding hand well over the horizon,some revelled in the experience whilstothers floundered, rudderless.Cooperation between the separatedistrict armies became the exception,flexibility was lost and sustainabilitycomplicated but most significantly,concentration of force was rarelyachieved. In March 1812, with hisRussian campaign looming, Napoleonfinally accepted that the autonomouscommands needed to be focussed undera single leader. Surprisingly he decidednot to appoint a military man as primusinter pares, instead King Joseph wasgiven the charge, much to the chagrin ofthe numerous Peninsular marshals whoconsidered Bonaparte’s dithering brotherincapable of the task. Inevitably, themajority refused to submit themselves toJoseph’s direct control, electing instead

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to play both sides off against the middle by going unswervingly to Paris,questioning the military orders anddirectives they received from Madrid.Consequently, other than the period in1808 and early 1809 when Napoleontook personal charge of events in Spain,no single commander ever exercisedeffective command and control over the French armies in the Peninsula.

Of equal significance was the lack of adedicated operational reserve. Initially a small reserve of about eight thousandmen under General Dorsenne was locatedin Madrid where their primaryresponsibilities lay in protecting King Joseph (in support of the imperialguards); however, the impetuousness ofthe Madrileños inevitably removed thelikelihood of nationwide deployment intheir secondary reserve role. Anoperational reserve did exist for a shortperiod during the time of Napoleon’spersonal involvement in theatre butquickly dissolved once the Emperor leftin early 1809. By mid 1811 thereorganisation of the French Army ofSpain into six separate armies increasedoperational isolation, counter tostrategic aims. The Army of the Centre inMadrid was de facto the only militaryorganisation directly controlled by KingJoseph and its utilisation as the

operational reserve even more remote.The third significant operational blunderwas the failure to appreciate thecomplexities of the Iberian topographyon military operations and logistics.Iberia is an extensively mountainousregion except in the central plateau andthe narrow coastal plains; the rivers arein deep ravines, generally not navigableand, depending on the season, eitherraging torrents or trickling streams. Bothmountains and rivers run at right anglesto the French lines of communicationfrom the Pyrenees and much of the landis infertile. In the early nineteenthCentury, these numerous rivers did not support the major lines ofcommunication; roads wereunderdeveloped and inevitably circuitousin their nature. Junot’s invasion ofPortugal in 1807, Blake’s retreat over themountains in the Asturias in 1808,Moore’s retreat to La Coruña in 1808-9,Soult’s retreat from Oporto in 1809,Massena’s retreat from the Lines of TorresVedras in 1811 and Wellington’s retreatfrom Burgos in 1812 all bear testamentto the rigours of soldiering in thePeninsula. Movement of anything otherthan lightly equipped soldiers wasproblematic, the movement of artilleryand baggage trains was at timesimpossible and the ‘rapid’ movement andconcentration of armies a desperatelyslow and frustrating affair. Furthermore,deep defiles enabled small forces to holdoff entire armies and provided theperfect surroundings for the Spanishguerrilleros and Portuguese militia andordenança who roamed the hills inunison with their environs. In turn,French commanders were forced topenny-packet their forces to maintaincontrol of their vast areas and, moreimportantly, their principal lines ofcommunication. These small detachmentswere vulnerable to the more resoluteguerrilla operations and immediately lost their localised control whenwithdrawn or concentrated. As a directconsequence economy of effort wasrarely achieved, it was impossible to be strong everywhere and exploits were often wasted for little or nopositive effect.

Logistically the Peninsula was anightmare. In central Europe and Italythe Grande Armée had lived off the landin cantonments or on the move; insimple Napoleonic terms, operationswere to be self sufficient and self-financing. However, in Spain this wassimply not possible as the majority ofthe land was infertile and barely able tosustain the indigenous population of justover twelve million people. Furthermore,the country was almost devoid suitablelivestock; carts and carriages werequickly damaged beyond repair. The bulkof military supplies had to be broughtinto the country, moved andconcentrated in advance of operations,which was both time consuming andexpensive. The logistical challenges ofthe region are often cited in officialFrench dispatches but were underplayedby Napoleon himself. Conversely, hisPeninsular commanders were quick tograsp the Iberian dilemma: that largearmies starved whilst small armies weredefeated8. Wellington too, quicklyappreciated the problems associated withsupplying his army and the Frenchdilemma. ‘Bonaparte cannot carry on hisoperations in Spain, excepting by meansof large armies; and I doubt whether thecountry will afford the subsistence for alarge army, or if he will be able to supplyhis magazines from France, the roadsbeing so bad and the communication sodifficult. The more ground the Frenchhold down, the weaker will they be atany given point’9. The British commanderon the other hand, paid considerableattention to the logistic implications of(most) operations early in the planningand in minute detail. In so doing, hewas often frustrated by the lack ofSpanish and Portuguese support.However, to be fair to the host nations,they had a finite amount of availableresources, and what little they had wasoften provisioned for their own armiesand starving populations in the firstinstance.

With one thousand five hundred miles ofcoastline, there was, of course, anotheroption available, namely sea transport.The want of a French naval presenceArthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington (Sir Thomas

Lawrence)( Wikipedia Commons)

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provided Wellington a significantoperational advantage, which he wasadept at exploiting. Only the Frenchoperations in Catalonia and Navarre ever received succour of anysignificance; conversely, alliedoperations throughout the war relied onsea transport for supplies, ammunitionand the movement and evacuation ofmen, horses and guns. The war ispeppered with examples of joint armyand navy cooperation, albeit sometimesfrosty in nature, from the evacuation atLa Coruña in 1809, succour at Cadiz,Gibraltar and behind the Lines of TorresVedras in 1810-11, to operations on theeastern and northern coasts in 1813. Theabsence of this luxury to the Frenchcannot be overstated and was anothernoteworthy aspect ultimatelycontributing to French defeat.

Operational security and surprise were two additional areas where theallies enjoyed significant advantages.Wellington noted in his dispatch of 21st July 1812, ‘the French armies inSpain have never had any securecommunication beyond the ground which they occupy.’ To deter partisanintervention, the movement of Frenchtroops and supplies had to be supportedby large military escorts but themovement of communiqués anddispatches was a far more dangerousaffair, as speed was critical. Small groupswere often intercepted en-route anddealt with mercilessly by their captorswho then passed the contents ofcaptured documents to British exploringofficers10. This provided the allies withan immense advantage, as they oftenreceived timely and accurate informationon the bona fide and planned movementsof the French forces and, from thisintelligence, the allied command wereable to piece together their plans andobjectives with remarkable exactness.Operational surprise was almostimpossible for the French as anymovement, large or small, was reportedthrough the network of partisan units,allied spies and reconnaissance orintelligence officers. The French too had their own network of informants, the Afrancesados11; numbers were limited

and their network very fragile. The early codes and ciphers used to try andprotect the contents of dispatches wereeasily broken and it was not until late1811 that a more sophisticated systemof cipher, known as the grand chiffre,was introduced12.

Tactically the French had mixed success.The oft-held view that Spanish armieswere uncooperative and ineffectual haspervaded British historical accounts. ‘The Duke of Wellington in hisdispatches, and still more in his privateletters and his table-talk, was alwaysenlarging on the folly and arrogance of the Spanish generals with whom hehad to cooperate, and on theuntrustworthiness of their troops’13.General Napier, Lord Londonderry and the many Peninsular diaries echo similarsentiments. Modern, more subjectivestudies do not support this poor opinion.‘The enemy confronting the Duke ofWellington would never thereafter be of the same high standard as the onewhich destroyed the Spanish armies inthe winter campaign of 1808’.14 Thosearmies, without doubt, endurednumerous defects at the start of the war. They were suffering from a lack offunding and an antiquated organisation:

there were no army corps, onlyindependent field armies and as such, no corps troops, no major units inreserve and the divisions were notfurther broken down into brigades.Consequently the armies moved andoperated as one, normally on the fringesof the country and at the speed of itsslowest arm, the artillery, that waschronically short of suitable draughtanimals. This lack of mounts was to have a momentous effect on theorganisation and efficiency of theSpanish cavalry. Centuries of interbreeding horses and mules across Iberia had reduced the quality ofsuitable mounts and at the start of thecampaign, the cavalry only had aboutnine thousand horses, half the numberthey needed. ‘No matter whether it wasclassified as light or heavy cavalry, asdragoons or chasseurs, or as line or elite,Spain’s cavalry was unlikely to be able to make much of an impact on thebattlefield’15. ‘The few cavalry divisionswere reduced to a handful of precioussquadrons, without any organisationallink between regiments. Badly mounted,they were even less well trained, andconsequently they lacked the morale. Asa result they were completely ineffectivein the face of the French cavalry, which

Salamanca - A view of the Grand Arapil (left) and the Lesser Arapil providing scale to a Napoleonicbattlefield. (Nick Lipscombe)

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was united and superior in everyrespect’16. Time and time again, battles between the Spanish and French lay in the balance until thedecisive employment of the Frenchcavalry. Of course, there is a finedividing line between quitting thebattlefield to save your skin andextracting yourself to save your force to be able to fight another day and thisis perhaps where many (mainly British)historians have been harshly critical ofthe Spanish military achievement andcontribution. To dismiss, out of hand thecollective Spanish military performanceis missing the point; the sheer presenceof numerous formed bodies of Spanishregular troops required the French toallocate troops to take on or containthese formations, rendering many tens of thousands of French troopsunavailable for operations against

Wellington. For example, the great battle at Salamanca would not have been possible if the Spanish 6th and 7th armies were not containing fortythousand French troops to the north.

The Grand Armée, at the commencementof the Peninsular campaign, wasinvincible having swept aside Austrian,Prussian and Russian armies in thepreceding years. The basic tacticalformation in the attack having beenworked during the Revolutionary Warssome fifteen years previously, and thenhoned by Napoleon himself during thenorthern Italian and Austerlitzcampaigns. Fundamentally, it consistedof a numerically strong screen oftirailleurs17 who manoeuvred in smallgroups or individually in front of themain body of advancing troops. Theirtasks was threefold, firstly to distract

the enemy’s attention from the mainbody of attacking troops moving intotheir attacking positions and formations,secondly to probe the enemy lines forweaknesses following the initial artillerybarrage and finally to exploit thoseweaknesses if the opportunity presenteditself. Indeed, a number of engagementsprior to the Peninsular War had endedwith the opponent’s lines beingpenetrated before the main body wasbrought to bear. The main body itselfconsisted of Ordre Mixte with the linessupporting a central core of troops indeep columns who literally battered their way through the lines by sheerweight of numbers. Artillery was asignificant supporting element to thistactic, as Napoleon himself observed‘columns do not break through lines,unless they are supported by superiorartillery fire’18.

Map depicting the initial positions at Busaco. From a collection of maps to be published in a Peninsular War Atlas in 2010 by the author (By kind permissionof Osprey Publishing)

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These tactics were to fail in thePeninsula and there were a number ofreasons for this. Firstly, the French wereunable to put into the field the amountof artillery that they had traditionallyenjoyed in central Europe19, due to thedifficult terrain and conflicting demandsfor both guns and gunners. Secondly,Napoleon’s commanders generally optedto attack in column alone and not OrdreMixte20, partly because this was an easiermanoeuvre for the less experiencedtroops who tended to be sent to thePeninsula but it also perhapsdemonstrated a lack of confidence on the part of the commanders themselves.By attacking in column alone, a divisionof five thousand men would assault on a front of one hundred and seventyindividuals, twenty-four ranks deep. Only the two front ranks of the columncould fire with any effect. Out of the five thousand advancing men only threehundred could shoot at the enemy.21 Therate of fire of these two bodies is alsosignificant: advancing infantry takemuch longer to re-load than static welldrilled and highly disciplined soldiers.Conversely, attacking infantry in columnprovided an easier and bulkier target forboth artillery gun and infantry musket.However, the matter of column versusline is only part of the reason forcontinued tactical success.

One notable modern Napoleonic tacticianconsiders that Wellington generallyemployed three additional and quiteseparate precautions. He anchored hisflanks, ‘to prevent the enemy working hisway around and attacking the weakestpart of the line…by extending the lineto some natural obstacle or strong point.Wellington also took steps to ensure thatthe men along the line were neverneedlessly exposed to either small armsor artillery fire before it was time forthem to enter the action. However, itwas not enough to anchor the line andinitially hide most of the defendersbehind protective or covering terrain.Adequate countermeasures had to betaken to neutralise the Frenchskirmishers. Wellington’s solution was tosend out skirmishers of his own, whowould not only contest their opponent’s

advance but force the opposingcommander to send out ever increasingnumbers of skirmishers….22.Perhaps Wellington’s greatest tacticalstrength was his ability to select groundfor both defence and attack. Hisappreciation of the tactical significanceof the terrain north of Lisbon is perhapsthe best example. In so doing heselected positions that afforded deadground, masked considerable numbers ofhis force, provided mutual support,covered lines of withdrawal andfacilitated good communication for thelateral movement of reserves. Busaco isundoubtedly the best example. Thistactical genius of utilising dead groundwas, at that time, ground breaking; itprevented the attacker knowing thedefender’s dispositions and de factostrengths and weaknesses, but it alsoprevented him employing his main body,reserves, artillery and skirmishers to besteffect, thereby undermining the shockand manoeuvre of the attack in column.

Wellington countered the mass oftirailleurs and guns deployed in advanceof the main body by throwing out acorrespondingly strong line ofskirmishers, a tactic that had beenhitherto ridiculed by the British military

establishment. These skirmishers werelargely resourced from the integral lightcompanies or from the newly formedBritish23 rifle and Portuguese24 lightbattalions. This protective line preventedthe tirailleurs from penetrating the alliedranks but often suffered heavy casualtiesas a result. At Barrosa the tactic workedbut at Fuentes de Oñoro the infantrywere returned to skirmish orderprematurely and were cut to pieces bythe French cavalry.

Off the battlefield the French wereravaged by the guerrilleros, hated by thepopulation, exhausted by the climateand terrain, overwhelmed by starvationand disease and unable to produce thedecisive blow to thwart allied intentions.They died in their thousands, the highmorale which they exuded at the outsetof the campaign quickly faded. Incontrast to the campaigns in centralEurope, opportunities for personalambition and advancement were few andfar between. One by one the best ofNapoleon’s subordinates tried and failed,and with their reputations tarnishedtheir despair and lethargy bredthroughout the French ranks. Even whenfighting on French soil at the twilight ofthe conflict, the dogged determination

Grand Kitchen of Europe - The Spanish Ulcer placed Napoleon in a stew, Ney in a pickle and Massena onthe spit. (Reproduced by kind permission of the Bibiloteca Nacional de Portugal.)

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and esprit de corps of the early days waslong gone.

It is difficult to tie down one particularaspect of these failures by Napoleon andhis Peninsular commanders thatultimately led to the French failure inIberia. It was a cocktail of misjudgementand mismanagement and, following hisdisastrous Russian campaign, Napoleonmust have rued the day he ever cast hiseye over his southern neighbour. Notthat it was a flawless performance by theallies. Co-operation between Wellingtonand the Spanish central junta (orRegency) and subsequent Cortes25 wasriddled with mutual suspicion and withthe Portuguese authorities matters wereoften little better. Despite this, thecombined allied aims, adherence to theprinciples of war and the determinationand tenacity of the Spanish andPortuguese people were sufficientlyharmonised to bring about the defeat ofthe greatest military force of the periodand shatter the Napoleonic dream.

1 Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, vol.I, p. 209.

2 Esdaile, The Peninsular War A New History,p. 31.

3 Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, vol.I, p.p. 202-203.

4 The Spanish term for the Peninsular War,it is worth noting that the French calledit the Campaign in Spain, while thePortuguese term was the war ofLiberation.

5 The Peninsular conflict was to spawn thisterm, guerrilla meaning “little war”. Thefighters were correctly called guerrillerosand they collectively fought la guerrillathe irregular struggle.

6 Portuguese Home Guard; quite distinctfrom the guerrilleros as they were in factuniformed but they, nevertheless, foughtunconventionally.

7 Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p.xxxix.

8 Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, a History of thePeninsular War, p. 32.

9 Reid, Tracing the Biscuit: The BritishCommissariat in the Peninsular War,Militaria, Revista de Cultura Militar,

Número 7, 1995, p. 103.

10 These were officers in uniform who movedand operated independently, providingintelligence on French movements,concentrations and troops strengths. Theyalso liased with the guerrilleros andtherefore had to speak good Spanish.

11 Spaniard loyal to Joseph Bonaparte –literally “frenchified one”.

12 Major George Scovell, one of Wellington’sstaff officers, ultimately broke this code.

13 Oman, A History of the Peninsular War,vol. I, p. 89.

14 Griffith, A History of the Peninsular War,vol. IX, Sañudo, Oman’s view of theSpanish Army in the Peninsular WarReassessed, ch. 6, p. 159.

15 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, A New History,p. 45.

16 Griffith, A History of the Peninsular War,vol. IX, Sañudo, Oman’s view of theSpanish Army in the Peninsular WarReassessed, ch. 6, p. 148.

17 French term for skirmishing troops orsharpshooters, who were positioned infront of the main body of forces.

18 Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, a History of thePeninsular War, p. 21 (from Girod de l’Ain,p. 107).

19 Napoleonic doctrine stipulated 5 guns perthousand infantry. In the Peninsula, thefigure average about 5 guns for twothousand men.

20 Though not exclusively and it would bewrong to assume that the entirecampaign was fought on this basis: atFuentes de Oñoro the central battalionsthat attacked the village of Pozo Bellowere in line, those on the flanks were incolumn and at Albuera the mixed orderattack so nearly broke the allied line.

21 Glover, The Peninsular War 1807-1814 aconcise military history, p.32.

22 Griffith, A History of the Peninsular War,vol. IX: Nosworthy, Sir Charles Oman onLine verses Column, ch. 10, p. 232-233.

23 The 95th Regiment wore green jacketsand were known by the French assanterelles or grasshoppers.

24 Known as caçadores. Initially there were 6caçadores battalions and by 1812, thenumber had risen to 12.

25 Spanish parliament. �

Rifleman BroomA Company TheRifles, Helmand,2009 (ArabellaDorman)

Boer IEDsLieutenant Colonel IP MillsSO1 PSO Logistic PlansBritish Peace Support Team(South Africa)

What can the actions of a Scottishrenegade Improvised Explosive Device(IED) expert in the Anglo-Boer War tellus about techniques, tactics andprocedures in Iraq and Afghanistantoday? At a time when most of the US,coalition and ISAF lives that are lost inthese theatres are a result of IEDattacks, the answer is a great deal andthat although technology may havemoved on, the lessons to be drawn fromthe British counter-measure experienceare as relevant today as they were allthose years ago......

This paper studies the use of innovativeIEDs against British and colonial forcesduring the Anglo-Boer war in SouthAfrica (1899 – 1902). Using existing

reference material and the results of afield trial, the paper examines thetactical and technical aspects of howIEDs were used against British trains onthe Pretoria to Delagoa Bay railway linebetween September 1900 and July 1901.The paper draws comparisons withcurrent and recent British militaryoperations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Boer insurgency took root because ofa limitation on the number of MainSupply Routes (MSRs), the vastness ofthe terrain and the nature of theinsurgent forces who fought in smallfractured cells.

During the Anglo-Boer war, the keymeans of communication for Britishforces was the railway network. Othersupply routes i.e. roads, paths andtracks, were unpredictable due toweather conditions and reliant upon thesupply of dependable oxen and horses.The British also experienced a great dealof difficulty in maintaining healthylivestock1; the general shortage ofhorses, particularly in the war’s earlierstages and the poor condition of troophorses in South Africa, hindered British

and colonial force mobility2. All of thismeant that the British were forced to usethe rail network for the movement oftroops, materiel and combat supplies.

Between 2003 and 2009, coalition forcesin Iraq were also limited in choice ofMSRs, using the established network ofmajor hard-top roads and highways forthe transportation and distribution ofsupplies. Conditions off these highwayswere too soft and unpredictable and themajority of military logistic vehicles weretoo heavy to handle off-road terrain. InAfghanistan, the ability to travel off theMSR varies, with conditions generallybetter in the southern desert. Carefulreconnaissance and planning such asthat carried out prior to the repair of theKajaki Dam hydro-electric turbines inAugust 2008 demonstrated thatalternative routes could be used, makingtroop movement less predictable.Nevertheless not all minor roads andtracks in Afghanistan are suitable for themany varieties of lightly and heavilyarmoured ISAF vehicles. The result beingthat there is a strong tendency to usethe Highway 1 circular road thattraverses through most of the country’sregions.

By 24th September 1900, the OrangeFree State and the majority of theTransvaal south of the Delagoa Bayrailway line were under British control.The northern Transvaal Republic couldonly be controlled where it wasphysically occupied by their militarycolumns3; the vast expanse of landmaking it impracticable for the 250,000British and colonial troops to control therest of territory effectively. Furthermore,these distances allowed the Boercommandos considerable freedom ofmovement and suited the strategy ofguerrilla warfare; commandos were sentoff to their own districts with orders toact against the British whenever anopportunity presented itself. Their aimwas to do as much damage as possible,and then move off quickly, disappearinginto the veldt prior to the arrival ofBritish reinforcements.

In South Africa the British won the

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Map Southern Africa 1899

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conventional war against the Orange FreeState and Transvaal Boer forcesconvincingly, but they were unpreparedfor the insurgency that followed andcould not fully comprehend the freedomand succour afforded by the terrain.

In a similar vein, the US Coalition in Iraqwas surprised by the speed at which theinsurgency followed the fall of Baghdadon 9th April 2003. Even theapprehension of Saddam Hussein on 14thDecember 2003 did nothing to quell thenumber of attacks by various groupsagainst coalition forces throughout thecountry. Indeed, British forces operatingin Basra experienced one of their busiestyears in 2004. The trend was country-wide; US DoD statistics show that thetotal number of service personnel Killed

in Action, or died of wounds, was 319 in2003 – but rose to 713 in 2004. Thesituation in Afghanistan is morecomplex, where the counter-insurgencydimension is mixed in with thetraditional war-fighting and peacesupport aspects of ISAF’s mission. In thiscase, Taliban havens extend as far as thesemi-independent tribal regions situatedalong the frontier with Pakistan. Thisunreachable geographical factor, similarto that encountered by the British in thenorthern Transvaal, means that despitethe establishment of a formal Afghangovernment on 7 December 2004, theinsurgency has flourished and even todaysome areas still remain “ungovernable”.

During the Anglo-Boer war, the Boercommandos operated semi-

independently. A degree of control wasexercised by senior leaders howevercommanders, such as Smuts and De laRey, were allowed to formulate andexecute their own operations providedthey complied with strategic guidelines.This was perhaps a true example ofmission command. Moreover Boer unitswere small and fractured, making itdifficult for the British to dislocate andfrustrate the overall structure. The sameis true of many of the insurgent forceswhich emerged during the twentiethcentury and is particularly pertinent toIraq and Afghanistan where the enemymake-up was and is multifarious,disjointed and deliberately difficult todisrupt through a central point of access.

With regard to IEDs, Boer attacks became

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increasingly sophisticated. The Britishresponse took time to formulate andrequired the use of armoured trainsfollowed by the construction of blockhouses plus other obstacles to combatthe threat.

Early on in the war, the Boers recognisedthat British reliance upon the railwaywas a significant weakness and by late1900, attacks against British trains hadbecome increasingly complex and wellexecuted. One of the stretches of railwaythat received a great deal of attention byBoer Commandos between late 1900 andmid 1901 was the line that linked theMozambique coastal port of Delagoa Baywith Pretoria, the capital city of theTransvaal. One Boer unit that employedparticularly sophisticated tactics andtechnology in this regard wascommanded by a renegade namedCaptain Jack Hindon.

Captain Oliver Jack Hindon, aka‘Dynamite Jack’, was Scottish by birth.He joined the British Army as a boysoldier but deserted claiming to havebeen physically assaulted by a seniormember of his unit. After this, Hindontravelled north to the Transvaal Republicwhere he became a stonemason and latera police officer. In 1895/6 he assistedthe Boers during the infamous Jamesonraid where British supporters tried totake the Transvaal Republic and its golddeposits by force. For his loyalty, Hindonwas awarded citizenship by the Transvaalgovernment; an honour normally notbestowed upon an uitlander at the time.At the outbreak of the war he was sentto the Middelburg commando where hefought with distinction throughout thefirst year of the campaign, particularly atSpion Kop. Between February and April1900, he formed the Hindon Scouts; theunit proved so successful that LordKitchener publicly stated that Hindonhad caused more difficulties for Britishand colonial forces than any other BoerCommander. The Hindon Scouts becamenotorious train-wreckers, particularlyalong the Pretoria - Delagoa Bay railwayline where they operated under thecommand of General Ben Viljoenalongside Captain Henri Slegtkamp and

his group of commandos.

Hindon would take time to survey theground in order to ensure that once atrain had been derailed, his unit wouldhave the advantage of surprise and theability to withdraw from the scenerapidly. During a reconnaissance on 16thJanuary 1901, Hindon noticed that threetrains were successively sent out ofBalmoral at short intervals; he realisedthat by derailing the first at a particularpoint on a slight rise they would havethe opportunity to ambush the secondand third in the same way before theBritish understood what was happeningand able to react according. As a resultof this raid, Hindon’s unit was able toresupply itself sufficiently well tocontinue to operate for several moremonths.

Considering the technology available atthe time, perhaps more impressive thanthe tactics employed by Hindon and hismen, was the relatively sophistication ofthe IED used to derail British trains. Thiswas a victim operated device, based onthe firing mechanism of a Martini Henryrifle. Research suggests that thisparticular type of device was unique tothis unit and that the IED was designedto operate when a locomotive passedover the rail track directly above it. Thedesigner of this device was a man namedCarl Cremer. Not much is known aboutCremer other than he was an associate ofHindon and, one assumes, was a memberof his unit. The payload was sometimesup to fifty dynamite cartridges containedin a bucket, although it is probable thatthe size of main charge was at least halfas large as this. The bucket was buriedunderneath the ballast (stone aggregate)surrounding the track and sleepers. Thegreat advantage was that it did not bringabout destruction on a great scale, sincenormally the only the locomotive wasderailed from the track and madeunserviceable. Damage to the track wasrelatively superficial, but for Britishrailway engineers, replacing twisted anddamaged tracks was a time consumingbusiness. In most cases the train wasbrought to a standstill at a distance ofabout thirty yards beyond the contact

point. At which stage the British hadvery little time in which to choosebetween two courses of action - fightingor surrendering.

Those who positioned the IED and bucketof dynamite were very careful not toleave any footprints which could betraced by British foot patrols. To avoidleaving any sign of their presence, theperpetrators would walk for quite adistance along the rails. Then the ballastwould be painstakingly removed frombeneath the rails and then replaced afterthe device had been positioned correctly.The trigger, placed in intimate contactwith the underside of the track, wasdesigned to operate by the weight of thelocomotive as it passed over. Lastly, allremaining excess stones were taken awayin a bag; at every stage, great care wastaken to conceal all traces of the device.

Insurgent tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTPs) have been no lesscunning in recent times. The use ofsurveillance to determine and thereforepredict allied and coalition TTPs is a wellpractised and executed procedure in bothIraqi and Afghan theatres. Both groupsof insurgents have become adept atpinpointing likely incident control pointpositions, cordon locations and themake-up of vehicle convoys and patrols.In Afghanistan, just as Hindon’scommando took painstaking precautionsto conceal their signature, so the Talibanhave become expert at burying devicesin footpaths and tracks without visibledisruption to the ground. Indeed, adegree of weatherproofing now takesplace in order to prolong the life ofTaliban pressure plate IEDs.

South Africa. C 1900. The Wreck Of An ArmouredTrain Lies Beside A Railway Line. In TheBackground, Centre Left, Is The HeadstoneCommemorating The Dead (AWM)

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The amount of destruction Hindon andhis men created was considerable andthe immediate British reaction was toup-armour more of its military trains. Theinsurgents realised that they could notdefeat this additional protection headon, so they focused their attacks againsta softer target (the railway line) instead.And so a contest of measure versuscounter-measure ensued throughout theguerrilla phase of the Anglo-Boer war. Asimilar pattern can be observed in bothIraq and Afghanistan. The gradual up-armouring of the HUMVEE in Iraq forexample led to the burial of IEDsdesigned to destroy the vehicle’s lesswell protected underbelly. Very large HEdevices with payloads around the 750 -1000 kg mark were sometimes dug inunder tarred roads at night; such deviceswere responsible for seriously damagingor destroying a number of Bradley APCs.In Afghanistan the migration in 20006/7from WMIK vehicles to the MASTIFF andother new armoured vehicles currently intheatre is as a direct response to theincrease in IED payload encountered inrecent years. One can expect to see thepayloads of IEDs increase in future andthe positioning of devices altered tomaximize effect against vulnerable partsof these vehicles.

Between June and mid September 1900,construction engineers of the ImperialMilitary Railways (IMR) made repairs tothe Pretoria to Delagoa Bay line. The IMRbegan to move troops and materiel alongthe line once the Komatipoort Stationwas finally occupied by British forces on25th September 1900. A total of 102trains were used to transport troops fromthe eastern part of the Transvaal back toPretoria from 26th September to 10th

October 1900. However, during theperiod between September 1900 and July1901, a number of bridges and culvertswere destroyed as well as tracks damagedand trains derailed.4 Throughout the firsthalf of 1901, the number of trainderailments along the railway linegathered momentum, happening dailywith the line often damaged at somepoint. These attacks were so successfulthat from the beginning of October1900, the IMR suspended the running oftrains at night on the line betweenPretoria and Waterval. Troop trainsreturning to Pretoria were routinelyambushed and it became clear thatsuitable defensive measures needed tobe put in place if the British were goingto continue to use the railway.5

After assuming command of the Britishand Imperial forces in South Africa, oneof Lord Kitchener’s first decisions was toimplement a number of defensivemeasures such as the digging ofcamouflaged open trenches at railwaystations, culverts and bridges in order toprotect personnel against artillery fire.These long trench systems proved largelyineffective however, absorbing a large

amount of manpower for patrol anddefensive purposes. Between 1st and 7thOctober 1900, Boer units launched aseries of successful attacks against fourlocations on the Pretoria to Delagoa Bayrailway line derailing and destroyingthree trains and a culvert at Brugspruit.

On 26 October, and acting on anintelligence tip-off, British troopsattacked what they believed to be theheadquarters of the Boer railwayattackers located at Witkloof, some 30kilometres south of Belfast. However,despite these actions, Boer attacksagainst the railway became morefrequent and more destructive. Inresponse, British troops began toimplement a programme of raiding andburning farms in the vicinity of therailway in an attempt to prevent furtherattacks from occurring.6

From about September 1901 onwardshowever, Hindon’s attacks were curtailed.Prior to the beginning of the war, fourarmoured trains had been constructed inCape Town. In addition, an armouredtrain was deployed in support of LordMethuen throughout the advance of hisDivision west from the Cape Provincetowards the Orange Free State border;another three were positioned atStormberg, Mafeking and Kimberley. Twomore were deployed in support of Britishforces in Natal and Southern Rhodesia.7

The frequency of attacks meant that theBritish had to equip themselves withmany more trains, some of which werebuilt as far away as Bulawayo, SouthernRhodesia.

With armoured trains in use during theday, Hindon’s men began to set up theirIEDs at night with the ambush site keptunder close observation the followingday. Initially, Hindon was perplexedbecause so many of his IEDs were beingdetected by British troops and renderedsafe. It seemed as though British footpatrols were capable of following histracks for distances up to 600 metresthrough the veld. By observing Britishearly morning clearance patrols however,Hindon saw that the trackers simplyfollowed the marks that he and his men

Glen, South Africa. The Glen Railway BridgeShowing Damage after an Attack by the BoersAWM)

South Africa, C. 1900. Fourteen Streams Bridge,Blown Up By Boer Soldiers in 1899, ShowingDamaged Sections of The Bridge (AWM)

Three Australian Bushmen pose in front of awooden-sided railway freight wagon. They areholding either Lee-Enfield or Lee-Metford .303calibre rifles (AWM)

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had left in the dew. Henceforth Hindonmade sure that his IEDs were positionedearly in the evening before the air hadcooled down sufficiently for dew to formon the grass. The British had littlesuccess in tracing Hindon’s tracks afterthis discovery was made.

Having initiated a programme of protecting military trains with armour, British commanders instituted a procedure whereby an armoured train,which had the locomotive locatedbetween a few reinforced trucks, would travel ahead of each scheduledpassenger/goods train. The front truck,designed to be sacrificial, would usuallycontain a section of soldiers. It wouldappear that the task of those thatsurvived the blast of the IED strike wasto provide the locomotive and its crewwith protection. After such an attack,the locomotive would simply beuncoupled from the damaged truck,allowing it to return safely up therailway with the undamaged trucks intow. Hindon soon identified this tacticand began to allow the first armouredtrain with its soldiers to pass safelybefore detonating a device directly underthe locomotive of the second train. It isassumed that the first train passed overa partially constructed IED and that thefiring mechanism was swiftly placedunder the rail and connected up in thetime window prior to the arrival of the second.

By May 1901, the British changed tacticsagain, this time using two locomotivesrather than one positioned between anumber of trucks and carriages. The ideabehind this countermeasure was that inthe event of one of the locomotivesbeing disabled, the other might be ableto carry on with the journey. On 20thMay 1901, such a supply train wasobserved near Godwan Station byHindon’s men. On this occasion Hindondeparted from his usual use of a victimoperated IED, instead opting for acommand initiated variant. He attacheda length of wire (presumably to thetrigger of the IED) and concealed himselfapproximately forty metres away fromthe track. At the optimum moment he

initiated the device by simply pulling onthe wire, operating the trigger andsetting off the firing mechanism.Although this attack brought the train toa standstill, Hindon and his men did notmanage to plunder much in the way ofsupplies due to the steady rate of firethat was brought to bear upon them byBritish troops who had survived theinitial explosion.8

By July 1901, the Pretoria-Delagoa BayRailway Line was defended by a systemof blockhouses joined by a network ofbarbed wire entanglements. The numberof armoured trains on the line wasincreased and deep trenches were dugalong both sides of the track to providepositions from which the line could bedefended as well a creating an obstacleto those wishing to attack. Furthermore,the British implemented a system offrequent patrols by locally stationedtroops, the aim being to search for signsof the presence of enemy activity whilstdenying freedom of movement to would-be attackers. The blockhouses were builtin lines at great expense with the idea oforganising ‘drives’ against small mobilegroups of Boer horsemen. Such ‘drives’were meant to corner the Boers againstthe lines of blockhouses although inpractice this rarely occurred.Nevertheless the combination ofblockhouses, barbed wire entanglementsand covering patrols proved effective inprotecting the railway line. In addition,the British had begun to execute thosethat they had captured who had been

involved in train wrecking.10 As a result,Hindon and his men decided that furtherattacks on the line would be pointless;they moved their operations to theNorthern Transvaal in the vicinity ofNaboomspruit on the Pretoria-Pietersburg railway line.11

The measure versus counter-measurecycle feeds off itself. By adding andcombining a series of defensive measureshowever, the British managed to preservethe integrity of the line and thus thesustainment of their forces. Whilst no-one is advocating the sacrificing ofsoldiers in a front railway car equivalenttoday, the fact remains that manpowerneeds to be dedicated to the protectionof key supply routes in order to countera significant insurgency, and particularlyan IED threat. As the Anglo-Boer Warexperience shows, it is the combinationof countermeasures that are important;block houses on their own areinsufficient as is simply up-armouringone’s means of transport. Moreover,manpower needs to be allocated todefensive tasks. Between 2008 and 2009 there has been a 37% increase in ISAF force strength. The increase inANSF strength has increased by 28% over the same period. It may be possible to use these increases to bolster security on key routes.

South Africa, c. 1901. A two storey fortifiedhouse at Middelburg during the South AfricanBoer War. The ground floor veranda has beenfortified with sandbags and corrugated iron.firing slits in the corrugated iron (AWM)

Blockhouse at Modder River, Northern Cape (LtCol IP Mills)

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The lesson for us is to anticipatesuch changes in direction before

they occur.

As Hindon discovered, successful IEDattacks must be tailored to theopportunity presented. He switched froma victim operated attack to one initiatedby command means because British TTPshad changed. He also switched fromoperating during the day to setting uphis ambushes at night. In both Iraq andAfghanistan there is ample evidence ofsuch flexibility and technologicaladvancement amongst insurgent groups.Simple roadside bombs in mid to late2003 against British forces in Basra wererelatively small command initiateddevices which, in the majority of cases,had limited impact against Britishvehicles. By 2004/5, these devices hadincreased in size, were far betterdisguised and used fragmentation andplate charge technology in order todefeat vehicle protection measures andcompromise British TTPS. The lesson forus is to anticipate such changes indirection before they occur.

ConclusionJack Hindon and some of his men finallysurrendered to the British in May 1902,just prior to the conclusion of the Peaceat Vereeniging agreement. After somedeliberation, they were cleared of allinfractions of the laws of war.12

When one considers the effectiveness of the type of IED used, it is easy to see why the Hindon Scouts were sosuccessful against British and colonialforces, which relied heavily upon theSouth African rail network forsustainment. Placed in historicalcontext, this was an innovative deviceand extremely difficult to detect; itsimply required track displacement in

order to operate, thus ensuring that the victim (the locomotive) was directlyover the main charge when it detonated.

The British did not find a technicalsolution to counter the effect of suchIEDs; rather they came up with a tacticalmethodology which relied upon acombination of obstacles (such asditches, trenches and barbed wire), keypoint defence (e.g. blockhouses) and alarge number of troops (to patrol, reactand defend) in order to frustrateHindon’s operations to such a degreethat he was forced to move away fromthe area.

A number of lessons have been drawnfrom this experience, many of which arestill pertinent to operations today:

● The deconstructed nature ofinsurgent forces makes it difficult tocounter the threat through acentralised destruction strategy.

● As measure is met with counter-measure and so on, attacks becomeincreasingly sophisticated and moretechnologically advanced. Where thecounter measure is robust however,the insurgent may revert to simpleopportunistic attacks.

● Single counter measures areinsufficient to create lasting change.Success rests upon the combinationof multiple, coherent defensivemeasures which preserve lines ofcommunications.

1 D Hall, The Hall Handbook of the AngloBoer War 1899 – 1902. University of NatalPress – 1999. ISBN 0869809490. page240.

2 I G Spence, The Boer War: Army, Nation

and Empire ‘To Shoot and Ride’: Mobilityand Firepower in Mounted Warfare.http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/docs/The_Boer_War_Spence.pdf.

3 E Lee, To The Bitter End. ISBN-10:0670801437 ISBN-13: 978-0670801435.pg 125.

4 D Aitken, The South African MilitaryHistory Society, Military History Journal –Vol 12 No 1, Oliver ‘Jack’ Hindon, BoerHero and Train Wrecker. http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol121da.html.

5 E P C Girouard, History of the Railwaysduring the War in South Africa (London,1903), pg 46.

6 G S Preller, Kaptein Hindon:Oorlogsavonture van ‘n Verbaas Verkenner.Pretoria, 1916. pgs 161 – 163.

7 D Hall, The Hall Handbook of the AngloBoer War 1899 – 1902, University of NatalPress – 1999. ISBN 0869809490. pgs 241& 244.

8 Viljoen, My reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War, pgs 380 & 381.

9 N Gomm, The South African MilitaryHistory Society, Military History Journal -Vol 1 No 7 Commandant P.H. Kritzinger inthe Cape. http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol017ng.html.

10 R Sibbald. The War Correspondents The Boer War. Bramley Books 1993. ISBN 1-85883-733-X. pg 208.

11 D Aitken, The South African MilitaryHistory Society, Military History Journal –Vol 11 No 6, Guerrilla Warfare, October1900 – May 1902: Boer attacks on thePretoria-Delagoa Bay Railway Line.http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol116da.html.

12 D Aitken, The South African MilitaryHistory Society, Military History Journal –Vol 11 No 6, Guerrilla Warfare, October1900 – May 1902: Boer attacks on thePretoria-Delagoa Bay Railway Line.http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol116da.html �

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IntelligenceLessons FromHizballah’sGroundCampaign 2006

James Spencer

This paper examines technologicallyadvanced elements of Hizballah’soperation against Israel’s LebanonCampaign of summer 2006 in order toderive lessons applicable to HM Forces’operations elsewhere in the MENAregion. It does not examine therelatively competent conduct ofHizballah ground operations.

The paper addresses Israeli DefenceForces (IDF) experiences only wherethese have a bearing on Hizballah’scapability – other papers1 have coveredthe issues. In summary, however, Israel’smistakes seem to have been:

● inaccurate Intelligence preparationof the environment (IPE)2;

● unrealistic political aims;

● poor intelligence;

● “air arrogance”;

● a failure to integrate all arms andservices;

● and inadequate training andequipment (this latter an issue incommon with the UK for Op TELIC1.)3

Hizballah exploited these tacticalweaknesses caused by IDF “VictoryDisease”, greatly multiplying Hizballah’slimited ground effect.

Only unclassified material has been usedin the preparation of this paper. Unlessotherwise qualified, the terms “Shi’i” and“Shi’a” (pl) are used to describe the 12erShi’a found mostly in Lebanon, S Iraqand Iran.

BLUFHizballah’s CSTAP understanding andISTAR capabilities are much better thanpreviously thought – as will be otherIranian clients and proxies in the region.

Political & Demographic BackgroundIn 1920, for colonial reasons, the Frenchformed Lebanon out of the city-state ofBeirut, and parts of Greater Syria west ofthe Lebanon Mountains. This led topolitical complications as the

predominately Christian (“Phoenician”)Beirut was coalesced with substantialSunni and Shi’a Muslim, and Druze Arabpopulations whose focus had alwaysbeen Damascus.

On independence in 1943, the two sidesagreed to support the idea of anindependent Lebanon, and not to inviteforeign patrons to intervene in Lebanon’saffairs. The unwritten National Pact of1943 was based on the last, 1932 census(in which the Maronite Christians were amarginal majority), and allocated thePresidency to the Christians, the PrimeMinistership to the Sunnis, and theParliamentary Speakership to the Shi’a.Since then, a combination of Christianemigration, low Christian and high Shi’a

Map of the Lebanon (CIA)

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and Sunni birth-rates, and rural to urbanmigration has left Muslims in a majority,and the Shi’a probably the largestdemographic element, but the poorestand least politically represented of the18 sects and ethnicities of whichLebanon is comprised.

In 1974, Imam Musa al-Sadr (a relativeof Muqtada’ al-Sadr) founded Harakat al-Mahrumin, a Shi’a empowerment / civilrights group, from which grew the Shi’aLebanese Resistance Detachments militia(Afwaj al-Muqawmat al-Lubnaniyya),better known by its acronym AMaL –theArabic for “Hope”.

In 1982 after Op PEACE FOR GALILEE,Israel occupied South Lebanon as far as the River Litani. Partly as a result of the occupation, Amal split, and themore militant Hizballah (“Party of God”)formed, initially following a terroriststrategy and Modus Operandi. Duringthat period, the Israelis allied with and sponsored the renegade “SouthLebanon Army” officered predominatelyby Christians from the Maronitecommunity interlaced with Shi’a, andoperated formally against the PLO inSouth Lebanon. The SLA pressed manyShi’i and Maronite youths into theirranks, and engaged in disappearances

and torture of their opponents,suspected or otherwise, in the notoriousKiyam Prison. Hizballah gained muchkudos from its “resistance” to the hatedIDF / SLA presence, and took credit forthe IDF withdrawal in 2000.

After Israel’s 2000 withdrawal, as sooften, the client was left vulnerable tovengeance by their ethnic counterparts.In the case of South Lebanon, many SLAmembers fled to Israel, although somehave returned. However, the Christianpopulation reduced dramatically, leavinga more homogenous, more hard-line,predominately Shi’a society, dominatedby Hizballah. It was into this polarisedpolitical environment, and ruggedphysical environment, that the IDF re-entered in summer 2006.

Hizballah Intelligence Preparation ofthe Environment & OPSECThe 12 Jul 06 Hizballah raid was by nomeans unusual4; Hizballah had beentrying to capture IDF personnel to use asbargaining chips for a prisoner exchangewith the Israelis; a previous attempt inNov 05 had failed. This raid did,however, show some interesting featureswhich suggest good surveillance at theleast. The site, Shtula - from which the

soldiers were seized, is a black spot, out of sight and communication fromsurrounding IDF OPs. As a result, it was formally out of bounds, except for transit, to IDF personnel. But since Hizballah identified an exploitable pattern, it seems to have been frequented nonetheless –probably for the traditional cigarette break.

“Hezbollah’s ability to harass theIsraelis and study their flaws, like atendency for regular patrols and fortroop convoys on the eve of theSabbath, gave Hezbollah confidencethat the Israeli Army “is a normalhuman army, with normalvulnerabilities and follies,” he[Timur Goksel] added.”5

While a diversionary rocket attack drewIDF attention, the Hizballah raidingparty engaged the patrol vehicles withRPGs and small arms fire, killing threeand capturing two IDF personnel. Theythen withdrew into Lebanon. A MERKAVAII AFV attempted an immediate follow-up but was then struck by a secondaryCommand Wire IED, killing its crew offour. Hizballah has a Modus Operandi ofsuch initial contact, followed bysecondary incident.

While not expecting the onslaught that followed the specific operation,Hizballah appears to have carried out an intelligence preparation of thebattlespace (IPB) of the border areas,and from that, worked out assemblyareas, avenues of approach, and killing areas.

The commander of a Ferret scout car of theQueen’s Dragoon Guards takes a photograph ofan East Beirut street scene whilst his vehicle ison patrol 1983 (IWM)

Forces of the United Nations Interim Force inLebanon (UNIFIL) are pictured in action alongthe Blue Line on the Lebanese-Israeli border.Merkava tanks of the IDF are in the foreground(UN)

Shtula; the far hill is in Lebanon, up whichHizballah took the captured IDF soldiers. Thebanner marks the capture site. (Photo © S Negus2007)

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It is known that Hizballah study IDFdoctrine: Sh Hassan Nasrallah, the leaderof Hizballah, even commented openly onthe first draft of the Winograd Report.During 18 years of IDF occupation of SLebanon, Hizballah carried out athorough assessment of IDF tactics,techniques and procedures, and wereable to integrate their understanding ofIDF doctrine into their IPB; Iranian IRGCadvisors are likely to have assisted inthis doctrinal analysis. Together with theIDF customary use of reserves (likely tobe trained in predictable drills, and rustyfrom lack of practice), it is unsurprisingthat Hizballah were able partly toanticipate IDF courses of action.

Bazzi records that “Even before the war,the group had dozens of translatorsworking in its southern Beirut offices tomonitor Israeli media and phoneintercepts.”6 An increase intransmissions, in particular within aspecific mobile phone cell, would haveprovided a combat indicator, and arelatively accurate location (to 100m2),quite apart from the usual ELINT harvest.Around the framework generated by the

IPB, and taking advantage of the highlycomplex terrain, Hizballah builtextensive fortifications in theintervening 6 years. This work wentundetected, by both UNFIL and theIsraelis/US:

“When Israeli troops discovered anddynamited the [Labboune] bunkerdays after the cease-fire, they founda structure consisting of firingpositions, operations rooms, medicalfacilities, lighting and ventilationsystems, kitchens and bathroomswith hot water - sufficient fordozens of fighters to liveunderground for weeks.

The bunker was built within view ofa UN observation post and an Israelimilitary position, respectively 100yards and 300 yards away. Neitherthe UN nor the Israeli army knewthe bunker existed. “We never sawthem build anything. They musthave brought the cement in by thespoonful,” says a UN officer.”7

While in Labboune OPSEC had beenassisted by Hizballah’s 2002 declarationof the area as a “security zone” (in otherareas “nature reserves” were similarlydeclared off-limits) the stealthy natureof the operation and the morehomogenous nature of the population islikely to have assisted discretion. WithHUMINT reduced, the IDF will have hadto rely on IMINT, vulnerable tocamouflage and deception, and mostlynegated by sub-surface activity.

Hizballah are estimated to have had atleast 40 such bunkers, of which 33 werediscovered and destroyed by either the

IDF, or UNFIL subsequently. Hizballahalso had numerous OPs overlooking theBlue Line (border with Israel), whichwere known (possibly deliberatelyrevealed) to the IDF, and shelled heavilyon 29 May 06.

In anticipation of IMINT collectionefforts, Hizballah had also prepared,protected and camouflaged much of itsrocket artillery, often employing reverseslope positions8:

“multiple rocket assemblies […]were placed in small, superblycamouflaged concrete bunkers, duginside thick natural groves oragricultural plantations, makingthem virtually invisible to airsurveillance. […] To fire therockets, the bunkers were opened,the rocket assembly washydraulically or manually tilted fromits horizontal position to therequired angle, and the salvo wasfired by means of a remote controlbox located in a nearby house. Eachindividual launcher was pre-targetedat an individual Israeli destination,yet enough such launchers were duginto the ground of SouthernLebanon so as to hit most Israelitowns and villages”9

It is probable that Hizballah’s IPB hadidentified likely IDF concentration areas.In this Hizballah may have been assistedby previous UAV flights over northernIsrael10.

“Curiously enough, on variousoccasions, the Hizbullah firedChinese-made Type-81 clustermunitions rockets into Israel,containing anti-armor bomblets.Since such ordnance is designed todestroy military equipment and isrelatively ineffective againstbuildings or persons, the reason forits use by the Hizbullah is unclear.Perhaps the Hizbullah was trying toretaliate against Israel’s own use ofcluster munitions. Another likelyexplanation is that the Hizbullahwas aiming at Israel’s armored corpsmassing for the land offensive inSouthern Lebanon,”11

A United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon(UNIFIL) observation tower near the Blue Lineon the border between Lebanon and Israel. (UN)

UNIFIL patrol base in El-Khiam, southernLebanon. On 25 July 2006, the base wasdestroyed by an Israeli air strike, killing fourunarmed UN military observer. (UN)

Bunkers uncovered in Southern Lebanon (IDF)

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Hizballah may also have attempted tointerdict Israeli operational assets:

“The brunt of the rocket attacks fellon civilian targets, although someevidence exists of attempts to hitmilitary targets. The heavy fire onSafed can be attributed to thelocation of the IDF’s NorthernCommand headquarters within thecity’s limits. Attacks on Mount Meronmight have been aimed at the well-known IAF installation on its top.[…] The 2006 attacks [on MigdalHa’emek] could thus be interpretedas the Hizbullah’s attempt to foiloperations from that air base.”12

What is quite certain is that Hizballahhad also prepared the likely manoeuvrecorridors, digging in blast explosives toattack the MERKAVAs’ belly armour, aswell as IEDs on the sides of the roads.13

Since the end of the conflict, and UNSCR1701 (which both provided for morerobust terms of reference, and largernumbers of more confrontational BlueHelmets), it is understood that Hizballahhas made extensive preparations north ofthe Litani River, out of UNFIL’s AO.14

● Hizballah demonstrated relativelysophisticated predictive intelligencebased on historical knowledge andimmediate analysis, around whichthey prepared their defences: strongpoints, killing areas etc.

● Hizballah maintained excellent OPSECin these preparations, counteringboth HUMINT and IMINT-basedcollection plans.

SIGINTOf all the aspects to Hizballah’s conductduring the conflict, their SIGINTcapability is the most worrying:

“Apparently using techniques learntfrom their paymasters in Iran, theywere even able to crack the codesand follow the fast-changingfrequencies of Israeli radiocommunications, interceptingreports of the casualties they hadinflicted again and again. Thisenabled them to dominate themedia war by announcing Israelifatalities first.”15

It is unlikely that techniques alonewould have allowed Hizballah to crack(probably US-sourced) encryption andfrequency hopping capabilities. Hizballahmust have had some SIGINT capability.An earlier Jane’s Defence Weekly Reportstated: “

“Following the signature andratification of a joint strategicdefence co-operation accord inNovember 2005, Syria and Iran havemoved to consolidate theircollaborative strategic signalsintelligence SIGINT capabilities inthe region” 16

While the main SIGINT station was sitedin the (Syrian) Golan17, this would havebeen insufficient to intercept tacticallevel (strength) communications,suggesting that at least some traps werewithin Lebanon. Bazzi18 uses the slightlyodd phrase “hack into Israeli radiocommunications”, which may imply aphysical interception of landline, ashappened to IDF infantry landline intheir assault on Beirut in 1982.

However the interception was effected,not only were Russia / Iran / Syria /Hizballah able to track the frequency-hops, and to break the encryption, butthey were also able to have the Hebrewtransmissions translated into Arabic(allegedly in the basement of the IranianEmbassy in Beirut) and passed back tothe front line within a tacticallysignificant space of time: “We were able

to monitor Israeli communications, and we used this information to adjustour planning”19 Although this statementmay have elements of InformationOperations (IO) in it, as one veterananalyst notes, this shows an unparalleleddegree of communication between up to three different nations, and a fourthnon-state actor.

One crumb of comfort is that [aHezbollah commander] “acknowledgedthat guerrillas were not able to hack into Israeli communications around the clock.”20 Unless there were physical(likely temperature) complications, this may imply a human factor.

Bazzi also quotes “a senior Lebanesesecurity official” as stating that“Hezbollah also monitored cell phonecalls among Israeli troops”, which hasbeen corroborated in part21. When usinga digital (but not analogue) mobiletelephone, the communication from thetelephone to the talk-through isencrypted, but thereafter goes down thesame, vulnerable fibre/copper as normaltelephony. However, Bazzi’s statementabove that Hizballah was able tointercept IDF mobile telephones beforeD-Day suggests that the interception(and decryption) was done betweentelephone and tower. Reservists inparticular are likely to have been lessintercept-aware when talking to theirfamilies at home.

Hizballah also used intercept product intheir IO campaign, regularly pre-emptingIDF announcements of casualties:

“When we lose a man, the fightingunit immediately gives the locationand the number back toheadquarters. What Hezbollah didwas to monitor our radio andimmediately send it to their Al-Manar TV, which broadcast it almostlive, long before the official Israeliradio.”22

Some analysts have pointed out that IDFraiding parties etc continued to achievesurprise, and have used this to suggestthat Hizballah therefore did not have the

Some of the unexploded devices that a UnitedNations Chinese battalion involved in thedemining of the town of Hiniyah in Lebanon,2006. (UN)

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ability to intercept signals traffic, merelytelephones. This, however, ignores theroutine use of Tactical Satellitecommunication – nearly impossible tointercept – by direct action / strategicrecce assets, a capability not available tothe Field Army.

Hizballah also showed an understandingof Emission Control: according to Col PatLang23 much of the decrypted SIGINT waspassed via buried cables (elsewhere fibreoptics24) to the strong points; a SovietSOP adopted by many Arab states. (Thisdoes not explain how Hizballah’s mobileanti-tank teams were informed.) There isalso suggestion that Hizballah had somesecure communications themselves:

“But Iran and Syria also used those six years to provide satellitecommunications and some of theworld’s best infantry weapons,including modern, Russian-madeantitank weapons and Semtexplastic explosives, as well as thetraining required to use themeffectively against Israeli armor.”25

Given that the Israelis seem to havebeen unable to act similarly, there is also the possibility that Hizballah hadtheir own encrypted communications,although there have been no reports of this. Blanford describes a use of“veiled speech” at the tactical level:

“Each fighter had a code numberand one of the Hizbs told me that a conversation could go like ‘42, 42,this 83. Meet me by the house ofthe woman who broke your heart 20years ago’. ‘How would the Israelisbe able to understand where thatmeant?’ he asked.”26

At the operational level, OPSEC was likelyenhanced by effective use of missioncommand:

“Goksel highlights the remarkablydispersed nature of the Hizbollahguerrilla forces, which operate insmall units with very littlecommunication through to anyoverall chain of command. Much of

what is done is according topreviously agreed tactics; this makesit very difficult for the Israelis todisrupt communications because itis simply not very important forunits to coordinate with each otheror with a notional “centre”.27

In addition to the SIGINT capability, livesatellite TV reports were broadcast fromthe seat of missile explosions insideIsrael, and television crews also“counted them all out” as IDF unitscrossed the start line into Lebanon. As inother theatres, a free press is a double-edged sword.

Hizballah also harnessed their SIGINTcapability at the geo-strategic level:despite the best efforts of the IAF, al-Manar (“The Lighthouse”) never went offair, demonstrating the importance whichHizballah attach to IO – as did the IDF.Al-Manar allowed Hizballah to projecttheir military success against Israel(which had unwisely declared unfeasiblecampaign aims) to the Arab World whose(mostly Sunni) rulers had been initiallycritical of Hizballah. Not only wereHizballah first with the news –establishing credibility – but they werealso accurate, consolidating it. Thesuccess of an Arab force against thehated Israelis, who had previouslyhumbled the Arab armies in the 1948, 67and 73 wars, caused a popular groundswell across the Arab World –precipitating a retrenchment of thecriticism by the rulers, worried by theseeming rise of Shi’i Iran.

● With the aid of Syrian & IranianSIGINT assets, Hizballah were able tofollow, intercept, decrypt, translateand disseminate IDF tactical andoperational transmissions withintactically significant time frames!

● Extensive use of insecure mobiletelephones by IDF Reservistsundermined IDF OPSEC / EMCON.

● Hizballah’s doctrinal use of missioncommand reinforced their ownOPSEC.

● Hizballah were able to use SIGINTintercept for Information Operationspurposes, achieving success at thestrategic level.

UAV RecceIran has had UAVs since the late 1980s,both indigenous and purchased(including, ironically, a Chinese versionof the Israeli HARPY.) It appears to havesupplied several to Hizballah, with theIRGC having trained Hizballah groundcontrollers28.

Hizballah used their UAV assets for bothreconnaissance, and to attack Israelitargets. They carried out several flightsover Northern Israel in the monthsleading up to the conflict29, videoing theground. This appears to have beenintegrated within the targetinginformation:

“The long-range Iranian-mademissiles which later exploded onHaifa had been preceded only a fewweeks ago by a pilotless Hizbollahdrone aircraft which surveyed

HARPY UAV Paris Air Show (Jastrow) (Wikipedia Commons)

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northern Israel and then returned toland in eastern Lebanon after takingphotographs during its flight. Thesepictures not only suggested a flightpath for Hizbollah’s rockets to Haifa;they also identified Israel’s top-secret military air traffic controlcentre in Miron.30 [How secret thisIAF location was is debatable –Blanford points out that it is justvisible from Lebanon, clearly viaGoogle Earth, and had beenattacked by Hizballah in May 2006.]

Hizballah also flew UAVs during theconflict, possibly for reconnaissance,possibly for BDA. In this they were lesssuccessful: in early September 06, anABABIL-3 was shot down by an IAF F-16from Ramat David Air Base before itcould penetrate Israeli airspace. Of moreinterest was its payload:

“The Ababil-T in its standardconfiguration carries a daylighttelevision camera as well as amedium-sized, high-explosivewarhead. The UAV was flying atnight, indicating its sensor packagehas been modified to include aninfrared system.”31

Hizballah also launched 4 UAVs againstIsrael on the nights of 07 August and 13August 2006. The UAVs were ABABIL-Ts,recce UAVs modified for “suicide”missions to carry a small payload of40kgs of explosive in place of the ISTARfit. The pre-programmed, explosive-carrying UAVs were thus primitivecruise-missiles.

“Since those attacks occurred whenthe ceasefire was already in theoffing, it is reasonable to assumethat they were meant to strike Israel“south of the south of Haifa,” so asto fulfill Nasrallah’s vow. The UAVswere probably programmed to hitthe Tel Aviv metropolitan areainstead of the Zelzal rockets thathad been destroyed by Israel (orvetoed by Iran).”32

● While Hizballah’s UAV assets may becomparatively rudimentary, they are

sufficient for day and night videoreconnaissance of tactical andoperational targets, and of crudeexplosive “cruise missile” operations.

TI & AWARENESSAnother possible first in the Middle Eastwas Hizballah’s possession, and use ofThermal Imaging (TI). Concern wasraised over the requested provision ofImage Intensifying NVGs to Syria (thatthey should fall into Hizballah’s hands).Hizballah’s possession of TI, on ATGMssold by Russia to Syria33, both confirmsthe fear and makes the PNVG issueirrelevant, as Russia is also likely to havesupplied them.

In his First Look, Dr Cordesman reportsHizballah (and thus likely Iranian)possession of the Russian-made AT-14KORNET-E:

“The AT-14 is a particularly goodexample of the kind of hightechnology weapon the US may facein future asymmetric wars. It can befitted to vehicles or used as a crew-portable system. It has thermalsights for night warfare and trackingheat signatures, and the missile hassemi-automatic command-to-line-of-sight laser beam-riding guidance.”34

Since TI usually requires a means ofcooling the active element of thedetection system, its continued use byHizballah over 34 days implies eitherextensive pre-dumping, or a competentlogistics chain for in-place sustainment.

Iranian etc possession of TI is likely tocause NATO forces less of a problem,since their tank engines are at the rear.TI’s continued presence in the ME,however, may cause the Israelis moreproblems, as the MERKAVAs have their(heat emitting) engine at the front -partly to increase crew survivability.

Hizballah were also aware that IAFaircraft and UAVs would be searching forlaunchers, and took steps to concealtheir physical and thermal signatures:

“...numerous dummy missile firing

sites with fake heat signatures weretargeted during the course of thecampaign.”35

and:

“The two-by-three-meter positionsconsisted of a hydraulic launch padin a lined pit. The pad could beraised to fire the 122-mm rocketsfrom a launcher at its center, andthen lowered and camouflaged withvegetation. The farmers receivedinstructions by cell phone regardingthe number of rockets to launch andin what direction and range. Theywere often provided with thermalblankets to cover the position inorder to keep IAF aircraft fromdetecting the post-shooting heatsignature.”36

● Hizballah showed a clearunderstanding of both how to exploitthe thermal spectrum, and how tominimise its exploitation by the IDF.

ADVANCED ANTI-TANK CAPABILITYMost of the IDF armoured losses tookplace during the attempts to exit thesteep-sided Wadi Saluki during the finalstages of the campaign. Tacticalcommanders, possibly for political(casualty avoidance) reasons, failed tocommit an infantry screen or adequateindirect fire support to clear the anti-tank teams. Hizballah had identified thisas a “slow-go area” and fully exploitedthe terrain.

While not strictly an intelligence issue, itis worth considering various aspects ofHizballah’s anti-armour campaign. Thereare two issues of importance:

“Israeli military observers remarkedthat Hezbollah seemingly hadaccurate intelligence about thecapabilities of Mark III and Mark IVand they targetted the Mark IIIselectively.”37

Such granularity shows not just goodrecognition training, but excellent firediscipline. Of more interest is thedescription of the means of attack.Hizballah seems to have adopted a

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mobile “swarming” defence: small,nimble anti-tanks teams using the local terrain (and in some cases tunnels)to excellent effect. Hizballah wereassisted by their possession of theKORNET and METIS-M ATGMs, and RPG-29s. Some of these missiles had tandemwarheads, capable of defeating IDFStand-Off Cages and Explosive ReactiveArmour. It has been widely suggestedthat Israeli Intelligence – civil andmilitary – was unaware of Hizballah’spossession or competence with theseweapons38.

However, it is the use of the missilesthat is most interesting: “the weaponswere fired in massive volleys.”39 Theanti-tank teams were small (3 - 6), yetmany shooters seem to have engaged the same target simultaneously.Although there is no confirmedreporting, given the intelligence requiredfor recognition of MERKAVA variants, thismay have been an effort by Hizballah tooverload the IDF Defensive Aides Suite -to beat its re-cycle time, or exhaust itsunder-armour ammunition.

The result was impressive: “Forty-five per cent of the Israel Defence Force’s(IDF’s) MBTs hit by Hizbullah ATGMsduring the fighting were penetrated.”40

No MERKAVA IVs were included in thisfigure, which may suggest that the IDFDAS was adequate:

“An Israeli-invented radar defenceshield codenamed Flying Jacket andcosting £200,000 was installed ononly four tanks. None of them wasstruck by anti-tank missiles.”41

[“four tanks” may be amistranslation for (MERKAVA) tank IVs.]

● Hizballah’s Recognition of IDF IFVs was excellent, to the extent ofbeing able to distinguish betweenMERKAVA III and MERKAVA IV.

● Hizballah may be aware of DASlimitations and attempt to overloadthe system’s recycle time / exhaustits ammunition leaving it vulnerable.

Human Intelligence & Counter-IntelligenceNeither HUMINT nor CI are new concepts; Sun Tzu devotes a chapter on it, and Moses sent spies into the land of Canaan (Numbers Ch 13.) Thegeneral assumption, however, is thatstates conduct organised HUMINTcollection. The IDF is aware ofHizballah’s attempts to:

“...locate and recruit Israeli Arabs—including Israeli Arab politicalfigures—for the purpose of usingthem for intelligence missions by theorganization, and its attempts toestablish contacts even with Jews inIsrael. An example of such tacticswas Hezbollah’s handling (up untilSeptember 2002) of about 10 IsraeliArabs from the villages of Beit Zarzirand Shfaram—including alieutenant colonel on active IDFservice and others who had formerlyserved in the IDF and in the Israelipolice. […] they delivered theirHezbollah handlers details on themovements and formation of IDFforces in northern Israel,information on IDF’s intelligencegathering technologies such asstationary cameras and camerasmounted on hot air balloons, andoperational intelligence on formerNorthern Command Chief GabiAshkenazi. Furthermore, some ofthose involved were asked to deliverto Lebanon maps, uniquecommunication devices used by theIDF, etc.”42

There is also a suggestion that Hizballahmay have run a penetration agent withinthe FBI – who was then re-assigned toCIA clandestine operations:

“A U.S. official familiar with thecase said Tuesday that thegovernment’s investigation hasuncovered no evidence so far thatthe agent, who was employed by theCIA until last week, hadcompromised any undercoveroperations or passed along sensitiveintelligence information to Hizbullahoperatives. After joining the CIA inJune 2003, the agent was an

undercover officer for the agency’sNational Clandestine Service, theespionage division, working onMiddle East–related cases. Theagent was reassigned to a lesssensitive position about a year ago,after first coming under suspicion,officials said.”43

On the CI side, the legendary capabilityof Israel’s MOSSAD (coupled with thesure knowledge of some remaining SLAmembers with a burning need forrevenge and a knowledge of interestedparties) have made Hizballah membersdiscreet:

“Hezbollah commanders travel in oldcars without bodyguards or escortsand wear no visible insignia, Mr.Goksel said, to keep their identitieshidden.”44

Given the lack of tactical and operationalknowledge available to even IDFStrategic recce – the MAGLAN platoon –it appears that any Israeli HUMINT assetin South Lebanon was unsighted, orneutralised by Hizballah CI – or unableto communicate with his/her handlerover 6 years:

“Evidently they had never heardthat an Arab soldier is supposed torun away after a short engagementwith the Israelis,” said Gad.

“We expected a tent and threeKalashnikovs — that was theintelligence we were given. Instead,we found a hydraulic steel doorleading to a well-equipped networkof tunnels.”45

The two raids by Israeli SOF intoBaalbek, the first seeking HassanNasrallah, and the second46 ShMuhammad Yazbik (a senior Hizballahfigure) were both “dry holes”. Unlessqueued by SIGINT47, this suggestsinformation from a deep asset, and thefailure implies that the Israeli HUMINTasset has been identified, and eitherturned or supplied disinformation – aCounter-Intelligence coup:

“On Aug. 2, Israeli commandos

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targeted the Iranian-funded,Hizbullah-run Dar al-Hikma Hospital.The commando assault and Israelistrikes throughout the region aroundthe ancient town killed 16 people,according to Lebanese police.Baalbek residents said four peoplewere taken away and none wereHizballah fighters.”48

and“The commandos, dropped with twoHummer vehicles by helicopter, wereengaged in a firefight in which threeHizballah were killed, before theywere evacuated by helicopter.

“DEBKAfile’s military sources reportthe Israeli commando raid probablytargeted newly filled weaponsstores. Also located at Bodai is theoffice of senior Hizballah officialSheikh Mohammed Yazbek, wherethe raiders apparently hoped to findinformation leading to the twokidnapped Israeli soldiers EhudGoldwasser and Eldad Regev.”49

● Hizballah demonstrated an enduring,geo-strategic HUMINT capability anda Counter-Intelligence mentality andcapability.

Electronic Warfare (EW)The failure of the IDF’s EW campaign,and the great strides made by Hizballah(doubtless with extensive Iranian andSyria backing) is another aspect of greatconcern. Hizballah showed the usualability to react to IDF tactical ECM:

“Then Hezbollah used radiodetonators, which the Israelis alsodefeated, and then cellphonedetonators, and then a doublesystem of cellphones, and then a

photocell detonator — like thebeam that opens an automaticdoor.”50

It is, however, at the operational levelthat there is more concern, bothdefensively, and offensively:

“Israeli EW [electronic warfare]systems were unable to jam thesystems at the Iranian Embassy inBeirut, they proved unable to jamHezbollah’s command and controllinks from Lebanon to Iranianfacilities in Syria.”51

The IDF-linked DEBKAfile was evenstarker, writing that: “In combat againstHizballah, both [complementary US andIsraeli devices and methods] were notonly found wanting, but had beenactively neutralized, so that noneperformed the functions for which theywere designed.”52

Hizballah (possibly with IRGC assistance)was able to hit the INS HANIT with a C-802 SILKWORM. IDF-linked sources havesought to play down ECM problems,suggesting that HANIT’s crew hadforgotten to turn on their BARAK ECM,allowing the SILKWORM to hit. Whilehuman error is always possible (andIsraeli Intelligence’s lack of knowledge ofHizballah’s arsenal might have added tothe sense of complacency) it seemsunlikely. Other reports suggest:

“Iranian technicians and Iraniansupplied equipment allowedHizbullah to jam thecountermeasures on the Israeli ship,allowing the upgraded IranianSilkworm missile to severely damageit.”53

The SILKWORM struck the HANIT justabove the waterline, but failed toinitiate, possibly because the ship waswithin the missile’s arming range. Giventhe presence of SILKWORMs in thePersian Gulf, especially on Larak Islandin the Straits of Hormuz, such counter-ECM is a worrying development.

● Hizballah’s EW hardening was better

than expected, and together withduplication, prevented IDF disruptionof C2 by kinetic of EW means.

● Hizballah demonstrated a reasonableunderstanding of IDF ECM, and wereable to hit the INS’s best shipsuccessfully.

ConclusionHizballah showed excellent morale,sound intelligence & counter-intelligence, competent tactics (albeit ina highly specific, carefully preparedenvironment), mission command, goodlogistics, sound planning and political /military integration, good training,excellent civil military affairs, andcreative (and enduring) IO. This was notthe performance of the historical ArabArmy, with political commanders, poormorale and lack of initiative, but theactions of a disciplined, competentcadre.

It is unlikely that all Hizballah’scapability at the time was demonstrated.Iran (and Syria) are reported to have re-supplied Hizballah with more modernweaponry since then54. This is likely toconcentrate on the anti-air campaign –in 2006 Hizballah managed to down aCH-54 heavy lift helicopter using anATGM, but had little success against IAFstrategic aircraft destroying Hizballahlong-range missiles or Lebaneseinfrastructure.Hizballah had six years to plan, prepare

IDF destroy Hizbollah post (IDF)

The Navy rocket ship Hanit after itsrehabilitation and return to continuousoperations this week at the Navy Ashdod base.(IDF)

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and rehearse for an operation in arelatively small area, with strategicsupport of Iran and Syria, and a broadlysupportive population. They faced acasualty-averse enemy, using armour incomplex terrain. Nevertheless, Hizballahwas able to contain Israel through a wellco-ordinated defence including manysophisticated aspects, and using assetsunknown to Israel.

While the relationship between Hizballahand Iran is more complex than client –patron (and Hizballah is far from beingmerely a proxy of Iran) the closerelationship is likely to mean passage oftactics, training and information willflow both ways.

Hizballah capability has already madethe IDF modify its operational profilegreatly – the use of piloted close airsupport and rotary aircraft was notablyless than one might have expected, dueto IDF assessment of Hizballah’spossession of advanced SAMs; IDF navalassets stood off much further from landthan in previous conflicts.

It is likely that Iran, and its regionalclients and subordinates, will haveaccess to the same capacity to degradeand defeat the high-technologycapability on which much of the West’s(and Allied) “edge” is predicated.

On the regional level, Hizballah’scapability has increased the alreadyconsiderable concern over Iran felt bySunni Arab rulers, epitomised by theevocation of a “Shi’a Crescent” by KingAbdullah II of Jordan. Israel’s failure,albeit in a highly specialisedenvironment, removed the aura of

invincibility formerly surrounding theIDF; efforts to refurbish this, such as theair-strike on Dayr al-Zawr, have beenunsuccessful.

While HM Forces remain committed to OpHERRICK, they will remain within strikingdistance of Iran, and its proxies.Although HMF retain a technologicaledge, the gap has narrowed significantly,and many of the areas in which HMFbelieved themselves to be supreme, theyfind their absolute capabilitycompromised. Should Iran and the UKfind themselves in direct or proxyconflict, many of the UK’s casualtyreducing advantages are likely to beneutralised.

1 Such as Cordesman, A Preliminary“Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War,(http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060911_isr_hez_lessons.pdf) and McGregorG Hezbollah’s tactics and capabilities inSouthern Lebanon Jamestown FoundationTerrorism Focus 01 Aug 06(http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370089)

2 Seymour Hersch claims(http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/08/21/060821fa_fact) that the ex-pilotGen Halutz planned to emulate the aerialbombardment campaign on Serbia thatNATO used to open up Kosovo unopposed.This was possible in Serbia due to thehomogenous ethnicity, and strong centralcontrol of armed force; there are 18 sects/ ethnicities in Lebanon, many of whichhave militia. There was also a credibleground element ready to force entry toKosovo, if the air campaign had failed.

3 Vide Mahnaimi, Uzi Humbling of thesupertroops shatters Israeli army moraleSunday Times 27 August 2006(http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article620874.ece)

4 Blanford, N Hizbullah-Israeli borderexchanges intensify Jane’s IntelligenceReview – 01 Mar 05

5 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A DisciplinedHezbollah Surprises Israel with itsTraining, Tactics and Weapons New YorkTimes 07 Aug 06<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07hezbollah.html?th&emc=th

6 Bazzi M, Hezbollah cracked the code

Newsday 18 Sep 06http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/ny-wocode184896831sep18,0,3091818.story?coll=ny-worldnews-print

7 Blanford, N After The War, HizbullahReevaluates Christian Science Monitor 25Sep 06 (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0925/p07s02-wome.html) cf alsohttp://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1604529,00.html andhttp://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0511/p01s02-wome.html

8 Blanford, N personal communication 19Jan 08

9 Rubin, U The Rocket Campaign againstIsrael op cit

10 Cook, Jonathan The Second Lebanon War,A Year Later in Counterpunch dated 16Aug 07(http://www.counterpunch.org/cook08162007.html)

11 Rubin, U The Rocket Campaign againstIsrael during the 2006 Lebanon WarMideast Security and Policy Studies No.71, Jun 07http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS71.pdf

12 Rubin, U The Rocket Campaign againstIsrael op cit

13 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A DisciplinedHezbollah Surprises Israel op cit; BlanfordN personal communication 19 Jan 08

14 Geopolitical Diary: The Winograd Reportand Olmert’s Fate STRATFOR MorningIntelligence Brief 30 Apr 07(http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=287873 )

15 Mahnaimi U, Humbling of the supertroopsop cit

16 Iran and Syria advance SIGINT co-operation Jane’s Defence Weekly 13 Jul06 (http://jdw.janes.com)

17 Schiff, Z Hezbollah received intel fromRussian-Syrian listening post during warHaaretz 03 Oct 06(http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/769512.html)

18 Bazzi M, Hezbollah cracked the code op cit

19 Bazzi M, Hezbollah cracked the code op cit

20 Bazzi M, Hezbollah cracked the code op cit

21 R Sale, private communication 29 Aug 06

22 Mahnaimi U, Humbling of the supertroopsop cit

23 Sic Semper Tyrranishttp://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semp

A south Beirut suburb ruined in the recentconflict between Israel and Hizbollah

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er_tyrannis/2006/09/an_interesting_.html

24 Debka-Net-Weekly 266 23 Aug 06

25 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A DisciplinedHezbollah Surprises Israel op cit

26 Blanford, N personal communication 19Jan 07

27 Goksel, T Hizbollah’s lack of structure itsstrength Asia Times, 10 Aug 06

28 Sale, R private communication 13 Sep 06

29 Hezbollah Mirsad-1 UAV Penetrates IsraeliAir Defenses Defense Industry Daily 20Apr 05http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/hezbollah-mirsad1-uav-penetrates-israeli-air-defenses-0386/

30 “zx8” Hizbollah disables Israel’s top-secretmilitary air traffic control centre usingdrone aircraft. 08 Aug 06(http://www.truthbox.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=55&Itemid=2)

31 La Franchi, P Iranian-made Ababil-THezbollah UAV shot down by Israeli fighterin Lebanon crisis Flight International 15Aug 06http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2006/08/15/208400/iranian-made-ababil-t-hezbollah-uav-shot-down-by-israeli-fighter-in-lebanon.html

32 Rubin, U The Rocket Campaign againstIsrael op cit

33 Simon, S private communication 13 Jan07

34 Cordesman, A Preliminary “Lessons” op cit

35 Moores, B A military assessment of theLebanon Conflict Winds of Change 24 Aug06(http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/008970.php)

36 Schiff, Z How the IDF blew chance todestroy short-range rockets Haaretz 05 Sep06(http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/757743.html)

37 AN Other private communication 14 Sep06

38 Sale, R private communication 13 Sep 06

39 Sale, R private communication 13 Sep 06;Franke, S private communication 12 Sep06

40 Israeli armour fails to protect MBTs fromATGMs Jane’s Defence Weekly 25 Aug 06(http://jdw.janes.com)

41 Mahnaimi U, Humbling of the supertroopsop cit

42 Intelligence and Terrorism InformationCenter at the Center for Special StudiesHezbollah’s use of Israeli Arabs as a toolfor furthering its efforts to increase anti-Israeli terrorism and gather intelligence onIsrael Special Information Bulletin August2004http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/8_04/hezb.htm

43 Isikoff, M & Hosenball, M A HizbullahMole? Case against CIA spy shockscounterintelligence community. Newsweek13 Nov 07(http://newsweek.com/id/70309)

44 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A DisciplinedHezbollah Surprises Israel op cit

45 Mahnaimi U, Humbling of the supertroopsop cit

46 The second raid was after the ceasefire,and thus was nominally to interdictHizballah weapons re-supply. However,the rank of one of the casualties (Lt Col),the presence of two HMMWVs, and thefact that the IDF SOF broke cover toengage in a lengthy gun-battle suggests amore offensive purpose.

47 Given the COMSEC Hizballah otherwiseshowed, this is moot. If the queue wasSIGINT, given the two failures, this mayhave been a Hizballah deceptionoperation.

48 Greenberg, H IDF officer killed in Baalbekoperation 20 Aug 06 Ynet News(http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3292974,00.html)

49 An Israeli special operations officer waskilled, two were injured – one seriously –in a pre-dawn commando raid at Bodai,30km NW of Baalbek Debkafile 19 Aug 06http://www.debka.com/

50 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A DisciplinedHezbollah Surprises Israel op cit

51 Athanasiadis, I How hi-tech Hezbollahcalled the shots Asia Times 09 Sep 06(http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HI09Ak01.html)

52 DEBKA-Net-Weekly 266 11 Aug 06

53 Sale, R private communication 29 Aug 06

54 Blanford, N Hizballah's reaction dependson its constituency Bitterlemonshttp://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=812 11Oct 07 �

The Armour forces assemble in the field before entering combat in Lebanon (IDF)

106

Recovering theDead

John Wilson

On Radio 4 on 24 November 2009,Michael Buerk (The Choice) talked toCathy O’Dowd about the choice she hadto make when she saw a dying climberon Everest. O’Dowd encountered thewoman, whom she had met briefly a fewdays before, just below the summit. Shewas dying, she begged not to be leftalone, although the repetition of thesewords with just two other phrases – whyare you doing this to me and I am anAmerican showed that she was, inpractice, incoherent – they could haveno conversation with her. There was noquestion of carrying her off themountain – she could not support herweight at all. They could give her nomedical assistance and they werethemselves becoming hypothermic. Theyeventually left her and Cathy O’Dowdreturned to her base camp.

In my view there was no other possiblecourse of action. Yet, clearly, it stilltroubles her, although she knew thenand knows now that it was the rightthing to do.

There have been several instances inrecent years when soldiers have beenkilled whilst recovering the bodies ofsoldiers killed in action. There isunderstandably huge emotionalsignificance in recovering the bodies ofthose who have fallen. It is differenttoday from the past. In the First War thesheer scale of the task prevented anysuch attempts and dulled thesensitivities. In the Second War the moremobile nature of battle permitted therecovery of bodies: from 1942 onwardswe were on the offensive and follow on

echelons were able to recover andidentify bodies and inter them. It wasnot a matter for front line troops.

In subsequent campaigns the nature ofthe conflict permitted the relatively easyrecovery of bodies although there wereexceptions. It is only since the FalklandsWar that bodies have been repatriated toUK – and not all were, hence thecemetery at San Carlos Bay. In Aden,Malaya, Cyprus et al bodies were buriedin military cemeteries in theatre. Indeed,in Aden the bodies of some of the 22soldiers of the RCT and RoyalNorthumberland Fusiliers killed in an

ambush by police mutineers on 20 June1967 were temporarily abandoned. Allthose soldiers were buried in SilentValley Cemetery in Aden.

There is also a different emotion –bodies from NI were returned to GreatBritain discreetly, there were norepatriation ceremonies, no respectfulcrowds lining the route at WoottonBasset, no Elizabeth Cross. There were nowebsites to carry the eulogies for thedead by their comrades. The militaryfunerals were quiet traditionalceremonies. It would be wrong toimagine that they were ‘hole in thecorner’ affairs – it was how it was doneand accorded with the wishes of thefamilies. What we see now is the publicdisplay of grief post-Diana style. Andpart of that more public openbereavement is a stronger emotion forthe recovery of bodies.

There is, too, the huge worry that bodiesthat cannot be recovered will be defiledby the enemy. It is a genuine concern:

BAR Thoughts

HMS Manchester’s Commanding Officer lays awreath at the San Carlos Cemetery (RN)

The Radfan Campaign A mine searching teamfrom the Assault Pioneer Platoon of the 1stBattalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment in an upcountry track in the South Arabian Federation.(IWM)

The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders searchingsuspects in Aden in 1967. (IWM)

Pte Nicholas Wilson, 19, from Preston, (Queen’sLancashire Regiment) examines one of thegraves at Basrah. His great-grandfather died inIraq during the First World War while servingwith the predecessors of the Queen’s LancashireRegiment, the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment,and is believed buried either in this cemetery ora similar cemetery at Nasiriyah.

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Captain RC Edwards and Trooper JWarburton from 22 SAS were killed in an action in the Radfan in May 1964, the patrol was unable to recover thebodies and fought fiercely just to extractthemselves. The tribesmen decapitatedthe dead and displayed their heads onpoles in a town in South Yemen. Beforethe Second War on the North WestFrontier, John Mastersi tells of thesavage death and mutilation of a Britishofficer, skinned and castrated alive. Thelocal British commander ordered ‘noprisoners’, and when, to his fury, awounded tribesman was taken, heordered that the man should be peggedout, face up in the sun. His body wasleft where the officer’s skin had beenfound.

No one of us doubts the emotional needto recover the body of a dead comrade.And we can understand the deep distressof the unit should a body be left. Weunderstand, too, the effect it will haveon the family. Not just to lose theirloved one, but not to be able to mournfully – and having to live with theknowledge that his body is out theresomewhere. And yet ... is it right to loseanother life to recover a body? Thesoldier is dead we cannot bring himback, and his body is not him; in CathyO’Dowd’s words it is a suit-case, thespirit, the man has gone.

Of course things are not always so clearcut. Is he dead? Can we be sure he isdead? If we are not sure then it is arescue not a recovery, and we expect ourpeople to do their utmost to rescue thewounded. There are plenty of occasionsover the last 6 years when soldiers haverisked and given their lives to rescuetheir comrades – the Army has shownthat is a true fighting force and acourageous force time and time again.

When it is the recovery of the dead,should we not apply a higher standard ofrisk? All effort short of likely furtherdeath? I do not have an answer; I doknow the empty feeling of leaving asoldier behind. The circumstances weredifferent. The IED killed two soldiers andwounded slightly others. I found the

torso and head of one soldier – his face unmarked. Of the second soldier, we found nothing. In the immediateaftermath of the attack we could search,but not freely. Once the area wassecured, we could search systematically.There was nothing, he had been layingon the buried IED (estimated at 100kgs).The big difference was that we couldeventually secure the area – this is notalways possible in Afghanistan.Nevertheless it was a bad feeling tocome away, having failed to find any ofhis body. Not as bad as knowing that hewas out there somewhere and that wewere leaving him to be found and

possibly defiled by others.

So, I leave the question unanswered. I say only that circumstances may notpermit the immediate recovery of thebody. The risk may be too high and weshould not judge those who have to takethat decision to leave him temporarily.All situations are different and it isbetter to think about these things anddiscuss them in advance.

Cathy O’Dowd discovered that there weresome who believed that she could havedone more: but they are never able to saywhat it is that I should have done.? �

Shaibah War Memorial - On 4 September 2003, British troops from 19 Mechanised Brigade began workto restore a Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemetery in Basrah, which had suffered years ofneglect and deliberate desecration under Saddam Hussein's regime. Hundreds of headstones have beendestroyed and many others damaged. The soldiers, including troops from the 1st Battalion The Queen'sLancashire Regiment, based only a few hundred yards away, began the task of salvaging the survivingheadstones for safe storage until the Commonwealth War Graves Commission can undertake acomprehensive reconstruction.

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A FortunateSoldierDavid Benest

It is not often that tributes to the deadappear in BAR but Major General(retired) Ken Perkins, who died on 23October 2009, aged 83, is one of thoseexceptions. I was fortunate to haveinterviewed him in 2007 at the DefenceAcademy about his time in command ofthe Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) in Oman.He arrived in a somewhat battered carand I asked him whether he needed ahand. He stared back at me and said,‘Young man, I cycled 15 miles yesterday!’We sat in the sun on the veranda atJSCSC on what was the last day of thestaff course. To his delight, the RedArrows suddenly appeared overhead andwe had a grandstand view. He hadhimself been a pilot, flying Beavers inMalaya during the Emergency and alsospotting for the artillery from the air inthe Korean War. In Dhofar he was knownto take the controls whenever he couldas he flew around his command.

Ken was born in Sussex in what weremodest surroundings, the only son of agardener. It was clear from the outset

that the armed forces were for him, anatural soldier and a natural leader whohad no time for notions that leadershipwas a skill that could be taught: youeither had it or you didn’t and there wasnothing further to be said on the matter.Social background had absolutelynothing to do with it either. Notsurprisingly, he gained a reputation asan ‘angry young man’ prepared to speakhis mind regardless of the consequences.Fortunately, his leadership ability wasrecognised for its true worth and hecommanded both 1st RHA and 24Infantry Brigade, which deployed toNorthern Ireland in 1972.

As Commander SAF (CSAF) Perkins wasdirectly responsible for all aspects ofmilitary decision making in SAF,reporting to his Commander-in-Chief,Sultan Qaboos and sitting as a memberof the National Development Council(NDC). Below him were just twobrigadiers, his deputy, Colin Maxwell andJohn Akehurst, in command of theDhofar Brigade. An RAF Group Captaincommanded five operational squadrons ofeight different types of aircraft and aRoyal Navy Captain operated six patrolcraft. Command of a force of 14,1001 wasexercised from his headquarters inMuscat. It was a multi-nationalcommand, comprising: British secondedand contract officers and NCOs; a UStrained Iranian infantry brigade; aSpecial Forces battalion and engineersfrom Jordan; Baluchi mercenaries; bothDhofar jebeli Firqats and Omanis; and byno means least, the SAS in the guise of‘BATTs’. India, Egypt and Pakistanprovided medics and Saudi Arabia lent agunner colonel.

Ken had jumped at the opportunity tocommand such a force, reflecting uponthe alternative in British Army of theRhine with ‘its peacetime, same as lastyear exercises on the North German Plain[as] hardly a preparation for war’.2 Thecounterinsurgency against the MarxistPeoples Front for the Liberation of theOccupied Gulf States (PFLOAG) hadreached a critical phase in Perkins’ timeof command. Fortune was with Perkins.The CAPSTAN feature overlooking the

‘Adoo’ (ie enemy) supply line form thePeoples Democratic Republic of Yemen(PDRY) was secured on 14 October. Crossborder raids by SOAF Hunters had struckat PFLOAG command elements. TheIranians were now able to exploit to thewest. PDRY troops withdrew across theborder. The main munitions stores of theSherishitti caves were cleared in lateOctober. The village of Dhalqut wasretaken on 1 December. A link up wasmade on the Darra Ridge on 2 December.SON had been cleverly positioned toensure logistic support was well forward.Civil development was taking placethroughout as soon as the Adoo werecleared, including the drilling of 50 wellsand laying of 250 km of roads. SultanQaboos was thus able to declare the 10year insurgency over on 11 December1975. Dhofar was now secure fordevelopment.

Perkins views on leadership3 bear out thesimplicity of his operational art, reducingthe morass of ‘qualities’ required ofleaders to just three: moral and physicalcourage; the ability to communicate; andvision of the end state. He might haveadded that leadership of a multi-nationalforce in Dhofar was as much aboutpersuasion as direction. Most telling washis clarity of thought: ‘What acommander needs is a clear notion of hisown intentions, reliable communicationsand good subordinates. [In BrigadierJohn Akehurst] I certainly had the latter.’4

He typically spent no more than a fewhours a week at his desk. Towards theend of the campaign he ordered acomplete change in plan without issuinga single piece of paper.

He summarised the reasons for success:identification of the threat, the isolationof that threat from the civil population,its neutralisation and then how tonegotiate the enemy to come over to theGovernment side. The impossibility ofdoctrinaire ‘solutions’ such as simplycopying the civilian resettlementprogramme so successfully enacted inMalaya, were of no use. Given theDhofari nomadic culture and completedependence upon the cattle economy,the provision of Government centres

Ken Perkins (Courtesy of The Sun)

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where medical and veterinary treatmentwas freely available was decisive inwinning ‘hearts and minds’. Developmentin the form of roads, wells, cattletroughs, a mosque and education quicklyfollowed – all this under the direction ofthe Wali of Dhofar, not some non-governmental organisation importedfrom afar. Psychological warfare was alsokey, the surrendered enemy recruitedinto the Firqat as local intelligenceadvisers under SAS guidance. It was alsorealised that interdiction of the adoo

supply chain was essential and hence theHAMMER, HORNBEAM, DAMAVAND andSIMBA ‘lines’. ‘Better communications,mobility and logistics and superiorfirepower’5 won the day. But mostimportantly, counterinsurgency warfarewas, is, and always will be, aboutpolitics and the development of a crossgovernment strategy, not armed forcesalone.

Well done Ken!

1 International Institute for StrategicStudies, ‘The Military Balance1975-6’

2 Perkins, Ken, ‘A Fortunate Soldier’,Brasseys, London, 1988, pp 119 -139

3 Interview with author, DefenceAcademy, 19 July 2007

4 Perkins correspondence with author 9February 2009 �

Radio Masts over Sangin (Arabella Dorman)

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FH 70 in a FOBJohn Wilson

FH 70 is a towed 155mm gun/howitzerweighting about 9,000kg. It has a rangeof 24,700m and has a small auxiliaryengine (1700cc, VW Beetle petrolengine) which will move it around thegun position without needing its gun-tractor. It was in service with the BritishArmy from about 1980 to 1992, and withthe TA until 1999.

We have 10 in storage according to theDASA website. And since we bother tokeep them at all, we trust that they arein good condition. The barrel wear willbe negligible. And they can be under-

slung a Chinook. They fire the sameammo as AS 90 – it is the same barrel.The L15 HE round is particularly goodwith a lethality of about 10 times the USequivalent (M107 HE round).The Light Gun has a range of 17,500m.So, FH 70 has a 40% increase in rangeover Light Gun – but:

Area covered by Light Gun fire:962 sq km.

Area covered by FH 70 fire 1916 sq km.

In both cases I am ignoring theminimum range.

So, for a 40% increase in range FH 70doubles the coverage.

137 (Java) Bty found itself at Fitzroy atthe end of Op Corporate (Falklands). AnFH 70 firing from Fitzroy could have

engaged every target fired by Light Gunduring the war without moving.

And, FH 70 has a burst fire capability; ithas a flick rammer. Some years ago I had30 rounds left at the end of the firingcamp – we were about to convert tolight gun for an emergency tour and Iknew that I would not see those roundsagain if we did not fire them. So, ratherthan blasting off we did a small trial.One gun was nominated, all ammo wasprepared and I ordered “One Gun, 30rounds continuous fire”. The detachmentstumbled over the first couple of roundsbut then got into the swing of it. Theyre-laid between rounds and achieved asmooth rate of a round every 4 seconds.A pair of FH 70s can cheerfully put 30rounds of 155mm HE onto the target inone minute – 1320kg of ammo.Just a thought.? �

FH 70 on Trial Firings Sardinia.

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How Myths AreMade

John Wilson

On page 421 of The Making of the BritishArmy by Allan Mallinson (reviewed inthis issue on p.?)he states that ‘InFebruary 1972 a staff-serjeant platooncommander of the King’s Own RoyalBorder Regiment (KORBR) was killed in anexchange of fire with an IRA active serviceunit (ASU) near Strabane’ He then goeson to describe the subsequent operation- ‘Soon afterwards the battalion receivedintelligence that the ASU was based in afarmhouse close by and the KORBR’scommanding officer ......ordered one ofhis platoons to set up an OP ready to takeoffensive action if the ASU showedthemselves’.

He quotes from the platoon commander’sdiary, I paraphrase:

● 2 Feb – receive orders for OP task.

● 6 Feb – Pl comd plus two snipers anda GPMG dropped off covertly to setup OP.

● 7 Feb – Deception plan unfolds –army helicopter wakes up ASU,platoon plus 3 Saracens (APC) andtwo Ferrets (Armoured Car) inposition to North; two men appear atthe door of a lone house andadjacent caravan – unarmed; laterone shot fired – platoon returns firethen withdraws as arranged.

● 7 Feb - Mid-day – ‘...a car arrived onthe forecourt of the lone building –was it a pub? Two men got outcarrying rifles. I nodded assent: twoshots, both men went to ground, butit was not clear if they had been hit.That’s what the GPMG was for. Longkilling burst’. Move to emergency RV.

● 8 Feb – Return with platoon –

overnight someone had constructed abrick wall with firing ports in front ofthe caravan. Ten minutes later shotsfired from the firing ports and fromtwo trenches beside the main road.‘All hell broke out. Six Brownings onthe Saracens, the Ferrets and thetroop leader’s Saladin [heavyarmoured car]were firing, plus thethree GPMGs. Sgt H tried to grip thefire discipline but they couldn’t hearhim; I watched transfixed at theimpact of this weight of fire on ahurriedly constructed brick wall.Within seconds it was gone and thepoor sods who had taken us on’.

Allan Mallinson comments, “At least 4 ofthe seven-man ASU had been killed.”The staff-serjeant was Colour SergeantBoardley and he was killed at a VCP inStrabane on 1 Feb 1973, not 1972. Thereis no record of any PIRA gunmen killedon 8 February 1973 in the Strabane area,or around that date – certainly not 4.There were only two occasions whenPIRA lost 4 men or more in one go – soit would have been a memorable event;and in keeping with PIRA’s usual stancethere would have been a stridentcampaign on ‘shoot to kill’ lines. Also inaccordance with PIRA practice thedeaths would have been acknowledged.PIRA considered itself as an army – andconducted some of the common militarypractices, which includes acknowledgingcasualties. There is only one PIRA deaththat has been unacknowledged becauseof the propaganda value and the threatof being sued and the political stormprevents me from naming that person.There are few serving soldiers who were

in NI and only a handful were there inthe 1970s when so many of these mythswere made. So we need to nail themwhen they appear. PIRA were not daft –remember the bleak statistics:

● The Army killed 301 people of whomjust 121 were republican terrorists.

● Republican terrorists killed 694soldiers (Loyalists killed 6).

● Republican terrorists killed 162 otherrepublican terrorists.

In other words they killed more of theirown than the Army did, and they killedus at nearly 6 times the rate that wekilled them. Curiously the figures reflectwell on the Army: we understood thenature of the campaign and wereprepared to accept the casualties inorder to protect the people – ie whatGeneral McChrystal demands of ISAF now.Of course our force protection got better– as did our campaign design and wefought PIRA to a stand-still.

Consider again the vignette above. Wasit a pub or a farm house – not usuallytoo difficult to distinguish betweenthem. Why would PIRA advertise theirambush point by building a brick wall –bearing in mind that it was compromisedby the firing on 6th Feb. PIRA could nothave been unaware of the AFVs – thatexcellent (in its day) family of vehiclesmade a most distinctive road/enginenoise that carried for miles – and thoseAFVs had been present the day before, sowhy provoke an open engagement whichthey could not hope to win? By 1973PIRA experience was quite good enoughto know that a single brick wall wasnever going to survive multiple GPMGand MMG fire. It is common practice in

2nd Lieutenant David Brough, 1st Battalion, TheParachute Regiment and Lance Corporal BernardWinter of the 2nd Battalion, The Queen’sRegiment, patrol a Belfast street with a Saracenarmoured personnel carrier. (IWM)

A Ferret of A Sqn 1RTR overlooking the border atPettigo, Northern Ireland, 1973 (Tank Museum)

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Ireland to build a brick wall to protectcaravans (often found as accommodationat Irish farmhouses) from the prevailingwind and that might be a more likelyexplanation for the wall. It is not usualterrorist practice to mount an ambushfrom their base.

Fortunately we have Lost Lives(McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney andThornton,Mainstream; Revised 2001;Hbk; £30; pp 1648; ISBN: 1 84018 504X)as a source of impeccable integrity. It isa painstaking, non-judgmental record ofevery ‘Troubles’ related death in NI since1966. I say again to all regimentalsecretaries, army libraries and to anyMOD branch with an interest in NI – buya copy for reference. Needless to say,there is no record in Lost Lives of thesekillings at Strabane in 1973, nor is therea record on Republican/Sinn Feinwebsites. No, PIRA did not spirit bodiesaway across the border to secret burials.Yes, some terrorists were taken tohospitals in RoI but there were neverunacknowledged funerals. So, how couldwe know that “At least 4 of the seven-man ASU had been killed “, or that therewere 7 of them?

It is a recurring sin of all fighters toexaggerate hits – or at least claim a

possible as a probable or even acertainty. It is just something we shouldbe aware of – it is part of our militaryeducation to know that many militarystories are myths. You will have met NIwarriors who have regaled you withstories of terrorists killed. Indeed, fromthose I speak to we must have killed not121 terrorists but hundred times that tomatch witness to death.

This vignette appears at a good time: we need to recognise the mythphenomenon because it interferes withour intelligence assessment and moredangerously it colours behaviour. Don’t believe the stories without good evidence – they must not beallowed to set the standard. �

Saladin at Bovington (Tank Museum)

A Ferret scout car of the 17/21 Lancers at a vehicle check point in Northern Ireland, 1970 – possibly Strabane? (Tank Museum)

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What future forthe TerritorialArmy Post theCentenary(The role of theTA Infantry inthe seconddecade of the21st Century)

The Patriot volunteer, fighting forhis country and his rights, makesthe most reliable soldier on earth.

Lt-Gen ‘Stonewall’ Jackson1862

Major Gerry Long3 PWRR

IntroductionThe future for the Territorial Army isuncertain. There is little understandingor vision for the reserve forces as awhole or of those who make up the TA,as could be seen by various spokespersons wheeled out during the currentfiasco with regards to cuts in the TAbudget who seemed not to understandwhy cutting TA training would affect thecapability of the TA and morale.

Post SDRThere is no doubt that the TA provides asubstantial force for relatively littlemoney, if closing the TA down for 6months saves only £20 million, then inthe big scheme of things the TA is smallfry in the Defence Budget. At anestablished strength of 38,500 spreadover 341 units the TA has shrunk backfrom its ‘Hendy Days’ of the Cold War.

Numerous cuts have probably reducedthe TA to a dangerously small componentof Defence. It may have gone belowcritical mass, too small to become a realelement in the event of the need formass mobilisation. Much of the countryhas no local TA; like the rural Post Office,the local TA Drill Hall has become a thingof the past. The whole idea of theTerritorial Army is that it is local.

The future of the TA, a possible‘Renaissance’Since the ‘Report on the Strategic Reviewof Reserves 2009’ is dead, what is theway ahead for the ‘Weekend Warrior’? Thepart-time volunteer solder is as old asthe Army itself (even the Spartans had aday job), but its present form is a legacyof WW2 and more recently the Cold War,and reshaped again since then.

There is no doubt that Op TELIC 1changed the TA, and changed it for thebetter. Gone is the drinking club culture;and through the Regional TrainingCentres and the DIE, the standard of theTA soldier has never been so high. This islinked to real operational experience; butstill divide remains. The Regular Armyhas very little understanding of the TA;and this showed when it came to cuttingthe budget. What is the easiest thing tocut? the TA.

The tempo for the Army since 2003 isnot what was planned for, and thedrawdown in Iraq has not given theexpected breathing space. The argumenthad probably been won at the MOD thatthe army is too small at the moment,and, of course, the credit crunch has putpaid to any increase for the RegularArmy. However, this is where the TAcould be used: to buy time and space forthe Regular Army.

Force Lay DownFirstly, the lay down of the TA needs tobe looked at and their roles and make upwithin the regional brigades. Forexample, my battalion – 3 PWRR -stretches from Dover to Portsmouth andfrom Canterbury to Farnham. Althoughthere is a garrison administration inAldershot, the Farnham companyadministration is done from Canterbury,which suggests that the footprint ofunits within the TA should be examined.Major units should be linked togethergeographically, not as in the 3 PWRRcase, which is simply two battalion areasamalgamated into one, straddling 2separate brigades. This is a wastefullegacy that we cannot afford. ThePortsmouth PWRR company and theFarnham PWRR company could combinewith the Reading company of the Rifleswith a HQ element at Aldershot. There isno need to lose battalions; some unitscould be re-roled within a tighteradministrative organisation.

Integral (Reserve) Coy Concept(I(R)CC)The reconfiguring of the force lay down

TA Poster 1938 (NAM)

Members of 51st Highland Regiment (TerritorialArmy) based in Perth Scotland, are out in Kabul,Afghanistan, until March 2003.

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of the TA could be linked to analternative ORBAT for the TA, that is tosay: fully integrating the TA with theRegular Army. For argument sake we willcall this the Integral (Reserve) CoyConcept (I(R)CC) this would save muchmoney, once again e.g. using A Coy 3PWRR as an example it would becomethe 4th Rifle Coy of the whicheverbattalion was in Aldershot, presently theColdstream Guards (or it could be just aseasily be 1 Royal Anglian in Pirbright),the TA centre could be situated withinthe battalion lines it could beadministered by the regular unit, andwhen the regular unit is deployed the TACoy is mobilised to bring the regularbattalion up to strength.

This could be mirrored throughout theInfantry (and other Arms and Service)with a 4th Coy being formed for eachregular battalion and mobilisedaccordingly. Annual Camp would be

based around the regular unit’s trainingcycle so the TA Coy would deploy for 2weeks with the regular host, this ofcourse would cut down the number ofposts for TA officers over the rank ofMajor, but the TA Coy would find it easierto mould with the regular counterpartsand make the mobilisation andoperational process a lot morestreamlined and efficient. And thewelfare support would be there from thestart. This will also do away with theunknown quality that the regularscurrently experience, instead the TAelement is known.

Readiness CycleSecondly, a proper readiness cycle ofreserve units could be formed around theregional brigade to mobilise them asformed units; with a rest period toreform as a unit post deployment, andthen a focused recruiting and trainingperiod before starting the process again.

The important thing is to go through thecycle as a unit and not as an individual,except perhaps for some officers.

Unit MobilisationFinally, if we stick to the presentformation of the TA rather than go downthe I(R)CC route, currently mobilisationis done on an ad hoc bases throughindividuals and or small cohorts going toserve (sometimes) with sister units orpurely to fill gaps where needed. A moreorganised programmed mobilisationmaking better use of the TA is anobvious solution. Those deploying wouldhave a proper welfare team to supportthem and a formal decompression thatcould be monitored by that same staff.Such a system could markedly increasethe numbers of TA soldiers mobilised insupport of operations.

ConclusionAlthough the TA is an essential

RMLY Soldiers of the TA Training on Challenger 2 (Stuart Bingham)

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The Radfan Campaign: A Sergeant-Major of the Coldstream Guards paying local tribesmen who were employed at an up-country camp. R 035164 (IWM)

component of the Field Army again andthe Army could not do without them,divisions remain. What is required is realvision for the future and proper focusingof resources to get the best for ourmoney. The present system is a costlylegacy item of massed mobilisation ofthe Second World War and the Cold War.This is an opportunity to mould theforces for the future rather than hangonto the past.

Comment from Colonel Mike ScottAD Reserves (A), HQLF

The Territorial Army (TA) and theReserves has had some high profile presscoverage over the latter part of 2009.This press coverage has included newsitems relating to The Strategic Review ofReserves undertaken by Major GeneralCottam, Planning Round 2009Efficiencies and Current Operationalplanning in Afghanistan. Major Long haspresented some interesting ideas for thefuture of the Territorial Army Infantry.The British Army Review (BAR) is

designed to stimulate debate and is animportant platform for discussion anddebate. However, it is important to bemindful of some factual inaccuracies inMajor Long’s letter:

● Firstly the future of the TA is notuncertain; Brigadier General Staff(BGS) is currently undertaking adetailed examination of what therequirement for the future TA andReserves will be. Until BGS hasreached his conclusions there is nochange to role and size. Future ArmyStructures Next Steps (FAS NS) maywell have a different operationalrequirement than currently exists.

● The temporary reduction in trainingthat hit the headlines in 2009 weremeasures taken after carefulconsideration and proportional to theTA’s requirement to be placed on aCampaign footing to supportoperations in Afghanistan.

● The size of the TA reflects theRegular Army reserve requirement

and this is currently based on largeScale Deliberate Intervention typeoperations.

● The TA has a very important role toplay with Community Engagementand the footprint it lays down is atthe forefront of this. (There arecurrently over 370 TAC locations with47 of these sites Infantry Platoonout stations).

● The Strategic Review of Reserves isfar from ‘dead’. Work is ongoingacross 3 strands (Define CapabilitiesRequired, Develop the GraduatedCommitment Model, and DevelopOptions for TA C2 and EstateLaydown) with 15 of therecommendations already in placeand a further 32 on track forcompletion. This work has beenshaped and complemented by thedevelopment work carried out by CRF(now AG) and D Reserves (A) in early2009.

Brig Tom O'Brien will be writing anarticle in the next edition of BAR. �

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AFGHANISTAN: A TOUR OF DUTY

UNFORGETTABLE IMAGES OF THEAFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN

PUBLISHED 29TH OCTOBER

Fast growing specialist international publisher, Third Millennium Publishing, is pleased to announce that it has launchedAfghanistan: A Tour of Duty, the very first book of its kind, which reveals a remarkable photographic portrait of the Afghanistancampaign, taken by a former Grenadier Guards officer operating from the front line in the Helmand province. All profits from thebook will be donated by Third Millennium to BLESMA (British Limbless Ex Service Men’s Association).

During his six month tour of duty in 2007 Captain (Retd) Alexander Allan, 29, captured a number of unforgettable images ofordinary British soldiers sweltering in the heat, liaising with the locals, training the Afghan Army, fighting off Taliban attacksand taking casualties. His feeling for his troops, the camaraderie, sacrifices and how they cope with what they have been sentto do, is evident from every image. The accompanying words are by the soldiers themselves.

Allan has dedicated the book to one particular colleague, Lance Sergeant Adam ‘Goolie’ Ball, who towards the end of their tourof duty lost his leg while trying to save two Afghan colleagues injured by landmines. In his introduction Allan says: “Somepeople write prose, some poems, others are raconteurs telling their stories as best they can to an eager audience. These picturesare my diary; take from them what you wish.”

Captain Patrick Hennessey, author of the Junior Officers’ Reading Club, says: “The Army is fond of saying that a picture paints athousand words – Captain Allan’s do so with incredible eloquence. Stunning and poignant, nothing I have seen or read in the lastfew years captures the colour and humanity of the Afghan conflict as well as these brilliant images.”

In his foreword, General Sir Richard Dannatt GCB, CBE, MC, former Head of the Army says: “…this wonderful book is a graphicrecord of British soldiers’ day-to-day experiences serving in Afghanistan.….along with service, sadly comes sacrifice, and thisphotographic record does not flinch from the issue. Readers will get an authentic insight into the realities of life for the Britishsoldier on Afghanistan’s front line.

However, they should also be reassured to know that all profits from the sale of this book will, at the wounded soldiers’ ownrequest, go direct to the charity which supports and cares for those who have lost limbs in service. Such motivation and service istruly humbling.”

Copies of Afghanistan: A Tour of Duty can be ordered online at: www.tmiltd.com or www.blesma.org at a special direct price of£10.99 + p&p, or by phoning Third Millennium on 020 7336 0144. (Normal RRP £12.99). Copies are also available from the likesof Waterstone's and other book trade outlets.

Third Millennium has published books for a number of leading heritage, educational and military institutions. These includetitles for Westminster Abbey, York Minster, Durham Cathedral and Lincoln’s Inn; the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, Durham,Manchester, Newcastle and SOAS; Harrow, Rugby School and Wellington College; the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the RoyalArtillery, the Household Division, the Royal Green Jackets, the Army Museum Ogilvy Trust and the Royal Hospital Chelsea.

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A Young Gentleman at War, The Letters of Captain OrlandoBridgeman, 1st FootGuards In the Peninsulaand at Waterloo1812–15 – Edited byGareth Glover

Ken Trotman Publishing, 2008, pp188; £22.50;ISBN: 978-1-905074-71-6;

When writing of military matters, however much the author or editor may have done his best to keep close to the truthwhen describing the sequence of events, their causes orconsequences, inevitably he will have second thoughts almostimmediately after sending his text to press. However wide mayhave been his reading of scholarly histories or memoirs ofbattles and campaigns composed by men who survived them,whenever he may re-read one, or study a new book, asinevitably he will find a point overlooked, or matter providingcontradictory evidence, at odds with what he had understoodpreviously to have been the case.

The graphic narratives of participants should be treated withcaution, for many of them, although writing with immediacy,and giving first-hand evidence of what was taking place aroundthem, were unable to appreciate the importance of the partthey were playing in the events they were experiencing. ThomasHenry Browne, for one, was the first to admit when writing hisJournal, that his observations had been ‘confined to what couldbe picked up in the hurry and bustle of continued marching andcounter marching ...’ Many other narratives were composed inlater years, when dulled memories were jolted by thepublication of Napier’s great History, a mine of informationfrom which they could pillage and pad out their own memoirs.As Oman was well aware, the strength of men’s memoriesdiffers: indeed ‘every year that elapses between the event andthe setting down of its narrative on paper decreases progressivelythe value of the record.’ A failing memory, the love of a well-rounded tale, a spice of autolatry, the inclusion of apicturesque anecdote, will have impaired the value of many aveteran’s reminiscences, while even the most readablenarratives occasionally mix up the chronology of events. Oman

reiterated that while they may be ‘admirable evidence for theway in which the rank and file looked on a battle, a forcedmarch, or a prolonged shortage of rations … we must not trustthem overmuch as authorities on the greater matter of war.’ This was brought forcibly to my notice recently when readingthe letters of the third son of the 1st Earl of Bradford, Captainthe Honourable Orlando Bridgeman of the 1st Foot Guards,certainly not from the ‘rank and file’! Mostly written during thelatter part of the Peninsular War, they describe his experiencesin an attractively produced card-back volume entitled A YoungGentleman at War, impeccably edited by Gareth Glover, andpublished by him last year in conjunction with Ken Trotman. One letter, penned to his mother from Irun on 3 October 1813while recovering from a wound received at the assault of SanSebastian, concerned the supposed stiff resistance of Spanishtroops when holding the ridge of San Marcial against Soult’scounter-thrust across the Bidasoa. Wellington described thiscombat to Stanhope many years later, as ‘in their own accounts’represented as being ‘one of their greatest battles – as a featthat does them the highest honour.’ Bridgeman felt otherwise,commenting to his mother:

‘I am almost afraid to make any remarks on LordWellington’s late dispatches to England in which hementions in such high terms the conduct of the Spaniards,it may be politic towards them, this they certainly deservedas they behaved better than usual, but from whateverybody says who saw them, his expressions are toostrong, remember I was at San Sebastian & therefore knewnothing till I returned, but all our officers saw the wholething, & at one time so many of the Spaniards ran awaythat our brigade which was formed close to the high roadactually received orders to form a guard in order to stop allSpanish soldiers who were not wounded. This I give you myhonour is fact, had you seen the ground they were formedupon you would have said it was impossible for the enemyever to come near them, nor could they have done so, hadthe Spaniards stood their ground like men. I made noremarks upon them in my last letter; but I could not helpsaying what I have done after reading Lord W’s dispatch &you will I believe find that almost all the private accountswill agree with mine.’

This was not the first time Bridgeman had reason to criticisethe Spaniards. Writing from the near Cadiz in the previous July,he had mentioned that ‘On the advanced picquet last night in avery different direction from ours, a Spanish sergeant & twelvewent very quietly over to the French, & their comrades let themgo without even firing at them, here’s a noble set of mengallantly defending their country, by jove it is too bad, poordevils, what would become of them if it was not for us’. But fromsuch asides one should not assume that his letters are merely

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devoted to criticism of Britain’s supposed allies, for very many of them are most informative, covering a great variety of topics, from complaints of lack of ready money (for he wasborn with a silver spoon in his mouth) to urgent requests foradditional clothing and equipment, but not ‘long cottonstockings which are very inconvenient on service’ (which hewould be sending home). He went on to demand

‘...six pairs of short cotton & let them be large enough. Nextcomes & saddle & bridle ... the saddle with a crupper, apad, and straps to carry a very small portmanteau behindme, as it often happens that in a march the baggage doesnot come up for some time after ourselves, & by carrying asmall portmanteau behind me I have always a clean shirt&c, in case I am wet through. My father will also remembera small leather roller he had before his saddle to carry hisgreat coat, I should like to have the same for me to carrymy boat cloak, only it must be rectangular with three straps... a pair of quite plain pistol holsters ... a double bridlewith a straight bit & rather sharp ... [also] two or threesoft tooth brushes, I have plenty of hard ones but no soft.’

(In a later letter, he exigently specifies ‘Smyth’s tooth brushes’,and also demands a good hair brush, as such things were not tobe had.)

The fact that these are confidential private letters – rather than notes jotted down at the time to be ‘written up’ later with a view to future publication – makes this, and other such collections, all the more valuable. Such authentic,unsophisticated, personal responses to the hostile conditions in which their writers found themselves, provide us withconsiderable further insight into their daily needs, interests,reactions, and preoccupations.

A Young Gentleman at War is just one of a growing number ofvaluable and illuminating memoirs or collections of letterswhich have been discovered in local or family archives andlong-overlooked caches, and which are now being edited byGareth Glover and a published in a accessible form by KenTrotman. Admittedly, some of the earlier volumes have beenprinted in a rather small type-size, but an appropriate design(including illustrations in colour in some cases) has now beensettled on, and Peninsular war and Waterloo buffs should begrateful to Gareth Glover and his publisher for making themavailable at a very reasonable price.

Among some of the more substantial volumes I have had theopportunity of reading in recent weeks, and with great interest,are A Hellish Business: from the Letters of Captain CharlesKinloch, 52nd Foot (partly devoted to the complexities of the‘purchase’ and ‘staff appointments’ systems then existing); AGuards Officer in the Peninsula and at Waterloo: the Letters ofCaptain George Bowles, Coldstream Guards (extracted from thevery rare ‘Series of letters to the First Earl of Malmesbury’, of1870); and, also from the Coldstreams, ‘It all Culminated at

Hougoumont’: the Letters of Captain John Lucie Blackman.

But these are only a few of the collections of letters now inprint, or in the pipeline. Regrettably, too few of them are to befound on the shelves of any but specialist bookshops, andrarely attract the notice of reviewers, and readers who wouldappreciate being advised about the appearance of forthcomingvolumes should not hesitate to contact Richard Brown atrlbtrotman@aol.com direct.

Ian Robertson �

Gallipoli: The End ofthe Myth – Robin Prior

Gallipoli: Attack from the Sea – VictorRudenno

Yale University Press, 2008, Hbk £25.00, pp338, ISBN 978-0-300-12440-8

There are some military campaigns that just seem to go ondemanding attracting attention decades afterwards. Gallipoli1915 is one of them. Even though libraries of books have beenwritten about the campaign, they still keep coming. This year,for example, two new major studies have been produced. Aftersuch rivers of ink, one might wonder what that is new couldpossibly be said.

Robin Prior’s book, the first of this duo, is determinedlyrevisionist; Prior looks at all aspects of the campaign and setsabout demolishing what he says are the prevailing myths thathave become attached to it. The biggest, at the level of grandstrategy, is that if the campaign had been as successful as itsprogenitors hoped, it would have knocked the props out of theTriple alliance and drastically shortened the war. Gallipoli,according to Arthur Marder, a respected naval historian, was theone bright strategic idea of the First World War. Not so. RobinPrior is a convinced Westerner who concludes that as far asBritain and France were concerned, the Western Front was the

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decisive theatre and everything else pretty much a waste oftime, effort and lives, though somewhat surprisingly, given hiscataloguing of the catastrophic errors of the Gallipolicampaign, he concludes that a fixation on the Western Frontwould probably have taken a bigger toll in human lives. This istendentious, basically unprovable, and fascinating, stuff butPrior’s discussion of these mammoth issues is at much higherlevel of generality than their importance warrants and isunlikely to convince Easterners, or advocates of the ‘British wayin warfare.’

He’s on much firmer ground at the operational and tacticallevels when he addresses a whole series of apparently brilliantopportunities lost through bad luck or inept implementation.Three stand out: the naval attack of 18th March, the inabilityto exploit the success at Y Beach on 25 April and the initiallysuccessful landings at Suvla on 6 August. Taking them inreverse order, the aim of the Suvla campaign, he says, was moreto establish a base than to launch a large scale outflankingcampaign. General Stopford, who apparently realized this whenhis latter day critics did not, accordingly gets sympathetictreatment; in any case, says Prior there were no reserves toengage in anything more ambitious anyway. This was true at YBeach, too; the lack of manpower [partly attributable toalready inadequate numbers of allied forces being distributedbetween too many beaches] made the famous walk up to theopen village of Krithia quite pointless. The notion of so manysubsequent critics that here was a priceless opportunity lost isa mixture of ‘fantasy and hindsight’; the army Prior says, had nosuch orders and wasn’t the kind of force able or willing todemonstrate initiative when the unexpected happened. Even ifsuch an advance had been made, an extended bridgehead wouldhave been no more than that and would have been defeated bythe Turks anyway. It wasn’t, therefore, ‘nearly a success’. As to the naval attack on the Narrows up to and includingMarch 18th, Prior argues that the Navy could never have gotthrough, as it had no answer to the combination of Turkishguns and minefields. Prior maintains that given a hitting rateof something like 2 per cent on the Turks’ main guns, the Navyhad too few shells and used them too sparingly. Attempts toget through the minefield in the face of Turkey’s mobilehowitzers were an exercise in futility. The Navy he concludesdid not ‘nearly get through’ and would have failed the next day,or subsequently, if it had tried again. It is interesting tocompare this with the more conventional account of VictorRudenno who makes many of the same points but nonethelesshighlights the fact that by 2 pm that day, both German andTurkish accounts conclude that the defenders were almost outof ammunition and in a desperate state. What saved them wasthe small, recent and unexpected minefield laid in the areawhere British and French battleships chose to manoeuvre. Buit there’s also the question of what would have happenedthen even if the navy had got through. Prior claims that alliedpolicy-makers had not thought through the next step ofworking out what to do if a fleet of allied battleships hadsqueezed through the narrows and turned up off Constantinople

pointing their guns at the city. Would they, could they morally,have bombarded it? Maybe, given the German bombardment ofParis in 1870-1. But would it have caused then Ottoman Empireto fall? And would that have led to a successor regime to throwin the towel ? To judge by French experience, yes and no,respectively. Again, this ‘what-if’ of history is fascinating, notleast because definitive answers are markedly elusive, but whatis clear is that Churchill, Fisher, Kitchener and all the rest ofthem simply hadn’t thought this through. Prior’s account ofthis is convincing, although it’s more of a criticism of theestimate process then in use, than a de-mythologising of thecampaign. Rudenno seems equally sceptical about the calmassumption that a fleet off Constantinople simply meant‘victory’.

However, Rudenno who concentrates on the naval side of thecampaign, does draw the reader’s attention to thedisproportionate moral effect of a few allied submarinesoperating with daring and success in the Sea of Marmora. Themoral effect of a full scale battlefleet turning up off the GoldenHorn is of course almost impossible to predict, but perhapsshouldn’t be entirely dismissed. Rudenno’s account of the navalcampaign, is well informed, more descriptive, much moreextensive but perhaps less analytical than Prior’s; his accountin particular of the fearless, derring-do of allied submariners isa needed corrective to the scathing accounts of Prior whosereview leads his readers to conclude that nearly all the chiefprotagonists in the Gallipoli campaign were fools. In theirvarying ways and for their very contrasting treatment of whatremains a fascinating campaign, both books are muchrecommended.

Geoffrey Till �

Maritime Dominion andthe Triumph of the FreeWorld – Peter Padfield

John Murray, 2009, Hbk £30.00, Pbk, £12.99, pp 369, ISBN 978-0-7195-6297-6This is the third of Peter Padfield’s masterly sweeps throughnaval history, following on from his ‘Maritime Supremacy andthe Opening of the Western Mind’ which appeared in 1999 andhis ‘Maritime Power and the Struggle for Freedom’ of 2003.Padfield is not new to the grand vista style of naval historywriting, for his Tide of Empires duo established his strengths inthis demanding field. But this latest trilogy is really verydifferent, much more ambitious in its scope and having a gooddeal to say about Britain and the 21st Century World.At first glance, much of the present volume looks like a pretty

standard naval history of the last 150 years. Padfield packs alot in, and the pace is more than a little breathless. The deadlyU-boat war of 1914-1918, for example is covered in barely 11pages and there are a number of other topics covered in it aswell. Again on the face of it, scholars seeking major insightsinto the strategy, tactics or technology of the campaign canhardly expect to find very many in a work of such limitedcompass – but in fact they would. Padfield has the great gift ofidentifying key points and getting them over concisely and witheffect; his paragraph on the success of convoys, for example,says it all. Of course, not everyone will agree with all hisconclusions. His whole-hearted espousal of one school ofthought in the great debate amongst historians about gunnerybefore and during the war will raise eye-brows. But no matter,naval history should raise questions as well as provide answers.

But, much more important than this and much more praise-worthy is Padfield’s extremely interesting efforts to put navalhistory into its proper context. To illustrate the point, his U-boat chapter doesn’t just focus on the questions of ‘to convoyor not to convoy’ and who was to blame for the Royal Navy’snot doing it earlier. Instead, he draws attention to the strategicimportance of the final British victory in this campaign interms of safely bringing allied troops to the European front andallowing the Anglo-American war industry to overwhelmGermany in the Materialschlacht in the Autumn of 1918. Healso points out how their defeat in this campaign illustratedGermany’s fatal strategic, social, political and commercialweaknesses. These were in Holger Herwig’s words, ‘a mirror ofthe Wilhelmine class state with its growing antagonisms thatultimately split and paralysed German society as a whole.’

And with this, we get to the real point and the real value ofPadfield’s trilogy. His real theme throughout is, if you like, thetriumph of Neptune especially but not exclusively in the handsof the British and now the Americans. Sea power has broughtso many advantages to the countries that have made proper useof it, that they have prospered in peace, prevailed in war andshaped world history. Over the past several centuries, hemaintains, seapower has been associated with freedom,because intimately connected with trade. Trade flourishes inconditions where the political system provides secure propertyand contract rights, personal liberty, stable, responsive,incorrupt government and the rule of law. And trade producespeace and prosperity. Trade, democracy, seapower and nationalsuccess all go together, he concludes. Hence the ultimatereason for the failure of the German U-boat campaign – theirredeemable faults on their social and political system. Hencethe triumph of the British and, now the Americans as theirnatural heirs and successors. Hence, also, the shape of today’smaritime world order – globalisation. But Padfield ends on anote of pessimism: sea-based globalisation can go bad and thewhole intricate web of relationships he describes might wellunravel.Over the past few years, Padfield’s general line of argument hasbeen followed by a host of other historians of Empire and

analysts of globalisation. Whether they agree or not with hismain propositions or, his readers will surely think that PeterPadfield provides an entirely new way of looking at navalhistory, and that is a very impressive accomplishment.

Geoffrey Till �

The Children WhoFought Hitler – ABritish Outpost inEurope – Sue Elliottwith James Fox

John Murray, 2009, Hbk, £20pp 309, ISBN 978-1-84854-086-6

BAR readers may well recall the excellent televisiondocumentary on the theme of this book which was broadcast onBBC4 in November 2009 to coincide with Remembrance Sunday.The story is told of the little known British community based inYpres as part of the Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC),later to become the Commonwealth War Graves Commission(CWGC). The focus is on the sons and daughters of those Britishcitizens who were responsible for the interment of the dead ofWorld War One, followed by the design and landscaping of thehuge cemeteries around Ypres. More specifically, it is about thepupils of the British Memorial School, itself generously fundedby Old Etonians. James Fox was one such pupil. What happenedwhen Nazi Germany invaded Belgium in 1940? There are vividaccounts of what it was like to be teenagers under occupation:some found themselves in internment camps; others fled toBritain and joined the war effort in the RAF or as SOE agents;some stayed behind to form the Resistance. The accounts areall compellingly told by Sue Elliott, who has obviouslyconducted meticulous background research. This is one of thevery few accounts of WW2 as seen from the vantage ofteenagers and young adults in occupied territory.

David Benest �

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CorrectionIn BAR 147 we attributed the review of The ForgottenFront to Jim Tanner when in fact it was written byAndrew Banks. We apologise for this error. Editor.

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Dambusters: ALandmark of OralHistory – Max Arthur

Virgin Books; 339pp; pbk; £7.99; ISBN 978-0-7535-1573-0

Let me start by saying that it wasn’t just prejudice on my partbecause recently I’ve been working with a small film crew whowere a delight: hard-working, dependable, welcoming andcreative. But my experience twenty-three years ago was verydifferent. For reasons I needn’t trouble you with now, I foundmyself under attack from an aggressive enclave of middle-classlefties from the film business. Even before they attacked, Iknew they saw me as an uncultured, reactionary, junior part ofthe establishment. I remember mischievously suggesting to oneespecially virulent woman that one of the highest achievementsof the British film industry was The Dambusters. With all thetechnical advances since, I argued, it would be a good idea toproduce a remake. I was just casting around to find the mosteffective way of annoying them; I never thought for a momentanyone would do it. But, do you know, someone’s doing justthat? And the screenplay for the remake is by Stephen Fry,which is how he came to write the rather touching foreword tothis book.

Fry says that Max Arthur’s voice has more authority than ahundred other historians because it is almost silent. And I thinkhe’s absolutely right. This is a wonderful piece of craftsmanshipin which selection, skilful editing and structure are all. WhatMax Arthur has done, with his customary skill andunobtrusiveness, is to locate and assemble within a simple,coherent structure, the recorded words of scores of peopleinvolved in various aspects of 617 Squadron’s attack on theMohne, Eder and Sorpe Dams on 16/17 May 1943. Foremostamong them are five survivors whom Arthur approachedpersonally: pilot Les Munro, bomb-aimer George ‘Johnny’Johnson, flight engineer Ray Grayston, rear-gunner GrantMcDonald and front-gunner Fred Sutherland. Les Munro’saircraft was hit by flak crossing the Dutch coast and he and hiscrew had to abort the operation. Johnny Johnson was JoeMcCarthy’s bomb-aimer and attacked the Sorpe. Grayston andSutherland were in Les Knight’s crew who together broke theEder Dam. Grant McDonald attacked the Sorpe with Ken Brown.

Many of the other aircrew left interviews and other accounts oftheir experiences. Foremost among these, of course, is GuyGibson’s Enemy Coast Ahead, which Arthur uses skilfully to plugany gaps and to bind the structure together. But this is not justthe story of the 133 aircrew, 56 of whom did not return and 53of whom died that night. It is also the story of the groundcrew,

squadron, station and group staff, engineers, administratorsand scientists who together made the raid possible. In poleposition here is Barnes Wallis, who everyone in this bookremembers with respect and affection. For most of us, he hasmerged in our memories with Michael Redgrave, but it seemsthat depiction was by no means wide of the mark. DaveShannon tells us: a more distressed figure it would have beenhard to imagine by the time the last aircraft had landed. He hadnot realised that there would be this tremendous sacrifice of life.He was in tears and quite pathetic the following morning.Wallis’s own account reveals his innate modesty. There is nogreater joy in life than first proving that a thing is impossibleand then showing how it could be done. Any number of expertshad pronounced that that the Mohne and Eder Dams could notpossibly be destroyed by any known means. And then one showsit can be done – but the doing was done by Guy Gibson and 617Squadron – not by me.

It will surprise no one who has read Richard Morris’s excellentbiography that recollections of Guy Gibson are less consistent.This book contains the candid memories of a number of peoplewho, in the brief, highly pressured time before OperationChastise, had varied experiences of the 24-year-old Gibson’sleadership. One or two remarks from groundcrew suggest gentlythat their contribution was perhaps underestimated in theround of post-operation celebration and congratulation. Noneof the many aircrew I was lucky enough to know would havebeen remotely surprised at this. Their entirely consistent viewwas that groundcrew were the unsung heroes of BomberCommand. The list of honours also looks invidious. The pilots,navigators and bomb-aimers of the aircraft that actuallyattacked the dams were all decorated; except in Gibson’s crew,almost all gunners, wireless-operators and flight engineers wentunrecognised. It was a rough and ready approach – thesematters often are. But the main impression left by theparticipants of all sorts was that it was worth doing and theywere glad to have played their part. Except, perhaps, for theGermans, whose accounts appear here too. Max Arthur includes35 pages describing the experiences of members of the guncrew on the Mohne Dam and of those who survived theappalling flooding that followed the breaching of the Mohneand Eder Dams.

This book seems to me to paint a balanced, vivid, structured,comprehensive portrait of the raid. Read this alongside JohnSweetman’s masterly The Dambusters Raid and you’ll have allyou really need on the subject. Stephen Fry says of Max Arthur’sbook: I do not believe it has ever been better told. And one feelsespecially privileged to hear about it from those – almost alldead now – who were there, saw it and lived it.

Christopher JaryAuthor, Portrait of a Bomber Pilot �

Australian BattalionCommanders in theSecond World WarAustralian Army HistorySeries) – Garth Pratten

Cambridge University Press; 2009, Hbk, £65, pp456 , ISBN-10: 0521763452

Battalion Command is the pinnacle of the soldiers trade as acommander, as Colonel David Hackworth (after his battalioncommand) put it in a later war ‘you can do so much with aBattalion of men, at Division… you had to be some kind ofmanager…but if you can manoeuvre six hundred men, you coulddo near anything with them… take that Battalion and mould itlike piece of clay and make them the best fighting force’ that iswhat the essence of this book is about, moulding that clay tothe will of the commander and making it work to the samepurpose.

The Australian Army being born of the same mother as theBritish Army but distant enough to have its own doctrine is anexcellent vehicle to study that command. There are few booksof such detail and thought about battalion command, (why doso many narratives of the Second World War concentrate on thestrategic level command, on the likes Monty and Slim incommand of armies). Literature by British or Commonwealthcommand at this level is particularly thin, I can think of onlyJohn Masters ‘The Road Past Mandalay’ that deals withcommand in this way and Masters’ book is really aboutobserving others and his own temporary command of a Chinditbrigade.

Pratten’s book deals with battalion command throughout theAustralian Army, a predominately infantry force. The AMF hassome very relevant lessons with regards to battalion commandat any time. Going as it does from the AMF’s less than gloriousfoundations after the Great War, through the Middle Eastthrough Tobruk, El Alamein and on into perhaps the lessenknown to (UK readers) the Australian Pacific campaign whichwas markedly different form the much better known USexperience.

Pratten makes some excellent observations on battalioncommand in the Second World War, the clear out of the deadwood of the post Great War army, the youth of the battalioncommanders (under 30 in most cases by 1945) and that manyafter achieving so much returned to civilian life after the warto continue there pre war lives as normal.

Hopefully somewhere someone is working on a similar title withregards to battalion command in the British infantry in theSecond World War or perhaps Afghanistan. Afghanistan alone(2006-9) would be a sizeable tome with some very relevantlessons learned, until that appears those taking up battalioncommand or aspiring to it could do a lot worse than read thisexcellent history, I leave the final word to one of the finest ofAustralian Battalion commanders: ' Fred Chilton CO 2/2 Bn,(later Commander 18th Bde) ‘there is nothing like a fightingunit, an infantry battalion...the people are the salt of the earth'

Gerry Long �

Clinton’s Secret Wars –the Evolution of aCommander in Chief –Richard Sale

St Martin’s Press, 2009, $27.99, pp512, ISBN: 031237366X

Had Bill Clinton become First Man to his wife Hilary, the worldmight have re-kindled its interest in him. But he did not, andso continues to fade into history. What is remembered of him?“Slick Willie” who dodged the draft, didn’t inhale marijuana,and had a penchant for “trailer trash” women. Mostly, Clinton’spresidency was ‘back in the halcyon days’ after the collapse ofthe USSR and before the calamitous events of the GW BushAdministration.

This book is an unabashed attempt to hasten the analyticalprocess of political history. Happily for those who wish tounderstand the politico-military nexus, Richard Sale examinesClinton’s evolving use of covert and overt forces. Sale isunflinchingly honest about all the figures in this epic, allowinganonymity to few. He extends this “warts and all” treatment toforeign actors also, not sparing even the British. (In this, Salecorroborates Sir Christopher Meyer’s contemporaneousobservation about the USA’s “close relationship” with the UK,rather than “Special Relationship” so trumpeted by Britishpoliticians.)

Many of the scenes Sale charts – the venal factionalism withinthe Administration, the politico-military tensions – areuniversal to politics. As a Washington insider of long-standing,Sale takes for granted many of the aspects of the Executive (inparticular its revolving-door patronage cliques) which are soalien to foreigners; yet in telling his tale Sale lays theExecutive’s workings bare, such that on one level the politicsare irrelevant; rather the institutional mechanics fascinate. Also

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laid open is the way in which Administrations of both partiesoperate internally in much the same way, and the fluidparameters within which the Executive operates: re-configuringaccording to personality, rather than statute.

The book is divided into three parts: the TransformationalPresident, Forward to Baghdad, and A Special Kind of Evil: AlQaeda in the Balkans. The course of the book jumps about fromtheatre to theatre, mimicking – perhaps unintentionally – theglobal jigsaw with which the US President is confronted daily.As the tale unfolds, Clinton’s policy team is winnowed andthreshed by events, while he himself learns the capability (andlimits) of force, of multilateral action, and of intrigue. Clinton’sown political acumen and personality increasingly synchronisewith these levers of power, resulting in a surprisingly sure graspof the cut and thrust of international politics, although this isoften constrained by domestic political realities: “It’s theeconomy, stupid!”

Clinton’s Secret Wars makes use of high-level, intimate sources,including many still serving politicians, providing not only theresult, but the reason – often all too human in its weakness.The book has a comprehensive bibliography, but as so often, itlacks maps (or any other illustration.) Given the geographicalcomplexities of the theatres, and the passage of time, mapswould have been useful to those now more familiar with Iraq orAfghanistan. Similarly, while the impact of 24 hour andsatellite television is mentioned, its huge impact – now takenfor granted – was first felt on Clinton’s watch. There areoccasional, distracting, lapses into journalese but otherwiseSale has written an informative and eminently readableaccount.

To an admirer of Bill Clinton or a student of modern US politics,this book will be a useful addition to their shelves. However, itschief value is for foreigners trying to comprehend the function– and dysfunction - of the US political system. In particular itlays bare for servicemen how the Highest Commander’s intent isformed (and waivers) and most modern politicians’ ignorance ofthe military “train sets” they control.

This is a superb historical study of almost contemporarypolitics, which resonates with, and provides depth to, currentevents and personalities on every page. Some of the moresearing criticism can make for uncomfortable reading, but it ishighly recommended for those who would understand howpolicy is decided, and the use of force is managed ormismanaged.

James Spencer �

Oman’s Insurgencies –The Sultanate’sStruggle for Supremacy– JE Peterson

SAQI, London, £55, Hbk, pp522, ISBN: 978-0-86356-456-7

Despite its success, there have been few accounts of whathappened in Dhofar. Most have been autobiographical, the bestfrom John Graham and Corran Purdon (Commanders Sultan’sArmed Forces (CSAF) John Akehurst (brigade command), TonyJeapes (the role of SAS), Bryan Ray (battalion command) andIan Gardiner (company operations).

John Peterson provides the nearest we will perhaps ever see ofan official history. He is eminently well qualified for the job: anacademic historian with specialist knowledge of the ArabianPeninsula and Gulf; Deputy Prime Minister for Security andDefence in the Sultanate of Oman; and Official Historian to SAF.He is refreshing in his chronology and analysis. He points tothe uniqueness of the particular political circumstances ofOman in general and Dhofar in particular. He traces in detailhow a nationalist war of liberation against a conservativeSultan (Qaboos’s father) eventually became a Marxistrevolutionary movement, backed by all the Communist Powersof the time.

The British policy was that South Arabia and the Gulf would beabandoned by 1971. The Chinese and Soviets seized thisopportunity and hence the advent of the Peoples Front for theLiberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf States (PFLOAG), itsinsurgent leaders trained in Peking and Odessa, with support interms of arms, advice and training form across the Cold Wardivide, including North Vietnam, Cuba, Iraq and East Germany.

Peterson demolishes many of the myths that have arisen as tohow to ‘do’ counterinsurgency. The notion that victory might beachieved by deploying special forces alone was clearly not thecase. That a counterinsurgency could be fought withouthelicopters was absurd but this was the situation up until 1971.Troops on the ground were in short supply and UK plc, facedwith a considerable deployment to its own counterinsurgency inNorthern Ireland, was hard pressed to do much about it.Fortunately, Iran and Jordan thought otherwise given thestakes involved - the real possibility of a pro-Soviet state onthe Straits of Hormuz. Peterson reminds us that thoughdeclared ‘over’, the war did not end in December 1975, butwent on until 1980. Development in Dhofar and the winning of‘hearts and minds’ could only really take off after the insurgentthreat had been neutralised, not before. The significant British

contribution was in commanders and leaders, some of the bestof their generation, many of whom were to play a considerablerole in the Falklands war in 1982. Indeed, this reviewer wouldgo so far as to claim that the Falklands War was ‘won’ in Dhofar.

Peterson’s style of writing is clear and concise. He tries torelate very incident as it arose and in this sense, thechronology is at risk of being criticised as tedious. Hisappendices are of particular value: a ‘Glossary and Gazetteer’;‘Sultanate Command Arrangements’; ‘A Chronology of the War inNorth Oman’; and ‘A Chronology of the Dhofar War’. There aresome useful maps but no photographs at all – surely anomission. This is the best to date on Dhofar. At £55 a copy, itwill probably best serve as a work of reference and shouldcertainly be made available in every Service library.

David Benest �

Danger Close –Commanding 3 PARA inAfghanistan – ColonelStuart Tootal DSO OBE,

John Murray, 2009,Hbk, PP 306, £18.99, ISBN 978-1-84854-256-3,

3 PARA was the first battlegroup to deploy to Helmand Provincein 2006 under Operation HERRICK. This is the only account todate written from the perspective of a commanding officer.Tootal recalls his experiences in command from every aspect,coping with uncertainties and when the odds against successwere stacked high. He brings home the reality of the non-linearbattle space where the CO’s Tac party is as likely to be engagedin combat as anyone else: thus leading by example and in thethick of the many engagements with the Taliban was an everyday occurrence. The relationships with his operations team arevividly recounted. In addition, he conducted over 120interviews with soldiers, wives, parents and widows so as tobring home the impact of the tour on the families of thosedeployed. He recalls the sense of pre-deployment nerves thataffect most soldiers, regardless of rank, akin to mostexperiences of military parachuting. He is open and frank inadmitting that adrenalin and fear invariably arise. The accountof operations is graphically told. The burden of responsibility incommand is ever present, especially as casualties mounted.Tactical decisions, especially whether to abort a mission afterdiscovering that the helicopter LZ was ‘hot ‘weighed heavily.Above all, the courage and fortitude of the young soldiersshines through on every page.

From a higher perspective, the story almost beggars belief. Theassumption that development can precede security is shown forthe fallacy it is. The command arrangements were ludicrous andensured that his brigade commander (Brigadier Ed Butler),despite his extensive personal experience of counterinsurgency,was removed at the moment critique from the chain ofcommand. The battle group was pitifully under strength for thetask in hand - ‘In short , we were fixed and our resources werestretched to breaking point’( p111). Intelligence on the enemywas abysmal. The bravery of the Chinook pilots (see review ofImmediate Response – Major Mark Hammond DFC RM – later inthis section – Ed), was beyond the call of duty but the failureto provide anywhere near enough helicopters was deplorable.British 0.50 calibre HMG ammunition was ‘faulty’ and soldierstherefore had to beg, borrow or steal ammunition from NATOpartners. MOD reaction to a vivid but factual account by theeminent journalist, Christina Lamb of a contact in Zumbelayvillage, resulted in a media black out. The policy on R&R,opposed by the Commanding Officer, required every soldier totake 2 weeks leave back in UK, entailing a shortfall of over 100troops at any one time, as well as greater risk and strain on aninadequate helicopter force. DFID failed even to connect asingle washing machine in a hospital. The treatment of thewounded on Ward S4 at Selly Oak Hospital was third rate. Whyso many (avoidable) failures of policy?

Tootal resigned his commission soon after the end of thedeployment as did one of his company commanders and hisbrigade commander. The Armed Forces lost not only 15 killedand 46 wounded in the battle group deployment but also threehighly talented and experienced leaders. In all, this is aharrowing account of how badly things can go incounterinsurgency and is thus compelling reading. Moreimportantly, it is a stirring account of leadership, moral andphysical courage and endurance in the face of adversity.

David Benest �

Immediate Response –Mark Hammond DFC

Penguin, 2009, £17.99, Hbk, pp304, ISBN: 978 0 718 15474 5

Mark Hammond is a Royal Marine major serving with the RAF as a Chinook pilot. And this book is the story of his time inAfghanistan. It was co-written with Clare MacNaughtonpresumably because Mark Hammond is not a professional writer

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and she provides the breathless prose. And it is terrible – thestory is good – and it is worth suffering the abysmal writing toget Hammond’s message. One more thing about the writing andthen I promise I won’t mention it again – she has employed arandom effing generator. We know that marines talk in suchterms but the book would have been about half the lengthwithout them.

Hammond captures the fear and excitement, and allows aglimpse into the world of the support helicopter aircrew. Iguess that most of us admire and respect the work of theChinook crews. No-one has yet died in an accident in a RAFChinook in Iraq or Afghanistan, nor have we lost aserviceman/woman (known hereafter as a soldier for reasons ofbrevity) to enemy action in one. Aircraft have been downed andmen wounded in them, but no-one killed – and this story helpsto explain why the RAF has such a good record.

The dedication and professionalism shines through; althoughyou won’t get much in the way of insights into their methods.This is a book about impressions, there is no analysis and Isuspect that Hammond is that sort of a chap – an action man,not an ideas man. If I am wrong, well he has Clare to blame,not me. He revels in his world of the highly competent jack-the-lad aviator. The combination of marine and pilot isirresistible – to him. And all your prejudices and pre-conceptions are pandered to, to an almost unbelievable extent.Apart from some mawkish sentimentality, Hammond appears tohave no thoughts beyond banter, his mates, bawdy goodhumour and how wonderful – sorry, how awesome – theChinook is.

If Hammond was a corporal or a subaltern, the absence of deepreflection would be understandable, damn it he is a field officer– a major, and a Marine major and pilot at that, who is earningmarkedly more than his brown apparently equally rankedinfantry colleague. But maybe it is me getting it wrong. Do Iwant to be flown by a couth, educated and cultured man whowrites sonnets to while away the time between sorties? Well,not if the better pilot is the rude, crude, professionalHammond.

Hammond hints at that by his dismissal of an AAC squadroncommander (major): He seemed to me to be everything I mostdisliked in an Army Air Corps officer, an ambitious promotionthruster who just happened also to be a pilot. Except for thetautology, Hammond is pretty straightforward. Apart fromdetesting REMFs, he is largely free from bile and criticism ofothers. Whether he (or Clare) means to or not, he does let usinto this closed world of the aircrew. It is a very self-centredworld and he seems to have spent little time with other partsof the Force in Helmand. In fairness, the intensity of theoperations may prevent such activity.

Yet I rather suspect that (I can feel Hammond sneering at that‘rather’) I am simply misunderstanding his position. I imagined

that he was a sort of flight commander, who also happens tocaptain a Chinook. And that he has responsibilities beyond hiscrew and flying. When in fact he was an aircraft captain whowas given extra responsibilities on an ad hoc basis. It wouldhave been useful to have that spelt out – Clare probably feltthat it would have got in the way of a good read. She’sprobably right; I just thought that a bit of education would nothave gone amiss.

A trick was missed, an opportunity to educate was overlooked:why do RAF aircrew (and I understand AAC aircrew) do shorttours? I can guess at the reasons – I even know some of them,but Hammond might have used this book to explain why a 6month tour is too long. A book like this shouldn’t be just anexercise in showing off – it is fair that he (Clare) tells us of thedifficult and the dangerous, but we could have gained far moreunderstanding of the stresses and strains and even of some ofthe technicalities of flying. But that would have taken a betterwriter – and we had Clare.

In a way I admire Hammond’s approach. Of course, I admire hisflying skills and courage – that is easy to do. He lives for flyingand he is in a system that will let him do that – which permitshigh levels of professionalism. Maybe we could learn from that.

General Rupert Smith has a way of classifying soldiers1–implementers and innovators (the RHA have a similar idea:benefiters and contributors). Broadly speaking the higher therank the more the holder moves towards innovation. I guessthat where many in the army diverge from General Smith’sanalysis is the numbers in each group. You don’t need manyinnovators and we have an army where too many try to beinnovators. RAF aircrew probably get this balance better thanwe do. The RAF lets their people fly if that is their thing; hencethe specialist aircrew system – experienced (elderly?) flightlieutenants (a good blend of mainly implementer with a dash ofinnovation) on wing commander’s rates of pay. This achievesreal expertise. Clearly our soldiers can achieve this expertisebecause they spend most of their time at regimental duty. Ourneed is to achieve something similar to that for most officers –ie more time as a platoon commander, more time as a companycommander – maybe ops offrs should be second tour companycommander types? In other words let those who want to bewarriors be warriors, much as the RAF lets aviators be aviators.Subject, of course, to fitness.

I am grateful to Clare for sparing us Hammond’s life history. Toomany of these books spend pages on where the author grew up,his mother’s cooking, his father’s jokes and how blissful/toughhis school was. We have been spared, too, the usual stuff aboutearly training and how hard commando/para/flying training is,and how he achieved an ‘A’ grading on the Health and Safetycourse. Rightly the book concentrates on Afghanistan.

To recap – rubbish book, great story – worth buying (inpaperback).

1 In his reply to the Palmer Report, General Sir Rupert Smith then abrigade commander wrote:

The third issue that needs to be addressed is to answer the question:What does the army want commissioned officers for in the future? Ofcourse, it needs leaders but not all our leaders are commissioned norneed they be. I suggest that up to now we have required ourcommissioned officers to implement and innovate, as well as lead. Atthe risk of over simplification, our NCOs & WOs implement and hardlyinnovate, our 2/lts - majors do both and lt cols and above innovatemore than they implement. In an essentially practical profession likeours you cannot innovate satisfactorily unless you have theexperience of implementation to go with the required intelligenceand imagination. Thus we have required our commissioned officers tospend a period, with the benefit of an experienced NCO or WOimplementer at their elbows, of apprenticeship before we examinethem for promotion and stream those judged to be the best potentialinnovators through Camberley. I am sure we want the innovators butdo we need so many commissioned implementers in the future?

If, against the background of social change, agreement can bereached as to the purpose of the Army in the 21 Century and the roleof its commissioned officers then some valid solutions can be foundto the problems identified in your Terms of Reference. My own view isthat we should:

a. Reduce our requirement for commissioned officers.

b. Expand the responsibilities of the Sgts Mess.

c. Make the zoning for promotion etc more flexible.

By reducing the requirement for commissioned officers I meanthat we should set out to recruit only our potential innovators.To over simplify again, we should aim to recruit our Camberleyentry plus a percentage for wastage and mistakes (Editor’semphasis – the Staff College annual entry (1986) for BritishArmy officers was 120 and the army strength (TAM/TAF) was145,423). �

The Making of theBritish Army – AllanMallinson

Bantam Press, 2009, £20, pp480, ISBN: 0593051084

In the 14 years and 2 terms I was privileged to spend on theacademic staff of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, theRoyal Memorial Chapel figured prominently in my life. Duringthat time I must have sat through hundreds of sermons. Mostwere mundane: only one was memorable and that was given bythe then Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie. He won anMC in 1944 in Normandy as a subaltern in the Guards ArmouredDivision. A fellow officer at the time, the redoubtable Willie

Whitelaw, often remarked subsequently that he took profoundcomfort from the fact that he had heard the future Archbishopof Canterbury utter the F word!

The Archbishop preached a sermon on the “Just War.” To myrecollection it was the only time in all those years that thissubject was ever addressed. Maybe the sermons became moreuplifting and relevant after I left (in 1984): certainly therecently retired Chief of the General Staff, Sir Richard Dannattreferred to the Christian ethos of the British Army. But for morelowly souls such as myself it is no wonder I spent so much timereading the memorial plates to the British infantry regimentsthat adorned the pillars in the chapel.

I justify such distractions by claiming that this gave me aninsight into at least a part of the British Army, for thesememorials were almost exclusively infantry and cavalry.

Does Allan Mallinson’s book give me a feel for the British Army?

It is a mammoth tome and hugely ambitious in its scope but Ifear it pleases and disappoints in equal measure. The author isat his best in the formative years of his account and the postSecond World War period.

At the start he takes the reader back to the English Civil War,through to the early 19th century and the defeat of Napoleon.Here the story develops in the best traditions of Englishmilitary history and the writing is at times outstanding in thequality of its prose.

My first grunt of disapproval comes with the war of 1812, whichfor some reason the author chooses to dismiss as a footnote.The question I wanted answered was how come an army, whichfought under Wellington in the Peninsular and from which someof its regiments were then transferred to North America, weresoundly trounced at the Battle of New Orleans? The authordismisses this little war as “unworthy of study” which frankly isjust not good enough.

By the time The Making of the British Army reaches the outbreakof the First World War we are reading an account which isheavily biased towards infantry and cavalry. This is not my fieldof specialism in military history but if the Great War wasanything it was surely also a war of artillery and how thiscritical arm was developed and equipped and performed iscovered in a superficial manner.

Similarly, at the end of the First World War and as the armyreverted to its peacetime posture, it underwent the trauma ofthe Irish Rebellion. What happened to the Irish regiments,especially those recruited beyond the Six Counties? Where werethey deployed? And what happened to the officers and menwith the creation of the Irish state? Again, Allan Mallinson haslittle to offer yet he does cover the mutiny at the Curraghbefore the outbreak of the First World War. Perhaps he has a

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justification for his selection of episodes but does not sharethis with the reader.

The interwar years were a time of stagnation which this authorcovers extremely well. But it was also a period of imperialpolicing in some very nasty parts of the world. Returning to mypreferred reading during Academy Sundays, many names on thememorials listed campaigns in Mesopotamia, Waziristan,Afghanistan, Burma, China, Palestine and bits of Africa, etc.Allan Mallinson makes much – and correctly too – of thesearing experience of divisional commanders in 1939 who hadfought in the trenches a quarter of a century earlier. But otherstoo, notably the redoubtable Bill Slim, arguably the finestBritish Army Commander of them all, had also learned his tradein pursuit of the “Great Game.”

So by the time that Allan Mallinson addresses the Second WorldWar there are gaps in his account. One in particular is that ofofficer education and training. Woolwich has some coverage,Sandhurst very little and the East India Company’s Officer CadetCollege even less. The Staff College at Camberley has asentence or two but he leaves us with no idea of what wastaught in any of these establishments and whether it matteredto an officer’s career. Allan Mallinson is outstandingly good atdescribing in intimate detail the relative qualities of the LeeEnfield and the standard of musketry but does not addressprofessional development.

To this reviewer’s mind these are important questions if we areto take the title of this book at its face value. Any reader wouldinterpret the words “The Making” to refer to professionaldevelopment of its soldiers and their terms of service as muchas to the technical side of their weaponry.

The treatment of the Second World War is better than that ofthe Great War. But again there is vast canvas to paint and theauthor has to be selective. Successful battles such as ElAlamein are given wide coverage and the Eighth Army isdiscussed in detail. Was it as good as Allan Mallinsonmaintains? Other writers have pointed to its weaknesses andeven Montgomery himself described its morale as “brittle.”Much of this comes to the fore of course, when the Eighth Armyfinds itself into the heart- and back-breaking campaignsslogging its way up the length of the Italian Peninsula. Thisperiod receives little cover and Cassino, that great clash ofopposing forces in a series of battles more reminiscent of theGreat War, has no mention of any consequence.

Normandy and the advance through Europe provide someinteresting insights. But of course one is spoilt because AllanMallinson’s chapters do not stand comparison with theimpressive account, albeit in much greater detail, in AnthonyBeevor’s latest book.

Some of the best chapters in “The Making of the British Army”are those dealing with the post war period through to the

present day. Even so it was always my understanding that thedeployment of the 1st British Armoured Division from BAOR toSaudi Arabia in 1990 was anything but smooth. I rememberconversations with its commander, Rupert Smith, which left mewith the impression that the whole of BAOR had to be scouredand plundered to produce two brigades of armoured fightingvehicles. The long drawn-out struggle then to have the mainbattle tanks modified for desert warfare by the industrialsuppliers was a nightmare.

In these pages of the post war period the author still persistswith the throwaway lines which are such a distraction. Forexample he describes Dag Hammarskjöld as, “The UN’s secondfinest Secretary General.” Who was the first, who came third,were questions that came to mind rather than the text.

Was Afghanistan such a resounding success in the early stages?Yes, the US-led forces along with their Northern Alliance alliesliberated Kabul and hurled the Taliban and Al Qaeda back to theborders of Pakistan. But if more troops had been deployed inthe final operations at Tora Bora and the escape routes deniedmaybe we would not be there now.

The final pages – covering Chapter 32 “The Army Falters” and“The Epilogue” – are outstanding. The trials and tribulationssuffered by the army in Basra, after the liberation of Iraq, aresensitively handled but with honesty and integrity. There isblame to be attached and the author apportions it with justice.But then as Mr Mallinson points out in 300 years of historythere have been a fair share of setbacks. The great strength ofthe British Army is its ability to learn on the job and putmatters right.

The author makes an eloquent defence of the need for infantryeven at the price of super carriers and more Typhoons and it isvery hard not to agree with this statement that, “Afghanistan ismore Victoria’s wars than network-enabled.” One interestingaside is whether Mr Mallinson feels that the army of today isvery different in terms of its social makeup from that of QueenVictoria’s, and even earlier. An interesting statistic he provides,which will doubtless fuel the cries of those who still see thearmy as an exclusive public school preserve, is that it is themain source of employment for young men leaving Eton.

So overall a worthy read and for those who are not familiar withthe history of the British Army there is much to enjoy. A goodChristmas present, especially if the buyer goes on line ratherthan paying the RRP – but then that is why the High Streetbookshops are disappearing.

Eric Morris �

The Scientific Way ofWarfare: Order andChaos on theBattlefields ofModernity – AntoineBousquet

Hurst Publishers Ltd, 2009, £15.99, Pbk, pp276,ISBN: 978-1-85065-945-7

Antoine Bousquet is a lecturer in International Relations atBirkbeck College, University of London and this book is theproduct of his doctrinal thesis. It is an examination of therelationship between warfare and science, and how, as theauthor states:

‘…the manner in which scientific ideas have beensystematically recruited to inform thinking about the verynature of combat and the forms of military organisationbest suited to prevail.’

He postulates that since the first real impact of science onwarfare there have been four different scientific ways of warfarewhich he categorises as: mechanistic, thermodynamic, cyberneticand chaoplexic. Each he characterises by a key technology (theclock, the engine, the computer and the ‘network’ respectively)which, with their associated scientific concepts, act asmetaphors for the resulting form of warfare. The underlyingpremise is that throughout the history of modern warfare themilitary has continually turned to science in its attempts toimpose order on the chaos of the battlefield.

The mechanistic way of warfare was that which existed in theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Characterised by drilland rigid tactical deployments, it imposed order through thecreation of military organisations that worked like ‘clockwork’.The author cites the example of the Prussian Army of Frederickthe Great as the zenith of this form of warfare. Thethermodynamic way of warfare spanned the Napoleonic erathrough to the end of the Second World War. Powered by theengine, a form of warfare emerged that was characterised bymobilisation, motorisation and industrialisation and reached itspinnacle with the use of the atomic bomb at the end of theSecond World War. The third period of warfare, cybernetics,brings us closer to today with the automation of command andcontrol enabled by the computer, with the Cold War as its peak.The author postulates that the final, chaoplexic, way of warfareis where we are moving to now. It is characterised by the

central tenets of what the Americans call Network-CentricWarfare (NCW) or in the UK, Network Enabled Capability (NEC).

Bousquet’s coverage of the first three ways of warfare is verymuch an historical review. His perspective provides someinteresting and novel views on the development of warfare overthe last three hundred years. His approach is very academic; asa result this is a very rich and erudite text, but at times a littlehard going. It is really only in the last third of the book that hetackles some of the issues that, I suspect, the average reader ofthe BAR might be interested to explore.

In this final section of the book his central premise onchaoplexic warfare is that:

‘…despite a clear move in the direction of a new non-linearway of warfare, network-centric warfare still remains miredin cybernetic conceptions.’

By this he means that progress to date has, and remains,largely in the automation and computerisation of command andcontrol systems. It has not delivered the radical organisationaland conceptual changes necessary to enable the transformationof warfare envisaged by the original NCW gurus such as Alberts,Gartska, Stein and Cebrowski. He does however recognise thedifficulties in doing this and the dichotomies it raises.Improvements in the ‘network’, enabled by high-speed datalinks, will create superior battlefield situational awareness andallow the ‘network’ to become all pervading. This leaves a wideleft and right of arc in our choice of how to exploit theopportunity. On one hand increased connectivity, and theconsequent wealth of information, would enable a very strongcentralised control to be exercised by a commander with a veryflat command structure. Alternatively, the perfect omnipresent,network could allow all force elements, however small, to havethe same shared situational awareness and therefore enable theself-synchronized ‘swarming’ behaviour envisaged by NCWpurists. Bousquet suggests that although these possibilities arestarting to emerge, the issue remains the military’s ability toeffect change.

‘According to network-centric warfare, these huge volumesof information and the resulting superior battlefieldknowledge are supposed to be the basis on which force-multiplying decentralisation and self-synchronisation can beachieved. However, such a scheme jars with much of thehistorical evidence on the successful practices pertaining tothe organisation of armies.’

It would be easy to dismiss this book as specialist academicterritory and indeed the first two thirds would probably fall intothat category. However, the final third asks, and in partanswers, some of the fundamental questions that we need toaddress before we continue our NCW and NEC quests. Not theleast of these is, do we have the intent, vision, culture, andresources necessary to fully achieve the full potential or are we

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content just to automate our existing processes?

Colonel Iain Standen Defence Network Enabled Capability Programme Office �

On Art and War andTerror – Alex Danchev

Edinburgh University Press, 2009, pp256, Hbk, £60.00, ISBN: 9780748639151

Even after having worked my way twice through Alex Danchev’snew collection of essays, I’m still unsure how to review it. WhatI am confident about is that this book will neither become abestseller, nor is it likely to be on many Christmas lists. It is,nonetheless, remarkable, taking the reader from Seamus Heaneyto In the Valley of Elah, from Georges Braque to Tony Blair, fromLiddell Hart to Lynndie England. It certainly merits ourattention.

Danchev is a name with which the reader may already befamiliar. In more distant times he was an Army officer (JohnKeegan is on record as saying he was “one of the two mostbrilliant people he taught at Sandhurst”) and, in due course, asuccessful academic – professor of politics at NottinghamUniversity. Since the early 90s, he has published or edited over50 books, notably including an award-winning biography ofLiddell Hart and as co-editor of the bestselling AlanbrookeDiaries in 2001. However, Danchev has ventured far beyond thefield of “drums and trumpets” military history in his work; he isa genuine polymath, even considering how often the term isoverused.

According to Danchev, the aim of this collection is to “put theimagination to work in the service of historical, political andethical inquiry.” This is an ambitious, worthwhile and trulymulti-disciplinary aim. What it means, practically, is thatDanchev offers the reader 10 essays on subjects as wide rangingas Waugh’s “Sword of Honour” trilogy, Gerhard Richter’sartworks inspired by the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group, and“War Photography and the ethics of responsibility.” The linkingthesis is that poetry, fiction, diaries and art, in its widestsense; not only matter to us as things of beauty in themselvesbut as ways of better interpreting the world around us, and itshistory. “Armed with art,” Danchev claims in his introduction,“we are more alert and less deceived.”

Whether Danchev achieves this aim, or not, is arguable. In sucha diverse collection, it would be unusual if readers did not findsome of the essays more convincing than others. Danchev’sanalysis of Evelyn Waugh and other literature of the SecondWorld War is compelling in its conclusion that their fictionsoften tell truths that histories do not. Similarly in dealing withAlanbrooke as diarist, Danchev highlights the pressures and“torque of mutable feeling” which impact on these records, butwhich make them nonetheless valuable. In recounting theshameful catalogue of interrogation methods used by the“night shift” teams at Abu Ghraib, Danchev quotes from Kafkaand Camus to reinforce the humiliation and shame that theseacts bring upon us all. In the final two essays, Danchevexamines how film has dealt with the so-called global war onterror, and, starting from an analysis of the codewords andhidden meanings in this and previous conflicts, the tensionbetween civilised and barbaric behaviours. Both are fresh andoriginal.

Other essays are less effective. Danchev is clearly no fan ofTony Blair’s, but I found it a stretch to make the leap fromdescribing the provenance of the Braque painting “The GuitarPlayer” to a discussion of the abuse of authenticity in politics.Likewise, Danchev invites us to consider Richter’s Baader-Meinhof artworks in terms of the moral responsibility of theartist, but without much conclusion. The essay on warphotography (which Danchev considers to be “the new warpoetry”) begins promisingly. Don McCullin’s famous Vietnam–eraphotograph of a US Marine’s thousand yard stare is comparedwith a Goya sketch of Wellington. However, despite Danchev’serudite prose, the narrative thread lacks conviction.Occasionally, the prose itself grates. Frank McLynn has writtenof Danchev’s writing overfilled with “gnomic utterances andlearned asides, the relevance of which often escaped me.” Theuse of illustrations in the essays – especially on visual media –is also variable.

Overall, this is far from an easy read. War historians mayappreciate new perspectives on Alanbrooke, or Liddell Hart(although these essays are reworked versions of writingpreviously published), and the inter-disciplinary scholars mayadmire the overall approach. The footnoting and referencing isimpeccable but occasionally intrusive, whilst the index isthorough. But the whole is somehow less than the sum of theparts, which is disappointing when the aim is so original andthought-provoking. Danchev quotes Seamus Heaney: “Theimaginative transformation of human life is the means by whichwe can most truly grasp and comprehend it.” In a few of theseessays Danchev demonstrates that he has the ability to showhow this might be, but he demands much of the reader in sodoing.

Bruce Pennell �

18 Platoon – SydneyJary MC

RHQ The Rifles, 14 Mount St, Taunton, Somerset TA1 3QE - 01823 333434Email: taunton@the-rifles.co.uk6th Edition, Hbk, pp 138, ISBN: 1 901655 01 6

I doubt that there are many privately published books on their6th edition. So, there must be a reason for the phenomenon of18 Platoon. And that reason is quite simple: it is aboutfighting a platoon in a major war. There aren’t many booksabout fighting a platoon in North West Europe in 1944/45 andthe reason for that is simple, too: not many platooncommanders survived to do so.

The casualty rates for platoon commanders fighting inNormandy in 1944 were on a par with the worst battles of the

Western Front. The older and more senior survivors probablyfound themselves commanding companies or in battalionheadquarters for the latter stages of the campaign. Sydney Jarywas 19, and even in war, 19 year olds didn’t commandcompanies. Although Sydney took over D Company, 4thBattalion Somerset Light Infantry for 48 hours of fierce fightingat Mount Pincon when his company commander was severelywounded and the replacement was found wanting. As DennisClarke MC, his estimable and elderly (34) FOO said, “ A grown-up will take over soon, sonny”.

Now take out from the survivors those who can’t write, thosewho don’t want to write and those who weren’t very good –even in wartime some not-so-goods survive intact, incommand. And of those who do get published, how many justwrite about the fighting? Precious few. The British Army hashad plenty of experience in fighting since the end of World War2, but I doubt that any post-Second War soldier hasparticipated in as many intense fights as a 21 Army Groupinfantry soldier. Look at Sydney Jary’s sub-campaigns:Normandy, The Seine, Market Garden, Groesbeek, The WinterBattles, Cleve, Across the Rhine and the nasty slog toBremerhaven. Eight parts to the main campaign – and howmany battles, recces, fighting patrols, night patrols, ambushes,

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USMC Mountain warfare mule

MOUNTAIN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER, BRIDGEPORT, Calif. - A Marine witha company from 2d Marine Special Operations Battalion, US Marine CorpsForces, Special Operations Command leads his mule during a mule and troopmovement. Marines and Sailors went through mule packing classes hereApril 26, 2009. (US Marine Corps photo)

reliefs in place, advances to contact, trenches dug, mealsmissed does that amount to? A lot. And not many men actuallydid the lot. Infantrymen, tank crews, artillery observers andsome sappers took the brunt – and even then few went fromNormandy beach to the Baltic as part of a platoon or a troop.No goretex, no waterproofs, no sleeping bags, no rucksacks –just itchy, absorbent battle dress, leather soled boots, ’37Pattern Webbing and tins of ‘Meat and Veg’.

Incidentally, one of things that mystifies Sydney Jary is theweight that our modern soldiers carry. Sydney, with MichaelCrawshaw (previous editor of BAR), was a tireless campaignerfor the ‘Bren Gun Carrier’. They recognised the need for a basicload carrying vehicle at platoon level – a mechanical ‘Mule’. Thesoldiers of 21 Army Group had a good administrative system tosupport them in the front line. Post arrived regularly (as it didto the BEF in WW1), cooked hot food, ammo and spares werebrought forward to them and BCRs were drafted in as needed –noting that the army was short of infantryman then, as it istoday. No one expected soldiers to fight with their large packon their back. However good the explanation for the equipmentcarried by an infantryman in Afghanistan, the Sydneys of thisworld will wonder if that is really wise and would suggest thatsome discretion is in order – and a modern load carrier please.

Understandably, many authors of war memoirs spend time ontheir early life or the Regiment in peace and war. And theyoften make for good reading – an outstanding example isGeneral David Fraser’s – Wars and Shadows. But Sydney Jarywrites about fighting a platoon, which includes the men in it.The men of 18 Platoon fought a decent war, as he says“Aggression increases the farther one goes behind the lines”, andhe lists the qualities of a soldier,

“..sufferance, without which one couldn’t survive…a quietmind, which enables a soldier to live in harmony…a senseof the ridiculous which helps a soldier to surmount theunacceptable. Add to these a reasonable standard ofphysical fitness and a dedicated professional competence,and you have a soldier for all seasons.”

I wonder if the Army Training and Recruiting Agency uses thatformula? Does the Military Secretary appoint on these criteria?Do cadre courses test for harmony and a sense of theridiculous? Well, if you do, then I suggest that you have anarmy that will not perpetrate atrocities. An infantry company inan occupied country in war which hands back to the Germanowner the silver cutlery it borrowed for dinner is unlikely to killprisoners or rape women.

These men out-fought the Germans. They did not manage itimmediately, but once they had gained the bitter experiencethey beat the Wehrmacht. 18 Platoon took on Panzer troops,Fallschirmjaeger and SS troops. They killed and captured at amost favourable ratio. Indeed, 18 Platoon led the 2nd Armyadvance from Cleve to Bedburg at a rate of 3 miles in themorning, pretty good going for a dismounted platoon with noartillery or armour support, brushing aside the opposition bytheir skill and manoeuvre. Of course, it came at a price: 4 SomLI lost 47 officers and 1,266 soldiers killed or wounded fromNormandy to North Germany, (the battalion establishment was36 + 809). It is possible to fight hard and decently and 18Platoon explains why it is that the British Army can do that.Our Army’s record is not perfect, just better than any other.

In a sense Sydney Jary has never grown up. He left the Army in1947 from Palestine and built up a successful business as apublisher. So, his military experience stopped at the platoonlevel and he has been left uncorrupted by the experience ofmore senior command in a peacetime army, which has allowedhim to write solely about the platoon at war. The success of 18Platoon and its enduring appeal to a new generation of soldiersis easy to understand when you have read this short and simplywritten book by a good soldier and writer.

John Wilson �

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Bren Gun Carrier

British soldiers with wounded on pack mules travelling over rough terrain(IWM)

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The InsurgentArchipelago: From Maoto Bin Laden - JohnMackinlay

Hurst and Company, 2009, £20, 292 pages + vii,ISBN: 1 84904013 3

John Mackinlay has been thinking about insurgency andcounterinsurgency in one way or another for the better part ofa lifetime, from 1964 when he first reported for duty in Borneoas a junior officer in the 6th Gurkha Rifles, and then after atwenty-year military career as a research academic during whichtime he has written many highly regarded scholarly articles andmonographs on the subject. This book, The InsurgentArchipelago, is the product of those many years of observationand thought. It is an important book because unusually for theinsurgency and counterinsurgency literature which, as I shalldescribe below, is relatively slow-moving, and repetitive (evenstatic), it has something new to say. It is a timely bookbecause eight years into the inaptly named ‘Global War onTerror’, about which Mackinlay says insightful and needfulthings, with the cost in blood and treasure of the two majorexpeditionary campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan far exceedingthe hopes and expectations of those who launched them, andwith meaningful success still elusive, it is past time for astrategic rethink. This elegantly written book, without jargonand largely unburdened by academic hokum, provides anessential guide to the ‘when the rubber hits the road’ issues ofglobal insurgency, what it is, how to understand it, and,possibly, how to deal with it.

But by way of full disclosure before I review the book’s mostimportant findings I should tell a short story. Just over fiveyears ago I was sat with John Mackinlay on the pleasantterrace of Somerset House on The Strand, which is locatedbeside King’s College London, where we both have the pleasureof working in the War Studies Department, talking about anarticle I was writing on the adaptation of land forces tooperating in the environment which Rupert Smith describes as‘amongst the people’.1 This was a new area of research for meand so, naturally, I craved the advice of the mostknowledgeable of my more senior colleagues on the matter:John Mackinlay. ‘You’ve got a lot to learn about insurgency’, heremarked after hearing my plan. I write this for three reasons.First, obviously, because I must declare a bias in reviewing thebook of a colleague whom I admire and with whom I workclosely; second, because it illustrates, I think, one ofMackinlay’s qualities—he is willing to speak uncomfortabletruths; and third because he is a good teacher. I did indeed

have a lot to learn and I did so in substantial part by listeningto what he had to say. Readers of this book will have a similarexperience. He has the knack for, as the Americans put it,‘cutting to the chase’—demystifying a (now) highly popularsubject plagued by too much punditry and humbuggery, cuttingaway extraneous and tangential detail to focus on theunderlying dynamics of the phenomenon under study.

The book is sweeping, as the subtitle ‘From Mao to Bin Laden’suggests; yet it is also admirably succinct at 292 pagesincluding notes and index.2 In design it is exceedingly clear,consisting of three parts—‘Maoism’, ‘Post-Maoism’, and‘Responding to Post-Maoism’, which reflect the basiccomponents of his argument. Insurgency’s classical form is thebrainchild of the carnivorously ambitious strategic and politicalgenius Mao Zedong who gave meaning to the now familiarbumper sticker that insurgency is ’80 per cent political and 20per cent military’. Mao’s innovation was to figure out what tofill that 80 per cent with: industrial scale political subversionby which he was able to harness the latent power of anaggrieved population to the wagon of political change, to whitthe victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese CivilWar which ended with the proclamation of the People’s Republicof China in 1949.3 This ‘Maoist prototype’ of insurgency wassubsequently adopted and adapted widely by variousrevolutionaries in the course of the myriad ‘wars of nationalliberation’ which wracked the decolonizing world from the1940s through to the beginning of the 1970s. Westerncountries, most notably Britain, in turn, developed techniquesof defeating Maoism which were laid down in doctrine and inquasi-doctrinal works such as those of Thompson, Galula, andKitson.4 Though unevenly applied in practice and repeatedlyforgotten by the major armies of the world, there exists a well-developed body of theory informed by practice for defeatingMaoism. The celebrated US Army/Marine Corps field manual FM3-24 Counterinsurgency represents something of an apotheosisof this genre.5

The problem is that what we now face in the form of ‘globalinsurgency’ is not Maoism but Post-Maoism—a form ofinsurgency which differs significantly from that which precededit.6 We have, in essence, been searching for the right tool todefeat today’s most virulent insurgency in the wrong conceptualtool box. This is perhaps the most uncomfortable truth to belaid out in this book; another worrying one is that the securityinterests of Western Europe differ markedly from those of theUnited States—because the threat in the former emerges fromtheir own undigested Muslim minorities which are alienatedfurther by their involvement in expeditionary campaigns which,arguably at least, serve the needs of the latter well enough.But there are many other useful observations in the bookwhich, perforce, in the interests of time and space I shallaggregate and summarize them into just two for the purposesof this review.

The first of these is that whereas the study of insurgency and

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counterinsurgency has been static and repetitive for decades,meticulously combing through the same campaigns—Malaya,Vietnam and Algeria, for the most part—and, more or less,coming up with the same conclusions,7 the practice ofinsurgency has not; it is constantly changing and thereforewhat worked to defeat it in the past may not necessarily workagain. The second is that insurgency naturally reflects thesociety from which it emerges. Insurgents exploit the featuresof whatever terrain that is available to them in order to offsetthe gross disproportion of their military strength as opposed tothat of the government and its security forces which theyoppose. If what’s available is steaming jungle then it isbeneath its leaf-thatched and leach-infested canopy that theywill make their encampments; if it is trackless desert then likeLawrence of Arabia it is in that vastness that they will losethemselves; similarly, if it is dense urban conglomeration thatdefines their territory than they will hide in plain sight in theanonymous multitude; and if, as Mackinlay argues, their milieuis the increasingly globally networked and borderless humansociety that will mean that it is the ‘virtual territories of themind’ that they will seek to exploit. This is not so much true ofthe counterinsurgent, however, because the counterinsurgentpossesses infinitely more baggage—a fact which wasapprehended so clearly and presciently by C.E. Callwell ahundred years ago when he observed that the fundamentalasymmetry between insurgency and counterinsurgency lies inthe fact that, while tactics favour the regular army, strategyfavours the irregular.8 Insurgency naturally reflects the societyfrom which it emerges; counterinsurgency, by contrast, mustconsciously laboriously adapt structure, organization, andmindset to the realities of the new environment. If theinsurgent is the proverbial ‘fish’ swimming amongst the sea ofthe people, as Mao put it, the counterinsurgent tends to be themetaphorical fish out of water.

This is not a book to be agreed with a priori; Mackinlay has astory to tell—albeit a carefully constructed one informed by alifetime of study—but a story nonetheless which he invites thereader to come along with. Not all readers will or necessarilyshould. Rather this is a book to be challenged by, to considercarefully and deliberately, and to debate. I myself who havegood reason to agree with most of it cannot bring myself toagree with all of it. Mackinlay, for instance, identifiesPropaganda of the Deed as the essence of the global insurgent’sconcept of operations. He maintains that it is solely a tool ofthe insurgent and not one available to the counterinsurgent. Ipersonally am not ready to concede that point—though toMackinlay’s credit I have not a better theory yet. I am, instead,simply reminded of Galula’s famous injunction about theasymmetry of insurgent and counterinsurgent propaganda:

The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use everytrick […] Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weaponfor him […] The counterinsurgent is tied to hisresponsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speaklouder than words […] For him, propaganda can be no

more than a secondary weapon, valuable only if intendedto inform and not to fool.9

There is much wisdom in what Galula says in general but thispassage in particular represents one of the most fundamentaland widespread theoretical mistake in the entire literature.Facts speak louder than words for both sides; both sides striveto shape the information environment in part throughharnessing the media; in crude terms, the job of thecounterinsurgent propagandist is to make the insurgents standup for their actions.10

But this is also why the book is to be treasured for whatMackinlay does, unusually for this literature, is say somethingnew. With The Insurgent Archipelago he has planted a flag onnew territory which others may explore too, to contest or toconfirm. His theory is complete and clearly articulated andsorely needed. It deserves to be apprehended by all thosewhose task it is to defeat the challenges posed to the post-industrial West by global insurgency. Looking for the cuttingedge of theory on insurgency and counterinsurgency? Here it is.

David Betz

1 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the ModernWorld (London: Penguin, 2006).

2 Compare this with Robert Asprey’s two-volume 2000 plus pages Warin the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse,2002) which says much less in almost ten times the length.

3 See Peter Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, 1895–1949(Abingdon: Routledge, 2005).

4 See Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St.Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 2005—originally published 1966); DavidGalula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York:Praeger, 1964); and, Frank Kitson, Low-intensity Operations:Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber,1971).

5 United States Army and Marine Corps, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

6 On ‘global insurgency’ see David Kilcullen, ‘Countering GlobalInsurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2005),597–617, and by the same author The Accidental Guerrilla: FightingSmall Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London: Hurst, 2009).

7 There is little difference in the spirit or even the detail of theprinciples of counterinsurgency outlined by Thompson, Galula, orKiston, noted above, or for that matter in Charles Gwynn’s ImperialPolicing (London: Macmillan, 1934).

8 C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London:HMSO, 1906), 85.

9 Galula, 14.

10 See Neville Bolt and David Betz, Propaganda of the Deed 2008:Understanding the Phenomenon (London: RUSI, 2008). �

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Northern Ireland – ThePolitics of War andPeace - Paul Dixon

Palgrave, Second Edition, 2008, pp 405, ISBN 10: 0-230-50779-4

Paul Dixon is a senior lecturer at Kingston University. Hisaccount of Northern Ireland is thus from an academic ratherthan a military perspective. He covers the history of theNorthern Irish conflict through the lenses of: Power, IdeologyAnd Reality; Partition and Civil Rights; the Crisis of Policy 1968-73; the First Peace Process 1972-4; Withdrawal to Integration1974 -81; the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement; and the Good FridayAgreement et seq since 1998. The political ground is thus wellcovered. This is an ideal text book for those wishing tounderstand how, why and where we have come from over thepast century. It has received judicious acclaim from seriouslywell placed academics such as Paul Bew and Jonathan Tongue.It is not an easy read but Paul Dixon, nevertheless, covers hisground admirably.

David Benest �

Cavalier andRoundhead Spies:Intelligence in the CivilWar and Commonwealth- Julian Whitehead

Pen and Sword, 2009, Hbk; £19.99 , pp 243,ISBN: 978 1 84415 957 4

Cavalier and Roundhead Spies is an unusual hybrid: it combinesa military history of the English Civil War and Commonwealthperiod (1649-60) with a commentary on the role thatintelligence played, at least where evidence allows. TheCommonwealth era occupies over half the book, but thedescriptions of the infamous Rule of the Major Generals and thecollapse of the army junta in 1659 following Oliver Cromwell’sdeath and his son Richard’s disinclination to assume the LordProtector’s mantle make interesting reading.

The role of General George Monck is common knowledge to thesuccessors of those hardy men who spent three cold weeks in amuddy village aptly named Coldstream in December 1659, but isnot so well known to others. With good intelligence, Monck, aformer royalist and now Parliamentarian General OfficerCommanding Scotland, who was more fearful of anarchy thanmonarchy, set out for London on 1st January 1660 to overseethe recalled ‘Convention’ Parliament which debated the returnof King Charles the Second. While based in Berwick, Monck used‘commissioners’ and paid agents to keep him in touch withevents across England and Ireland: he was giving instructionsto trusted people in places as far away as West Cornwall. Inlate 1659, Monck interpreted the signs of growing popularfeeling against the army-backed London government well: hismarch Southwards was unopposed as a result.

The author of Cavalier and Roundhead Spies, Julian Whitehead,was commissioned into the Intelligence Corps in 1966 and hascombined historical interests with Service knowledge toproduce this account of ‘intelligence’ in its broadest senseduring this turbulent period. The Preface, however, reads likethe opening Royal Military Academy Sandhurst lecture onIntelligence, and jargon terms like SIGINT, IMINT, ELINT,JSTARS and GCHQ leap from the page, surprising in a book ondecades in the Seventeenth Century. The acronyms do show,however, that this country today has a professional intelligencesystem – and spark the thought that however sophisticated theproduct, leaders, then as now, need good judgement tocapitalise on the information presented.

Julian Whitehead uses few original sources, and some of thebooks quoted, and historical interpretations are dated. Hisjudgements on some tactical actions are also debatable:intelligence failures were not always the reason for Civil Wardefeats. That said, the approach is reasonably effective, and hedescribes quite well how the intelligence side of the campaignswas managed, sometimes with very sparse ‘intelligence’ derivedfrom intercepted letters, observation from reconnaissance orroutine reporting, or questioning those A1 sources: fearfulinnkeepers, wary landowners and unemployed soldiers.

The timeliness of intercepted and deciphered letters meant thatthey tended to contribute more to strategic intelligence, butbetter organised scouting certainly influenced tactical actions.The author introduces practitioners of military ‘scouting’ orreconnaissance, codebreakers, including Sir Samuel Luke, andothers like the administrator, postmaster general andintelligence director John Thurloe, although it is surprising thatthe awful description of John Wallis as ‘a GCHQ, albeit of onlyone person’ escaped the editor’s blue pencil.

The coverage of counter-intelligence during the Commonwealthmay have less interest for general readers but the book explainsCromwell’s efforts and sketches in General Monck’s intelligencemethods. The Commonwealth was unstable and subject toseveral coup attempts, including one by the Fifth Monarchist

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Thomas Venner in 1657. Venner’s plot was discovered and hewas locked in the Tower. After the Restoration, the New ModelArmy was disbanded, and all but Monck’s Regiments of Horseand Foot had gone when, in January 1661, Venner led anuprising in the City of London. Monck’s Regiment restoredorder, and this led to the last-minute decision to allow Monckto keep his regiments in the royal Army (it was not really theBritish Army until 1707). Monck’s Regiment of Foot became ‘HisMajesty’s Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards’ after itsColonel’s death in 1670.

There are some disappointing features to the book. Poor editingand proofreading have allowed howlers and typographical errors

to remain: Pen and Sword could do with a good Colour Sergeantshouting ‘attention to detail’ on a regular basis. A fair degree ofknowledge of the period is assumed, and there are somehistorical confusions, notably regarding the sieges of Bristol.There are no maps. That said, this is an intriguing account ofthe Civil War and Commonwealth period from the military andintelligence perspective. At a discounted price of less than£15.00, Cavalier and Roundhead Spies represents reasonablevalue, and perhaps offers a way of explaining intelligence tonovices to the business. I recommend it, but with reservations.

Hugh Boscawen �

Barker Crossing –Theatre Troops – Specialist Support to Operations

Maj PLC Crook TD RWxY

On Monday 7th of December 2009 a temporary pedestriancrossing known as Barker Crossing was opened across theRiver Derwent. This linked north and south Workington for thefirst time since local bridges were damaged and brought downas a result of flooding.

The operation to erect the Logistic Support Bridge was carriedout by 64 Works Group RE of 170 Infrastructure Support Groupcommanded by 8 Force Engineer Brigade. The bridge wastransported by the men and women of 27 Transport Regiment,Royal Logistic Corps, part of 101 Logistic Brigade.Communications to support the whole military effort, the civilauthorities and the bridging task were provided by 2 (National

Communications) Brigade, Royal Signals. 253 MedicalRegiment (102 Logistic Brigade) stood by to provideemergency first aid to personnel on the bridging site.

All these units and brigades are commanded by HQ TheatreTroops which demonstrates the span of utility and capabilitywithin the command. This capability was then given to thelocal Brigade HQ in the NW (42 Bde) to command, which thenused it to carry out the bridging operation itself. Most military eyes are on operations in Afghanistan at themoment but when Cumbria County Council asked forassistance during the recent heavy rains and flooding theArmy was called in. The Chief Executive of the county councilformally asked for assistance on the 26th of November andwork began immediately. The forward assembly area for thebridging equipment was established at Halton Training Campnear Lancaster and the bridging site itself was to becommanded by CO 64 Works Group with the immediatesurrounding area under the command of CO The 4th Battalionthe Duke of Lancaster's Regiment (V) (4 Lancs). The buildingof the bridge itself was carried out by 3 Armoured EngineerSquadron from 22 Engineer Regiment. The HQ of 42 NWBrigade was established at Preston and this Brigade HQcoordinated the entire operation together with the Police andCounty Council. At the same time the Minister for the ArmedForces had granted permission to call out the HigherReadiness Reserves of the TA who had been standing by forjust such an emergency.

It is easy to see the complete coordination of effort fromcentral government, through the County Council and localPolice, down to the local Brigade and to the units actuallydoing the work. HQ Theatre Troops provided the technicalexpertise to carry out the transport and bridging operationstogether with the communications plan and medical support.The local regional forces helped with security and otheraspects of the task.

A combination of Regular and Territorial Royal Signals,including Higher Readiness Reserves personnel from 10Signals Regt and 32 Signals Regt (V) deployed an ImmediatePreparing the Site

Response Team to Carlisle Castle to provide communicationssupport with the Airwave system. A second ImmediateResponse Team from 10 Signals Regt moved up to Stafford tobe prepared to support other elements. At the same time aCommand Support Team from 32 Sig Regt (V) deployed fromEdinburgh to support the GOLD HQ in Penrith. All of this wascommanded by 32 Sig Regt (V) RHQ based in Glasgow, whichalso had further Higher Readiness Reserves mobilised insupport of the Operations Room.

The actual construction of the bridge was carried out by 3Armoured Engineer Squadron of 22 Engineer Regt under thesupervision of 64 Works Group RE who designed the solution.

Most of the Royal Engineers' bridge kit is currently in use inAfghanistan, so the bridge was built from available parts fromtwo bridges that eventually formed a single lane, 51m long,steel truss bridge. The structure is a Mabey Bridge Compact200 panel bridge _ typically used as a military logisticssupport bridge.

The team assembled the bridge on rollers and pushed it acrossthe river from the south side. It used 17 pairs of 3m longprefabricated steel truss panels braced together. The mainbridge section was guided at the front by 12 lightweight trusssections acting as a “nose”. A counterweight was fitted to theback section of the structure during the push to prevent itfrom dipping. The trusses are linked by transverse steeltransom beams which carry a proprietary Mabey Bridgedecking system.

So the people of Workington now have a functioning footbridge which allows them to get across the River Derwentuntil a permanent bridge is built. In spite of the pressures ofthe operational tempo in Afghanistan and elsewhere, theArmy rose to the challenge and provided aid to CumbriaCounty Council. HQ Theatre Troops and its brigades and unitsplayed a crucial part in this operation thus demonstrating theconsiderable capabilities both Regular and TA within thecommand. �

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The Team