The Brussels Conference and Conflict With Japan Author

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World Affairs Institute

THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE AND CONFLICT WITH JAPANAuthor(s): LEON E. BOOTHESource: World Affairs, Vol. 135, No. 3 (Winter 1972), pp. 240-259Published by: World Affairs InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671383 .

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THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE ANDCONFLICTWITH JAPAN

By LEON E. BOOTHEO n July7, 1937,JapaneseandChinesetroopsclashedat theMarcoPolo Bridge. This belligerent action on the simmering Sino-Japaneseborder inChina signaled thebeginningof generalwar as Japanese

troops invaded Chinese territory.' The decision for war was to be aculmination of Japanese efforts to penetrate and control China botheconomically and politically. China's defeat at the hands of Japan inthe Sino-JapaneseWar of 1896marked thebeginningof Japan's overtefforts to control China. The ease with which Japan, a much smallerand supposedlyweaker nation,defeated China foredoomed theChineseEmpire. Japan's steady path to empire in China, while successful, wasnot, however, always smooth. For example, imperialistic rivalries inManchuria led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Additionally,Japan's gains during the early part of the 20th century had beenchecked or frustrated by America's paternalistic open-door policieswhich sought to prevent the economic and political dismemberment ofChina.2

The 1937 invasion was to be far different from Japan's otherimperialistic attempts. It had tremendous international significancebecause of Japan's signature on the Nine Power Treaty of 1922.The signatories of that covenant had pledged to respect the territorial and political sovereignty of China.3 However, the nationalinterestof Japan had changed considerably in the decade and a halfsince the signing of the Nine Power agreement. The Depression hadhelped the militants in Japanese society to convince Nippon thatJapan had a sense of destiny inAsia. By extendingher influenceprogressively,Japan could become a stabilizing force in the Far East.4Despite the change of interest,Japanese actions were a clear violation of the 1922 agreement. The main question was whether theother signatoriesof the pact would take collective action to preservethe treatycommitments.

240


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 241Reaction inAmerica and Abroad

The firstmajor reaction of the American government came on July16, 1937. American Secretary of State Cordell Hull, a staunchWilsonian idealist, tried to rise to the tense situationby making hisfamous statement of principles for the settlement of the present andany future international disputes. In brief summary, Hull proposedmaintenance of peace, national and international self-restraint,abstinence from the use of force, abstinence from interference in theinternal affairs of other nations, adjustment of problems by peacefulnegotiation and agreement, faithful observance and strengthening ofinternational agreements and laws, and limitation and reduction ofarmaments. While laudatory in their general aims, Hull's proposalslackedprecision of language and could thusbe interpretedina varietyof ways. Reflective of that inherent failure of precision was theadoption of theseprinciplesby everymajor power. Unfortunately theparadox so very evident in this lesson was to be ignored generally inlaterAmerican foreign policy.'Britain also was concerned about the Far Eastern situation. TheBritish demonstrated this interest to Norman Davis, American delegateto the International Sugar Conference in 1937. In London, Davisconferred with Prime Minister Chamberlain about world events. WhileChamberlain indicated a policy of appeasement inEurope, theBritishleader espoused a more positive policy in reference to Japan.Chamberlain's fear was that Japan would take advantage of Britishweakness in the Orient in case of general war in Europe. The PrimeMinister felt thatonly a resolute standby theUnited States and Britaincould stem the tide of Japanese imperialism.6Britain suggested to the United States government on October 1,1937, thepossibility of a joint boycott against Japan.Officially theUnited States ruled out such a policy course. The basic argumentssupporting this negative response covered the major categories oflegalism,moralism, departure from tradition, and even sheer pragmatism. The American officials agreed that theproposed policywentbeyond existingAmerican legislation,named an aggressorand thuswastaking sides, and would mean aligning theUnited States and GreatBritain. The United States also feared that theAmerican fleetwouldbear the brunt of any Japanese retaliation.Britain's proposal showedtheweakness of the League of Nations. England felt it had to gooutside of theLeague forpositive action.7


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242 LEON E. BOOTHEA dramatic chain of events temporarily arrested the uncertainty of

the diplomatic vacuum. On October 5, 1937, President FranklinRoosevelt made his famous Quarantine Speech in Chicago. ThePresident intimated that the United States was throwing the uncommitted past to the winds and was instead sounding a clarion call forconcerted action. There could be little doubt that the talk ofquarantine was aimed squarely at Japanese actions inChina.'Just 24 hours after Roosevelt's speech, the League of Nationsadopted a resolution made by its Far Eastern Advisory Committee. Thisresolution implicatedJapan and furthercalled for the signatoriesof theNine Power Washington Treaty to initiate consultations. Since thecontractingnations had pledged to support the integrityof China, aNine Power Conference seemed in order. The League's action ismorerelevantwhen it is realized that SecretaryHull had notified theLeaguebefore the Chicago address that President Roosevelt was going tomakea major foreign policy speech. The American President's call for actionwas acceded to by the League and the United States was encouraged toplay a fullrole ifitsowilled.9The U. S. State Department took a bold step in issuing a statementthat Japan was in fact in violation of existing treaties. The communiquestated in part: "The Government of the United States has been forcedto the conclusion that the action of Japan inChina is inconsistent withthe principles. . .between nations and is contrary to the provisions ofthe Nine Power Treaty. . ., and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact."American conclusions were in general accord with those of the Leagueof Nations Assembly. The fact that the American announcement cameon the same day that the League adopted its resolution indicates that ajoint effort was being made.10The trend of events indicated that theUnited Stateswas devising aconcerted policy that would go beyond moralistic condemnation.Having taken the initial steps, Roosevelt waited for domestic andinternationalreaction.''1In Europe reactionwas mixed. The French,who were hard pressedbecause of thevulnerabilityof Indochina,were veryenthusiastic aboutRoosevelt's speech. French officials thought the moves by theAmerican governmenthad come at a verypropitious time.Chamberlainof England hoped to channel suchmoves. He stated that the firststepof any concerted action would be the holding of a Nine PowerConference. Germany and Italy reacted negatively to the speech and


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 243the calling of a Nine Power meeting. The Italian government consideredthat the Nine Power Treaty had died with the Japanese seizure ofManchuria in 1932.1 2

Initial reaction among Japanese government circles indicated that theNine Power Treaty was obsolete and that the Kellogg-Briand Pact wasinapplicable to the "China incident." If invited, Japan's inclination wasto refuse any invitation to a proposed Nine Power Conference. TheJapanese could not acquiesce in any intervention between China andherself. The Japanese military, having little understanding of theWest,resented American and British intrusion into the Chinese problem.' 3

American OpinionWhile Revisionist studies have indicated strong support forRoosevelt's quarantine speech, the Roosevelt Administration inter

preted the domestic reaction as largely negative to the sudden change offoreign policy.'" There was a large outcry of public opinion against anykind of aggressive action against Japan. The German Ambassador to theUnited States verified the reception of Roosevelt's speech by theAmerican citizenry. He reported to Berlin on October 9 that, due to theoverwhelmingly negative response, "the fanfare in Chicago has ratherquickly become a call to retreat. . . .)Reaction in the State Department varied. A minority group advisedagainst strong action. Many feared that the United States would be in aposition similar to that of Britain in the Ethiopian crisis-making acommitment with no follow-up support from other nations. This groupfeared that theUnited Stateswould have to bear thebrunt infightingBritain's battles in the Far East. The New York Times echoed thisgeneral idea in stating that the United States should remain uncommitted unless it could be firmly convinced that the other major nationswith interestsin the Far East would actively take part in any adoptedcourse of concerted action.' 6Assistant Secretaryof State G. S. Messersmithwas the spokesman fora groupwhich espoused a secondviewpoint:

We arewitnessing . .. a reversion to the doctrine of force and ofmight. .. to an entirely different internationalmorality. . .. This resurrectedlaw . .. is to replace present international law . . . and a whole newsystem of public and private morals . .. is to be imposed on theworld.'"'


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244 LEON E. BOOTHEPatience would only lead the United States to war, and there was noshelter behind neutrality legislation or ignoring the facts as theyexisted.A notable thirdgroup consistingof Secretary of State Hull,WilliamBullitt (Ambassador to France),William Phillips (Ambassador to Italy),and Hugh Wilson, James Dunn, and J. P. Moffat of the StateDepartment met on October 10. This group felt that the situation inChina might not be resolved even if the United States took strongaction and ifJapan completelybacked down. The Soviet Union mighttry to move into the chaotic vacuum and nothing would be gained.1"Conference at Brussels

Despite evident division of opinion both at home and abroad, anavenue for possible action was still available in the Nine PowerConference forwhich the League had issued a convention call. England,in communication with the United States, began preparation for such aconference. The powers first approachedthe Netherlands to host the

conference. The Dutch government, however, refused because of thesusceptibility of their Asian empire to Japanese reprisal. The Dutchgovernment announced that it would attend a conference but statedpessimistically that itwas not in favor of coercive measures.

Britain, following American advice, then asked the Belgian government to serve as conference host. The Belgian Ambassador to Japanstronglyadvised his governmentagainst theholding of such ameetingby stating that "no international action short of force could in any wayalter the course of developments in China. . . ." Since such action wasvery unlikely, Belgian interests in Japan would necessarily suffer. Inspite of such ominouswarnings,Belgium did accept and scheduled theconference forNovember 3, 1937.1 9

Because of the magnitude of the crisis, Britain and the United Statesagreed to invite certain nonsignatory governments of the Nine PowerTreaty to the conference, notably Germany and the Societ Union.Trying to bolster the roster of the conference even more, BritishForeign Minister Anthony Eden sent a personal message to ForeignMinister Ciano of Italy and Reich Foreign Minister Constantin vonNeurath asking each to attend at the head of theirdelegations. Bothlaterrefused.20oThe United States officially accepted the League's invitation onOctober 16, 1937. One United States diplomat unofficially remarked


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 245about the League invitation, "We are damned ifwe do and damned ifwe don't." There was little doubt, though, that until the time ofRoosevelt's quarantine speech it looked as if the League would try tohandle the Far Eastern dilemma. The American president's speech thuswas the genesis of the Nine Power Conference.2

PolicyPlanningRoosevelt appointed the following to theUnited States delegation:Norman Davis as the sole delegate, Stanley Hornbeck as Far Easternadviser, J. P. Moffat as European adviser, Robert Pell as Press Officer,and Charles Bohlen as Secretary. Secretary of State Hull could not gobecause the President had called the Congress back into special session.There was a vital need for Hull to stay inWashington.22Norman Davis was Roosevelt's ambassador-at-large and had servedthe President at previous international meetings, especially disarmamentconferences. Ambassador Davis's background indicated that he was infavor of a strongerapproach by the United States to the worldsituation. Davis's general outlook was clearly stated in an article writtenin 1934: "It should be possible for the United States. . .to cooperate inan endeavor to promote peace and solve such questions of internationalconcern as can only be dealt with effectively by concerted action." Hefelt that such things as nonaggression treaties were insufficient. Davishad additionally prepared two of the four memoranda for Roosevelt's

quarantine speech. Those two memoranda contained very strongstatements which Roosevelt toned down in the final draft.23If Roosevelt selected Davis because of the Ambassador's desire for a

stronger policy, the rest of the delegation was not so firmly convinced.Divisions in the United States entourage developed between those whofelt that theUnited States shouldgo slow lestJapan retaliate and thosewho thoughtthat Japan should be stopped now lestwe be faced by astronger threat later. Davis emphasized the importance of the BritishEmpire toAmerican security.While Davis did not advocate theUnitedStates becoming a lackey for Britain, he felt that a prime aim ofAmerican foreign policy should be to prevent the Empire frombecoming endangered.At the other extremewasMoffat's position. Hispreoccupation was to prevent American involvement in hostilitiesanywhere and to prevent an entanglingcommon frontformation ofdemocratic powers. He felt the destruction of Japanwould leave apower vacuumwhich could only augmentcommunism.24


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246 LEON E. BOOTHEThe division among the delegation was matched by confusion in the

higher foreign policy echelon of Roosevelt's Administration. SecretaryHull's instructions to Davis were guided by the outline of principlespreviously made public. The Secretary of State listed national securityand the promotion of the maintenance of peace as the first objective ofAmerican foreign policy. He stated further:

You will bear inmind that public opinion in the United States hasexpressed its emphatic determination that theUnited States keep outof war. . . . The primary function of the conference is to provide aforum for constructive discussion to formulate ... possible bases ofsettlement, and ... bring the parties together through peacefulnegotiation.25

Davis visited Roosevelt at Hyde Park to receive personal instructions.They discussed the possible courses of action-from banding togetherfor collective action to such neutral action as verbally ostracizing Japan.Roosevelt indicated that the ultimate guide would be the developmentof public opinion. In

a memorandum Roosevelt told the Americandelegation "to make it clear at every step. . .that the United Statespolicy does not envision theUnited States beingpushed out infrontasthe leader, or suggester of future action." The American contingent wasnot to take the lead as Japan might direct its animosity toward theUnited States. Additionally, such action would arouse the clamor of theisolationists. After instructing the delegation not to assume the leadingrole, Roosevelt told Davis that if the United States were to avoid anultimate clash with Japan some practical means of checking Japaneseconquests had to be found. The sad fact was that Roosevelt also toldDavis that there was a need for collective action but he could only usethe tools of bland moralism. Another unfortunate aspect was that theAmerican delegation had only three days to prepare officially beforesailing for the conference.2 6The policies of ambivalence continued up to the time the delegationsailed. Roosevelt told the nation in a fireside chat that the purpose ofthe conference was to work with other signatories to find a solution.Then indicatingthat theUnited Stateswas thinkingin termsof a moreactivistpolicy, the President said: "I want our great democracy to bewise enough to realize that aloofness fromwar isnot prompted by anunawareness of war. In a world of mutual suspicions, peace must beaffirmativelyreached for. It cannot justbe wished for. It cannot justbewaited for." The President,however, retractedany imageof collective


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 247planning by announcing on the eve of the delegation's sailing that Mr.Davis would enter the conference "without any commitments on thepart of this government to other governments."27Undoubtedly Roosevelt was being influencedby developments onthe international scene. Secretary-General Alexis Leger of the FrenchForeignMinistry notifiedWashington on October 16 that due to thesituation in Europe and the vulnerability of Indochina, it wasimpossible for France to adopt the use of force at the upcomingconference. France said that the United States would have to protectthe small power from retaliation by Japan if economic sanctions wereto be considered. A pledge of protection for Indochina by America wasparamount in French minds.2"The British government in an aide-mimoire on October 19 tried topinpoint the American position. Britain felt that if the only result ofthe conference was moral condemnation of Japan, this would betantamount to acquiescing in the aggression. Added to this futilesituation would be the creation of frustrated feelings in Japan and anembedding of their inferiority complex. The only solution was positiveaction in the form of active assistance to the Chinese or economicsanctions against Japan. However, the United States would have to giveassurances of military protection to any countries who would participate in such positive action against Japan. Britain felt that if assuranceswere forthcoming, there would be a good possibility of restrainingJapan and making an early peaceful settlement.The United States considered such action as proposed by Britain tobe outside the bounds of the conference. The United States viewed thepurpose of the conference as being to induce an armistice in China,which was to be followed by peaceful negotiation and a stabilizingofthe situation. Pragmatically, the Roosevelt Administration realized thatthere was little public support for a guarantee of American militarysupportas suggestedby theBritishand theFrench.29The initial prerequisites for any strong action were apparentlybeyond the limitsof American foreignpolicy.With this realization, itcan be seriouslyquestioned why the United States pursued a coursethatcould only lead to frustrationfor all parties involved.Belgium asked theUnited States onOctober 30 for theproposals andprocedural plans that were to be submitted to the conference. TheAmerican answer was: ".. .we have no proposal worked out to submitto the conferencenorhavewe anyplan of procedurewhich we propose


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248 LEON E. BOOTHEto support." Almost dryly, the United States suggested that delegatesarrive two or three days early to thrash out the agenda.Boycott by Japan andGermany

Since no other nation expressed awillingness to lead the conference,Belgian official circles panicked at the thoughtof playing the leadingrole by default. Added to thisdilemmawas the fact that theBelgiansthemselves did not know what the conference was supposed toaccomplish.34

Japan shook the preconference atmosphere by announcing that itwould not attend themeeting. Nippon claimed that itwas fightinginChina out of self-defense and to stamp out the communist menace. TheJapanese reasoned that communist espionage in China had made theNine Power Treaty obsolete. Deviating from such excuses, Japanrealisticallysaid that it felt that itcould not obtain a fairhearing at theconference even if itwere to attend. The basis for this viewpoint wasthe fact that the convening of the conference was under the aegis of theLeague. Since the League had condemned Japan previously, theJapanese saw the conference as nothing more than a forum to abuseJapan. In the Japanese estimation, the conference only added to thebelligerency in theFar East because itgaveChina somehope that theymight receive foreign support and aid."Germany furtheradded to thedifficultyby announcing that itwouldnot attend the conference. The Germans declined because they felt noobligation to attend (not being a'signatory to the Treaty), and becausethey thought that there was little prospect that the conference wouldachieve a successful end result. Germany concluded that the aim of theconference was a moral condemnation of Japan. The Third Reich didleave open the possibility of later joining themeeting if it appeared thatthere was a movement toward the achievement of "practical goals."As a signatory to the Nine Power Agreement, Italy announced that itwould attend the Brussels Conference. Under German and Japanesediplomatic pressure, Italy agreed to representand explain theJapaneseviewpoint. ForeignMinister Ciano announced that hewould not attendthe conference because he felt therehad not been adequate preparationfor the conference. Ciano felt that nothing tangible would beaccomplished.3"The Soviet Union announced itsacceptance of the invitationto themeeting.While Russia expected little in termsof accomplishments, it


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 249did have a faint hope for some sort of a strong stand. Moffat viewed theSoviet acceptance as an effort to embarrass the powers represented atthe conference and an effort to prevent any sort of a peacefulagreement. The latter goal was to keep Japan occupied in a war ofattrition that would hopefully weaken Nippon's resources to threatenthe Soviet Union.33

ProceedingsWith the list of powers now complete, delegates began to arrive forthe preconference planning and maneuvering. In a preconference

meeting on November 2, Eden told Davis that Britain was prepared togo as far as the United States but no further. Britain could not afford tobe lefton a diplomatic limb again, especially duringthiscrucialperiodin Europe. Eden proclaimed a willingness to base British actions onAmerican policy.Davis replied thatBritain and theUnited States should concentrateevery effort on exerting a moral influence through their diplomacy.Such a processwould crystallizepublic opinion and theforces of peaceand order. These were to be the weapons to combat the lawlessness thatprevailed at that time.Meeting laterwith the French and Belgianrepresentatives, Davis reiterated this idea. However, Davis complainedto the State Department of thedifficultyinconvincingthe French andthe Belgians of the importance of building up and educating publicopinion because such concepts were foreign to them. Despite such aroadblock,Davis notifiedSecretaryHull thathewould continue tourgethe importance of the "constructive part" of the American policy.In trying to give support to the American delegation, AssistantSecretary of State Sumner Welles emphasized the American viewpointto the British Ambassador inWashington. Welles stated:

Every effort is to be made to rally moral opinion in every other countryof theworld in favor of the principles embodied in theNine PowerTreaty and the effort to make perfectly clear to public opinioneverywhere the attitude which . .. Japan had assumed in connectiontherewith. . .. The whole premise of this government ingoing to theBrussels Conference was the keeping alive ..,. of international law andmorality. . ..34

With no visible format forconducting the conference and with oneof the belligerentsbeing absent, the BrusselsConference convened on


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250 LEON E. BOOTHENovember 3, 1937. Moffat reflected the morale of the delegates undersuch gloomy circumstances by stating: "I have never known a conferencewhere even before we meet, people are discussing ways to end it."

American delegate Davis opened the working session with a mildspeech calling for a peaceful settlement "within the scope of thesetreaty provisions and principles." Britain and France seconded theAmerican position. Count Aldovandi, Italian delegate, indicated thecynical view of the Italian government by stating that past attempts atinternational settlements had ended in failure, citing such things as theLytton Report of the League of Nations. He left very little doubt thathe believed that the Brussels Conference would also end in failure. TheCount said that Italy deplored the situation, but itwas impossible toestablish the facts in the China problem and, therefore, impossible tojudge who was guilty. Echoing the Japanese position, the ItalianDelegate said that the best course would be to let the two belligerentsdeal directlywith each other.The course of opening speeches changedwith theaddressbyMaximLitvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. His blunt call forcollective concerted action rocked the conference. He stated that unlessthere was a strong successful solution arrived at by the assembledpowers, the world was in essence adopting the maxims: "Take yourplunder, take what you have seized by force, and peace be with you.Love your aggressor, resist not evil."Dr. Kee of China presented the Chinese position in detail. Chinaconsidered the conference as representing the forces of righteousnessand justice thatwould correct thewrongs being inflictedupon theChinese peoples.With the initial round of speeches completed, the conferees were at aloss as to what to do next. Any specific solution that might be arrivedat would be meaningless as long as Japan was absent. The conferencethen decided to send Japan a second invitation, which, in time, Japanwould also refuse.3sA diplomatic bombshell hit the conference on November 6, 1937,with the announcement of Italy's entrance into theAnti-ComminternPact. Ciano's absence was clear in perspective. Such news promptedmany smaller nations to propose appointing a negotiating team andadjourning. However, the major powers were able to keep theconferencegoing.36sNegotiations behind the scenes added another dimension to the


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 251conference. Soviet delegate Litvinov apparently felt that his career wason trialwith thisgathering.Litvinovhad been theardent supporterof aRussian policy of collective action with the West against the risingFascist menace. If the Commissar returned home without success, he

would suffer the consequences. His dismissal would mean thewaning ofhis position of working with the democracies. Litvinov stated that theSoviet leaders would replace him and his major advisers with youngermen who had little or no knowledge of Europe and who were verysuspicious of all foreigners.Russia would most likelyfollow a policyindependent of the West.37 Litvinov's fears turned out to be aprophecy of what was to come.The French governmenthad become disturbed over thedriftingofpolicy. While consulting with the United States about France'smembership on any negotiating team thatmight be appointed, theFrench Premier lectured the American Ambassador:

What I cannot understand is thatyou Americans from time to time talkas ifyou really intended to act in the International spherewhen youhave no intention of acting in any way that can be effective.... Such apolicy on the part of the United Statesmerely leads the dictatorships tobelieve that the democracies are full ofwords but are unwilling to backup theirwords by force, and force is the only thing that counts todayin theworld.38Davis became restive over the apparent failure of moralistic diplo

macy. In a meeting with the French and British representatives onNovember 10, the American delegate suggested that the final draftinclude a refusal to recognize Japanese aggressive gains as well as arefusal to extend loans and credits to Japan. However, Davis said thathe spoke only for himself and not his government.The American delegate's rebellion showedup on that sameday inhiscommuniques with the State Department. He verbally assaulted theAmerican Neutrality laws as negating "our affirmation of high moralprinciples and advocacy ofmoral pressuresupon Japan."Words spokenoutside the realm of power could have little impact upon such asituation. Davis clearly stated that ifmoral pressure failed "we may findourselves embarrassed or impotent." If Japan refused the secondinvitation as expected, Davis stated itwould be impossible to keep theconference going.Reflecting the lack of a positive atmospherewas the statementofCanada on November 12: "Condemnation if you will, but no


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252 LEON E. BOOTHEsanctions." The Scandinavian governments who sent only secondranking delegates to the conference openly stated that they wereagainst anything that was critical of Japan.Hull's response to Davis was completely negative. After conferringwith the President and congressional leaders, Hull said there was nohope for repealingor suspending theNeutrality legislation in order tostrengthen the American bargaining position. Nonetheless, Hull urgedthat the conference be kept in session for world opinion's sake. Hullordered Davis to emphasize the principles and provisions of theNinePower Treaty. The American Secretary felt that the conference hadclarified a few issues, ifonly in a negative way.3 9

Acting according to orders, Davis in a speech on November 13 statedthat the Sino-Japanese conflict was destroying the "integrity of certainprincipleswhich we hold sacred." Davis pointed out thatJapanhad hadtwo chances to explain its case and argued that if Japan really wasinterestedin internationalgood will, then theJapanese should take thisopportunity toprove it.The State Department soon concluded, however, that nothingpositive could be accomplished by the conferenceand instructedDavison November 13 tomake no new initiative, and to confine his speechesto a discussion of platitudes.40Being bitterly disappointed in this communique of abandonment,Davis sent a strongly-worded message toWashington on November 16in support of his views. He stated that, unless the United States was

prepared to participate in some positive steps, "most countries will losetheir nerve." Anthony Eden supported Davis that "we cannot usefullyand with dignity continue much longer to confine ourselves to anexpression of principles and pleas to Japan. . . ." Davis outlined whathe felt was the "minimum step" of nonrecognition of gains andprohibition of loans. The American delegate said there were signs thatJapan was nervous about this conference. However, "if we go on muchlongerwithout any evidence of intention to do anythingmore thanpreach. . .," Japan would become satisfied that there was no danger ofany interferencewith herplans of expansion.41iFutile Results

On November 15 the Conference adopted a General Declarationaccusing Japan of violating theprinciplesof theNine Power Treaty andof international law. The Declaration closed by noting that Japan's


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 253reluctance to cooperate with the other powers was in itself arecognition of guilt. Japanese nervousness showed itself when thegovernment of Japan notified American Ambassador Joseph Grew thatall they wanted was a reasonable peace "and not a foot of Chineseterritory will be taken. . . .42 Grew realistically noted to the StateDepartment that, iftheUnited States insistedon effortstowardpeacewithin the framework of collective security, force and only force couldbe effective.This was a strongstatementof the futilityof thepolicythe United States was pursuing at Brussels.4 3The American government's attitude on the use of force came in amessage from Hull to Davis on November 15. Hull instructed: ". . .wefeel that a strongreaffirmationof theprincipleswhich should underlierelationships.. .would be the best method" of offsetting the vastcriticism of the Conference.44 It was clear thatWashington would notback anything other than moralistic enunciations.Davis answered: "I bow to your judgement." This statement was,however, a decoy for a strong plea for more responsible action. Asurvey by Davis had revealed that most of the powers at Brusselsbelieved a mere reaffirmation would not contribute to a solution of theproblem. In noting Japan's past actions, Davis suggested that thematterof Japanese actions inChina shouldbe eitherdropped gracefullyor elsea decision should be made to do something "more definite." Again,Davis repeated his minimum plan of nonrecognitionand restrictionofloanswhich he feltcould realisticallybe achieved.He emphasized thattime was a crucial factor lest the situation worsen with delay.

Though the State Department did not take the positive stanceadvocated by Davis, American officials were embarrassed by theimpotency of the conference. Hull issued a public statement trying tooffset the evident fact. He stated that the Conference "sets a precedentfor concerted action to uphold the doctrine of international morality. . . ." However, press dispatches disturbed Hull, particularlyreportswhich stated that theUnited States was primarilyresponsiblefor the lack of success of the conference. Journalists indicated thatother nationswaited for action by theUnited States as the signal forthe adoption of positive pressure against Japan. The AmericanSecretary of State cabled Davis that hewanted the situation arrestedsince thepressmade ithard "to maintain a position in defense of ourprinciples."Hull sent additional suggestions for bringing the conference to a


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254 LEON E. BOOTHEclose. He wanted the conference to adopt a final resolution whichwould serve as a report to the world. Such a report would contain alistingof eventswhich would implicate Japan as the villain. Therewasto be a reaffirmation of the principles of the Nine Power Treaty; plus,Hull stated,

. . those other principles which are essential to world peace.... Thevalidity of those principles cannot be destroyed by force; their universalapplicability cannot be denied; and their indispensability to civilizationand progress cannot be gainsaid.

The recess of the conference was to be on the stipulation that itwouldmeet again if the situation availed itself.4 'The controversy between Davis and the State Department, however,continued. Davis reported that there were various concepts as to wheremeasures of persuasion left off and measures of pressure or positiveaction began. The Japanese, for example, considered the BrusselsConference as a measure of pressure. Even in the minimum programthat had been presented, Davis emphasized that "our delegation has atno time contemplated or suggested any measures which we wouldregard as involving positive action and we have at no time initiatedconsiderations in Conference circles of any measures of pressure." Thedelegate reported that the other nations had never suggested the UnitedStates act alone or assume outstanding responsibility for any positiveaction program. Now that the Conference was coming to a close, everypower sought to escape the onus of failure. Although the powers hadtalked of a cooperative effort, Davis noted that the United States wouldbe blamed for the negative results of the conference.Hull's answer came in principled language.Trying to salvage somesort of victory, the American Secretary stated that the Conferencecould provide a broader basis for the support of principles governinginternational relationships. Hull stated: "I feel that each nation shouldmake everyeffortto educate itspeople as to theurgent importanceoftheprinciples of peace and. . .tobuild up. . .an understanding of theprinciplesessential to orderlyand healthy relationsamongnations."Davis cabled back thathewas runninginto resistancefrom theotherdelegations as to the implementationof Hull's instructions.Britain feltit inadvisable tomake any furtherdeclarations of principles as theycould not thinkof anything furtherto saywithout being repetitiousand monotonous.4 6


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 255On November 21 Hull again rebuked the American contingent for

not handling the press properly. Hull was especially indignant over suchcomments as printed by the New York Herald which said: "TheAmerican and British delegations, with.. .the Belgian Foreign Minister,were preparing to give the Nine Power Treaty a first class funeral."Secretary Hull instructed the delegation to emphasize the constructiveachievements of the gathering and noted that "the Conference inrecessing gives each government the opportunity in its own way to takeappropriate measures toward keeping alive and educating its people inregard to the fundamental importance of the. . .broader principles andissues which are of world concern." The rebuke on handling the pressenraged the delegation. Hornbeck called the censure a "stinkbomb."Pell considered the press dispatches as being critical ofWashingtonpolicy rather than the delegation at Brussels. Moffat indicated surprisethat the news stories were not worse. As the leader of the delegates,Davis informed Hull of the attitude news columnists had taken at thebeginning of the Conference. When the delegation had arrived inBrussels, the newsmen thought Roosevelt's quarantine speech wouldprovide the leadership for concrete action by the Conference. Theinitial enthusiasm had faded as the Conference dragged on withoutresults. Many newspapermen bitterly felt "that American cooperationwas meaningless and consisted exclusively of fine phrases."4 7The Conference stumbled along hoping to adjourn on themodifiedbasis of Hull's suggestions. Davis reported to Hull: "To get ameeting oftheminds with theBritish,we had topermit some cuttingdown of thestatements of principles" in the text of the final report. The BrusselsConference adopted, with Italy abstaining, a final report on November24. With this task completed, the Conference recessed. Itwas never toconvene again.48All the forecasts about the uselessness and failure of the Conferencecame true with the recessing of the Conference. The BrusselsConferencewas theheight of themoralistic approach to internationalproblems and at the same timewas the nadir of pragmatic diplomacy.The vacuum of power that existed in the 1920s and early 1930swas nolongeran internationalfact.The United States could no longerdeludeitselfinto thinkingthat itwould always be able to settlea situationbypious rhetoric.A question was asked appropriately at that time as towhat theUnited States expected to achieve by displays ofmass angerand moralistic lectures.49~Unfortunately, the answerwas always the


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256 LEON E. BOOTHEarousing of public and world opinion. That answer alone shows how farthe American people had strayed from the diplomatic mainstream ofpower politics.In retrospect, the Roosevelt Administration's handling of the crisisof 1937 reflectsa lack of understandingof the internationalsituation.The American government's adherence to the Wilsonian approach ofemploying moral verbiage instead of positive concrete action not onlyneglected the national interest but created confusion on the nationaland international scene. Defenders of the Roosevelt Administrationargued that the isolationist block in the United States was large andcould not have supported a policy aimed at stemmingtheJapanesebyforce if necessary. In addition to this point of cleavage, there is therationalization that the Allied leadership was in an appeasing mood.Forceful policies adopted by theAmerican governmentwould notonly have threatened unity at home, but would also have required theUnited States to go it alone internationally.

Weakness of American PolicyThe internationalistschool ofwriters which has tried to vindicateRoosevelt Administration policy has overlooked the opportunities forcollective action which existed in 1937. In particular, these writers havefailed to examine critically the events surrounding the BrusselsConference.5 0 Had decisive measures been adopted at this international

meeting, it seems clear that the United States would not have borne thebrunt of Japanese reaction. Britain, France, and the Soviet Union werewilling to join with theUnited States in a vigorous program to stemJapanese intent.Failure by the United States to seize the initiative was a clear signalto the aggressive powers. The American nation had long establisheddiplomatic traditions in China as well as being party to internationalagreementsconcerning that ill-starredcountry.The point overlooked inpast studies is that theBrusselsConferencewas theone casewhere theUnited States was obligatorily involvedby its 'signatureto theNinePower Treaty.5' In the othermajor incidents of the 1930Osprior to1937, the United States was always an outsider observingthe crises.s52In such cases, the role theUnited Statesmight play in the event of amajor conflagrationcould neverby accurately assessed by theaggressorpowers. In failing to respond to Japan's patent violation of historic


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 257American interests, those nations bent on imperialism now felt assuredthat the United States would not bring its power to bear against them.At the same time those nations who sought to collaborate with theUnited States became discouraged by the inaction of the Americangovernment. With the failure to frame a collective policy at Brussels,Britain and France resorted to appeasement, and Russia eventuallysought nonagression pacts with the martial powers. The BrusselsConference appears significant not only because it revealed the clearfailings of moralistic diplomacy, but also because it was a crucialturning point between peace and war.The Brussels Conference set the stage for what was to happen inMunich in 1938. Brussels dramaticallydemonstrated the inabilityof the

major powers in the anti-fascist camp to unite against imperialisticendeavors. Munich represented a reaffirmation of the evident bankruptcy of the anti-fascist powers. Appeasement at Munich was acontinuation of appeasement at Brussels.It is not surprisingthatdiplomatic historianspay so little attentionto the consequences of the Brussels Conference.s 3 Those few writerswho treat the subject place the conference in the wrong frame ofreference, viewing it as a study of internal American politics, ratherthan as one of themajor failuresof American foreignpolicy whichculminated inwar.

NOTES1. A. W. Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Yale

University Press, 1938), pp. 454-458.2. Theodore Roosevelt limited Japanese gains from the Russo-Japanese War by keepingRussia strong to check and balance Japan; U. S. support of China during World War I helpednullify Japan's Twenty-One Demands; the Stimson Doctrine refused to recognize Japan'sseizure ofManchuria in 1932.

3. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, July 3-December 25, 1937 (1938), p. 396.4. Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and her Destiny (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1958), pp.43- 44.5. U. S., Department of State, Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (1942), pp.44- 45.6. Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," Political Science Quarterly,Vol. LXXII (September 1957), pp. 409-410. Norman Davis Manuscript Collection (Library of

Congress), Boxes 8, 51, and 55.7. Nancy H. Hooker, ed., The offat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956),pp. 152-153.8. New York Times, October 20, 1937. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers andAddresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937 (New York, 1941), Vol. VI, pp. 418-423. NormanDavis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Box 55.9. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937 (Washington:Government Printing Office, 1954), Vol. IV, pp. 58-61.


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258 LEON E. BOOTHE10. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, 1937, Vol. XVIII, p. 285. Hooker, op. cit.,

pp. 153-154. Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co., 1941), Vol. I,p. 544.11. Hooker, op. cit., p. 155.12. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 134; Vol. IV, p. 78.New York Times, October 9, 1937.13. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 56. Shigemitsu,op. cit., p. 150.14. Borg, "Notes. . .," op. cit. See also, Dorothy Borg, The United States and the FarEastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).15. Hull, op. cit., pp. 552-554. U. S., Department of State, Documents on German ForeignPolicy, 1918-1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), Series D, Vol. I, pp.634-635. Borg, "Notes. . .," op. cit., pp. 426-430.16. Hooker, op. cit., p. 154. New York Times, October 20, 1937.17. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 140-141.18. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 155-156. Norman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Boxes 27,41.

19. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 70, 74-75,90-97.20. Ibid., pp. 67-68, U. S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy. . .,

op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 20-21.21. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 82-83. Hooker,op. cit., pp. 150-156.22. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 73.

23. New York Times, July 16, 1937. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 153-154. Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace, International Conciliation (Washington, 1934), no. 298, p. 25; no. 308,p. 34. Norman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Boxes 8, 47, 55.24. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 157, 182-183.25. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 84. Norman Davis

Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Boxes 4, 5, 27.26. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 85. Hooker, op.cit., pp. 156-157. Hull, op. cit., pp. 551-552. Norman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit.,Boxes 4-5.

27. Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 133. Council on Foreign Relations, The U.S. inWorld Affairs,1937 (New York: Harper, 1938), p. 226.28. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 422.29. Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 90-91, 97.30. Ibid., Vol. 1,94-95, 108.31. Ibid., pp. 80, 112-113. New York Times, October 28, 1937.32. U. S., Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy. . ., op. cit., Vol. I,pp. 26, 764-769.33. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 119-120.

Hooker, op. cit., pp. 158-159.34. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 146-148,154-155, 161-162.35. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 158-172. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases 1937, op. cit.Vol. XVII, pp. 352-355. Times (London), November 4, 1937.36. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 157-158.Vorman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Box 41.37. Hooker, op. cit., p. 174.38. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . .,op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 172-174.39. Ibid., pp. 175-181. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 177-180. Hull, op. cit., p. 556.40. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, 1937, op. cit., Vol. XVIII, pp. 376-377.41. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 184-185.


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BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 259Hooker, op. cit., p. 182. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, 1937, op. cit., Vol. XVIII,pp. 376-377.42. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 189-193.43. Ibid.

44. Ibid, pp. 184-185, 194-196. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, 1937, op. cit.,Vol. XVIII, pp. 380-382.45. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 189, 197-210.46. Ibid., pp. 212-221.47. Ibid., pp. 221-226. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 186-187.48. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 226-227.Norman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Boxes 4-5.49. Times (London), November 4, 1937.50. Langer and Gleason, The Challenge of Isolationism; Roberty E. Sherwood, Rooseveltand Hopkins: An Intimate History; Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality;Basil Rauch, Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor.51. Borg, "Notes...," op. cit. Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis. . ., op.cit.; John McV. Haight, Jr., "Roosevelt and the Aftermath of theQuarantine Speech," Review

of Politics, Vol. XXIV (April, 1926).52. Manchuria, 1931; Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, 1935; Spanish Civil War, 1936;occupation of Rhineland, 1936.53. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States; Robert H. Ferrell,American Diplomacy: A History; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the AmericanPeople; Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy; Alexander DeConde, AHistory of American Foreign Policy; Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of

American ForeignPolicy.

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