The CarrefourGroup the First 25 Years by Steve Burt University of Stirling, UK Abstract The Carrefour group hasbeenresponsible for introducing several innovative concepts to the French retoil sector - most notably the hypermarketand "no-name" products. This article charts the developmentand strategy of CarreJourover the first 25 years of the company's existence. Introduction Thedeath of Marcel Fournier, in January 1985, saw the passing of one of the leading figures in French retailing. In collaboration with the Def- forey family,Fournier guided the Carrefour group to its present posi- tion as the mostsuccessful hypermarket chainin France. Since its crea- tion by Fournier and Louis Defforey in 1959, the group hasgrown to achieve a 1985 post-tax turnover of 44,169 million francs and a net pro- fit of 520 million francs (see Figure l). In addition, during the past 25 years, the Carrefour tradename has appeared in no fewer thanten coun- tries spread over three continents. The group acquired its tradename from the siteof the first store open- ed by Fournier and Defforey in 1960. This 650sq m supermarket was Iocated at the crossroads (carrefour) of the rue du Parmelan and rue Andr6:Iheuriet in Annecy. However, it was in 1963 that Carrefour first made its mark on French retailing. The previous year Fournier attend- edthe ClubMMM seminar held at Dayton, Ohio,andbecame convinced that the retail techniques championed by Bernard Tiujillo would pro- vide the way forward for Carrefour. Early in 1963, Carrefouropened the first hypermarket in France in the smalltown of Sainte-Genevidve- des-Bois outside Paris.This venture proved to be an instant success, 54 | International Journal of Retailing 1,3
Transcript
The Carrefour Groupthe First 25 Yearsby Steve BurtUniversity of Stirling, UK
AbstractThe Carrefour group has been responsible for introducing several innovative conceptsto the French retoil sector - most notably the hypermarket and "no-name" products.This article charts the development and strategy of CarreJour over the first 25 yearsof the company's existence.
IntroductionThe death of Marcel Fournier, in January 1985, saw the passing of oneof the leading figures in French retailing. In collaboration with the Def-forey family, Fournier guided the Carrefour group to its present posi-tion as the most successful hypermarket chain in France. Since its crea-tion by Fournier and Louis Defforey in 1959, the group has grown toachieve a 1985 post-tax turnover of 44,169 million francs and a net pro-fit of 520 million francs (see Figure l). In addition, during the past 25years, the Carrefour tradename has appeared in no fewer than ten coun-tries spread over three continents.The group acquired its tradename from the site of the first store open-ed by Fournier and Defforey in 1960. This 650 sq m supermarket wasIocated at the crossroads (carrefour) of the rue du Parmelan and rueAndr6:Iheuriet in Annecy. However, it was in 1963 that Carrefour firstmade its mark on French retailing. The previous year Fournier attend-ed the Club MMM seminar held at Dayton, Ohio, and became convincedthat the retail techniques championed by Bernard Tiujillo would pro-vide the way forward for Carrefour. Early in 1963, Carrefour openedthe first hypermarket in France in the small town of Sainte-Genevidve-des-Bois outside Paris. This venture proved to be an instant success,
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closely associated with this new form of retailing, Carrefour initiateda franchise system for hypermarkets through its buying subsidiary,Samod. The Cora group, Promomag (a subsidiary of Promodbs), andGrands Magasins Ardennais took advantage of this system, and by 1973a third of the Carrefour stores in France were franchised. However, thisfranchise arrangement did not last. Promodds, which operated threestores, left Samod at the beginning of 197 4 to develop its own "Conti-nent" tradename, as did Cora (nine stores) in 1975. The third franchisegGrands Magasins Ardennais, was taken over by Carrefour in 1975, butthe following year their two stores were sold to Cora.
Initial spatial penetration of the Carrefour tradename was also achiev-ed through the formation of a number of joint subsidiary companiesto operate stores. In 1967 Carrefour formed Sogara on a 50:50shareholding basis with Guyenne et Gascogne to develop stores in theSouth-west of France. This venture was followed in 1972 by the crea-tion of Soracma with Docks Lyonnais and Docks de Nevers, and GrandesSurfaces et Distribution (GSD) in conjunction with lAllobroge in theSouth-east of France. In the same year Carrefour also acquired Decr6's49 per cent stake in Sogramo, a joint subsidiary formed with ComptoirsModernes and based in the North-west of the country.
As a consequence of these two development strategies the Carrefourtradename was quickly diffused throughout most regions of Francg par-ticularly in the North and West (Map 1). However, in 1973 less thanhalf (18) of the 43 stores trading under the Carrefour name in Francewere fully owned by the parent company. Of the remaining stores, 14were franchised, and eleven operated through the joint subsidiarycompanies.
The year 1973 was an important one for hypermarket development inFrance. The rapid expansion of this form of retailing in the late1960s/early 1970s was bitterly opposed by the small shopkeeper organisa-tions. Faced with the growing militancy of these groups in the early 1970s,plus the approach of Pompidou's referendum on extending the member-ship of the EEC in 1972, and the parliamentary elections of 1973, thegovernment appeared to give way to some of their demands (Eatwell,1982). These concessions culminated in the introduction of the I-oi Royerin December 1973. As Fournier commented in the national press at thetime ". ..One says that it will act to regulate an economic and socialproblem. I rather have the impression that one wishes to regulate anelectoral problem" (Doyere, 1973).
Part of this legislation changed the role of the advisory urban commer-cial planning commissions established in 1969, effectively providing thesebodies with the power to refuse applications for retail developments of
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One of the major impacts of the Loi Royer was to raise the costs ofdevelopment through delay, increased application and appeal costs, andthe creation of a market for authorised sites (Rochard and Peretig l98l).In 1980 Carrefour claimed that the Loi Royer had increased the costsof building a store in France fuom2,577 francs per square metre in 1972,to 3,500 francs per square metre in 1979 (LSA 757, 1980).In addition,Carrefour also felt that the company was penalised for its ascendancyin the hypermarket sector through low success rates in applications madeto the planning commissions. In an attempt to outmanoeuvre theserestrictions, since 1974 Carrefour appears to have placed greater em-phasis upon expansion through joint subsidiary companies andacquisition.Analysis of company reports and store listings provided in the Frenchtrade journals Libre Service Actualitds and Points de Vente show thatbetween 1963 and lgT4,theparent Carrefour company opened 19 hyper-markets. Of these stores, only one appears to have been the result ofa takeover, the former Galeries Parisiennes store at Antibes which Car-refour acquired in 1973. Over the same period, twelve stores were open-ed by joint subsidiary companies, and only one of these, the formerCentor store at kscar, was taken over.In contrast, the 197 5 to 1985 period presents a different picture. Duringthis period the parent company opened a further 16 stores, closed a storeat Cr6teil in 1979, reduced the store at Villeurbanne to supermarket statusin 1977, and transferred the Chdlons-sur-Marne hypermarket to a sub-sidiary company SCI Croix Dampierre in 1981. However, in reality on- .ly eight of these stores were new openings; the others were existing storesthat were either absorbed or acquired from joint subsidiary companies.Irt 1975, the three Soracma hypermarkets were absorbed into the parentcompany, as was the Venette Superstore hypermarket in CompiBgne dur-ing 1977. These moves were followed at the beginning of 1980 by theabsorption of the hypermarkets at Givors (from Givors Investissements)and Rambouillet (Bel-Air), and in 1982by the absorption of the storetransferred to SCI Croix Dampierre a year earlier. Finally, in 1983, thehypermarket at Gennevilliers, which was operated through SEMGS inconjunction with Roger Flament, was absorbed by the parent company.The increased importance of joint subsidiary companies in maintain-ing Carrefour's growth is illustrated by their activities orrer the same 1975to 1985 period (see Figure 2), during which these companies opened25 stores, five of which were later absorbed by the parent Carrefour com-pany. GSD opened another two stores, one of which was the formerG6ant Perso hypermarket at Chdteauneuf-les-Martigues acquired fromSoprodis in 1977; Sogara opened three stores including gaining full con-trol of the Sochadis "Rendez Vous" hvoermarket at Sovaux in 1977 and
58 | International Journal of Retailing 1,3
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approach to further development will continue as not only doesthis strategy spread the initial costs of development; but also applicat-ions for development made in conjunction with local or regionalretailers were thought likely to be viewed more favourably by the planningcommissions. By 1985 Carrefour operated 60 hypermarkets and foursupermarkets in France (Map 2), and 48.3 per cent of the hypermarketswere controlled through joint subsidiary companies. The formation ofCarcoop marked the beginning of renewed expansion for thewithin France. During the early 1980s the number of new storeings had fallen to around one per year, but this collaborationseven stores to the Carrefour portfolio, and a further five neware scheduled for completion during 1986.
groupopen-addedstores
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In 1978, the group sold its holding in Distrimas which by then operatedthree stores to Delhaize Frdres k Lion (IS-4 666, lgTg), as dominanthome competitors, market saturation, and legislation introduced in 1975restricted the future grorruth potential of the hypermarket concept inBelgium. Disinvestment from Germany occurred ii 19i9, and the foilow-ing year carrefour sold its 50 per cent share in verbrauchermarkt whichoperated a 16,950 sq m store in Vienna. Similarly a venture in SouthAfrica involving two stores operating through OK Hypermarkets (F,Ty)Ltd was disposed of in 1978. More recently, in 1983, Carrefour sold iti10 per cent share in Hypermarket Holdings which operated six storesin Britain to its partner Wheatsheaf (Dee Corporati,on), and in l9g4the group sold its share in Euromercato to Standa (LSA 922, l9g4).Euromercato, which controlled four hypermarkets in Italy, had beencreated in 1980 by the merger of the Italmare subsidiary with the hyper_market operations of Standa.
Figure 3. The Ownership of Carrefour Hypermarkets OutsideFrance 1969-85
* Consolidated - Stores operated by companies in whichCarrefour have at least a 5O7o shareholding
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Carrefour has devoted considerable effort to adapting and integratingits hypermarket operation in Spain, including the regionalisation of buy-ing to cater more efficiently for distinct regional tastes, and the adop-tion of a Spanish tradename (LSA 839,1982). Owing to the piecemealhistorical development of the chain, the group's hypermarkets original-ly traded under a variety of names including "Carrefour", "Pryca" and"Hiper", but it was decided to adopt the Spanish name "Pryca" (PrecioCalidad: Price and Quality) throughout the whole group to encourageintegration.
In Brazil, Carrefour has experienced similar success, with the Ti"evo Com-mercio e Industria subsidiary (now renamed Carrefour Commercio eIndustria) opening approximately one store per year. However, high ratesof inflation have hindered the financial performance of this subsidiary.and for certain stores problems of packaging and supply of goods havearisen. The third Carrefour hypermarket, opened in Brasilia in 1977,received 80 per cent of its stock from Sio Paulo, some 1,300 kilometresaway (Grobscheiser, 1977)! However, in spite of these difficulties, Car-refour has made considerable investment in the Brazilian market in whichit operated ten stores at the end of 1985. The group's commitment toexpansion in South America was reaffirmed following the opening oftwo stores in Argentina in 1982 and 1984 (Map 4).
A further dimension was added to the international strategy of Car-refour when the company acquired a 20 per cent stake in the CostcoWholesale Corporation of Seattle during 1985. Costco, formed in 1983,operates twelve discount warehouses in the West of the USA. Althoughthis deal involved an agreement whereby Carrefour would not extendtheir shareholding interest for five years (LSA 968, 1985), the group areusing the opportunity provided by this investment to examine theAmerican market carefully with a view to opening stores in the USAat some later date.
Essentially, since the introduction of the Loi Royer, Carrefour has con-solidated and increased its investment abroad, concentrating upon coun-tries where the retail structure remains largely underdeveloped. In thesecountries the conditions favouring the modernisation of the retail sec-tor resemble those existing in France during the early 1960s, when selfservice and the hypermarket concept were rapidly adopted. FurthermorgCarrefour have not been prepared to undertake the role of a "sleepingpartner" and have concentrated on those countries in which manage-ment control has been achieved. The importance of overseas investmentto Carrefour can be illustrated by reference to the store profile of thegroup. In 1970 Carrefour op€rated only two stores outside France whichaccounted for 11.8 per cent of the group's floorspace. By 1975 the
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hypermarkets. Castorama had been formed in 1969 from the companyowned by christian Dubois, and had a similar impact upon tt.-dlysector as that of carrefour upon the food market. rne ririt cartoramuoutlet, a 5,000 sq m store at Englos (Lille), opened in 1969, Urouehta new dimension to a retail sector traditionairy dominated'bv sm?lspecialist retailers (LSA 919, l9B4).Later in 1977 both carrefour and castorama acquired an lg per centshareholding in the carifornie group, a retailer or buitding niui.iia,operating in spatially complementary markets. This group *lr rulv uu-sorbed into castorama in 197g. This particular diveisificitio" inioblvretailing has had considerable benefit for carrefour, for as nr"ii o"r-forey observed in 1978, it^was generally thought thal pla;id;;rd_sion was easier to obtain for a complete comirerciat entity, ,uirriitiunfor single isolared units (2S,4 666 t97g).Carrefour has also attempted -to diversify from its hypermarket opera_tion into other sectors of the food market. one of thi gro"p,r ririiui-tempts at diversificatioqwas the r97g acquisition of a26peicent straiein the Dutch-company Fradema,. which iontrols 90 per .;rt ;iMA;;_France, a cash and carry operation. However, the mijor aiuerriri"atio"undertaken by carrefour in the food market has been into limited-linediscount food outlets. In September l97g Carrefou, a"quired ;;;;;;cenl shareholding in Erteco, a company trading primariiy in trr" Firi,region as 'Archi-Bas'1 Erteco had been formei in 1975 6v trr" n"a",group and Simon Bertaud, the entrepreneur behind ttre concept. itreintervention of carrefour saw a restructuring of the share
"upitli r.u*ing Bertaud with l0 per cent and Radar *ittr +s per cent. A n"* .*-ecutive committee was also created, Carrefour u"a nuaai g""e;i; p;;
duct ranges were introduced into thestot"r, und the compan! ttuai"-ur*was changed to "Ed', (Epicerie Discount: Discount droc"ry St"r+'The physical expansion of Erteco was rapid, with the number of storesrising from 18 in 1979 to 75 by the end of i9g2, but was not ,iirr"ridifficulty, largely attributed to the- costs of operating the si;le sup;i;depot at Rungs (LSA 886, 1983). The
"ompury *adei loss or-zo *iirioifrancs on a turnover of 650 million francs in rssz. rn an Jteffi;;;improve the performance of the chain, carrefour assumed the manase-
ment of the company in Jury 1983 and appoint"o u n.* *"."ir"g-ir]iE"-tor to control the operation.Despite these.problems, carrefour showed their faith in the concept andfuture potential of Erteco by acquiring Radar's shareholding ilb;r6;;1983. carrefour decided that following the rapid growth oi trr"pii"*chain during the early 1980s, the emphaiis strouia biswit"rrJ t" *"r"e.-ment aspects rather than further physical expansion. tn particuiar
66 | International Journal of Retailing 1,3
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which must meet sales objectives established annually by the company.Even the Samod buying subsidiary, created in 1967 for the purchase of"bazar" and textile goods, is not a buying centrale in the traditionalsensg but acts more as a selection agency for these types of goods, recom-mending which lines should and should not be adopted. The store direc-tor is then free to decide which goods his or her store should carry onthe basis of this advice, and is fully responsible for these decisions.The decentralisation of authority within the carrefour organisation isintended to provide scope for flexibility, allowing store managers to res-pond to local factors and environmental conditions. The group doesnot pursue a national price policy, allowing individual stores to reactto local competition and to take advantage of any additional discountsthat they can obtain from suppliers. Denis Defforey regards the groupas a "confederation" of individual stores operating within certain com-mon denominators (2S.4 930, 1984b). Through this approach Carrefouraim to benefit from "the delegation of responsibility and federation ofeffort".
A further indication of the decentralised nature of carrefour is the sizeof the head office staff, which in 1973 numbered only twelve - headedby the company President, Marcel Fournier, and the two joint Directors-General, Jacques and Denis Defforey. The remaining nine personnel con-sisted of a finance director, two counsellors (one responiible for inter-nal management, who established and monitored sales objectives, andthe other responsible for social and administrative affairs), four super-visors, who each co-ordinated personnel, supply, and short-term manige-ment problems for five to six stores, and two secretaries. All otheroperating functions were contracted out to external agencies (Toussaint,1984).
In 1978, Carrefour appeared to accept the limitations placed upon fur-ther expansion in France through the opening of new stores, and decid-ed that future improvements in the group's performance should beryliey9! UVltre development of store operation and management (ZS^4668, 1978). To realise these improvements, Carrefour reorganised theirsenior management structure, creating a Group Directorati and an Ex-ecutive Directorate.
The Group Directoratg consisting of Marcel Fournier and Denis Def-forey, assisted by a finance director, a general affairs director and amarketing director, was to involve itself with short and medium-termissues (2S,4 666, 1978). Whereas the l4-member Executive Directorateheaded by Jacques Defforey and Bernard Fournier, and composed ofseven regional directors, three merchandise directors, an administra_tion,/management director, and a social affairs,/personnel director,
Figure 4. Carrefour: Sales by Product Range 1972-82
76 77
As Denis Defforey remarked in the company's 1984 report, ,,In 25 yearsconsumers have changed. All of us in Carrefour are conscious of this,we adapt ourselves, we innovate, we progress3' One result of the carefulmonitoring of consumer behaviour and the operational responsg hasbeen a steady rise in the proportion of the group's sales accounted forby fresh produce since 1970, as Figure 4 shows. Similarly, distributioncosts are constantly under review at the family of goods, and even in-dividual goods, levels. Reflecting the success of some of these adapta-tions in operating policy, space productivity throughout the group hasrisen consistently from 19.4 francs,/sq m in 1974 to 55.5 francs,/sq min 1985 (Figure 5).
The careful attention paid by Carrefour to changing market conditionsis further reflected in the hypermarket opened at Etampes in August1983 (The Grocer, 1983). This store was deliberately adapted to suit theeconomic recession of the early 1980s. The store design was kept sim-plg with no false ceilings or automatic energy control installation, andfew decorative elements. Operating costs were kept down by simple andfunctional fixtures and a basic presentation of merchandise with
70 | International Journal of Retailing 1,3
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(LSA 580, 1976), and in the first ten days of sales they accounted for12 per cent of the turnover achieved by all the goods in their specificranges, and 3.5 per cent of total store turnover. By the end of the firstyear (LSA 626, 1977), the "Produits Libres" range accounted for 4 percent of total turnover, and 40 per cent of all sales in their respectiveproduct ranges. From this successful start encompassing grocery, drug,and perfume lines, the range was extended to 200 products by April 1978.The success of the l'Produits Libres" range prompted most of Carrefour's .competitors to launch their own generic and own-brand lines, a situa-tion which pleased Denis Defforey, "It is always good to be imitated,because when one of your competitors imitates you, he does not in-novatel' (LSA 666, 1978).
The successful "Produits Libres" range was followed in the autumn andwinter of 1982 by the low-key launch of an own-brand textile range underthe "Tex" label. In line with Carrefour's policy of decentralised manage-ment and store autonomy not all stores were obliged to stock the rangqalthough all but one hypermarket did. Despite the limited success ofthe "Tex" range it was extended by the addition of a further 15 linesin the spring of 1983, and a household textile range in 1984. Overseas,in Brazil, a range of household linen products was launched under the"Bonjour" name towards the end of 1983, followed by a range of ,,Ex-tra Plus" sportswear lines in September 1985, whilst in Spain,i ,,prycd,own-brand range was introduced in May 1985.
The most recent development in the own-brand strategy of Carrefourhas seen the launch of a range of 40 goods under the ,,Carrefour',tradename. The intention is to replace the "Produits Libres" range withthe "Carrefour" ow[label over the next three years (Distribution dAu-jourd'hui, 1985). To reinforce the quality image of the Carrefour brand,early in 1986 the company launched a series of ,,produits concert6s,'which were only to be stocked if consumers approved the range. If anyproduct failed to be approved by less than 80 per cent of consumersit was to be removed from the group's stores. In March 1986, Secodipinterviewed 66,000 consumers and tested 87 ofthese products, only oneof which failed to reach the required standard. Those goods thaf wereapproved had a red triangle added to their packaging to represent col-laboration between Carrefour, suppliers and consumers (LSA 1014, 19g6;LSA 102r, 1986).
Carrefour has also added financial services to its retail operation. In1981 an in-store credit card, the "Carte pass", was introduced in a six-store pilot. By the end of 1982, 20000 cards were in use and the cardaccounted for between 6 and7 per cent of sales (LSA 930, 1984b). In1983 the "Carte Pass" was extended to 40 stores, and was used by
72 | International Journal of Retoiling 1,3
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the activities of the commercial centre, and details of the services of-fered by the Carrefour store. The cost of this system for the consumeris that of a phone call, as a special number provides access. Followingthe success of this pilot scheme, Carrefour are planning to equip theirremaining stores with this facility as soon as the expansion of Minitelallows.
The image of Carrefour as the leading innovator in French retailing isone of which Carrefour are understandably proud, and the group hastaken steps to preserve this reputation. In 1984 the group's advertisingexpenditure amounted to 90 million francs, compared to 63 million in1983. As TV advertising by retailers is prohibited in France, Carrefourhas taken advantage of other methods, one element of which is the mon-thly Carrefour Journol produced for each of its stores. This eight-pagenews-sheet, which accounts for around 20 per cent ofthe group's adver-tising expenditure, is delivered free to approximately 560,000 households(LSA 940, t984).
Carrefour have made efforts to reduce the role of promotions in theiradvertising strategy, believing that too many of these activities can pro-ve detrimental (LSA 685, 1978). Instead emphasis has been placed uponmore sophisticated promotional strategies and in particular upon theconstruction of a Carrefour image which stresses the qualitative aspectsof the organisation (Clauteaux, l98l). However, price competition stillremains a central element of the group's operating philosophy. In theannual survey of retail prices conducted by the Consumers' Associa-tion and published in Que Choisir? Carrefour was recognised as offer-ing the cheapest prices in France in the 1984 and 1985 reviews.
Discounting has been central to the group's operating strategy in LatinAmerica, and in France it is in relation to this aspect that Carrefour'sadvertising strategy has been at its most innovative. In 1979, Carrefourfirst tangled with the thorny issue of the legality of comparative adver-tising, when the group launched an 'tconomic indicator" to reinforcethe discount element of the Carrefour operation (LSA 701, 1979). Thisindex was derived from the price of a shopping basket of 200 brandname products, chosen each month by the Ifop-Elmar agency (withoutprior consultation with Carrefour) from goods featured on the Inseeconsumer price index. The cost of this shopping basket in the Carrefourstore was then compared with the cost of the same goods in the storesof the group's four main competitors in the region in question, and theresults were published locally.
The issue of comparative advertising was again to involve Carrefour inlate 1983. On 2l November, the Carrefour hypermarket at Chartrespublished a double-page advert in LEcho Rdpublicain comparing the
74 | International Journal of Retailing 1,3
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Marseille on own-brand washing powders and washing-up liquids pro-duced by the major retailers. Future plans involved similar tests for sham-poos, coffee, oils, chocolatg and fresh produce.
SummaryOver the past 25 years the Carrefour group has developed into one ofthe leading food retailers in Europe. This position has been achievedthrough the exploitation of one type of retail outlet, the hypermarket.Attempts to diversify into other specialist retail markets and to developother types of outlet have proved problematical, and with the excep-tion of the Erteco chain, further investment in diversification is thoughtto be unlikely. Spatial expansion, both in France and overseas, has beenbased upon a strategy of initial development through joint subsidiarycompanies in conjunction with local or regional retailers, followed bythe acquisition of these stores or the joint ventures themselves. Aftersearching for development opportunities in most European markets dur-ing the early 1970s, the international strategy of Carrefour has focusedupon the Spanish and Latin American markets, although future develop-ment may well involve expansion in the USA.
Within France the company has remained a leading innovator in thefood sector. Store layout and product assortment have been adaptedto changing consumer needs, Carrefour has introduced "no name" pro-ducts to the French market and financial services to its stores, and thecompany has shown originality in its promotional activities. The cor-nerstone of the company's operating philosophy has been the decen-tralisation of management, and development of personnel, in supportof the corporate ethic of the Carrefour group: "Carrefour's future, in-dependence and steady growth are based upon people. Every person,every day, endeavours to bring a more harmonious response to the multi-ple expectations of the Company's partnersl' This approach to manage-ment appears to have served Carrefour well during the first 25 yearsof the company's existence.
ReferencesBataillg R., (1978), "Jacques Defforey: 'Je ne suis plus un cow-boy!' " Points de Vente,
177a, I October, pp. 59-63.Beaujeu-Garnier, J. and Bouvert-Gauer, M., 0979), "Retail Planning in France", in
Davies, R.L. (Ed.), Retail Planning in the European Community, Saxon HousqFarnborough.
Betts, P., (1983), "Discount war hots up inFranc€', Financial Times, S December, p. 10.Burt, S.L., (1984), "Hypermarkets in France - has the Loi Royer had any effect? "
Retail and Distribution Management, January/February, pp. 16-19.Burt, S.L., (1985), "The Ini Royer and Hypermarket Development in France - a study
of public policy towards retailing", unpublished PhD thesis, University of Stirling.
