Transitions Pathways and Risk Analysis for Climate Change
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies
COP23 Side Event, November 9th, 2017, UK Pavillon
Presentation by
Jenny Lieu, Sussex University, Science Policy Research Unit
(SPRU)
Gordon MacKerron, Sussex University, Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU)
Oscar Oscar van Vliet / CP / D-USYS
The case of the oil sands in Alberta
AGENDA
• Introduction to TRANSrisk
• UK nuclear power
• Oil sands in Alberta
• Renewable energy in Switzerland
CASE STUDY COUNTRIES: AREAS STUDIED
Overarching Research Question:
What are the costs, benefits and risks & uncertainties associated with transitions
pathways for climate change mitigation policies?
Americas1. Canada
(SPRU)
2. Chile
(CLAPESU
C)
Europe3. Sweden (SEI)
4. Netherlands (JIN)
5. UK (SPRU)
6. Poland (IBS)
7. Austria (Uni Graz)
8. Switzerland (ETHZ)
9. Spain (BC3)
10. Greece (NTUA/ UPRC)
Africa11. Kenya (SEI)
Asia12. China
(SPRU)
13. India
(SPRU)
14. Indonesia
(SEI)
Risk• Outcome is uncertain
• Potential for negative consequences
• Negative impact on livelihoods/society, environment,
economy, and infrastructure…
Uncertainty • Incomplete knowledge
• Lack of information
• Disagreement of what is known
Source: IPPC, 2014
Definitions
?
Likelihood (uncertainty low to high)
Ou
tco
me
posi
tive
negative
Risk
Benefit
Implementation risk: potential for a policy to not be implemented, given a barrier
Consequential risk: potential of a policy to cause a negative consequence
Synergy/ co-benefit: positive outcomes that have benefit on multiple scales: e.g. actors, context (political, social, environmental etc.)
Context of r isks & uncerta int ies
…over time and space
Society
Economy
Environment
Technology
Risk related to our potent ia l future pathways
1. Where do we want to go?
2. What actions are required to get there?
• Risk (in implementation): what are the barriers to get there?
3. How might the future look like?
• Risk (as a result): what could be a negative outcomes of that
future option?
Risk & uncerta int ies: P ieces of the puzz le:
Less difficult to define More difficult to define
Uncertainty
Risk
Stakeholders
Stakeholders
Modelling
Modelling
Transitions Pathways and Risk Analysis for Climate Change
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies
Jenny Lieu, Sussex University, Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) content in collaboration with Luis D. Virla and Fort McKay Sustainability Office
Source: Billy Chan Source: taken by Ryan Abel,
Fort McKay Sustainability Office
Alberta’s two faces:
future pathways
• Canada contributes 1.6% of global
emissions and is one of the top 10
emitters
• Fossil fuel production: biggest
contributors comprising of 27%.
• Alberta emits the most ~37.4 % in 201
• Fossil fuel industry sector and power
generation in Alberta has increased
emissions (53% from 1990-2005)
• Alberta emissions reductions need to
reflect Canada’s Paris Agreement goals
to: decrease GHGs emission by 30% below
2005 levels by 2030.
INTRODUCTION TO A LBERTA O I L SANDS
Source: Google maps
• The oil sands deposits in Alberta 3rd
largest proven oil reserves)
• Located on traditional land of 24
Indigenous communities (~23,000 people)
• In 2016, Alberta's oil sands proven
reserves were 165.4 billion barrels
• 20% recoverable open pit mining
• 80% recoverable through in‐situ
production
• Oil production in Alberta was 15.8 million
m3 in July 2017, 8.2% higher compared to
July 2016
• Consists of 5.5% of the total minable
287 billion m3
INTRODUCTION TO A LBERTA O I L SANDS
Source: taken by Ryan Abel, Fort McKay
Sustainability Office
• The Athabasca region in Alberta
overlaps with traditional territories
of 5 Indigenous communities
Regional Municipality of Wood
Buffalo:
Mikisew Cree First Nation,
Athabasca Chipewyan First
Nation, Fort McKay First Nation,
Fort McMurray First Nation, and
Chipewyan Prairie Dene First
Nation.
• Risk of adverse cumulative effects
on ecosystem of the boreal forest
has significantly increase since 1981
• Impacts socioeconomic welfare of
communities
INTRODUCTION TO A LBERTA O I L SANDS
Source: https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/b6f2d99e-30f8-
4194-b7eb-76039e9be4d2/resource/063e27cc-b6d1-4dae-
8356-44e27304ef78/download/FSOilSands.pdf)
• Government of Alberta’s current effort to decrease emission in the oil sand sector.
• Alberta (2015): Climate Leadership Plan and proposed a emissions caps emissions
trading system and a carbon tax for facilities that exceed the 100,000
CO2 tonnes/year.
• Oil Sands Emission Limit Act: legal obligation for the oil sand sector to limit
emissions to 100 Megatonnes (Mt) per year
• Alberta the first jurisdiction in North America to regulate greenhouse gas for large
industrial facilities
PATHWAY 1:
“CAP THE EMISS IONS HAT”
Crude bitumen production in 2016:
2.5 million barrels per day (bl/d) or
70 Mt of GHG emissions
Quick and dirty calculation : cap at
~3.57 million bl/d
Source: Author’s own
• Carbon tax of 30CAD/tonne year, increasing to 50CAD/tonne by 2022
• Cost of production has decreased to around 25CAD/barrel due to
technological efficiencies
• Tax increases costs by ~1 CAD/per barrel.
• Tax to encourage CO2 reduction in the bitumen extraction/
production process: e.g. increasing energy efficiency & renewable
energy, & reduce methane flaring
• Carbon capture and storage as a ‘game changer’. From 2018, Alberta
is expected to capture 2.76 million tonnes of CO2./year
PATHWAY 1: “CAP THE EMISS IONS HAT”
Source: Author’s own
Barriers to implementation:
• Uncertain implementation of the 100 MT emissions cap: may delay
implementation
• Uncertain implementation of sector based performance standards
• In 2016-17, bitumen revenue amounted to $1.48 billion, or 47.9 % of
the non-renewable resource revenue
• Change in government in the next election (2019) can create risks in
overthrowing emission cap
PATHWAY 1: “CAP THE EMISSIONS HAT”
Source: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/rachel-notley-and-the-ndp-fresh-faces-or-ruin-of-alberta-1.3567192
Potential negative consequences:
• Oils Sands are a main economic
driver in Alberta, risk of high
unemployment
• Emissions leakage: companies may
move to other provinces with lower
regulations
• Consolidation of companies due to
exit of international players-
creation of powerful oligopolies
• Opportunistic behaviour: increase
oil production for short term gains
to offset profit losses
PATHWAY 1: “CAP THE EMISSIONS HAT”
Source: Author’s own
• Paced oil sands development and
land use rights protection
• Developed by the community of
Fort McKay (study carried out by
ALCES, 2013)
• Bitumen production should peak at
3.5 million barrels per day (Mdpd)
by 2040
• In 2012 the annual production was
at 1.6 Mbpd
• In 2016 production was at 2.5
Mbpd
PATHWAY 2:
“PACE YOUR DEVELOPMENT”
Source: Google maps
• Maintain traditional land uses and protecting
wildlife while enabling the oil sands to
develop at a more thoughtful pace
• The Traditional Territory: land entitled to
the people of Fort McKay to exercise their
treaty rights
• Right to hunt, trap, and gather resources on
their Traditional Territory
PATHWAY 2: “PACE YOUR DEVELOPMENT”
Source:
http://www.wbea.org/tradit
ional-knowledge
• Include indicators e.g.: Moose Habitat, Fisher
Habitat and Edible Berry Suitability, Native Fish
Integrity
• Key strategy to increase protected areas: from
current 10.4% to ~39.2%
• 378,483- 1,420,579 ha of the area, ~ 84% of the
area makes up Fort McKay’s Traditional Territory
Celina Harpe, Elder in Fort
McKay
• Strong collaboration between industry and the First Nations community needed
• Industry collaboration to set best practices
• Protected land areas -> aligned with the 2012 Federal Recovery Strategy for
Woodland Caribou – Boreal population
• Provincial plans needed to protect 65% of caribou ranges by October 2017
• In Alberta, between 57% - 95% of each caribou range are disturbed by
industrial activities
PATHWAY 2: “PACE YOUR DEVELOPMENT”
Source: Billy Chan
Barriers to implementation:
• Segmented efforts between
environmental agencies, communities,
industry and government
• Lack of following up on monitoring
studies and translating studies to
policy objectives
PATHWAY 2: “PACE YOUR DEVELOPMENT”
Potential negative consequences:
• May not meet the governments CO2
reductions target-
• May impact the economy
• Currently modelling needs to be
carried out to assess these potential
negative consequencesSource: Author’s mom
• Government of Alberta to
consult with Fort McKay
community and coordinate
with existing organisations to
monitor and explore
cumulative impacts of
industry
• Meaningful consultation:
free, prior and informed
consent (FPIC) in United
Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous peoples
(UNDRIP).
CONCLUSIONS NEXT STEPS:
Proposed Consensus Building
Engagement Process
1. Pre-assessment
2. Development
3. Implementation
4. Monitoring & learning
5. Reflection on lessons
Core inclusion
values* :
Respect
Relevance
Reciprocity
Responsibility
Censuses: trust built between the
Indigenous right holders and other parties
Source: Authors’ own
• When setting policies and targets to reduce
emission, consider wider approach to
include land use and wildlife indicators
• Collaborate with in-situ monitoring
programmes
• E.g. disturbance indicators including
Land Use Footprint and reclamation
indicators
• Synergies with the Alberta Biodiversity
Monitoring Institute (ABMI) and The
Cumulative Environmental Management
Association (CEMA)
• E.g. specific fish and wildlife indicators
for the mineable oil sands area north of
the LICA region.
CONCLUSIONS NEXT STEPS:
Source: Author’s own
OPPORTUNIT IES : A 3RD PATHWAY
“M IX AND ROUND IT ALL UP”
• Supporting a clean energy mix supply & demand side changes
• Considers limited growth of oil sands and expansion of
renewable energy (goal of 30% by 2030 in the electricity sector)
• Alberta Renewable Electricity Program: 5000 MW by 2030
• RE estimated to bring in $10.5 billion in new investment by 2030
creating-> ~7,200 new manufacturing jobs
Source: http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/wind-energy/
A message from Cece Fitzpatrick,
Elder in Fort McKay
AlCES and Integral Ecology Group (2013) ‘Fort McKay Cumulative Effects Project Technical Report of Scenario
Modeling Analyses with Prepared for the Energy Resources Conservation Board on behalf of the Fort McKay
Sustainability Department’, (1673682).
Boothe, P. and Boudreault, F.-A. (2016) BY THE NUMBERS: CANADIAN GHG EMISSIONS. Lawrence National
Centre for Policy and Management. Available at: http://www.ivey.uwo.ca/news/news-ivey/2016/1/by-the-
numbers-canadian-ghg-emissions/.
Energy Resources Conservation Board, A. (2010) ‘ST98-2010: Alberta’s Energy Reserves 2009 and
Supply/Demand Outlook 2010-2019’. Available at: http://www.aer.ca/documents/sts/ST98/st98_2010.pdf.
Leach, A. et al. (2015) Executive Summary. CLIMATE LEADERSHIP. Report to Minister. Alberta Minister of
Environment and Parks. Available at: http://www.alberta.ca/climate-leadership-plan.aspx.
Natural Resources Canada, N. R. C. (2016a) ‘10 Key Facts on Canada’s Energy Sector’. Edited by M. of N.
Resources. Available at:
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/pdf/10_KeyFacts_Energy_Sector_e.pdf
Natural Resources Canada, N. R. C. (2016b) ‘Energy Fact Book’. Available at:
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/pdf/EnergyFactBook_2016_17_En.pdf
Russell, T., Pendlebury, D. and Ronson, A. (2016) ‘Alberta’s Caribou: A Guide to Range Planning Vol 1: Northeast
Alberta’, 2, p. 61.
World Resources Institute, W. R. I. (2016) ‘CAIT Climate Data Explorer - Historical Emissions’. Available at:
http://cait.wri.org/historical/, Environment Canada and World Bank Population data?indicator[]=Total GHG
Emissions Excluding Land-Use Change and Forestry&indicator[]=Total GHG Emissions Including Land-Use Change
and Forestry&year[]=2012&sortIdx=NaN&chartT
Websites:
https://www.alberta.ca/climate-oilsands-emissions.aspx
http://www.energy.alberta.ca/CCS/pdfs/FSCCS.pdf
REFERENCES
Thank you very much for your attention!
Contact:
Jenny Lieu
Email: [email protected]
Twitter:@transrisk_EU
LOCAL PERSPECTIVES ON MITIGATION
TECHNOLOGIES IN SHANGHAI AND BALI
A case study of the electricity system
Oscar van Vliet / CP / D-USYS
Do we need gas as a bridging fuel?
Contents
Swiss electricity system & Energy Strategy
Impact of renewables and gas as a bridging fuel
Implications for other countries
Outlook for renewables without gas
Current e lec t r i c i ty p roduct ion in Swi t zer land
3
0
Swiss Energy St ra tegy 2050
source: Bundesambt für Energie
Scenar io ana lys i s
Swiss renewables
+ natural gas
intermittent supply
vs. variable demand
Swiss + imported
renewables
North
Sea
Morocco
choice experiment
1186 Swiss citizens
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0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12Hours
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Demand
Technologies
Hydro dam
Pumped storage (Cons)
Pumped storage (Prod)
Run−of−river
Wind offshore
Wind onshore
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Wind onshore
Demand
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Hydro dam
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Wind onshore
Demand
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Hydro dam
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Demand
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Demand
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Hydro dam
Pumped storage (Cons)
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Run−of−river
Wind onshore
Demand
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Nor th Sea w ind impor ts in Win ter
Díaz et al, 2017
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Hydro dam
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Wind onshore
Demand
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Hydro dam
Pumped storage (Cons)
Pumped storage (Prod)
Run−of−river
Wind offshore
Wind onshore
Demand
Hours
Moroccan CSP impor ts in Summer
Díaz et al, 2017
100% renewables is not a problem for Switzerland
Wind and/or CSP can cover demand
Complementary production profile, mix is cheaper
Not enough hydro to cover all PV without batteries
Rooftop PV and imported wind are generally supported
(Plum et al., in preparation)
Where do the Swiss p re fe r the i r in f ras t ruc tu re?
PV in industrial areas
Wind around ski resorts
PV in remote mountains
Wind in outdoor sports areas
Power lines near residential areas
Wind in residential areas
Wind in nature reserves
Power lines abroad
Plum et al., in preparation
0
25
50
75
100
0 25 50 75 100
%
%
3400 TWh
2800 TWh
380 TWh
30 TWh
Economically competitive (2030)
Swiss scenario scaled to EU population
Built & planned capacity (2016)
Swiss imports in scenario (C) (2035)
Wind offshore in Europe
We have enough space
Rooftop & facade
potential: 4.4 TWh
Needed for ES 2050
Useable - Compagnon, 2004
Useable - IEA-PVPS, 2002
Díaz et al, 2017
2035
(A) Gas intensive (B) Gas as bridging fuel
(C) 100% renewables
Commercial costs contracted in 2017
under ideal conditions
Cost imp l i ca t ions
Díaz et al, 2017Risks of low-carbon transition in Poland
Cl imate change impacts on hydropower
Knüsel et al., in review with Climatic Change
Wha t abou t c oun t r i e s w i t hou t 60% hyd ropowe r ?
Poland
United Kingdom
… everywhere in Europe except Switzerland and Norway
Renewab les vs . base load
Electricity for a midsummer week in the UK electricity system
Gas + Renewables 40 GW of Nuclear
Mak ing PV less in te rmi t ten t
Mak ing CSP less in te rmi t ten t
Pfenninger et al., 2014
Making wind power less intermittent
Grams et al., 2017
4
4
Do we need gas as a b r idg ing fue l?
Not in Switzerland, gas would be more expensive
Probably not elsewhere
Coal and nuclear face unfavourable conditions in open EU power
market
Wind turbines and power lines near residential areas are not easily
accepted
4
5
Thank you
Questions? Comments?
Oscar van Vliet (New Risks, TRANSrisk) [email protected]
Paula Díaz (New Risks) [email protected]
Stefan Pfenninger (Calliope) [email protected]
References
Díaz et al., 2017, Do We Need Gas as a Bridging Fuel? A Case Study of
the Electricity System of Switzerland,
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/EN10070861
Knüsel et al., 2018, Changing Seasonality of Hydropower Production
Facilitates the Integration of Large Shares of Solar Energy, in review
Plum et al, 2018, Same but Different – Public preferences for the Swiss
electricity system after the nuclear phase-out: A choice experiment,
in preparation
Pfenninger et al, 2014, Vulnerability of solar energy infrastructure and
output to climate change, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-
0887-0
Grams et al, 2017, Balancing Europe’s wind-power output through
spatial deployment informed by weather regimes,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3338
E lec t r i c i ty cos ts
4
8
Techno logy cos ts
4
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Risks of low-carbon transition in Poland
5
0
5
1
5
2
A case study of the electricity system
Oscar van Vliet / CP / D-USYS
Do we need gas as a bridging fuel?
Transitions Pathways and Risk Analysis for Climate Change
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies
Presentation to COP 23 side meeting – 10 November 2017
Professor Gordon MacKerron, SPRU, University of Sussex
Nuclear power in the UK
• UK commitment: 80% emission reductions relative to 1990; 57% by 2032
• For 2050, implies carbon–intensity per unit GDP less than 10% of 1990 level
• Since 2008 new nuclear power a major element in UK policy
• This commitment reaffirmed in October 2017 Clean Growth Strategy
• UK alone among EU-28 in planning for a significant growth in nuclear –
originally 16GW by 2030
• UK expectation (Committee on Climate Change) of large growth in
decarbonised electricity, with electricity then ‘invading’ heat and transport
uses
UK CONTEXT
• Interrogating risks and uncertainties in climate change pathways
• Nuclear power case study for UK
• Process has been to engage stakeholders, develop scenarios/narratives,
model them and then get further stakeholder feedback
• Stakeholder input suggested two pathways to 2050
• one with no new nuclear
• the other with 40GW of new nuclear
• Here we look at 40GW pathway (= c. 2 GW/year from late 2020s)
TRANSRISK AND NUCLEAR POWER
• Stakeholders all had expertise but held a wide diversity of views on nuclear
• Despite differences of view, there were nevertheless common elements in
their views on risk and uncertainty
• There was a widely shared view that political leadership had been weak and
that more consistent, long-term commitments were needed
• There was also some shared scepticism about the value of the modelling
results
• In particular, model runs did not incorporate large growth in electricity demand
• Models also did not handle the kind of disruptive change often witnessed (e.g. electric/diesel car developments)
R I SKS AND UNCERTAINTIES IN 40GW
NUCLEAR PATHWAY: STAKEHOLDER VIEWS (1 )
• Lack of coherent long-term political support was regarded as the main
risk
• The second most important risk was the high costs of current
reactors, potentially aggravated by new safety/security needs
• The cost point led to further issues
• A new finance model was needed to reduce the cost of capital. This meant that some public financing was needed, and possibly some cost pass-through in advance of construction completion
• Some took the view that Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) were necessary to reduce size of financing obstacle
• But others were sceptical that SMRs would be developed cheaply
R I SKS AND UNCERTAINTIES IN 40GW
NUCLEAR PATHWAY: STAKEHOLDER VIEWS (2 )
• There were signs that industrial policy was emerging (sector deal with
nuclear industry) and R&D commitments to nuclear were rising
• Social acceptability was unlikely to be a major problem, either for reactors
or waste. UK public opinion had little concern over nuclear (e.g. hardly any
post-Fukushima reaction)
• The need for ongoing skills/resources to support military policy gave some
protection to civil activities
R I SKS AND UNCERTAINTIES IN 40GW
NUCLEAR PATHWAY: STAKEHOLDER VIEWS:
SOME LESS IMPORTANT RISKS
• The biggest risk to nuclear expansion was lack of long-term political support
• This was followed by issues of high cost, to which there might or might not be
remedies
• Other risks were less severe (social acceptance); and military needs gave
some comfort to civil sector
• Recent developments including Clean Growth Strategy reaffirm Government
commitment to nuclear, including long-term R&D and SMR development
• Perhaps the most surprising stakeholder result was lack of attention to
international context (e.g. UK isolation in EU/OECD on nuclear; difficult
financial position of major vendors)
CONCLUS IONS
• How would be the UK energy sector without nuclear?
• Are fossil fuels away of any strategy?
• Is the UK ready for a renewable expansion strategy?
• What would be the biggest risks to fulfil UK electricity demand (society
changing energy behaviour, rapid emergency of electric cars, electrification
of trains, electricity storage, etc.)?
• Are renewables firms (and their supply chains) ready for full expansion
including transmission infrastructure?
STEPS AHEAD
