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The Central Force Behind India’s Fourth Party SystemRAHUL VERMA AND ASIM ALI

Rahul Verma (rahulverma@cprindia.org) and Asim Ali (asim@cprindia.org) are with theCentre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi.Vol. 56, Issue No. 10, 06 Mar, 2021

Is the BJP's rise a result of piggy-backing on Narendra Modi’s unique appeal or did Modifast-forward a historical process that was imagined and set in motion by the BharatiyaJanata Party and its predecessors almost a century ago? We argue that a long-term politicalrealignment was perhaps made inevitable by the ideological shift along with the structuralmakeup of the Indian society and Modi can be more pointedly credited with quickening thepace of history. We also suggest that Modi’s leadership, in no small part, has helped containthe emerging contradictions within the BJP system. However, it is unlikely that thedeparture of Modi would represent an abrupt end to the BJP-dominant system, rather theincreasing electoral expansion of the BJP indicates further shifting of India’s ideologicalspace in the party’s favour.

The decisive triumph of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2019, following its spectacularvictory in 2014, has firmly put India’s party system into its fourth phase, what somedescribe as the BJP-dominant system (Mehta 2017; Palshikar 2017; Chhibber and Verma2019). We suggest that this argument does not merely rest on the repeatedly demonstratedelectoral advantage that the BJP enjoys. It also fulfils other necessary pre-conditions. TheBJP’s organisational resources along with a charismatic leadership at the top far outweighits competitors. The party, along with its allied Sangh Parivar, had always possessed an

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envious cadre strength on the ground, but its massive advantage in terms of financialresources (Sahoo and Tiwari 2019), disproportionate control over communicationchannels—both traditional media and social media—helps it set the agenda of politicaldiscourse (Ninan 2019). And, partly because it faces a fragmented and ideologicallydisarrayed opposition, despite electoral setbacks in the states, the ideological moorings ofIndia’s median voter today seem to be much closer to the ideological position of the BJP(Chhibber and Verma 2019).

However, some scholars have stopped short of calling it a BJP dominant system as for themthe electoral dominance of the party does not match the Congress' level during the first(1952-67) and the second party systems (1967-89), and has yet not fulfilled the test oflongevity in power (Ziegfeld 2020; Vaishnav and Hinston 2019). The latter view is held bythe notion that the electoral dominance of the BJP is largely built on, and is sustained by,the unique charisma of Modi (Sircar 2020). In this telling, it is unlikely, or at the very leastunclear, that the BJP's electoral ascendency would outlive the reign of Modi. The place ofModi at the top of this system is thus unimaginable and irreplaceable. While there is little toquibble with this cautious approach in gazing the future, it becomes important to analysewhether the BJP dominant system rests fundamentally on a long-term realignment of Indianpolitics, or the contingent advantages that might be lost in the near future.

This note makes an attempt to answer two questions. First, the underlying conditions thatled to the rise of the second-dominant party system led by the BJP. Second, it outlines thechallenges—both external and internal—to this system, and while doing so, estimating thelife of India’s fourth party system.

The Twilight of the First Republic: A Hegelian Reading of Modi

Did the BJP merely piggy-backed on Modi’s unique appeal or Modi fast-forwarded ahistorical process which was imagined and set in motion by the BJP and its predecessors?There are no easy answers to this question but a Modi-centric reading of the currentmoment divorces the political appeal of Modi not just from the immediate political context ofhis rise, but more essentially from the political age. Hegel famously described Napoleon as“world spirit on horseback” as he saw, with his own eyes, Napoleon astride a horsemarching victoriously through the Prussian town of Jena. For Hegel, the world historicalfigures were those charismatic leaders who embodied the hopes and fear of their age. Theywere forceful instruments of the ‘Weltgeist’—world spirit (Taylor 2015).Hegel does not use the word “genius” to describe the distinctive quality of great historicalfigures, rather he uses the word “instinct.” These historical figures, Hegel argues,instinctively sensed the importance of what they are doing, and people flock around them asthe instincts of the leader coincides with their inner will and desires. “These are the greatmen in history, whose own particular purposes comprehend the substantial content which isthe will of the world-spirit. This content is the true source of their power ... the peoplesassemble under his banner; he shows them what their own inner bent [immanenter Trieb] is

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and carries it out,” as Hegel wrote.

The political appeal of Modi, similarly, is situated in the current national zeitgeist (spirit),which is why his political instinct is so often in lockstep with popular desires, and which isoften misattributed “political genius.” Modi’s political judgment, reflected both in hispolicies and his style of leadership, has been able to sense and respond to the shiftingexpectations of Indian voters better than any rival, helping him cement his popularity(Verma and Barthwal 2020). And this national zeitgeist has been shaped by the gradualmovement of India’s ideological space in favour of the BJP (Verma and Chhibber 2018).Even when the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) came to power in 2004,surveys showed that the BJP’s ethno-majoritarian ideology had a wide appeal among thepopulation (Palshikar 2004). Over many decades of painstaking groundwork, the RashtriyaSwayamsevak Sangh (RSS) socialised and integrated a large grouping of subaltern casteswithin its framework of Hindu nationalism (Narayan 2009).

Modi can be more pointedly credited with quickening the pace of history. A long-termpolitical realignment was perhaps made inevitable by the gathering ideological strength ofthe RSS and BJP, and a steady expansion of the middle class (not just in size, but in socialand political attitudes) creating the ground for a new politics of aspiration (Chhibber andVerma 2019). Modi’s charismatic leadership helped effect that shift in 2014. In fact, Modirode to power based on three forms of popular anxieties, all of which, as we would show,were decidedly constituted or shaped by BJP and RSS’s ideological agenda.

During the six years of Modi’s prime ministership, the BJP continues to transform theinstitutional arrangements, restructure the governance framework, substantially expand itssocial and geographic base, and alter the political culture of India—what some havedescribed as making of India’s Second Republic (Yadav 2020). While similar rhetoric diddominate certain intellectual-political circles, such a profound shift was not fathomableduring the six years under Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s prime ministership. We suggest that thisdifference is better explained by political context rather than individual charisma.

In his appraisal of transformative leaders in Presidential Leaders in Political Time, StephenSkowrowek (2008) argues that whether presidents are able to disrupt and transform thepolitical landscape depends on the particular economic and political context they inherit:presidential leadership needs to be understood in "political time." Only when the regimethat leaders inherit is vulnerable—the existing institutional arrangements have beendiscredited as "failed or irrelevant responses to the problems of the day"—do they have thepolitical capital to implement a transformative agenda.

Vajpayee did not mount a forthright challenge to the economic and political ideas of hispredecessors, perhaps because the old order (which we define as the institutionalarrangements and the style of politics represented principally by the Congress party) wasnot thoroughly discredited yet. In fact, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the

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BJP was itself crucially dependent on caste and region-based parties which constrained theparty’s ability to manoeuvre. While the ideological base of the old order had been hollowedout by this time, it would only start to unravel in the second term of the UPA. In adapting tothe old political framework, the BJP of Vajpayee and Advani, did not change the bases ofpolitical competition, and hence did not bring about a long-term political realignment. Infact, L K Advani spent the first term of the UPA in taking the party towards a moderatestance on nationalism and Hindutva, misreading the causes of the 2004 debacle. The lossesin 2004 and 2009 were not, however, a repudiation of BJP’s ideology. In 2004, the BJPsuffered from mismanaged electoral alliances, and in 2009, it struggled to make itsideological agenda salient against a popular incumbent.

What led to the discrediting of the old order? As the case of the Christian Democrats in Italyand the Labour Party in Israel shows, political parties can hold on to power long after losingtheir ideological bases of support (Pempel 1990; Inbar 2010). The ability to dispensepatronage based on control over governmental resources can paper over their structuralweaknesses, but certain dramatic events can precipitate their enduring politicalmarginalisation. In the case of the Christian Democrats it was a series of corruptionscandals, and in the case of the Labour Party the failure of the Oslo accord to stop terrorismand bring peace to the country. In the case of the Congress party, it was a string ofcorruption scandals and internal security challenges that supercharged a potent confectionof gradually mounting cultural, economic and leadership anxieties. The rise of the BJP andModi in 2014 happened against the backdrop of these anxieties which had hollowed out thepopular legitimacy of the old order represented by the Congress party.

Three Popular Anxieties and the Rise of the Modi-led BJP

The first was a cultural anxiety, or the belief that Hindus must “politically” unite to checkthe politics of “Muslim appeasement.” This was reflected in the growing ethno-politicalmajoritarianism of the population, which most sharply correlates to the vote for the BJP(Chhibber and Verma 2019). The majority public opinion has long been wary of specialprotections for minorities and BJP has skilfully succeeded in sticking this charge of “Muslimappeasement” on its political opponents. Some of the UPA-era Congress’s rhetoric onminorities—whether the Prime Minister’s statement on minorities having the first right onresources, to some party leaders questioning police encounters, to talk of reservations forbackward Muslims—was also latched on to by the BJP to embellish this charge ofappeasement.

These sentiments got further fuelled due to a series of terror attacks and increasingtensions with Pakistan, also aided to the rise of Modi. The BJP succeeded in portraying theUPA as too soft on these security threats, while surveys indicated that people desired amore forceful response (Lokniti MOTN 2011). Palshikar (2017) has argued that it is the“conflation between nationalism and Hindutva” that is “the backbone of the newhegemony.” “The mixing of the registers of nationalism and Hindutva adroitly strengthens

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the BJP’s new hegemony because while many people may not have any emotionalconnection with the idea of Hindutva, a majority certainly has emotional investment in theidea of a nation. Because the BJP succeeds in conflating these two, new recruits to Hindutvacome from a cross-section of the society,” Palshikar wrote. Modi’s uncompromising stanceon “Muslim appeasement,” an unabashed invocation of Hindu nationalism, as well as hishard-line stance on Pakistan helped him benefit from this cultural anxiety.

The second was an economic anxiety, or the belief that the corruption and inefficiency of thestate is throttling the economic aspirations of the people. Many voters were increasinglydisillusioned by the ‘statist economic model,’ which they thought brought neither prosperitynor equality, but resulted in the enrichment of politicians and their supporters. In teasingout the effect of Modi, Chhiber and Verma (2018) wrote that “in 2014 Modi, not the BJP,drew voters opposed to statism to the party.” Chhibber and Verma’s analysis, based on theNES 2014 survey, showed that in voting for the BJP, the candidature of Modi made nodifference for voters opposed to the politics of recognition, but a large difference to votersopposed to the politics of statism. Thus, they argued, the Modi effect consisted in mainlybringing aspirational “economic-right” voters to the BJP.

However, in terms of economic philosophy in itself, there is no qualitative distinctionbetween Modi’s BJP and Vajpayee-Advani’s BJP (Sitapati 2020). Both advocated a larger roleof private enterprise in the economy. The difference is that whereas Modi presented hiseconomic thoughts in sharp ideological terms, in the vocabulary of a clear break from thepast, the BJP before Modi articulated their economic ideas in the vocabulary of incrementalreforms, and were mindful of conciliating the statist factions within the party. Modi’s styleof conflict in legislating or executing contentious economic policy is popular preciselybecause he frames it as necessary to break through the stranglehold of the ‘middlemen,brokers and vested interests’—the vestiges of the old order.

The third was a leadership anxiety, or the belief that weak leadership is sapping thecollective strength of the nation. The dual leadership structure of the UPA government, andthe perception of political weakness of the prime minister Manmohan Singh, had resulted ina popular craving for strong leadership. The corruption scandals exposed in the second termof the UPA further contributed to the general belief that the Prime Minister was not able toexert a disciplinary force on either his party or its allies. The Hindu nationalist movementhas always advocated a strong centralised leadership to guard against both external threatsand the fissiparous tendencies present in the nation. Modi rode this leadership anxietybecause his forceful, strongman personality (encapsulated in the invocation of the “56-inchchest”) was the polar opposite of the cautious, guarded personality of Manmohan Singh.

Emerging Contradictions within the BJP-dominant System

The above discussion clearly shows that there were longstanding ideological currentsgathering strength, particularly over the last three decades, that were chipping away at the

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bases of support of the opposition and fashioning a more fertile terrain for the BJP. Theseideological currents merged into a storm during the latter phases of the UPA, discrediting

the old political order and creating the space for a transformative leader.1 The personality ofModi was perfectly suited to become the instrument for this national zeitgeist, and hispolitical instincts of preferring conflict over conciliation coincided with the popular hungerfor change, indeed a new political order, which Modi has captured in his project of “NewIndia.”

Because the BJP under Modi has succeeded in transforming the political basis of electoralcompetition, disrupted caste- and community-based political alignments, expanded its socialbase of support, and set the ideological agenda of the country, the current political systemcan indeed be accurately described as the BJP-dominant system. The effects of suchfundamental political realignments accelerated by a transformative leader goes beyondelectoral cycles and should be seen in generational terms (for example, the effect of Reaganand Thatcher on the political structure of their countries lasted well beyond their individualterms in office). And the dominant BJP system can continue to thrive without the leadershipof Modi, provided that the successor is able to replicate the intensely ideological appeal ofModi.

However, none of this implies that the BJP has become politically invincible. Every period ofpolitical dominance carries within it the seeds of its own decline. There are three dangerouscontradictions—both external and internal—in BJP’s pattern of dominance that canpotentially unravel it.

The first contradiction is that the uncompromising style of leadership that has so far provedbeneficial to the Modi-led BJP can also lead to hubris, and prevent the party fromadequately addressing the anxieties bubbling under the surface. The slowdown in theeconomy, farm crisis, and the inability to produce enough jobs, three economic problemsthat have dogged the government in recent years, have been intensified by the COVID-19induced recession. The economic effects of the pandemic would likely last, at least, for theremainder of the second Modi term (Jorda et al 2020). The recent Bihar elections reinforcedthe notion that an opposition political campaign based on class and economic opportunitieshas the potential to challenge the BJP-led coalition. Relatedly, surveys have captured agrowing restlessness among the educated urban youth of India and dissatisfaction towardsthe government, not only about economic opportunities, but also about political crackdownson civil liberties (Barthwal and Ali 2020). A global integration of youth, through the internetand social media, means that this section of the population is especially aware of theirclaims to freedoms of speech and lifestyle, and the BJP has recently found itself on theopposite end of some of these issues.

Second, the conflict between purists and power seekers that can lead to intense factionalconflicts in a dominant party (Boucek 2012). In its phase of expansion, the BJP has liberallyincorporated politicians from every political party and given them important posts, which

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has led to an undercurrent of resentment within the party, and the larger Sangh Parivar. Acontinued smooth relationship with the larger Sangh Parivar, based on ideologicalconvergence, is crucial to the BJP as the Parivar remains important for both ideologicalresources and personnel mobilisation. Relatedly, in expanding its geographical and socialbase, the BJP also pragmatically reconfigures its core ideological message to fit regionalcontexts. This is, for instance, part of the BJP strategy to expand its political space inSouthern India. In the long term, it risks diluting its ideological positions, and thus losingthe distinctive character that has led to its dominance. The third contradiction, as Suri and Verma (2017) pointed out, is between the increasingdisproportionality of the BJP’s upper-caste leadership and the vote base of the party that ismostly made up of backward castes. It was this identity-based struggle of representationand the benefits of office that progressively tore apart the Congress’s social coalition(Chandra 2000; Jaffrelot 2003). Going forward, this would require tremendous political skillto gradually integrate more backward castes in leadership positions, to satisfy the demandsof its backward caste base, without provoking a backlash from the upper castes.

Conclusions

To be sure, Modi’s leadership, in no small part, has helped contain these latentcontradictions. When Modi departs, certain dissatisfied factions might rear their head andtry to shape the course of a post-Modi BJP, bringing these tensions to the surface. Thepolitical skill and charisma of the successor would no doubt be tested in this phase oftransition. Yet, as we have argued in this note, the sociopolitical and ideological advantagethat the BJP enjoys was neither created by Modi nor would end with him, but instead wouldlikely accrue to his successor. If they successfully negotiate the fractious phase of transition,there is little reason to believe that they would not be able to take the baton from Modi andcontinue with this system that enjoys a pole position in the electoral battles as well as in thearena of political culture. The Congress party ruled the majority of years even in the thirdparty system (1989-2014) and continued to influence the political and policy discourse. It isunlikely that the departure of Modi would represent an abrupt end to the BJP-dominantsystem, rather the increasing electoral expansion of the BJP indicates further shifting ofIndia’s ideological space in the party’s favour. It is a long haul before a new dawn.

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End Notes:

1. See Chhibber and Verma (2018) for a more detailed discussion on transformativeleadership.

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