The Challenges of Accountability for International
Nongovernmental and Civil Society Organizations
Margaret P. Karns, Timothy J. Shaffer, and Richard K. Ghere
The University of Dayton
Paper prepared for the Kettering Foundation Symposium on Accountability,
May 22-23, 2008
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The Challenges of Accountability for International Nongovernmental and Civil Society Organizations
Abstract: There are more than 6,000 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) addressing issues such as human rights, the environment, education, health care, development and other issues around the globe. Although accountability in government is synonymous with “red tape” for some; for others, it is synonymous with democratic practices and transparency. NGOs for the most part are not subject to the same provisions and checks that bureaucracies have; even those that are membership organizations are rarely accountable to their members. With respect to the accountability of bureaucracies, legislation such as the Administrative Procedure Act, Freedom of Information Act, and Government in the Sunshine Act are examples of measures taken by the United States government to help frame policy decisions within an environment that asks that four types of accountability be met: bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political.
There is no counterpart for establishing accountability mechanisms for INGOs. Yet, these entities are often seen as the embodiment of “global civil society.” They also have assumed growing importance within global governance as a result of their roles in delivering international humanitarian relief, development assistance, health aid, and other public goods. There are particular challenges of accountability for locally-based NGOs within many developing countries that draw resources from large INGOs such as CARE, and Oxfam, from intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), as well as from donor governments. In Bangladesh, for example, there are large numbers of INGOs present, thousands of locally-based NGOs, and one, in particular, called Proshika that has become so large that it has assumed many functions that would normally be filled by government agencies and has increasingly come to be seen as a political actor. This paper examines the challenges of accountability for NGOs and provides a case study of NGOs in Bangladesh to illustrate how some of those challenges are currently being addressed. Introduction
The growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and NGO networks in the 1990s
has been a major factor in their increasing activity at all levels of human society and governance
from global to national and local. These private voluntary organizations are generally formed by
individuals or associations to achieve a common purpose. Some are formed to advocate a
particular cause such as human rights, peace, or environmental protection. Others are established
to provide disaster relief, humanitarian aid in war-torn countries, or development aid. The
literature on NGOs generally distinguishes between not-for-profit groups (the great majority) and
for-profit corporations. In reality, terrorist and liberation groups, as well as drug cartels and
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crime syndicates are also NGOs, but they represent the “dark side” of the phenomenon and are
therefore usually studied separately. Exclusively national NGOs are estimated to number over
26,000 and grassroots organizations number in the millions. National and grassroots groups are
sometimes linked to counterparts in other countries through transnational networks or
federations; the majority, however, are not part of formal international networks, but may have
informal links to international development or human rights groups from which they may get
funding for local programs or training assistance. Women have been particularly active in
organizing many small, grassroots NGOs in developing countries.
Truly international NGOs (INGOs) are identified by the nature of their membership or
their commitment to conduct activities in several countries. The Yearbook of International
Organizations identifies approximately 6,000 such INGOs currently. Examples of large INGOs
include the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam,
CARE, Doctors without Borders, Transparency International, Greenpeace, and Amnesty
International.
Reimann (2006, p. 48) explains how both states and international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have promoted the growth of NGOs
by providing new political opportunities and incentives to organize. More specifically, as the international system has expanded over time it has increasingly offered two types of international opportunities that are also crucial factors for the growth of citizen groups at the national level: (1) resources in the form of grants, contracts and other kinds of institutional support (food aid, transportation costs, technical assistances, etc.) and (2) political access to decision-making bodies and agenda-setting arenas.
Numerous international relations scholars and sociologists have studied and analyzed
NGOs and INGOs over the past fifteen years. Where previously much of the NGO
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literature was written by activists, there is now some excellent scholarship, including
recent work on the challenges and issues of NGOs’ accountability.
NGOs’ governance functions have increasingly come to parallel many functions provided
provided by IGOs such as the various agencies within the UN system. They create and mobilize
global networks, gather information on local conditions, mobilize to put pressure on
governments from both within states and transnationally. They are often key sources of
information and technical expertise on a wide variety of international issues, particularly
environmental and human rights issues. They have increasingly been provided opportunities to
participate in IGO-sponsored conferences by submitting documents, drafting sections of law-
creating treaties, and providing expertise. Indeed, UN-sponsored global conferences such as
those on the environment and development (Rio, 1992) and women (Beijing, 1995) have
provided a great deal of impetus to the growth of NGOs and grassroots groups as well as
transnational networks.
In a few countries, NGOs have taken on many of the functions not being filled by a weak,
inept, or failed state. Bangladesh is a particularly interesting example for purposes of studying
the roles of NGOs and the challenges of NGO accountability. It hosts the largest NGO sector in
the world (over 19,000 by one count), responding to what one Bangladeshi describes as “the
failure of government to provide public goods and look after the poor, and the failure of the
private sector to provide enough gainful employment opportunities” (quoted in Waldman 2003,
p. A8). NGOs have taken on roles in education, health, agriculture, and microcredit, all of which
were originally government functions. Some attribute the decline of Bangladesh’s poverty rate
since 1971 from 70 percent to 43 percent to this nonstate sector. The role of NGOs in
Bangladesh has also been extensively studied which provides more information for examining
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the issues of accountability than is available in most other countries. In this connection, we
utilize the case of Proshika which has become almost an NGO “conglomerate.”
Why NGO Accountability Matters
Accountability in government is synonymous with “red tape” for some; for others, it is
synonymous with democratic practices and transparency. NGOs, for the most part, are not
necessarily subject to the same provisions and checks that governmental bureaucracies have.
Even INGOs that are membership organizations are rarely accountable to their members. With
respect to the accountability of bureaucracies, legislation such as the Administrative Procedure
Act, Freedom of Information Act, and Government in the Sunshine Act are examples of
measures taken by the United States government to help frame policy decisions within an
environment that asks that four types of accountability be met: bureaucratic, legal, professional,
and political. There is no counterpart for establishing accountability mechanisms for NGOs or
INGOs. Because of their increased roles, however, NGO accountability is important.
Regarding accountability, NGOs are regularly answerable to at least four different
authorities: to their boards of governors or executive committees, and then to the general
members (if they are membership organizations); to governments in countries where they
operate; to the people (both recipients and nonrecipients of the benefits and services provided);
and to the donors that provide resources. Yet, it is important to note that “accountability” has
many different connotations and meanings (Karim 1996, p. 139). Lee (2004, p. 3) suggests that
“their commitment, values and good intentions…[is no longer] a sufficient basis for
accountability.” Rapid growth, increased funds, and increased power are three of the factors that
have raised the issue of accountability for NGOs. With the measures to demonstrate
accountability, NGOs stand to benefit from an increase in trust and commitment from
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stakeholders, increased organizational performance and learning, and counter criticisms that
NGOs are secretive and undemocratic (Lee 2004, p. 7).
A United Nations Development Dossier from the Non-Governmental Liaison Service
addresses in detail numerous issues of accountability such as regulatory action by the
government, voluntary accountability, organizational accountability, donor accountability, and
other issues connect with NGOs and their growing role in global governance and development.
Bendell, 2006) It raises important questions about the “skills and power of many NGOs” while
also recognizing the “concerns about opportunities for the misuse and abuse of humanitarian
funds” (Bendell 2006, p. ix).
Although governments and IGOs are able to satisfy questions of accountability through
their highly structured guidelines, constitutions, and charters, there is much more ambiguity
when considering transnational civil society and the role that NGOs play within that dynamic.
Because civil society is still emerging as a legitimate player in governance both at the national
and international level, the ways of identifying and defining accountability continue to be
established. Assessing accountability, therefore, requires discerning how NGOs sort through a
broad array of interests among stakeholders, recipients, governments, and other groups with
respect to particular contextual needs (i.e. to demonstrate transparency, to satisfy donors, to
answer to host governments etc.).
Managing Expectations in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) inquiry into the “lessons from the 1986 Challenger
tragedy” focuses upon alternative approaches for managing diverse expectations within a public
sector context. These scholars understand that accountability questions—even those appearing to
hinge upon narrow technical and managerial questions—need broader scrutiny within the
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institutional context of a wider social system. To Romzek and Dubnick, accountability in the
public sector thus extends beyond technical and managerial “answerability” to the institutional
question “involv[ing] the means by which public agencies and their workers manage the diverse
expectations generated within and outside the organization” (228). These researchers identify
alternative systems for managing diverse expectations as dependent upon two inter-related
control issues: (1) whether the ability to define and control expectations resides within or outside
the organization and (2) “the degree of control that entity is given over defining those agency’s
expectations” (228). Thus, four alternative systems emerge—
• Bureaucratic accountability systems (internal source of control; high degree of
control over expectations)—Expectations are managed by those “at the top of the
bureaucratic hierarchy” (228);
• Legal accountability (external source of control; high degree of control over
expectations)—accountability is based on relationships with a controlling party
outside the organization in a position to impose legal sanctions;
• Professional accountability (internal source of control; low degree of control over
expectations)—accountability based on deference to skill and expertise within the
organization; and
• Political Accountability (external source of control; low degree of control over
expectations)—accountability corresponds to responsiveness to various consti-
tuiencies and stakeholders outside the organization.
The study of NGO accountability can significantly augment Romzek and Dubnick’s
“managed expectations” framework, provided that certain fundamental themes particular to
NGO missions and contexts can be accommodated. NGO governance, for example, falls
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obviously outside the formal structure of a governmental entity. Second, some NGOs may
commit to norms and values (for example, those related to “conscious-raising”) that require some
insularity, autonomy, or “buffered discretion” in conflict with stakeholder expectations that fuel
“accountability” demands. And third, the NGO accountability contexts include a variety of
national governance arrangements that extend beyond the U.S. political system—assumed as a
given in the Romzek and Dubnick approach (1987, p. 230). Thus, one cannot assume that NGOs
enjoy constitutional or legal protections against aggressive, controlling actions on the part of host
regimes.
Romzek and Dubnick’s institutional perspective appears especially helpful in
understanding the cross-pressure of stakeholder demands exerted on NGOs in assuming
particular roles in a variety of settings. The remainder of this section explores the utility of their
managed expectations perspective for understanding accountability issues that nongovernmental
organizations confront. First, discussion centers upon whether and how Romzek and Dubnick’s
four accountability systems (bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political) relate to selected
issues that affect how NGOs function. Second, since NGOs operate internationally in varying
political contexts, attention turns to how matters of political legitimacy (in varied national
settings) affect the management of expectations host governments place upon them in relation to
other stakeholder interests. Finally, this section considers how NGO attention to accountability
dilemmas facilitates ongoing strategic management efforts in programmatic decision-making.
Accountability Systems to Manage Expectations on NGOs
The expectation management perspective moves past the futility of asking if a particular
NGO “is accountable”—simply ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ depending upon the stakeholder, circumstance,
definition of accountability, etc.—to questions of how a diversity of expectations are mediated
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around the NGO’s mission and role. Edwards and Hulme (1996, pp. 260-60) in fact conclude
their edited book Beyond the Magic Bullet stressing “the management of accountability” as a key
theme that emerges in studying NGOs. This approach extends the accountability question
beyond reaction to imposed demands, standards, and constraints to proactive initiatives related to
strategic action. As Biggs and Neame (1996, pp. 48-49) suggest, “It might seem that the more
accountable NGOs are, the less autonomy they have. Pure autonomy and multiple accountability
are clearly incompatible. However, by increasing the number and types of arenas in which NGOs
are accountable, they may create greater room to maneuver as they gain spheres in which to
negotiate.”
The following assesses some selected topics addressed in an emerging literature on NGO
accountability—stakeholders, performance criteria, functional versus strategic accountability,
hemispheric region, the New Policy Agenda, internal structure and roles, and self-regulation.
Explicitly or implicitly, each of these issues raise accountability demands that NGOs must
somehow address. It is instructive to understand the accountability implications of these selected
themes in terms of Romzek and Dubnick’s four accountability systems.
Stakeholders
NGOs need to manage the expectations of a diverse array of constituents, support groups,
and regulating authorities—each with varying capacities to demand and appraise reports and
information, as well as operate sanctions on NGOs. Edwards and Hulme (1996, p. 10) list the
following among that stakeholder mix: (1) beneficiaries and members, (2) trustees, (3) private
contributors, (4) NGO networks, (5) nations, (6) donors, and (7) other supporting (funding)
NGOs. Clearly some of these constituents reside outside the host nation, while others represent
regime authorities and beneficiary groups within that setting.
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Performance Criteria
Accountability typically presupposes tangible definitions and standards of performance.
Nonetheless, ideas about NGO performance can be ambiguous as well as contestable within the
cross-pressures of expectations from multiple stakeholders. For example, investors may demand
productivity in turns of output-cost ratios, host nations may expect conformity with regime laws
and agendas, and beneficiaries and/or mission-committed contributors could seek out evidence of
“results” as desired change or improvement from the status quo. To the extent that
“improvement” is understood as social or political change (for example, “democratization”),
adverse reaction might be anticipated on the part of governmental authorities.
Functional Versus Strategic Accountability
According to Avina (1993), NGO accountability can be differentiated between functional
reporting on resource use and short-term outcomes and longer-term impacts that affect the wider
environment. Performance as impact, as assessed by strategic accountability, contends with the
reality of pertinent forces outside of NGOs control. To the extent that strategic accountability
informs subsequent NGO action, impact studies imply that the NGO benefits from some
“negotiating room [in which] to maneuver” (Biggs and Neame 1996) or “insulation” to facilitate
learning from the process of being held accountable.
Hemispheric Region
The NGO literature differentiates between “Northern” and “Southern” NGOs, a distinction
relevant to performance-related issues. First, Northern NGOs (such as Oxfam USA or Care
International) often function as donor agencies that disburse funds for particular projects (for
example, rural development) undertaken by Southern NGOs, typically in poor settings. As
Chambers (1996) points out, both the “Northern” disbursement- and the “Southern”
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recipient/project implementation-functions suggest actions that presumably attest to
“appropriate” performance. For example, Northern donor organizations want to be seen as
actively disbursing money, rather than having it languish in banks. Thus, the donor’s need to
“move money” places pressure on recipient NGOs to show timely results, irrespective of critical
timing and other strategic considerations that impinge on the recipient’s program activities.
Chambers details how the interplay between donor and recipient performance imperatives result
in hierarchical relationships with northern NGOs usually at the top. Nonetheless, recipients may
willingly assume this subservient role in seeking out readily available dollars to underwrite their
efforts (Edward and Hulme 1996, p. 6).
New Policy Agenda
Much as the New Public Management influences contemporary public administration, the
New Policy Agenda (NPA) affects the rationales for funding some NGO projects as well as the
accountability standards placed upon them. In essence, these “Northern” donor agencies base
their funding decisions on how NGOs contribute to “good governance” and market efficiency.
As Edwards and Hulme (1998) explain, the neo-liberal thrusts of the NPA encourage NGOs to
assume economic roles as “efficient providers of services” and political agents of
democratization. In some cases, the former attempts to characterize NGOs as “more efficient
providers” of services than counterpart governmental agencies. Such a rationale is clearly
consistent with an ideological preference by which “leaner” governments are assumed better able
to compete in the global market. Regarding the latter, the political expectation that NGOs should
act as “democratizers” may complicate “Southern” NGO project initiatives to promote social and
political mobilization in particular settings. From an accountability standpoint, “good
governance” imperatives impose (what Edwards and Hulme refer to as) “accountancy”
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standards—in essence, business control systems—rather than impact accountability that assesses
project effectiveness. Concerns are that donors strongly committed to the NPA will compromise
NGO performance in institutional development, weaken their legitimacy as independent actors,
and distort accountability away from responsiveness to grassroots constituencies in favor of
quantitative reporting outputs (Edwards and Hulme 1998, p. 8).
Internal Structure and Roles
Those who serve in organizations are typically held accountable by upper-level managers and
executives. Nonetheless, those individuals should be understood as internal stakeholders whose
efforts and conduct have direct impacts upon organizational performance and legitimacy. Of
particular significance in project-oriented NGOs are field-workers who directly interact with
those served, often poor and in remote locals. One account characterizes field-workers in a
southern setting as “underpaid, undervalued, overworked, and unappreciated” (Ahmad 2007, p.
349). As Ahmad notes, strongly-motivated field workers can stimulate client satisfaction. On the
other hand, those engaging in corrupt practices or showing indifference to the poor can
undermine NGO legitimacy (351).
Internal Structure and Roles
NGO efforts toward self-regulation often involve developing codes of conduct or ethics for
individuals and/or organizations either within national settings or partnership associations. In
regard to the former, Antöv et al. (2007, p. 157) discuss the efforts of the Agency for Research,
Education, Economic and Social Development in Indonesia to establish an NGO umbrella
organization as a platform for a code of ethics and Karim (1996, pp. 134-35) tells of the
Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh undertaking similar activities. Difficulties
in inter-organizational consensus building can lead to minimal standards that counteract the
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intent to gain legitimacy through self-regulation. Callamard (2007, pp. 184-86) chronicles the
efforts of the Humanitarian Project International that involved identifying the following elements
in determining some common principles for self-regulation: Who is accountable? To whom? For
What? How? And for what outcome?
Together, these selected variables coax out an array of institutional pressures on various
types of NGOs that in turn account for diverse expectations placed upon them. Romzek and
Dubnick’s accountability perspective asserts that public organizations prioritize among
alternative accountability mechanisms in accommodating the particular mix of demands they
confront. Table 1 depicts how the variables discussed above activate varying accountability
systems as means of managing expectations. It shows, for example, the underlying tension
(particularly acute among Southern, grassroots organizations) between pressures to impose
hierarchal (bureaucratic) control systems to satisfy investors or donor organizations and the need
for political accountability—that is, the need to be mission responsive to project beneficiaries
and other committed constituents. This tension becomes all the more pronounced in an era of
“good governance” (as manifested in the New Policy Agenda) that in some cases expects NGOs
to replace supposedly “inefficient” government agencies as direct providers of services. Such
pressures to assume “loads shed” are accompanied by expectations that these third-sector roles
mandate NGOs to prioritize business-like control systems.
Table 1 about here
Second, Table 1 suggests that program-implementing NGOs need to offset bureaucratic
“accountancy” pressures to maintain sufficient “insulation” (Johnson 2008) or “maneuvering
room” (Biggs and Neame 1996) for subsequent action in pursuit of mission legitimacy. Although
these demands place priority on political accountability, they also direct attention to
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professionalism, the support for self-regulation and for institutionalizing “good practice” in the
field. And, third, Table 1 stresses legal accountability that, although pertinent generally, takes on
primacy where NGO operations potentially conflict with regime values, leading to aggressive
government regulations and perhaps sanctions. In summary, we assert that Romzek and
Dubnick’s perspective offers a workable framework for understanding both the diversity of
institutional pressures NGOs confront and various types of accountability systems for managing
those pressures.
Stepping Back: The Linkage From Context
Since Romzek and Dubnick develop their accountability perspective within a singular
socio-political context—that is, the American political system, there is little concern for how
accountability systems relate to matters of political legitimacy in varied national settings. As
applied to NGOs, their perspective raises questions regarding the linkages between political
legitimacy (whether based on national regime values, global “good governance” agendas, or
some other authority) and priorities among alternative accountability systems. In the introductory
chapter of their edited volume NGO Accountability, Jordan and van Tuijl (2007, pp. 9-13)
present a “short history of NGO accountability…[in terms of ] an evolving set of syllogisms that
outline the prevailing perception of NGO roles, roughly in the last 25 years. As logician Irving
Copi (1982, pp. 261-68) explains, a syllogism can be understood as a type of “argument in
ordinary language.” As such, the syllogisms offered by Jordan and van Tuijl embrace what
March and Olsen (1989, pp. 21-26) call “logics of [rule-based] appropriateness” or rules to be
learned as “catechisms of expectations.”
Jordan and van Tuijl (2007, p. 20; note 6) use syllogisms to “provide a simple format to
support discussion of the issues at hand”—in this case, informed thinking about what constitutes
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NGO accountability. It should be noted that Jordan and Van Tuijl’s intent is to show a sequence
of developing discourse within the NGO community over twenty-five years, such that one
“paradigm” evolves to challenge that in vogue. (Table 2 below presents that sequence as
numbered.) Yet it appears appropriate as well to cast each of the five syllogisms as
argumentative logics that test the legitimacy of NGO operations within particular regimes or
authoritative contexts. Thus, Table 2 characterizes Jordan and Van Tuijl’s syllogisms as
legitimating logics of appropriateness that call for (or prioritize) certain (of Romzek and
Dubnick’s) accountability systems instead of others. For example, syllogisms 1 (complementing
government) and 2 (the rise of civil society)—both assertions from neo-liberal ideology—
demand bureaucratic accountability mechanisms, although somewhat different. In the first case,
it is reasoned that NGOs (preferable to government agencies) should administer public services
shed from government and that their accountability obligations should primarily focus on
financial reporting. The second line of neo-liberal thinking presumes NGOs as logical engines of
democratic capacity-building and therefore views accountability in the establishment of “good
governance” structures and processes within NGOs.
Table 2 about here
In contrast to the second, syllogism 3 emphasizes “good government” outcomes more
than form and process. As Jordan and van Tuijl note, this thinking provoked “a more heated
discourse on NGO accountability” that pitted self-regulation and accreditation (professional
accountability systems) against imperatives for management controls and governance structures.
“The return to state supremacy” (syllogism 4) constitutes a state-centered reaction to increased
NGO autonomy through self-regulation, thereby imposing legal accountability to governmental
authority. (It should be noted here that Jordan and van Tuijl discuss these paradigm shifts within
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the recent context of globalization. Outside of this context some states may have historically
demanded regime accountability from NGOs, rather than having “returned” to it.) Finally, a
“rights-based approach” (syllogism 5) focuses on balancing stakeholder interests of multiple
constituencies, thus stressing political accountability mechanisms as especially vital. In
summary, the multiplicity of settings emerging from inquiry on NGO accountability encourage
“a step back” from the question of appropriate systems for managing expectations to
consideration of varying logics of legitimacy that support accountability mechanisms.
Stepping Forward: The Linkage to Strategy and Action
Obligations of accountability are typically understood as constraints upon action in the
public sector. Although valid to a point, such thinking tends to understate the inherent
complexity of public matters, complexity that necessitates successive iterations of adjustment—
often referred to as “boundary spanning.” This idea implies that program implementation rarely
flows from the straight-forward execution of tasks in furtherance of a pre-established goal, but
rather as a continuous mission-refining process (see Thompson and McEwan 1968). Adjustment
depends upon the accurate reading of cues from the environment as stimuli for mission
refinement.
In this regard, an NGO’s assessment of its various accountability obligations constitutes a
key step in boundary-spanning, or more specifically, its ongoing strategic management process.
Specifically, accountability matters need consideration as risks (as well as opportunities) in both
mission-setting and decision-making that guides implementation. David Lewis’ (1994, pp. 128-
33) essay on NGO roles in Caribbean development emphasizes the risks various NGOs take—in
the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, and Barbados—in pursuing programs that
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fundamentally change social and economic conditions rather than merely reinforcing the
political status quo by channeling in outside resources.
Such overt political roles necessitate organizational learning processes that factor in
accountability dilemmas between stakeholder (the state, donor agencies, beneficiaries)
expectations that pit risks against impact opportunities in the strategic management process.
NGO management consultant Ricardo Wilson-Grau (2003, p. 533) characterizes these strategic
efforts as follows:
Typically, once every three to five years, NGOs agree and implement a multi-annual process sharply focused on positioning the organisation to achieve its mission and long- term goals. Increasingly, however, development NGOs are experiencing rapid, accelerating change. Not only do strategic decisions have to be made outside a multi- year cycle, but by the time managers know whether or not a decision has been implemented, they have taken new ones.
Asserting that NGOs are risk-takers to the extent they advance social change and innovation,
Wilson-Grau stresses the need to focus on how those agendas affect the probabilities of success
or failure, asking “What are the positive and negative consequences if I (we) succeed or fail?”
(534) From an accountability standpoint, anticipating how various stakeholders may react to
these consequences in large part drives strategic management processes.
Thus, NGO accountability can be assessed in terms of an elongated model of three
components: (1) state and/or societal legitimacy as the source or sources of compelling
accountability mechanisms; (2) the management of expectations and demands among those
mechanisms (in essence, the Romzek and Dubnick model); and (3) concern for how expectations
management informs strategy and action.
The Case of Bangladesh and Proshika
For exploring the issues of NGOs and the issue of accountability, Bangladesh stands out
for several reasons. Compared to similarly sized nations, Bangladesh has a huge number of
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registered NGOs (nearly 23,000) and some of the largest INGOs in the world are active here
(Haque 2002, p. 412). Thus it is an excellent case study for NGO activity in developing
countries. Finally, Bangladesh’s NGO–government relationship is important to explore because
as the public sector is diminishing in that country and NGOs have gained prominence and
support in multiple ways (Haque 2002, p. 412).
Historical Background
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh was formerly East Pakistan and only gained its
independence in 1971 as a result of war with Pakistan. As a result of the partition of former
British India, this territory became part of Pakistan in 1947 but it was separated from then West
Pakistan by more than 1,000 miles and language differences. At independence Bangladesh was
one of the world’s poorest nations and for many years bore the unfortunate sobriquet of being a
“basket case.”
Many of the issues still being addressed today by NGOs and INGOs operating in
Bangladesh have very clear roots in the struggle for independence in 1971. As the nation was
becoming Bangladesh, efforts were made to provide medical and other humanitarian services to
refugees across the border in India as well as within the country to help address the suffering of
war. After Bangladesh gained independence, several relief and rehabilitation programs were
started both with and without international assistance. This alternative relief process then led to
development initiatives that are still apparent with the tremendous number of both NGOs (local
and national) and INGOs operating in Bangladesh. In the mid- 1990s, according to one study,
NGOs in Bangladesh operated in “more than 50 percent of all villages in the country, involving
over 3.5 million families as beneficiaries of their work” (Karim 1996, p. 132). The country’s
geographic location also makes it extremely vulnerable to natural disasters that produce flooding,
19
massive loss of life, and displacement of thousands. This reality has reinforced the continuing
need for international relief aid and the presence of relief organizations. In addition, Bangladesh
is a vibrant democratic society and that has encouraged the growth of grassroots groups.
NGOs in Bangladesh are almost totally dependent, however, on foreign financing. The
total aid to NGOs rose from an average of $232 million (0.7% of GDP) between 1990-1995 to
$326 million (0.7% of GDP) between 1996-2004, while the total aid to Bangladesh fell from an
annual average of $1.62 billion (4.9% of GDP) to $1.35 billion (2.9% of GDP) during this
period. Thus, the share of aid to NGOs as a portion of total aid to Bangladesh has risen from
14.4% in the early 1990s to 24.5% since then as shown in Figure 1 (Zaman 2005).
Figure 1
External Aid to Bangladesh
$0
$200,000,000
$400,000,000
$600,000,000
$800,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$1,200,000,000
$1,400,000,000
$1,600,000,000
$1,800,000,000
NGO Aid Gov't Aid
Raw
US
Do
llar
Am
ou
nt
1990-19951996-2004
Thus, the role of NGOs in Bangladesh continues to expand into areas where typically
government would respond, such as education and economic development. Increasingly, also,
some NGOs in Bangladesh are acting as political entities (Ahmed and Potter 2006, pp. 128-130).
The delicate balance of power between governments and NGOs in nations such as
Bangladesh shows the shift in power and prominence from government agencies to NGOs in
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terms of “societal roles, public image, and [the] capacity to command external support” (Haque,
2002, p. 412). While the elected governmental officials are accountable to the Bangladeshi
public, large NGOs have obligations “mainly to the multilateral institutions, bilateral agencies,
and private foundations financing their activities.” Additionally, the accountability of NGOs to
the public becomes problematic with the growing monopoly of “a few large NGOs in terms of
membership, loans, revenues, and funds.” Haque (2002, p. 426) contends that the monopolistic
nature of these large NGOs “makes them too powerful for their poor and powerless members to
hold their NGOs accountable to them.” That is to say, as small NGOs mature into larger entities,
the connection with those they seek to serve is severely diminished because there are more
internal organizational issues and less participation by members. Building on the work of Hulme
and Edwards, Haque (2002, p. 429) notes the importance of not “overemphasizing the
contribution of NGOs to society while overlooking the vested interests behind the ‘big business’
of NGOs.” Another important point is the need to adopt “practical measures, especially to
monitor the relationship between local NGOs in Bangladesh and global players such as bilateral
and multilateral agencies and donors.” These measures include closer scrutiny of foreign
linkages and funding sources of NGOs and ensuring that NGOs comply with national rules for
dealing with external forces such as foreign assistance agencies.
In “NGOs and Transnational Accountability in Bangladesh,” coauthors Shamina Ahmed
and David Potter (2006, pp. 126-27) note that NGO accountability is becoming a transnational
problem because of the responsibility to multiple stakeholders (patrons, clients, and the NGO
itself). The influence of donors is important and several scholars suggest that “NGOs are often
willing to change their own goals about participation and community development in order to
fulfill the product demanded by donors.”
21
Even from this brief review of recent literature on NGOs and accountability in
Bangladesh, there are certainly points on consensus. First, there is a recognition of the
tremendous challenges faced in Bangladesh because of extreme poverty as well as political
volatility. Nevertheless, the impact that NGOs have on many rural communities is noted and
continues to increase with the support of external donors. Second, the political tensions between
NGOs and the government are well documented with a number of cases where there have been
crackdowns on NGOs. This tension is likely to increase as more and more financial resources go
to NGOs rather than the government itself. Third, accountability to multiple stakeholders is a
prevalent issue, with divergent views in regards to the level of desired accountability to all
stakeholders. This seems to be a point of contention among scholars and practitioners because
there is such a range of what “accountability” actually requires. The challenge to meeting
stakeholder accountability is that the spectrum of those invested in the work of NGOs ranges
from external donors to the government which has tension with the growth of NGO, and then to
the citizens themselves who benefit from the work of NGOs. Bangladesh differs from many
other nations because it has such an extremely high number of NGOs, both domestic and
international. As will be demonstrated in the case study on Proshika, Bangladeshi culture has
grown to include the increased role of NGOs in the sphere of power and influence, but that does
not mean it has been welcomed with open arms. Although needs remain great, NGOs have lost
some of the luster they had when they first emerged as meaningful players in the country.
The Story of Proshika
In 1976, in a few villages in the Dhaka and Comilla districts, Proshika (a center for
human development) was begun by a group of social workers. Its aims were reducing poverty,
protecting and regenerating the environment, improving the status of women, increasing people’s
22
participation in public institutions, and enhancing people’s capacity to gain and exercise their
democratic and human rights. Proshika emerged from the desire of a small group of social
workers and others to try to address societal issues where they saw the government lacking.
Proshika quickly assumed a meaningful role in rural communities through their multiple
programs which to grow in number and expand in scope as both capabilities and resources
allowed.
To achieve its goals, Proshika has implemented a wide range of activities geared toward
facilitating people’s access to public resources, services, and institutions with the hope these
steps will lead to self-reliance (Karim 1996, p. 135). All Proshika programs are rooted in the
“People’s Organization Building Programme” which is the core of all other programs and all the
achievements and activities emanate from the concepts and methods of organization building
created by Proshika. The poor people living in rural and urban areas are encouraged to organize
themselves into primary groups popularly known as Samitis and to form group federations at
village, union and upazila levels, building a broad organizational network. The process
constitutes the basis of participatory development and spurs the acquisition and strengthening of
human, socio-economic, and cultural resource bases of the poor. Figure 1 shows how Proshika
attempts to accomplish its goals through the People’s Organization Building Programme.
23
Figure 2
Proshika People’s Organization Building Programme
Microcredit and Saving Services: Types of Programs
Social and Natural Resource Development: Types of Programs
1. Employment and Income Generating 2. Practical Skill Development Training 3. Small Enterprise Development 4. Livestock Development 5. Policies for Risk and Vulnerability
Management 6. Fisheries Development 7. Apiculture Development 8. Sericulture Development 9. Organic Agriculture 10. Irrigation and Farm Power Technology
Services 11. Collaborative 12. Research and Demonstration Project
1. Human Development Training 2. Extended Social and Human
Development 3. External Training Division 4. Universal Education 5. Good Governance and Advocacy 6. Social Forestry 7. Health 8. Housing 9. Impact Evaluation and Research
Department 10. Development Support Communication
Program 11. People’s Culture 12. Programme on Liberation War 13. Proshika Legal Aid Services 14. Integrated Multisectoral Women’s
Development 15. Information and Documentation
Resource Cell 16. Computer in Development 17. Disaster Management and Preparedness 18. Human Resource Department
After their formation, the groups go through a process of empowerment involving various
savings plans and much human and skill development training, and engage themselves in
different income-generating activities with credit from Proshika. The group federations play an
effective role in achieving greater alliances among the poor and protecting their interests at all
administrative levels. The federations undertake various socio-economic programs in a
participatory way to strengthen their capacity.
To date, 149,016 primary groups have been formed with 97,562 of these being women’s
groups. This number of primary groups is up from 41,205 in 1996. There are currently 18,231
24
group federations. According to statistics reported by Proshika, work is taking place in more than
24,139 villages and 2,108 slums, up from 6,006 villages and 108 slums in 1996. This is a
considerable increase in little more than a decade. Additionally, the numbers of districts in which
Proshika operates have increased from 35 to 59 during the same period (Karim 1996, p. 135).1 It
is easy to see the increased scope and responsibility of Proshika as it continues to expand its role
in both rural and urban settings, providing necessary programs to empower the poor through
employment and income-generating programs, a universal education program, and disaster-
management programs (Ahmed and Potter 2006, p. 132). These programs are geared toward
both adults and children, providing the necessary training to move individuals and families
beyond a dependence upon on Proshika and its funds.
The Internal Structure of Proshika
Mokbul M. Ahmad (2002, p. 23) writes that “Although PROSHIKA says that it has a
democratic management system and has no system of bosses, it was found…that there is a
hierarchy in the management of PROSHIKA.” And, while field workers within Proshika call
each other and their superiors “bhai” (brother), a hierarchical structure is also present within
Proshika.
Thinking about NGOs and their roles and relationships often is oriented toward those
who support the work (external donors), those that receive benefits (the poor of Bangladesh), or
those who govern their impact (the government). However, it is important to look at Proshika’s
internal relationships, especially those who serve as the first contacts with those they hope to
help. Field workers are the individuals who are “on the ground” and make the multiple programs
happen. Field workers are the lowest level of Proshika’s organizational structure and have
1 Current statistics are available at http://www.proshika.org/at_glance.htm.
25
commented in interviews that there is little opportunity for promotion and that a change in pay or
elevation from one post to another “does not require any examinations, as promotions are on the
basis of evaluation of the field workers by the area co-ordinator,” but for a change of duty (e.g.
for promotion from economic development worker to training coordinator) all field workers
“have to sit for a two-hour written test and face an interview.” Some workers complained of
irregularities in the promotion and posting system. For the first twenty years of its existence,
Proshika did not a system of evaluation and only introduced it in 1996 after years of demands
(Ahmed 2002, p. 24).
There is a clear structure with Proshika beginning with field workers, to area
coordinators, to zonal coordinators, and then to central coordinators based out of the Dhaka
office. Each level supervises and monitors the activities of those immediate below within the
organization. With this structure, there is a direct supervisor for those below in the organizational
structure, allowing for ongoing supervision to ensure that mission and responsibilities of
Proshika are met. This type of supervision is foundational to ensuring that all workers within
Proshika are working toward organizational goals and expectations. This hierarchical
relationship carries over to the relationship between the field worker and clients.
In Ahmad’s (2002, p. 120) assessment of field worker/client relationships, Proshika
ranked highest because, until recently, Proshika “was a different type of NGO.” The recent push
for NGOs to become more involved in microcredit has taken Proshika away from its roots of
motivating and organizing the landless poor. This shift, albeit only one aspect of Proshika’s
overall mission, has changed issues of accountability because now there is much more concern
for recordkeeping of finances in contrast to simply serving as the catalyst for communities to
become involved in political and social issues for their own benefit. As NGOs such as Proshika
26
continue to grow and become more bureaucratic, there are both positive and negative impacts.
Negatively, there is an increased disconnection from the poor Proshika is aiming to help.
Positively, there is increased professionalization that leads to a system with better accountability
than what currently exists.
Increased Political and Social Activity
In 2002, following October 2001 general elections, the Bangladeshi government
intervened in Proshika’s work and halted $50 million in funds from foreign donors. The
crackdown on Proshika was over alleged concern that it was engaged in “anti-government
activities.” Proshika’s president, Dr. Ahmed, and the vice president were detained along with
hundreds of Proshika employees, often times without being charged with any specific crime. The
most common reason cited for these actions was the increased political involvement of Proshika
and its desire to raise awareness of issues for the poor and encourage them to become politically
active. The government also charged the organization with alleged financial irregularities. Yet,
there were serious concerns about the lack of transparency in the investigations. Donors
expressed concern to the government that they saw no grounds for blocking Proshika’s entire
program while this investigation was carried out, as this would cut off thousands of people from
assistance, but Proshika’s funds were not unblocked.
Regardless of the authenticity and legality of the charges, Proshika must provide
measures of accountability in response to them. Bangladesh’s government agencies are key
stakeholders in the work of Proshika because the NAB functions as a gatekeeper between donors
and the NGO itself. And, unlike many of the thousands of grassroots groups in Bangladesh,
Proshika functions more like a governmental entity, because of both its size and range of
programs. Its increased role, however, affects the power relationship with the government. In
27
addition the variety of inputs and services related to “microfinance, small industry, livestock,
fisheries, sanitation, basic education, and health care…state monopolies are facing formidable
challenges from large NGOs in areas such as printing and computer software. Proshika, for
example, has programs dealing with both of these areas” (Haque 2002, p. 420). It also has
developed a transport company of 28 buses at a cost of 30 million Taka ($437,000) in addition to
a printing press and garment industry with a cost of 15 million Taka ($219,000) (Ahmed 2002, p.
13). These types of ventures blur the lines between the tax exempt work of NGOs and the
market-oriented work of private companies.
The government of Bangladesh, not surprisingly, has grown very concerned about the
role and influence of Proshika in the political arena. By using police forces to disrupt the work of
Proshika, the government is able to directly affect the impact Proshika has on those who stand to
benefit from increased involvement in the political process.
Proshika’s most recent annual report for the fiscal year of July 2006 to June 2007
addresses the effects of the government crackdown on its work. The chairman notes,
In spite of the continued blockage of donor fund and crackdown (sic) on the organization by the government as well as a turbulent political environment, PROSHIKA has made considerable achievements in almost all the programme areas during 2006-2007. The programme activities in this period have been implemented with PROSHIKA's own resources against the targets set on the basis of the cash-flow situation (Proshika, 2007, p. Foreword).
The Impact of Microcredit
The ability to provide microcredits to individuals and families is one of the primary
methods for addressing societal issues facing Bangladeshis. Indeed, microcredit was invented in
Bangladesh by Mohamed Yunis who founded the Grameen Bank. As Proshika has become
involved in microcredit lending, however, it is becoming more like a business rather than a
development organization. The growth of microcredit lending requires lenders to become
28
performance-oriented through routine checks from supervisors to ensure that individuals are
repaying their loans in a timely manner. The outcomes sought include meeting goals for the
delivery of services as well as maintaining appropriate repayment schedules for microloans.
With its workers being dependent on their performance in service delivery, Proshika has had to
become more business/market-oriented (Ahmed 2002, p. 183).
One of the biggest issues of accountability comes from Proshika’s role in microcredit and
the ways that this new area poses challenges for its mission. Although not as strict as some of the
other large NGOs (e.g. the Grameen Bank), Proshika must also seek repayments from its clients.
Proshika has changed its system for access to funds to curb someone from embezzling from a
group savings account for beneficiaries by having the savings of clients deposited in a bank
account that cannot be operated without the consent of the relevant field workers assigned to that
group of beneficiaries. While addressing the old problem of relying on one individual to manage
the money of the group savings account, it has created a new problem where clients are now
completely reliant upon the field workers. This diminishes the empowerment that has been
foundational to Proshika’s mission (Ahmed 2002, p. 159). For accountability, this change is a
positive one, but it does run counter to the purpose of Proshika’s existence which is to give the
poor the ability to manage their own lives.
Let us turn, then, to examine some of the other issues of Proshika’s accountability and the
general challenges associated with NGO accountability. These include the multiple stakeholders
to whom NGOs are accountable for their performance—not only the delivery of goods but also
the results; for NGO donors there is the necessity to demonstrate good stewardship. There is
legal accountability to governments of countries where NGOs operate – in the case of Proshika,
29
Bangladesh. Clearly, Proshika’s increased range of activities and political role poses a threat to
the government and raises questions about its legal status as well as the legitimacy of its mission.
Proshika and The Challenges of NGO Accountability
The Proshika case presents a diverse array of expectations placed on an NGO that has
assumed key roles that (1) provide basic public services complementing or in lieu of those
provided by the government; (2) offer means of integrating and empowering emerging “civil
society” groups in Bangladesh; and, thereby, (3) promote “good governance” that obligates
Proshika to model principles of transparency, financial discipline and political responsiveness.
Each of these roles speak to accountability as related to the broader context of political
legitimacy.
Legitimacy and Accountability
Proshika’s roles in providing public services, promoting civil society development, and
modeling “good governance” both enhance and threaten the political order in Bangladesh.
Indeed these three roles represent alternative logics of NGO legitimacy based upon Jordan and
van Tuijl’s syllogisms as represented in Table 2 (see columns 1, 2, and 3). To the extent that
these activities could be taken as political mobilization, it is apparent that Proshika runs afoul of
state supremacy (logic 4 in Table 2), a traditional interpretation of political legitimacy. Thus,
Proshika is challenged to manage expectations in ways that recognize that its ongoing activities
coincide with new logics of appropriateness that are to an extent welcomed by the state, yet also
elicit aggressive state reactions in the form of NGO regulation.
Managing Expectations
Within this national context of cross-cutting logics of legitimacy, Proshika confronts
numerous pressures. Some of these are internal to Bangladesh society; others are products of
30
the extensive presence of INGOs and other international donors. This presents a serious
challenge for managing the diverse expectations of all stakeholders and must be managed by the
various accountability systems in the Romzek and Dubnick (1987) typology.
Legal Accountability
Proshika is registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860 in addition to the
NGO Affairs Bureau (NAB) which functions out of the prime minister’s office. The NAB is the
governmental agency that is charged with controlling the activities of NGOs that operate with
foreign funds in Bangladesh. If an NGO receives foreign funding, it must be registered with the
NAB. To do this, the NGO must operate under the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities)
Regulation Ordinance of 1978 and the Foreign Contributions (Regulation) Ordinance of 1982.
According to these rules, no NGO is allowed to implement any activity using foreign funds
without the NAB’s prior approval of both the budget and the overall project itself (Karim 1996,
pp. 133-134).
As one considers the regulatory role the government plays in the operation of NGOs such
as Proshika, there is a need to recognize the power dynamic taking place within Bangladesh
between the government and power of NGOs with substantial financial support for their
initiatives. Nevertheless, Proshika is accountable to the state and must satisfy the requests of the
government when it comes to issues of accountability and finances.
Professional Accountability: Self-Regulation
In 1993, the Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB) adopted a
code of ethics as a step toward self-regulation for its member NGOs. The code was prepared in
consultation with its members, which at that stage was viewed as a positive response to many of
the problems confronting NGOs. The code is an excellent innovation, providing a detailed
31
framework of nonprofit sector ethics defined at four levels in relation to the poor people for
whom the nonprofit sector works: the government and the state, other private volunteer
development organizations in Bangladesh, development partners (or donors), and NGO staff. In
terms of commitment, the document promises high standards and practices including self-
regulation, efficiency, transparency, and accountability. It raises the importance of checks
against political influences, factionalism and divisiveness within NGOs. The code also commits
NGOs to strong collaboration with the government, and an independent and transparent
relationship with donors. The objectives of NGOs laid out in the code are to raise the standard of
living of the poor and to help them become worthy citizens of Bangladesh. The code posits that
aside from generating their own funds, NGOs can “accept resources and services from the
public, the business community, the government of Bangladesh, and external development
partners. But these resources are to be used exclusively for the development of the poor and not
for any personal profit” (Karim 1996, p. 134).
Members of ADAB (Proshika included) commit themselves to “working for solidarity
among the poor, democratic leadership, and self-reliance, irrespective of caste, creed, religion
and gender.” The NGOs must also be accountable and transparent to the government with regard
to their funds and activities. The code calls for “the highest standards of transparency and
honesty” (Karim, 1996, p. 134-135)
Yet, there are no means of ensuring compliance with all these lofty goals. There is no
incentive system within the sector to encourage good practices, nor any mechanism to prevent
non-compliance. Any prospect of introducing effective measures to implement such instruments
and to promote internal self-governance has suffered a serious setback. Thus, the code of ethics
32
that was regarded as a means for the ADAB to have a standard for NGOs in Bangladesh
functions in that capacity only as much as each NGO chooses to comply.
Multiple Stakeholders: Performance and Political Accountability
The complexity of NGOs and relationships with their multiple stakeholders are a
challenge from the standpoint of accountability. Northern donors include the World Bank, UN
development agencies, major INGOs such as CARE and Oxfam, as well as the United States, the
United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, and Japan. Proshika must conform to the goals
and procedures of these donors in order to secure funds. Additionally, the restrictions of donor
funding require proposals for work on particular issues for a particular set of time (Ahmed and
Potter 2006, pp. 136-137).
Figure 2 illustrates the multiple levels of accountability when dealing with internal and
external funding, governmental oversight, and accountability to those who are beneficiaries of
the services and programs provided by Proshika.
Figure 3
The NGO Chain: Proshika’s Accountability to Multiple Stakeholders
International Donors INGOs Beneficiaries Government of Proshika Bangladesh
The complexity of multiple donors is part of what makes Proshika an interesting NGO to
probe more deeply. One example of INGOs partnering with Proshika was on a project aimed at
addressing the exploitation of women. Since exploitation has a central role in perpetuating
poverty, Proshika has a program that provides training for self-help groups as well as providing
33
microcredit loans. This project included the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), the Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation (NOVIB,
which is associated with Oxfam), and the British Government’s Department for International
Development (DFID). CIDA, for example, contributed $11.4 million to this project that lasted
from 1999 to 2006. (CIDA) Each partner had its own guidelines for how its funds were to be
used and reported. This is only one example of how international donors and INGOs have a stake
in the work of Proshika and it illustrates the challenges of accountability with multiple donors.
One of the most important methods for Proshika providing accountability to all
stakeholders is through the publication of its annual report. The most recent report available on
the Proshika website is for July 2006 to June 2007. The report is provided to all stakeholders and
to those who have interest in the work of Proshika. As Chairman Qazi Faruque Ahmed notes in
the foreword to the most recently available annual report, “We take much pleasure in presenting
it [the annual report] to the members of PROSHIKA, its development partners, members of civil
society and all those who have inspired and stood by us in our fight against poverty” (Proshika
2007, Foreword).
Although Proshika’s annual report includes highly detailed information regarding the
programs for 2006-2007, it lacks information regarding funding and the organization’s
relationship with donors. Donors are able to see what their financial support contributed to
during the year, but there is no detail on funding from particular donors. This is not atypical.
According to Ahmad (2002, p. 11), “Most NGOs in Bangladesh maintain a high level of secrecy
about their documents, staff salary and budgets.” This is important to note because NGOs tend to
identify themselves as participatory grassroots groups. Yet, in reality, this is illusory. (Ahmad,
2002, p. 11) It also is a point of concern because transparency helps to address concerns about
34
accountability and without access to this funding information, one is only able to guess about the
relationships that Proshika has with its donors. Still, from the standpoint of performance
accountability, the activity report for Proshika shows different levels of measurement for
programs, ranging from the amount of income generated for the Employment and Income
Generating Programme to the number of bee colonies established for the Apiculture
Development Programme. By providing tangible numbers for the various programs it operates,
Proshika demonstrates a level of transparency that allows one to assess its performance.
The requirements for Proshika from international donors and INGOs are not spelled out
in material that is publicly available. This is does not negate the accountability to those who
supply funds for the work of Proshika, but this lack of transparency does demonstrate the secrecy
of the relationship between Proshika and its donors. Nevertheless, donors continue to fund
projects and see the objectives and programs implementing them in the activity report. The
Information and Documentation Resource Cell within Proshika publishes the annual activity
report in addition to preparing six-month progress reports for Proshika’s governing body, senior
management, and donors, detailing the accounts of the overall achievements as well as the
reasons for either over-achievements or under-achievements for all of the programs (Proshika
2007, p. 62).
Finally, Proshika is fundamentally accountable to its beneficiaries. Through the field
worker/client relationship, Proshika engages citizens and encourages them to feel empowered in
order help address societal issues which marginalize a considerable portion of the population.
Yet, as it has been noted, the hierarchical structure of Bangladeshi culture pervades Proshika.
The challenge for Proshika is to allow its beneficiaries to take responsibility for their own lives
35
and the health of their communities while also getting the support necessary to make and sustain
meaningful impacts.
From Accountability to Strategy and Action
Accountability for NGOs, particularly those such as Proshika with many different
stakeholders, is clearly challenging. Likewise, the issues may be very different in a developing
country where an NGO “conglomerate” comes to be seen as a threat to the legitimacy and
authority of the government because of the wide range of services it provides and roles it plays.
Proshika’s role in promoting microcredit can be taken as a classic example of goal succession in
response to several governmental reactions than its previous efforts in mobilizing “civil society.”
In essence, by emphasizing political accountability as responsiveness to program beneficiaries
and donors Proshika has strained its relationship with the government of Bangladesh. The
relatively recent microcredit role provides Proshika with opportunities to adjust its strategy in
ways that allow some room for subsequent negotiation with the government. It also shifts its
priorities away from the political rationales of accountability toward increased emphases on
bureaucratic control and professional self-regulation. For some, these developments are
troubling since it appears that Proshika has abandoned its programmatic role in serving
Bangladesh’s poor and marginalized to that of monitoring microcredit loan repayment. The
case, therefore, also illustrates how government actions can force NGOs to reassess their
strategies and tactics in reference to their understanding of the need for accountability.
What is also striking about the case of Proshika is how the government crackdown and
resulting block on foreign funds has hindered the organization from carrying out many of its
activities that benefit the poorest citizens of Bangladesh. In this way, legal and political to
36
accountability to the government trumps accountability to the beneficiaries (and to some extent
donors).
Table 1
Romzek and Dubnick’s Four Accountability Systemsa Related to Selected NGO Issues
ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS Selected NGO Variables Bureaucratic Legal Professional Political Performance -investor, donor
demands for productivity
-regulation by host (government) regime
-responsiveness to direct program beneficiaries
Functional vs. Strategic Accountability
-Functional: Need to report on resource use and short-term impacts
-Strategic: Need to (re-)assess direction to make long-term impacts vis-à-vis forces outside NGO control; need to maintain negotiating room in which to maneuver.
North/South; New Policy Agenda
-need to impose management control systems to report on services “shed” by government.
-NGOs pressured to assume “third sector” roles.
Internal Structure and Roles
-“Northern” NGOs, top executives in “Southern” NGOs focus on “account-tancy,” reporting systems
-some roles (parti-cularly in field work) subject to government regulation
-employee (especially field worker) conduct a determinant of NGO legitimacy
Self-Regulation
-need for codes of conduct, principles of practice (especially for field workers); training important.
-Associational consensus on account-tability standards; practice supports NGO’s legitimacy
a. Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick. 1987. “Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy.” Public Administration Review. 47, no. 3: 227- 238.
37
Table 2 Contextual Logics of Accountability Legitimizing or Prioritizing
Alternative Accountability Systems Jordan and Van Tuijl’s Syllogismsa Related to Romzek and Dubnick’s Accountability Systemsb (1)
Complementing government (1980-1989)
(2) The rise of
civil society (1989-1995)
(3) The rise of
good governance (1995-2002)
(4) The return to
state supremacy (2002 onwards)
(5) A rights-based
Approach (2002 onwards)
Syllogisms: Logic of Argument
1. Governments are not good at delivering public services
2. NGOs are closer to the public
3. NGOs are good at delivering public services
1. Civil society is necessary for democracy
2. NGOs are civil society
3. NGOs are good for democratic development
1. Good governance is necessary for development
2. NGOs are not different from other organi-zations in civil society
3. NGOs need to apply principles of good gover-nance
1. Government is essential to ensure safety and devel-opment.
2. NGOs’ influ-ence is not in proportion to their credentials
3. NGOs need to be kept in check by legitimate government frameworks
1. There is no democratic global governance supporting universal human rights
2. NGOs assert and solidify human rights in different political arenas… regardless of governance
3. NGOs contribut to democratic governance by articulating public policy needs and practicing solution resolving public needs
Alternative Accountability System
Bureaucratic
Professional
Legal
Political
a. Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl. 2007. “Rights and Responsibilities in the Political
Landscape of NGO Accountability: Introduction and Overview.” In NGO Accountability. London: Earthscan.
b. Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick. 1987. “Accountability in the Public Sector:
Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy.” Public Administration Review. 47, no. 3: 227- 238.
38
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