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The Challenges of Economic Proof in a The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System Competition Policy System Presentation by Presentation by Andrew I. Gavil Andrew I. Gavil Professor of Law Professor of Law Howard University School of Law Howard University School of Law Of Counsel, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, LLP Of Counsel, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, LLP Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics University of Amsterdam University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, The Netherlands Amsterdam, The Netherlands March 17, 2006 March 17, 2006 Copyright Andrew I. Gavil, 2006
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Page 1: The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System Presentation by Andrew I. Gavil Professor of Law.

The Challenges of Economic Proof in a The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Decentralized and Privatized European

Competition Policy SystemCompetition Policy System

Presentation byPresentation byAndrew I. Gavil Andrew I. Gavil Professor of LawProfessor of Law

Howard University School of LawHoward University School of LawOf Counsel, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, LLPOf Counsel, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, LLP

Forensic Economics in Competition Law EnforcementForensic Economics in Competition Law EnforcementAmsterdam Center for Law & EconomicsAmsterdam Center for Law & Economics

University of AmsterdamUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdam, The NetherlandsAmsterdam, The Netherlands

March 17, 2006March 17, 2006

Copyright Andrew I. Gavil, 2006

Page 2: The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System Presentation by Andrew I. Gavil Professor of Law.

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Overview of Presentation – Four PartsOverview of Presentation – Four Parts

1)1) The Role of Economic Evidence in The Role of Economic Evidence in Successfully Successfully Enforcing Competition Laws Enforcing Competition Laws in Europein Europe

2)2) American FrameworkAmerican Framework for Integrating for Integrating Economic Ideas into Antitrust -- Economic Ideas into Antitrust -- Emphasis on Role of Emphasis on Role of Expert TestimonyExpert Testimony

3)3) LessonsLessons from the American Experience from the American Experience4)4) Challenges for Challenges for Public & Private Public & Private

Enforcement inEnforcement in Europe Europe

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Part IPart I

The Role of Economic Evidence in The Role of Economic Evidence in Successfully Enforcing Successfully Enforcing

Competition Laws in EuropeCompetition Laws in Europe

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Building Competition Policy “Systems”

DeterrenceCompensation

SubstantiveLegal Rules

Detection

Antitrust Injury and Standing

PenaltiesRemedies

Costs of Enforcement

Deterrence & Compensation: A Complex FormulaDeterrence & Compensation: A Complex Formula

Procedural Rules

Public & Private Rights of Action

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Current State of Competition Current State of Competition Policy in EUPolicy in EU

ECEC has been has been primary enforcerprimary enforcer– Greater Reliance on Greater Reliance on Economic ReasoningEconomic Reasoning– ECJ & CFI Demand More ECJ & CFI Demand More Economic Reasoning and Economic Reasoning and

Economic EvidenceEconomic EvidenceGE/Honeywell; AirTours; Schneider Electric; Tetra LavalGE/Honeywell; AirTours; Schneider Electric; Tetra Laval

– EC Response: EC Response: Office of CCEOffice of CCE

ParadoxParadox: EC is more : EC is more institutionally capableinstitutionally capable, but , but expansion of EU Member Statesexpansion of EU Member States means means EC EC can’t adequately policecan’t adequately police all of EU all of EU

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The Next Phase of EvolutionThe Next Phase of Evolution

Two Stage ApproachTwo Stage Approach– DecentralizationDecentralization

Regulation 1/2003Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 of 16 December 2002 Increased Public Enforcement by Member StatesIncreased Public Enforcement by Member States

– PrivatizationPrivatizationGreen PaperGreen Paper on Private Damages Actions on Private Damages ActionsDecember 2005December 2005

Two-fold Purposes:Two-fold Purposes:– Alleviate burden on ECAlleviate burden on EC– Expand EU-wide understanding of and commitment to Expand EU-wide understanding of and commitment to

CompetitionCompetitionMore “stakeholders” with vested interestsMore “stakeholders” with vested interests

Page 7: The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System Presentation by Andrew I. Gavil Professor of Law.

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Major Premises of Decentralization & Major Premises of Decentralization & PrivatizationPrivatization

There is now a There is now a settled and uniform bodysettled and uniform body of of European-wide European-wide competition lawcompetition law – EC decisions, regulations, and guidelinesEC decisions, regulations, and guidelines– CFI and ECJ decisionsCFI and ECJ decisions

It is It is based on economic reasoningbased on economic reasoning

It is It is bindingbinding on the member States on the member States

It will be It will be appliedapplied by their courts in by their courts in public public and privateand private enforcement actions enforcement actions

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Green Paper: Specific Impediments to Green Paper: Specific Impediments to Private Actions for DamagesPrivate Actions for Damages

Substantive Law IssuesSubstantive Law Issues– Concepts of FaultConcepts of Fault– Scope of Rights of ActionScope of Rights of Action– Measurement of Amount of Damages & CostsMeasurement of Amount of Damages & Costs

Procedural IssuesProcedural Issues– Access to EvidenceAccess to Evidence– Coordination of Related ActionsCoordination of Related Actions– Jurisdictional ConflictJurisdictional Conflict– Expert Evidence and WitnessesExpert Evidence and Witnesses

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Green Paper: Invitation to Search for Green Paper: Invitation to Search for SolutionsSolutions

Proposes Various Proposes Various OptionsOptions for Discussion for Discussion to to Facilitate Private ActionsFacilitate Private Actions

GoalGoal: More : More Compensation & DeterrenceCompensation & Deterrence– Supplement EC & Member StatesSupplement EC & Member States– Directly Compensate VictimsDirectly Compensate Victims– Key Key “Promote Culture of Competition, not “Promote Culture of Competition, not

Litigation”Litigation”

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Decentralization and Privatization:Decentralization and Privatization:Two Critical QuestionsTwo Critical Questions

Will Will courts of Member Statescourts of Member States demand of demand of public and private parties the public and private parties the same level of same level of economic proof being demanded of ECeconomic proof being demanded of EC??

If they do, will public & private parties have If they do, will public & private parties have the the procedural and evidentiary procedural and evidentiary infrastructureinfrastructure to respond? to respond?– If not, enforcement efforts may failIf not, enforcement efforts may fail

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Part IIPart II

American Framework for American Framework for Integrating Economic Ideas into Integrating Economic Ideas into Antitrust -- Emphasis on Role of Antitrust -- Emphasis on Role of

Expert TestimonyExpert Testimony

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U.S. Antitrust Evolution: 1975-2006U.S. Antitrust Evolution: 1975-2006

A Period of Significant ChangeA Period of Significant Change::– Past history of unjustifiably Past history of unjustifiably expansive expansive

prohibitionsprohibitions– Increased reliance on Increased reliance on economic conceptseconomic concepts– Increased reliance on Increased reliance on economists and other economists and other

expertsexperts– Ascension of more Ascension of more conservative political and conservative political and

economic ideology economic ideology – courts and agencies– courts and agencies– Fewer public & private casesFewer public & private cases

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Access Points for Economic Ideas:Access Points for Economic Ideas:Institutional DifferencesInstitutional Differences

Internal Sources

Political AppointeesStaff Economists

Internal SourcesJudges/Justices

ClerksJuries

Court Expert (FRE 706)Guidelines (Judicial & Agency)

1. Legal Commands (legislation & regulations)2. Ideologies & Intuitions of the Decision-makers 3. Legal and Economic Commentary (“Economic Authority”)4. Parties and Third Parties (Amici before courts)5. Expert Witnesses

Antitrust Agencies Courts

External Sources of Economic Ideas Common to Agencies and Courts

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Checks and BalancesChecks and Balances

For CourtsFor Courts– Adversarial Adversarial

ProceedingsProceedings– DaubertDaubert/FRE 702 for /FRE 702 for

Expert WitnessesExpert Witnesses– Court Appointed Court Appointed

Expert (FRE 706)Expert (FRE 706)– Appellate ReviewAppellate Review

but not for SCTbut not for SCT

– Legislative ReviewLegislative Review

For AgenciesFor Agencies– May not always have May not always have

adversarial adversarial proceedingsproceedings

– No No DaubertDaubert-type -type RequirementRequirement

– Permanent Staff of Permanent Staff of EconomistsEconomists

– Internal ReviewInternal Review– Judicial ReviewJudicial Review– Legislative ReviewLegislative Review

Note: It is much more difficult for courts to dislodge errant economics integrated into the law than it is for agencies to alter enforcement policies and priorities.

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The Critical Role of Appellate ReviewThe Critical Role of Appellate Review

Public Enforcement(Competition

Agencies)

PrivateEnforcement(Trial Courts)

Appellate Review(Could be > 1 level)

Implication:Economic Evidence Will Be Scrutinized

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Developing Economic Evidence Developing Economic Evidence in U.S. Courts Iin U.S. Courts I

What is an “expert” witnessWhat is an “expert” witness??– A witness “qualified…by A witness “qualified…by knowledge, skill, knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or educationexperience, training, or education””– Who possesses “Who possesses “scientific, technical, or other scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledgespecialized knowledge””– That will “That will “assist the trier of factassist the trier of fact””

What can an What can an expert witnessexpert witness do that a do that a lay lay witnesswitness can not? can not?– Offer Offer opinion testimonyopinion testimony

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Developing Economic Evidence Developing Economic Evidence in U.S. Courts IIin U.S. Courts II

Four Stages Four Stages (Interrelated):(Interrelated):– Disclosure Disclosure (FRCP 26(a)(2))(FRCP 26(a)(2))

Identity and Report for Testifying ExpertsIdentity and Report for Testifying Experts

– Discovery Discovery (FRCP 26(b)(4))(FRCP 26(b)(4))Depositions of testifying experts (After Report)Depositions of testifying experts (After Report)

Limits for non-testifyingLimits for non-testifying

– AdmissibilityAdmissibility (FRE 104 & 702) (FRE 104 & 702)““DaubertDaubert Challenges Challenges” – qualification, relevance & reliability” – qualification, relevance & reliability

– SufficiencySufficiency (FRCP 56 & 50) (FRCP 56 & 50)Meeting a burden of productionMeeting a burden of production

“FRCP” = Federal Rules of Civil Procedure“FRE” = Federal Rules of Evidence

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The Intersection of Trends in Antitrust The Intersection of Trends in Antitrust and Expert Evidence: 1993-2006and Expert Evidence: 1993-2006

For Antitrust:For Antitrust:– Greater Greater reliance on economic evidencereliance on economic evidence– Increased Increased demand for economistsdemand for economists– Economists Economists treated astreated as “expert witnesses” “expert witnesses”

For EvidenceFor Evidence::– Uniform Uniform Federal Rules of EvidenceFederal Rules of Evidence - 1975 - 1975– Expanding role of “Expanding role of “expert testimonyexpert testimony””– Increased concern about “Increased concern about “junk sciencejunk science””

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DaubertDaubert in the Supreme Court in the Supreme Court

Daubert Daubert (1993); (1993); Joiner Joiner (1997); (1997); Kumho Kumho Tire Tire (1999)(1999)– Admissibility Standard: Admissibility Standard:

relevantrelevant

reliablereliable methodologymethodology;; andand

““fit” of methodology fit” of methodology with factswith facts

– Standard of Appellate Review: Standard of Appellate Review: abuse of abuse of discretiondiscretion

Page 20: The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System Presentation by Andrew I. Gavil Professor of Law.

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Criteria of ReliabilityCriteria of Reliability

DaubertDaubert mentions mentions::– TestabilityTestability– Peer reviewPeer review– Rate of ErrorRate of Error– Existence/Maintenance of StandardsExistence/Maintenance of Standards– General AcceptanceGeneral Acceptance

But….But….flexible and unique to each area of flexible and unique to each area of expertiseexpertise

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Revised FRE 702 (2000)Revised FRE 702 (2000)

Incorporates Incorporates DaubertDaubert, , JoinerJoiner & & Kumho TireKumho Tire, but , but goes beyond to goes beyond to reach applicationreach application

A witness “qualified as an expert…may testify …A witness “qualified as an expert…may testify …in the form of opinion or otherwisein the form of opinion or otherwise,” if: ,” if: – (1) the testimony is based upon(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or sufficient facts or

datadata, , – (2) the testimony is the product of(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles reliable principles

and methodsand methods, and , and – (3) the witness has(3) the witness has applied the principles and applied the principles and

methods reliably to the factsmethods reliably to the facts of the case.of the case.

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Common Contested Areas in Antitrust Common Contested Areas in Antitrust Involving Expert TestimonyInvolving Expert Testimony

ConspiracyConspiracyMarket Power & Market DefinitionMarket Power & Market DefinitionCausationCausationExclusionary Conduct (Price & Non-price)Exclusionary Conduct (Price & Non-price)Competitive EffectsCompetitive EffectsEfficiencyEfficiencyDamages & Other RemediesDamages & Other RemediesClass Certification IssuesClass Certification Issues

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Efficacy of Efficacy of DaubertDaubert Motions Motions

Largely a Largely a defense tool (FTC Exception)defense tool (FTC Exception)

Motions Motions In LimineIn Limine -- -- most failmost fail

Enough succeed and serve a Enough succeed and serve a useful screening useful screening functionfunction (termination of case typically follows) (termination of case typically follows)

Some Evidence of Some Evidence of Judicial Error/Poor DraftingJudicial Error/Poor Drafting::– Conflating admissibility and sufficiencyConflating admissibility and sufficiency– Elevating Judicial View of Economics Over RecordElevating Judicial View of Economics Over Record– Elevating Burden of ProductionElevating Burden of Production

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Part IIIPart III

Lessons from the American Lessons from the American Experience: Integrating Experience: Integrating

Economics into LawEconomics into Law

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Limits of Economic EvidenceLimits of Economic Evidence

Increased reliance on economics has vastly improved Increased reliance on economics has vastly improved antitrust analysisantitrust analysis– objective benchmarks; flexibility; fewer false positivesobjective benchmarks; flexibility; fewer false positives

Three cautionary notes:Three cautionary notes:– Lack of ComprehensionLack of Comprehension

Adopting standards that are Adopting standards that are difficult to comprehenddifficult to comprehend raises burden of raises burden of production and may tend to production and may tend to over or under-deterover or under-deter

– Lost in TranslationLost in TranslationAdopting standards that are sound in theory and comprehensible, Adopting standards that are sound in theory and comprehensible, but difficult to implement owing to but difficult to implement owing to limitations on data and expenselimitations on data and expense also can also can over or under-deterover or under-deter

– Lack of Credibility and MistranslationLack of Credibility and MistranslationLegonomistsLegonomists: Lawyers and judges who don’t know their limits: Lawyers and judges who don’t know their limitsProfessional WitnessesProfessional Witnesses: the “adversarial standoff”: the “adversarial standoff”

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Some ExamplesSome Examples

Conspiracy – Conspiracy – Blomkest & WilliamsonBlomkest & Williamson– Circumstantial evidence ever enough?Circumstantial evidence ever enough?

Predatory Pricing -- Predatory Pricing -- AMRAMR & & Spirit AirlinesSpirit Airlines– Is the “below cost” standard operable?Is the “below cost” standard operable?

Causation – Causation – MicrosoftMicrosoft– Conduct and Effects on Nascent CompetitionConduct and Effects on Nascent Competition

Unilateral Effects of Mergers –Unilateral Effects of Mergers –OracleOracle– What level of certainty is needed when making What level of certainty is needed when making

predictions?predictions?

Efficiencies – Efficiencies – HeinzHeinz (Baby Food) (Baby Food)– Can efficiency rebut the structural presumption?Can efficiency rebut the structural presumption?

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Reliance on EconomicsReliance on Economics

Some advocate even Some advocate even greater reliancegreater reliance– CertaintyCertainty– RationalityRationality

Others urge caution -- Others urge caution -- over-dependenceover-dependence – Indeterminate StandardsIndeterminate Standards– Increased Costs (economists are charging lawyers’ Increased Costs (economists are charging lawyers’

rates!)rates!)

Defense Bar sees Defense Bar sees bright lines and filtersbright lines and filters

Plaintiff’s Bar sees Plaintiff’s Bar sees moving targets and hurdlesmoving targets and hurdles

Page 28: The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System Presentation by Andrew I. Gavil Professor of Law.

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Some QuestionsSome Questions

How do we How do we translatetranslate economics into operable economics into operable legal standards?legal standards?– Amenable toAmenable to accessibleaccessible proof? proof?– Consistent withConsistent with burdens of production/proof? burdens of production/proof?

How much and what kind of economic evidence How much and what kind of economic evidence is “is “enoughenough”? ”? – Always Always complex and costlycomplex and costly? No? No

In defense of bright line rules where warrantedIn defense of bright line rules where warranted

– Always Always easy and certaineasy and certain? No? NoIn defense of careful and thoughtful applicationIn defense of careful and thoughtful application

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Beyond Relevance & ReliabilityBeyond Relevance & Reliability

An An Economic AnalysisEconomic Analysis of of Economic EvidenceEconomic Evidence::– Does the Does the marginal valuemarginal value in terms of in terms of economic economic

certaintycertainty outweigh the outweigh the costscosts of demanding additional of demanding additional economic evidenceeconomic evidence??

Add Add proportionalityproportionality standard to standard to DaubertDaubert analysisanalysis??– Three Part InquiryThree Part Inquiry::

Is the additional evidence Is the additional evidence reasonably availablereasonably available??

If so, at what If so, at what costcost??

How much How much additional certaintyadditional certainty will it bring? will it bring?

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Part IVPart IV

Challenges for Public & Private Challenges for Public & Private

Enforcement in EuropeEnforcement in Europe

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The Major PremiseThe Major Premise

Following lead of CFI and ECJ, Courts of Following lead of CFI and ECJ, Courts of the Member Statesthe Member States will demand will demand rigorous rigorous economic proofeconomic proof in competition cases. in competition cases.– Many cases may be Many cases may be easyeasy, but…, but…– Some may involve Some may involve difficult judgment callsdifficult judgment calls, and , and

hence hence significant economic studysignificant economic study

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Challenges for Public Enforcers: Challenges for Public Enforcers: Capacity BuildingCapacity Building

Competition AgenciesCompetition Agencies– Will Will public enforcerspublic enforcers have the have the institutional institutional

resourcesresources and and expertiseexpertise to meet the to meet the challenge?challenge?

Need to replicate EC’s own experience?Need to replicate EC’s own experience?

– Will Will Courts Courts be be competent competent andand receptive receptive??Judicial training?Judicial training?

Procedural reform?Procedural reform?

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Challenges for Private ActionsChallenges for Private Actions

Will Will private partiesprivate parties have the tools and have the tools and institutional infrastructureinstitutional infrastructure necessary to necessary to successfully litigate a competition case?successfully litigate a competition case?– Access to Access to economic proofeconomic proof– Autonomy Autonomy in collection and presentation of in collection and presentation of

evidence, including evidence, including expert evidenceexpert evidence– Reasonable Reasonable burdens of productionburdens of production and proof and proof– Procedural devices for Procedural devices for filtering out weak filtering out weak

evidence, claims, and defensesevidence, claims, and defenses

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Green Paper LimitationsGreen Paper Limitations

Options 1-5 on Options 1-5 on Disclosure & ProductionDisclosure & Production– No discussion of expert-specific issuesNo discussion of expert-specific issues – No contemplation of party-expertsNo contemplation of party-experts

Limited Direct Discussion of Economic Limited Direct Discussion of Economic Proof Proof ((¶¶ 255-60)¶¶ 255-60)– Notes Notes variationsvariations in lay/expert witness in lay/expert witness

practices among Member Statespractices among Member StatesDistinction between Distinction between party-proffered and court-party-proffered and court-appointed expertsappointed experts

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Option 35Option 35

Three Pronged ApproachThree Pronged Approach::– Court-Appointed Expert Court-Appointed Expert – Judicial TrainingJudicial Training– EC as AmicusEC as Amicus

Rationale for Rejecting Party ExpertsRationale for Rejecting Party Experts??– Lower evidentiary valueLower evidentiary value– Increased litigation costsIncreased litigation costs

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Option 35 – Some QuestionsOption 35 – Some Questions

Does Option 35 Does Option 35 Understate Likely Party Use of Their Understate Likely Party Use of Their Own ExpertsOwn Experts??– Prepare casePrepare case– Respond to oppositionRespond to opposition– Scrutinize court-appointed expertScrutinize court-appointed expert– Satisfy burdens of production and proofSatisfy burdens of production and proof

Without Without testifyingtestifying Party-Experts, will parties be Party-Experts, will parties be adequately equipped to meet evidentiary burdensadequately equipped to meet evidentiary burdens??– If not, will the If not, will the Green Paper goalGreen Paper goal of facilitating private damages of facilitating private damages

actions be actions be frustratedfrustrated??– If frustrated, is the “problem” the If frustrated, is the “problem” the level of economic evidencelevel of economic evidence

being demanded or the being demanded or the inadequacy of the tools available to inadequacy of the tools available to present itpresent it??

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The End!The End!


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