The Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, 1861-1865

8/20/2019 The Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, 1861-1865

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The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

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CMH Pub 75–3

Cover: Detail from Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, c. 1889, by Kurz & Allison


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by Jeffery S. Prushankin

Center o Military History United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015

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Introduction

Although over one hundred fify years have passed since thestart o the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues tomatter. Te orces unleashed by that war were immensely destruc-tive because o the significant issues involved: the existence o the

Union, the end o slavery, and the very uture o the nation. Tewar remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with oversix hundred thousand killed in the course o the our-year struggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the AmericanCivil War was no exception. Te seeds o the conflict were sownin the earliest days o the republic’s ounding, primarily over theexistence o slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict canbegin without the conscious decisions o those engaged in the

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way topaper over the division o the country into two camps: one thatwas dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limitits spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “hal slaveand hal ree,” and that could not stand.

Regardless o the actors tearing the nation asunder, thesoldiers on each side o the struggle went to war or personalreasons: looking or adventure, being caught up in the passions

and emotions o their peers, believing in the Union, avoringstates’ rights, or even justiying the simple schoolyard dynamico being convinced that they were “worth” three o the soldierson the other side. Nor can we overlook the actor that some wentto war to prove their manhood. Tis has been, and continuesto be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the proes-sion o arms. Soldiers join or many reasons but ofen stay in thefight because o their comrades and because they do not want to

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues o national impact shrinkto nothing in the intensely personal world o cannon shell andminié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly andonly culminated with the conquest o the rebellious Conederacy,


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the preservation o the Union, and the end o slavery. Tesecampaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared incommemoration o our national sacrifices, seek to rememberthat war and honor those in the United States Army who died topreserve the Union and ree the slaves as well as to tell the story othose American soldiers who ought or the Conederacy despitethe inherently flawed nature o their cause. Te Civil War was ourgreatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study andcontemplation.

RICHARD W. SEWAR, PH.D.Chie o Military History


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THE CIVIL WAR IN THETRANS-MISSISSIPPI THEATER

1861–1865

Strategic Setting

Ofen neglected in history books, the rans-Mississippi Westplayed an important role in the Civil War. Although the battlesought in this region were relatively small compared with thoseought elsewhere, the struggle to control the rans-Mississippi hadar-reaching consequences or both sides ( Map 1).

For the Union, the theater presented several major objectives.

At the outset o the war, President Abraham Lincoln’s first concernin the region west o the Mississippi River was securing the state oMissouri and its principal city, St. Louis. Until the military accom-plished this objective, it would be difficult to achieve the broaderstrategic goal o severing the Conederacy in two by gainingcontrol o the Mississippi. Second, the United States hoped topaciy western Louisiana and establish a presence in exas. Whileall o the rans-Mississippi states had the potential to provide

the Conederacy with resources, exas gave the Conederacy itsonly common border with a oreign country. Since France hadinvaded Mexico in December 1861 over issues related to unpaiddebts, U.S. officials eared that the Conederacy might be ableto acquire European goods in exchange or cotton via Mexico,

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thereby deeating the government’s planned blockade o Southernports. I France recognized the Conederacy as an independentnation, its presence on the exas border could prove even moredangerous. Finally, the Lincoln administration wanted to ensure

that the Federal government maintained control o the Far West,to include the gold deposits in Colorado and Caliornia.For the Conederacy, the rans-Mississippi was an impor-

tant source o agricultural commodities, including cotton,sugar, and rice. he southwestern part o the region contained

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nearly one million horses, 800,000 oxen, over 300,000 mules,and millions o cattle. he area was likewise a source omanpower. During the course o the war exas urnished 58,000men or Conederate armies, Louisiana provided 53,000, andArkansas sent 45,000. Missouri and Indian erritory did notsecede rom the Union, but nonetheless sent 40,000 and 5,000men, respectively, into rebel service. Although most o theserans-Mississippians served in eastern armies, enough soldiersremained west o the river to protect the Conederate politicaland economic inrastructure in the theater.

Te region’s vast distances and primitive transportation andcommunication networks posed challenges or both sides during

the war. Early in 1862, the Conederate War Department createda rans-Mississippi District and later that year elevated the rans-Mississippi to department status. Te U.S. Army never createda single entity to command its orces west o the Mississippi.Rather, it organized several geographically based military depart-ments. During the conflict the War Department continuallyadjusted existing designations and ofen combined two or moredepartments to create military divisions. Individual field armies

unctioned within each department. In the rans-Mississippi theprinciple Federal armies included the Army o the Southwest, theArmy o the Frontier, and the Army o the Gul. State and localauthorities ofen complicated command relationships, particularlyor the South, so that military orces did not always act in concertwith one another. During the course o the war, some 200,000Union soldiers would serve in the rans-Mississippi Teater.

Operations

WAR IN THE DESERT

Te most remote area o operations during the AmericanCivil War was that in the ar western territories o New Mexico andArizona. Te American Southwest was a sparsely inhabited lando divided loyalties. In New Mexico, the population around SantaFe was predominately neutral, while settlers arther south called

themselves Arizonians and harbored pro-Conederate sentiments.In 1861, Conederate sympathizers decreed Arizona a territory.o secure that claim, and with hopes o conquering New Mexico,Colorado, Utah, and perhaps even Caliornia, rebel Brig. Gen.Henry H. Sibley organized a orce o 3,700 men that he called the


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Te Conederate repulse brought an end to significant fighting inthe ar western territories.

THE BATTLE FOR MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS

Te only rans-Mississippi slave state remaining in theUnion, Missouri, was the linchpin or the U.S. government’sability to use military orce on the Mississippi River and thelands beyond. Control o St. Louis would allow the U.S. militaryto establish lines o communications along the Mississippi River

VALVERDE FORD21 Feb

PIGEON RIDGE28 Mar

GLORIETA PASS26–28 Mar

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Union Movement

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and along the road network that connected the city to pointsto the north, west, and south. Missouri was a divided state,however, and many citizens held strong pro-Conederate sympa-thies. Te United States strengthened its military presence in St.Louis by reinorcing Capt. Nathaniel Lyon and his 2d UnitedStates Inantry stationed there. Te pro-Conederate state militiacamped just outside o town, and Lyon eared it would attemptto seize the St. Louis arsenal. On 10 May, in a preemptive strike,he arrested 600 militia members. As he marched the prisonersthrough town, rioting broke out, and Lyon’s troops killed overtwo dozen civilians. ensions continued to rise as the WarDepartment promoted Lyon to brigadier general and authorized

some 10,000 troops to serve under him in Missouri. Lyon’s nextmove was against pro-Conederate politicians at the state capitalin Jefferson City. In June, his orce drove the nascent Conederatesto the southwest corner o the state.

In the summer o 1861, the United States could not riskleaving the situation in Missouri unresolved. A Conederate resur-gence would threaten not only St. Louis, but also possibly Kansasand Illinois. Fearing that Conederates in northwest Arkansas

would join Brig. Gen. Sterling Price’s secessionist Missouri StateGuard in the southwest portion o Missouri in late July, GeneralLyon gathered 5,400 troops into what he called the Army o theWest and marched into south-western Missouri. (See Map3.) Soon afer he arrived atSpringfield, Missouri, Lyondiscovered that Brig. Gen. Ben

McCulloch’s Western Army, aConederate orce that includedPrice’s Missouri State Guardamong its 11,000 effectives,was fify miles to the southeastat Cassville. Te Conederatesadvanced toward Springfieldand Lyon planned to attack

isolated elements o the rebelcolumn. Afer a skirmish on 2August at Dug Spring, he recon-sidered and ell back ahead oMcCulloch’s superior orce.

General Lyon, shown as captain(Library of Congress)


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McCulloch hoped to drive Lyon rom southwest Missourias a means o protecting northwest Arkansas and the Indian

erritory, while Price saw the capture o Springfield as the first stepin regaining control o his home state. On 9 August, bad weatherdelayed the Conederate advance, and when McCulloch pausedalong Wilson’s Creek, twelve miles south o Springfield, Lyonseized the initiative.

Lyon accepted a plan offered by Col. Franz Sigel to dividehis army and launch simultaneous surprise attacks againstthe enemy flanks. At dawn on 10 August, the Federals hit the

unsuspecting Conederates. Striking rom the north, Lyon andhis 4,200 men caught the rebels off guard. From the south, Sigeland his column o 1,200 men likewise enjoyed initial success, butMcCulloch rallied the Conederates and Sigel soon withdrew indisorder, leaving behind most o his artillery. Tis allowed theConederates to take the offensive. Unaware o Sigel’s retreat,Lyon put up a erocious deensive fight along a ridge knownlater as Bloody Hill. Price’s Missourians also ought tenaciously,

and the battle turned in avor o the Conederates. During thefighting, Lyon was killed, the first U.S. Army general officer todie in combat during the Civil War. Union command devolvedto Maj. Samuel D. Sturgis, who continued to hold the position atBloody Hill until he learned o Sigel’s retreat. With ammunition

General Price(Library of Congress)

General McCulloch(Library of Congress)


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running low, Sturgis ordered a withdrawal to Springfield and by

1200, the Federals were gone.Te Battle o Wilson’s Creek lef the Federals with 1,317 casu-

alties, including 258 killed and 873 wounded. Te Conederates,who called the battle Oak Hill, suffered similar losses, with 1,222casualties, including 277 dead and 945 wounded. As the first majorbattle in the rans-Mississippi, Wilson’s Creek set into motionevents that shaped the prosecution o the war in the West.

Te Conederate victory at Wilson’s Creek rendered the

Federal hold on Springfield untenable. Sigel assumed commando the Army o the West and ordered a retreat to Rolla in centralMissouri. During the retreat, Union officers and enlisted menalike criticized Sigel’s perormance at Wilson’s Creek, and he relin-quished command to Major Sturgis. From Rolla, a rail line took thetroops to St. Louis where Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, commandero the United States Western Department, reassigned the units andofficers to other commands.

Frémont was an antebellum adventurer, abolitionist, and theRepublican Party presidential nominee in 1856. In 1861, it waspolitical influence, rather than military prowess, that earned hima generalship in the Union Army. Frémont had taken commando the department in July, and since his arrival in Missouri, he had

Colonel Sigel, shown asmajor general

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Major Sturgis, shown asbrigadier general

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PEA RIDGE7–8 Mar 1862

LITTLE SUGAR CREEK 17 Feb 1862

PRAIRE GROVE7 Dec 1862CANE HILL

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WILSON’S CREEK 10 Aug 1861

SPRINGFIELD12 Feb 1862

DUG SPRING2 Aug 1861

LEXINGTON12–20 Sep 1861

FORT HINDMAN9–11 Jan 1863

HELENA12 July 1862

LITTLE ROCK 10 Sep 1863

PINE BLUFF17 Sep 1863

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busied himsel with organizinghis orces. He did not have time toocus on internal dissent, particu-larly on the heels o Wilson’sCreek. Moreover, Price was onthe move, and the Conederateshad retaken Springfield.

Like the Federals, Conederatecommanders bickered amongthemselves. General Price, whoheld his commission rom the stateo Missouri, insisted on advancing

north to Lexington, a city onthe Missouri River, to recruit volunteers or the State Guard.General McCulloch, who held acommission rom the Conederategovernment, reused to sanctionthe mission and insisted that hedid not have authorization to conduct offensive operations in

Missouri. He considered the earlier movement toward Springfielda deensive measure, designed to help him achieve his primarymission o securing Arkansas and the Indian erritory. Price’s planwas more offensive in nature. Moreover, McCulloch insisted thatthe Conederates lacked the means and manpower to hold posi-tions around Lexington. Te disagreement lef Price embittered,and as he marched his Missourians to Lexington, McCullochmarched the Western Army to Arkansas.

On 12 September, Price reached Lexington, and as recruitslocked to his command, the State Guard increased to nearly18,000 men. For nine days, Price’s orce besieged the townand pinned down the small Union garrison o 3,800 Federalsunder Col. James A. Mulligan. he town ell on 20 Septemberwhen a majority o Colonel Mulligan’s subordinate oicers voted to surrender.

General Frémont’s ailure to reinorce the garrison at

Lexington lef him open to criticism. He responded quicklyand pushed 30,000 troops west rom St. Louis to conront theMissouri State Guard. Price realized that his position was unten-able and ell back toward the Arkansas line ahead o Frémont’sadvance. In late October, the Federals marched into Springfield.

General Frémont (Library of Congress)


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Frémont provoked controversy with a declaration o martiallaw, alienating many civilians and politicians. His decision toconfiscate the property o Conederate sympathizers, includingslaves, exceeded his authority as department commander. On 2November, President Lincoln relieved him and appointed Maj.Gen. David Hunter to command. Hunter withdrew the army tothe Sedalia-Rolla line and scattered his orces across the centraland eastern portions o the state. Meanwhile, Price’s State Guardsecured positions around Springfield.

On 19 November, the War Department transerred GeneralHunter to command the Department o Kansas and appointedMaj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck in his place. Nicknamed “Old

Brains,” Halleck oten took a theoretical approach to war andapplied his considerable intellectual prowess to solving militaryproblems. In Missouri, he recognized the need to secure St.Louis as the base o operations or a spring campaign to controlthe Mississippi River. Accordingly, he designed a campaign to“drive Price rom the state,” thereby ridding Missouri o theConederate threat and releasing Union troops or operationsto secure the Mississippi.

On 25 December, Halleck appointed Brig. Gen. Samuel R.Curtis to command the Military District o Southwest Missouriand instructed him to lead the 12,000-man Army o the Southwestagainst Price. In mid-January 1862, Curtis organized his orces atLebanon, some fify miles southwest o his supply base at Rollaand sixty miles northeast o Springfield, his immediate objective.Curtis appointed General Sigel second-in-command and gavehim control o a corps o two small divisions: the 1st Division

under Col. Peter J. Osterhaus, a Prussian, and the 2d Divisionunder Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Asboth, a Hungarian. A largenumber o German immigrants rom St. Louis made up thesedivisions, and Curtis took Sigel’s German ethnicity into consider-ation. Nevertheless, relations between Curtis and Sigel remainedstrained or the duration o the campaign. Te rest o the armyconsisted o the 3d Division under Col. Jefferson C. Davis, aregular Army veteran rom Indiana, and the 4th Division, led by

Col. Eugene A. Carr.Curtis’ advance units approached Springfield on 12 Februaryand took the Conederates by surprise. Price had not anticipated awinter offensive by the Federals and had ailed to prepare adequateortifications. He had 8,000 men at Springfield, but with General


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McCulloch’s command inNorthwest Arkansas, theConederates could not effecta concentration in time.Price ordered an expeditiousretreat down the elegraphRoad toward the state line.Curtis paused in Springfieldlong enough to secure thetown and then pursued Price.For Curtis and Halleck,possession o Springfield itsel

meant little without puttingan end to the Conederatepresence in Missouri, andthat meant the destruction oPrice’s army.

With Price in flight,Curtis had to take decisive action to catch the Conederatesbeore they escaped Missouri. He disregarded Halleck’s admo-

nition to keep his orces together and, at Sigel’s behest, dividedthe army. Curtis pushed the 3d and 4th Divisions down theelegraph Road while Sigel’s command moved along a parallelseries o roads to the west in an attempt to get in ront o Price.Snow, ice, and reezing conditions slowed the movement o bothcolumns. A Missouri Conederate noted that “snow was all overus, and our clothes rozen to our bodies.” Curtis ailed to preventPrice’s escape, and on 16 February, the Conederates crossed

into Arkansas. Rather than stop at the state line, however, Curtiscontinued the pursuit.Just inside Arkansas, the Federals encountered stiff resis-

tance near Little Sugar Creek. Unbeknownst to Curtis, elements oMcCulloch’s command under Col. Louis Hebert had come up tosupport Price. Curtis halted pursuit and took stock o his situation.Already 250 miles rom the supply depot at Rolla he did not wantto extend his lines o communications deeper into enemy territory,

particularly i, as he suspected, the Conederates were in strongorce. Halleck instructed Curtis to secure his position and awaitsupport. Meanwhile, the Conederates evacuated Fayetteville,Arkansas, and concentrated their orces twenty-five miles to thesouth in the Boston Mountains.

General Curtis(Library of Congress)


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Te Conederates had a new commander, Maj. Gen. EarlVan Dorn, an impetuous U.S. Military Academy graduaterom Mississippi. Recent squabbles between generals Price andMcCulloch concerning troop dispositions and command respon-sibilities had prompted Conederate President Jefferson Davis todesignate the rans-Mississippias a separate military districtand to appoint an overallcommander. Van Dorn arrivedin late January and consoli-dated the orces o McCulloch,Price, some exas cavalry units,

and a brigade o AmericanIndians under Brig. Gen. AlbertPike, to create a new army, the16,000-man Army o the West.Van Dorn planned a springcampaign to capture St. Louis.Te Federals, however, hadseized the initiative and by the

end o February, Curtis heldthe road network in northwestArkansas as well as good deen-sive ground behind Little SugarCreek along a broad plateauknown as Pea Ridge.

Van Dorn devised a planto regain the strategic initiative by destroying the Union Army o

the Southwest. He would first strike Sigel’s orce at Bentonville,Arkansas, then turn east to all on Curtis. Once Van Dorn disposedo the Federals in northwest Arkansas, he would have a clearroad to Springfield and St. Louis. Van Dorn’s plan to concentratesuperior orce against divided elements o the enemy was sound.In addition, the Conederates had the element o surprise workingin their avor. However, bad weather, a lack o supplies, and poorstaff work undermined Conederate efforts.

Van Dorn’s army advanced rom the Boston Mountains on 4March, but the next day Unionists in northwest Arkansas alertedCurtis to the rebel movements. On 6 March Curtis concentratedhis troops at a ortified position astride the elegraph Road, northo Little Sugar Creek. When General Van Dorn neared Bentonville,

General Van Dorn(Library of Congress)


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he realized that Sigel had fled and that Curtis had concentrated hisarmy in a deensive position to the east. Tat night at a council-o-war, General McCulloch identified a road called the BentonvilleDetour that ran around Curtis’ right and led to the elegraph Roadnear Cross imber Hollow, five miles to the rear o the Unionposition. McCulloch suggested a flanking movement with parto the rebel army to orce Curtis out o his entrenchments andcompel his retreat to Missouri. Van Dorn, however, envisioneda grand flanking maneuver with his entire command to envelopthe enemy position completely and orce Curtis to surrender.Van Dorn ordered the Conederates to begin the operation atonce, although McCulloch and Price protested that the men were

exhausted and hungry. Nevertheless, by 2400, the Conederateswere on the march.

Meanwhile, the Federals did not stand by idly and awaitattack. On the afernoon o 6 March, Curtis created deensivepositions that commanded clear fields o fire to his ront andflanks. He also secured avenues o approach on all sides. At thesuggestion o Col. Grenville M. Dodge, he ordered trees elledacross the Bentonville Detour to slow any Conederate attempt

at a flanking maneuver.By dawn, only General Price’s command had reached the

elegraph Road in the rear o Curtis’ line, while McCulloch’s menremained strung out along the Bentonville Detour. Realizing thatMcCulloch could not reach the staging ground at Cross imberHollow until midafernoon, Van Dorn divided the army. Heordered Price to move south along the elegraph Road to theElkhorn avern. Meanwhile, McCulloch would march two and

a hal miles along the Ford Road, a arm lane that ran east belowthe southern ace o a sprawling hill known as Big Mountain. Tepath would carry McCulloch to the elegraph Road just belowElkhorn avern and two miles above Curtis at Little Sugar Creek.At that point, McCulloch and Price would reunite to conrontthe Federals.

On the morning o 7 March, Curtis expected the mainConederate attack to come rom the south against his ront. He

realized, however, that a contingent o Conederates had indeedturned his right. Tereore, he ordered Colonel Osterhaus, whosedivision held the Union right, to conduct a reconnaissance inorce, advancing north rom Little Sugar Creek toward Leetownand the Bentonville Detour. (See Map 4.)


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Moving north along the Leetown Road, Osterhaus spottedseveral thousand Conederates marching directly across hisront headed east on the Ford Road toward the elegraph Road.He realized that this was not a diversionary orce but GeneralMcCulloch’s entire command, over 8,000 strong. “I could nothesitate in my course o action” Osterhaus reported, “the saetyo our position was dependent upon the securing o our rightflank and the keeping back o the enemy until I was re-enorced.”He deployed several companies o his cavalry under Col. CyrusBussey into line o battle and, with his artillery, opened onthe Conederates. Te attack took the latter by surprise, butMcCulloch deployed 3,000 cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. James

M. McIntosh, whose charge routed the outmanned Federals.Osterhaus brought up reinorcements, ormed a line at Oberson’sField, and directed his artillery to fire over the trees at theConederates occupying Foster’s arm.

Despite his initial repulse, Osterhaus had accomplishedhis immediate objective o delaying the Conederate attemptto concentrate at Elkhorn avern. Rather than risk leaving aFederal orce in his rear, McCulloch decided to stay and fight.

Beore ordering his attack to commence, however, he was killedreconnoitering the Federal lines. Command devolved to General

Battle of Pea Ridge, Ark.(Library of Congress)


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McIntosh, who sent orders to launch the attack. McIntosh chose tolead rom the ront, and in the course o the attack he too ell. Teloss o two commanding officers in ewer than two hours stunnedthe division. Leaderless, and without a clear understanding o theobjectives, Conederate field officers pulled their troops back.

Conederate command ell on Colonel Hebert, whoseArkansas brigade held the flank east o the Leetown Road. Hebertdid not know what had happened to the rebels across the road,and poor communications lef him unaware o his new status asdivision commander. Upon hearing the fire to the west, Hebertsent his brigade orward. Te thick woods disrupted the brigade’salignment and they soon came under fire rom Union artillery. Te

Federals held back the Conederates or nearly orty-five minutesuntil Hebert’s superior numbers began to turn the fight in his avor.When the Conederates broke through the battery, Indiana troopsunder Col. Tomas Patterson arrived and the Federals pitchedinto the rebel’s lef flank as other regiments opened on the enemyright. Under fire rom three sides, the unsupported Conederatesell back in disorder as the Federals took numerous prisoners,including Colonel Hebert. Colonel Osterhaus thus had achieved

East front of the Elkhorn Tavern, Pea Ridge, c.1886(Library of Congress)


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two objectives—he had secured the right flank o the Union armyby uncovering the Conederate turning movement and he hadprevented the rebels rom concentrating both wings o GeneralVan Dorn’s army in Curtis’ rear.

As the ighting unolded at Leetown, General Curtisreceived word o a Southern orce massing several miles to hisrear along the elegraph Road in Cross imber Hollow. Curtisdiscerned the Conederate strategy and took steps to addressthe threat to his rear. He ordered Colonel Carr, commandero the 4th Division, to send Colonel Dodge’s brigade northon the elegraph Road to the Elkhorn avern, a way stationthat stood at the southern edge o Cross imber Hollow on

the Pea Ridge plateau. Dodge posted his men along the highground overlooking the approach to Pea Ridge. His let restedbetween the tavern and a rise known as Big Mountain whilehis right extended east along the Huntsville Road. Carr hadthe bulk o the Union army to his rear with an unknownConederate orce to his ront. Despite the avorable ground,Carr recognized the need or more men to secure the position,and Curtis instructed him to bring up the rest o his division,

a brigade under Col. William Vandever. Around 1200, asVandever deployed his inantry, Carr ordered a battery to ireon suspected Conederate positions about one-hal mile away.Rebel guns promptly returned the ire.

Te sudden firing took both the Federals and Conederatesby surprise. Carr did not expect to discover hal o the Conederatearmy deployed into line o battle north o his ront, while Priceand Van Dorn did not anticipate meeting the Federals until they

neared Little Sugar Creek. For over two hours firing filled thehollows with dense smoke. Price was shot in the arm but remainedin command o his division. Although the Conederates outnum-bered Carr’s orce by over two-to-one, the Federals held the highground, and Van Dorn did not press the advantage. Unaware othe troubles along Ford Road, he undoubtedly hoped McCullochwould arrive to unhinge the Federal lef at Elkhorn avern. Onlyafer learning o the battle at Leetown did Van Dorn shif to the

tactical offensive. He instructed Price to ascend Pea Ridge and rollup the Union right flank on the Huntsville Road while Col. LewisHenry Little’s Missouri brigade attacked the Federal lef at Elkhornavern. I successul, the Conederates would crush the Federalsin a vise.


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Te assault got underway late in the afernoon. On the Unionright, Colonel Dodge anticipated the Conederates and orderedhis brigade to reuse its thin line. Dodge’s inantry held a strongposition along a belt o woods bordering the Clemons Field, butwith only two guns, he could do little to answer Price’s artillery.Afer enduring nearly twenty minutes o shot and shell, Dodge’smen braced or Conederate inantry. General Price committedhis troops piecemeal, and the Federals repelled the attack. Pricerepeated the pattern o artillery ollowed by inantry but againailed to utilize his numerical strength, and the Conederates ellback a second time. Finally, Price used the woods to conceal themovement o a portion o his command while another contingent

struck Dodge’s brigade head on. Te Federals gave ground grudg-ingly and retreated toward the elegraph Road.

Tings were no better or Colonel Vandever’s brigade on theUnion lef as the Conederates seized Elkhorn avern. ColonelCarr ordered a retreat and his division withdrew down theelegraph Road or nearly one-hal mile beore officers directedthem to re-orm along the woods south o Ruddick’s cornfield.Vandever’s brigade held a position with their lef on the elegraph

Road and Dodge’s brigade to their right.Te Conederate pursuit was ragged, and at dusk elements o

Price’s division finally emerged rom the woods north o Ruddick’sfield. Tey ound the Federals in line o battle supported by thirteenguns. Flush rom the rout at Elkhorn avern and undeterred by thestrong Union position, the rebels advanced across the field. Manyo Price’s Missourians wore newly issued, undyed, wool uniormsthat stood out as bright white against the darkness, and Union

musketry cut them down by the score. Again, the Conederatesailed to take advantage o superior numbers and ell back intothe woods. During the fighting General Curtis arrived on the fieldand, sensing a chance to regain ground around Elkhorn avern,personally led some 500 reinorcements up the elegraph Road.He ordered Dodge to take the 4th Iowa Inantry and join the sortiebut as the troops pushed orward, Conederate artillery opened onthem, and the Federals ell back.

In the day’s fighting around Elkhorn avern, the Conederateshad squandered numerous opportunities. Van Dorn’s ailure to imme-diately seize the tactical initiative in Cross imber Hollow gave Curtistime to shif Carr rom Little Sugar Creek to Elkhorn avern anddelay the Conederate advance. Once the Conederates launched an


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all out attack, Carr made good use o the terrain and, rather than yieldthe ground to superior numbers, orced Van Dorn to claw his way uprom Cross imber Hollow to Pea Ridge. By the time the fighting onthe Huntsville Road and at Elkhorn avern became general, Curtisknew that he had been turned and took steps to reorient his ront180 degrees rom Little Sugar Creek to ace the Conederate threatrom the north. Nevertheless, the Conederates could have pushedthe Federals at Ruddick’s Field, but they again ailed to bring superiornumbers to bear. Personal gallantry notwithstanding, Curtis displayedstrong, i not deliberate leadership and, despite the bold vision o hisSouthern counterpart, out-generaled Van Dorn.

Troughout the night o 7 March, the Federals completed their

redeployment o the ace o their ront rom south to north andsent the army’s supply trains to saety south o Little Sugar Creek.General Curtis also recalled Colonel Davis’ division rom Leetownto extend Carr’s lef across the elegraph Road south o Ruddick’sField. General Van Dorn attempted to consolidate his orces alongthe elegraph Road below Elkhorn avern, but by dawn, nearlyhal o the troops rom Leetown had not arrived. He positionedMcCulloch’s men, now under General Pike, astride the elegraph

Road but divided General Price’s division, placing the Missouri StateGuard on the eastern flank and the 1st and 2d Missouri brigadesto the west. Moreover, the wooded heights known as Big Mountainhemmed in the Conederate right and constrained inantry move-ments. Although Big Mountain was a poor place or inantry, itprovided a strong artillery platorm. Yet, Van Dorn either ailed torecognize this or simply did not oresee the need to turn this terrainto his advantage. Further complicating the situation or Van Dorn,

Conederate trains made a wrong turn on the Bentonville Detourand had moved away rom the elegraph Road. Consequently, atdawn on 8 March, the Conederate ranks were thin and poorlyaligned, as well as short o ood, medicine, and munitions.

Te Federals expected Van Dorn to initiate battle at dawn,but when a Conederate advance ailed to materialize, ColonelDavis unleashed his artillery to probe the enemy position northo Ruddick’s Field ( Map 5). Te Conederates returned a concen-

trated artillery barrage toward Davis’ position, and the Federal lefor western flank began to bend back. Te artillery duel had uncov-ered the Conederate position, and Curtis sensed an opportunityto take the tactical initiative. He directed General Sigel to hurryhis divisions rom Little Sugar Creek and orm on the lef o Davis’


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A S B O T H

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Elkhorn Tavern

Clemens

Pratt’s Store

Winston

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Leetown

Confederate Position

Confederate Retreat

Union Position

0 1 2

Miles

DAY 2

8 March 1862

B AT T L E O F P E A R I D G E

MAP 5


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division. Sigel moved quickly and placed Osterhaus’ divisionbetween Davis’ lef and a rise o ground, later called Weley’s Knoll,while General Asboth aligned his command at a slight angle lefo Osterhaus’ men. Te Union line soon stretched nearly one mileand extended past the Conederate flanks. Moreover, the Unionhad more guns and a strong artillery platorm. Around 0800, withdeployments completed, Curtis ordered the artillery to open aheado the inantry advance.

Afer a two-hour artillery battle Van Dorn realized the situationwas hopeless and ordered a retreat eastward on the Huntsville Roadbeore directing his army to march south to Van Buren, some onehundred miles distant. roops already in line o battle would fight a

rear guard action to protect the withdrawal and then join the retreat.About 1030, 10,000 Federal troops advanced against rebels at theElkhorn avern. In the ace o the onslaught, the Conederate linecollapsed, precipitating a conused and disorderly rebel retreat. Teconusion actually worked to the rebels’ advantage. Te Federals didnot know in which direction Van Dorn’s main orce had fled, and soCurtis did not launch a ull-scale pursuit.

Te battle was costly to both sides. O the 10,250 engaged, the

Federals suffered 1,384 casualties, a rate o 14 percent. Casualtieswere worse or the Conederates as Van Dorn lost 2,000 o the12,500 men engaged, a 16 percent casualty rate. wo weeks later,when most o the Conederates reached Van Buren, the Army othe West was a shell o its ormer sel with limited combat capabili-ties and little esprit de corps. For the Conederates, the campaignto regain Missouri had been a disaster. For the Federals, however,the Pea Ridge Campaign had accomplished its dual objectives o

destroying Price’s army and saving Missouri or the Union, at leastor the time being.Te Union Army o the Southwest moved east to secure the

Missouri border while Van Dorn’s army crossed the Mississippi,intending to join Conederate orces at Corinth or operationsagainst Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant in ennessee. Van Dorn’sremoval lef the Conederates in the rans-Mississippi without anorganized military orce to contest Union troop movements. With

the Conederate Army o the West gone, Halleck believed Curtiscould capture Little Rock, the capital o Arkansas, with relative easebut this was not the case. One o the unintended consequences oVan Dorn’s withdrawal was the emergence o guerrilla warare inArkansas. Conederate partisans, many o whom had deserted


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the Army o the West, waged a bloody campaign to protecttheir homeland rom invasion, occupation, and subjugation.Conederate irregulars ambushed supply trains, harassed oragingparties, and executed captured Union soldiers. Despite a lack ocentralized control, Arkansas guerrillas brought Curtis’ advance toa standstill at Batesville, ninety miles north o Little Rock.

In May, the Conederate War Department gave thecommand o the rans-Mississippi District to Maj. Gen. TomasC. Hindman. A skilled administrator, Hindman had built a newConederate orce o some 12,000 troops, dubbed the Army othe rans-Mississippi. Empowered by the Partisan Ranger Act,passed by the Conederate congress six weeks earlier, he imme-

diately assembled various partisan units and small companieso volunteers to operate with little guidance and oversight. Teadded pressure rom Hindman’s rangers was more than Curtis’Northern army could endure. With Union lines o communica-tions rom Rolla in ruin, Curtis abandoned plans to reach LittleRock and instead turned his attention to Helena. Forced to liveoff the land, he implemented a policy o total war as he thun-dered down the White River, destroying everything in his path

including civilian property.As or Conederate parti-sans, Curtis characterizedthem as villainous assas-sins and authorized Unioncommanders to show noquarter. On 12 July, Curtis’Army o the Southwest took

Helena and re-establishedsupply lines with Federalorces on the Mississippi.

By June 1862, theConederate War Departmentexpanded General Hindman’sauthority to include theDepartment o the rans-

Mississippi, encompassing allConederate territory west othe Mississippi River. Havingoiled the Union offensive,he turned his attention to

General Hindman(Library of Congress)


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rebuilding a conventional orce. His draconian approach, however,angered many in the Department, and in August, Richmonddemoted Hindman to command o the Arkansas District andappointed Maj. Gen. Teophilus H. Holmes, a veteran o theregular Army, as commander o the Department o the rans-Mississippi. Hindman persuaded Holmes to renew the offen-sive against Springfield by going on the offensive in NorthwestArkansas.

Reports o Conederate cavalry activity drew General Curtis’attention to southwest Missouri. He instructed Brig. Gen. John M.Schofield to secure the Missouri-Arkansas border and eliminateany Conederate orce in the area. Schofield took the newly ormed

Army o the Frontier into the region and scattered the small orceo Conederates there. He posted two divisions at Springfield and athird seventy-five miles south at Maysville, Arkansas. Complainingo illness, he returned to St. Louis, leaving Brig. Gen. James G.Blunt in command. Upon learning o Blunt’s exposed position inArkansas, Curtis advised him to all back toward Springfield, butthe counsel went unheeded.

In November, with the Army o the rans-Mississippi concen-

trated at Fort Smith, Arkansas, Hindman seized what he saw as anopportunity to destroy the Union Army o the Frontier, startingwith Blunt. He sent 2,000 cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. John S.Marmaduke to screen the Conederate advance. At the same time,Blunt pushed his 5,000-man division south to probe Conederatedispositions. Te orces clashed on 28 November at Cane Hill.Te Federals won a tactical victory, but Blunt’s advanced positionlef him even more vulnerable and over one hundred miles rom

support. Still, afer the fighting, he remained at Cane Hill. Blunt’sdecision was imprudent and needlessly put the security o hiscommand and o southwest Missouri at risk.

On 3 December, Hindman moved to take advantage o Blunt’sexposed position. His plan called or inantry to strike the orceat Cane Hill, while cavalry rode east to gain the Federal rear andcompel Blunt to surrender. Although Hindman’s plan was techni-cally sound, his army was ill prepared or the operation. Most o

his men were green recruits or conscripts, and many shoulderedinerior smoothbore muskets. Moreover, munitions and othersupplies were insufficient to conduct the campaign effectively.

Meanwhile, Blunt sent word or Brig. Gen. Francis J. Herron,in command o two Union divisions in Springfield, to move his


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orce south to Cane Hill at once. Herron led his 7,000 men on aorced march rom Springfield, and arrived in Fayetteville beoredawn on 7 December, having covered some 115 miles at a pace oover 35 miles per day. Hindman learned o Herron’s advance on thenight o 6 December but was not sure o his numerical strength.Nevertheless, he could not strike Blunt as planned with a Federalorce in position to all on his rear. He thereore decided to moveeast and attack Herron’s command beore it reached Cane Hill.

General Hindman moved his army to Prairie Grove, tenmiles southwest o Fayetteville, and took up a deensive positionon the hills overlooking the Illinois River and commanding theroad to Cane Hill. When Herron’s divisions arrived, the column

came under fire rom Conederate batteries on the ridge. Herrondeployed his rifled guns along the Illinois River beyond reacho Conederate smoothbore cannon and destroyed Hindman’sbatteries. Federal inantry attacked the Conederate position,and throughout the morning, the armies struggled or controlo the high ground. Meanwhile, at Cane Hill, Blunt remainedunaware o Herron’s predicament until the sounds o battle drewhim toward Fayetteville. His Federals arrived at Prairie Grove

afer 1200, and attacked the Conederate lef, just as Herronbegan to alter. Hindman repulsed Blunt’s attack but could notexploit his advantage. As dusk approached, the battle came to aninconclusive end.

Hindman asked or a cease-fire to retrieve his casualties,and Blunt agreed. Te truce was a ruse, however, and in the earlyhours o 8 December, Hindman withdrew his army to Fort Smith.During the retreat, many Conederates deserted, disillusioned with

Hindman and the Conederacy. Blunt was urious and accusedHindman o unchivalrous conduct. He declared victory and, inlate December, moved to take Van Buren and Fort Smith, bothin northwest Arkansas. Hindman retreated south o the ArkansasRiver and then turned east toward Little Rock.

Although Prairie Grove ended as a tactical draw, it was anotherstrategic Union victory. Te battle decimated Hindman’s army andthereby crippled the Conederacy’s ability to wage an effective

campaign or Missouri. Missouri and much o Arkansas wouldremain in Union hands or the rest o the war. Te Federals helda firm grip on the area north o the Arkansas River rom Indianerritory to the Mississippi River. In January 1863, they capturedFort Hindman, 117 miles southeast o Little Rock at Arkansas Post.


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In September, Little Rock andPine Bluff ell, and Union orcessecured control o the ArkansasRiver Valley. Tese Union victo-ries confined Southern orces tothe southwest corner o the state.

For the Conederates, ailureat Prairie Grove led to Hindman’stranser east and a shake-up incommand or the Department othe rans-Mississippi. Richmondreduced General Holmes to the

Arkansas district command andappointed Lt. Gen. EdmundKirby Smith to head the depart-ment. Kirby Smith was a WestPoint graduate and regular Army veteran, known across the South

or his timely arrival at First Manassas, his organizational skills as adepartment commander in East ennessee, and his role in the 1862

Kentucky Campaign.

THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN: THE STRUGGLE

FOR LOUISIANA AND TEXAS

Along with St. Louis, New Orleans was a key componentin the Union strategy to control the Mississippi River. Withoutcontrol o the lower Mississippi and the Gul Coast region, theUnited States could not project its military power in that sector

o the rans-Mississippi. Te capture o New Orleans in April1862 opened the door or the Union to push north rom themouth o the Mississippi while other Federal orces drove southalong the river rom Missouri, Arkansas, and ennessee. At thattime, the U. S. War Department began discussions regarding acampaign into exas. Establishing a military presence in exaswould compel the Conederates to divert manpower rom othertheaters to meet the threat. Beyond that, the occupation o exas

would deprive Southern orces east o the Mississippi o animportant source o ood, animals, and raw materials.Other voices also called or a exas campaign. Many Northern

politicians argued that the large German immigrant population inexas would support the Union as volunteers or military service

General Kirby Smith(Library of Congress)


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and as voters to re-establish apro-Union state government.Economic and business inter-ests also exerted pressure on theLincoln administration to invadeexas. Te Northern textileindustry suffered rom a cottonshortage that shuttered nearlythree-quarters o the nation’smills and ueled both unemploy-ment and inflation. o manyEastern industrialists, control

o the exas cotton fields heldthe solution to their economicwoes. For all o these reasons, inOctober 1862, Secretary o WarEdwin M. Stanton instructedMaj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks toprepare or an invasion o theLone Star state.

On 14 December 1862, Banks arrived in New Orleans ascommander o the Department o the Gul. A ormer governoro Massachusetts and United States Congressman, Banks receivedthe appointment or his political aptitude and not his militaryachievements. His orders were to secure the western side o theMississippi River Valley, cooperate with General Grant in gainingcontrol o the Mississippi River, and then turn toward exas. oachieve these ends, General Banks commanded the XIX Corps

with our divisions made up primarily o recent volunteers romNew England and New York. Nearly hal o the 42,000 troops underhis command had enlisted or nine months, and ew possessed anyprior military experience. Banks deployed 40,000 troops in NewOrleans or operations along the Mississippi, while the remaindergarrisoned in Pensacola.

Banks directed most o his attention to developing a campaignalong the Mississippi but elt beholden to the “on-to-exas” contin-

gent o politicians and cotton speculators that had accompaniedhim to New Orleans. Accordingly, he dispatched 300 men rom the42d Massachusetts Inantry to support a small Federal orce thatheld a tenuous oothold in Galveston, exas. Te Conederates’exas district commander, Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, devised a

General Banks(Library of Congress)


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two-pronged attack on the port city that called or approximately1,000 dismounted cavalry troops to strike the Federal garrison byland while two cotton-clad gunboats, manned by 300 sharpshooters,slipped into Galveston Bay and engaged the six Union shipsprotecting the ortifications.

At dawn on New Year’s Day 1863, Magruder’s joint orcestruck the Union outpost. Although the overland attack ailed,Conederate ships inflicted significant damage to their Unioncounterparts. With two Union gunboats crippled, the remaindero the warships steamed to saety in the Gul. Te outnumbered42d Massachusetts surrendered, and the Conederates regainedcontrol o Galveston and the exas coastline. For the moment,

Union occupation o exas would have to wait as Banks turned hisocus to the reduction o Port Hudson, the Conederate ortress onthe Mississippi between Baton Rouge and Vicksburg.

As Banks probed the avenues o advance rom New Orleans toPort Hudson, a small Conederate orce in south central Louisianamenaced his lines o communications. In the District o WesternLouisiana, Maj. Gen. Richard aylor commanded two Conederatedivisions o exans and Louisianans, many o whom were fighting

in deense o their hometowns. Te son o ormer United StatesPresident Zachary aylor andbrother-in-law o ConederatePresident Davis, aylor hadserved as a brigadier generalunder “Stonewall” Jacksonin the Shenandoah Valley.Recently transerred to

district command in his homestate, he engineered sortiesthat orced Banks to divert hisattention rom Port Hudson.Banks detached 16,000 menin two divisions and onebrigade to clean the Bayoueche region o Conederates

in a campaign conductedrom early April through lateMay 1863. Te region wassome sixty miles west o theMississippi River in the south

General Taylor (Library of Congress)


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central portion o Louisiana, and the Bayou eche flowed or 120miles south rom Opelousas to join the Atchaalaya River belowGrand Lake, west o New Orleans.

By 9 April, the Federals reached Fort Bisland, the Conederateworks west o Grand Lake on the Bayou eche. Banks divided hisorce and, using naval transports on Grand Lake, orced aylor’swithdrawal rom Fort Bisland. Te Conederates moved up thebayou, deep into the Louisiana interior. Te Federals pushednorth all the way to Alexandria, just above the confluence o theMississippi and the Red River.

In early May, as General Grant stepped up his campaign totake Vicksburg, Banks installed his army as an occupation orce

and began to probe the area beyond Alexandria or pathways intoexas. His oray deep into Louisiana concerned the Union highcommand. His army had already cleared aylor’s troops rom theeche region and, in doing so, had cut Port Hudson’s supply linerom the Louisiana interior. Banks’ current operations, however,had little to do with his primary mission to clear the lowerMississippi, and rom Washington, D.C., General in Chie o theU.S. Army Halleck called the activities at Alexandria “too eccen-

tric to be pursued.” He demanded that Banks move against PortHudson immediately. On 14 May, Banks marched his commandtoward the Mississippi. By the time he arrived, one week later, hehad concentrated 30,000 Federal troops against 7,500 Conederatesat Port Hudson.

Despite the numerical discrepancy, the Conederate positionwas strong. Te ortifications stretched across high ground, whilethe terrain surrounding the position was swampy and choked

with thick underbrush that provided poor fields o fire and ewavenues o advance or an attacking orce. Moreover, interior linesallowed the talented Conederate commander, Maj. Gen. FranklinK. Gardner, to shif his troops and mass his firepower as needed.Banks devised a plan to offset Gardner’s interior lines by orderinga simultaneous assault along the entire Conederate position. Heassigned Brig. Gen. Tomas W. Sherman to lead the lef wing andBrig. Gen. Godrey Weitzel the right wing. Maj. Gen. Christopher

C. Augur and Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover would direct the attackagainst the Conederate center. Although Banks’ subordinatesdisagreed on the wisdom o the plan, arguing instead or a siege,the commanding general insisted, “Te people o the North wantblood,” and he ordered the attack to proceed.


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On 27 May at 0530, Federal batteries and gunboats beganshelling Port Hudson, but the inantry assault ailed to unold asplanned. Weitzel’s right wing moved against the northern flanko the Conederate line at 0600 but the terrain disrupted unitcohesion. Moreover, Union orces in the center and on the lef ailedto move in concert with the right wing, thus allowing Gardner toshif troops to meet each threat in turn. Te Union lef wing didnot get under way until afer 1200, and by then the Conederateshad repulsed Weitzel’s attack and secured the northern sector. TeUnion lef wing thus aced a reinorced Conederate line, whichthe Federals were unable to break. Sherman ell wounded and wascarried rom the field. Similarly, at the center, Augur waited or

direct orders to advance and did not move until afer Sherman’srepulse, while Grover’s men did not advance until 1500. By then,the deenders had blunted the uncoordinated Union assault, andBanks broke off the fighting.

Te Conederates counted ewer than 500 casualties, whileFederal losses numbered over 2,000 and included some AricanAmerican troops rom the 1st and 3d Louisiana Native Guardorganized in the all o 1862. Tese regiments were in Col. John A.

Nelson’s brigade o Brig. Gen. William Dwight’s division and sawaction as part o the Union right wing.

Following the assaults o 27 May, General Banks settled inor a siege. On 14 June, he ordered an attack against a portion othe Conederate center at Fort Desperate but could not break theSouthern lines. Te Conederates held on at Port Hudson untilreceiving word that Vicksburg had allen on 4 July. On 9 July, PortHudson surrendered. With the Mississippi River in Union hands,

Banks returned his attention to exas.By the summer o 1863, a new development added to the urgencyo the exas mission. French Emperor Napoleon III had invadedMexico in 1861, and in June 1863, his troops captured Mexico City.Rumblings o a possible Franco-Conederate alliance worried theLincoln administration. Union control o exas would do much todissuade the French rom aiding the Conederates, and the conquesto exas was thereore o increasing importance to President Lincoln.

General Banks examined a variety o invasion routes andavored an amphibious landing on the Gul Coast over a campaignthrough the Louisiana interior. In August, he devised a plan tomove elements o the XIX Corps on naval transports to SabinePass, a lightly deended position on the Gul at the border o


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exas and Louisiana. Once theFederals gained control o thepass, they would use the area asa staging ground or a ull-scaleinvasion o exas, while theNavy protected supply lines onthe Gul and up the Sabine River.

Banks gave Maj. Gen.William B. Franklin commando the expedition. Franklinwas a West Point graduatewhose lackluster perormance

at Fredericksburg in 1862 hadearned him a transer to therans-Mississippi. Nonetheless,with elements o the XIIICorps arriving in New Orleans,ostensibly to replace troopswhose enlistments had recentlyexpired, Banks reorganized the XIX Corps and gave Franklin the

command. On 4 September, an invasion orce o 5,000 bluecoatsboarded transports and, accompanied by several gunboats, setout or the Sabine Pass.

On 7 September, the flotilla reached the pass without incident,but the ollowing day brought disaster. Conederate Lt. RichardW. “Dick” Dowling, a young Irish immigrant, held the positionwith just orty-two men, mostly Irish-born exans, and twelveguns. Dowling’s artillery controlled the channel, and it decimated

the Union orce, disabling 2 ships and inflicting 375 casualties,while the Conederates did not lose a single man. Franklin aban-doned the mission and returned to New Orleans. exas districtcommander General Magruder called Dowling’s perormance “themost extraordinary eat o the war.”

Afer the fiasco at Sabine Pass, Banks designed overlap-ping operations or exas and Louisiana. In October 1863, heordered General Franklin into the eche region with instructions

to advance to Opelousas, the temporary Conederate capital oLouisiana. Once Franklin reached that point, the Federals couldcontinue to move northwest and reach exas by way o the RedRiver, or turn west and strike or the Sabine River. Franklin’scolumn moved cautiously as enemy cavalry slashed at its flanks

General Franklin(Library of Congress)


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and rear. When the outnumbered Conederates offered battle nearOpelousas, Franklin ordered a retreat.

At the same time, Banks sent another amphibious expeditionto Brownsville, exas. Across the Rio Grande rom Matamoras,Brownsville was a trade center or cotton, munitions, andmedicine. Te 2d Division o the XIII Corps took Brownsvilleon 6 November and installed Andrew Jackson Hamilton, a exasUnionist, as provisional governor. Te Federals now controlled thelower Rio Grande valley rom Brownsville up to Laredo but ailedto shut down illicit trade or win over civilians to the Union occu-pation. In the spring o 1864, General Magruder sent Col. JohnSalmon “Rip” Ford to retake the lower Rio Grande Valley. Ford was

a ormer exas Ranger and politician, who orged a colorul collec-tion o state troops, conscripts, home guard, deserters, partisans,outlaws, and civilians, ranging rom teenagers to old men, into hissel-styled Cavalry o the West. Urging his men to deend theirhomes against the “mongrel orce” o Union invaders, Ford inchedhis 1,800-man orce south rom San Antonio toward Laredo andthen east toward Brownsville. In late June, a 400-man Conederatereconnaissance orce clashed

with Union troops outsideo Brownsville. Ford learnedthat ewer than hal o the6,000 Union troops remainedat Fort Brown. For threeweeks, he prepared to attackthe ort, but in late July, helearned that the Federals had

evacuated Brownsville.Meanwhile, GeneralHalleck started to pressureBanks to invade exasthrough Louisiana alongthe Red River. Halleckpromised to provide Bankswith support rom Maj. Gen.

Frederick Steele’s Army oArkansas and rom Maj. Gen.William . Sherman’s Armyo the ennessee. In addition,President Lincoln endorsed

General Steele(National Archives)


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a Red River campaign, in part because Banks could use Louisianaas a laboratory or the administration’s reconstruction policy. Banksconsented and, with Halleck’s direction, began to draw up plans orthe campaign.

Te Army o the Gul would provide most o the manpoweror the expedition with over 18,000 men under Banks’ command.General Franklin would lead the XIX Corps with Brig. Gen. WilliamH. Emory’s 1st Division and Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee’s CavalryDivision. Brig. Gen. Tomas E. G. Ransom would command adetachment rom the XIII Corps that included the 3d Divisionunder Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron and the 4th Division underCol. William J. Landram. Te expedition would draw on an addi-

tional 11,000 men rom the XVI and XVII Corps o the Army othe ennessee. Brig. Gen. Andrew Jackson Smith, a Pennsylvanian,West Point graduate, and regular Army veteran, led this contin-gent that included two divisions rom the XVI Corps, the 1st and3d under the command o Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower, along witha provisional division rom the XVII Corps, designated as the 2dDivision under Brig. Gen. Tomas Kilby Smith. Joining A. J. Smith’s

command was Brig. Gen. Alred W.

Ellet’s Mississippi Marine Brigade.Banks planned a massive

pincer movement directed atShreveport, Louisiana, the newcapital o the Conederate rans-Mississippi and the department’sindustrial center. Te XIX andXIII Corps would march rom

Baton Rouge to Alexandria; therethey would unite with General A.J. Smith’s orces. Admiral DavidD. Porter’s fleet o warshipswould accompany these troopsto Alexandria. Porter’s fleet, thelargest ever assembled on NorthAmerican waters, totaled 104

vessels and included an arrayo ironclads, tinclads, rivermonitors, and transports. Onceunited at Alexandria, Banks, A. J.Smith, and Porter would advance

General A. J. Smith(National Archives)


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northwest along the Red River to Shreveport with the navyproviding logistical support as well as firepower. At Shreveport,the Louisiana arm o the campaign would rendezvous with11,000 troops rom Arkansas under General Steele. Tis orceconsisted o the 3d Division o Steele’s VII Corps, a total o 7,000men, and another 4,000 soldiers rom the Army o the Frontierunder Brig. Gen. John M. Tayer. Steele and Tayer would unitetheir orces in the southwest corner o the state at Arkadelphia,the ormer marching southwest rom Little Rock and the lattermarching south rom Fort Smith. From Arkadelphia, they wouldcontinue on to Shreveport and a junction with Banks’ army.Once in Shreveport, a portion o Banks’ orce would march west

into exas, while the remainder occupied the city.Te plan suffered rom poor design with too many elements

lef to chance. While Banks stipulated Shreveport as the objec-tive, he never clearly defined or prioritized the military, political,and economic goals or the campaign. He certainly hoped totake the offensive against enemy orces that totaled less thanone-third o his numbers, but he did not speciy the destruc-tion o the Conederate army in Louisiana as the primary objec-

tive. Moreover, Banks would not achieve concentration until hereached Shreveport. Te multiaceted operation called or precisecoordination and communication between columns separatedby hundreds o miles. Worse yet or Banks, the Northern presspublished the particulars o the invasion plans, and Conederateoperatives in New Orleans provided detailed inormation o theoperation to General aylor. Te lack o security eliminated theelement o surprise. Tis gave the Conederates an opportunity

to utilize interior lines to gain a tactical advantage at a time andplace o their choosing.Internal divisions urther jeopardized the Union plans. While

the campaign included units rom our different armies and romthe navy, General Halleck ailed to appoint a single individualto direct the action. General William . Sherman had offeredto oversee operations, but Banks outranked him, and Shermanreused to serve under an officer o dubious military talent. As a

result, Sherman sent General A. J. Smith to lead the contingentrom the Army o the ennessee. In Arkansas, General Steelewas unenthusiastic about the campaign. He sought to exert hisauthority by continually making unilateral decisions regarding thedisposition o his command and the prosecution o the campaign.


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Te navy added to the internaldissention as Admiral Porterconsidered himsel exemptrom orders, instructions,or suggestions issued by anyarmy officer, particularly roma nonproessional like Banks.General Grant specified thatA. J. Smith’s troops were onloan and that Banks mustreturn them to the Army othe ennessee by 15 April, thus

creating an arbitrary deadlineor the capture o Shreveport.

Beset by a host o problems,the campaign got underwayon 7 March 1864, one weekbehind schedule, when Lee’s5,000 Union cavalry troopersrode out rom Baton Rouge, headed or Alexandria. A. J. Smith’s

Federals lef Vicksburg on 10 March and, along with Porter’s fleet,entered the Red River two days later. Te lead column o Banks’inantry, commanded by General Franklin, set off on 15 March.Te Federals in Arkansas did not begin until 21 March, nearlythree weeks behind schedule.

Admiral Porter (Library of Congress)

The Red River Expedition, Louisiana and Texas, 1864(Library of Congress)


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MANSURA16 May 1864

FORT DERUSSEY14 Mar 1864

YELLOW BAYOU18 May 1864

PORT HUDSON27 May–9 Jul 1863

NEW ORLEANS29 Apr 1862

FORT BISLAND9 Apr 1863

VICKSBURG18 May–4 Jul 1863

SABINE PASS8 Sep 1863

PLEASANT HILL9 Apr 1864

MANSFIELD8 Apr 1864

JENKINS FERRY30 Apr 1864

M i s

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Grand Lake

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Helena

Pine Bluff

Monroe

Yazoo City

Shreveport

Alexandria

Opelousas

Natchitoches

Grand Ecore

Camden

Hot Springs

Arkadelphia

Natchez

Baton Rouge

JACKSON

LITTLE ROCK

T E X A S

L O U I S I A N A

A R K A N S A S

M I S S I S S I P P I

Engagement

April 1862–May 1864

L O U I S I A N A - A R K A N S A S B A T T L E F I E L D

0 10050

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MAP 6


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Conederate agents apprised General Kirby Smith o theUnion campaign in January, and he ordered rans-Mississippidistrict commanders to prepare. roops in Indian erritorygathered along the Arkansas border, while those in exas movedtoward the Louisiana line. In Arkansas, Price, recently elevated todistrict command and the rank o major general, had 14,000 troops.He deployed his cavalry above Camden, while Brig. Gen. TomasChurchill held the town with his own division o Arkansas inantryand Brig. Gen. Mosby Parson’s division o Missourians. KirbySmith ordered General aylor to dam the Red River upstream bysinking the 300-oot steamer New Falls City , and wedging bow andstern into opposite riverbanks. Downstream, aylor’s men reur-

bished a series o orts and water batteries, the most prominent owhich, Fort DeRussy, stood between the mouth o the Red Riverand Alexandria ( Map 6 ).

General Kirby Smith ordered aylor and Price to retard theFederal advance but to avoid a general engagement and all backtoward Shreveport. By using interior lines, Kirby Smith hoped tomass his orces at a central position or a strike against whicheverarm o the Federal pincer presented the more immediate threat to

the capital. Ten, he would turn and concentrate against the otherFederal column. While this plan was sound, given the numericaldiscrepancy that Kirby Smith aced, it required aylor and Price toretreat in the ace o the enemy, and neither district commanderendorsed the strategy.

On 13 March, the Federal vanguard ascended the Red River.Te next day the joint Federal orce advanced fifeen miles up riverto the Conederate works at Fort DeRussy. Porter’s gunships began

to shell the ort while A. J. Smith deployed the 1st and 2d Brigadeso the 1st Division, XVI Corps, into line o battle to take the rebeldeenses rom the rear. Conederate Maj. Gen. John G. Walkerprepared to contest the Federal advance along the Marksville Road,but citing the discrepancy in strength and firepower, ell backwithout a fight, and Fort DeRussy surrendered beore the Unionassault began. Te battle was little more than a skirmish, with theFederals suffering 38 casualties while capturing 310 Conederates,

10 guns, and a supply o ordnance. With the lower Red River inFederal hands, the path to Alexandria lay open. aylor abandonedthe town and moved upriver toward Natchitoches.

General Banks did not reach Alexandria until 25 March,ten days afer the first Federal troops had entered the town. He


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and Admiral Porter aced significant challenges. Te anticipatedseasonal rise in the water level o the Red River above Alexandriahad ailed to materialize. Tis meant that most vessels in Porter’sfleet could not continue upriver, leaving Banks without logisticalsupport. Under pressure rom Grant to take Shreveport by 15April, Porter managed to get thirteen gunboats and thirty trans-ports above the alls at Alexandria on the Red River. On 26 March,advance elements o Banks’ column moved toward Natchitoches,where they arrived on 30 March.

At Natchitoches, General Banks’ staff ailed to locate the roadthat ran alongside the Red River to Shreveport. Rather than spendadditional time reconnoitering, Banks chose to have his men take

the stagecoach road that ran inland, away rom the river and romthe protection o the Union fleet. Porter would continue upriverwhile Banks marched across country through Mansfield. Oncepast Mansfield, the army and navy would reunite at SpringfieldLanding, just below Shreveport, and reach their objective ahead oGeneral Grant’s 15 April deadline. Banks’ troops began the marchon 6 April, while Porter began to steam or Springfield Landingthe ollowing day. Banks based his decision in part on misleading

intelligence rom locals, as well as the lack o resistance romConederate orces. Certainly pressure rom Grant to return A. J.Smith’s troops to the Army o the ennessee also influenced Banks.Nevertheless, the decision proved a costly mistake that changedthe course o the campaign.

Te stagecoach road was narrow, at some points no morethan a ditch that snaked its way through pine orests that pressedin rom both sides. Te march progressed slowly with Lee’s Union

cavalry in the lead. Franklin’s troops ollowed, strung out ortwenty miles, with A. J. Smith’s command slogging through themud lef in Franklin’s wake.

Lee ran into Brig. Gen. Tomas Green’s veteran exas cavalryat Wilson’s arm, twenty miles south o Mansfield. Recognizingthat he aced more than token enemy resistance, Lee brought uphis artillery to drive off the Conederates and sent word to Franklinor support. He eventually received the 1st Brigade, some 1,200

men, o Landram’s division o the XIII Corps.On the evening o 7 April, afer a council o war, Generalaylor determined that the Federal order o march combined withthe wooded terrain and the narrow road reduced Banks’ abilityto rapidly concentrate his superior firepower. On the other hand,


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once past Mansfield, the road divided into three parallel avenueso advance, with one road running to the river at SpringfieldLanding. Tis would allow Banks to move his army along separateroads, each within supporting distance o one another, and enablehis inantry to re-establish contact with the fleet. aylor concludedthat i the Federals passed Mansfield, Shreveport would certainlyall. Consequently, he decided to disregard General Kirby Smith’sorders to all back toward a concentration o orces at Shreveportand to take the offensive south o Mansfield.

aylor selected the Moss plantation three miles below thetown to conront the Federal advance. Tere, the road emergedrom the woods on Honeycutt Hill and ran northwest across an

open field that measured 1,200 yards in length and 800 yards inwidth. aylor planned to deploy inantry across the road and usethe woods north o the field to conceal his cavalry on the flanks. Hehoped to draw Banks down rom Honeycutt Hill and into the openwhere the Conederate inantry would drive the Federals back ontheir trains while Conederate cavalry enveloped the flanks.

Col. Frank Emerson’s Federal brigade, accompanied byColonel Landram, reached General Lee’s cavalry camp at Carroll’s

Mill early on the morning o 8 April and the cavalry promptlyrenewed the advance. Te Federals drove Conederate skirmishersthrough woods or six miles until they reached the clearing belowthe northwest slope o Honeycutt Hill. Tere, across the field, Leesaw aylor’s orce deployed into line o battle. Lee positioned histroopers in a deensive alignment along the crest o Honeycutt Hilland sent word to General Franklin or inantry support. Franklininstructed Ransom to bring up the 2d Brigade o the 4th Division,

and General Banks rode to the ront to assess the situation. Banksarrived around 1300 and sent word or Franklin to bring up theremainder o his orce at once. Te commanding general instructedLee to hold his position until support arrived.

Lee skirmished with the Conederates throughout the afer-noon as Union support came to the ront, slowed by the narrowroad and the wooded terrain. By 1530, Landram’s 4th Divisionwas in position with Col. Joseph W. Vance’s brigade to the right

o the road and Emerson’s brigade astride the road. Capt. OrmandF. Nims’ 2d Massachusetts battery took a position in the center othe road while the Chicago Mercantile battery, under Lt. PinkneyS. Cone, unlimbered its guns northeast o the road on the slope oHoneycutt Hill. Te Federals positioned cavalry on the flanks with


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Col. Tomas J. Lucas’ brigade securing the right and Col. NathanA. M. Dudley’s brigade anchoring the lef. Altogether, the Federalshad 5,000 men.

Nearly 1,000 yards across the field, aylor had deployed Brig.Gen. J. Alred Mouton’s division to the lef o the Mansfield Roadand posted Walker’s exans to the right with elements o Green’scavalry holding each flank and artillery manning the center.aylor had 8,800 effectives and outnumbered the Federals, but theFederals remained atop Honeycutt Hill in a deensive posture, andwith each passing hour they grew in strength as reinorcementsarrived at the ront. aylor had to take the initiative or risk losingthe battle and the campaign. At 1600, he ordered Mouton to attack.

On the Conederate lef, Mouton’s division charged acrossthe field and up the slope o Honeycutt Hill northeast o theMansfield Road. o their ront, General Ransom’s five Union regi-ments commanded t

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The Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, 1861-1865

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