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The Climate Treaties: UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol
UNFCCC
UNFCCC
• Most important aspects– Objective = overall goal for the treaty– Divides parties into different categories– Establishes moderate commitments– Applies to 6 greenhouse gases– Requires parties to meet every year to assess whether
the existing commitments will meet the objective
Art. 2 - Objectives
• Stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
• within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner
Art. 4 - Commitments
• All Parties, Annex I Parties, Annex II Parties– All = developed, developing, economies in
transition– Annex I = developed – Annex II = developed - economies in transition
All Parties:InventoryDevelop programmesCooperate in tech transferManage sinks and reservoirs
Subject to “common butDifferentiated responsibilities”
Annex II:Fund emissions inventoryTransfer technologyFund adaptation
Annex I:“take the lead”Develop national programsAnd take actions to mitigate
UNFCCC
• Structural importance– Developed countries must take the lead to reduce
emissions– Developing countries do not have strong
obligations to reduce emissions – but should inventory and report
– Parties will meet to determine if they need to do more
Kyoto Protocol
The Politics = Same as Before• Developed countries
– EU– U.S.– Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, etc.– Former Soviet Union
• Developing countries– Association of Small Island States (AOSIS)– OPEC– Brazil, Indonesia, other major forested areas– China– India– Least Developed Countries
The Politics = Same as Before• Increased differences:
– Developing countries argue: developed countries promised to “take the lead” – until they do this, no new commitments for developing countries
• Berlin Mandate: affirms no new commitments for developing countries
– U.S. argues:• if developing countries (i.e., China) do not have
commitments, then United States should not sign or ratify any treaty
Kyoto Protocol Key Elements• QELROs = targets and timetables
– collectively, 5.2 percent reduction below 1990 levels during 5 year reporting period, 2008-2012
– Individually – calculated in AAUs• flexibility mechanisms
– emissions trading - AAUs– Joint implementation - ERUs– EU bubble - AAUs– CDM - CERs
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
• Art 3(1) - Annex I Parties• individually or jointly• CO2Eq emissions of GHGs in Annex A
–“basket of gases”• do not exceed assigned amounts
–QELROs in Annex B• overall goal = at least 5 percent below 1990
levels in commitment period 2008-2012
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
• Art 3(1) - Annex I Parties– CO2Eq emissions of GHGs in Annex A
• “basket of gases” = CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
• Art 3(1) - Annex I Parties– do not exceed assigned amounts = QELROs in
Annex B
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
• Art 3(1) - Annex I Parties– do not exceed assigned amounts = QELROs in Annex
B– Australia 108 Austria 92 Belgium 92 Bulgaria* 92– Canada 94 Croatia* 95 Czech Republic* 92 Denmark 92– Estonia* 92 European Community 92 Finland 92 France 92– Germany 92 Greece 92 Hungary* 94 Iceland 110– Ireland 92 Italy 92 Japan 94 Latvia* 92– Liechtenstein 92 Lithuania* 92 Luxembourg92 Monaco 92– Netherlands 92 New Zealand 100 Norway 101 Poland* 94– Portugal 92 Romania* 92 Russian Federation*100 Slovakia* 92– Slovenia* 92 Spain 92 Sweden 92 Switzerland 92– Ukraine* 100 United Kingdom 92 United States of America 93– * Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
• Art. 3(7) - Annex I Parties– 1st commitment period - 2008-2012– assigned amount
• percentage reduction times baseline times 5– = Annex B percentage of 1990 baseline emissions of GHGs– alternate baseline for human-made GHGs (see Art. 3(8))– alternative baseline for Economies in Transition (EITs)
– example• Japan baseline emissions in 1990 = 100• What is its assigned amount?
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
– example• Japan baseline emissions in 1990 = 100 MtCO2eq
• What is its assigned amount?• 100Mt * .94 (percentage reduction) * 5 (commitment
period) = 470 MtCO2eq
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
– example• Japan’s assigned amount = 470 MtCO2eq
• What does this mean?• Japan may emit, on average, 92 Mt/year, but can
have varying emissions levels during that 5-year period
• It just needs to achieve the overall goal
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
• Baselines– 1990 baseline in most cases– alternate baseline for human-made GHGs– alternative baseline for Economies in Transition
(EITs)
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
• Why have different baselines?– 1990 baseline – alternate baseline for human-made GHGs
• Montreal Protocol phase out – wanted to give time for companies to use alternative products and create new ones
– alternative baseline for Economies in Transition (EITs)
• “hot air”
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables
• What is “hot air”?– Economies in transition = large emissions in
early/mid 1980s– Soviet Union collapsed, so did their economies, so
did their emissions– But countries want to allow EITs to pretend their
emissions were higher – why?
Economies in Transition – Hot Air
Hot Air and Assigned Amounts
• If use 1989 as baseline:– Emissions = 100 MtCO2eq– QELRO = 100%– Assigned Amount = 100 MtCO2eq * 100% * 5 = 500
MtCO2eq• If use 1990 as a baseline:
– Emissions = 70 MtCO2eq– QELRO = 100% – Assigned Amount = 70 MtCO2eq * 100% * 5 = 350
MtCO2eq
Kyoto Protocol: Flexibility Mechanisms
• Emissions Trading• Joint Fulfillment• Joint Implementation• Clean Development Mechanism
Kyoto Protocol: Flexibility Mechanisms
• Joint Fulfillment - Art. 4– “EU Bubble”– Annex I parties may jointly fulfill commitments
• enter into agreement• total combined aggregate GHGs cannot exceed total assigned
amounts• revised emissions allocations must be set out in the agreement
– if revise regional economic integration organization, does not change commitments
• if Parties fail to meet combined level of emissions reductions, each Party is responsible for its emissions in the agreement
Joint Fulfillment - Art. 4
• “EU Bubble”– Annex I parties may jointly fulfill commitments
• enter into agreement• total combined aggregate GHGs cannot exceed total assigned
amounts• revised emissions allocations must be set out in the agreement
– if revise regional economic integration organization, does not change commitments
• if Parties fail to meet combined level of emissions reductions, each Party is responsible for its emissions in the agreement
• See page 66
Joint Fulfillment - Art. 4• “EU Bubble” – every EU country agreed under Annex
B to reduce emissions by 8% (or to emit .92 of baseline)
Country % reduction
New QELRO
Country % reduction
New QELRO
Austria -13% .87 Italy -6,5% .935
Belgium -7,5% .925 Luxembourg -28% .72
Denmark -21% .79 Netherlands -6% .94
Finland 0% 1.00 Portugal 27% 1.27
France 0% 1.00 Spain 15% 1.15
Germany -21% .79 Sweden 4% 1.04
Greece 25% 1.25 UK -12.5% .875
Ireland 13% 1.13
Emissions Trading
• Simplest form– Regulators set an overall cap on allowable emissions
from covered sources– Regulators allocate emissions credits/allowances to
covered sources – each credit = amount of pollution (e.g., 1 credit = 1 ton CO2eq)
– Sources may:• Emit same amount of pollution as they have credits• Emit more pollution, so buy credits• Emit less pollution, and sell credits
Emissions Trading
Emissions Trading
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Year 1-5 Year 6-10 Year 11-15 Year 16-20
Facility AFacility BFacility C
Emissions cap: year 1-5 = 12, year 6-10 = 9, year 11-15 = 6, year 16-20 = 3
Emission Trading
Emissions cap: year 1-5 = 12; emissions trading allows facilities to buy/sell credits, but cap stays the same
Emissions Trading
• Arguments in Favor?
Emissions Trading
• Arguments in Favor?– Cost-effective– Flexible– Administratively easier (money v. expertise to set
emissions limits)– Spurs Innovation– Absolute cap on emissions
Emissions Trading
• Arguments in Favor? Some responses.– Cost-effective
• For some facilities, but not all.
– Flexible• Subject to gaming
– Administratively easier• Not always
– Spurs Innovation• Not always
Emissions Trading
• Arguments in Favor? Some responses (cont.)– Absolute cap on emissions
• Overallocation problem• What if the cap doesn’t achieve environmental goals?• Caps may not be more effective than command-and-
control• But they are more directive than taxes