The Communist Uprising in Malaya

Institute of Pacific Relations

The Communist Uprising in MalayaAuthor(s): Ian MorrisonSource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 17, No. 24 (Dec. 22, 1948), pp. 281-286Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021451 .

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THE COMMUNIST UPRISING IN MALAYA

BY IAN MORRISON

The communist insurrection in Malaya will be six

months old by the end of this year. Two questions are frequently asked in connection with it: What is

its relation to communist uprisings elsewhere in South?

east Asia? And why and when did the Malayan Com?

munist Party decide to resort to direct action?

The answers are bound to be speculative in charac?

ter, for no direct sources of information are available.

The central executive committee of the Malayan Com?

munist Party (MCP), its high command, has always been an ultra-secret underground body, even during the

postwar period when the party was a legal organization. The party was proscribed immediately after the in?

surrection and is now likely to remain so for a long time to come.

It has become a popular assumption that the change of "line" of the communist parties in Southeast Asia

dates from conferences in Calcutta in February and

March 1948. There were three conferences, held more

or less concurrently: a conference of the Indian Com?

munist Party; a conference of New Democratic Youth

Leagues; and a Southeast Asia Students Conference.

Representatives from all of the countries of the Far East

attended. The Russians sent a number of delegates on

diplomatic passports. After the conferences communist risings occurred in

three Southeast Asian countries. In March the Burma

Communist Party (the White Flag Communists) held

an important conference at Pyinmana, and on April 1

revolted against the government headed by Thakin Nu.1

Two of their leaders, Than Tun and the Indian Goshal, had been at Calcutta. In June the Malayan Communists

took up arms against the government. In September occurred the attempted communist coup in Java.2 A

more extreme line was being taken by the Indonesian Communists as early as March, but it seems to have been the arrival from Europe in July of Soeripno and the Moscow-trained Moeso which actually precipitated the rising, although neither of these men had been at

Calcutta. No similar risings occurred in the other two coun?

tries of Southeast Asia?Siam and Indochina?because in Siam communism is still comparatively weak and is

confined almost entirely to the Chinese minority, while

in Indochina the Communists, from within the national

coalition, have been pursuing a policy of direct action

against the French ever since the attempted coup in

Tonkin on December 19, 1946. By contrast with the

Mr. Morrison is the Far Eastern correspondent of the London Times.

1 See Virginia Thompson, "Burma's Communists," Far East? ern Survey, May 5, 1948, pp. 103-105.

2 See "The Communist Revolt in Java," Far Eastern Survey, November 17, 1948, pp. 257-64.

DECEMBER 22, 1948 VOL XVII NO. 24

THE COMMUNIST UPRISING IN MALAYA

by Ian Morrison The Malayan revolt poses several questions with re? gard to the new direct-action policy of Communists in Southeast Asia.

THE NEW JAPAN: AN AMERICAN VIEW

by Joseph W. Ballantine A critical examination of the uneasiness displayed by other Asian countries concerning Japan's recovery.

EURASIANS?DUTCH OR INDONESIAN?

by Frances M. Earle Some Eurasians in Indonesia, finding assimilation unattractive, seek a colony under the Dutch flag.

? 281



Indonesians, the Indochina Communists, following the

principles long ago enunciated by Ho Chi Minh, have resisted the temptation to split the national coalition and have continued to put the struggle for national liberation before the class struggle.

The MCPsent only one delegate to Calcutta (report- edly because of lack of funds), a young man called Lee

Soong, who in 1947 was one of two Malayan delegates to the big youth rally in Prague. The man who is believed to have been mainly responsible for informing the Malayan communist leaders of the decisions and sentiments of the Calcutta conferees is Lawrence Shar-

key, a member of the central committee of the Aus? tralian Communist Party, who spent two weeks in

Singapore on his way back to Australia from Calcutta and is known to have had meetings with the MCP lead? ers. The Sydney Tribune, an Australian communist

paper, on August 14 quoted Sharkey as saying that it had been obvious to him at his meetings with the MCP leaders that the Malayan situation was very critical. He

reported having told the MCP that, in order to prevent the old colonial slavery from being again imposed on

them, a struggle for national independence was justi- fied, but such questions as to when or whether they should start an armed insurrection were matters that could be decided only by the Malayans themselves; they were much better qualified than he because of the great experience which they had gained in their heroic strug? gle against the Japanese invaders.

Communist Strength Within Unions

The following are some of the outstanding internal

developments in Malaya during the months preceding the insurrection, as they affected the MCP.

1. Ever since the end of the war it had been the

strategy of the Malayan Communists to seek political control of Malaya through gaining control of labor.

Immediately after the war they hurriedly formed a whole multitude of trade unions, covering every field of

labor, from tappcrs on rubber estates to taxi-dancers in Singapore's cabarets. They infiltrated their members into the offices of the older unions; they formed federations of unions for each of the nine Malay States; they also formed a General Labor Union embracing the whole country. When they had difficulty in getting the latter registered, as its constitution did not comply with the separate regulations of the two governments (Malaya and Singapore having been constitutionally separate since the end of the war), they created a Pan-

Malayan Federation of Trade Unions with head-

quarters in Kuala Lumpur, and a Singapore Federation of Trade Unions with headquarters in Singapore.

These various federations of trade unions became the main instruments of the Malayan Communists in their struggle for control of labor. They did not scruple

to use intimidation and strong-arm methods, effective

weapons in a country whose people, especially the Chinese sections, are traditionally compliant with the demands of extortioners and protection racketeers. The

degree to which the Communists were successful is shown by the fact that at the time of the insurrection

(and the figures were about the same at the end of

1947), out of 301 trade unions in the Malayan Fed?

eration,3 it was estimated that 127, with a membership of 79,975, were under communist control; 61, with a

membership of 13,180, were doubtful; and 113, with a

membership of 54,440, were independent. In other

words, the Communists were believed to control more

than a third of the unions on the mainland and more

than half of the labor force. But it was still not enough to enable them to achieve their ends. At the end of

1947, they were making much slower progress in the

labor field, and were losing some of that momentum

which is essential to every revolutionary movement.

British Attitude Toward Unions

As is brought out very clearly in a recent report on

Malaya's trade unions by two veteran British trade

unionists who came out in February 1948 to survey

Malaya's unions,4 it has been the policy of the British

government to encourage a vigorous trade-union move?

ment in postwar Malaya. Such a movement, it was fully

realized, could not help becoming partially political in

character. The government has, however, tried to prevent it from becoming a field for revolutionary po? litical activity by a party using force and threats rather

than normal democratic methods. The government's Trade Union Adviser, Mr. Jack Brazier, formerly a

member of the executive committee of the (British) National Union of Railwaymen, while trying to give guidance and the benefit of British union experience to

the movement as a whole, has also concentrated on

building up a few key unions along what in the West

would be regarded as sound democratic lines. There is

no doubt that these unions have obtained more for their members in the way of better conditions of employ? ment than have the communist-controlled unions, whose

members have received hardly commensurate returns

for the heavy monetary contributions and frequent stop-

3 When the new constitution came into effect on February 1, 1948, the Malayan Union became the Malayan Federation, with a High Commissioner instead of a Governor. It was still constitutionally distinct from the Colony of Singapore. The use of the word Federation in this connection must not be confused with the federations of trade unions created by the MCP.

4 S. S. Awbery, M.P., and F. W. Dalley, Labour and Trade Union Organisation in the Federation of Malaya and Singa? pore, Kuala Lumpur, 1948.

282 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



pages of work insisted on by the communist union leaders.

2. Another important internal development took

place towards the end of 1947 when certain changes were made in the personnel of the high command of the MCP similar to changes in the Indian Communist

Party and in some of the other Southeast Asian Com? munist parties. The more cautious old-time leaders, now branded as "rightist opportunists," who were prepared to try to exploit existing conditions to their advantage, were losing control of the party and were being sup- planted by a younger and more extreme type.

3. When the writer visited the Malayan Federation in December 1947, it was evident that the MCP was shorter of funds than it had been at any time since the end of the war. The Registrar of Trade Unions was

tightening up the machinery for inspection of union ac- counts. Affiliation fees payable by any one union to a federation were being limited to ten per cent of its revenue from membership dues. Early in 1948 the

Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions ceased to exist when the Registrar declined to register it on the

ground that there was nothing in the Trade Union Ordinance providing for what was in effect a federa? tion of federations. (Its demise is estimated to have cost the MCP a monthly income of Malayan $40,000, equivalent to US $20,000.) Other measures to reduce the scope of labor organization for exploitation by the MCP were under discussion, as was well known to the communist leaders. The most notable of these was an amendment to the Trade Union Ordinance, finally en- acted on June 12, 1948, which contained the following provisions: (a) no federations of unions to be permitted except within the same industry; (b) no man to be an official of a union (exxrept in the office of secretary) who has not worked in the industry for three years; (c) no man to be an official who has ever been convicted of extortion or any other serious crime.

Communist Reverses in Singapore 4. Finally, during the first half of 1948, the MCP

suffered a series of reverses in Singapore. Early in Jan? uary the Singapore Harbor Board determined to abolish the old system of contract labor and to institute a system of direct employment, a change which has since greatly increased output and reduced costs. It was decided to make the change early in February, immediately after the Chinese New Year. When the change was announced, the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU), the main instrument through which the MCP sought to control Singapore's labor, tried to exploit the situation to its own ends and called a strike. But since the aboli- tion of the contract system had always been one of the main planks in its platform, it found itself in a false

position. The strike was settled by an agreement in

which the SFTU leaders accepted the change on con- dition that two months were taken to put it into effect, and in return they gave a promise of two months of industrial peace. They kept their promise and there were no disturbances in the dock area between February 5 and April 5. But the SFTU was not idle during these months: it used the time to prepare a big strike which would affect both the harbor and the roads. It must be appreciated that the port has always been the primary objective of subversive elements in Singapore. If the island's trade could be brought to a standstill, that alone might bring about the chaos up-country which would give the MCP its big opportunity.

The Workers1 Protection Corps On April 12 leaflets and posters inciting to bloodshed

and violence were found in the Harbor Board area. The

government decided that a serious situation existed and issued banishment warrants against the Chinese section of the communist-controlled Singapore Harbor Union which had issued the leaflets and posters. Some arrests were made and the premises of the union were raided. Here the police found a complete list of the active members of an organization called the Singapore Work? ers* Protection Corps, which was in effect the strong- arm branch of the MCP in Singapore. As this Corps was an illegal organization in that it had not been

registered under the Societies Ordinance, the policy had the power to arrest all active members without warrant. Several of the leaders were arrested and sentenced to

varying terms of imprisonment. In spite of this action, the SFTU continued, by vio?

lence and intimidation, to try to prevent the dock laborers from remaining at work. On April 26 and 27 two hand-grenades were thrown at laborers in the dock area. Once again the police acted promptly. They caught one of the men who had thrown grenades and

they continued their arrests of prominent members of the Workers' Protection Corps. The list of names and

descriptions was produced in court and this had the ef? fect of causing the entire corps to dissolve. Those of its members who had not been arrested either went under-

ground or fled up-country. In consequence, when the MCP declared war on the government its main weapon in Singapore no longer existed. To this breaking up of the Workers* Protection Corps, and to the fact that

Singapore does not have the dense jungle where out- laws can hide, must be attributed the island's freedom from the terrorism which has gripped the peninsula.

The Communists received another setback in connection with their plans for a big demonstration on May Day. Early in April the SFTU applied to the govern? ment for permission to hold a mammoth assembly in Farrer Park, to be followed by a procession through the city. Since in the previous year the procession had

DECEMBER 22. I 948 283



got out of hand and had developed an extremely hostile

character, the government decided to permit the as?

sembly but not the procession. On April 28 the assistant

secretary of the SFTU addressed a communication to the Colonial Secretary, stating that the SFTU pro? posed to hold the procession regardless of the ban and that any disturbances which might result would be solely the responsibility of the government. The government promptly banned the assembly as well as the procession. Elaborate precautions were taken on May Day, large numbers of police were moved into potential danger spots, troops were held in reserve, and the day passed off without incident. Largely because attention was focused on the trial of strength between the govern? ment and the MGP in Singapore, the day passed quietly in the Federation as well. It is significant that shortly after May 1 a number of prominent communist and labor leaders in Singapore disappeared up-country. Amongst them were Veraseenan, the Indian President of the SFTU, and Chan Ming-ching, Singapore repre? sentative of the MCP.

Early in May there was trouble in some of the rub? ber factories on Singapore island similar to the pre- paratory disturbances which preceded the insurrection

up-country. On May 10 the Bin Seng rubber factory was burned down, there being strong suggestions of arson. Sit-down strikes were organized at other fac? tories. The Singapore police again acted firmly. At the Tai Tong factory, for example, they turned up in con? siderable strength, and arrested 140 men for tres-

passing, of whom thirty, regarded as ringleaders, were

shortly afterwards sentenced to three months' imprisonment.

Increase in Strikes

The following figures not only illustrate the degree to which the MCP was using the trade union movement as a political instrument in its struggle for power but also strongly suggest that, whether or not by the end of April the leaders had decided on direct action, they had certainly determined to intensify greatly their ac-

tivity. On April 1 substantial rises in wages throughout the planting industry were promulgated by the Malayan Planting Industries Employers Association, a body that

might be described as a trade union of employers, which had held its inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur on

September 27, 1947. These rates were based on recom? mendations made by the Joint Wages Commission ap? pointed by the governments of the Federation and

Singapore. Normally an advance in rates on this scale would have ensured a period of peaceful and harmoni- ous cooperation between employers and employees. But whereas 12,773 man-days were lost through strikes in

April, no less than 179,539 man-days were lost in May. Moreover, the disturbances were most acute on the big

estates, like those of the Dunlop Rubber Company and the Socfin Company, where conditions of housing and

employment are the best in Malaya. (As soon as the insurrection began, the strikes started to collapse, ow-

ing to the disappearance of the Communists and of most of the more militant labor leaders. Since July 14 there have been only two small stoppages of work. A further factor was that, after the Emergency Regula? tions came into force immediately following the in?

surrection, conferring wide powers on the government and the police, few of the laborers dared to strike.)

The Question of Timing There are many puzzling features about the risings in

Indonesia and Malaya. Both give every indication of

having gone off prematurely, before the Communists were really ready. Why did the Communists kill only three planters in Malaya on June 14 when, if there had been a properly-coordinated rising, they could quite eas-

ily have killed 300? The murder of three, while bring? ing no commensurate advantages to them, sufficed to

bring about an immediate and maximum reaction from the British side. It might be observed that the date

June 14, now generally used to mark the opening of the insurrection, is only a D-Day in retrospect and from the British point of view. Throughout May and

June there was a steady crescendo of strikes and violent incidcnts up-country in which a number of Chinese enemies of the Communists were murdered. It was the murder of the three British planters that caused the British governments at home and in Malaya to take the affair seriously.

Again, why was it three months before the insurgents made any attempt, and that a half-hearted one, to in- terfere with Malaya's important north-south railway? Why is it that they have only recently turned their at? tention to communications, an obvious target for a guer? rilla movement such as theirs? Has it been sheer inef-

ficiency? Politically they have always showcd themselves to be capable of considerable organization. During the war the Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army (the armed

organization which the British are fighting) had, when it called itself the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army, the benefit of guidance and instruction from trained British guerrilla leaders.

The analysis of the above events which makes most sense to this writer is the following: Even at the end of 1947 the Malayan communist leaders were consider-

ing a much more extreme "line" in view of their failure to obtain sufficient control of Malaya's labor to achieve

political power by that means. The government was be?

ginning to implement some measures, and was con-

templating the introduction of others, curtailing the

scope for political activity in the labor field. Changes in personnel inside the MCP had already occurred, and




some of the new young leaders were temperamentally more inclined to direct action through having spent their most formative years living by the gun as mem? bers of the anti-Japanese resistance. From the Calcutta conferences the Malayan leaders learned that direct action was in accord with what some of the other com? munist parties of Southeast Asia, or at any rate power- ful sections of them, had in mind, and that it was in accord with the desires of the Soviet Union, as part of the latter's campaign to sabotage the Marshall Plan and to strike at "the soft under-belly of the capitalist world." Some sort of time schedule for the risings was worked out at Calcutta. There is considerable evidence that the

big climactic moment in Malaya, whether for an armed revolt or for a general strike, was to be August. In April the communist leaders decided to step up the

tempo of their industrial activity and in May, largely as a result of the setbacks which they received in Singa? pore, they gave orders for the preliminary mobilization of the Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army (MPABA). The murder of the three British planters was not intended by the high command and was almost an ac-

cident, possibly the result of one of the state regiments misinterpreting or interpreting too zealously a directive

ordering increased activity. It brought about, as described above, an immediate reaction from the govern? ment, and the communist leaders had to make up their minds in a hurry whether to go underground quietly or to fight. They chose to fight.

One gets the irresistible impression in Malaya that the Communists were forced into direct action before

they were ready?almost that they drifted into revolu? tion.

The Question of Russia's Role

Beyond certain coincidences and a common pattern of action which manifested itself throughout Southeast

Asia, suggesting a coordinating agency, there has been no concrete evidence of direct Russian instigation or

complicity. What has happened has, of course, been in the Russian interest, but it is difficult to imagine that the Kremlin could have "ordered" direct action un- less it had seemed to the local communist leaders to be the right tactic.

The Indonesian rising also went off half-cocked.

Why? According to foreign observers in Jogjakarta, the Indonesian rising was timed to begin three months after the Malayan rising, which would have meant Novem? ber if indeed August was originally intended to be the

big month in Malaya. There is believed to have been a considerable difference of opinion between Sjarifoeddin and Alimin on the one hand and Moeso and Soeripno on the other, not on the principle of direct action but on the timing, the two latter wanting to adhere to the three-month interval even after Malaya had begun prematurely. Another possible explanation is that after

Mohammad Hatta, the Premier, had cleverly released from prison the old Trotskyite Tan Malaka, the latter made such rapid headway amongst the left-wing groups that the other leaders felt they had to strike before he had whittled away too much of their support. It is inter.

esting to speculate whether the revolution might have fared differently if the Indonesian communist leaders had waited until the month of November, when the news of the big communist victories in China was be-

ginning to have a noticeable effect throughout the countries of Southeast Asia.

Communist Miscalculations

The Malayan communist leaders made certain grave miscalculations. First, they miscalculated to some degree the willingness of the rank and file of the MPABA, many of them living in comfortable civilian billets, to return to the dangers and hardships of jungle warfare that they had endured during the war years. Many of them had to be forced at the point of a gun to obey the mobiliza? tion call.

Second, in the opinion of some detached observers, they miscalculated their hold on labor and expected the insurrection to be followed by mass risings on the part of the labor forces in Malaya which would effectively disrupt the economic life of the country. They failed to realize that what hold they did have on labor was based very largely on intimidation and that, despite all the postwar discontents and difficulties, there is far less popular anti-British feeling amongst the masses than there was anti-Japanese feeling during the war. No popular risings occurred and?instead of there being any disruption of the country's economy?production in the rubber and tin industries, owing to the cessation of strikes, will almost certainly be greater in 1948 than it was in 1947. It has been universally accepted by British statesmen and officials that the primary aim of the insurrection was to disrupt the economy of Malaya, and they have regarded it as a bright spot in an otherwise dark picture that this has not in fact occurred. That is certainly the "aim" which makes most sense to a western mind. But it is possible that when the Malayan Communists found themselves at

war, so to speak, before they were ready, they accepted the fact that they could do little in the labor field under the Emergency Regulations for the time being and so made their primary aim the task of trying to discredit the government in the eyes of the people without causing the latter too much economic hardship.

Third, they were frustrated by vigorous military ac? tion in what seems to have been their early plan of

seizing the Gua Musang area in Kelantan State and

proclaiming it a "Liberated Area." Fourth, even if the Communists had foreseen that in such a rising they would temporarily have had to abandon leadership of the

DECEMBER 22, 1948 285



country's labor, they can hardly have foreseen the dis- astrous political consequences which the rising has had, especially in widening the rift between the Chinese and the Malays, perhaps, as some people think, to the point of permanent irreconcilability. An interesting feature of MCP politics during the months preceding the insurrection was a noticeable cooling-off between the Ma-

lay and Indian Communists on the one hand and the Chinese Communists on the other. It was significant that, when the insurrection began, the Indian member of the central executive committee, Balan, and the two most prominent left-wing Indian labor leaders,

Kurup and Krishnamurthi, allowed themselves to be

picked up by the police when they could quite easily have escaped.

The lack of spontaneous voluntary support which the Communists have received from the peoples of Malaya,

as distinct from the very considerable help which they are continuing to extract from the people by force and

threats, confirms the statement made by Malcolm Mac-

Donald, the British Commissioner-General in South? east Asia, during a recent visit to England, that the

rising cannot be regarded as an expression of genuine Malayan nationalism similar to the nationalist move? ments which are agitating other parts of the Far East. It is of course tinged with nationalistic motives and, in its wider context, it is part of the protest which all of the Asian peoples have made against the old relationship between East and West. But in essence it remains the at?

tempt of a small minority, overwhelmingly Chinese and

predominantly immigrant in composition, to seize power by force and impose a totalitarian system on the coun?

try. Singapore, November 24

THE NEW JAPAN: AN AMERICAN VIEW

BY JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

It is perhaps idle to attempt to persuade peoples ? whose past exposure to Japan's aggressions has made

their fear and hatred of the country instinctive that it has been transformed in the space of three years into a

peaceful member of the family of nations. Indeed, neither this nor the contrary is susceptible of proof. The most that can be soberly claimed is that an honest ef- fort is being made to foster in Japan?in order to offer the best hope for the future in the interests of all con?

cerned, including Japan, China and the United States ?conditions that will give the Japanese the greatest opportunity for developing along peaceful, democratic, and stable lines.

Chinese criticism of current United States policy in Japan raises a question as to whether occupation poli? cies are being' directed to the achievement of primarily American political, economic and strategic objectives, or whether they are being directed, as Allied agreements and arrangements affecting the Allied control of Japan clearly provide, to conform to the declared policies and the current decisions of the Allied powers.

Whereas the occupation forces are under American command and are predominantly American in composition, occupation policy is in the hands of the eleven- nation Far Eastern Commission. Once the FEC began to function early in 1946, the right of the United States

to issue interim directives pending a ruling by the FEC was invoked on only two or three occasions, and in each case with a preponderant majority (including China) supporting the United States position. The FEC's "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" is substantially a re-

iteration, in large part word-for-word, of the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" issued before the formation of the FEC. As for the Allied Council for Japan, its waning significance is occasional-

ly pointed to in support of the thesis of a predominant United States voice in matters relating to Japan, but few even outside the United States except in the Soviet Union have reason to regret its present moribund state.

Although the Supreme Commander early introduced

topics for open, objective debate on occupation prob? lems, the Council rapidly became stultified through its use as a sounding board for Soviet propaganda.

One could cite on the other hand the statements of numerous American spokesmen, official and otherwise, advocating the pursuit by the United States of a course aimed primarily at serving American interests in dis-

regard, if necessary, of the other Allies. The writer has seen no evidence, however, that the attitude reflected in such statements represents the opinions or decisions of the United States government.

Looming large among the misgivings about present occupation policies is an apprehension that the steps being taken to eradicate Japan's war-making potential have been inadequate. Such an apprehension is height- ened by current rumors that Japan is being permitted a

large armed police force, a reconstituted navy, and the like. In actual fact, Japan's police force is small by

Mr. Ballantine was in the Foreign Service of the United States for twenty years in Japan and six in China. He was subse- quently Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, in the Department of State, and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Since 1947 he has been a staff member of the Brookings Institution.




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The Communist Uprising in Malaya

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