This article was downloaded by: [North Carolina State University] On: 26 September 2013, At: 14:50 Publisher: Taylor & Francis Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ttie20 The concept of habit in the analysis of situated actions Leena Norros a VTT Industrial Systems, PO Box 1301, 102044 VTT, Finland b VTT Industrial Systems, PO Box 1301, 102044 VTT, Finland E- mail: Published online: 23 Feb 2007. To cite this article: Leena Norros (2005) The concept of habit in the analysis of situated actions, Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 6:5, 385-407, DOI: 10.1080/14639220500076520 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639220500076520 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions
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This article was downloaded by: [North Carolina State University]On: 26 September 2013, At: 14:50Publisher: Taylor & FrancisInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Theoretical Issues in ErgonomicsSciencePublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ttie20
The concept of habit in the analysis ofsituated actionsLeena Norrosa VTT Industrial Systems, PO Box 1301, 102044 VTT, Finlandb VTT Industrial Systems, PO Box 1301, 102044 VTT, Finland E-mail:Published online: 23 Feb 2007.
To cite this article: Leena Norros (2005) The concept of habit in the analysis of situated actions,Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 6:5, 385-407, DOI: 10.1080/14639220500076520
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639220500076520
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
The concept of habit in the analysis of situated actions
LEENA NORROS*
VTT Industrial Systems, PO Box 1301, 102044 VTT, Finland
The paper presents a new framework for the analysis of situated action froma cultural point of view. The methodology is named the Core-Task Analysis.Its aim is to promote understanding of the core content of particular work activityand the dynamics of the construction of situated actions in complex, dynamic anduncertain environments. The methodology also aims at evaluating workingpractices and culture by providing a way to analyse the internal good of practices.The CTA approach draws on the cultural–historical theory of activity and itscurrent application in the developmental work research. It also utilizes functionalmodelling of the constraints of work domains to identify the environmentalaffordances for action. The innovative feature of the approach—that could belabelled an ecological one—is to complement activity theoretical analysis byexploiting the pragmatic conception of habit. This solution provides an empiricalway of analysing situated action and operations in connection with their societalmeaning and motivation. A study of the anaesthetists’ actions in clinicalsituations is utilised to demonstrate the Core-Task Approach.
The idea of Scarry (1976) in his book ‘What do people do all day’ is to communicateto young children the essential content and societal significance of those differentoccupations and working activities with which their parents are involved. The motiveis not far from this when through a scientific analysis we try to reveal the essentialcontent of working activities and professional expertise. The methodology emergingout of these studies was called the Core-Task Analysis (CTA). It is a combination ofthe conceptual modelling of the domain and the task demands, on the one hand, andthe analysis of actual actions, on the other. The aim of the methodology is topromote understanding of the core content of particular work and of the dynamicsof the construction of situated actions in complex, dynamic and uncertain environ-ments typical of the modern work. Moreover, the methodology enables theevaluation of working practices and culture by providing a way to analyse theinternal good of practices. An elaboration of the development of the methodologywas published in a larger work (Norros 2004). The present paper clarifies the basicideas and the structure of the methodology and demonstrates it by an example froma study on the anaesthetists’ clinical practices.
The cultural–historical theory of activity developed originally by Vygotsky (1978)Leont’ev (1978) and Luria (1976) is the theoretical background of the methodology.
Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics ScienceVol. 6, No. 5, September 2005, 385–407
According to this theory, the major determinant of activity is its object. The object isthe part of the environment that may become an actual source of the fulfilment ofhuman needs and, therefore, it forms the societal motivation of activity (Leont’ev1978). In each particular work, the different characteristics and possibilities of theenvironment are exploited by the actors. The ‘core task’ denotes the result-criticalcontent of a particular work, which defines both possibilities for action and demandsthat must be fulfilled in all situations in order to maintain an appropriate interac-tion with the environment (Norros and Nuutinen 2002). Orienting oneself to the coretask in the daily work is, thus, the critical feature that defines the adaptivity ofactions.
The core task needs to be analysed because its content is not necessarily evidentfor the actors themselves or for those who manage the work. Instead, at a given time,people have different interpretations of the core content of their work, which has aneffect on what is considered appropriate performance (Norros and Nuutinen 2002).One of the reasons for the failing transparency of the core task is that workingactivities normally have multiple goals, e.g. efficiency and safety. Hence, the coretask consists of demands that must be balanced. Moreover, the core tasks are notstable but, instead, pressures for change emerge when the societal and materialobjectives and conditions of the activity change. For example, the extensiveexploitation of information technology creates new core-task demands. The roleof information technology to ‘informate’ work was pointed out by Zuboff (1988)in the 1980s. Her claim was that exploiting this informing potential would requirean increase of intellectual skills for the interpretation of the state of the environ-ment and development of the object of actions. Also, the emergence of newco-operative demands in traditional occupations is facilitated by the implementa-tion of information-technology. It is, furthermore, evident that some develop-ments in work may endanger the possibilities of the individuals to orient tothe core content of their work. Thus, for example, the increase of informationtechnology in work may hamper the conceiving of the central content of work bydrawing attention to the increasing computational tasks. People often feel distressedby the flood of information, which tells of difficulties in the orientation to thecore task.
There is a further problem in orienting towards the core content of work. Itrelates to the fact that all result-critical demands of work are not actual in eachsituation. This is typical for the high reliability organizations in which a number oftasks should be accomplished for ensuring safety, even though their significance isnot evident in most everyday situations. In these domains, professional performanceis qualified by insight of the connections of these tasks to safety critical functions ofthe process (Corcoran et al. 1981). The core-task analysis is meant to provide meansto reflect upon the present and future changes in work and the demands they put onthe development of the working practices.
2. Integrating the concept of habit in the activity theory
When adopting the cultural–historical theory of activity as the framework for study-ing situated actions, a basic methodological choice is made regarding explanationsof human conduct (Eskola 1999). Eskola argues that, when attempting to explainhuman behaviour within the framework of the prevailing mechanistic-deterministic
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research paradigm, there exists a persistent dilemma between the two main setsof situational explanatory factors, the person-related and the environmental factors.He maintains that this dilemma can be solved through the adoption of the conceptof activity. According to an activity-oriented realistic paradigm, the analysiswould focus on clarifying ‘(1) the structure and development of activity andits meaning to different actors; (2) the laws and rules that actors take intoaccount in this activity; and (3) the logics on the basis of which they do so’(Eskola 1999, pp. 110–111). This advice of Eskola coheres with von Wright’s(1998) suggestion that understanding human conduct would require the adoptionof a reason-based instead of a causal explanation of action. The attempt was tofollow this methodological principle in developing an empirical research approachfor the analysis of situated actions. This approach combines the pragmatistsconception of habit with the cultural–historical theory of activity with the intentionto explain the psychological dynamics of the construction of actions within thesocietal systems of activity.
A perspective was adopted of the personal actor’s situated action to the analysisof activity. Through this specification of the point of view, one wants to emphasizethe interest of taking into account the active agency of people in defining societalactivity. The specification also draws attention to the question of how activitybecomes actualized in the situated actions of persons or groups. This choice ofthe perspective should not be interpreted as if the intention was to comprehendan individual actor detached from his or her societal surrounding. Such anabstraction would be as unreasonable as the conceiving of an actor intact ofthe material circumstances of his actions (Dewey 1922/1983, Kivinen and Ristela2000).
As indicated earlier, the object-orientedness of activity is the cornerstone of thecultural–historical theory of activity (Leont’ev 1978). The related further inventionof Leontjew (1973) was that, through the historical division of labour, human activ-ity became hierarchically structured and, thus, the goal-defined actions and, further,the operations defined by the situational conditions emerged. With the formation ofthis hierarchical structure, a further significant change took place with regard to thefunctions of the object of activity. Originally, the object had acquired a dual functionin the regulation of activity. It served both to motivate and orient activity. Duringthe formation of the hierarchical structure, the object of activity maintained itsmotivating function, but the orienting function was transformed. The goals relatedto the actions of individual persons and groups acquired this orienting role. Yet,because activity exists only through actions (Leont’ev 1978), a dynamically import-ant relationship between the object and the goal emerged. According to Leont’ev(1978), the relationship between the societal object-related motive of the activity andthe situated goals constitutes the personal sense of action. This relationship is, thus,the key factor in the energizing of personal action and, therefore, extremely import-ant for understanding the construction of situated actions. The problem is how, inconcrete, to study personal sense and its constructive role in work.
During the development of the CTA methodology, the pragmatist notion ofhabit was gradually discovered as the possible conceptual tool to approach thesocietal meaning of behaviour (Dewey 1901/1991, Peirce 1903/1998).
The pragmatist conception of habit was developed by the American philo-sophers and social scientists Charles Peirce, Georg Herbert Mead and John Dewey.In studying the thoughts of these writers, one has had great help from the work of
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Kilpinen (2000). Kilpinen’s conception of ‘reflective habituality’ is an internationally
interesting interpretation of the classical writings of the above mentioned scientists.
For this purpose, i.e. finding a concept to guide an empirical analysis of semiotic
structures of behaviour, it has been found important to emphasize three aspects of
habits (a further explication is found in Norros (2004)).
The first habit denotes the repetition and regularity of behaviour. This aspect
is by far the most dominant in the daily use of the word. Also in the scientific
considerations habit is usually seen as routine or analogous with mannerisms.
Repetition is essential, particularly because it offers the possibility to express meaning
in action, which forms the second aspect of habit. Habit is a way of being in the
world and may be understood to relate to a personal style, ‘my way’ or also social
customs. Important, therefore, is that what is repeated is the way to set oneself into a
relationship with the world in a situation. This ‘way’ itself conveys the message that
needs to be repeated. However, because this is the reason for repetition, habit is not
determined by the situational constraints. Instead, it may act in a reflective way as a
critical and controlling moment in situational action. This is the third aspect of
habit, which is less dominant in the everyday use of the term. This aspect is inter-
preted to have connections with the idea of Vygotsky (1978) regarding the role of
auxiliary stimuli as having a controlling role of action from outside.
For an adequate understanding of the concept of habit and its empirical use
in the analysis a further distinction is important. It relates to the ontological
nature of the concept. Habit is in Peirce’s terms a logical interpretant of sign.
Peirce (1931–1958, cited in Kilpinen 2000, p. 70) adds that ‘The habit conjoined
with the motive and the conditions has action for its energetic interpretant; but
action cannot be a logical interpretant, because it lacks generality’. Thus, habits
are distinguished as having the potential for action and the course of action as the
realization of habits in particular situations.
For denoting the empirical psychological aspect of habit, the term habit of action
is used. It expresses the personal sense of actions that are constrained by the situa-
tional features of operations. Habit of action denotes, first, the possible empirical
types of habits, i.e. instead of finding expression in the ‘habit of action’ habit
may also appear as ‘habit of thinking’, ‘habit of communicating’ or ‘habit of
co-operating’. Another aspect of the psychological concretization of ‘habit’ in the
‘habit of action’ is that habit of action is understood to reflect the actor’s personal
accounts of the critical functional features of the particular domain and the object of
activity. Neither habit nor habit of action denotes particular situational courses of
actions. Instead, habits of action demonstrate optional ways to act. Habits of action
constitute practices which, according to MacIntyre (1984) may not be evaluated on
the external, result-related goods, but on the basis of their internal good that are
defined within the practice itself. It was seen that the method of distinguishing habits
of action on the basis of finding out what features are valued by the practitioners in
an adaptive interaction in a particular environment contribute to defining the inter-
nal good. The adaptive adequacy of habits of action must, however, be analysed
in social–historical perspective. The activity–systemic method of Engestrom is used
to this aim.
Consequently, an empirical research method that focuses on the identification
of semiotic structures of behaviour in particular working situations was developed
for the study of the construction and content of actions.
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3. The core-task inference scheme
The core-task analysis method may be presented as a conceptual scheme that makes
explicit the inferences that are needed to analyse empirical data of behaviour from
the perspective of its meaning. The aim of the analysis is to enhance understanding
of the content and the dynamic construction of actions and to provide a basis for the
evaluation of actions. Use is made of both quantitative and qualitative empirical
material. Divergent sources of data may be exploited, e.g. observations and video
recordings of the actors’ behaviour, process-tracing and other interviews of actors,
logs of the system performance and various documents. The inferences scheme
exploits the above-mentioned main concepts of activity by Leont’ev (1978) and the
concept of habit. The scheme has three parts, within which the actual analysis
and interpretation of data is accomplished. The inferences may be repeated several
times for the acquisition of the result, i.e. a conception and an evaluation of
the content and the situated construction of action. The inference scheme is depicted
in figure 1.
Figure 1. The inference scheme for the core-task analysis of the situated actions. Thethree parts of the analysis are the formative modelling of the work domain (upper part),the analysis of habits (lower part) and the reason-based analysis of actions in which thesemiotic relationship model (S-O-I) is utilised (centre).
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3.1. Formative modelling of the work domain
In the CTA, an ecological point of view is observed while perceiving the actions asdetermined both through the environment and the actor. The formative (core-task)modelling of the work domain constitutes the first part of the core-task analysisand relates to the analysis of the environment. The notion of formative modellingis adopted from Vicente (1999). It refers to such modelling of work domains inwhich constraints and possibilities of action are defined as boundary or potentialto act. The modelling of the domain was elaborated by functional situation models.This part of the analysis is represented in the upper part of the background field offigure 1. The modelling of the work domain represents an external analyst’s pointof view and provides him with a conceptualization of the core task demands ofthe work.
3.2. Analysis of habits
As the actor is intentionally directed towards the environment he takes the con-straints and possibilities into account. Thus, the work domain also expressesitself in a situation as a habitual state of readiness to act in it. The second phaseof the inferences of the CTA focuses on the individuals’ operations from the point ofview of the various different ways of taking into account the constraints and poss-ibilities of the domain. This is the analysis of habits, depicted in the lower part offigure 1. This part of the analysis also represents an external point of view to action.Even though the analysis is based on the actual actions, it focuses on distinguish-ing generic habits expressing possible reasons for action. A habitual analysis is aformative analysis in the sense that it does not aim at describing the actualizedaction, but the potential to act.
The right-hand side of the modelling of the domain and the analysis of habitsmay be interpreted to relate to a functional way of modelling of the domain andaction. The left-hand side refers to a sequential and causal modelling, which iscarried out on situational data. The parallel arrows on the left indicate the situa-tional dimension of the analysis, as the sequential–causal modelling and analysis ofactual performances takes countless forms and reflects situationally specific goalsand human–human and human–environment interactions. The relationshipsbetween the elements of the scheme are indicated with two-way arrows. Thisshould stress the fact that the analysis is not a linear process, but one that has severalcycles of inferential acts.
The analysis is restricted to working activities and, thus, to the meanings that theobject of activity and the activity system comprise. In a professional activity, it maynormally be assumed that the actor intends to take into account the result-criticalfunctions of the domain. These are understood as historically developing intrinsicconstraints of appropriate interaction with the environment. The objectives of theactivity and the critical functions of the domain may be comprehended as havingmeaning for a professional actor. These meanings are conceptualized in the above-described analysis of the work domain and habit.
However, one does not know the logic according to which the actor will considerthese meanings, i.e. what is their sense to him. Thus, one may observe that theanalysis of behaviour has a double perspective, the external observer’s and the sub-ject’s perspective. The need to distinguish between the observer’s and the subject’s
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perspective in the analysis of actions was also pointed out by Theureau (1996) whenhe developed his semiotic analysis of behaviour.
3.3. Reason-based analysis of actions
The actor’s subjective point of view denotes the environment as a personally mean-ingful object of action. The actor faces the environment equipped with a multitude ofacquired habits. The actions of the agent should not be explained as an externalconnection between the situational features and the observed behaviour. Instead, theinvestigator must make an analytical effort to become knowledgeable of the personalsense of action, usually through inquiry about the reasons for action. This constitutesthe third phase of the inference scheme. It is called the reason-based analysis of actionsand it is depicted in the centre of figure 1.
In this final phase, the results of the first two phases of analysis are utilised asinput to be interpreted in the frame of the meaning relationship model depicted inthe middle (see also figure 2). The actor’s personal accounts of the situation areanalysed with the aid of von Wright’s (1998) principle of behavioural inferenceof reasons. This principle is adapted into Peirce’s (1998b) meaning–relationshipmodel including the sign (S), the object (O) to which the sign refers and theinterpretant (I) that connects the former two elements with each other. By thismodel, we identify the actors’ understanding of the meanings of operations as rea-sons for action and determine habits of action and orientations. These reveal thepersonal sense of action.
As a result of the inferences, knowledge is acquired of what people really do intheir work, i.e. what the content and demands of their actions are, how the actionsare constructed in situations and what could be considered as appropriate action
Figure 2. Demonstration of the inference of the meaning of observed particular opera-tions during anaesthetic induction (Interpretants I1, I2, I3, I4) and their reasons (ObjectO1, O2, O3 and O4) as reactions to the signs of blood pressure and heart rate (S).
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with regard to attaining the desired results. The results of the analysis are depicted inthe centre of figure 1.
4. Analysis of situated actions: Example of anaesthetists’ action in clinical situations
This section shall demonstrate the core-task analysis methodology with the help ofthe study in the anaesthetists’ clinical practice. The study was accomplished togetherwith an expert anaesthetist, Ulla-Maija Klemola. Results of the study have beenpublished in several papers which will be referred to for further information.The study comprises three phases. In the first one, 16 expert anaesthetists weresubject to themed interviews regarding their conceptions of their work. In thesecond phase, eight randomly selected experts from the former phase participatedin a study focusing on the clinical practices of these anaesthetists. In this study, thehabits of action were identified on the basis of material collected through registeredobservations and through performance-tracing interviews. The last phase carriedout a 10 month follow-up study. It focused on the development of the habits ofaction and the use of monitor information among nine young anaesthetists whoparticipated in the specialist education at Helsinki University. The results of thislast phase of the study are still under preparation for publication and cannot beincluded here.
The presentation is structured according to the analytical steps of the Core-TaskAnalysis, even though the actual course of analysis did not strictly follow it. This isdue, first, to the fact that the inference model is rather a result of the study than of anestablished method ready to be exploited in the study when it was started. Moreover,the analysis of the empirical material took several iterative cycles. There is a con-tinuous interaction between the empirical interview and behavioural material and itsconceptualization in the sense described in the grounded theory approach (Charmaz1995). The iterative character of this conceptualization is indicated by the two-wayarrows in the model (figure 1). The whole analysis was carried out twice, first withregard to the expert anaesthetists and then to the novices. As a result, two sets ofcriteria for habits of action were created that resembled the overall professionalsituation of these two groups of subjects.
4.1. The object of anaesthesia activity and the tensions within the activity system
The analysis of the developmental situation of the activity system of ‘anaesthesiaand intensive care in surgical operations’ was based on the profound practicaland theoretical acquaintance of the anaesthetist of the research team withthe domain (Klemola and Norros 1997, 2000, Klemola 1998). The well-informedexpert insight of the domain can be conceptualized with the help of the activity–system model of Engestrom (1987). The model depicted in figure 3 is a first schematiccomprehension of the anaesthesia activity. It makes explicit the possible develop-mental tensions in the system. The appropriateness of the developmental hypothesescould and should be tested in eventual historical analyses of the activity system.Equally important, however, is the role of these hypotheses in directing the actual-empirical study of the anaesthetists’ clinical practice. One proceeded towards thisdirection.
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In the model of figure 3, the object of anaesthesia activity is depicted in its two
aspects. For the first, the object is represented as the aimed outcome of the activity
that can be defined as the efficient and excellent quality of anaesthetic care for the
patients who undergo surgical treatment. Today there is strong external pressure
from society to enhance the economical efficiency of the health care. This applies also
to the surgical domain and the anaesthesia and intensive care as part of it. Improved
efficiency should not, of course, threaten the high quality of care. The strategic
question is how to balance these two demands.
The hypothesis was that the solution depends on the way the object of activity,
the patient in anaesthesia, is conceived in the organization. This is the second
aspect of the object of activity. It is evident that the patient population that is
going to be treated by surgical operations is going to be older in the future. It is
also to be expected that these patients will be suffering from severe and multiple
illnesses. These factors increase the demands on the anaesthetic treatment. Thus, due
to the reduction of the patients’ own potential to tolerate anaesthesia, the safety
margins in anaesthesia tend to become narrower. A further critical question, there-
fore, is how the system is tuned to tackle this fact. One strategy would emphasize the
highly tailored care of individual patients, which would reflect an intention towards
increased adaptiveness in the system as a solution to face the ‘context-conditioned
variability’ (Vicente 1999) that the patients’ idiosyncratic needs demand.
Mediating artefacts:Patient monitoring systemsPatient information systems=> strive for automation andstandardisation
The actor:The clinical practice ofthe anaesthetistsUNDER INVESTIGATION
The object:Patients olderand moreseverely ill=>HYPOTHESIS:Demands on individuallytailored care
The aimedresult:Efficiencyand excellentquality ofcareBUT HOW?
Rules and norms:- epistemologyemphasises knowledge from controlledexperiments and bases onstatistical generalisations;skill interpreted asstandardperformance => evidence-basedmedicine, standardisation
Division of labour:Hierarchical structureswithin the community=>Development of qualitycontrol systems to allowcontrolled distribution ofresponsibilitydownwards,standardisation
Figure 3. An activity–systemic model of anaesthesia activity. It provides a first approx-imation of the system’s developmental tensions (the lightning-shaped arrows). Thereappears to be a generic incoherence between standardization of means and the increasingneed for individually tailored care of the patients.
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According to an optional strategy it would be beneficial to reduce variability in thesystem through various measures of standardization.
In figure 3, one has sketched the developmental tendencies that were identifiedwithin the mediating elements of the activity system (the three corners of the largetriangle). Thus, first, there is currently a great amount of development work goingon with regard to the artefacts that mediate interactions with the patient.Information technological possibilities are widely used to enhance patient moni-toring and to improve the handling of patient information. It was assumed, however,that the benefits of the new possibilities cannot be fully exploited if there is not asufficient consideration of the functionality of the new equipment for the actualcare of patients before their implementation in practice. The problem of the insuffi-cient reflection of the functionality of the technical equipment becomes evident in theanalyses of incidents and mishaps in anaesthesia (Williamson et al. 1993).A technology-driven development of artefacts tends to create a trajectory towardsthe automation of functions toward a non-reflected increase of measurements of thepatient, or toward over-emphasis on the registration and documentation of thecourse of anaesthesia instead of facilitating the on-line monitoring of the patient.Secondly, the rules and norms that mediate co-operation within the communityfollow an epistemology of practice that is characterized through the high valuingof the knowledge from strictly controlled experiments, without articulated consid-eration of its limitations in clinical inferences regarding single cases in practicalrealistic settings (Klemola and Norros 1997). The art-like and less valued clinicalskill should be made rigorous through standardization of procedures. Finally, withinthe element of the division of labour that mediates the efforts of the communitytowards the object, one can identify further tendencies for standardization. Thetendency is evident in the great amount of effort that is devoted to the developmentof quality-control systems. These are designed for assuring the results of medicalactivity by specifying the tasks and by clarifying responsibilities within the hierarchi-cally structured organization.
On the basis of such observations regarding the tendencies within the system thecentral research questions were derived. It was assumed that there is a dominantgeneral tendency for efficiency and quality through standardization of the perform-ance of the system. It was seen that this strategy does not take sufficiently intoaccount the critical demands on anaesthesia practice that the expected reductionof the patients’ own potentials for sustaining the treatment puts. Thus, a tensionexists between the demands of the object and the means by which the safetyand efficiency objectives are predominantly met. This study was interested to seehow this clear dilemma in the strategic level would manifest itself in the practices ofthe experts and in the professional socialization of the young anaesthetists duringtheir specialist education. One was also interested in developing views for anoptional and more adequate developmental strategy that would orient towardsincreasing adaptability of actions through the enhancement of expertise.
4.2. The outcome-critical functions of the domain
This analytical phase relates to the conceptualization of the constraints of thedomain and object of activity on a functional level (Rasmussen 1996, Hukki andNorros 1998, Vicente 1999). The generic goal of anaesthesia is to enable a surgicaloperation efficiently without endangering patient safety. In order to achieve this goal
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the anaesthetist has to strike a balance between several critical demands regardingthe patient’s physiological functioning under the vital constraints set by the anaes-thetic agents and the surgical stimuli. These constraints also include adequatecontrol of complex non-linear drug interactions between the drugs effecting thelevel of consciousness, pain and muscle relaxation (see details in Klemola andNorros 1997, 2000, Norros and Klemola 1999).
Another critical function relates to the nature of knowledge of patient’s physio-logical reactions to anaesthesia. The physiological potentials of the patient are onlyvaguely known before anaesthesia and the conception is based on general knowledgedrawn from controlled experiments and statistically inferred results. Therefore, thecourse of anaesthesia is basically unpredictable in a particular case.
Finally, the process also sets demands on the control of pharmacodynamicsand, in particular, on the mastery of the delays of these processes and requires thecareful anticipation of actions.
4.3. Identification of the sequential phases of the anaesthesia process
This study focused on the interactions between the anaesthetist and the patient.It distinguished three phases within the anaesthesia process, the preoperative evalua-tion, transformation of the patient’s homeostatic state and maintenance and regula-tion of the transformed state. These phases do not simply state a sequential orderof events in an anaesthesia process. Though being related to the above mentionedcritical functions of anaesthesia, their inter-connections and significance for main-taining the functions becomes overt. The phases were further divided in severalelements or sub-tasks that concerned the utilisation of the available tools in balan-cing between the main functional demands of anaesthesia in particular situations.The decomposition of sub-tasks was used later for the structuring of the criteria ofhabits of action.
4.4. Analysis of habits
It can be normally assumed that in a professional activity the actor, at least to acertain extent, takes into account the critical functions of the domain. Above, it wasstated that the patient population in the anaesthetic care is in the future expected tobe older and more severely ill. These factors increase the demands on anaesthetictreatment through reducing the patients’ own ability to tolerate anaesthesia. Thus,the safety margins in anaesthesia tend to become narrower. The two basic strategiesavailable would be: either an adaptation-oriented strategy focusing on the patients’idiosyncratic needs as the means to cope with the diminished margins, or to reducevariability in the system through various measures of standardization in the care.This hypothesis could in this phase of analysis be concretized in reference to theindividual anaesthetist’s clinical action. Hence, a further hypothesis was derived.It stated that, because of the only vague knowledge of the physiological potentialsof the patient before anaesthesia, the anaesthetist would probably make use of thephysiologically informative phases, i.e. the anaesthetic induction, to make inferencesof the patient’s potential while at the same time controlling the process. Formationof a cumulative interpretation of the physiological potentials in the most informativephases of the process would provide a basis for regulating the state of the patient
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in the later phases, during which unwanted physiological complications cannot beexcluded (Norros and Klemola 1999). This way of administering anaesthesia wouldexpress an adaptive strategy on the level of individual action.
The new hypothesis reflects the researchers’ assumptions of the possible sensiblelogic of the practitioner in his/her treating the patient. The taking into account of thecritical functions of anaesthesia is regulated through the epistemic–emotional rela-tionship that the actor has with the object of his action in the particular situation.This relationship can be seen to be characterized by the two adaptation-criticalfeatures that were derived from earlier studies in process control and related theoriz-ing on diagnostic judgement (Iljenkow 1984, Norros and Sammatti 1986, Hukki andNorros 1993, Harre and Gillet 1994). The first is the epistemic tendency to formulatea coherence of interpretation of the environment by which is meant conceiving theobject in terms of its essential dynamic principles and in its systemic connections(Rasmussen 1996, Hukki and Norros 1998). The necessary counterpart of this is thetendency to situativeness of interpretations by which is emphasized the appreciationof the situated object as the source of knowledge and an aim for knowing (Dewey1929/1999, Hukki and Norros 1998). These tendencies express themselves in anenergetic–emotional relationship with the object that has been called situated atten-tive engagement (Ingold 1996). At present, it is considered that the earlier attempt tocomprehend acting in an uncertain world coheres with the characterization made byPeirce (1903/1998). This study refers to Peirce who developed a notion of humaninteraction with the environment as an oscillation between the state of belief and astate of doubt. According to Peirce, fully fledged abductive inference characterizesinterpretative action, where as less developed interaction characterizes reactive action(Peirce 1998a). The continuous cycle is mediated by the production of abductivehypotheses and by their operational testing. This is the way habits work. Continuityin behaviour is accomplished by developing habits that are repeated and that expressthe meaning of operations. By virtue of the repetition of habits, actions becomesituationally adapted and they may develop. The conception of abductive inferenceforms the underlying evaluation dimension for habits and is also depicted in theCTA inference scheme in the bottom of figure 1.
These features of behaviour, which can be considered as relevant for adaptabilityof actions in the dynamic, complex and uncertain situations in open-systems, refer tothe nature of a subject’s own relationship to the object of action. Thus, they aresupposed to be realized in different intensities by different actors. In the eyes of theexternal evaluator, the strength of these adaptation-critical features in a subject’srelationship towards the object in a particular domain can be interpreted to expressthe logic with which the subject takes into account the functional outcome-criticaldemands of the object domain. They would become identifiable through observingthe features of the perception-action cycles that the subject’s tool-using interactionswith the object express.
Hence, the generic habitual relationship with the environment is concretized inthe core-task analysis scheme in two ways. First, the observable courses of action areconceptualized as tool-using human–environment interactions. In the case of anaes-thesia these are interactions between the doctor and the patient. (This study was notable to consider the role of team co-operation in the situated construction of theanaesthesia process. This is an important topic of further studies.) Drugs, patientinformation and professional concepts were conceived as tools of the anaesthetist,with which he/she interacts with the patient with the aim of maintaining the patients’
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physiological state within safe boundaries. Thus, in these studies, the anaesthetists’actions and the patients’ physiological and other responses were recorded throughobservation and video-recordings and log outs from the monitors. On the basis ofthis data, graphical time-line representations of the action–perception cycles wereconstructed. Different kinds of operations, such as giving drugs, laryngoscopy, aus-cultation, communicating with the patient, etc., were indicated in the graphicalrepresentations. One was especially interested to identify what kind of action percep-tion patterns appeared in different cases and what reasons the actors gave to explaintheir operations. Clearly identifiable performance patterns could be observed in thecourses of action of different practitioners.
According to the core-task analysis scheme (figure 1), one should, secondly,concretize the generic abductive relationship with the environment from a func-tional, result-critical perspective (lower right-hand side of figure 1). The above-mentioned hypothesis concerning the core-task of the anaesthetist is assumed toreflect the possible sensible logic of the agents in their taking into account theresult critical functions of the particular work. From this hypothesis, the followingfour core-task demands were derived, and are also depicted in the inference scheme(figure 1). An earlier model of diagnostic judgement in a disturbance situation(Hukki and Norros 1993) distinguished the diagnostic and operative aspects ofjudgement. This distinction is also valid in the normal situation. The first two coretask demands refer to the diagnostic, and the other two to the operative aspects ofdiagnostic judgement in a normal process control situation:
. rich use of situated information,
. cumulative interpretation of the physiology of the patient,
. anticipation of the dynamics of the process in the control of anaesthesia, and
. preparedness and checking attitude in the use of tools.
The core-task demands are functional requirements, with which the tool-using inter-actions that are identified in the analysis of the courses of actions (left-hand side ofthe CTA scheme, figure 1) must be related. Thus, behaviours are acquired that haveemerged among the practitioners of this particular work activity. These are used asindicators for habit of action. Other work activities may have other types of psy-chological core-task demands depending on the result critical functions of thedomain and, correspondingly, different indicators for habits of action emerge.
4.5. Reason-based inferences regarding actual habits of action
It has been indicated that the object of activity and the functional demands thatneed to be fulfilled in action have meaning to the actor in his professional perform-ance. However, to understand what people do in their work, one also must knowaccording to what logic he will do that, what their personal interpretation is.
In an earlier work, the intentional aspect of action has been approached throughthe concept of orientation defined as an individual’s comprehension of the object ofhis or her activity (Norros 1995, Klemola and Norros 1997). To this definition onemay add that orientation denotes a personal stance with relation to the object ofactivity as it appears in the framing of the goals of situated action. According to thetheory of activity, orientation can be assumed to control situated action through theframing of the object as the goal of action. In this function, orientation acts as anepistemic attitude towards the situational constraints that may be relevant for the
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attainment of the goal (von Wright 1998). Exploiting von Wright’s (1998) principleof behavioural inference of reasons, one may analyse behaviour and infer whetherthe subjects have understood the meaning of the result-critical functions of the workthat have been considered meaningful for the work.
Use of the above-described evaluation basis puts challenges on the practicalmethods. Orientation interviews were used as a tool through which the interviewee’sconception of the object of activity was identified. In addition, the personal sense,understood as whether the actor has comprehended the functionally significantmeaning of certain things as personally sinful reasons to act, can be inferred fromperformance, as von Wright (1998) has proven. In order to enable such inferences,action-tracing inquiries were also used that help in becoming knowledgeable aboutthe actors’ accounts, i.e. reasons (Harre and Gillet 1994).
In the next section, the intention is to demonstrate the way meaning structuresare identified in the texture of actions and how habits of action are defined thatexpress the personal sense of action.
According to pragmatist philosophy, the general expression of meaning is habit,which has the logical triadic structure depicted in figure 2 (Peirce 1958, pp. 369–390).In this meaning-relationship model, Peirce distinguished the Object of the sign, itsmaterial carrier the Sign, and the Interpretant of the sign. The object is the ‘target’that the Sign refers to and the interpretant is the connection of the two into arelationship with each other. In this method, this meaning-relationship model isused to interpret the behavioural data. Jacques Theareau (e.g. Pinsky andTheureau 1989, Theureau 1996) used the triadic sign as the elementary unit in theanalysis of courses of action. There is a need and a task for the future to relate thisway of using the concept of habit with this semio-logical analysis of action.Moreover, the relationship of the habit concept and the ‘scheme’ concept used byPiaget should be theoretically clarified in the near future.
It was stated earlier in this paper that anaesthetists have the possibility during theinduction phases of anaesthesia to gain information concerning the state of thepatient’s physiological potentials that before anaesthesia are known only vaguely.The intensity of the usage depends on the personal sense of this possibility, i.e. on thelogic of his or her action. This is seen to manifest the strength of coherence andsituativeness of the doctor’s interpretation of the patient as his object of activity.These features are projected in the interpretativeness or reactiveness of habits ofaction. A high level of interpretativeness is seen to relate to the strength of situativeattentive engagement and to result in appropriateness of action. In the study onexperts (Norros and Klemola 1999, Klemola and Norros 2001) concrete behaviouralcriteria for the evaluation of actions were constructed. The method was developedfurther and adapted to meet the conditions that characterize the clearly differentsituation of the residents of anaesthesia (in preparation). One item of evaluation thatwas included in both sets of criteria may serve as an example of the inferential logicused in the evaluations (see figure 2).
The example demonstrates four different habitual relations that the expertanaesthetists of the study manifested during the induction phases of anaesthesia,in connection with the task of inducing doses of anaesthetic drugs. The differentreasons for actions that are connected to particular situatively available signs areinterpreted to denote the different possible senses that the situation may make to theprofessionals. One of them may be the actual efficacious reason for a particularperson to act in the situation. The relations represented in the model express the
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different personal sense that a particular sign may make to the doctor with regard tothe patient. The example presents an item that expresses the fulfilment of the psy-chological core-task demand of creating a cumulative interpretation of the patient’sphysiology. The relation S-I1-O1 manifests the weakest and the S-I4-O4 thestrongest tendency towards this core-task demand and towards the underlying inter-pretativeness of action. The fulfilment of this demand is connected with the subject’sunderstanding of the critical functions of the task. This connection is realizedthrough the contextual criteria of habits of action. Thus, though being connectedto the core-task demands, the item informs about the features of habits of action.However, because the features of habit of action are contextually defined they alsorelate to the critical functions of the domain. Thus, understanding is taken of howthe critical functions of the domain are taken into account.
The core-task criteria provide a possibility to identify professional practices fromthe point of view of their meaning. As such, the analysis may be considered a culturalanalysis of performance. The criteria were used to form profiles of each anaesthetist’shabits of action. The criteria offered a mirror for the subjects to reflect on theirpractice. It became evident in the study that in a given interview few expertswould report behaviours belonging to the first level criteria under each item.However, the results indicated that such practices are not rare.
By identifying a considerable amount of perception-operation interactions in thecourse of actions and the related reasons that were acquired from the action-tracinginterviews, criteria for habits of action were obtained. These criteria reflect what theparticular agent is taking into account as a relevant reason for action (efficientreasons) and to what extent the result-critical functions are included as relevant(possible reasons). These are valued in respect to the habitual core task demands.Evaluations of each actors’ operations were summarized and characteristic profilesof habits of action, i.e. anaesthetic practice, were formulated (Klemola and Norros2001).
4.6. Summary of the results regarding the anaesthetists’ habits of action
The thus far available empirical results of the study on the anaesthetists’ clinicalpractice (Klemola and Norros 1997, 2001, Norros and Klemola 1999) can besummarized in the following points. The results enable identification of systematicdifferences in habits of action among expert anaesthetists. The central differ-entiating feature is the fulfilment of the core-task demand of the construction ofan interpretation of the physiological potentials of the patient. The habit of actionthat was labelled interpretative is characterized through a deliberate construction ofa personal cumulative interpretation of these potentials. This conception also servesas a reference for regulating actions in the later phases of the anaesthesia. This habitof action was also characterized with rich use of available information. In the otherprinciple habit of action, that was labelled reactive, such an interpretative attemptdoes not become evident, instead the anaesthesia process is controlled with the helpof pre-defined schemes with less intensive search for information.
These differences in habits of action correlate with the practitioners’ conceptionsof the object of activity that were obtained through the orientation interviews. Theidentification of uncertainty regarding the reactions of the patient during anaesthesiaand, consequently, a clearly expressed need to set oneself in a communicativerelationship with the unconscious patient through an intensive use of the available
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information of the physiological reactions, were considered the essential signs of arealistic orientation. The lack of identification of the uncertainty and manifestationof a control relationship towards the patient, instead of a communicative one, wereconsidered indications of an objectivistic orientation. The two different epistemicattitudes towards the patient correlated with the interpretative habit of action andthe reactive habit of action, respectively.
Already in an earlier work (Norros 1995), a hypothesis was formulated thatdifferences in orientation and ways of acting would be relevant for explaining theconstruction of expertise. However, because such habitual differences in action arelogically not related to experience per se, this tendency is easily over-shadowed in theusual studies of expertise, in which the expert–novice comparison design is normallyused. In the third phase of the anaesthesia study, one was able to test this hypothesis.It is expected that the differences found in the experts’ habits of action will alsocharacterize the young anaesthetists’ habits of action. Moreover, the interpretativehabit of action should, according to the hypothesis, facilitate learning and,thus, explain construction of expertise (the results of the study are currently underpreparation for publication).
4.7. Conclusions of the use core-task analysis, the analysis of anaesthetists’ action
When the available and expected results concerning the anaesthetists’ action areinterpreted in the activity-system frame, several conclusions can be made that arerelevant for the development of the activity. The conclusions are summarized in twomajor points.
First, it is seen that the potentials embedded in the realistic orientation and in theinterpretative habit of action meet with the demands that the care of ageing surgicalpatients with more severe illnesses puts. This conclusion provides a system-orientedargument for preferring this particular form of professional practice. Hence, the usedmethod opens up a perspective for training. In the development of practices it shouldbe necessary to reflect on the reasons of the operations and their relation to thefunctionally critical demands of the work. The scientifically educated anaesthetistshave an extensive theoretical competence that is continuously up-dated through thereading of scientific publications. The reflection on habits of action could be usefulfor bridging the gap between theoretical knowledge and clinical practice.
Second, when put in the societal connection of the anaesthesia activity system thetwo habits of action and the related orientations may be seen to express genericforms of anaesthetic practice. The practice qualified with the objectivistic orientationand reactive habits of action is rooted in the prevailing philosophical conceptionsof neutrality and detachment of objective science (Klemola and Norros 2000). Theprevailing epistemology of practice, for its part, resembles the ‘technical rationality’described by Schon (1983). Its interpretation of knowledge sets the controlled andabstracted conditions of experiments as a standard for rigorous knowledge. Thus, itunder-values the informative potentials of clinical skill. The prevailing conceptof practice does not take into account the principle difficulty of using statisticalinformation as a basis for inferences in particular cases. Such inferences are, ofcourse, the essence of clinical work. Silence about this central question may beinterpreted as a sign of considering clinical practice simply as a controlled applica-tion of knowledge. Such a characterization of skill would be a further indication oftechnical rationality. Technical rationality is the epistemic orientation that underlies
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standardization, the predominant strategy today for the improvement of anaestheticactivity (Klemola and Norros 1997, 2000). This orientation may over-shadowthe actual need for a genuine science-based development of practices and newco-operative forms of action.
Thus, one may state that the hypothesized contradictions in the anaesthesiaactivity become visible in the daily practices of anaesthetists. The expert practitionersre-construct the prevailing technically oriented and objectivistic conceptions of theobject of activity through their clinical actions and provide the background forstandardization as the dominant strategy for development. Further studies areexpected to be able to verify the assumption that the young practitioners alsoadopt the prevailing form of practice during their professional learning and sociali-zation process. Developing interpretative habits of action is possible in individualcases but changing common practices requires deliberate reflection on the strategyand a more elaborate consideration of the object of anaesthesia and intensive carewithin the organizations.
5. Discussion
The need for adaptation is typical for many modern work domains. There are,however, difficulties in developing an adequate adaptation-oriented operating strat-egy for organizations. It is maintained that one generic problem may be that theactors and the organizations have not succeeded in developing habits and workingpractices that enable adaptive behaviour under the constraints set by the informationtechnologically and organizationally very mediated work. The increasing mediationof actions probably facilitates standardization rather than adaptive behaviour.This tendency is especially outspoken in high-reliability domains and it hindersnot only the activity of the operating personnel, but perhaps even more, that ofthe managers or the safety authorities responsible for the control of nuclear, patient,etc., safety. To develop adaptive mediated actions it is necessary to develop reflectiveprocesses in the organizations. Reflection, understood as consciousness of the social–historical determination of the prevailing concepts of the phenomena of the world(Bourdieu 1990), is not an easy qualification to develop. Reflective attitude andaction assumes profound personal object-orientedness in the interaction with theenvironment in everyday practice. Such an orientation to the environment mayresult in new insights of the nature of the phenomena and in learning. It is considerednecessary to take distance (Norros and Nuutinen 2002) from the commonly heldview of reflection, which conceives reflection as an in-build and ready-to-use meta-cognitive mechanism that is launched in novel situations. Such a conception isembedded even in some relatively recent theories of naturalistic decision-making(Klein 1993). Instead, one agrees with Dewey (1980) that the construction of knowl-edge for the mastery of uncertainty in practice and learning are one and the samephenomenon. Learning is most effective when the person focuses on the objectand not on learning itself.
5.1. Empirical evidence for the concept of reflective habituality
The theoretical innovation to adopt the pragmatist conception of habit as a con-ceptual tool in the analysis of everyday actions provides an opportunity to identify
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reflection in action. The issue of the reflectivity of habit has been tackled in recentstudies regarding the concept of habit (Kilpinen 2000). The interpretation is thatrepetition as a characteristic of habit is the essential feature of adaptation preciselydue to the fact that what is repeated is not the actual realization of actions but themeaningful relationship with the world that is embedded in the habit. Therefore,changing conditions must be taken into account in the construction of the act (in thissense the conditions really determine the act) and, at the same time, they may createdoubt and critique and eventual tuning or change of habits. Reflection is a more orless intuitive acknowledgement of the object as a source of new knowledge, not onlyas a target to be controlled.
The interpretation of habit deviates from those views that tend to distinguishhabit and reflective action (Miettinen 2000) and see habits as repetitive routines thatnormally work. A problematic event is seen to trigger reflective thinking that isqualified as experimenting on the problem and it may create new means to tacklethe problem. These become new habits. In his very informative article, Miettinen(2000, p. 65) based his interpretation of habit on Dewey’s distinction betweenprimary and secondary experience. The first is composed of material interactionwith the physical and social environment and the latter is a reflective experiencethat makes the environment and its things as objects of reflection and knowledge.The latter aspect appears to draw Miettinen’s full attention and, consequently, anintellectualization of the concept of reflection easily follows. It may, however, bemore interesting to hold the two forms of experience together when studying action.
We propose that one reason behind the unintended tendency to trivialize habitand intellectualize reflection is due to the fact that repetition is seen merely asrepeating an action, not specifically the meaning of the act. This has the consequencethat habits are conceived as if they were created through conscious acts (with mean-ing) that become automatic routines through repetition (without meaning). This isclearly not in accordance with the pragmatist conception of habit. One may alsodraw on Kestenbaum’s (1977) argumentations when believing that this is notDewey’s own intention. Also, Kilpinen (2000) has shown that pragmatists interprethabits as meaningful entities and, yet, they are formed pre-reflectively. This viewis also in accordance with the more recent ideas of Lakoff and Johnson (1999).Habit includes the possibility of reflection because repetition in human performanceis related to the subject’s way of being in the environment and not to the particularactualization of this way in any situated act. This distinction between habit as apotential, general mode and action as the actual realizations of this potential isheld by Peirce (1903/1998) an essential of the habit concept.
The observed two habits of action among the anaesthetists may be interpretedto give empirical support to the concept of reflective habituality (Kilpinen 2000).A corresponding difference in habits of action was also found in the analyses ofnuclear power plant operators’ habits of action in disturbance situations (Hukki andNorros 1993, Norros and Hukki 1996). The categories used in the identification ofthe ways of acting were coherence and situativeness. It was maintained, further, thatthese characteristics manifest themselves in a person’s more-or-less situated attentiveengagement with the object (Ingold 1996) or complete presence in the situation.This concept is decisive because with it one was able to explain how the actualacts become meaningful each time they are repeated. Hence, a connection wasdrawn between the dual character of habit as routine and reflection. Through thepersonal complete presence in action the reasons for repeating the operations
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become present in the act. The famous Swedish film director Ingmar Bergman drewattention to the same idea as he characterized differences between actors. The dif-ference is in the way the roles are repeated every night:
I long for peace, order, kindness. It is the only way we can approach infinity. It is the only
way we can solve mysteries and learn the mechanisms of repetition. Repetition; living,
pulsing repetition. The same performance night after night; the same but, yet, reborn.
How else can we learn the split-second rhythm of our assigned dialogue, which is so
essential to avoid degeneration of the performance into a lifeless routine or an intolerable
unruliness? All good actors know the secret intrinsically, the average must learn it, bad
actors never learn (Bergman 1987, p. 35) (translation LN).
5.2. The role of habits of action in the construction of situated action
The motivation to identify habits of action is to be able to explain the constructionof actual actions in work. The construction can be analysed in two respects, theconstruction of the dynamic course of actions in an on-going situation andthe development of expertise in work with an accumulation of experience. In thestudy of anaesthesia, descriptions of the courses of action were prepared as a firststep of the analysis and used later to clarify the differences in habits of action(Klemola and Norros 2001). One did not, yet, present systematic descriptions ofthe relationship between the courses of action and the expressed habits of action.The study concerning handling of disturbances in simulated nuclear power plant(NPP) operations (Norros and Hukki 1996, Hukki and Norros 1998, Norros2004) described differences in the courses of action as manifestations of differencesin habits of action of the operating crews. The differences were visible with regard tothe attainment of the situation-specific goals, timing and scheduling of diagnosticand operating actions and in the preferences concerning the use of information andoperating methods (Norros 2004).
Explaining the development of expertise in work is the further aspect of interest.The content of the two principle habits of action that were identified in the NPPand anaesthesia studies allow inferences regarding learning from experience.It was demonstrated that the interpretative habit of action focuses on constructinga personal interpretation of the object of action. This tendency is accompanied withrich use of the situatively available information of the process. The reason for suchbehaviour is the understanding of the idiosynchratic nature of the object andthe coping with uncertainty that this fact causes for the control. The functionallyadaptive solution in this situation is to create knowledge of the object for its propercontrol (Klemola and Norros 1997, Norros and Nuutinen 2002). This construc-tion of knowledge through the forming of an interpretation about the particularobject builds up the kernel around which both the further experience and the accu-mulating formal knowledge can be gathered. In reference to Dewey (1910/1997),the construction process is not merely an intellectual process but, also, a practicaloperational testing of the functioning of the knowledge and inquiring of the resultsof acting.
Construction of knowledge of the uncertain world is a continuous social processwithin communities of practice. As Engestrom (1987) has shown, learning is con-nected with the possibilities for re-construction of the activity system. One agreeswith Engestrom and considers the results to be compatible with his theory.
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The results provide detailed knowledge of the process of creation of new knowledgein the daily personal practice of professional actors. However, by virtue of this focus,it became evident that not only the clearly identifiable (objective) problems anddisturbances play a role in explaining developmental processes. Disturbancesrelate to a more global organizational point of view and to comprehending practicesfrom an outsider’s perspective. A compatible but a more subjectively tuned con-ception of the continuous cycle between ‘state of doubt’ and ‘state of belief’ thatPeirce (1903/1998) uses for explaining the way habit works, appears important whenexplaining the constructive process on a personal level. According to Peirce, such acontinuous process of inference is characterized by abductive guess-like hypotheses,which define what habit in essence is. Peirce, furthermore, maintained that habitshould be understood both as a way of thinking and as a corporeal practice.The inference process is continuous when intending to survive in the world ofcontingencies. Thus, the subjective constructive process is not event-oriented in anobjective sense, rather it is object-oriented in a subjective sense. The existenceof such inferential habitual processes can explain observations of the existence ofinterpretative habits of action in the anaesthetists’ normal daily work. It alsoprovides grounds to expect that learning from experience in normal daily work ismore effective the more interpretative the habits of action are.
The analysis of the potentials for action by identifying habits of action in normalpractices provides diagnostic and predictive possibilities in the study of work. Onemay identify dispositions that in particular circumstances may lead to problems.This possibility is especially important in work that is carried out in dynamic,complex and uncertain (DCU) situations, and in high-reliability organizations.Thanks to the technical defences designed into these systems, severe problemsseldom occur. When disturbances or accidents do occur it is not easy to draw con-nections between these end-results and the daily behaviour of the personnel.The difficulty is, among other things, the restrictions in the incident and accidentanalysis techniques that are normally in use. As indicated by Rasmussen (1996),the event-specific causal analyses are weak in identifying the functionalgeneric determinants for maintaining the system within the boundaries of safeperformance. The identification of such features in specific incidents would offerwell-founded perspectives for preventive measures. Moreover, combined with ahabit-centred analysis of actions such modelling would also be useful in the analysisof normal actions. As a result, the yet not actualized risk-proneness of normalactions could be identified.
Acknowledgements
Our studies on the anaesthetists’ work demonstrate inter-disciplinary co-operationthat an ecological analysis of actions necessitates. The author expresses her deepestgratitude to the expert anaesthetist Dr Ulla-Maija Klemola for companionship inthe empirical and theoretical work during these studies.
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About the author
Leena Norros PhD, works at the Technical Research Centre of Finland as asenior research scientist. Her area of research is human performance in complexhigh-reliability work.
The concept of habit in the analysis of situated actions 407
