The Controversy About the H5N1 Transmissibility Experiments

http://www.nature.com/news/work‐resumes‐on‐lethal‐flu‐strains‐1.12266

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Learning Objectives

• Participants will be able to:– Describe  the details of the experiments in question.

– Explain why the research is considered as “dual use”

– Examine the role of scientists in contemporary society 

H5N1 viruses Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) virus –is avirus that occurs mainly in birds, is highlycontagious among birds, and can be deadly tothem, especially domestic ones. Few sporadichuman infections with this virus have occurred andcaused serious illness and death.

Summary of the issuesStudies by Ron Fouchier at Erasmus Medical Center inRotterdam, Netherland and Yoshihiro Kawaoka at theUniversity of Wisconsin, USA, aimed to answer a question“whether H5 influenza viruses can achieve sustainableaerosol transmission in ferrets?”

http://www.inferno‐guide.net/chapitre102/

Ron FouchierYoshihiro Kawaoka

• They did repeat passage and replication of H5N1 inferrets, a well established animal model for thestudy of influenza transmission.

• Ferrets are also more likely than humans to havedisseminated, multiorgan influenza diseaseincluding neurologic sequelae (consequences)resulting from virus replication in the brain (ZitzowLA, et al, 2002).

• Their results showed that mutant strains of H5N1can achieve sustainable aerosol transmission inferrets

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The Kawaoka Experiments 

Random mutation produced about 2.1 million strains –one could now bind the human/ferret receptor

That H5N1 was reassorted with the 2009 H1N1 virus (mix two viruses)  and injected into ferrets – a third mutation 

led to airborne transmission

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A fourth mutation that stabilized virus entry caused effective airborne transmission between ferrets

Activity 1 ‐15 minutesResearch the five  steps in influenza replication

• Group 1: virus  attachment• Group 2: cell entry• Group 3: nuclear entry and transcription• Group 4: transcription and replication• Group 5: assembly and budding 

Linda Stannard http://www.rapidreferenceinfluenza.com/chapter/B978‐0‐7234‐3433‐7.50009‐8/aim/virus‐replication

Authors(Group 1) 

Jigsaw model (4 groups)

Regulatory agency(Group 2) 

WHO(Group 3)

Public(Group 4)

Media(Group 5)

Activity 2 – Role play and jigsaw

Group 1: The authors, who support and justify the research approachGroup 2: A government regulatory agency in Indonesia concerned with dissemination of information

Group 3 : The WHO, who has to balance open publication with public safety

Group 4: The public, who are frightened and skepticalGroup 5: The media, who overreact to the issue 

Time line of H5N1 dual use events

MALTAmeetingSept 2011

OCTOBERmanuscripts arrive at NSABB*

NSABB advises Redaction/limitedAccess Nov 21

Jan 2060 dayvoluntary moratorium

WHO opposesredactionFeb 17

Mar 30NSABBReversesdecision 

May 2 Kawaokapaper published

Jul 31 Flu meeting NYCNIH (Fauci) advises that moratorium be continued

2011‐2012

Jun 21 Fouchierpaper published

Dec 17‐18NIH meetingon flu researchregulations

*National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity

Jan 23 2013 controversy ended by the resumption of research

Oct 17, 2014

As a group, list the elements that arise in the H5N1 case

Activity 3 – concept mapping

An example of a concept map

As a group, now link these elements together in a concept map

Activity 3 – concept mapping

Conclusions 

• Scientists should understand that their research may be misused or misapplied to harm society.

• Scientists must take into consideration the essential procedures to minimize and prevent the misuse of their research.