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The Corporation as Citoyen? Towards a New Understandingof Corporate Citizenship
Michael S. Aßlander • Janina Curbach
� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract Based on the extended conceptualization of
corporate citizenship, as provided by Matten and Crane
(Acad Manag Rev 30(1):166–179, 2005), this paper
examines the new role of corporations in society. Taking
the ideas of Matten and Crane one step further, we argue
that the status of corporations as citizens is not solely
defined by their factual engagement in the provision of
citizenship rights to others. By analysing political and
sociological citizenship theories, we show that such
engagement is more adequately explained by a change in
the self-conception of corporate citizens from corporate
bourgeois to corporate citoyens. While the corporate
bourgeois acts primarily for private business purposes, the
corporate citoyen engages in society, performing civil and
political rights and duties. As an intermediate actor in
society, shaped by the principle of subsidiary task-sharing,
the corporate citoyen undertakes co-responsibility for
social and civic affairs and actively collaborates with fel-
low citizens below, beside and beyond governmental
regulation.
Keywords Bourgeois � Citoyen � Corporate citizenship �Corporate social responsibility � Responsibility � Social
doctrine � Subsidiarity
Introduction
In recent years, concepts such as ‘corporate social
responsibility’ (CSR) and ‘corporate citizenship’ (CC)
have become prominent topics in international discussions
of business ethics. Although there are differences in the
accentuation of what should be the core elements of these
concepts (e.g. Buchholtz and Carroll 2009; Leisinger 2007,
2009) and although differing traditions and national polit-
ical frameworks lead to different interpretations of the
single issues defined by these theories, the ideas of CSR
and CC have started to shape a new understanding of the
role of corporations in society. However, despite the
increasing number of publications in this field and ongoing
discussion in both science and business practice, there are
as yet no commonly accepted definitions of CSR and CC.
Thus, the role of corporations in society as defined by these
concepts remains ambiguous: from a technical perspective,
CSR and CC are seen as strategic tools or management
techniques that enhance the reputation of corporations with
their stakeholder groups and at the same time guarantee
that corporate policy adheres to minimal ethical require-
ments. Hence, most CSR management tools aim for the
implementation of respective corporate procedures and
management standards.
From a political perspective, CSR and CC describe
corporate duties intended to contribute to societal welfare
and environmental improvements by providing services
and goods for the community which go beyond corpora-
tions’ regular economic activities. Going one step further,
Matten and Crane (2005) plead for an extended theoretical
conceptualization of CC and describe corporations as
quasi-governmental actors, arguing that corporations have
started to administer civic rights voluntarily in cases where
nation governments fail or are unable to do so (Matten and
Crane 2005).
However, this latter view of CC remains fragmentary
and ambiguous for at least three reasons: First, Matten and
Crane seem to deal with two different conceptualizations of
M. S. Aßlander (&) � J. Curbach
International Institute Zittau, Technical University Dresden,
Markt 23, 02763 Zittau, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
123
J Bus Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-2004-8
Page 2
CC. On the one hand, the status of individual citizenship
depends on the role of corporations as citizens in society,
which means that they are defined as corporate citizens
because they are the addressees of citizenship rights. On
the other hand, corporations should take over governmental
duties and administer civic rights instead of governments
and are thus defined as corporate citizens because they are
the guarantors of citizenship rights. This is not simply a
change in perspective or, as Matten and Crane claim, an
extended conceptualization, but a very different under-
standing of what CC stands for.
Second, if corporations contribute to societal welfare, it
remains unclear whether this should be seen as a voluntary
discretionary engagement which can be terminated at any
time for any reason, or whether such engagement must be
seen as allegiance, obedience and an obligation that result
from corporate citizen status. In this sense, there is a need
to clarify which definition of citizenship is to be applied to
corporations: Are corporations to be seen as bourgeois,
acting mainly for private business purposes, or should they
be defined as citoyens, engaging on behalf of society due to
their rights and duties in relation to political participation
and social membership?
Third, if corporations play an active part in society,
contributing as corporate citizens to social welfare and a
cleaner environment or providing citizenship rights as
described by Matten and Crane, the mode of such
engagement needs to be specified. It remains unclear
whether corporations have to substitute, supplement or
compensate for governmental efforts and in which fields
corporations must, should or can contribute to social and
ecological affairs.
While increases in corporate engagement that substitutes
or supplements governmental activities seem to be less
problematic, compensating for governmental duties by means
of corporate activities—such as those discussed by Matten
and Crane—causes serious problems because it cannot be
taken for granted that corporate activities will compensate for
a lack in governmental services in all relevant areas on a
sustained basis. In addition, it raises the question of the
democratic legitimization of such quasi-governmental activi-
ties. In order to clarify who bears what responsibilities in
society, in our opinion, a regulatory principle is needed that
offers clear rules for corporate and governmental task-sharing.
In this context, as we will show in this paper, the tenet of
subsidiarity might serve as a regulatory principle, allowing a
description of corporate duties that go beyond good man-
agement practices and are more concrete than voluntary
engagement. According to the tenet of subsidiarity, corpora-
tions can be described as intermediate actors bearing concrete
duties in a system of subsidiary societal task-sharing.
The purpose of our article is to solve two of the afore-
mentioned problems and to elaborate further the status of
corporate citizens and their mode of contributing to society.
In the second section, we will provide a critical account of
the CC concept as outlined by Matten and Crane (2005),
arguing that such a conception of CC remains ambiguous
in some of its key aspects and would benefit from a clearer
definition of the societal status of corporate actors and their
duties in contributing to society. To develop the concept of
CC further, we will then discuss the citizenship status of
corporations in the following sections, starting with a his-
torical sketch of the different conceptions of citizens as
bourgeois and citoyens and the key citizenship principles to
be found in citizenship research and discussing these in the
corporate context. We will argue that the understanding of
corporations as citizens refers to both bourgeois and cit-
oyen corporate roles. While the understanding of corpo-
rations as bourgeois focuses on the way in which business
is conducted and concentrates on the business case, the
understanding of corporations as citoyens highlights the
political rights and duties of corporations which are derived
from the status of corporate citizens as political actors. In
the fourth section, we will consider the consequences of
such political duties in terms of the mode of corporate
contribution to society. We will show that voluntary
engagement causes difficulties if corporate activities are
used to compensate for missing governmental capacities.
Thus, the tenet of subsidiarity is introduced as a regulatory
principle allowing for a distinction to be made between
corporate duties and voluntary activities. Subsequently, our
conclusion will be that the CSR/CC discussion should be
enriched with a new aspect, which can be described as
corporate subsidiary co-responsibility, defining corporate
duties in society going beyond economic activities. As a
bourgeois, the corporation concentrates on the business
case by focusing on the technical aspects of corporate
responsibility. As a citoyen, the corporation takes on sub-
sidiary co-responsibility and engages as a full corporate
citizen in society beyond economic considerations.
Corporate Citizens as Quasi-Governmental Actors:
The Extended Conception of CC
In a number of recent articles Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten
and Jeremy Moon have discussed a new role for corporations
as corporate citizens in globalizing societies (Crane et al.
2004; Matten and Crane 2005; Matten et al. 2003, 2010;
Moon et al. 2005, 2008). Starting with an analysis of the
contemporary CC literature, they argue that the term CC is
primarily discussed from two perspectives: The first is a
‘limited view’ which equates CC with corporate philan-
thropy in the form of strategic investments aimed at
improving the firm’s reputation capital or human capital; the
second is an ‘equivalent view’ which equates CC with CSR
M. S. Aßlander, J. Curbach
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(Crane and Matten 2007, pp. 71–74; Matten and Crane 2005,
pp. 168–169; Matten et al. 2003, pp. 112–113). Returning to
the political roots of the term citizenship, they propose an
extended conceptualization of CC which focuses on the
role of corporations as providers of citizenship rights to
individuals.
They argue that, from a political perspective, stake-
holders—such as employees, consumers, investors and
civil actors—have to be seen not only as simple interest
groups having specific stakes in a company but also
interpreted in a broader political context as citizens in a
democratic society. Thus, Crane, Matten and Moon advo-
cate reframing the firm–stakeholder relation from a citi-
zenship perspective (Moon et al. 2008, pp. 24–25): From
this perspective, stakeholders are either citizens who expect
from corporations the administration of some of their cit-
izenship rights or they are constituencies which participate
in the administration of citizenship rights for others (Crane
et al. 2004, p. 108). In this conception, corporations play a
vital role because they are the addressees of the stakeholder
citizens and are expected to provide citizenship rights in
society. Addressing the problems of entitlement of citi-
zenship, of citizenship participation and of its democratic
legitimacy, the authors stress that the citizenship status of
corporations arises from a decline in the role of the state as
the provider of civil rights (Matten et al. 2003, p. 115) and
the factual process of participation that corporations
undertake in civic affairs (Crane et al. 2004, p. 109).
However, interestingly, corporations are not seen as citi-
zens ‘because they have an entitlement to certain rights as
‘‘real’’ citizens would, but as powerful public actors which
have a responsibility to respect those ‘‘real’’ citizen’s rights
in society’ (Crane et al. 2004, p. 109; see also Matten et al.
2003, p. 115). Thus, the firm–stakeholder relationship is
remodelled as a citizen–government relation and corpora-
tions are ascribed a role as quasi-governmental actors and
guarantors of civic rights for others (Crane et al. 2004,
pp. 109–110). As quasi-governmental actors, corporations
engage in providing individual citizenship rights entitle-
ments in cases where governments fail to administer citi-
zenship rights, where governments have not yet
administered such rights or where the administration of
such rights is out of reach of nation state regulation (Matten
and Crane 2005, p. 172). As Matten et al. state, ‘Our
central argument is that corporations enter the arena of
citizenship at the point of government failure in the pro-
tection of citizenship’ (2003, p. 116). By doing so, cor-
porations become the guarantor of three types of
citizenship rights: they provide civil rights, e.g. by shaping
consumers’ abilities to engage in markets; they grant social
rights, e.g. by offering additional services that are no
longer provided by national governments; and they secure
political rights, e.g. by giving employees’ representatives
a voice in the corporate decision-making process (Crane et al.
2004, pp. 113–114; Crane and Matten 2007, pp. 74–75).
This new perspective overcomes the limited view of
citizens primarily as members of the states within which
they live and as proper citizens of a specific nation state.
Consequently, CC is not defined solely as a ‘legal per-
sonhood’ bestowed by national governments and defining
the specific rights and duties of corporations in societies,
but by corporations’ contribution to society: ‘Corporate
citizenship describes the corporate function for governing
citizenship rights for individuals’ (Crane and Matten 2007,
p. 77; see also Matten and Crane 2005, p. 173).
Such a new definition raises at least two questions. The
first concerns the groundwork of the extended perspective
of CC. In their various publications, Matten, Crane and
Moon claim that the citizenship status of corporations is
derived from their engagement on behalf of the citizenship
rights of other citizens in the community. But, is it really an
extended conceptualization if the status of citizenship is
defined by the contribution of the citizens to the ‘res
publica’ or the common good? Matten and Crane (2005)
draw a picture of communities in which individual citizens
are more or less defined as ‘consumers’ demanding civic
rights either from national governments or, in cases where
nation states fail, from multinational corporations. How-
ever, the status of citizenship—be it of individuals or of
legal persons—is not constituted solely by granting civic
rights to subjects, but includes the political collaborative
duties of all citizens. In this sense, citizens are both subject
to governmental authority and accorded specific rights, and
part of society and obliged to increase the ‘common good’
by making individual contributions. Even the authors see
this point when they write, ‘In so doing, citizenship is not
confined to rights only, but includes the respective duties as
well’ (Matten et al. 2003, p. 115). Thus, corporations
contribute to society as citizens, but bear no specific quasi-
governmental responsibilities compared with other citi-
zens. In other words, corporations do not act at the level of
governments as Matten et al. believe (Matten et al. 2010,
pp. 142–145; Moon et al. 2008, pp. 21–23), but at the
subordinate level of citizens and other civil organizations.
Since their argument focuses on corporations as quasi-
governmental actors, it is questionable whether the authors
really develop a new perspective in terms of an extended
understanding of (corporate) citizenship.
Secondly, concerns also arise in terms of the practical
implications of such a perspective of corporate citizens as
quasi-governmental actors. As Matten and Crane state,
‘‘‘corporations’’ and ‘‘citizenship’’ in modern society come
together at exactly the point where the state ceases to be the
only guarantor of citizenship any longer’ (Matten et al.
2003, p. 116; see also Matten and Crane 2005, pp. 171–172).
But, the examples they use to describe how corporations
The Corporation as Citoyen?
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grant ‘civil rights’, ‘political rights’ or ‘social rights’ are
mainly services provided also by other non-governmental
actors such as unions, consumer associations or humanitar-
ian organizations. Although this is recognized by Moon
et al. (2005, p. 440), the authors refrain from an in-depth
discussion of a similar ‘citizenship-role’ of such associa-
tions. Furthermore, the democratic legitimacy of CC activ-
ities has to be assessed carefully. Their conclusion, stating
that in cases of governmental failures ‘society can only be
happy if corporations fill this gap’ (Matten and Crane 2005,
p. 175), seems to be a little rash. Although laudable, CC
engagement remains dependent on public consent and this is
true for every kind of societal engagement, irrespective of
the kind of organization. However, even in such cases, it is
hard to draw a line: Most of us would be alerted if Islamic
fundamentalists or the Ku Klux Klan started to provide
educational services and we would not see this as a legiti-
mate form of engagement, assuming that such kinds of
education could erode the fundamental bases of our demo-
cratic society. Why then are we not alerted if companies
provide such services? Matten et al. (2003) recognize this
problem: If CC engagement is primarily driven by ‘self-
interest’, services will be designed for companies’ purposes
and not for civil society. Furthermore, they will only be
provided as long as they are considered to be useful in
improving corporations’ financial performance (Matten et al.
2003, p. 118). Even if corporations stand up as ‘quasi-gov-
ernmental’ actors providing civic rights and services for
other citizens, political regulations are needed to ensure that
those services are in line with society’s expectations and
thus will be legitimized democratically.
To sum up, in their extended conceptualization of CC,
Matten and Crane (2005) have created an image of the
corporation as a quasi-governmental actor: In specific sit-
uations in which states are no longer or not yet capable of
administering and ensuring civil, social and political rights
for individuals, corporations may fill this gap. Corporate
citizens thus assume responsibility as political sovereigns,
representing the citizens’ collective will (formed in a
democratic political process) and ensuring that there is a
stable framework of laws and rules to protect the individual
citizens’ equal rights against any violations. Still, this
extended conceptualization of CC only captures part of the
rights and responsibilities that may be associated with
citizenship status. Bestowing corporations with collective
citizenship status raises more questions than simply the
issue of administering rights for individuals in contexts of
failing states. We fully agree with Matten and Crane (2005)
and others that a new, more encompassing conception of
CC promises to be fruitful for the debate on the role of
corporations in society. However, we see at least two
fundamental deficiencies in this extended conceptualiza-
tion: First, there is the lack of a rationale for the change in
perspective from corporations as citizens to corporations as
quasi-governmental actors and the interrelated issue of the
at least incomplete definition of the status of CC; second,
there is the omission of a legal or political framework that
would permit the institutionalization of corporations’
responsibilities and regulate the mode of their contributions
to the common good. As we will show in what follows, a
more differentiated analysis of the citizenship concept and
a reinterpretation of the role of corporations as intermediate
actors in a system of subsidiary societal task-sharing can
help to overcome these weaknesses. However, before
arguing for an even more encompassing, status-based
concept of CC, we need to take a closer look at the key
elements of the political idea of citizenship status and at
what it really means to endow corporations with the status
of ‘surrogate citizenry’ (Moon et al. 2005, p. 438).
The Status of Corporate Citizens: The Corporate
Citizen as Bourgeois or Citoyen?
The extended conceptualization of CC developed by Mat-
ten and Crane (2005) is largely based on Marshall’s (1964)
historical account of the development of civil, political and
social citizenship rights in the UK over the last three
centuries. While Marshall’s work is enlightening for the
development of the rights aspect of CC, we intend to
broaden the perspective to include other key findings from
citizenship theory and research.
The modern ‘idea’ of citizenship is derived from the
Enlightenment and is strongly influenced by social contract
theory (e.g. Hobbes 1982; Locke 1952; Rousseau 1998).
By consenting to a hypothetical contract, people establish
political government, guarantee its supremacy and consti-
tute the legal framework of society. However, Adam Smith
already doubted that a hypothetical contract guarantees
governmental authority pointing out that such contracts are
inappropriate in terms of binding future generations and do
not allow any citizen to withdraw agreement (Smith 1982,
pp. 402–404). Nonetheless, quite apart from this theoretical
discussion of whether the fiction of a hypothetical original
contract can justify real nation state constitutions, step by
step the idea of a social contract among citizens has
replaced the view of people as the subjects of a prince.
From this new perspective, communities have been seen as
voluntary associations regulated by a contract between
their members. It is worth noting in this context that some
early contractualists defined the state as analogous to a
private association, seeing it as a corporate body, itself
a moral entity and to be held responsible for its actions
(Pufendorf 2009, pp. 39–42). Accordingly, like private
associations, ‘states’ are constituted by two different
contracts: one among the individuals concerning the
M. S. Aßlander, J. Curbach
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establishment of the association and its constitution and
one between the associates and their representatives con-
cerning their responsibilities and the conduct of public
affairs (Pufendorf 2003, pp. 195–196; see also Carmichael
2002, pp. 147–150).
For Rousseau, such an act of association of all indi-
viduals and their subordination under a general will (vol-
onte general) forms a moral and collective body in which
the individual is sovereign and subject at the same time
(Rousseau 1998, pp. 14–16). Based on this idea, he defines
two ‘types’ of citizen: while the burgess (bourgeois) is
defined by his settlement (town), the citizen (citoyen) is
part of a political community forming the state (city, polis).
Thus, the first must be seen as the subject of another
authority, while the latter is part of this authority and
contributes actively to the community in which he lives
(Rousseau 1998, p. 15ff.).
With the early writings of Marx, the terms bourgeois
and citoyen were redefined and are now used to differen-
tiate the spheres of private and political life. While the
citoyen lives in the political community, considering
himself a communal being, the bourgeois lives an egoistic
private life, interested primarily in his own affairs and
regarding other men as a means for his own purposes
(Marx 1975, p. 154). Later, in the writings of Sombart
(1987), the bourgeois is solely defined by his ‘commercial
spirit’ and is seen as a member of a specific class, the
commercial society. Thus, as Marx points out, the citizen
lives a double life: As citoyen, he is part of the community
and interested in public affairs; as bourgeois, he is an
individual, interested primarily in his private (economic)
affairs.
These changes in the theoretical understanding of citi-
zenship are also reflected in political theory and mirror
historical development. Thus, in the aftermath of the treaty
of Westphalia, the idea of the nation state with a closed
territory and sovereignty within its territory was born (Hirst
and Thompson 1995). Following that, since the time of the
French Revolution, citizenship has become a privileged
status of equal individuals who are members of a ‘societal
community’, governed by the rule of law and protected by
the authority of the nation state. While such citizenship
allows individuals to enjoy a set of inalienable rights on the
one hand, it also consists of some obligations, such as, for
example, obedience to the law, allegiance to the state and
respect for the citizenship rights of fellow citizens, on the
other hand (Bobbio 1987). Today, admittedly, it is exactly
this ‘Westphalian’ idea of a closed and homogenous soci-
etal community of fellow citizens within a national terri-
tory (Kobrin 2009; Scherer et al. 2009) which is again
challenged by the increasing globalization of markets,
the weakening of the authority of national governments
(denationalization), significant cross-border migration
flows and new transnational forms of civil society and
solidarity (Keck and Sikkink 1998). To develop the idea of
citizenship status for corporations further, it is thus useful
to look closer at the very analytical core of citizenship
status that appears in the context of these radical processes
of social change.
According to Cohen (1999), the ‘citizenship principle’
consists of three analytical components that describe what
makes up full citizenship status in modern societies: citi-
zenship as the juridical status of legal personhood, citi-
zenship as a political principle of democracy and
citizenship as a form of membership. All three of these
analytical components have implications for the idea of a
corporate citizenry.
Citizenship as legal personhood is based on a juridical
conception of citizenship that reaches back to Roman law
and emphasizes that every citizen as a legal person has
freedom and rights protected by law; as a legal person, a
citizen ‘can sue in court and invoke a law that grants him
rights’ (Cohen 1999, p. 249). Since this component of
citizenship is not tied to a particular collective identity or
membership in a ‘political demos’, it is universalistic and
can quite easily be transferred from a bounded national
territory to a transnational or global level. According to
Cohen, the global positivization of human rights is an
example of the very universal and inclusive character of the
juridical model of citizenship (Cohen 1999, p. 249).
In contrast, citizenship as a political principle of
democracy is a model that goes back to Aristotle and
ensues from republican thinking in which citizenship is
defined as an ‘activity that involves participation in ruling
and being ruled by equals who have uniform political
status’ (Cohen 1999, p. 248; see Aristotle 2009, p. 117
[1283b]). The citizen is both author of the laws and bound
by its rules; he is sovereign and subject at the same time,
and he therefore has the right and responsibility to engage
actively in deliberation and discourse in the public sphere,
as well as in the political decision-making process. As
members of the demos, citizens are expected to consider
‘the common good as well as particular interests’ (Cohen
1999, p. 248).
In addition to the legal and political aspects, Cohen also
describes citizenship as a form of membership. For Cohen,
membership is the key prerequisite for the enjoyment of
any social status and a ‘pole of identification that can itself
become a rather thick and important identity able to gen-
erate solidarity, civic virtue and engagement’ (Cohen 1999,
p. 248). Drawing on communitarian thinking, this aspect of
citizenship as membership status refers to a collective
identity and solidarity between those enjoying citizenship
status as opposed to non-citizens. Citizenship status as
The Corporation as Citoyen?
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membership and the associated notions of solidarity and
identification are by definition exclusive and imply ‘social
closure’, i.e. the exclusion of those who do not belong to
the respective social community of citizens (Brubaker
1992). Cohen (1999), in her attempt to develop a ‘post-
modern, disaggregated paradigm of citizenship’ (p. 262),
widens the scope of citizenship, creating a picture of a
citoyen that goes beyond the idea of nation state mem-
bership (ius solis) or shared culture (ius sanguinis) as a
rationale for and membership criterion of citizenship. Thus,
citizenry seems no longer to be bound to a ‘national
identity’ or homogenous social community, which may
prove promising in developing membership criteria for
future CC status1 (Table 1).
These aspects of citizenship, as outlined by Cohen
(1999), correspond to the aforementioned role models of
the bourgeois and citoyen. While the citizen as bourgeois
follows the universalistic idea of a private life protected by
the (international) law, guaranteed by external authorities,
the citoyen is a member of a social and political commu-
nity and undertakes responsibilities as a citizen. For the
citoyen, active participation is part of his understanding of
democracy and this understanding goes beyond the limits
of national boundaries.
The modern type of corporation, as developed in the
nineteenth century, invested with a specific ‘identity’ and a
‘legal personhood’, is a child of the bourgeois society. As a
legal entity, a company is distinct from its owners and
officers; it is able to possess private properties and it
receives legal protection. Its primary function is seen as
profit maximization on behalf of the companies’ share-
holders. As institutions in modern markets, corporations
are granted legal personhood status as bourgeois. They are
legally designed to be economic citizens whose main goal
of action is to succeed in the marketplace. Such corporate
bourgeois are full members of the economic sphere and
private sector and therefore enjoy the privileges and free-
doms to follow their own self-serving economic interests
within legal boundaries. As corporate bourgeois, the cor-
poration remains the subject of a sovereign external to its
own economic sphere. Since the corporate bourgeois are
solely interested in economic success, CSR or CC
engagement is seen simply as an indirect way of safe-
guarding corporations’ economic interests ‘…by enhancing
the institutional contexts within which they operate and by
creating intangible assets’ (Gardberg and Fombrun 2006,
p. 330). For the corporate bourgeois, CSR and CC are
‘strategic investments comparable to R&D and advertising’
(Gardberg and Fombrun 2006, p. 330) and an appropriate
toolbox serving as a safety net and opportunity platform
(Fombrun et al. 2000). Criticizing this purely strategic
profit orientation of companies, Bakan (2005) sees the
corporate bourgeois as psychopathic, following a patho-
logical pursuit of profit and power.
Transferring the component of political participation to
CC would entail that corporations, by virtue of their status,
should have a voice in creating and shaping the rules and
legal framework of the society within which they operate
(Scherer et al. 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007). In addition
to their bourgeois personhood, corporations are hence
ascribed a role as political citoyens who have a right and
responsibility to participate in public discourse, civil
society and political rule-making. This idea of political CC
has become increasingly popular against the background of
globalization and denationalization, as well as for political
challenges beyond national boundaries which lack the
potential of a neat division of labour between public (state)
authorities and private corporate actors (Haufler 2001;
Marsdon 2000). The increasing engagement of corporate
actors in initiatives such as the Caux Round Table or the
Global Business Initiative on Human Rights, aimed at
defining ‘soft law’ standards of responsible business
Table 1 Corporate citizenship as societal status
Citizenship principle Corporate
citizenship
status
Resulting social
responsibilities
Legal personhood:
citizens as bearers of
rights
Bourgeois
(economic
citizenship)
CSR as instrumental,
technical and
voluntary, serving
economic self-
interests, limited to
core business
activities
Political participation:
citizen as sovereign
and subject in
political community
and civil society
Citoyen
(political and
civil
citizenship)
Subsidiary co-
responsibility in
public rule-making
and service provision;
co-responsibility to
serve the well-being
of the community
Membership: societal
community as
prerequisite for being
bestowed with
citizenship status
Full citizenship
(member in
social
community)
Responsibilities based
on membership
criteria and resulting
identification,
solidarity and sense of
belonging
1 Showing that the collective identity of fellow citizens is solely
based on a collectively shared illusion of an ‘imagined community’,
Anderson (1996) has revealed the socially constructed nature of the
‘nation’ and contributed to new understandings of citizenship. In the
face of phenomena such as transnational migration, Europeanization,
economic globalization, as well as recurring outbreaks of ‘global
solidarities’, e.g. with the victims of natural disasters, citizenship
research has thus led to new ideas of citizen-membership realms
(Sassen 2006) and afforded long new descriptions for greater
understanding of citizenship, such as transnational citizenship (Bau-
bock 2003), multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka 1995) and post-
national citizenship (Soysal 1994).
M. S. Aßlander, J. Curbach
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behaviour, shows the changing self-conception of corpo-
rations and exemplifies how the corporate citoyen becomes
both ‘legislator’ and the ‘subject’ of its own rules. As
Zadek points out, ‘Corporations have of course always
influenced public policy. What is new is that this influence
is increasingly becoming formalized and legitimized
through their involvement in partnerships with govern-
ments, international institutions and civil society organi-
zations’ (Zadek 2001, p. 99). Highlighting this new quality
of political participation, Zadek touches on the crucial
distinction between the corporate bourgeois and the cor-
porate citoyen: While the corporate bourgeois sees political
intervention primarily as an instrument serving its private
(business) interests, the activities of the corporate citoyen
are inspired by the will to contribute to the community and
to the common good as a member of the community.
In a similar vein, Scherer et al. distinguish between two
models of citizenship. With reference to Habermasian
philosophy and in the tradition of Peter Ulrich and Horst
Steinmann and Albert Lohr, they contrast the liberal
bourgeois with the republican citoyen. While the first acts
as a private person under the authority of a nation state, the
latter is seen as a political citizen involved in political
communication and decision making (Scherer et al. 2006).
The authors see this as a shift from a liberal to a republican
understanding of citizenship and point out that such a
republican perspective on citizenship can be seen as a
normative complementing of the descriptive citizenship
model of Matten and Crane (2005).
But, it is exactly this normative conception of a political
citizenry, bestowing corporations with specific rights and
duties, which causes theoretical problems at least: Aside
from their competencies or capabilities to address global
political problems, corporations are in fact neither legiti-
mized nor controlled by any democratically constituted
political demos, and thus are not accountable to wider
society (Scherer et al. 2006). Accordingly, Scherer et al.
assert that if corporations ‘assume responsibility for state
functions and generate global rules, then it becomes
obvious that it is necessary to control corporations just as
the democratic state needs to be controlled by its citizens’
(Scherer et al. 2006, p. 516; see also Matten et al. 2003,
p. 118). Critically, Bakan comments on this lack of legit-
imization for the social and political engagement of cor-
porations and points out that ‘the belief these can be a
substitute for government regulation, rather than a neces-
sary complement to it, is dangerously mistaken’ (Bakan
2005, p. 151). However, by focusing solely on corporate
status as a legal person, Bakan’s critique misses the point.
As in the original definition of Rousseau or Marx, the
corporate citizen is both bourgeois and citoyen. Cohen’s
(1999) broader account of the ‘citizenship principle’ con-
siders this double nature of the citizen and emphasizes both
the legal and the political aspects of citizenship, which are
bound to be in tension with each other. Thus, the main area
of conflict for corporate citizens obviously results from this
double nature, causing a dichotomy between the corpora-
tion’s private interests as bourgeois citizen and public
interests as political citoyen.2
The Mode of Corporate Contribution to Society:
Substituting, Supplementing or Compensating
for Nation State Activities?
Apart from the question of how the political role of cor-
porations can be legitimized in theory, a more practical
question arises in terms of how such CC activities can be
integrated in a political conception which entails clear rules
for corporate-governmental task-sharing. As defined above,
CC engagement describes a discretionary engagement of
companies, going beyond the pure technical aspects of
good management practice in the sense of CSR. As good
citizens, companies are expected to contribute to their
social and natural environment beyond regular business
activities. This view is not only based on the assumption
that corporations benefit from society in many respects
(e.g. legal security, infrastructure, an educated workforce)
and accordingly have to give something back to the com-
munities in which they reside (Bowie 1999, pp. 94–95;
Crane and Matten 2007, pp. 71–73; Enquete-Kommission
2002, pp. 458–459) but it is also influenced by a conception
of corporations as citizens bearing responsibilities for
societal issues in general. However, from a political per-
spective, such an understanding of CC engagement as a
voluntary engagement suffers from a fundamental short-
coming. On the one hand, governments and society expect
an additional contribution from companies. On the other
hand, it remains up to the companies whether in which field
and to what extent they want to contribute to social wel-
fare. Furthermore, such an idea of corporate responsibility,
i.e. engaging for the benefit of social or environmental
issues, may conflict with the idea of governmental regu-
lation. Thus, social and environmental problems should be
solved either by national governments, voluntary engage-
ment by corporations or by collaboration of public and
private actors, but it remains unclear how the tasks should
be shared. Theoretically, at least three modes of corporate
contribution can be distinguished (Aßlander 2011, 2012):
What must be discussed is whether corporations have (1) to
substitute, (2) to supplement, or (3) to compensate for
governmental duties in the selected areas.
2 For further reading on the theoretical foundations of these role
elements, see Ulrich (2008).
The Corporation as Citoyen?
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(1) Corporate engagement as a substitute for govern-
mental activities means that corporations provide
alternative offers in addition to governmental ser-
vices. Examples of such additional services are
endowed hospitals, private schools or the provision
of company-based retirement programmes. In these
cases, the government specifies standards, but allows
substitutes for governmental offers if they meet the
predefined standards. Hence, citizens have the choice
between governmental and private services.
(2) Supplementing governmental activities with corporate
activities implies that existing governmental services are
expanded. In this case, private actors help to enhance the
offers of state institutions by sponsorship or donation
programmes. Thus, for example, an endowed chair
might extend the educational programme of a state
university. However, the engagement of private actors
will not jeopardize the regular tasks of universities if
additional programmes are not provided.
(3) Compensation for a lack in government services means
that national governments cut down their engagement.
This would entail that governments withdraw from
classic fields of social and environmental politics and
that former government or community services are no
longer provided. In these cases, it is expected that
private actors compensate for a lack of governmental
offers. Such compensation for government activities is
not limited to the financial aspect alone. Corporations
may also engage in the provision of citizenship rights in
the case that governments fail to administer those
rights, as mentioned by Matten and Crane (2005).
It is clear that corporate engagement that aims to offer
additional opportunities to the public does not affect the
basic supply of public goods or the general protection of
social, civil or political citizenship rights. If corporations
refrain from engagement in the provision of public services,
some services may be not provided. But, this does not
endanger the provision of public goods in general. However,
in cases where corporate activities must compensate for a
lack in nation state activities, such restraint would cause
serious problems. Since such corporate engagement is vol-
untary and decisions about the areas of engagement are left to
corporate management, it is difficult to guarantee that the
reduced engagement of nation states can be compensated for
in all relevant areas by corporate activities on a sustained
basis. Furthermore, if CC activities are intended because of
anticipated effects on corporate reputation or other business
considerations, such engagement will not always benefit
society (Matten et al. 2003, p. 118).
To clarify the societal responsibilities of corporations, a
political concept is needed that allows for differentiation
between corporate and governmental obligations. We
believe that the conception of subsidiarity, as formulated in
Catholic social teaching, might provide a solution for
questions of when, in which spheres and under which cir-
cumstances corporations as corporate citizens must take
social responsibility.
Subsidiarity as a Regulatory Principle
for Governmental–Private Task-Sharing
The tenet of subsidiarity states that in the political or social
context nothing should be assigned to a larger community
that can be accomplished by a lesser and subordinate
entity. This can be considered one of the basic principles of
Catholic social teaching (Pius XI 1931, § 79; John Paul II
1991, § 48; PCJP 2004, §§ 185–186). Pope Pius XI, in
formulating the principle of subsidiarity in his encyclical
letter Quadragesimo anno, explains:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals
what they can accomplish by their own initiative and
industry and give it to the community, so also it is an
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and dis-
turbance of right order to assign to a greater and
higher association what lesser and subordinate orga-
nizations can do. For every social activity ought of its
very nature to furnish help to the members of the
body social, and never destroy and absorb them. (…)
The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore,
to let subordinate groups handle matters and concerns
of lesser importance… (1931, §§ 79–80)
While in the political context the principle of subsidiarity is
commonly used to characterize the relationship between
political entities of higher and lower orders, e.g. between
the European Community and its member states, in the
context of the Catholic social encyclicals, it functions as a
norm for task-sharing among governmental and private
actors within civil society. Hereby, from the perspective of
social doctrine, civil society is ‘understood as the sum of
the relationships between individuals and intermediate
social groupings, which are the first relationships to arise
and which come about thanks to ‘‘the creative subjectivity
of the citizen’’’ (PCJP 2004, § 185). Thus, society is built
by different layers reaching from the base of individuals
and families as the smallest entities, through economic,
social, cultural, clerical and professional associations as
intermediate actors in society, to national and supranational
governmental bodies at the top as the highest entity in
society (PCJP 2004, § 185).
Although this understanding of society principally
reaches back to Aristotelian philosophy and the tradition of
natural law, it has also been recognized by liberal thinkers.
As a coordinating principle which allows for differentiating
M. S. Aßlander, J. Curbach
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and coordinating the various tasks in society, the tenet of
subsidiarity can be seen as a prioritization rule which gives
lower-order entities precedence over centralized, higher
entities. The principle is based on the idea of citizen
autonomy and individual self-determination which ought to
be respected as basic civil rights and liberties by every
political order. At the same time, such liberties oblige all
citizens to bear the consequences of their activities and
does not allow for shifting the burden of individual deci-
sions to others or to the community. Only in cases in which
the personal means of the individual citizen are insufficient
to accomplishing that individual’s own affairs does the
community have a general moral obligation to assist
(Gosepath 2005, pp. 163–164).
However, this right to assistance does not necessarily
require state intervention, but first and foremost concerns
support from other subordinate institutions in society.
Based on the respective tradition of thought—i.e. natural
law or the liberal tradition—the various layers in society
are described in one of two ways. In terms of natural law,
they are seen as the result of the natural social development
of societies, which means that sub-state institutions (such
as families, tribes and neighbourhood or village commu-
nities) are seen as natural institutions following the pro-
gress of human nature (e.g. Aristotle 2009, pp. 7–12
[1252a–1253a]; Cicero 2009, pp. 22–23 [I, 53]). Alterna-
tively, in the liberal tradition, society may be perceived as
the result of mutual contracts concluded among the citizens
to solve the problems of associates below nation state
regulations at a neighbourhood or community level
(Gosepath 2005, pp. 165–166; Lower 2010, p. 85). Thus, in
this tradition, intermediate layers in society are not seen as
the result of nation state regulations defining respective
responsibilities at a sub-governmental level. Quite the
opposite, they are seen as the result of the bottom-up
activities of the citizens which first lead to smaller com-
munities and finally result in the state as the highest level
of association. Consequently, societal tasks exceeding
individual capabilities should preferably be accomplished
at the intermediate levels. Only in cases where the means
of intermediate institutions are not sufficient or the issue at
stake requires general regulation—due to its importance or
because only this can ensure the equal treatment of all
citizens—is state intervention required.
As a coordinating principle for the collaboration of the
various layers in society, subsidiarity works in two ways. It
defends the subordinate layers of society from illegitimate
overregulation by higher entities if they can accomplish the
respective tasks on their own. Simultaneously, it consti-
tutes a right of assistance if the accomplishment of these
tasks exceeds their capabilities. Thus, if the subsidiary
entities are in need, the higher entity must intervene (Nell-
Breuning 1964, 1968; PCJP 2004, § 187). However, as
Pope Benedict XVI (2009, § 57) explains, subsidiarity
should first and foremost be a form of assistance to the
human person, while respecting the autonomy of interme-
diate bodies. Help from governments or other superior
entities should be provided only in those cases where
individuals themselves or the intermediate bodies as the
next higher entities are unable to accomplish something on
their own and should always aim for the achievement of
their emancipation.
Although often seen as a governing principle in the
context of the nation state, the tenet of subsidiarity gen-
erally allows for the limited perspective of nation state
citizenry to be exceeded. Thus, under the conditions of the
global economy, some scholars (e.g. Kelly 2004) discuss
subsidiarity as an organizational principle for shaping
responsibilities and interrelations among political, civil and
economic actors in a globalizing society. Seen from the
perspective of Cohen’s (1999) fully developed citizenry,
such a developed understanding of subsidiarity in global-
izing societies would demand new forms of solidarity and
subsidiarity beyond national territories. This view is also
expressed by Pope Benedict XVI in his encyclical letter
Caritas in veritate:
[T]he governance of globalization must be marked by
subsidiarity, articulated into several layers and
involving different levels that can work together.
Globalization certainly requires authority, insofar as
it poses the problem of a global common good that
needs to be pursued. This authority, however, must be
organized in a subsidiary and stratified way… (2009,
§ 57)
In this sense, cross-national CC activities, such as the
aforementioned Caux Round Table, can be seen as first
steps in corporate citizens taking over subsidiary co-
responsibilities at a transnational level. In this context,
corporations can be seen as intermediate actors in society,
taking subsidiary co-responsibility.
Nevertheless, given the constraints of a ‘post-national’
society, the idea of a (supra)national authority coordinating
societal activities according to the principle of subsidiarity,
as expressed in the encyclical letter, seems unrealistic
(Beck 1998; Giddens 1998). Under the conditions of
globalizing economies especially, corporations can no
longer be controlled by nation state regulations. Accord-
ingly, as some scholars assume, corporate compliance with
minimal ethical standards can be enforced only by stake-
holder pressure and threats of boycotting from international
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Crane and Mat-
ten 2007; Matten and Crane 2005; see also Palazzo and
Scherer 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2008, 2009).
However, it would be a misinterpretation of the principle of
subsidiarity to see it as one-directional regulating principle
The Corporation as Citoyen?
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for nation state activities describing a top-down task dis-
tribution between different social actors. Rather, the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity must be seen as a coordinating
principle for the assignment of responsibilities in society
that goes beyond governmental regulation and highlights
independence and autonomy, especially of the subordinate
entities in society.
This leads back to the discussion of the role of corpo-
rations as corporate citizens in a globalizing society. As
corporate citizens, corporations contribute to society and
thereby substitute, supplement or compensate for nation
states in social and environmental activities. Therefore, the
coordination of state and corporate responsibilities remains
one of the most challenging problems in globalizing soci-
eties. As John Ruggie, special representative of the United
Nations Secretary-General on the issue of human rights,
notes, especially when corporate responsibilities ‘are
entangled with State obligations, it makes it difficult if not
impossible to tell who is responsible for what in practice’
(Ruggie 2008, p. 190). To resolve this problem, Ruggie
introduces a conceptualization of complementary respon-
sibilities. Asking the question of how human rights can be
enforced by government–corporate public–private collab-
oration, Ruggie develops what he calls the ‘framework of
‘‘protect, respect and remedy’’’ (2008, p. 192). Nation
states are invoked to protect human rights through juris-
diction and the refinement of their legal means (‘protect’);
state, non-state or industry-based organs, such as human
rights associations, national oversight institutions or
industry-based ombudsmen, should give voice to the vic-
tims of human rights violations (‘remedy’); corporations
are obliged to ‘respect’ human rights in their business
activities and should enforce human rights protection
actively in their sphere of influence and by engaging in soft
law activities (Ruggie 2008, 2009). In this sense, Ruggie
sees corporations as ‘organs of society’ (2008, p. 199)
which actively have to take on responsibilities for the
protection and enforcement of human rights. However,
although he gives various recommendations of how human
right issues could be integrated in company business rou-
tines in his reports (Ruggie 2009, 2010), he sees a per-
sisting challenge in terms of a normative foundation:
‘Asking companies to support human rights voluntarily
where they have influence is one thing, but attributing
responsibility to them on that basis alone is quite another’
(2008, p. 203).
We believe that the tenet of subsidiarity might be an
instructive concept in terms of clarifying precisely the
normative background of corporate citizens’ co-responsi-
bilities in society. As a regulatory principle, subsidiarity
demands that issues of lesser importance should be handled
by lower level entities. However, according to the principle
of subsidiarity, the accomplishment of such tasks by lower
level entities is not a voluntary engagement, but an
essential duty. Only in cases where subordinates are unable
to take care of themselves or if the accomplishment of
specific tasks is of greater interest to the community is state
intervention necessary.
Applied to our discussion of CC, this would mean that
the picture of corporate responsibilities has to be comple-
mented by a new perspective (Aßlander 2011, 2012). As
outlined above, as corporate bourgeois, the corporation is
seen as economic citizen and has to adhere to national and
international regulations. Thus, as corporate bourgeois,
corporations are responsible for their business practices and
have to ensure that they are in line with minimal legal and
ethical requirements. As corporate citoyen, the corporation
has to be seen as an intermediate actor bearing specific
duties in a society based on the subsidiary collaboration of
its members. As corporate citoyen, corporations—like
other intermediate actors—have the duty to accomplish
social activities that can be accomplished by them more
efficiently or with greater competencies and bear specific
duties to enable and to foster civic and human rights. Such
responsibilities do not derive from the factual engagement
of corporations, but according to the principle of subsidi-
arity result from the political and moral obligations of each
group in society to contribute to the common good to the
extent that they are able to do so.
Although it is debatable how far such corporate sub-
sidiary co-responsibility will reach in particular cases and
in which areas corporate contributions can be expected,
corporate engagement in this field is not voluntary, but an
essential (moral) obligation. Irrespective of whether sub-
sidiarity as governance principle for societal activities is
justified by natural law or the liberal tradition, it provides a
general rule for coordinating the activities of the various
layers in society by assigning specific duties also to cor-
porate citizens in their role as intermediate actors.
An example of taking over such subsidiary co-respon-
sibility is provided by the Swiss pharmaceutical company
Novartis. In 2002, the company opened the Novartis
Institute for Tropical Diseases in Singapore. The purpose
of the institute is to discover novel treatments and pre-
vention methods for major tropical diseases. Novartis is
aware that the success of its newly developed drugs in
market terms is quite unlikely as those who are in need of
such medication are unable to pay for it. Rather, the
company’s research efforts aim to make treatments readily
available to indigent patients in developing countries
without profit (Novartis 2010). Seen from the perspective
of subsidiary co-responsibility, the company uses its
competencies in the field of health care research to fight
tropical diseases and thus to contribute to public health in
less-developed countries. Even though similar research
could also be provided by governmental research institutes,
M. S. Aßlander, J. Curbach
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it can be argued that the pharmaceutical industry has
greater expertise in this field and is able to solve particular
problems more efficiently. In this example, Novartis takes
on subsidiary co-responsibility as a corporate citoyen to
contribute to the common good beyond its pure business
interests and without legal obligation (Aßlander 2011).
From Corporate Bourgeois to Corporate Citoyen:
Towards a New Picture of CC
To sum up, we have analysed two important aspects of CC,
considering the status of citizenship and clarifying the
mode of corporate citizens’ contribution to society. This
allows a deeper understanding of what constitutes CC from
a political point of view. To explain what the term CC
might mean, we have differentiated which sphere of citi-
zenship should be addressed. If corporations are seen only
as corporate bourgeois, their citizenship status is defined by
an external governmental authority and reduced to private
business purposes. In this sense, corporate citizens operate
under a national government that defines the rules and
standards in society. Governmental authority determines
and guarantees legal certainty and freedom for their sub-
jects’ private economic activities, and any citizenship
behaviour on the part of the corporate bourgeois is limited
to private (business) interests. Thus, as good corporate
bourgeois, the corporation adheres to national and inter-
national laws, respects commonly accepted international
standards of behaviour and implements standards and
procedures that ensure that all these regulations are
observed in the company’s day-to-day business. Additional
engagement on behalf of society is viewed in terms of the
enlightened self-interest of the bourgeois and aims at
improving the corporate reputation or enlarging the human
capital base of the firm. Thus, philanthropy and CSR
become strategic management tools used to stabilize the
bourgeois’ social environment for business purposes.
In contrast, as corporate citoyen, the corporation is part
of the community and plays an active role in shaping the
political and social order. The self-conception of the cit-
oyen is that of a political actor who is both sovereign and
subject to the established order at the same time. The cit-
oyen acts in the interests of the community, taking on
responsibilities for others and for the common good. Thus,
a corporate citoyen actively takes part in the political and
social life of the community and contributes to the common
good. As an intermediate actor in society, it bears sub-
sidiary co-responsibilities and accomplishes respective
tasks in those areas in which it has specific competencies,
or when these can be accomplished at this level more
efficiently or with greater effects for the community. In
general, the citoyen is guided by an interest in the well-
being of the community and assists other citizens to enjoy
their social, civic and political citizenship rights. As ‘sov-
ereign’, the citoyen even endeavours to establish com-
monly acceptable regulations, not only by influencing
national governments but also by collaborating in the
development of business standards and industrial norms.
Corporate philanthropy for the citoyen is not a strategic
tool, but an instrument to participate in civil society (civic
philanthropy).
We started our article with a discussion of the ‘extended
conceptualization’ of CC as outlined by Matten and Crane
(2005). We have especially highlighted two aspects of this
conception which, in our opinion, have to be developed
further: First, there is the unexpected change in the way in
which citizenship is assigned to citizens and the lack of a
rationale for this. On the one hand, citizens are defined as
the addressees of citizenship rights; on the other hand, the
status of (corporate) citizenship is defined in terms of the
function of providing citizenship rights to others as a
‘quasi-governmental actor’. We believe that our deeper
analysis of the political understanding of citizenship helps
to clarify the new political role of corporations in society.
From our point of view, the factual engagement of cor-
porations as providers of citizenship rights should not be
interpreted as a new role of corporations as quasi-govern-
mental actors filling the gap if governments fail to facilitate
citizenship rights, but as a change in the citizenship status
of the corporation. Although we agree with Matten, Crane
and Moon that corporations in a globalizing world play a
different role in society, we rather see this as an indicator
for an evolving understanding of CC. In our opinion, cor-
porations are, so to speak, on their way from being cor-
porate bourgeois to being corporate citoyen. By
emphasizing this new political self-understanding of the
corporate citizen as corporate citoyen, we recognize the
new role of corporations in society in a way that attempts to
overcome the difficulties that arise when remodelling cor-
porate citizens as ‘quasi-governmental actors’, as in the
extended conceptualization of Matten and Crane. As out-
lined above, corporations take on a role as political citizens
due to their engagement on behalf of the community and by
contributing to the common good. However, this does not
mean that corporations now act on a superior level and will
take on what hitherto have been governmental tasks.
As has become clear, we believe that the globalization
of societies demands new solutions of task-sharing among
corporations, governments and civil society, and we also
see corporations in a new role as political actors. However,
we do not believe that corporate self-estimation will simply
switch from corporate bourgeois to corporate citoyen, but
that corporations undergo an incremental learning process.
For example, when Zadek (2004) asks the question of how
corporations become good corporate citizens, he points out
The Corporation as Citoyen?
123
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that such a development passes through different stages—
defensive, compliant, managerial, strategic, civil—and
each stage is seen as vital for the learning process of
companies. In this vein, corporations adopt their new role
step by step; this is not without friction and may also result
in intense role conflicts when specifying corporate strategy.
Thus, for example, the aforementioned Swiss company,
Novartis, has also earned fierce public criticism for its
lawsuit in India concerning the patentability of its phar-
maceutical drug ‘Glivec’. Critics argue that the patent
policy of Novartis hinders the poor from accessing medi-
cine at affordable prices and thus stands in sharp contrast to
the company’s citizenship understanding (EvB 2007a, b).
While, on the one hand, the corporation’s self-estimation
refers to its role as corporate citoyen, taking on additional
responsibilities in society beyond purely economic con-
siderations, on the other hand, the company seems to
behave simultaneously as corporate bourgeois, taking
every (legal) means to serve its profit interests.
Our second point of discussion concerned the by and
large unanswered question of how corporations should
contribute to society as corporate citizens. Based on our
conception of corporate citizens as corporate citoyen, we
introduced the tenet of subsidiarity as a regulating principle
for such corporate–governmental task-sharing. Defined as
intermediate actors in society, corporations bear a sub-
sidiary co-responsibility and have the obligation to
accomplish ‘what can be accomplished by a lesser and
subordinate entity’ (Pius XI 1931, § 79). In this sense,
corporate responsibilities not only include good manage-
ment practices, but governance structures and policies that
guarantee that legal and ethical requirements are also
observed in a company’s day-to-day business, or voluntary
occasional philanthropic engagement that might assist
governmental efforts in the fields of social development or
environmental protection. In addition, the corporate cit-
oyen bears subsidiary non-voluntary co-responsibilities
which result from the role of corporations as intermediate
social actors and define long-term corporate duties in
society. We believe that the tenet of subsidiarity outlines a
promising and encompassing principle for regulating
responsibilities and duties in society and can serve as
helpful conception to clarify respective responsibilities also
in the context of globalizing economies.
Perspectives for Future Research
Even though we believe that our model may contribute to a
more encompassing understanding of the nature of citi-
zenship in the context of the ‘surrogate citizenry’ of cor-
porations, this new perspective also has implications for
future research. If the idea of corporate citizenship is to be
taken seriously, corporations in the global realm today have
to be seen as intermediate actors among the economic,
political and civil spheres which increasingly enjoy polit-
ical rights of participation and bear subsidiary co-respon-
sibilities in terms of contributing to the common good
beyond their bourgeois self-interest. The prerequisite of
such an extended role of the corporation as citoyen is to
develop criteria (over and above those already identified)
for the membership of corporate citizens in the societal
community in order to enhance solidarity, legitimacy and
accountability. When considering the three elements of
citizenship identified by Cohen (1999)—the juridical status
of legal personhood, the political principle of democracy
and citizenship as a form of membership in a societal
community—CC status is well defined as the legal per-
sonhood of the bourgeois, but there remains much schol-
arly and political work to be done to define fully the new
role of corporations as corporate citoyens and community
members.
As outlined in our article, we believe that corporations
are on their way to becoming corporate citoyens and thus to
undertaking social and political responsibilities as inter-
mediate societal actors. Although this new perspective in
CC discussion helps to explain the factual citizenship
engagement of corporations and to define the mode of
corporations’ contributions to society, it remains primarily
an analytical frame. Future research is required to develop
a normative basis that would permit the development of a
rationale for the role of corporations as citoyens and to
clarify the legal and political consequences of such a new
understanding. For example, the question arises as to
whether such an extended conception of CC, demanding
co-responsibility in the social and political spheres, will
also lead to a new discussion concerning the rights of
political participation by corporate citizens. In addition,
empirical research must determine whether the enhanced
quality of the citizenship engagement of companies is
aligned with a new self-conception of corporations as
political actors.
Another field of research concerns the question of how
distinct subsidiary co-responsibilities of corporations can
be identified in detail. Notably in ‘post-national’ globaliz-
ing societies, the assignment of distinct co-responsibilities
will depend on deliberative democratic processes at
national and supranational levels. Additional research in
the fields of political and social science must clarify how
the assignment of corporate co-responsibilities can be
backed by legitimate democratic decision-making pro-
cesses. Furthermore, it must be considered that the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity also describes a moral right, enabling
subordinates to organize their affairs in the way that is most
suitable for them. In this sense, subsidiarity describes a
kind of positive freedom to act independently of superiors’
M. S. Aßlander, J. Curbach
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regulation. In this context, there is a need to discuss how
far such rights will reach and when and under what cir-
cumstances they can be required or must be limited.
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