The Creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency

7/29/2019 The Creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency

1/121

THE CREATION OF THE NATIONAL

IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY:CONGRESSS ROLE AS OVERSEER

Occasional Paper Number Nine

April 2002

Joint Military Intelligence College

DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

UN

ITED

STATES OFAME

RIC

A


2/121


3/121

The Joint Military Intelligence College support

research on intelligence issues that distills less

support to policy-level and operational c

This series of Occasional Papers presents the work of faculty, students aintelligence issues is supported or otherwise encouraged by the Join

through its Office of Applied Research. Occasional Papers are distribut

schools and to the Intelligence Community, and unclassified papers are

the National Technical Information Service (www.ntis.gov). Selected pap

the U.S. Government Printing Office (www.gpo.gov).

Proposed manuscripts for these papers are submitted for consideration

torial Board. Papers undergo review by senior officials in Defense, Intelian academic or business communities. Manuscripts or requests for ad

Papers should be addressed to Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Milita

of Applied Research, MCE, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

Russell.Swen


4/121

Occasional Paper Number N

THE CREATION OF T

NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAP

CONGRESSS ROLE AS OV

by Anne Daugherty Miles, Ph

JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC

April 2002


5/121


6/121

CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Creation of NIMA: Congresss Role as Oversee

Why NIMA?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Early 1990sPowell Objects. . . . . . . . . . . . .

CIOA Sponge Hammer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mid 1990sThe Executive Branch Presents a

Understanding Turf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DMA Brought into the Fold . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Legislative Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inside BaseballDavid versus Goliath . . .

NIMA in ConferenceHNSC and SASC . . .

A Three-Ring Circus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Appropriators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Letter from the Speaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Created On Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendation for Further Research . . . . . .


7/121

Appendix E-3104-337, SGAC Report. . . . . . .

Appendix FLetter to Newt Gingrich . . . . . . . .

Appendix GMemorandum of Agreement, SAS

Appendix HLegislative Package Briefing . . . .

Appendix INIMA Decision Process Briefing C

Appendix JImagery Functional Management B

Appendix KNIMAWhats Included Chart .

Appendix LNIMAWhats Excluded Chart .

Appendix MDoD Directive 5105.60, 11 Oct 96Establishing NIMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


8/121

PREFACE

In October 2000, the National Imagery and Mapping

fourth anniversary. That occasion marked a significant mile

the Intelligence Community. In the previous four years the l

established an identity and culture for the agency and had d

strategy. That is not to say that there are no more challenge

government agencies, NIMA faces issues of downsizing atransformation and integration. However, in view of the ag

for meeting these challenges, at the Agencys fourth annua

Henry H. Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarke

as a key component in arming decisionmakers and operator

knowledge... NIMAs customer focus is the big reason that y

in the four short years of your existence as a separate agency

During the spring and summer of 1995, I served as execu

known as the NIA (National Imagery Agency) Steering G

various NIA Working Groups. I was in a unique position to

tics that led to the decision to establish NIMA. Thereafter, I

the implementation period from December 1995 until NIM

NIMA was formed from eight different agencies from

Defense and the Intelligence Community. At the outset,

above all else, the quality and timeliness of service to custo

sition. This meant protecting imagery intelligence and

from the bureaucratic blizzard of new policies and procedur

new organization (literally hundreds of policies had to be rev

or modified, and the streamlining process still goes on toda

ing task was to begin the process of creating a NIMA cultur

In December 2000, the congressionally-mandated ind

found that NIMA is an essential component of U.S. natio

mation dominance. This agency has come a long way in


9/121


10/121

FOREWORD

Although several articles have been written on the cre

and Mapping Agency (NIMA) from the executive branch

icled the attendant debate on Capitol Hill. Creating the N

Agency: A Studies Roundtable, is the most comprehensiv

on a discussion in November 1997 between the editorial b

and key participants of the NIMA implementation team.1

point for the present case study of congressional decisionm

which focuses on the struggle in Congress, rather than in t

The present monograph may be characterized as a case s

seer of the U.S. Intelligence Community. A case study can

Congress on a day-to-day basis, offering a perspective that go

of procedure to illustrate the human dynamics of the decisistudy offers the advantage of depth and detail, but only one c

generalization. Works that do offer a more theoretical overvie

a context within which to judge whether elements of a part

Thus, it is has become the norm in academic treatments to p

Eric Redmans, The Dance of Legislation, is a classic examp

the creation of the National Health Service Corps in the ea

augment textbooks about Congress in countless classrooms acation in 1973. Similarly, Birnbaum and Murrays more re

details the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and has a

supplement in courses on the Congress.3 Unfortunately, in

sional decisionmaking on intelligence issues are too few to h

textbook offering a theoretical context for this decisionmakin

The case study presented here illustrates the combinat

that resulted in the establishment of NIMA in 1996. It ha

those who are studying Congress and the U.S. Intelligenc

role of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and

ith th itt t ifi ll th A d S


11/121

be read with that context in mind, and any generalizations ba

be made with extreme care.

Although oversight is often associated with confrontatio

pected wrongdoing, the reality is that most oversight is routin

mal authorization and appropriation process.7Legislative ove

that Congress has the information it needs to develop legislat

tation of public policy and disclose to the public how its gove

sight objectives vary. The focus may be on promoting ad

economy in government, protecting and supporting favored p

an administrations failures or wrongdoing, or its achieveme

members or committees goals, reasserting congressional au

tive branch, or assuaging the interests of pressure groups.8

law is passed. According to Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) C

passing this law. We have to make sure the law works.9 Inadopted its role as overseer in first determining whether the co

one, and it has continued to exercise its oversight responsib

establishment to ensure that the agency evolved in the way en

Beyond the personality and politics evident in this case, it i

fact that congressional members and staffers take their oversig

ously. The creation of NIMA was an executive branch propos

every angle on the Hill. The concerns of a myriad of intereste

workers, NIMA customers, NIMA components, constituents

Staffwere all funneled into 13 different congressional com

marily by the Intelligence and Armed Services committees. T

ability to weigh the merits of a host of special interests in a wa

its members and hopefully results in good public policy. In itskeptical, demanding justification for each and every propo

overseer, to stay a part of the process, to have a seat at the ta

tees must have jurisdiction over an executive branch agency

in this case, jurisdictional concerns were paramount largely


12/121

THE CREATION OF N

CONGRESSS ROLE AS OV

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee... w

redundant capabilities in several different agencies

ately to consolidate the management of all imagery

distribution. In my judgment both effectiveness and eby managing imagery in a manner similar to the Na

organization for signals intelligence.10

Director of Central Intelligence (D

WHY NIMA?

The consolidation of imagery promised by John Deut

SSCI, in his confirmation hearings for the position of D

was a direct reference to the concept of a National Imagery

agreed with those who wanted to assemble all or part of as

grams into a single, focused imagery agency. The pieces to

Defense Mapping Agency (DMA),

Central Intelligence Agencys National Photographic

Central Imagery Office (CIO),

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Imagery Pro

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO),

Defense Intelligence Agencys Photographic Interpre Defense Dissemination Program Office (DDPO) and

Central Intelligence Agencys imagery-related eleme

According to Leo Hazlewood, then CIA Deputy Directo


13/121

with examining the structure guiding the Intelligence Comm

one of its recommendations was to integrate imagery and mthe entire defense establishment was a popular idea in the ear

of the Berlin Wall in 1989.14At about the same time, reorga

Community was popular in the aftermath of DESERT STORM

the attractiveness of a NIMA concept to three particular probl

operation: jurisdictional disputes over the dissemination of i

authorities, and confusion over who owned NPIC (CIA orsought solutions to these problems and many others. Its reco

like NIMA was based on a conceptual seed planted by Keith

wood calls the intellectual father of the NIMA concept. As

of Defense for Intelligence and Security at the time the Pane

his idea to several panel members. In fact, the FY 1992 Int

recommended establishing a National Imagery Agency (NI

Panel recommendation. The timing was not right, however, in

islative branches, for reasons discussed later in this article.

years and the notoriety of problems associated with the Cent

make NIMA happen.

NIMA was created near the end of the 104th Congress

were numerous proposals to reorganize the U.S. Intelligence

sive review undertaken by the House Permanent Select

(HPSCI) culminated in a lengthy document titled IC21: Int

21st Centuryand legislation called theIntelligence Communi

to the floor of the House on 13 June 1996. Also in 1996, the S

Intelligence (SSCI) was engaged in its own hearings, buildi

interviews carried out in the early 1990s. The Commission o

of the U.S. Intelligence Community, known as the Aspin-Brwinding up a year-long investigation along these same lines.

sion presented its report to the SSCI in formal testimony on

Chairman and Vice Chairman, Senators Specter and Kerrey,

Senate as S 1593 on the same day


14/121

budget execution, missions, procedures, products and me

reports recommended, to varying degrees, expanded authoriobligate or spend IC funds to better manage his domain. The

the expense of the Secretary of Defenses authoritiescreat

Armed Services committees. There was a feeling that intell

different ways without any plancreating redundancies an

no DCI could manage it well. Part of the need for an incre

increase efficiency, and in the process, also increase the quasupport. Thus, the NIMA was part of a larger plan to grou

activities together in an effort to improve management of

improve efficiency, and improve customer support. Disagre

tered on whether a NIMA would, in fact, accomplish those g

In order to understand the larger context in which NIM

the activities of the intelligence committees in the early 19

EARLY 1990sPOWELL OB

The early 1990s found the intelligence committees conc

nize the communitybut not equally so. The two committ

act autonomously much of the time. The priorities and change over time and have much to do with the leadership

Staff Director. Senator Boren (D-OK) was nearing the en

the SSCI and clearly saw this reorganization effort as his l

IC. Senator Boren was also a good friend of DCI Bob G

worked closely throughout this period.18A staffer remem

approximately 185 people, all off the record, and for no

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligenc

with reorganization of the Community but not to the sam

by Representative David McCurdy, the HPSCI tackled reo


15/121

true relationship between the two committees, the package o

offered jointly by Boren and McCurdythe bulk of whichAuthorization Bill.20 The legislation recommended establ

Agency (NIA)21in line with the Burnett Panel recommendat

Some of the recommendations in the intelligence autho

received by either the executive branch or the Armed Servi

were considered too far reaching.22DCI Gates, in a statemen

in the Intelligence Community, warned of deep reservations

Military Services about a proposed NIA that would include N

Imagery. He said that he, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Ch

agreed to approach the problem a step at a time including at

changes to strengthen the coordination and management of ta

my creation of a small organization that will become part of th

According to Leo Hazlewood, Gates recognized the fact th

be solved and was willing to place national imagery assets w

fix the problems associated with DESERT STORM. He rem

bling block to a NIMA in 1992 was CJCS Colin Powell.24S

was supportive, telling a staffer, We need a strong DCI, an

DCI initiatives.25General Powell was briefed on the Burnett

convinced that DMA was not broken, could not be persua

NIMA plan. According to Hazlewood, once Powell killed NI

together to see what could be done to fix imagery within t

From that meeting, the Central Imagery Office (CIO) was bor

The CIO was deemed acceptable by all parties in the exec

Leo Hazlewood stressed that CIO was an executive branch coaccepted as a first-step solution.27The CIO alternative had lim

ties. As noted in the Aspin-Brown report, most imagery e

Community, including the largest imagery exploitation org


16/121

outside the new office, which had limited policy authority

outside elements. CIO did retain control of the tasking oand made strides in setting standards and policy to gove

tion.28In sum, Politics, after all, is the art of the possib

CIOA SPONGE HAMM

In January 1993, Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) to

with Senator John Warner (R-VA) as the Vice Chairman, w

man (D-KS) took over the HPSCI with Congressman Larr

Minority Member. During this period, a growing number

executive branch became convinced that CIO was not the

Its Director, Dr Annette Krygiel, described CIO as a real clout because of its lack of budget authority and lac

CIOs problems stemmed from the fact that DMA, NPIC, C

were all outside its authority! It had real control over only

DCIs tasking committee (the Committee on Imagery Re

Despite these organizational difficulties, its responsibilities

By the time the 1994 elections ushered in a new Repub

the climate had shifted and there was more of a grassroot

agency.32Leo Hazlewood recalls, however, that if there w

for an NIA, it was only in DIA/PGX (Imagery) and CIO. D

opposed.33In fact, many organizations were vocal in their

against an NIA (despite Deutch being in favor), and refusi

the situation, all the way up to its actual establishment.34S

being brought onto the NIMA Implementation Team as i

and Congressional Liaison. She recalls that the Team was s

guerrilla warfare aimed at us. The Implementation Team w

t h b ti fi ht b t CIA d D D d


17/121

January 1995 ushered in the first session of the 104th Con

Combest (R-TX) took over the House Intelligence CommitteDicks (D-WA) as Ranking Minority Member. Senator Arlen S

Senate Intelligence Committee as Chairman37with Senator

Vice Chairman.38

Senator Specters opportunity to Chair the SSCI came some

Specter left the committee in 1990, even though he had served

year term, having made an agreement (in writing) with Sena

return in January 1993, with his seniority intact, and serve as

man. However, by 1993, Senator John Warner, who was co-eq

seniority and had lost his ranking member position on the S

Chairmanship position. After heated discussions among Dole,

ary 1993, and more assurances from Senator Dole, Senator Spec

until January 1995. By waiting the extra two years, Senator Spman when the Republicans gained control of the Senate in the N

Also in January 1995, DCI Woolseys resignation was ac

General Michael Carnes (USAF, Ret) was nominated40 to take

was still Deputy Secretary of Defense. In his role as DepSecDef,

Hall (in his role as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence

the Intelligence Community along with Halls solutionsone of

The idea was apparently well received because when Joh

be the new DCI, Halls idea emerged in Deutchs testimony

became just a matter of time and determination. The agenda l

timony became known as the symphony, and Admiral D

charge of implementing it. To achieve the NIMA objective, ANIA Steering Group.41

In mid-June, the Steering Group approved a Terms of Re

tered an NIA Task Force. The Task Force, chaired by E

ti f th NIA th t t k th t CIO ith f


18/121

extreme (the so-called CIO on steroids solution) and

full budgetary and management authority as the other echoices in-between. Over the summer, the options were n

finally 1.43DIA, the Service Intelligence Chiefs and the

agreed to some Abiding Principles, one of which was

Support Agency.44

MID 1990sTHE EXECUTIVEPRESENTS A UNITED FR

The mid 1990s found the entire Congress fully engage

Aspin-Brown Commission, chartered by the Congress in 1

throughout 1995 and reported in March 1996 that its conclu

cided with the DCIs.45

Despite early promises that Aspin-Bthe table,46the final report made only modest, incrementa

SSCI began building on its previous research and the mod

tions, with many staffers still present who had conducted

Because the changes the committee ended up with tended t

themselves, they were largely evolutionary in natureand

part, to both the executive branch and other committees suc

The HPSCI elected to break new ground, not having pre

took a different path under Chairman Larry Combest, resu

ligence Community in the 21st Century, published by the H

Combest hired Mark Lowenthal, a man with many years

and the executive branch and noted for his numerous pub

because he could conduct the broad type of inquiry Comand Combest agreed on a manner of approach.49The repo

43According to Mark Lowenthal, staffers felt that these options were f

broad range of alternatives but only a few really had any chance of happe


19/121

saying, Everything is on the table. There are no sacred cow

missions or functions.50

The changes proposed in IC-21 wereand largely unacceptable to both the executive branch and

Armed Services (at least at first, for reasons mainly due to tur

A major theme in IC-21 was the elimination of stovep

House Intelligence committee suggested more synergy and

break down barriers created by too many stovepipes and wa

within the IC seems to be one that would reinforce the stovepounding problems for little or no perceived gain.53Thus, t

executive branch proposal for an NIA was Why do you wa

fact, the SSCI thought that the HPSCIs reorganization of th

different stovepipes by inserting another layer of authority o

Leo Hazlewood remembers responding that NIMA would

designed to improve access to imagery-derived information.56

The HPSCI was also opposed to NIMA because it thought

win, strategic support would lose.57As Mark Lowenthal reca

would suck up imagery to the military with nothing left ove

too hard for non DoD to get the assets they needed when the

believe that an organizational fix like NIMA was the right wa

lems associated with the Gulf War.... And, we also saw to

between cartographers and imagery analysts for the agency to

It is important to note, however, that theHouse Intelligenc

not united in their opposition to the NIMA concept. While

Director Lowenthal and most of the Republican member

another stovepipe, the Democratic members and stafferemained undecided. The Democrats were more inclined to s

position than the Committee Chairmans.

49 Lowenthal interview


20/121

UNDERSTANDING TU

In Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Ju

that committee jurisdictions are like property rights and

more closely guarded or as fervently pursued.59Turf ba

ence in their rawest forms. They are about property rights

legislatures, jurisdictions distinguish one committee from an

sense, a lawmakers legislative power base.60

The two intelligence committees are not equal in their j

gence Community, resources have traditionally been categ

as national intelligence assets in the National Foreign Intel

under the supervision of the DCI, or tactical intelligence as

and Related Activities (TIARA) Program, belonging to the

creation in the 1970s, the HPSCI was given jurisdiction ov

grams, while the SSCI was given jurisdiction over only th

gory, the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), wa

defense-wide intelligence assets.62This development cau

until a Memorandum of Understanding was signed betwee

ing that the SSCI had no formal jurisdiction over either th

can and does make recommendations to the SASC concernzations, and those recommendations are usually accepted.

Within the NFIP, the situation for the two intelligence

SSCI and HPSCI have sole jurisdiction over the non-def

gence Program (NFIP).64Armed Services has the authorit

sequential referral, but they cannot claim shared or sole jurgrams.65The SSCI and HPSCI share jurisdiction with Ar

portions of the NFIP.66

59 David King Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Ju


21/121

Thus, in 1995, since the House National Security Com

with the HPSCI for all defense intelligence programs, it waconcept be supported by both the Intelligence and Armed S

the Pentagon (the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Def

HNSC had little reason not to. According to Mark Lowen

increasing its turf.68Since members of the HNSC were unite

the HPSCI Republicans ultimately stood alone in their oppos

The SSCIs concerns about NIMA were jurisdictional in n

dered whether all the money associated with imagery was

Military Intelligence Program,70and thus remain under the p

SSCIs jurisdictional concerns reflected its deeply felt comm

strategic focus intact. Senator Kerrey72in particular, was wo

ignated a combat support agency that fell entirely under

NIMA would focus all or most of its energy on military snational-level policymakers at the National Security Council

like. Without jurisdiction, the SSCI would lose important infl

which NIMA was conceived and implemented.73The NIMA

NIMA as falling within the NFIP and briefed it that way.74

Like its House counterpart, the Senate Armed Services Cthe idea of NIMA. Unlike the Senate Intelligence Committee

tional issues because the new agency would fall either compl

tion or be shared with the SSCI. The DoD wanted NIMA des

Agency and as such, to fall under an amended Title 10 of t

the result of which would place it within SecDef and SAS

SSCI jurisdiction.

67 The House Armed Services Committee became the House National Se


22/121

DMA BROUGHT INTO THE

Sometime between September and November 1995,

objections, that DMA would be included in the envisione

DMA continued to have reservations about joining thr

Deutchs remarks throughout 1995 indicate that he alwa

organization.75From a strategic point of view, Deutch wou

7,000 people added great clout to the proposed organizati

jurisdiction. In addition, as William Allder recalls, Wh

potential for shared and complementary technologies th

imagery and mapping businesses in the future, he saw a se

that could be pursued most effectively through a single set

target date for stand-up of the new agency was set for 1 Oc

On 27 November 1995, a joint letter of agreement onagency, to be known as NIMA, was sent to House Speaker

ity Leader Robert Dole and appropriate Congressional Co

tary of Defense Perry, DCI Deutch, and General Shalikashv

We believe that the consolidation of imagery resources

gle agency within the Department of Defense will imp

ness and efficiency of imagery and mapping support to customers.Accordingly, we have agreed in concept to

and Mapping Agency that would have responsibility

similar to what the National Security Agency has for si

At this point, a NIMA Director-Designate was appoin

Team drawn from the intelligence and mapping commun

RADM Joseph (Jack) Dantone, Jr., USN, was announHis three deputies were Dr. Annette Krygiel from CIO, Le

Douglas Smith from DMA. Sharon Basso moved over fro

munications and Congressional Liaison and was responsib

strategy to push NIMA through Congress quickly The


23/121

THE LEGISLATIVE STRATE

Thus, by the time the Implementation Team was assemble

to craft a package acceptable to both the executive branch a

from Deutch was constant. He ordered them to be on the Hil

the interests and concerns of relevant committees, members

was the teams eyes and ears on the Hill. She remembers th

team received from CIAs Congressional Affairs Office.80Tea

ings with anyone who would agree to hear them out. Accordi

rarely had the time and most considered it a staffer issue. H

Members the hardest group to schedule time with and r

appointment four times with one Congressman before finally

tion year, and setting up a new agency was not high on their l

Leo Hazlewood remembers that the team had to worry aboteesIntelligence, Armed Services, Appropriations, Foreign R

dom of Information matters), Government Operations (on perso

the House and Senate)plus the Joint Committee on Printing

in-house capability was needed for printing classified informa

ever, was spent with the Intelligence Committee staffers. Quest

mittee jurisdictional concerns (protecting DCI or Secretary obalance national and combat commander support, the nature o

ture, cost and programmatics (NFIP or JMIP), personnel conce

membership issue, and constituent interests. He recalled bein

take jobs out of my district? This became a big concern of Mi

(DMA in St Louis, MO) and Senator Arlen Specter (DMA in P

In both January and February 1996, the team held NIMA Dinviting staffers from all relevant committees out for briefings

Why Now? About nineteen staffers came to the first, represen

Services and the Intelligence Committees. Staff members from

i t ll Sh B b it t th


24/121

Edward Obloy, the teams legal counsel and Chairman

described three most contentious issues the legislative stratepersonnel issues to include how to keep employee unions iCIA personnel into NIMA, (2) how to ensure both a straagency, and (3) who (the DCI or SecDef) should be responCompromise characterized the final solution to all three con

The union issue was particularly sensitive because it was

House had no intention of alienating a key constituency. Talways prohibited unions based on national security concernsbe made for DMA union members or the NIMA concept waexecutive branch. Leo Hazlewood remembers that Harold Icof Staff, became personally involved in resolving the issue. Uaccepted into NIMA with resolution of the issue deferred unt

The strategic and tactical focus was resolved through langTitle 50. The CJCS was placed in charge of reviewing NIMAport and the DCI was tasked to review its ability to provide tomers. Likewise, collection and tasking responsibilities werThus NIMA officially, by statute, serves two mastersthe Dgressional overseersArmed Services and Intelligence.

On the floor of the Senate, Senator Kerrey explained his poas a combat support agency, which would distance NIMA frocially designated by Congress as combat support agencies. Hterm was first used in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense ReorgaDoD agencies that have wartime support functions and a requiCJCS to ensure combat readiness.86Using that logic, Congre

Security Agency (NSA) as a combat support agency because NDoD. Congress subjected NSA to periodic review by the CJCwere concerned. Senator Kerrey argued that NIMA should haever, he agreed that since DMA would make up the largest pogo along with the combat support agency designation under T

i (b l i h i b f i


25/121

Obloys legal team wrote the statute, legislative history and le

drafting service for the Hill.89

This saved considerable time foIn putting the legislative package together so thoroughly, the

all the stakeholders90in the executive branch (including the

Budget) knew what was going on. Regular meetings were hel

the working groups were drawn from throughout the relevan

NIMA team briefed all the CINCs at a CINC Conference being

February 1996. At that meeting, General Shalikashvili reiterateNIMA.91February 1996 was also when the first meeting of th

(CAB) was held. That group comprised national and military or

to provide a customer perspective to the Implementation Team.

the National Intelligence Council and Joint Staff representative

Ultimately, the most important executive branch player was th

Budget (OMB). A clearinghouse for all executive branch legisbless NIMA by 15 April. Fortunately, by mid-April, the legisla

sively coordinated within DoD, was in OMB at the time, and ha

officials and their general counsels. The final signature was pro

remembers having to take the package to the Hill on 15 April, w

although it did get cleared by the 23rd. He knew the Hill staffe

deadline, that missing the deadline would kill all chances of psession, and he was sure enough of OMB support to take the cha

DoD General Counsel, for helping NIMA through its last execut

INSIDE BASEBALLDAVID VERSU

The jurisdictional disputes between the SASC and SSCI cam

1996 when the committee bills were ready for markup. Commitrevise bills in a process called a markup session in which the

According to congressional rules, a bill with overlapping jurisd

more committees have formal budgetary authority over some pa

sequentially so that each concerned committee has an opportuni


26/121

budget is hidden in the defense budget. Because so many b

sequential referral is a necessary evil but one that can plagies. Some staffers like to refer to sequential referral as i

In terms of member prioritiesreelection, influence with

intelligence and armed services committees are not equal.

include: Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce and Fi

is the single largest controllable segment of the yearly fede

Armed Services Committee has always been popular. Wdefense establishment, the immense size of the annual Armed

tion bill makes these committees the thousand pound goril

Services committees are used to being deferred to. As one s

other committees are always trying to get a piece of that pie.9

interpersonal relationships are so important on the Hill, it is

anything to upset cordial relations with any committeeespeIn 1996, this baseball game (the sequential referral pro

esting than usual. The Senate Armed Services Committe

Committees authorization bill (numbered S. 1718) on seq

the SASC took the SSCIs bill in order to have a chance to

was as usual, and in accordance with Senate rules, precede

its referral period, the SASC took exception to many of theals, and crossed out all SSCI references to NIMA(placed b

ing its mark. Still supportive of the NIMA concept, the

establishing NIMA into the SASC bill under Title 10 and e

completely, particularly those that appeared to increase t

DCI at the expense of the Secretary of Defense.97

94SSCI Professional Staffer interview.95 Davidson and Oleszek 208 In comparison the intelligence comm


27/121

The SASCs actions so infuriated the SSCI that Senator

the SSCIs taking the SASCs National Defense bill (numbereferrala highly unusual move!In other words, it was not

Davids bill on sequential referral, but very unusual for David

In the committee report issued by the SASC to accomp

Authorization Bill, SASC Chairman Senator Thurmond voic

SSCI over the issue of sequential referral.98

The SSCI nonetheless included many of the controversia

thereby creating a significant disagreement between the

Once S. 1718 had been referred to the SASC on sequenti

ligence Authorization Bill is every year), the SASC C

Minority Member agreed to enter into negotiations with

resolve these differences. Notwithstanding this effort to wgood faith, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the S

dented step of requesting sequential referral of the Defen

The SASC Chairmans anger was also apparent in other pa

His comments concerning a Department of Intelligence ar

posals in the SSCI bill which would have expanded the DCI

the SecDefs. (Italics added by author.)

S. 1718, as reported by the SSCI, contains a number o

sions, which the SASC opposes and the executive bra

On April 15, 1996 the Chairman and Ranking Minority

wrote to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSC

regarding these issues and to urge the SSCI not to incluthe Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1997

In general, these provisions seek to shift a significant de

the Secretary of Defense to the Director of Central Inte


28/121

and the DCI has not sought such authorities. If S. 17

rent form, it would almost certainly be vetoed....

Title VIII of S. 1718, as reported by the SSCI, establ

ery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in Title 50, U.S.C

port Agency. The executive branch had requested tha

Title 10, U.S.C., and be designated in law as a Com

SASC-reported Defense Authorization Bill contains

tive charter for NIMA, which, with a few minor excethe executive branch proposal.

As one staffer notes, the SASC is used to assaults from

just another assault to be warded off. In fact, he rememb

SASC and SSCI were high at that particular time. The two

resolved the issue of jurisdiction over JMIP funds, with the

randum of Agreement in April 1996 relinquishing to the SAAccording to both Leo Hazlewood and Ed Obloy, Eric Tho

was NIMAs guardian angel. Convinced at the January NI

NIMA was the right thing to do, and persuaded by the

SecDef and CJCS approved, Thoemmes helped to she

through the committee. He helped team members talk to th

and calm the waters stirred up by the sequential referral up

SASC members may have been unaware of how deep

NIMA under Title 50thinking it to be a Staffer issue as o

In fact, the SSCI felt so strongly about keeping NIMA wi

members decided as a committee to fight the SASC by req

bill on sequential referrala request never made by the SSC

confrontation between the two committee chairmenStrom

99 SASC Professional Staffer interview See Appendix F for a copy o


29/121

A SASC staffer remembers that confrontation and the ma

staff level. Ultimately, it came down to a meeting between out the most contentious issues. At one point, these Memb

DepSecDef White and Vice-Chairman, JCS Ralston to decide

with NIMA as a Combat Support Agency under the DoD.

One big issue between the SASC and SSCI had to do wit

would be military; if military, whether it would be a two-

three-star billet, whether the services would get an additionwould have to take it out of hide (meaning the total num

divided among the services). A three-star billet was agreed

tor would be equal in rank to the Director of DIA, NSA, NR

SASC wanted no increase in three-star billets. According t

did not lobby hard enough for an additional three-star bille

although NIMA did end up with the option of either a seniorthree-star billet has to be borrowed from the service that n

tor. Thus, RADM Dantone had to be called Acting Dire

because he had two stars, not three.

Having taken the SASC bill, and earned the wrath of Se

such as Senator Stevens, the SSCI released it ahead of sched

SSCI committee report accompanying the SASC Defense Au

conciliatory, although he makes some pointed references to S

tee report. Senator Specter makes a point of justifying the SSC

and the speediness of its review.104

After careful review, including extensive discussions a

staff and member level with the Armed Services ComDirector of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Secretary of

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee v

with amendments on June 11well before the expiratio

session allotted in Senate Resolution 400 for considerat


30/121

upon, the DCI will have the ability to ensure that a n

Mapping Agency will be responsive to the needs of a

NIMA IN CONFERENCEHNSC

Typically, once the HPSCI and SSCI have resolved the

vices, and any other committee with overlapping concern

Judiciary, each bill is reported from committee and s

chamber. Here is where the reputation of the Intelligencemost critical. In the words of one HPSCI staffer, the chai

the entire chamber and ask fellow members to trust him

have made the right decisions because the majority of th

Members can come to the committees work spaces and

the bill but few do. Most trust the committee and its st

thing. He calls the committees role the lubricant betweand legislative branches, allowing a secret part of the gov

in an open society that inherently distrusts any operation

Before bills can be sent to the president, however, the

House and Senate in identical form. House and Senate diff

ference. In the usual course of things, conferees include

tees that sponsored the legislation, but can sometimes inclwith important overlapping jurisdiction.107

NIMA would normally have been conferenced by th

in which HPSCI committee members sit across the table f

to iron out any differences.108Had that happened, the S

to take advantage of the divided House, using the isola

cans on the NIMA issue to win its passage.109NIMA, how(since the SSCI had, in fact, eliminated NIMA language in

rization Bill in order to gain Senate passage of the bill) an

HPSCI110or SSCI bills pertaining to NIMA. NIMA was in

th HNSC t f di tl ith th SASC Th ith


31/121

A THREE-RING CIRCUS

Newspaper articles discussing committee differences referr

ring turf battle par excellence. Washington Post staff write

Walter Pincus named the ring leaders as DCI John Deutch, De

senting SecDef Perry) and Senator Specter. Waiting just ou

Pincus, is Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Chairman of the A

committee and booster of the Pentagon and Senate Armed Ser

man of the Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee handlhas gotten sequential referral on Specters bill and is holding it

Senator Stevens actions came as a great surprise to th

According to Charlie Battaglia, Senator Stevens staff never pr

why the committee was taking a sequential referral on the SSC

of his several offers to negotiate changes or provide clarificatio

Senator Stevens was using the procedure as a tool to show su

and reprimand the SSCI for overstepping its bounds.112

THE APPROPRIATORS

The committees discussed thus far (Intelligence, Armed S

and so on) are authorizing committees and through their billexist. Authorization committees review the merit of existing

decide whether to authorize money for them in the coming fis

authorizers is whether programs have merit, and how to priori

There is only one Appropriations Committee in each ho

divided up among its 13 subcommittees. Each agency in the

upon one of those thirteen appropriations bills for its budget dgram is both authorized by an authorizing committee, such as

priated funds by an appropriating subcommittee such as the

Subcommittee on Military Construction.


32/121

authorizers. In addition, Sharon Basso recalled that Sen

Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, had wanted a NIAtime. He was unhappy with CIO and his staffer kept whac

to pay attention. She also remembered that House appr

that information got to the guy in the foxhole and thoug

able to do that.113

Not surprisingly, appropriators focused in on DCI Deu

ciency and cost savings as a result of the consolidation of cover ways in which the new agency could save money. T

resolved, however, and the implementation team considere

cause for concern.114

A LETTER FROM THE SPE

Despite their isolated position, Leo Hazlewood remembeto mobilize other House Republicans to Just Say No to NIM

ence committee over the DoD Authorization Bill. Furtherm

HPSCI staff briefed Speaker Gingrich on the issue and conv

In response, the Speaker wrote a letter of objection.115Lowe

is, after all, an ex officiomember of the HPSCI and is therefo

express his opinion on the subject within the House and Senahave been circulated among key Republican members throug

signal to the conference committee members not to support t

The fact that the Speakers letter had so little effect illus

the Senate, but also the momentum that the NIMA concep

support from both key players in the executive branch and C

at this late stage. Leo Hazlewood recalled that the NIMAperiod the importance of reaching out to people who could c

Hill.117One such person was Senator Trent Lott.118Sharo

was particularly lucky because Senator Lott was the subc

sored the NIMA legislation As its sponsor he had a pers


33/121

given day, the heartbeat grew stronger or weaker. Team mem

correlations, like the fact that the more the HPSCI disliked Nsupport! They also learned that proposed legislation can fa

potentially disastrous Gingrich letter demonstrated at the very

Having survived the scrutiny of these many committees a

the management of imagery intelligence, and having faced

executive branch, NIMA was legislated into existence in th

Bill.121

The bill passed on 30 September 1996meeting the by DCI Deutch in November 1995an incredibly short tim

spective. This retrospective case study highlights just how r

How can we explain its success despite all the odds against it

The importance of the combined support of the Secretary

Joint Chiefs of Staff and Director of Central Intelligence ca

they not been united, the fast track approach would not havovercame the tremendous opposition within the executiv

clashed over such fundamentally contentious issues as budge

benefits, and organizational cultures. Despite all that, the big

ing was right, and so it happened. As David Broadhurst conc

was the biggest change in the Intelligence Community since

1947.123

Such revolutionary change probably had to happeweight of the opposition.

In conclusion, it appears that policymakers in the executive

Congress is an ally, sometimes a foe. In the case of NIMA

advocate. According to Helen Sullivan, Office of the Deputy G

primary drafter of the NIMA legislation,

[i]t has been said that it can be easier to get legislation t

through the executive branch. NIMA may be proof of t

seek an administration solution to the problem, having t

of Defense sign some kind of charter that would have


34/121

sional intelligence committees have a variety of responsibi

cise continuous watchfulness over the agencies withinadministration of a statute is, properly speaking, an ex

cess.125Congress gave the NIMA several years to overco

in starting a new agency and then sought an independent a

cerns of the various committees were well-founded and wh

support national policymakers more fully. Using the Cla

DoD Appropriations Conference Bill, Congress establishe

NIMA and directed the DCI and SecDef to appoint its

chaired by Peter Marino, conducted its study throughout

January 2001. The Commission concludes that while N

incomplete, and progress against some goals is mixed, the

in virtually every area.126The commissions report offer

as of the year 2000. Researchers might consider using this

to measure progress at some future date.


35/121


36/121

APPENDIX A

1996 SENATE SELECT COM

ON INTELLIGENCE (S

(Republicans shown in Roman type, Demo

224-1700 SH-211 Party Ratio:

MEMBERS:127

Arlen Specter, PA, Chairman

Richard Lugar, IN

Richard Shelby, AL

Mike Dewine, OH

Jon Kyl, AZ

James Inhofe, OK

Kay Bailey Hutchinson, TX

Connie Mack, FL

William Cohen, ME

Bob Dole, KS, ex officio

J. Robert Kerrey, NE, Vice Chair

John Glenn, Ohio

Richard Bryan, NV

Bob Graham

John Kerry, MA

Max Baucus, MNJ. Bennett Johnston, LA

Charles Robb, VA

Thomas Daschle, SD, ex officio


37/121


38/121

APPENDIX B

1996 HOUSE PERMANENT

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGE

(Republicans shown in Roman type, Demo

225-4121 H405 Capitol Party Rat

MEMBERS:128

Larry Combest, TX, Chairman

Robert Dornan, CA

Bill Young, FL

Jim Hansen, UT

Jerry Lewis, CA

Porter Goss, FL129

Bud Shuster, PA

Bill McCollum, FL

Michael Castle, DE

Newt Gingrich, GA, ex officio

Norman Dicks, WA, Ranking Minority Mbr

Bill Richardson, NM

Julian Dixon, CA

Bob Torricelli, NJ

Ronald Coleman,TX

David Skaggs, CO

Nancy Pelosi, CA

Dick Gephardt, Mo, ex officio

KEY STAFF:


39/121


40/121

APPENDIX C

EXECUTIVE BRANCH PLAYERS

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGE

John Deutch Director of Ce

Jeff Smith General Coun

SENIOR STEERING GROUP

CO-CHAIRPERSONS:

Paul Kaminski Under SecDef

George Tenet Deputy Dir, C

Adm Bill Owens Vice Chairman

MEMBERS:

Keith Hall Exec Dir, Inte

Emmet Paige Asst SecDef f

Nora Slatkin Exec Dir, CIA

Ted Warner Asst SecDef, S

Randy Beers National Secu

NIMA IMPLEMENTATION TEAM

MEMBERS:

(Position at th

RADM Jack Dantone, Director Dep Director f

Dep Dir for O

Dep Dir for D

Leo Hazlewood, Deputy Director Dep Dir for A

Dr Annette Krygiel, Deputy Director Dir, CIO

W. Douglas Smith, NIMA Team Ldr Dep Dir, DMA


41/121


42/121

APPENDIX D


43/121


44/121

APPENDIX E

SENATE COMMITTEE R

E-1: 104-277, SASC RPT ON SSCI

E-2: 104-278, SSCI RPT ON SASC

E-3: 104-337, SGAC RPT ON SSCI


45/121


46/121

APPENDIX E-1

104-277, SENATE ARMED S

COMMITTEE REPORT ON SSC

104th Congress, 2nd Session Senate

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FORFOR INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATE

June 6, 1996- Ordered to be pri

Mr. THURMOND, from the Committee on Armed Serv

REPORT[To accompany S. 1718]

The Committee on Armed Services, to which was ref

considered the same, reports favorably thereon with ame

the bill as amended do pass.

PURPOSE OF THE BIL

S. 1718 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1

gence-related activities of the United States Government, i

Defense intelligence-related activities within the jurisdict

vices Committee (SASC).

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 1996 and it was referred to the Committee on Armed Serv

dance with section 3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Co

SCOPE OF COMMITTEE R


47/121

Overview

S. 1718, as reported by the SSCI, contains a number o

which the SASC opposes and the Executive Branch does

1996, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the SA

and Vice Chairman of the SSCI to express concern regarding

SSCI not to include such provisions in the Intelligence Autho

1997. In general, these provisions seek to shift a significan

the Secretary of Defense to the Director of Central Intellthe area of budget formulation and execution. The bill a

provisions that, taken together, lay the foundation for the

to a Department of Intelligence. The SASC supports a

that the DCIs function is not to act as a quasi-departmen

the intelligence activities of various departments and to a

gence advisor to the President and the National Security Cthe type of authority recommended by the SSCI would ser

retary of Defenses ability to manage the Department o

notes that the Secretary of Defense strongly opposes such

DCI has not sought such authorities. If S. 1718 were pas

would almost certainly be vetoed.

The SSCI nonetheless included many of the controverthereby creating a significant disagreement between the S

S. 1718 had been referred to the SASC on sequential re

Authorization Bill is every year), the SASC Chairman and

ber agreed to enter into negotiations with the SSCI to atte

ences. Notwithstanding this effort to work out a cons

Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI took the unpring sequential referral of the Defense Authorization Bill.

After three weeks of negotiations and four proposals and

the committees the SASC concluded that given the SSCIs i


48/121

Section 707Enhancement of authority of Director of

budget, personnel, and activities of intelligence community

Section 707, as reported by the SSCI, would significan

over the DOD elements of the intelligence community. It w

of Defense to get DCI concurrence on the Joint Military

budget, and consult with the DCI on the Tactical Intell

(TIARA) budget; (2) give the DCI authority to manage al

ties of the intelligence community (including Defense huthat any reprogramming within the JMIP receive DCI appr

to reprogram funds and transfer personnel among Nationa

(NFIP) elements after consultation with (in lieu of concurr

the DCI authority to allocate and expend all NFIP funds fo

Office (NRO), the National Security Agency (NSA), and t

ping Agency (NIMA) (giving the DCI authority he now ogence Agency (CIA)).

The proposed SASC amendment would enhance the D

agement of Defense intelligence activities, but would not

tary of Defense over such activities. Specifically, the ame

the participation of the DCI in the development of budge

leaving the final authority on these matters with the Secreta

time authority to approve national collection requirements

priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levie

(3) require the Secretary of Defense to consult with the

actions; (4) strike SSCI language allowing the DCI to trans

tion of the affected Defense Agency head; (5) strike the

authority to manage and expend funds for Defense Departmsubstitute language establishing a database on intelligence

insight into the overall intelligence budget; (6) strike S

authority to rotate personnel in the absence of coordination


49/121

Section 709Improvement of intelligence collection

Section 709, as reported by the SSCI, would establish the p

Collection, to be appointed by the President and confirmed

would also transfer the responsibilities and authorities of the

clandestine elements of the Defense Human Intelligence Serv

The proposed SASC amendment would modify the authori

Collection, limiting them to general responsibilities in assistexisting collection authorities. The proposed SASC amend

SSCI language regarding the transfer of authorities over the D

Services, and substitute language requiring a report by the DC

of Defense regarding on-going activities of those official

interoperability, and, where practicable, consolidation betw

intelligence activities of the Defense Human Intelligence Serv

Section 711Improvement of administration of intelligenc

Section 711, as reported by the SSCI, would establish the p

Administration to be appointed by the President and confirme

The proposed SASC amendment would modify the SSduties of the Assistant DCI for Administration by dropping a

administration.

Section 714Office of Congressional Affairs

Section 714, as reported by the SSCI, would establish an o

for the intelligence community.

The proposed SASC amendment would change the desig

Office of Congressional Affairs for the Director of Central


50/121

Section 716Appointment and evaluation of official

related activities

Section 716, as reported by the SSCI, would require th

the concurrence of the DCI before making a recommendat

NRO and NSA. The SSCI provision would also require the

mance evaluations for the heads of NRO and NSA to the S

The proposed SASC amendment would modify the SSC

currence on appointments to provide that the Secretary, a

make the recommendation to the President without the DC

notes that the DCI does not concur. This modification is co

tion to extend this recommendation process to the director

up on the Defense Authorization bill). The amendment w

guage requiring the DCI to provide annual performance

intends to include language in the Defense Authorizationinput on performance evaluations for the directors of NSA

eration by the Secretary of Defense in the preparation o

mances evaluations of these directors.

Section 717Intelligence community senior executive s

Section 717, as reported by the SSCI, would establiSenior Executive Service.

The proposed SASC amendment would strike this prov

the Department of Defense strongly opposes the establishm

Executive Service that would include a large number of D

nel. The SSCI provision contradicts a proposal made by th

DOD intelligence civilian personnel management, whichone of his top priorities, and which the Secretary of Defen

mittee is considering options for including a version of the

ligence personnel proposal in the Defense Authorization b


51/121

identify deficiencies in the capabilities of NIMA to accomp

sions and develop policies and programs to review and cor

committee expects that disagreements between the DCI an

relating to the identification of NIMAs deficiencies in perf

would be settled according to normal interagency procedure

the ultimate authority to resolve differences. These provision

50, U.S.C. The SASC intends to include identical language i

bill in addition to language specifying that the Secretary o

actions to correct deficiencies jointly identified by the Secreta

COMMITTEE ACTION

In accordance with the Legislative Reorganization Act o

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the committee approv

ably S. 1718 with an amendment.

FISCAL DATA

The committee will publish in the Congressional Record in

projections when such information is received from the Cong

REGULATORY IMPACT

Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of

report on the regulatory impact of a bill be included in the rep

tee finds that there is no regulatory impact in the cost of S. 17

CHANGES IN EXISTING LA

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI o

Senate, the changes in existing law made by certain portion

shown in this section of the report because, in the opinion of

essary to dispense with showing such changes in order to e


52/121

APPENDIX E-2

104-278, SENATE SELECT CO

ON INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON


TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FORFOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRU

DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTTO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STR

SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARME

FOR OTHER PURPOSJune 11, 1996Ordered to be pr

Mr. SPECTER, from the Select Committee on Intellige

REPORT

[To accompany S. 1745]

The Select Committee on Intelligence, to which was refconsidered the same, favorably reports the bill with amend

PURPOSE OF THE BIL

S. 1745 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year

the Department of Defense, for military construction, an

Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths forForces, and for other purposes.

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) reporte

it was referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence in a


53/121

Prior committee action

These amendments to the National Defense Authorizationgence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, S. 1718, reflec

mittee has reached after six years of focused examination

Intelligence Community operate more effectively, more e

accountability in light of the significant changes in the wo

1994, this effort led Congress, at the urging of Senator Warne

ers, to establish a Commission on the Roles and CapabilitCommunity (the Aspin-Brown Commission) to conduct a

objective review of U.S. intelligence. The Commission was g

1996, with the expectation that its report would inform a le

enactment of needed changes during this Congress.

Armed with the Commissions report and enlightened by t

nation, including numerous hearings, briefings, and interviewIntelligence voted on April 24, 1996, to report S. 1718, the In

for Fiscal Year 1997, containing a number of measures to imp

Intelligence Community, strengthen the DCIs ability to mana

of all intelligence consumers, and enhance the ability of the

public to ensure that the secrecy necessary for the conduct of i

the vigilance and oversight necessary for an effective demoCommittee took the Intelligence Authorization bill on a 30-da

have done every year since the establishment of the Select Com

The Armed Services Committee staff was briefed on S. 17

to the April 24 vote to report the bill and the Chairman and Vi

sively on the Committees legislation in a hearing before the

following that vote. During this same time frame, the Armeconsidering the National Defense Authorization Act for F

reported to the Senate on May 13. Despite expressing in a let

on Intelligence dated April 15, 1996, initial concerns about pa

l i l i i hi d l i l i h A d S


54/121

about protecting the equities of the Secretary of Defense an

withstanding that the objective of the reform provisions in S

ity of intelligence provided to all consumers, including th

Armed Services Committee did not want any changes th

authority of the Secretary of Defense, who now controls abo

community budget. The Intelligence Committee is concern

under which the Director of Central Intelligence is respon

intelligence needs are met effectively and efficiently while h

the CIAwhich represents only a small portion of the intelllems like those reflected in the recent revelation that severa

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in funds were never expende

after year.

As the current DCI John Deutch, who was formerly De

tified on April 24, [t]he Deputy Secretary of Defense has

covering a much larger range of resources10 tim

resources...of the whole intelligence community. So to say

deputyand I am not talking about personalitiesand s

Defense, why didnt you catch this, hes going to say, we

track of this and to let the Secretary of Defense know. So in

say that the Director of Central Intelligence does not vie

responsible for the NRO, fundamentally nobody will be.

The Director of Central Intelligence is in a unique po

effectiveness of intelligence programs throughout the gove

this person responsible for ensuring that the various eleme

nity are more responsive to this national objective than to p

too often typify bureaucracies. Yet he lacks the authority n

tive, particularly with regard to the intelligence elemeDefense. The DCI can be given enhanced authority withou

intelligence community from the various agencies in which

the ability of those agency heads to manage their depart


55/121

the Department of Defense authority for processing and diss

While the Intelligence Committee supports this consolidation

by the benefits of the synergy it will bring to imagery analysis

national customers outside of DoD will continue to receive the

Specifically, the Committees disagreed on the appropriate rol

these national customers, including the President and the N

well as the Secretary of State and other Cabinet officials and ke

administrations decision to establish NIMA as an agency

Defense, with its budget controlled by the Secretary of Defecombat support agency subject to review by the Joint Chiefs

Defense clearly will be able to ensure appropriate considerati

both tactical and national. The issue debated by the Committee

of Defense should be able to effectively block adjustments in

NIMA that might be needed to address deficiencies in the imag

the needs of other national customers such as the DepartmentCommerce, and Energy, as well as the Office of the U.S. Trade

Representative to the United Nations. The Committee was con

the Armed Services Committee would allow the Secretary of

changes needed to meet these other national needs.

The second issue that remained unresolved was the ability

ments in the allocation of funds within the National Foreign Iduring the fiscal year to meet unexpected intelligence needs.

all former DCIs who testified before the Committee, public

authority as important to effective management of the natio

The DCI has the authority today to make the initial allocation

lating the budget. However, when unforeseen requirements ari

funds are available from a lower priority intelligence activityauthority to transfer those funds unless the affected agency h

contained a provision to enhance the DCIs authority by shifti

agency to convince the President or his designee that the tr

Armed Services Committee objected to giving the DCI t


56/121

intelligence activities of the Department of Defense an

Defense from delegating this authority to anyone other

Defense. The provision would have severely hampered th

Defense Intelligence Agency to manage the Defense H

agency today and would have effectively prohibited the c

activities of the Defense HUMINT Service into the Direct

under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligenc

recommended by the Aspin-Brown Commission, and the

vision to effect it in S. 1718.

The two Committees have agreed to the deletion of this

the SSCI bill that would require consolidation and to require

tary of Defense submit a report on efforts to achieve greater

Director of Military Intelligence

Section 906 of the bill would have designated the Dire

of Military Intelligence (DMI) and would have created

(MIB) inside the Department of Defense.

This Committee has previously opposed the creation o

Intelligence inside the Department of Defense because mi

appropriately shared among the Director, DIA; the J-2 of retary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication

son, the Aspin-Brown Commission also recommended aga

The Committee also notes that the Deputy Secretary

against legislation creating a DMI and a MIB.

The Committee recommends that Section 906, as repor

the bill.

DCI role in appointment and evaluation of nationa

The Committee recommends that a new Section 906 b


57/121

to the Department of Defense for intelligence activities of the

ual who is not an officer or employee of the Department of De

This provision, the intent of which is unclear, would have f

the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities, the funds for which

the Department of Defense. The Administration is still studyi

vision if it were enacted, but it is clear, at minimum, that it w

with the obligation and expenditure of funds by the NRO, m

employees are not DoD employees. The provision would alsfers of funds under the Economy Act.

The Committee recommends that Section 1007 be deleted

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency

Title IX, Subtitle B of S. 1745, would consolidate the

the Central Imagery Office, the National Photographic I

the imagery-related functions of a number of other agen

Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).

The creation of NIMA would constitute a major reor

gence activities, and accordingly the Committee has focu

on the provisions of Subtitle B. The Committee believes tby SASC, must be amended in several key respects.

Most important, the Committee believes that the DCI

to set imagery collection requirements and priorities, and

priorities. The DCI has such authority under existing exec

tial decisions, but, in light of the establishment of NIMA a

ment of Defense, the Committee believes the DCIs autho

statute. The Committee recommends that these authoritie

10, U.S. Code (together with other provisions establis

National Security Act of 1947 in Title 50 (which specifie


58/121

work together cooperatively to ensure that NIMA prov

DoD customers.

The Committee is also concerned that, as reported

Subtitle B would have stated that NIMA is established

of the Department of Defense. The Committee recogn

nent of the new NIMA is the Defense Mapping Agency,

in statute (10 U.S.C. 193) as a combat support agency,

to have significant combat support functions. But uAgency, NIMA will also have important responsibilitie

military customers. Accordingly, the Committee belie

establish NIMA as a combat support agency, even if o

cifically state that NIMA also has national missions. T

that NIMAs primary purpose is to provide combat sup

In this regard, the Committee notes that when Con

Title 10, which specified the combat support agencies o

Congress specifically declined to list the National Secu

port agency because NSA serves customers outside the

gress, nevertheless, subjected NSA to the same JCS

combat support agencies but only with respect to its co

Committee believes that it would be most appropriate

not list NIMA as a combat support agency but subject

to its combat support functions. The Department of Def

have insisted that NIMA be listed as a combat sup

Defense Mapping Agency will comprise the largest act

mittee is willing to agree to have NIMA listed as a c

U.S.C. 193 for purposes of JCS review of its combat smends that Section 921 be amended so that NIMA is no

combat support agency.

i i A S i


59/121

Finally, pursuant to agreement with the Armed Servic

tee has deleted proposed Section 445 of Title 10. This sect

the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agen

inspection, investigation, or audit of NIMA without the

Inspector General.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On June 11, 1996, the Select Committee on Intelligence v

amendments. Because the provisions considered by the Co

tively small portion of the entire National Defense Authorizat

the Committee did not make a recommendation to the Senate

the Committee supports the provisions related to intelligence

REGULATORY IMPACT

Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of

report on the regulatory impact of a bill be included in the rep

tee finds that there is no change in the regulatory impact of

amendments.

ESTIMATE OF COSTS

The Committee finds no changes in the estimate of costs as a

CHANGES IN EXISTING LA

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI o

Senate, the changes in existing law made by certain portion

shown in this section of the report because, in the opinion of

sary to dispense with showing such changes in order to exped

ate and reduce the expenditure of funds.

APPENDIX E 3


60/121

APPENDIX E-3

104-337, SENATE GOVERNMEN

COMMITTEE REPORT ON SSC


TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FORFOR INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATE

July 29, 1996Ordered to be pr

Mr. STEVENS, from the Committee on Governmental A

REPORT[To accompany S. 1718]

The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, to

(S. 1718) having considered the same, reports favorably

recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMS. 1718, as reported from the Governmental Affairs

appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for intelligence and i

the United States Government, including certain activitie

Governmental Affairs Committee.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported

was referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services

with section 3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congres

Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. 1718 was, on Jun

mittee for a 30 session day period

O J 6 1996 th S t A d S i C itt


61/121

On June 6, 1996, the Senate Armed Services Committee pu

on S. 1718 and suggested several amendments, one of which

senior executive service personnel program for the intelligenthe Armed Services Committee report a number of provisi

authority over DoD intelligence assets from the Secretary

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Most of these provi

Armed Services Committee and eventual compromises negot

Intelligence Committee.

On June 11, the Intelligence Committee published its repo

Department of Defense Authorization bill, agreeing to the A

recommendation to strike the new senior executive service pe

The Governmental Affairs Committee only addressed iss

however, we fully concur in all the changes recommended b

mittee including its recommendation to strike all language est

utive service personnel program for the intelligence communi

III. GLENN AMENDMEN

Senator Glenns amendment to S. 1718 (1) provides more

cations of commission members; (2) enumerates how the effectiveness of the U.S. cooperation with other countries wit

activities; and (3) calls on the commission to address export

tion flow, and the organization of counterproliferation activit

issues. The committee voted to report the bill with this amend

IV. INSPECTORS GENERA

An earlier draft version of the Intelligence Authorizati

which would have broadened the role of the CIAs Inspector

As the committee charged with the oversight of the st


62/121

As the committee charged with the oversight of the st

have found no evidence indicating Congress should take th

a community inspector general. This would be analogoDepartment IG to act as coordinator and central point of co

ing the law enforcement community which, like the intel

various organizations spread across more than one departm

This committee has heard from a number of the inspec

agencies comprising the intelligence community expressiraised in the Intelligence Committee report. These are: the

Committee of a lack of effective coordination between intel

consistent IG coverage of high risk or high dollar intellige

management support and attention to the IGs and their prod

inconsistent training and professional standards for IG emp

gence Committee noted that concerns have been expressed

the IG community regarding the professionalism, experienc

The IGs expressed their view that these concerns were for t

In our view adequate mechanisms for coordinating in

exist. We reference the August 1994 establishment of the D

General Forum (the Forum) created to ensure adequate

involving interagency functions and programs. In additioIntegrity and Efficiency (PCIE), comprised of representati

the responsibility for coordinating interagency IG activitie

ernment. The Government Affairs Committee has been

Management and Budget with a view toward formalizing

statutory IG representatives from all those agencies and de

ligence community. We believe this would be the proper v

activities involving those intelligence community agencies

The Intelligence Committee report calls for the thirtee

(Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, D

and Smith A voice vote then occurred on the motion to report


63/121

and Smith. A voice vote then occurred on the motion to report

Glenn Amendment, from the Governmental Affairs Committe

VI. ESTIMATES OF COST

The committee finds no changes in the estimate of costs as a

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI oSenate, the changes in existing law made by certain portion

shown in this section of the report because, in the opinion o

sary to dispense with showing such changes in order to exped

ate and reduce the expenditure of funds.

VIII. REGULATORY IMPACT OF LE

Paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules

each report accompanying a bill evaluate the regulatory impa

in carrying out the bill. The enactment of this legislation wou

ulatory impact.

APPENDIX F


64/121

APPENDIX F

LETTER TO NEWT GIN


65/121

APPENDIX G


66/121

APPENDIX G

MEMORANDUM OF AGR

26 April 1996, SASC and SSCI, JM


67/121

APPENDIX H


68/121

LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE BRIEF


69/121


70/121


71/121


72/121


73/121


74/121


75/121


76/121


77/121


78/121


79/121


80/121


81/121


82/121


83/121

APPENDIX I


84/121

NIMA DECISION PRO6 FEB 96 BRIEFING CH


85/121

APPENDIX J


86/121

IMAGERY FUNCTIONAL MA6 FEB BRIEFING CHA


87/121

APPENDIX K

NIMA WHATS INCLUDE


88/121

NIMAWHATS INCLUDE

ReportonImplementationPlanningforNIMA

TEmplo

ymees10April

96,Hazlewood

SlidePresenta

tion


89/121


90/121


91/121

APPENDIX L

NIMA WHATS EXCLUDE


92/121

NIMAWHAT S EXCLUDE


93/121

APPENDIX M

DoD DIRECTIVE 510


94/121

DoD DIRECTIVE 51011 OCT 96, ESTABLISHIN


95/121


96/121


97/121


98/121


99/121


100/121


101/121


102/121


103/121


104/121


105/121


106/121


107/121


108/121


109/121


110/121


111/121


112/121


113/121

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basso, Sharon. Director of Communications and CongressImplementation Team. Interview by the author by e

Battaglia Charlie Staff Director Senate Select Committee


114/121

Battaglia, Charlie. Staff Director, Senate Select CommitteeInterview by the author, 24 August 2000.

Best, Richard A. Jr. Intelligence Reorganization in the 10More Corporate Community, CRS Report for Cong

DC: CRS, 13 Sep 96.

Birnbaum, Jeffrey and Alan S. Murray. Showdown at GuBooks, 1987.

Broadhurst, David. Director, NIMA College. Interview by

Brown, Harold; Rudman, Warren and Les Aspin. Preparin

Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence. Washington, DC: CoCapabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1

Creating the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (U)Studies in Intelligence, 42, 1 (1998): 39-49.

Davidson, Roger and Walter Oleszek. Congress and Its MPress, 2000.

DCI Plans a National Imagery Agency,DIA Communiq

Duncan, Philip D. and Christine Lawrence. Politics in AmeWashington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995.

Elkins, Dan.An Intelligence Resource Managers Guide. W

Fialka, John. Congress Set to Approve Big Review of Co

Community, Wall Street Journal,26 Sep 1994, 6.

Gates, Robert. From the Shadows. NY: Simon and Schust

Statement on Change in the IC U S Congr

Lowenthal, Mark. Staff Director, House Permanent Senate Co1996. Interview with author, 24 August 2000.

Memorandum of Agreement, 26 April 1996, between the SASJMIP and TIARA.

NIMA Decision Brief October 1995 Joint Chiefs of Staff


115/121

NIMA Decision Brief, October 1995 Joint Chiefs of Staff

Obloy, Edwar

Date post:	04-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	shakes21778
View:	216 times
Download:	0 times

The Creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency

Documents