The Cultural Revolution and China After Mao

(1960-1989)

Teacher Resource Guide

East Asia National Resource Center

By Kelly Hammond

The Revolution Continues?

After the failures of the Great Leap

Forward, the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) leadership was divided over which

path to take to successfully complete the

revolution in China. Domestically,

millions of Chinese suffered and starved

during the Hundred Flowers Campaign

and the Great Leap Forward.

Internationally, tensions were mounting

between China and both the Soviet Union

and the United States. Mao, who had

orchestrated the Great Leap Forward, felt

threatened about his legitimacy and was

concerned about maintaining his position

as the leader of China. Indeed, Mao’s

reputation was tarnished by the early

1960s. Other leaders, including Liu Shaoqi,

Deng Xiaopping, Chen Yun, and Zhou

Enlai, who were as seasoned

revolutionaries as Mao, advocated a

gradual model to revolutionize China

because they understood the implications

of radical policies as seen in the case of the

Great Leap Forward. Mao and his

entourage, including his wife Jiang Qing,

disagreed.

The cult of Mao. Source: Chineseposters.net

In order to consolidate his power, Mao

appointed a man named Lin Biao as the

new Minister of Defense, making Lin the

de facto leader of the People’s Liberation

Army (PLA). While Liu Shaoqi and Deng

Xiaoping were busy stabilizing the

economy after the Great Leap Forward,

Mao used the army to cement his power.

Lin Biao and his faction brought together

a selection of Mao’s writings and

published them in what is infamously

known as the “Little Red Book.” The

copies of this book were distributed to all

Chinese soldiers for them to memorize

and study. By 1963, there were clearly two

different revolutionary visions in China.

Mao, who wished to forge ahead with his

revolutionary ideals, insulated himself

from criticism and kept only “yes men,”

such as Lin Biao, close to him because

they followed Mao’s command without

question. On the other hand, Deng and

Liu opted for a safer and more

conservative approach, and many of them

paid for their criticisms; both Deng and

Liu were shamed and imprisoned during

the Cultural Revolution.

Lei Feng: Then and Now

In 1963, Lin Biao, with Mao’s full support,

developed the propaganda detailing Mao’s

vision for the socialist future in China. The

campaign focused on highlighting a young

soldier, Lei Feng, who had died for his

country. When Lei Feng’s journal got

published after his death, he came to

represent the emblematic PLA soldier who

was a selfless revolutionary completely

devoted to Mao Zedong. However, it later

came to light that the diary was fake and

written by the propaganda team within the

PLA.

Lei Feng’s Journal was a symbol of service

and obedience to the Communist Party.

He was presented as an honest, if

somewhat naïve, hardworking laborer who

had joined the party. Lei’s family was

described as having suffered under the

oppression of the KMT, evil capitalist

landlords as they were described, as well

as the Japanese occupation. In the end,

Lei’s death was presented as a selfless act

in which he died heroically while trying to

save his comrade. The Diary of Lei Feng

was taught in elementary schools,

indoctrinating young children with

revolutionary zeal. Through the

revolutionary martyr Lei Feng, the CCP

was able to tailor their message to young

children that servitude to the party should

come before everything else.

Lei Feng poster. Source: Chineseposters.net

Despite the fact that his diary was

fabricated by the PLA’s propaganda unit,

Lei Feng is still remembered as a

revolutionary martyr in China today.

People perceive him as a figure who

embodies the values of the “good ol’ days,”

and the CCP continues to use his image to

promote the idea that people should live in

accordance with socialist values.

The year 2013 was the 50th anniversary of

Lei Feng’s death and the CCP launched a

propaganda campaign to honor him,

encouraging young Chinese to become

“modern-day Lei Fengs.” The party

acknowledged several “selfless” teachers,

doctors, cadres, and army officers,

elevating their good deeds (e.g. teaching

handicapped children in the countryside

for almost no pay, providing free dental

service to people who could not afford it).

In their effort to curb growing corruption

within the CCP and increasing capitalistic

characteristics in Chinese society, the CCP

is actively utilizing old symbols of

revolutionary zeal, promoting good deeds

and good Samaritans within the

community. Not all of the local population,

however, views these propaganda

messages with enthusiasm. Cynicism

towards the CCP’s propaganda efforts

certainly exists, indicating that The Diary

of Lei Feng was not well received by

everyone since the 1960s.

The Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution in China is a

period of time that is still not thoroughly

understood. Most of the information

about the period available in the West

comes from Chinese defectors or

questionable sources. Because the Chinese

government has not released the archives

from this period, if there are any, a lot of

the information we have is confusing,

confounded, and hard to corroborate. The

general view of the Cultural Revolution in

the West is that China was in complete

chaos and anarchy during this period.

However, there are some indications that

despite the overall violence and

ruthlessness, chaos might not be the best

way to describe the period. For example,

during the same time as the Cultural

Revolution, the Chinese government

undertook several enormous

infrastructure projects, such as the

construction of the Beijing Metro. This

tells historians that China was not in a

complete state of anarchy as some sources

suggest, though it is clear that there were

many problems in the country at the time.

The bottom line is that we might never

know what actually happened during the

Cultural Revolution and given the paucity

of sources, so it is wise to keep an open

mind and place the events of the Cultural

Revolution into a larger historical context

rather than viewing them individually as

an isolated incident.

Throughout the early 1960s, intellectuals

continued to find ways to criticize the

party, using allegory and metaphor to

write stinging critiques. Mao was at a loss

for what to do and in 1965 he declared that

there would be a new campaign against

“reactionary bourgeois ideology.” However,

the response to the campaign was weak

and Mao grew even more frustrated with

the lack of revolutionary zeal for his ideas

to create a socialist utopia in China. In

tandem with Mao’s frustration, Lin Biao

reformed the army and in a drastic move

abolished all insignia on uniforms, making

generals, officers, and low-level infantry

indistinguishable from each other. At the

same time, Mao’s wife upped her

revolutionary propaganda campaign in the

realm of theatre and arts, having cadres

perform plays and revolutionary operas

throughout the country. By 1966, she

secured her influence over the Ministry of

Culture.

Poster depicting children respecting and praising

Mao. Source: Chineseposters.net

By 1966, Mao and his supporters were

ready to launch the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution to promote his

revolutionary vision. From the beginning

the movement was divided between the

more radical Shanghai Faction, which

included Mao’s wife, and the less radical

faction of intellectuals who supported the

revolution but did not agree with some of

the methods that Jiang Qing employed.

These factional cleavages grew deeper as

disgruntled urban and educated youths

who were frustrated at the lack of jobs and

the campaigns to send them down to work

in the countryside chose sides. Students

quickly took up the revolutionary cause

and were given red armbands, declaring

them to be part of the “Red Guards”. As

the revolutionary fervour grew, the more

radical factions called for purges,

subjecting many older revolutionaries and

their families to intense criticism and

humiliation.

Propaganda during the Cultural Revolution.

Source: Chineseposters.net

Leaders of the Cultural Revolution

attacked what they called the “four olds”

of Chinese society: old customs, old habits,

old culture, and old thinking. As you can

see, these phrases were ambiguous and

open to interpretation, and the Red

Guards were able to manipulate them in

any way they wanted. There was

widespread fear and violence throughout

the country as Red Guards attacked

anyone who they decided still adhered to

the four olds or those who directly or

indirectly questioned the authority of the

Red Guards. The extent of the violence

suggests the real frustrations that the

younger generation of Chinese felt with

the problems in society. By the end of 1967,

the CCP realized that they needed to reign

in the Red Guards, who were wreaking

havoc throughout the country. They were

beginning to fight one another in factional

battles throughout the countryside. It took

the party almost a year to get them in

check.

One of the lasting legacies of the Cultural

Revolution was that it completely

fractured the education system in China.

During this time, most universities were

closed and college students became Red

Guards. They were “sent down” to the

countryside to learn from the peasants.

However, an entire generation of elites

essentially lost out on their university

education. There were many victims in the

Cultural Revolution, and the time was

definitely tumultuous. After the failures of

the Great Leap Forward and the

unhinging of youths who ran-sacked the

countryside unchecked for a few years,

Chinese people sought stability, and were

also looking to their leaders to head them

in a direction that would increase their

standard of living. By 1969, Mao’s

authority within the upper echelons of the

party was severely damaged, yet it was not

until his death in 1976 and a changing of

the guard that China would emerge from

the problems orchestrated by a small

group of Mao’s supporters.

Reopening the Doors to the West:

Nixon in China During the Cultural Revolution, China was

closed to the outside world. China was

hoping to make its own way and provide a

model for other countries to follow its

path to socialism without the help of the

Soviets or aid from the United States.

However, the Chinese leaders quickly

realized that they did not have the proper

technology or resources to carry out some

of the advanced projects, such as offshore

drilling, oil refining, and large

construction like the Three Gorges Dam.

By the end of the Cultural Revolution, the

CCP agreed to hold a meeting with then

U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1972 to

discuss transfers of technology. Some

hard-liners within the CCP were opposed

to this move, arguing that China should

focus on developing models of socialist

self-reliance. However, in the end, the

reform-minded members won; these

reformers were more in touch with the

Chinese public, which was growing

intolerable of Mao’s vision for revolution.

Mao and Nixon.

Source: White House Photo Office

Since the establishment of the PRC, China

had lobbied hard for a seat on the UN

Security Council, which was held by the

KMT government in Taiwan. By the end of

the 1960s, the PRC had enough support

from non-aligned countries, to an extent

that the United States could no longer

oppose Chinese entry, resulting in

Taiwan’s forced withdraw from the UN.

The United States was also interested in

creating a diplomatic relationship with

China. China and the United States knew

that the two countries had a common

concern, which was curbing the Soviet

Union’s monopolistic power in global

affairs. Under the Kennedy administration,

high-level diplomatic exchanges occurred

between the United States and China and

secret meetings were held in Warsaw,

Poland. In the 1970s, China became

increasingly concerned about Soviet troop

build-up along the border in Xinjiang and

asked Nixon to visit China to discuss the

matter. Henry Kissinger, who was the U.S.

Secretary of State at the time, secretly

headed to Beijing to meet with Zhou Enlai

to plan Nixon’s visit to China. Nixon’s trip

was a great success from both a diplomatic

and public relations standpoint. It

resulted in a joint communiqué from the

two nations, in which they addressed

issues involving Vietnam and the Korean

peninsula. The two governments also

discussed the status of Taiwan, which was

a crucial question since the United States

had continued to support Chiang Kai-

shek’s increasingly oppressive regime in

Taiwan. Most importantly, the two

countries agreed on scholarly and

technological exchanges and to work

towards the normalization of their

relationship. Nixon’s visit to China is

considered as one of the most important

diplomatic manoeuvres of the twentieth

century.

The Death of Mao Zedong and the

Gang of Four At the end of 1974, Mao became severely

ill and the CCP prepared for a leadership

change. Zhou Enlai, who was

orchestrating policies from behind the

scenes, was also suffering from cancer. At

a micro level, China was running a deficit

since they began to import technology

from the West. This alerted many of the

party’s “radicals,” such as Mao’s wife Jiang

Qing, who criticized reformers for bowing

to the imperialists and worshiping foreign

goods rather then concentrating on taking

care of domestic issues. By the beginning

of 1976, Zhou Enlai had died of cancer and

it was clear that Mao would soon die, too.

Mao’s inner circle worked tirelessly to

ensure that Hua Guofeng, Mao’s chosen

successor, would replace Mao after he died.

In the meantime, Deng Xiaoping and his

economists worked to fix the economy. In

an effort to consolidate his power, Hua

Guofeng purged Deng and ostracized him

from the party for the second time (Deng

was purged during the Cultural Revolution

as well). This effectively removed Deng

from power for a short period before

Mao’s death. While this political turmoil

was occurring behind the scenes, the July

1976 earthquake hit China, one of the

largest earthquakes in its history. The

death toll reached approximately 800,000.

China declined assistance for the

humanitarian crisis from the UN and had

the PLA step up to help with the rescue

efforts. This helped to improve the PLA’s

reputation, which was tarnished by the

Cultural Revolution, in the eyes of the

Chinese public. Two months after the

earthquake in September 1976, Mao died

and a week-long mourning period was

instituted.

The Gang of Four.

After Mao died, Deng quickly worked

within his extensive and expansive

political networks to root out the party

radicals who had purged him twice and

disregarded his economic advice since the

late 1950s. Deng and other high-ranking

PLA members who were ready for change

managed to convince Hua Guofeng to

have Mao’s wife and her cronies arrested

and tried for the crimes of the Cultural

Revolution. They became known

internationally as “the Gang of Four.”

Anti-Gang of Four poster.

Source: Black and White Cat

Their trial provided some closure for the

party for the disgraces of the Cultural

Revolution and in some ways provided the

necessary scapegoats to begin the process

of reconciliation. Although the most

destructive events of the Cultural

Revolution took place between the chaotic

years of 1966-1969, some scholars argue

that the Cultural Revolution was not really

over until the end of the trial of the Gang

of Four, which placed the blame squarely

on certain radical members of the party

for the events of the previous years. As

Deng worked to bring about massive

changes to the economy from behind the

scenes, Hua Guofeng continued as the

Chairman of the Central Committee of the

CCP. In the next few years, Deng would

work to push out Hua Guofeng and

implement his macro-economic vision for

a new and changing China.

Deng Xiaoping and the Four

Modernizations: A New Revolutionary

Path? Deng was a survivor of the Long March

and had been central to the party

apparatus for almost six decades. He had

survived the Pacific War, the Civil War,

the turmoil of the first years of the PRC

and the Cultural Revolution. He was an

adept political strategist and an incredible

macro-economist. After Mao’s death, he

planned his comeback quietly and

carefully. In 1977, Deng was reappointed

as the Vice-Premier of the Politburo and

controlled the CCP from behind the scenes,

although Hua remained the face of the

party. Under the surface, there were

incredible struggles over the future of the

party and the direction China should take

with regards to both foreign and domestic

policies.

By the late 1970s, the reliance on the

collective was slowly being replaced with

individual and local initiatives. These

policies, known collectively as the four

modernizations—encompassing industry,

agriculture, science and technology, and

national defense—required foreign

investment in China and training of

Chinese students overseas. This policy was

called “socialist modernization” and was

meant to bring about the changes needed

to institute a communist society more

slowly, as Marx had intended. Small-scale

entrepreneurs were closely monitored by

the state, but pilot projects allowed them

to test the waters of the free market.

Farmers were allowed to sell their

surpluses on the market, and small-scale

mom-and-pop shops opened. The

economy was still tightly controlled, with

the party keeping a firm grip on the prices

of commodities, but the groundwork had

been laid for change.

Deng Xiaoping. Source: Wiki Wargame

At the same time, the Party went about

rectifying some of the damage it had done

to intellectuals and landlord since the

anti-rightist campaigns, offering apologies

to families and those who had suffered.

This meant that as China entered a new

era, those equipped to benefit the most

from the changes to economic policies—

the elites of the previous generation—had

been pardoned by the party and were

ready to make their re-emergence on the

economic and social scene in China. In

essence, the party knew that it needed the

connections, business savvy and cultural

capital of these people in order to

implement some of the economic changes

it envisioned.

Deng Xiaoping with Jimmy Carter during his

visit to the United States.

Source: White House Photo Office

A Fifth Modernization?

People in China referred somewhat

sardonically to a “fifth modernization”—or

democracy. People had grievances that

they did not feel were being addressed by

the party. After the trial of the Gang of

Four helped to put the Cultural Revolution

behind them, regular citizens began to air

their grievances in public. In Beijing

outside of the Forbidden City, a large wall

was covered with posters and came to be

known as “the Democracy Wall” where

citizens wrote large character posters that

criticized the party and their lack of

foresight in planning the economy. This

harkened back to the May Fourth

Movement and people drew on the

symbols of this important event in Chinese

history to indicate that this was a moment

for change. The posters had an important

impact, but one in particular stood out. It

was by a man named Wei Jingsheng and

he wrote that in order for the Four

Modernizations to work, China needed to

embrace democracy where there were free

elections and people could choose their

own leaders—or a fifth modernization.

As Deng Xiaoping left for a tour of the

United States, the PLA cracked down on

the growing democracy movement in

China. By the beginning of 1979, a number

of people, including Wei Jingsheng were

arrested. Wei was tried and sentenced to

fifteen years in prison. The crackdown

essentially quelled any more dissidence

from society, and as people began to reap

the benefits of more liberal economic

policies in the 1980s, they were less likely

to complain about some of the draconian

techniques the party used to suppress the

voices of their own people. The movement

left its mark on the party and the people

and echoes of it would reverberate all the

way down to the Tiananmen protests ten

years later. The government also realized

that in order to keep the people happy,

they needed to push full speed ahead with

the four modernizations. Maybe people

would stop asking for the fifth

modernization if the economy was doing

very well?

Special Economic Zones and the

Development of China

As China embarked on a new economic

course in the late 1970s, its leaders needed

to figure out what to do about their

relationship with Taiwan. It was agreed

between the United States, Taiwan, and

the PRC that they would begin to

“normalize” their political relationships.

The PRC needed connections to wealthy

Taiwanese businessmen for investment

and bean to reach out to the KMT

government in Taipei.

Special Economic Zones in China. Source: BBC

Another challenge that the CCP faced was

how and where to institute the reforms of

the four modernizations. China was still

largely an agricultural society in the late

1970s. The CCP focused on developing and

reforming urban centers, designating a

number of special economic zones (SEZ)

throughout China. The first SEZs were

opened in southern China: Zhuhai was

just across the border from Macao,

Shenzhen was across the border from

Hong Kong (which remained part of the

British Commonwealth until 1997), and

Shantou and Xiamen were facing Taiwan

and had been treaty ports in the past. All

of these cities were along the southern

coast of Guangzhou and Fujian provinces.

These SEZs offered cheap labour and thus

low costs, as well as tax incentives for

foreign investors. Soon, foreign investors

(at first mostly Taiwanese and Japanese)

came to the mainland and the SEZs

became a manufacturing hub for the world.

As the manufacturing sector began to

grow, the government shifted its focus to

agriculture. They began to import

agricultural technology and invested in

large-scale infrastructure programs such

as irrigation system that would increase

yields and change agriculture in China

from a venture of sustenance into agri-

business. There were some ups and downs

at the beginning of the 1980s, but as the

economy gradually improved owing to the

development in the new SEZs, the

government was able to divert fiscal

resources to improve living conditions in

the countryside. People in China were

beginning to feel the benefits of the

revolution, but how socialist it was is still

questionable.

Amid all these new developments, Deng

Xiaoping consolidated his power. By the

early 1980s, Deng, with the support of the

army and the intellectuals, as well as his

protégés Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang,

had manoeuvred Hua out of power.

The One-Child Policy

By 1982, the census confirmed that the

population of China had reached a billion

people. This had a profound impact on

policymakers who were well aware that if

the population kept growing at the same

rate, there would be nothing that the

country could do to support it.

Furthermore, the growing population in

China was accompanied by gender

imbalance and the young age of the

population. At the same time, life

expectancy was rising rapidly. Sex ratios

were skewed heavily in favour of boys,

who were preferred because they were not

married out of the family. Although the

CCP had issued several laws concerning

the size of families in the 1950s, but the

famines and general turmoil in the

countryside throughout the 1950s and

1960s managed to keep birth rates low. In

general, fertility rates were around 2.2

percent in 1980, which was much lower

than those in poorer countries.

However, this was not low enough. In

1980, Hua Guofeng made a speech stating

that families should strive to have only

one child, emphasizing the importance of

family planning in China’s long-term

economic goals. Part of this strategy was

to increase the average age for men and

women to get married by a few years, and

to tell couples to wait a year or two after

marriage before having children. This

generally decreases the number of years a

woman is fertile, a method that has long

been used for population control in poor

countries. Ethnic minorities were exempt

from such policies, which generated

resentment among the Han population.

Some communities were quite strict with

the policy, enforcing sterilization of

women who had more than two children.

Other communities were more relaxed

and in some places the policy became

known as the “three strikes your own.”

Families were allowed to keep trying to

have a son, but if their first three children

were girls, then they had to stop there.

A poster encouraging people to have one child

per household. Source: Alamy

The CCP also introduced financial

penalties for people who violated the one-

child policy. In general, people who had

more than one child were made to pay a

large fine, and then had to pay for their

children to attend school and for their

medical bills (rather than a state public

school and state funded medical care).

This resulted in an urban-rural divide;

wealthier people in the cities were capable

of and willing to pay the large fines to have

more than one child, whereas people in

the countryside could not afford to do so.

Although the policy did manage to curb

the growing population, some

demographers argue that the long-range

implications of this policy are yet to be felt.

As China’s population ages, there are less

young people to take care of the elderly.

This is, of course, a serious issue that

many other countries face today, but the

scale and magnitude of the problem in

China is much grander given its size. It

will be interesting to see how China deals

with its aging population in the coming

years as the Chinese government began to

re-assess the one-child policy.

Tiananmen Square and the Crackdown on the Democracy

Movement

By the late 1980s, it was apparent that

some people were benefiting greatly from

the economic reforms, while people in the

countryside continued to toil in poverty.

The government was faced with the task of

controlling over one billion people,

regulating foreign investment, revising the

school system that had been destroyed

during the Cultural Revolution, and

rehabilitating Chinese academics and

intellectuals in ways that they could be of

service to the state. It was a daunting task,

but the government had a large

bureaucracy behind it, and the people

knew from their recent past that the

government was not afraid to suppress

any forms of dissent if needed. There were

claims of corruption among party officials

and people began to call for more

transparency. There were also calls for

more even distribution of wealth, as

people in some of the SEZs amassed great

fortunes, and for the first time ever the

China announced a trade surplus in 1982.

In 1989, tensions reached a breaking point,

and by mid-May, over one million Chinese

from all spheres of society assembled in

Tiananmen Square, demanding a dialogue

with the CCP leaders. The protesters, who

were mostly students, wanted to bring an

end to corruption and begin talks about

instituting some democratic reforms in

China. At the time, then Soviet leader

Mikhail Gorbachev was making a historic

visit to Beijing after thirty-three years of

strained relations between the Soviet

Union and China. Students filled

Tiananmen Square, some of them going

on a series of hunger strikes. The Western

media was already in China for

Gorbachev’s visit and many of the

reporters quickly began to cover the

protests in Tiananmen, bringing

international attention to the movement.

Tiananmen Square, Beijing. Source: Cross Map

The Chinese government responded to the

protests by declaring martial law but the

people of Beijing remained defiant,

blocking the entrance of the army into the

city. Finally, on June 3, 1989, hard-liners

in the CCP ordered that tanks and riot

police be sent in to smash through the

crowds. Many people were killed, and

ringleaders of the demonstrations were

rounded up and jailed. In the aftermath,

Deng Xiaoping offered thanks to those in

the PLA, whom he said had fought bravely

to protect their nation. This comment

solidified in the minds of the Chinese

people that Deng fully supported the

government crackdown on Tiananmen,

and in fact, might have ordered it

personally.

Tanks in Beijing. Source: Politics in Spires

In the end, many dissidents were jailed,

protesters were killed, and the party lost

its legitimacy. Soon after, Deng, a

revolutionary from the Long March,

stepped down and ushered in a new era of

Chinese politics under Jiang Zemin. It was

the first time that a leader in China since

the 1940s had not been part of the

revolutionary struggle or the Long March,

but was a product of it. The changes that

China underwent in the 1990s and 2000s

were sweeping, and the shape of the

revolution continued to change as China

adapted to its new place in Asia. However,

the echoes of Tiananmen are still felt in

China, and people know that their leaders

are capable and willing to suppress

opposition movements. For the meantime,

it seems that if the country continues to

prosper economically, the fifth

modernization will wait, and the Chinese

Revolution under the Chinese Communist

Party continues, albeit in a different form.

Useful Websites China Overview from the World Bank http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview Information about the Cultural Revolution http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/cultural_revolution.htm University of Washington website about the Cultural Revolution http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph/9wenge.htm Propaganda Posters from the Cultural Revolution http://chineseposters.net/themes/cultural-revolution-campaigns.php Three-page downloadable PDF from Stanford about the Cultural Revolution http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/115/CRintro.pdf BBC Website about the Cultural Revolution http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/cult.htm Documentary on YouTube about the Cultural Revolution http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nPuvFXv8Gos

New Yorker article about Lei Feng http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2013/03/fact-checking-a-chinese-hero.html Remembering Nixon in China—Forty Years Later. Article from the NY Times with good videos http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/recalling-nixon-in-china-40-years-later/?_r=0 Information from the US Government about Nixon’s Visit to China http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/modern/jb_modern_nixchina_1.html Recordings and Documents from the Nixon Library about his trip to China http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/tapeexcerpts/chinatapes.php Postings from the National Security Archive about Nixon’s Trip to China http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/press.htm National Archives Teaching Module about Nixon in China

http://docsteach.org/activities/13326/detail PBS website about Nixon in China http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/sfeature/nixon.html University of Washington website about the Four Modernizations http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph/9confour.htm Economic development in China after Mao—presented by Economics professor in the UC system http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/china2.htm Quick notes about China under Deng Xiaoping http://ibguides.com/history/notes/china-under-deng-xiaoping-economic-policies-and-the-four-modernizations

Short online article about the Four Modernizations http://www.chaos.umd.edu/history/prc4.html Modern Chinese Literature resources—online bibliography http://mclc.osu.edu/ Google LIFE magazine image search http://images.google.com/hosted/life Online primary sources from Fordham University http://www.fordham.edu/HALSALL/eastasia/eastasiasbook.asp#China Since World War II Maps of China—all kinds of political and social maps from the UT collections http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/china.html Princeton University hosts a nice explaination about the Gang of Four http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Gang_of_Four.html Asia for Educators—the Fifth Modernization http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/wei_jingsheng_fifth_modernization.pdf Maps of China’s Special Economic Zones http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5en/conc5en/China_SEZ.html Princeton hosts a short essay about China’s Special Economic Zones http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Special_Economic_Zone.html Article about governing China using the model from the Special Economic zones from the Economist

http://www.economist.com/node/21540285 Article from the World Bank about China’s Special Economic Zones http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/china-s-special-economic-zones-and-industrial-clusters-success-and-challenges

History Channel “On this Day” about Tiananmen Square in 1989 http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/tiananmen-square-massacre-takes-place National Security Archives articles hosted by George Washington University about Tiananmen Square and what the United States knew about it. http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/ BBC “On This Day” June 4, 1989—video and history of Tiananmen Square Incident http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/4/newsid_2496000/2496277.stm Atlantic article “Tiananmen Square, Then and Now” by Alan Taylor—photo journal essay http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2012/06/tiananmen-square-then-and-now/100311/

Suggestions for Further Reading

Ashiwa Yoshiko and David L. Wank. Making

Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

Baranovitch, Nimrod. “Others No More: The

Changing Representation of Non-Han Peoples in Chinese History Textbooks, 1951-2003.” The Journal of Asian Studies 69.1 (February 2010): 85-122.

Baum, Richard. Prelude to Revolution: Mao,

the Party and the Peasant Question, 1962-66. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.

Belléer-Hann, Ildiko. Community matters in

Xinjiang, 1880-1949: towards a historical anthropology of the Uyghur. Boston: Brill, 2008.

Bennett, Gordon. Yundong: Mass Campaigns

in Chinese Communist Leadership. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California Press, 1976.

Bianco, Lucien. Origins of the Chinese

Revolution, 1915-1949. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Bianco, Lucien. Peasants without the Party:

Grass-Root Movements in Twentieth- Century China. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001. Bianco, Lucien. Rural Disturbances on the

Eve of the Chinese Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Brown, Jeremy and Paul G. Pickowicz.

Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Brugger, Bill, and David Kelly. Quelling the

People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Chan Anita, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan

Unger. Chen Village Under Mao and Deng. Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1992.

Chan, Alfred L. Mao’s Crusade: Politics and

Policy Implementation in China’s Great Leap Forward. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Chan, Anita. Children of Mao: personality

development and political activism in the Red Guard generation. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985.

Chang, Liu. “Making Revolution in Jiangnan."

Modern China 29 (January 2003): 3-37. Cheek, Timothy, et al. New Perspectives on

State Socialism in China. London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.

Chen Yung-fa. Making Revolution The

Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

Chong, Woei-lien, ed. China’s Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarritives. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.

Clayton, Cathryn H. Sovereignty at the Edge: Macau and the Question of Chinessness. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Cohen, Paul. “The 1949 Divide in Chinese

History,” in Jeffrey Wasserstrom (ed.) Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Cohen, Paul A. Discovering History in China:

American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

Cohen, Paul. “The Post-Mao Reforms in

Historical Perspective.” Journal of Asian Studies 47 (1988): 518-540.

Dahpon, David Ho. “To Protect and Preserve:

Resisting the Destroy the Four Olds Campaign, 1966-1967,” in The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.

David Apter and Tony Saich. Revolutionary

discourse in Mao's Republic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Dryer, June Teufel. “China’s Minority

Nationalities in the Cultural Revolution.” China Quarterly 35 (1985): 96-109.

Esherick, Joseph. “Ten Theses on the Chinese

Revolution.” Modern China 21 (1995): 45-76.

Esherick, Joseph, Paul Pickowicz, and

Andrew G. Walder. “The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History: An Introduction.” In The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

Fewsmith, Joseph. China since Tiananmen:

The Politics of Transition, Cambridge Modern China Series. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Fitzgerald, John. Awakening China: Politics,

Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.

Friedman, Edward, Paul Pickowicz, and Mark Selden. Chinese Village, Socialist State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

Fung, Edmund S.K. “Nationalism and

Modernity: The Politics of Cultural Conservatism in Republican China.” Modern Asian Studies 43 (May 2009): 777-819.

Gladney, Dru C. Muslim Chinese: Ethnic

Nationalism in the People’s Republic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Goldman, Merle and Andrew Gordon.

Historical Perspectives on Contemporary East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Greenhalgh, Susan. Cultivating Global

Citizens: Population in the Rise of China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Harrison, Henrietta. China, Inventing the

Nation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Hayhoe, Ruth. China's Universities, 1895-

1995: A Century of Cultural Conflict. New York: Garland, 1996.

Hershatter, Gail. Remapping China: Fissures

in Historical Terrain. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.

Honig, Emily. Creating Chinese Ethnicity:

Subei People in Shanghai, 1850-1980. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

Huang Shaorong. To Rebel is Justified:

Rhetorical Study of China’s Cultural Revolution Movement. Lanham: University Press of America, 1996.

Jager, Shelia Miyoshi and Rana Mitter, eds. Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Karl, Rebecca. Staging the World: The

Invention of China in Modern World Making. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Lary, Diana, ed. The Chinese State at the

Borders. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004.

Li Huaiyin. Village China under socialism and reform: a micro-history, 1948-2008. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

MacFarquhar, Roderick and Michael

Schoenhals. Mao’s Last Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.

MacFarquhar, Roderick. The Origins of the

Cultural Revolution 1: Contradictions among the People, 1956-1957. London: Oxford University Press, 1974.

MacFarquhar, Roderick. The Origins of the

Cultural Revolution 2: The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1960. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

MacFarquhar, Roderick. The Origins of the

Cultural Revolution 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Mackerras, Colin. China’s Minorities:

Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Meisner, Maurice J. Mao's China and After: A

History of the People's Republic. 3rd ed. New York, NY: Free Press, 1999.

Mitter, Rana. A Bitter Revolution: China’s

Struggle with the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Nedostup, Rebecca. Superstitious Regimes:

Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Perry, Elizabeth J. Patrolling the Revolution:

Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

Perry, Elizabeth. “Reclaiming the Chinese

Revolution.” Journal of Asian Studies 67 (November 2008): 1147-1164.

Saich, Tony and Hans van de Ven. New

Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

Schoenhals, Michael. China's Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party, An East Gate Reader. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.

Schoenhals, Michael. Doing Things with

Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California Press, 1992.

Schoppa, Keith. Revolution and Its Past:

Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002.

Shapiro, Judith. Mao's War Against Nature:

Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Solomon, Richard. Mao’s Revolution and the

Chinese Political Culture. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan Press, 1998.

Spence, Jonathan D. The Gate of Heavenly

Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895-1980. New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1982.

Thøgersen, Stig. A County of Culture:

Twentieth-Century China Seen from the Village Schools of Zouping, Shandong. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002.

Tu, Wei-ming, ed. The Living Tree: The

Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.

Walder, Andrew G. Fractured Rebellion: The

Beijing Red Guard Movement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009

Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. "Toward a Social

History of the Chinese Revolution: A Review, Part Ii: The State of the Field." Social History 17 (1992): 290-317.

Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. Putting 1989 in

Historical Perspective: Pitfalls and Possibilities, Working Papers in Asian/Pacific Studies; 93-03. Durham: Asian/Pacific Studies Institute, Duke University Press, 1993.

Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.

Wong, R. Bin, China Transformed: Historical

Change and the Limits of European Experience. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

Yan Yunxiang. Private Life under Socialism:

Love, Intimacy, and Family Change in a Chinese Village, 1949-1999. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Yeh, Wen-Hsin. Provincial Passages: Culture,

Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.