The Culture of Indian Politics: A Stocli Talring

ASHIS NANDY

IN India, where the immutability of social institutions is considered a major feature of the system, the psychocultural aspects of contemporary politics become im-

portant for at least one reason: while drawing sustenance from these traditional forces, the new politics is also expected to alter them and introduce the society to the modernizing process. This means that it is not just the style of politics as a re- flection of the community life-style which becomes the major subject of interest. Rather it is how the people's historical experiences of politics and the links which these experiences have had with modal identities can be hitched to the needs of new political forms, how the primordial identities can be made to yield a culturally viable national political style, and how this new style on its part can be integrated within the community life-style as a legitimate force of change. Political culture in such a case is mainly the evolving style of meeting a historical challenge.

This perspective has eluded most of those who have tried to relate the manners of Indian politics to other aspects of Indian life. The earlier interpreters had in mind, due to the historical realities they were exposed to, the image of a static society subjected to an alien government which held a laissez-faire attitude to all social practices and a handful of social reformers fighting a rear-guard action for limited gains.' Their conceptual tools consequently have become inadequate for the analy- sis of a different political situation-a society receiving continuous political inputs and trying to maintain its identity in the face of this. More recently, others have tried to argue away cultural and psychological forces as independent variables determining political behavior. They have seen Indian political development as a sequence of modern economic forms vanquishing more traditional structures of behavior and ideas to establish the supremacy of a historically superior order.2 Alternatively, these "reflection theorists" have taken a cross-sectional view of politics and have tried to relate it to Hindu culture or personality on a one-to-one basis." Between them, such economic and psychocultural historicists have made political culture a static concept with deterministic overtones. Undoubtedly, both these approaches provide impor- tant clues to the functioning of the Indian political system. But they have hindered the growth of a truly cross-disciplinary perspective to the subject. As a result, re-serach in the area has remained fragmented and noncumulative.

It is possible, however, to interpret the political process in India as a continuing

Professor Nandy is at the Centre for the Study Weber in T h e Religion of India: The Sociology of of Developing Societies, Delhi, India. Hinduism, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958).

The author is grateful to D. L. Sheth and Rajni For an informative but blinkered work, see Kothari whose reactions have structured this paper A. R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nation- to a great extent. alism, (Bombay: Popular, 1959).

= T h e most successful of these is perhaps Max A recent example is P. Spratt, Hindu Culture and Personality, (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1966).

58 ASHIS N A N D Y

attempt to reconcile older categories of thought and social character to the demands of nation-building and political culture as a complex of continuities in the style of response to the changing relationship between society and politics. In this overview I propose to employ such a definition and to use the insights of a number of disparate studies to define the psychocultural forces that have been involved in the search for national identity in India. I shall do so without assuming an irreversible one-way relationship between culture and politics as independent and dependent variables, and by trying to see both as elements in the process of historical change in India.

When the first impact of the raj started bringing parts of an apolitical social order within the compass of politics toward the end of the eighteenth century, it initiated the first stage of India's politicization. This stage had a few basic features. First, it favored the upper-caste social leadership in governmental appointments, professions, and business. At that stage, their ancient caste skills in symbol manipulation helped them to reconcile work, world view, and personality by reinterpreting traditions- which was their prerogative as well as specialization-and by ascribing meaning to the exogenous bureaucratic, political, and judicial forms-in which they had had some experience in the earlier Muslim period. Also,. the colonial legal system was built on the Dharmashastra laws of twice-born castes and its point of reference in social matters was the brahminic culture. Both favored upper-caste elements. Though their domination of trade and commerce ended by the 1840's (by which time busi- ness had become more a matter of ~ersonal risk-taking, entrepreneurial acumen, and business ethics, and less a product of political participation and government pa- tronage), their domination of politics continued till about 1920 and that of the professions and bureaucracy till almost recently. This monopoly in modern sector of groups which represented the core of brahminic orthodoxy precipated a long crisis of identity in the political elite^.^ Torn between new means of livelihood and a secular incentive system, on the one hand, and older concepts of goodness and rightness, on the other, they experienced a sharp dissociation between their historical self concept and the changing realities of the external world. Unable to find support immediately from a new integrated identity in response to conflicting norms, de- sires and allegiences, they were forced to engage in makeshift compartmentaliza- tions. This was not difficult in an agglomerative culture which encouraged accretion of new cultural elements, rather than substitution of the old. For a time at least, the strategy took away from their sense of crisis its more debilitating and painful edges. These developments brought within politics the purer greater sanskritic norms by giving salience to the political identity forged by the traditional elites, their value conflicts, and their style of political adaptation. Secondly, limited communications among elites from different regional centers and alienation from the masses en-sconced in their folk cultures-ensured by poor literacy on one side, English

4 For an interpretation which generalizes the con- mountcy and Indian Rennaissance, Part 11, (Bom-flict of identity in this group to the national scene, bay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1961); and B. B. see L. W. Pye, "The Political Cultures of India Mishra, lndian Middle Classes, (London: Oxford and China," in R. M. Maru and Rajni Kothari University, 1961). Of the Syncretist culture of the (ed.), China and India: Contrasts in Development, babus, perhaps the best description is in Sivanath forthcoming book. For two historical accounts of Shastri, Ramtamu Lahiri 0 Tatkalin Banga Samaj the period, see R. C. Majumdar, British Para- ( ~ g o g ) , (Calcutta: New Age, 1957).

THE C U L T U R E O F INDIAN POLITICS

education on the other, and orthodox attitudes to hierarchy on both-made these twice-born political mandarins a collection of small, scattered groups. Within each of these groups relationships became intimate and face-to-face; politicians of different hues maintained personal links with administrators, intellectuals, and creative social thinkers; and often these politicians held elite positions in nonpolitical sectors also. Consequently, ideological differences, carried into face-to-face groups, had to be tolerated and rationalized, new "codes" of primary group politics had to be developed, and personal political success had to be defined in essentially noncompetitive terms. Lastly, given the low levels of participation, inter-regional hostilities, and unconcern with national issues or goals, this political awareness was highly pro-government. The attitude was authenticated by the British, whose ruling culture was still feudal, assimilationistic, socially noninterventionist, and commercially rather than politically motivated. They treated the Indian elite with some respect and friendliness and created the image of a political authority which was benevolent and impartial. All this ensured that, to some extent at least, the crisis of identity could be solved in favor of modernity. Cross-validating psychosocial, economic, and political forces made changes in life style and integration of new cultural elements easier.

A more widespread internalization of Western norms started the second stage in the middle of the nineteenth century. This took the crisis of identity to a different level. As values began changing in the exposed sectors of the community, individuals began judging themselves in terms of their newly acquired standards and found themselves wanting. This deeper level personality crisis split the elites into two clear groups: the modernists and the restorationists. Both were defensive about their Indianness, but each chose to cope with their anxieties in a distinctive way. The for- mer sought national salvation in total Westernization, the latter in revivalism. The first movement was represented by groups such as the Young Bengal radicals, the Brahmo Samaj and its splinters, British India Association and early Indian National Congress, and by symbol manipulators like Madhusudan Dutt, Ranade, R. C. Dutt, and Naoroji. Their style was a mixture of brahminism and Western utilitarianism. The mouthpieces of the second movement were groups like Arya Samaj and Ramakrishna Mission, and individuals like Bankim Chandra Chatterji, Dayananda Saraswati, Vivekananda, Aurobindo, and Tilak. Between them they offered the small but growing middle classes two models of social change and two collective identities. However, as the first group retained its links with the reformism of the first phase-and was in some ways, its offshoot-and as the era ended up by favoring aggressive exclusivism, the second group remains more typical of this phase. This group grew out of the cornered traditionalists of the first phase. With increasing participation and access to new communications media, which had been used so effectively for reform in the earlier generations, they could now establish a hegemony in the political sphere. Their style gave salience to the Kshatriya identification and world image, and deemphasized the syncretic Upanishadic imageries which had till then dominated the political idiom. It would however be wrong to explain this style as merely an angry reaction to growing British exclusivism. In a deep sense, it was also colored by the British evaluation of the Kshatriyas as the true Indians and the feudal rulers as the natural leaders of the masses. The British antipathy toward the anglicized, city-bred, effeminate babus was accepted almost fully by the restora-

ASHIS NANDY

tionists.' It is this rejection of a part of themselves in both the groups which sought expression in their angry tone and defensive ideological closure.

Things started changing again in the Gandhian era beginning from the 1920's. This brought both the strands of consciousness within a single political movement. The factional structure of the new Congress included the representatives of both the exclusivists and the syncretists and these insiders gradually stole the thunder of their unorganized, elitist, ideological cousins outside the Congress movement. The leader- ship of the nationalist movement continued, of course, to lie at first with the upper castes. They were helped in this by their education, exposure to Western norms of nationalism, better skills in handling the available means of communication, and prestige in both modern and traditional sectors. Also useful were their long experi- ence in leading other castes in terms of traditional rules of the game, their ability to forge ingroup solidarity on the basis of their Sanskritic identity, and their hostility to the British for discriminating against Indians in exactly those sectors where the modernist upper castes specialized. But the attempts to mobilize large-scale support and to bridge the gaps between modernism and revivalism unleashed other forces. More traditional symbols had now to be invoked, traditional groupings had to be recognized and bargained with, the Western concept of nationalism had to be ortho- genetically transformed, and traditions had to be reinterpreted so that they could be made palatable to the modernists participating in the movement and providing leadership. This rendered marginal the babu politics of yester years, which now went on the defensive as ~olitical liberalism of the Gokhale and Surendranath Banerji variety, while the extremist style was transformed into an adventurist one, trying to change the fate of the country through armed means. T o the traditional upper strata of the society and to the secular modernists, the mobilizational politics of the Gandhian type seemed ideologically impure, self-seeking demagogy or Mep- histtophelean bargaining and politicians increasingly seemed crude ruthless ruralities, given to vulgar mass politics and power seeking.

This process has continued beyond independence in 1947 in the fourth phase of India's political development. There is of course now less necessity to "sell" participa- tion to anyone or to make politics the pure pursuit of a cause. Conformity can now be demanded from actors and a price set for political rewards. This has brought into the center of political activity the influence of the peripheral groups which had been mobilized by the nationalist movement and, later on, by adult franchise. Primordial

5For a general account of this period, see examples of internalization of Western image of Majumdar, op. cit, The last phase of the era has the babus, and the resulting brutal self denigration, been described by Haridas and Uma Mukherji, in nationalist writers are Bankim Chandra Chatterji, India's Fight for Freedom or the Swadeshi Move- "Babu," (1873) in Granlhabali, Vol. I, (Calcutta: ment , (Calcutta: Firma K . L. Mukhopadhaya, Sahitya Parishad, 1958); and Sarat Chandra Chat- 1958); and A. Tripathi, T h e Extremist Challenge, terji, Sreekanta, Part I (1917), (Calcutta: G. Chat-(Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1967). On the vary- terji, 1940). For examples of the same self criticisms ing British response to different social groups in ending in an aggressive syncretist stance see Madhu India see L. I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, Sudan Dutt, "Ekei ki Bole Sabhyata," (1860) and Modernity of Tradition, (Chicago: University of "Buro Saliker Gharhe Ro," (1860) in Rarhanabali, Chicago, 1967), Part 2. The Rudolphs also in- (Calcutta: Sahitya Sangsad, 1967), and Shastri, directly deal with some of the psychosocial forces op. n't., passim. which helped initiate the Gandhian phase. Two

THE CULTURE O F INDIAN POLITICS

solidarities and traditional hierarchies have been increasingly challenged by caste-based bargaining and competition within and between parties; politics has become de-ideologized, non-brahminic, "crude," organization-oriented mass politics; babu politics has been given its coup-de-grace and intellectuals have been depoliticized and rendered politically impotent. Extremist politics has also retreated into the background in this phase and has been gasping for breath as the marginal politics of revivalism and religious authoritarianism. More recently, even the "saintly" pol- itics of Gandhian times has been rendered marginal and its major expositors have become isolated messiahs whose apolitical appeal is no longer related to their political importance.'

It is against such a rough periodization that I shall now discuss the major thematic focii of Indian politics at which modernizing forces have been interacting with the older society. I shall try to show how each of the so-called cultural themes in Indian politics has served, and has been utilized for, different purposes as political develop- ment has proceeded through these four stages. In the process I also hope to show how this history leaves its marks on the contemporary culture of Indian politics as four strains of political adaptation.

The nucleus of the culture of Indian politics is said to be the pervasive tendency to ignore history and the process of time-a tendency which is presumed to derive its sanction from the value of ~ont inui ty.~ To many modernists in India, this aspect of Indian culture has seemed the least tolerable personally and the greatest obstacle to change socially; some of them even made their quasi-obsessive concern with time a major personal symb01.~ And yet, all traditional societies probably have strong resistances to accepting a concept of time which glorifies the manipulable future or stresses the here and now? The inadequate human control over the means of livelihood and the perceived fickleness of a nonmaneuverable nature in such so-cieties demand a certain cynical suspicion of anything which promises future frui- tion against planned inputs or which glorifies human control over the process of history. In fact, the anxious awareness that most of the worldly things, especially those which pretend to permanance, are only ephemeral is perhaps ego-defensively handled by the emphasis on interminance and on the "truly" permanent. Thus we find that Indian orthodoxy sanctifies the concept of a cyclical time where the pres- ent, past, and future blend into a static timeless absolute and where the progress of

6The third and fourth stages and idioms they Dhirendra Narayan, "Indian National Character in have generated have been studied in great detail. the Twentieth Century," The Annals of American Two papers which deal specifically with political Academy of Political and Social Science, March culture are W. H. Morris-Jones, "Behaviour and 1967, 370, pp. 124-132, particularly p. 130. Idea in Political India," R. N. Spann (ed.), Con- 8Two obvious examples of heightened and al-stitutionalism in India, (Bombay: Asia, 1963) pp. most obsessive consciousness of time are Rammohun 74-91; and Myron Weiner, "India: Two Political Roy and his personal collection of about 150 Cultures," in L. W. Pye and S. Verba (ed.), clocks and Ghandhi and his famous watch. A Political Culture and Political Development, (Prince- popular nationalist myth tells how Surendranath ton: Princeton University, 1965) pp. 199-244. Bannerji once threw away his slightly slow-running

7 S. J. Samartha, The Hindu View of his His- watch because he was late for a public meeting. tory: Classical and Modern, (Bangalore: Christian 9 See Florence R. Kluckhohn, "Dominant and Institute for the Study of Religion and Society, Variant Value Orientations," C. Kluckhohn, H. A. 1959); see brief reviews in W. Rowe, Values, Murray and D. M. Schneider (ed.), Personality in Ideology and Behaviour of Emerging Indian Elites, Nature, Society and Culture, (New York: Knopf, unpublished monograph, 1964, p. 12; and in 1953) PP. 342-357.

ASHIS NANDY

enlightenment or material well being seem to bear no direct relationship to the pro- gression in time. The theme also seems to authenticate the psychodynamically inter- related modal traits of resignation, submissiveness, and passivity, and-if literary reflections are to be trusted-the fatalist acceptance of events and repetitious experi- ences.1°

Naturally, the theme was not conspicuous in the first phase of politicization. T o the this-worldly babus, often brought into politics by sheer greed, neither trans-migration of soul nor renunciation could be of immediate relevance as political sym- bols. When, however, in the mid-nineteenth century the sense of national humilia- tion started growing in certain politically sensitized sectors, it came to be more and more exploited by the modernizers seeking a means of protecting national self es-teem. By assigning some amount of inevitability to British rule, by building toler- ance on a fatalistic belief that the alien government would ultimately have to give way due to the inexorable logic of destiny, and by emphasising the passive accept- ance of history at a time when active intervention was almost impossible, they helped these exposed groups to participate in the modern sector without inhibitory anxiety?'

Since the ~gzo's, this cultural strain has legitimized the attempts to integrate different religious communities, first, within a single nationalist movement and, then, within a nation-state-tolerance toward other belief groups being a correlate of the tendency to undervalue history.12 While doing so, it has also perhaps encouraged unconcern with worldly suffering and postponed any explosive increase in consump- tion demands. Both are helpful to large-scale planned development through contain- ment of consumption.13 They suggest, firstly, that a style of mobilization which stresses personal ambitions, hopes, and achievement-concerns as the goals of eco-nomic development cannot be effective for many in the community. Secondly, they also seem to imply that implementation, so far as it connotes a concern with the here and now, is likely to remain a matter of unconcern in Indian public life for some time to come. T o an extent these attitudes are validated by the stoicism and patience of India's underprivileged (as character traits as well as stereotypes), by their unconcern with both the process of history and the making of history, and by

O n the traits see G. M. Carstairs, The Twice- kananda, Modern India, (Almora: Advaita Ashram, born, (Bloomington: Indiana, 1g57), passim, par- 1913). See also more recent attempts in S. Radha- ticularly, pp. 137-169; W . S. Taylor, "Basic Per- krishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thotight, sonality in Orthodox Hindu Culture Patterns," (London: Oxford University, 1940) ; K . M. Panik- Iournal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 43 kar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads, (Bombay: Asia, (1948) pp. 3-12. T h e more intuitive and impres- 1955). sionistic approaches are provided by W . S. l2D. E . Smith, India as a Secular State, (Prince- Maughum, The Summing Up, ( N e w York: Double- ton: Princeton University, 1963) p. 40. day, 1943); N . C. Chaudhuri, Autobiography of 13See K. W . Kapp, Hindu Culture, Economic an Unknown Indian, (London: Macmillan, 1951) ; Development and Economic Planning, ( N e w York: T. S. Eliot, "Burnt Norton," Pour Quartets, (Lon- Asia, 1 9 6 3 ) ~ for an interesting discussion o f the don: Faber and Faber, 1959) p. 13; J . B. Priestly, relationship between concepts of cyclical time to Man and Time, (London: Aldus, 1964) pp. 171- resistence to economic growth. See also J . Goheen,

173. M. N . Srinivas, D . G. Karve and M. Singer, 11Some examples drawn from different periods "India's Cultural Values and Economic Develop-

o f history are: Rammohun Roy, English Works, ment: A Discussion," Economic Development and Vols. 1-7, particularly Vol . 2 ; (Calcutta: Sadharon Cultural Change, 7 (1958) pp. 1-22, which deals Brahrno Samaj, 1947); Bankim Chandra Chatterji, with the problem of relating such themes to eco-op. cit., Vols. I and 2, particularly, the novel nomic growth in general. Anandamath (1876-1878), Vol. I ; Swami Vive-

T H E CULTURE OF INDIAN POLITICS 63

the legitimization of certain forms of political alienation and apathy by reference to karma or performance in previous births. Later, we shall return to this point.

A t the same time, however, during the third and especially the fourth stage, this world image has been increasingly negated by political mobilization and competition on the basis of parochial groupings such as caste. Though apparently caste loyalties are being strengthened by this, the concept of fixed caste-specific status is being con- tinuously challenged by a system which allows a caste the chance of building its fate on its ingroup solidarity, organizational and coalition-building capabilities. This by partly invalidating the fatalist rationale underlying traditional hierarchies may be loosening the belief in cyclical time and karma. Resignation and apathy in some are in consequence clashing with hope and self-confidence, generating tension and per- haps some amount of anomia. These attempts to change the "fated" actively through self-created roles are reflected in the self-induced politicization of previously power- deprived parochial groups, in disintegrative political behavior of the more sensitized among them (as a reaction to earlier power-deprivation), and in the adaptive as well as anomic responses to social mobilization and competition in the traditional elites threatened by status deprivation and political displacement."

Belief in karma and timelessness also gives Indian subjectivity its resilience. The notorious Indian spiritualism supposedly seeks expression in rejection and reifica- tion of reality, premature generalization, a global and "besetting passion for meta- physics and philosophising," and in the "complete abstraction of time, history and person." The concepts of maya (illusion) and anasakti (the consequent detach-ment)15 entered politics in the early stages as symbols providing psychological re- wards to the prosperous gentlemen-politicians voluntarily participating in active public life. They became more important when, toward the end of the second phase, participation also came to mean a rather unpleasant form of defiance of au-thorities. But the prepolitical antimaterialism also had persisted. The ambivalence was expressed in self-esteem builders like Bankim Chandra Chatterji, Vivekananda, and Tilak who, while invoking these symbols, also tried to move away from their world-denying subjectivist connotations. With the growth of modern political in- stitutions and movements, presuming a greater acceptance of competitiveness, per- sonal ambition and organizational capabilities, this theme became somewhat anach- ronistic for political functionaries in the third stage. The Gandhian renunciation, its later-day derivative, handled this by making the saintly style a criterion of charisma in mass politics.16 By attaching antimaterialist self-denial to denial of the tendency

1 4 Some aspects of these attempts to alter tra- Western terms, see H. Zimmer, Philosophies of ditional status and the conflicts associated with these India, (London: Pantheon, 1951); see also A. attempts have been analysed by M. N. Srinivas, Schweitzer, lndian Thought and its Development, Caste i n Modern India and Other Essays, (Bombay: (New York: Beacon, 1959). Brief introductions Asia, 1962); L. I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Ru- are provided by R. N. Dandekar, "Brahmanism," dolph, "The Political Role of India's Caste Asso- W. T. de Bary et al. (ed.), Sources of lndian ciations," Pacific Affairs, 33 (1960) pp. 1-22; see Tradition, (New York: Columbia University, 1958) the series of studies in Rajni Kothari (ed.), Caste pp. 1-36; and R. E. Hume, T h e Thirteen Principal i n lndian Politics, (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, Upanishads, (London: Oxford, 1958) pp. 32-42, 1970); for another indirect reference to this prob- 52-57. lem in the context of the emerging elites, see Mar- 16W. H. Morris-Jones, op. cit.; D. M. Dutta, garet Cormack, She W h o Rides a Peacock: lndian "Political, Legal and Economic Thought in Indian Students and Social Change, (New York: Frederick Perspective," C. A. Moore (ed.), Philosophy and A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 18-19. Culture, East and West. (Honolulu: University of

1 5 For detailed analyses of these Concepts in Hawaii) pp. 569-593.

64 ASHIS NANDY

to seek "safety" in political passivity and withdrawal, it introduced the concepts of active pacifism and directed asceticism. While overtly compatible with traditional norms, these actually emphasized intervention in history and justified the renuncia- tion of the profits of the colonial system.

These contradictions have not fully dissolved. While the brahminic tradition cannot sometimes conceive of competition for material gains as a legitimate feature of the polity, some acceptance of "self-seeking" or personally ambitious political leaders, political hard-headedness, bargaining, and organizational shrewdness are required by today's politics. Fortunately, sacred texts can be interpreted in a variety of ways. And this built-in mechanism to neutralize their inevitable prophets of asceti- cism is often used by historical societies to solve their more immediate day to day problems. In modern India such reinterpretations are evident in the new self-image and ideologies which primoridal groups entering the modern sector have been de- veloping, to justify their status-seeking through their newly acquired political roles. Caste histories are being rewritten, new meaning is being given to certain occupa- tions, and claims to new community status are being advanced on the basis of polit- ical or economic power. This wider search for a new shared identity implicitly denies the supremacy of a supra-individual ahistorical spiritual reality. Interestingly, sup- port for these changes has often come from the reinterpretation of the same an- cient texts used earlier for justifying anti-materialism and from resurrected ac-counts of commercial involvement, entrepreneurial risk-taking and business acumen of earlier generations. These interpretations themselves remain as important a datum as the times and people they describe.17 They show that Indian traditions could sometimes be used to legitimize this-worldliness and to help the individual to inter- nalize a new reward-punishment system through ideological adjustments.

Transcendentalism in India is also associated with a concern for monistic unity which denies the difference between the self and the nonself, the alive and the dead, and the active and the passive. In the greater Sanskritic culture, this is expressed in the living belief that the individual is one with everything and that reality is ultimately unitary. The concept thus helped the culture to underplay individual personality not by superceding it, but by subsuming it under the awareness of a "collective, im- personal and timeless ab~olute."'~ Traditionally, this attempt to transcend dvandva or opposition legitimized judicial, legislative, and bureaucratic decisions which sup- ported reconciliation and nonalignment. Traditionally too, the strongest sense of Indian unity and originality and the tolerance of evolution and dissent were rooted herein.'' Advaita Ashram, no date). This is reflected in reinterpretation as a part of historical adaptation; social interpretation too, see Goheen et al., op. cit., also J. Elders, "Industrialism in Hindu Society," and the response to it in D. Dasgupta, Economic Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1959. Development and Cultural Change, 13 (1964) pp. Reincourt, op. cit., p. 9 ; see also R. N.

17 TWO examples of authoritative attempts at re- Dandekar, Role of Man in Hinduism, (New York: interpretation are Shri Aurobindo, T h e Life Divine, Ronald, 1953); and Dutta, op. cif., pp. 574-575. (Pondycheri: Shri Aurobindo Ashram, 1943); For a more extended discussion of the textual basis Swami Vivekananda, Prachya 0 Praschatya (1900- of the concept see Hume, op. cit., pp. 9-69. ~ g o z ) , (Almora: Advaita Ashram, no date) 100- 1°G. Murphy, In the Minds of Men: T h e Study 102. Also Panikkar, op. cit. and also Dutta, op, cit. o f Human Behauiour and Social Tensions i n India, see my "Defiance and Conformity in Science: The (New York: Basic Books, 1953) pp. 44, 268; Identity of Jagadis Chandra Base," forthcoming M. R. Anand, Is There An Indian Culture, (Bom-monograph, for a discussion of the process of bay: Asia, 1963), p. 80; F. Carnell, "Political Ideas

THE CULTURE OF INDIAN POLITICS 65

It is through this linkage that the theme became important in the first phase of politicization. Firstly, the high castes exploited the sanctity attaching to the idea of unity of knowledge to learn exogenous symbol manipulation skills and to deliberately expose themselves to a new culture. Secondly, the intellectuals who then dominated politics equated brahminic scholarship with the exposition of a monistic world image. They were then the only interpreters of the changing world to the laity and the most consistent opponent of defensive responses, and monism was their main means of le- gitimizing "assimilative" politics and reinterpretation of traditions. As the major cultural support for disjunctive innovations, it allowed nonconformism in the po- litical participants and resuscitated the community usage of exploiting commentaries and elaborations as the preferred style of expression of dissent. Understandably, most Indian modernizers preached monistic synthetism, and some of them were keen on reactivating Upanishadic monism as the core of a modern Indian univer~al ism.~~ Also, both the belief that differences somehow represent aspects of the same ul- timate reality and the rejection of Cartesian dichotomies between the good and the evil and the right and the wrong allowed for ideological flexibility, secular integra- tion of parochial groups, and more efficient faction management in colonial poli- tics. For a time at least, the pliability of Indian political processes, and their ability to absorb alien ideas or forms as well as a variety of objective or subjective group demands from within, derived strength from this theme.

In the second phase, when the intellectuals became the main defenders of com-munity self-esteem, monism became a sign of Indian ~upremacy.~' It was used not only to prove the universalist content of the previously decried folk anthropo- morphism, but also to demonstrate the superiority of indigenous metaphysics over its Western counterpart. Also, it seemed to justify transcendental deductive scholar- ship and a revelatory attitude to all knowledge-sources of embarrassment earlier?2 Intellectuals and political leaders in this sense became the prototypes of Brahmins "giving" or interpreting "given" laws and prescribing doctrinaire purity.

In the Gandhian era, the theme of creating or maintaining a balance among in- consistencies and disharmonies entered political relations and allowed the politics of mediation to infiltrate into almost all parts of the society.23 The age-old decision- making style of village India combined with the ideology of anthropomorphism to

and Ideologies in South and South East Asia," in and History, 3 (1961) pp. 368-394. S. Rose (ed.), Politics in Southern Asia, (London: 21 For example Aurobindo, op. cit., passim; Macmillan, 1963) p p 261-302; Dutta, op. cit., Vivekananda, op. cit., passim. p. 575; R. Bhaskaran, Sociology of Politics, (Bom- 22 See my "Defiance and Conformity;" E. Shils, bay: Asia, 1967) pp. 57-58; see also my "Defiance "The Culture of the Indian Intellectual," (Chicago: and Conformity," which develops this theme in University of Chicago Reprint, 1959); P. T . Raju, some detail. "Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian Thought,"

20A. Tonybee, A Study of History, Vol. 8: T h e C. A. Moore, op, cit., pp. 263-292, particularly Modern West and the Hindu World, (London: pp. 282-284. Oxford University, 1954) pp. 580-623; S. N. Hay, 23 An example of a Gandhian Islamic scholar "Western and Indigenous Elements in Modern articulating the idiom is A. K. Azad, Speeches, Indian Thought: The Case of Rammohan Roy," 1947-1955, (Delhi: Publications Division, Govern- in M. B. Jansen (ed.), Changing lapanese Attitudes ment of India, 1965) pp. 20-21; also Abid Hussian, Towards Modernisation, (Princeton: Princeton Uni- T h e National Culture of India, (London: Asia, versity, 1965) pp. 311-328. Chaudhuri gives a 1963); S. R. Radhakrishnan, op, cit., and East and scintillating, albeit literary, account of this syn- West: Some Reflections, (London: Allen and Un- thetism; see his Autobiography, pp. 178-218; also win, 1955) p. 40. All of them trace the various S. S. Tangri, "Intellectuals and Society in Nine- aspects of Congress consensualism to this linkage. teenth Century," Comparative Studies in Society See a brief review in Rowe, op. cif., pp. 11-14,

66 ASHIS NANDY

strengthen this pluralism by basing it on the level-wise and sector-wise multiplicty of sacred and profane authorities. Political mobilization at a large scale was possible in an amorphous society mainly because this new connotation of monism allowed both interest aggregation and conflict resolution through legitimate means.

All this, however, has now made it difficult to displace the semi-sacred concept of consensus strengthened by Gandhian politics. Secular national consensus, de-manded by present-day politics, therefore has to continuously compete with the en- trenched concepts of apolitical primordial consensus, traditionally brought about through a highly specified system of unanimous allocation of rights, duties, and responsibilities to meet the diverse conflicting ends of the individuals involved. This ancient preference for harmony over abstract justice survives as a marginal ideo- logical strain in some contemporary leaders who use the doctrine of synthesis to plead for a noncompetitive partyless p0lity.2~ Profane consensus on a competitive electoral system and on political goals which are attained at the cost of others re- mains suspect as a result of this surviving idea of sacred consensus. Within the "one- party dominance system" of the last two decades, for instance, the predominant mode of decision-making consisted not so much of a consensus of program, political ideology, or mutual benefit, but of a subtler group dynamics growing out of modes of demand articulation, communicated expectations about desirable interpersonal behavior, shared beliefs about conflict-resolution techniques, and the image of a leader as a faction-managing consensus builder.

These changes in the meaning and function of this theme has been associated with drastic changes in the political fate of the groups which used it as a symbol. The shift to mass politics which began in the third phase of politicization caught the in- tellectual elites on the wrong foot. The indigenous version of white man's burden which had been functional to the elitist politics of the first two stages now success- fully isolated the upper-caste literati from their contemporary society. Gradually, their impact came to be restricted to a small, often-ineffective, urban minority. Once, the Sanskritic self-concept of these scholar politicians, supported by brahminic so-cialization and elitist politics, had helped to project into politics the demand for Platonic-often Fabian or Marxist-acharya-kings who would provide brahminic governance. Now, it made them poor political bargainers and the first victims of adult franchise. The consequent diminution of the political influence of intellectuals and their self-induced depoliticization have been throwing up, since the Gandhian times, professional politicians less committed to ideological or doctrinaire p0sitions.2~ Political divisions have now started reflecting the nondoctrinaire interest-aggregation

2 4 On the older concept of concensus in the con- naissance, 1960); and J. P. Narayan, "Organic text of a changing society, see J. D. M. Derrett, Democracy," in S. P. Ayar and R. Srinivas (ed.), "The Administration of Hindu Law by the British," Studies in Indian Democracy, (Bombay: Allied, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 4 1965) pp. 327-344; for analyses of the role of the (1961) pp. 15-16. L. I. Rudolph and Susanne H. theme in party politics see Rajni Kothari, "Opposi- Rudolph, Modernity of Tradition, (Chicago: Chi- tion in India," Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Regimes and cago University, 1967) pp. 187-190, 254-268; Oppositions, (New Haven: Yale University, in E. Wood, "Patterns of Influence within Rural India," press). in R. L. Park and Irene Tinker (ed.), Leadevship 2 5 Edward Shils, "Influence and Withdrawal: The and Politicai Institutions in India, (Princeton: Intellectual in Indian Political Development," D. Princeton University, 1959) pp. 372-379. For sys- Marvick (ed.), Political Decision-makers, (Glencoe: tematic statements of the modernized and polit- Free Press, 1961) pp. 29-59; Selig Harrison, "Lead- icized versions of an ancient position, see M. N. ership and Language Policy in India," in R. L. Roy, Power, Parties and Politics, (Calcutta: Ren- Park and Irene T i k c r , op. cit., pp. 151-166.

67 THE CULTURE OF INDIAN POLITICS

of the unexposed rural sectors and power is slowly seeping through the fingers of the politically conscious urban centers, making the latter the spheres of anomic agitational politics growing out of political impotency and fears of economic dis- crimination. This defeat further diminishes the influence of sophisticated political theories and concepts, of both domestic and imported varieties, and potentiates the pull of more mundane and less brahminic values, laying down the basis of what has been called "unheroic politics."

Originally, the concept of dharma, or duty, acted as the final source of temporal power in India. Perceived as man's differentia, it influenced the organization and legitimacy of political power, decision-making authority, and law. Also, drawing support from the popular idea of nishtama karma, or desireless work, dharma superceded personal morality by an impersonal amoral sense of duty and equated inward detachment with freedom from the sense of good as well as evil. The system was supported by traditional patterns of socialization which ensured diffusion of identifications and partial individuation in the individual. He therefore tended to rely upon norms, rules and constraints which were more aggregative in nature and this reliance was psychologically validated by his extended family, caste, and village republic.26

Though this discouraged individual autonomy and initiative, there are in this stress on familism and "communality" the ingredients of integrative commitments and a sense of collective responsibility in politics can perhaps be built upon it.27 Moreover, complex civilisations often have inbuilt checks against their own excesses. Thus, the emphasis on dharma also seems to breed a special individualism of socio- political isolation and alienation. By admitting the possibility of individual salvation and by believing that the individual soul is coeternal with God rather than created by him, it indirectly holds each man responsible for his own worldly status and gives him the power to make a new status for himself in another life. On the other hand, this primordial individualism, possibly what Spratt diagnoses as sec-ondary narcissism, dissociates community responsiveness from individual respon-sibility and equates individualism with withdrawal from profane group efforts of a political type.28 It also probably underwrites the tendency to perceive politics as an amoral, affectless, ruthless pursuit. We shall come back to this point.

-

2eThe concept of dharma is almost impossible bindo, and Gandhi. Personality correlates of the to translate. "Duty" is a very inadequate rendering. theme have been mentioned by W. S. Taylor, The best description the concept is of course in op. cit., passim; Carstairs, op. cit., pp. 137-169. P. V. Kane's History of Dhmmashastsa, (Poona: 27 R. K. Mukherji, Social Structure of Values, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1946), Vol. (London: Macmillan, no date) p. 83; E. Green, 3, pp. 241, 825-829. More sociological analyses are The Far East, (New York: Rinehart, 1959) p. 310. available in Irawati Karve, Hindu Society: An 2s On the metaphysical and personality correlates Interpretation, (Poona: Deccan College, 1961); and of this primordial individualism, see Dutta, op. k t . , P. H. Prabhu, Hindu Social Organisation, (Bom- pp. 571-573; and P. Spratt, op. cit., passim; on bay: Popular, 1954). On the influence of the con- the individual's withdrawal from public concerns, cept on traditional power structures and jurisprud- see D. N. Sinha, "Psychologist in the Arena of ence, see R. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizen- Social Change," Presidential Address, Section of ship, (New York: Wiley, 1964) pp. 215-298. The Psychology and Educational Science, ~ 3 r d Indian concept of nishkama karma of Geeta has also been Science Congress, (Chandigarh, 1966) p. g; A. Can- repeatedly given new meanings by different com- tril, "The Indian Perception of the Sino-Indian mentators. Some of the most influential of the Border Clash," (Princeton: Institute of International reinterpretors have been Vivekananda, Tilak, Auro- Social Research, 1963). Also, Beatrice Lamb, India,

ASHIS NANDY

This textbook theme had its more mundane hardheaded coordinates in even the traditional system.29 By giving absolute legitimacy to ascribed parochial roles and by making personal achievement ego-alien, it reduced both free-floating power, status, and economic resources and the psychological range of political, social, and occupa- tional choices. This tendency to regulate society through external rules or concepts of fixed duty was-and perhaps still is-a major obstacle in Hindu theology to the integration of different ethnic, occupational, and religious groups within the frame- work of a nation-state?'

In the age of elitist politics, the concept of dharma deepened the gap between achievement-emphasizing, competitive, individual-choice-oriented politics and the collective identity of the masses. But in the elites themselves a persistent ambivalence toward older duties and ascribed roles were generated by the "large-scale intro- duction of achievement rite ria."^^ This in course of nearly two-hundred years con- tinued to invalidate older attitudes toward personal autonomy, achievement, and initiative. The groups which, however, dominated the professions and politics in the course of this long period and in whom the ambivalence was generated, have been slowly elbowed out by mass politics. Undoubtedly in the new groups too, personal achievement and initiative are gaining grounds as important values and individual freedom and rights are becoming potent political symbols.32 But to them at a cer- tain level, competition and achievement are even now pejorative ideas and they have to be sanctified with reference to ~articularistic group goals. Consequently, in com- petitive politics, tension management still involves the reduction of this normative dissonance to make the realities of an achievement-criteria-dominated politics mean- ingful to the new groups entering politics.

The nationalist movement, in this respect, played a special role. T o mobilize large-scale support it constantly fought against two processes which the concept of duty validated: segmentation and political perfect i~nism.~~ This retarded the growth of these traits within politics. But after 1947, when the culture of this movement was displaced by a system oriented to governmental or bureaucratic procedures, the con- cern with segmentation sought expression in interpersonal distance, ritualization and formalization, and rule-bound incompetence in governmental functioning. Simul- taneously, with ascent to political power, it became possible to indulge in the luxury

A World in Transition, (New York: Frederik A. Politics of Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton Praeger, 1963) p. 41; Morris-Jones, "Behaviour and University) pp. 153-246, see pp. 166-167. Idea," p. 83. 32 Joan Mencher, "Growing up in South Mal-

29 Kane, op. i t . , Vol. 5, p. 1629; B. K. Sarkar, abar," Human Organisation, 22 (1963) pp. 54-65, The Political Institutions and the Theories of the Cormack, op.cit., 1961, p. 21.

Hindus, (Leipzig: Market and Petters, 1922). For 33 On segmentation see Morris-Jones, "Behaviour analysis of this in the context of traditional sectors and Idea," pp. 82-83; Rowe, op. cit., p. 16; and in modern India, see D. C. McClelland, The Margaret Cormack, The Hindu Woman, (Bombay: Achieving Society, (New York: Van Nostrand, Asia, 1961) p. 25. On ~olitical perfectionism see 1961); and "Motivational Patterns in the South W. H. Morris-Jones, "Stability and Change in East Asia with special reference to the Chinese Indian Politics," S. Rose (ed.), Politics in Southern Case," 1ournal of Social Issues, 16 (1963) p p 9-19; Asia, (Bombay: Asia, 1963) pp. 9-32> especially J. T. Hitchcock and Leigh Mintern, "The Rajputs pp. 10-11. Segmentation also reinforces the dis-of Khalapur," in Beatrice B. Whiting (ed.), Six tinction between the functions of political and Cultures, (New York: Wiley, 1963) pp. 203-361. religious authorities, and the resulting contemporary

Smith, op. cit., pp. 25-30, 40. stress on secularism. Smith, op. cit., Chapters 2, 3, 31 M. Weincr, "The Politics of South Asia," in and 4; M. Weiner, op. cit., pp. 153-246, par-

G . A. Almond and J. S. Coleman (ed.), The ticularly p. 160.

69 THE CULTURE O F INDIAN POLITICS

of doctrinaire rigidity and factionalism, based on political perfectionism which was in turn embedded in a purist tradition.

The movement also had to fight against the belief, long authenticated by the idea of duty, that all relationships are or should be hierarchically arranged and that power, responsibility, and the prerogative to make decisions should only lie with ascribed leadership. This gave a special meaning to the equalizing forces of new politics. T o the numerically weak traditional elites, handicapped by a participatory system, most politics began to seem illegitimate, with the possible exception of the marginal poli- tics of authoritarianism or violence. T o the more numerous traditional groups or to groups in good bargaining position due to their strategic location, politics became a means of rising in the traditional hierarchy. These have unleashed four forces. Firstly, the changing hierarchical relations and status hunt continue to be brought within competitive politics and they provide part of the ideational basis of political commitment, with both disintegrative and integrative consequence^.^^ The principle of hierarchy was invalidated by a second development which took place in the third and fourth phases. Some of the older skills of traditionally low-status groups be- came functional in a changed context, and groups previously low-placed in hier- archy were thrown into dominance because of their innovative behavior and/or organizational skills. These communities, as already mentioned, started trying to sanctify their new-found status by a second reinterpretation of sacred texts, group histories, and community myths. Simultaneously of course, the traditional skills of some of the other groups became disfunctional and these groups lost status. For in- stance, the symbol manipulation skills were no longer the cutting edge of politics, and upper castes which specialized in these lost some of their political significance. Thirdly, to turn around a much publicized point, while the nationalist movement and the subsequent political developments have given a new lease of life to caste groups by validating caste identifications, broadening the basis of caste ties, and politicizing caste associations, it has by these very means changed the nature of caste and has undermined many of its traditional normative a s s~mpt ions .~~ Castes now compete, cooperate, or fall apart in a manner which explicitly invalidates traditional hierarchy. And lastly, the growing selfesteem of the previously low castes is giving a new prestige to a less Sanskritic style of political expression. As the interests, fears and values associated with Sanskritisation are loosing their salience, this emerging style is entering the culture of politics as part of a more "hard headed" and "down-to-earth" ideology. This also is undermining the ideological basis of fixed status relations.

Nonetheless, of all the cultural "immutables" in Indian politics, the theme of hierarchy perhaps has shown maximum resilience. As Srinivas points out, even the much boosted Indian tolerance is bound within the compass of hierarchy?' The accepted style of handling heterodoxy has been to bring the latter within the hier- archical order and assign it a relatively harmless role. In this connection, it is worth noting the fate of new occupational choices and work relations which opened up for

34 See the papers in R. Kothari (ed.), Caste in 35 Kothari, op. n't., passim; Rudolph and Rudolph, Indian Politics, op, cit.; also F. G. Bailey, Tribe, op. cit., Part I; Srinivas, Caste i n Modern India, Caste and Nation, (Manchester: Manchester Univer- passim, particularly Chapter I. sity, 1960). 86 Ibid., particularly pp. 87-97, I 12-1 19.

70 ASHIS NANDY

the individual in the last two centuries. Though apparently catalyzing social change by allowing traditional, emergent, and functional hierarchies to operate at cross-purposes, they often have only managed to deepen the moorings of hierarchy as a group value.37 For instance, Western education, while it has increased social mobility and class distinctions and, thereby, has partly invalidated older criteria of social grouping, has also created in the process new status relations. Not only the system itself has become "crushingly hierar~hical,"~' but even those who have dominated it have created an ingroup almost primordial in its characteristics.

The principle of hierarchy also persists in the special style of Indian authori- tarianism. Authority in India was traditionally not so much a concentrated source of power and coercion, open to competition, pressures, and threats of dislodgement. It was a passive, apolitical, ascribed role which could not be contested by anyone from within the system. The pattern was validated by the absolute patriarchy of village and caste elders in group decision-making and conflict resolution and by the history of distant arbitrary political authorities who rarely interfered with the day to day living of their subjects. In present-day Indian politics too, authority con-tinues to have its "natural, substantially hereditary seats" and cannot be dislodged without radically modifying the entire hierarchicalstructure within which it op- e r a t e ~ . ~ ~This is expressed in the fear and unconditional acceptance of established authority (remember for example, the long history of collaboration with alien rulers at various levels and the more recent tendency of elections to give a ruling party al- ways an edge over its opponents40), the widespread faith in the supralogical intuition of accepted political leaders,41 and the manner in which individuals wield political charisma on the basis of their nonpolitical authority. Yet, on the whole, authori- tarian rigidities have not been very conspicuous in Indian party politics and demo- cratic institutions have shown a remarkable resilience up until now. Perhaps the hierarchization that goes with Indian paternalism, though it touches every social stratum, was especially a feature of the upper-caste elements. When these groups dominated politics, not only was the traditional hierarchy validated, but also the traditional self image of these castes and their concept of political "mission." For instance, the type of political identity Bankim Chandra Chatterji, Tilak, and Subhas Chandra Bose offered had clear authoritarian streaks; at some level their ideologies established links with the traditional concepts of leadership, hierarchy, and brah- minism. While some of these links persist in the latent ideology of certain political groups, they have become marginal to the system, mainly because of the diminishing bargaining power of the groups which these individuals represented.

Suppression of desires has been another significant theme in Indian politics. The traditional concept of purity connoted cleanliness of mind as evidenced by the ability to subjugate hatred totally. There seems to be substantial agreement among social

37 M. Weiner, op. cit., p. 166. Community in Village India," Pacific Affairs, 32 88 Edwards Shils, "Indian Students; Rather Sadhus (1959) pp. 93-133; L. I. Rudolph and Susanne H.

than Philistines," (Chicago: University of Chicago, Rudolph, "Generals and Politicians in India," Reprint, 1961) p. 3. Pacific Affairs, 37 (1964) pp. 3-19,

39 W. H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, (Lon- 40M. Opler, W. L. Rowe, and Mildred L. Stroop, don: Longmans, 1957) pp. 33-37; "Behaviour "Indian National and State Elections in a Village," and Idea," pp. 78; Dutta, op. cit., pp. 576-577; Aiyar and Srinivas, op. cit., pp. 641-654. Murphy, op. cir., p. 56; H. Tinker, "Authority and 41Lamb, op. cit., p. 106.

THE C U L T U R E O F I N D I A N POLITICS 7 1

scientists that this demand for total nonviolence actually represents a latent conflict about aggression in the modal Indian. It seems that child training in India neither gives the aggressive impulses a chance to be patterned or shaped nor equips the in- dividuals with internalized techniques of resolving intergroup conflicts. Conse- quently, when aggression is aroused under economic or political stress, it bursts out in a "primitive chaotic way."42 In spite of all ideological emphasis on pacifism, thus, themes of hostility predominate at the projective level of personality functioning. This further increases the concern with aggression control and the fear of one's loosing control.

The theme was first used in politics in its connotations of charity and daya (mercy) by some of the early reformers. For instance, one of the earliest attempts to renovate the antedeluvian social ethics of this peasant society used the theme as the basis of a new, more universalist, political ethics.43 It was partly in this sense and in the sense of self sacrifice of brahmacharya (abstinence) that it became associated with politics in the second stage. It then started legitimizing the individual's political participation and made political protest a sacred obligation for some. Pre-Gandhian brahmacharya also, following ancient texts, conceived of power mainly as power over self and conservation of this power within self through impulse control and sexual abstinenceP4 The bond between political conservatism and revivalism, on the one hand, and personal anxiety about loosing purity through "dissipation" and im- pulse indulgence, on the other, was mainly established in this era. Conservation of that which is already there became, in this idiom, a valued political goal, and every- thing new, unstable, and smacking of impulse gratification a source of suspicion and fear. Power-oriented politics in consequence could not but become a constant attempt to conserve purity and potency at all cost. Simultaneously, the deep-seated fear of pollution through contact that pervaded Indian folklores, classics, rituals, and inter- personal relations, became a restorationist defense against all cultural encroachments.

The equation which Gandhi made between self-discipline and self-government in the third stage is of course much more well known. Blending Jain, Vaishnava, and brahminic asceticism, he for the first time underlined the connotation of aggres- sion control in the theme. The brahmacharya of the revivalists and extremists did not have this connotation. Such a symbol had become necessary because of the felt need to mobilize the peripheral sectors of the community by giving them a new sense of personal efficacy and political potency. This was the time when both the extremist challenge and constitutional liberalism had failed. The first because of nonchalant, unorganized apolitical masses and the organized might of British empire supported by a loyal army and police; the second because the mood of both the rulers and the ruled had changed and none were willing to use the liberals as brokers. In such a situation, unarmed pacifist satyagraha was perhaps bound to become a concern of colonial The intersecting demands of these political forces and traditional

42 Murphy, op. cit., p. 52; see also N. C. because he considered it a cause of Hindu degrada- Chaudhuri, The Continent of Cirre, (London: tion. Chatto and Windus, 196j) pp. 97-115. Hitchcock 44Carstairs, op, cit., passim; Arther Koestler, and Mintern, op. cit., passim; Carstairs, op. cit., The Lotus and the Robot, (London: Macmillan, passim. 1g60), Part I.

43 Rammohun Roy, op. d.,Vol. 2, particularly 45 See M. K. Gandhi, My Non-Violence, (Ahmeda-pp. 135-189. Roy also explicitly rejected pacifism bad: Navajiwan, 1950); and N. K. Bose, Selec-

tions from Gandhi, (Ahmedabad: Navajiwan, 1948).

72 ASHIS NANDY

identities made unconditional ahimsa not only a technique of protest, defiance, and change, but also the major support for consensual decision-making and conflict reso- lution in intergroup and interpersonal contexts. This partly negated the older Indian concept of politics as a dirty, aggressive, alien game and made political participation seem a legitimate, sometimes almost saintly, behavior. On the other hand, it stressed total unconditional acceptance of consensus-through-any-means as a cureall of all political ills and seemed to emphasize the "perverseness" of competitive party politics in comparison to the primordial purity of the sarvodaya movement.

In "inner speech" the search for political potency still involves the principles of impulse-control and self-abnegation. And, socially too, these are a vital source of legitimacy and charisma. However, the present system tends to invalidate the Gandhian style and this has become a source of conflict. Firstly, the experience of the nationalist movement, which proved the politics of ahimsa and satyagraha to be efficacious tools of pressure and mobilization, still tends to justify agitational strat- egies and leads to the undervaluation of formal means of demand articulation and protest. Simultaneously, persistent implicit assumptions about Indian passivity and pacifism induces authorities to disregard demand management till extra-systematic pressures are applied. This reinforces the agitational strategy and heightens further the participating Indian's inner doubts about his capability to control and channelize hostility. A highly successful attempt to resolve these contradictions was Nehru's concept of peaceful coexistence or nonalignment. It shunted away the saintly style into the nation's international relations. For a time at least Indian foreign policy seemed to offset the diminishing Gandhian influence in national politics. Irrespective of its success or failure in the international sphere, it was therefore part of the politics of national consensus building. Now, with the lessening appeal of Nehru's moralistic idiom in India, the confrontation between the styles may again become sharper. Secondly, the Gandhian emphasis on public purity, expressed in the concern with incorruptibility, invulnerability, and cleanliness of mind and body, is also capable of becoming the fear of being "let down" by the corrupt and the vulnerable in politics. In this respect it may confirm the lack of trust and mutuality and reduce the ability to share responsibility at different levels of political f~nctioning.~'

Another dimension is added to Indian politics by the agricultural ethics of the so- ciety. Expressed in the plurality and situation-specificity of group values and in- dividual morality, this traditionally sanctioned the diversification of ethical com-mitments, "inner compartmentalisation" and tolerance of dissent, and claimed that "there are as many moral codes as appointed stations in life, rather than one com- mon ethical system for all men regardless of position and social function."47 Typ- ically, the concept of rightness and goodness varied with caste, occupation, age, and sex roles, and even the gap between personal values and cultural configurational values widened and shrank with the valuer's social situation. Both this ego capacity to accommodate contradictory ethical systems specific to diverse political, economic,

For two interesting analyses, see Susanne H. Ru- 46 Morris-Jones, "Stability and Change," p. 11; dolph, "Self-Control and Political Potency: Gandhi's Cormack, op. n't., pp. 24-25; see also M. K. Gandhi, Asceticism," American Scholar, 35 (1965-1966) Hindu Dhurma, (Allahabad: Navajiwan, 1950) pp. 79-97; and Joan Bondurant, T h e Conquest p. 16. of Violence, (Princeton: Princeton University, 47 Reincourt, op. n't., p. 51; see also Rowc, 1958). o p cit., pp. 34-36.

THE CULTURE OF INDIAN POLITICS 7 3

and cultural orders and the availability of alternative goals and criteria to the in- dividual for this purpose have at different periods of Indian history neutralized dis- sent and radical innovations by seemingly accommodating them into the consensual system.48 In nineteenth and twentieth centuries particularly they have made politics and politicians meaningful parts of an apolitical society.

The avoidance of sharp choices according to a single moral code and the absence of an "active ethics" tended, especially at times of flux, to seek expression in the con- cept of ethical irrelevance and in the weak personal commitment to social or po-litical values. This "avoidance of personal moral issues," sometimes referred to in virulent and apocalyptic tones and sometimes in tones of mild exasperation, had a certain functional validity in an agricultural society.49 It helped maintain the viability of the system by underplaying individual judgement and preferences and by con-trolling self righteousness and bigotry:

"Monism . . . inevitably creates a moral climate quite different from that created by the dualism to which the West is more accustomed . . . even if some things are more divine than the other, evil does not have the hard, tough reality that it has in the religious beliefs of the West.5o

T o the extent, however, that universal and absolute "inner controls" or moral imperatives are essential to the growth of complex systems of secondary relationships requiring competence in undefined social situations, the acceptance of such "ex- ternal" values as authoritative preferences undermined organizational skills and interpersonal competence in contractual situations. The weakness was reinforced by the modal traits of interpersonal hostility and suspicions which in the peasant so-ciety stood in the way of mutuality and eficienc~ in secondary groups.51

The tradition-directed tendency to base values on external controls--of sacred texts, brahminic commentaries, and rituals-had another corollary. The awareness and even cultivation of alternative ethics, the tolerance of any dissent which can be interpreted as a commentary or reinterpretation of sacred texts, and the living faith that all dissent represents aspects of an indivisible truth and therefore reconciliation somehow is always possible, were all strengthened by this weak and fragmented commitment to one's own values. This was particularly true of politics where the long deprivation of power and absence of legitimate authority-in the sense of the legitimacy arising out of meaningfulness as opposed to the legitimacy arising out of the tendency to submit to all authority-retarded the crystallization of explicit political values and symbols. This combination also accounts for the observed poten- tiality of Indian society to generate "a certain cynical ruthlessness" and "naked

48011 the relative autonomy of politics from Examination of Radhakrishnan's Reply to Schweit- society see M. Weiner, "India's Two Political Cul- zer's Critique of Indian Thought," Ethics, 67 (1956) tures," in Political Change in South Asia, (Calcutta: pp. 25-41. Brief discussions of this subject are avail- Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1965); "India: Two able in T . M. P. Mahadevan, "Indian Ethics and Political Cultures;" Morris-Jones, "Behaviour and Social Practice," in C. A. Moore, op. cit., pp. 476- Idea," and "Stability and Change;" M. N. Srinivas, 493; also A. B. Keith, The Religion and Philosophy Caste in India; S. N. Eisenstadt, "Transformation of Veda and Upanishads, (Cambridge: Harvard of Social, Political and Culutral Orders," Amevican University, 1925) pp. 584-586; Hume, op. i t . , Sodological Review, 30 ( 1 ~ 6 5 ) pp. 659-673; Smith, p p 58-66. op i t . , pp. 57-62. 50 Lamb, op. n't., p. 113.

49 Chaudhuri, Autobiography, pp. 214-21 5; A. 61 On the lack of mutuality and interpersonal Schweitzer, op. cit. See a review of this argument distrust, see Chaudhuri, Autobiography, pp. 212-

in W. F. Gwdwin, "Mysticism and Ethics: An 213; Carstairs, op. cit., Chapter 3, particularly.

ASHIS NANDY

realism" in political matters, which can exploit the imageries of Mahabharata and Arthashastra to picture politics as a situation-specific amoral pursuit.62

In the first three stages of political development, the need to alter this ethical system was sensed by the modernizers. Till almost Independence, therefore, the struggle for political changes remained associated with religious reform. Continuous attempts were made by the political leaders to universalize and deritualize Hinduism and to forge new religious ideologies out of older texts to justify individual respon- sibility and individual morality. These reform movements not only fought against the form and substance of the older ethics, but also sought to justify public concerns and political responsiveness on the basis of individual conscience and a new image of sacred authority.

Simultaneously, a number of attempts were made during the first three stages to utilize the normative pliability of the Hindu society to integrate Western political ideas and forms. This was possible because the principle of person and situation- specific dharma provided the individual a rationale for meaningfully separating politics from society and then judging politics on its own terms. This special secu- larism was reinforced by the nine-centuries-old reality of a superimposed, alien, political framework, the gradual diminution of the. sense of political efficacy and potency in Hindus, their large-scale withdrawal from subcontinental politics, and the erosion of commitments to public values or symbols in them. There was con-sequently no need for the modern political forms to fight against established non- secular political institutions or ideologies.

With the increasing tempo of economic and social change and the expanding sphere of participation, the specialized capacity of the Hindu society to absorb new ideas and the ideologies, through segmentization and moral neutrality, may fail to act as a safety valve. This special capacity had grown out of special experiences. The type of heterodoxy the society had faced over the centuries in the form of Buddhist, Jain, and Islamic intrusions or in the frequent growth of denominations and cults starting from Vaisnavism and Shaivaism and ending in Brahmoism and Arya Samaj movement has mainly been ideological, in the sense that the life style and means of livelihood of the majority were not touched by these. Only in recent times has the community met the joint challenge of scientific and technological sgrowth, large-scale changes in means of livelihood, and new political forms. The type of problems, crises, and anxieties that have been typical of the elites until now may soon therefore become the lot of the entire society. The institutional pliability and inter- personal skills which can cope with such nonideological challenges, particularly challenges which are cross-validating, are yet to be demonstrated and are perhaps still to develop.

Nevertheless, the long tradition of tolerance of heterodoxy has given a certain viability to the present political system. The legitimacy of the political opposition and the disproportionately important role assigned to its leaders till 1967 (when the election results at least provided them with a formal basis), the ability to make large- scale "amoral" political compromises (which contributes to the image of sancti-monious Indian leaders) and the agglomerative nature of the party of consensus, Indian National Congress (and increasingly of the major opposition parties), reflect

62 Reincourt, op. n't., p. 400; K. M. Panikkar, pp. 18-20. A Survey of Indian History,(Bombay: Asia, 1963)

76 ASHIS NANDY

values) is itself, in this context, a major aspect of the nation's political culture. It reflects the reality of a fragmented society, characterized by a wide variety of mar-ginal as well as changing cultural strains and their distinctive histories. The new links which are being forged among these primordial cultures, and between them and more secular political forces, are opening up new areas of culture conflict as well as new possibilities of cultural consolidation. The overall tendency has been to shake the organic balance of the traditional society. The historical compatibility among its autonomous subsystems is breaking, though politics is yet to give mean- ing to the rearranged relationships among these subsystems.

Fourthly, the ways in which politics of dominant decision-making groups sum- mates the political cultures and life-styles of little communities are probably as im- portant as the content of individual cultural themes. The operant political values in India are, in this sense, the result of the confrontation among sets of political values, and among sets of symbols which integrate as well as aggregate. The unique features of these local and regional cultures-reinforced by different histories, weltanschauun-gen, and, ultimately, by different patterns of socialization-interpenetrate to some extent in the leadership values of a pluralist society. These interchanges within the themes are often as important contents of the political'idiom as the themes themselves.

Fifthly, the phase-specific adapative style of Indian politics has bound together, at each historical phase, the phase-specific meanings of all the themes salient in public life. In fact, one can even go further and say that both the changing significance and salience of themes have been defined mainly by the basic adaptive problems of the community at each historical point.

Lastly, it appears that over the last hundred and fifty years, political values have been increasingly drawing strength from the pragmatic nonbrahminic aspects of the cultural themes I have listed. This movement away from textual aspects of the themes is perhaps another sign of politics becoming a part of day-to-day living of ordinary people.

In conclusion, let us briefly discuss the characteristic features of Indian national- ism which, utilizing these thematic complexes and building upon primordial al-legiences to older apolitical symbols, has been trying to create a new awareness of the nation and responsiveness toward national efforts. In a society with a colonial past, nationalism is perhaps the major pacesetter in the immediate post-colonial period. As a process which has coped with the confrontation between two complex cul- tures, the growth of nationalism in India has not only determined the exogeneous elements which could be integrated within the self definition of the political com- munity without destroying self-esteem, but also the selection, redefinition, and re-jection of tradition-elements for the purposes of developing the idiom of new poli- tics.

Having been historically an elite response to alien rule, Indian nationalism has had three main features. Firstly, over the entire nineteenth century it conceptualized political authority as a stabilizing, modern, liberal instrument that could be utilized for reformist purposes. The pro-British sentiments of indigenous elites in the last century were not merely a reaction to seven-hundred years of muslim rule or the crumbs of colonial exploitation which the elites were then collecting. It also grew out

THE CULTURE OF INDIAN POLITICS 7 7

of the utilitarian sense of mission of the nineteenth century British, which had its reflection in the brahminic sense of mission of Indian leaders. This mutually rein- forcing sense of a "cause" was gradually destroyed by British superciliousness gen- erated by the quickening tempo of industrial and scientific revolutions in the West, the gradual entry of British middle-class elements into the ruling junta of India (a group itself searching for the self esteem their Victorian society denied them and trying to find it in the white man's burden), and the growing feelings of inferior- ity among Indians. Nonetheless, the old expectation that the government should be the major agent of social change persists in certain groups. Much of Indian socialism and communism, led by educated Westernized upper- and middle-class elements and drawn from traditional social elites, could in this sense be a remnant of the long ex- perience of high-caste urbanites working with, and through, the British government toward a more modern society. The "demand explosion" in these sections in the fourth stage probably is a delayed result of the hopes of Indian liberal reformers of the nineteenth century whose support for, and expectations from, the government were often

Starting from a different vantage but converging with this, twentieth century politics has confirmed this authority image by its intermittent references to socialist centralized models of social engineering and by bringing in through Nehru, Patel, and others the sources of charismatic authority within the government. In the proc- ess, it neutralized partly the Gandhian emphases on voluntary nongovernmental reformist politics and directed it away from the mainstream of Indian public life. This demise of voluntarism in politics was further encouraged by the cultural dis- inclination to interfere with life processes, the growth of a psephocratic model of democratic participation where power was relinquished to "elected kings," and the gradual association of professional politics with competition among the "natural" leaders of ascriptive groups, played out above the level of the laity.

Secondly, the ineluctable logic of colonial politics managed to associate national- ism in some to attempts to cope with personal feelings of inferiority. Whether it was a culturally modal fear of inadequacy or a sense of inadequacy generated by inter- nalization of Western norms, a major coping mechanism for many became the re- affirmation of one's nationalist self and identification with national interests. The result was chauvinist self righteousness or aggressive moralistic feelings of cultural supremacy.54 Because nationalism was extremely weak in the first phase, when cultural syncretism was the main substance of politics, no strong bond between the two strains could perhaps grow.

Thirdly, in the second phase Indian nationalism became associated with "im- ported" values and structures-an association later consummated by the Westernized nineteenth century leadership and self-imposed Western political forms. Probably from this are derived part of the legitimacy-and illegitimacy-of the new system, the load that it carries by way of the ideological overconsciousness and national sensitiveness in the exposed elites, and the underestimation of nongovernmental mass efforts even at the highest political echelons. Though the Gandhian style countered this in some ways, the association between Westernization and political

53 Mujumdar, op. cit., Chapter I ; Mishra, op cb., Man in India, (New York: Dryden, 1955); Dhiren-passim. dra Narayan, op. cir.; Chaudhuri, The Continent 54 John and Ruth Useem, The Weslern Educated of Circe.

7 8 ASHIS NANDY

authority persisted and was in fact strengthened by the Gandhian protest move-ments in certain other ways. The challenge of legitimacy in India resides therefore not so much in the public evaluation of new political forms and authority, but in the containment as well as exploitation of the percept of omnipotent politics in the elites, and the dissociation of politics from its image as a disruptive, radical, alien instrument among others.

I shall conclude by offsetting these features of Indian nationalism against the four styles of political culture and by briefly specifying the role of nationalism in relation to four different strata of Indian personality.55

The first style invokes a period when nationalism was a relatively greater aware- ness of the nation as a field of expanding economic and occupational opportunities and of an alien political power. At that stage it did not arouse deeper psychological conflicts because of two reasons: one's self image as an Indian was not internalized enough to contradict one's deeper concepts of authority, hierarchy, and power (which at that time was not challenged by the British), and nationalism was an aspect of the salient and successful defence of identification with the aggressor. Aggressive integration of the new and aggressive universalism remain therefore the major feature of this idiom and intellectuals its major carriers. The idiom seems to tap the weak male identification, the diffusion of identifications ensured by mul- tiplicity of authorities within the joint family, and the search for absolute authorities who like the father are "intruding strangers" and by identifying with whom one could affirm one's masculine self.

The second idiom represents an attempt to bind feeling of personal or national inferiority by revivalist nationalism. Identification with the nation here helps one to restore self esteem by projecting one's unacceptable self on to scapegoats within and outside the system. The major element of this style are the imageries associated with the nation: the conception of a motherland by identifying with whose aggressive motherliness one could restore the sense of infantile omnipotence. This style derives its strength from modal phantasies and cultural myths centering around the mother and from the way in which these become associated with the preservation of one's "true'' self as a son of the soil. Aggression geared to The Cause becomes this way a defense against ambivalence toward the first and only intimate authority the individual has to cope with in a traditional Indian famliy. While this gives the commitment to nation a deep embeddedness in the traditional culture-personality system, it perhaps allows less political maneuverability and is conducive to chau- vinistic conservatism if the individual's self-system is under pressure.

The third style utilizes nationalism to tackle superego problems of a particular type. Ideological purity, doctrinaire conformity to pacifism and impulse-control, and search for political potency through renunciation are used here to cope with per- sonal feelings of shame about impulse indulgence which participation in the modern sector induces. In a deep sense the style is reparative: participation in public affairs and organization building are used here to combat latent destructive impulses. Politically, the style is mobilizational, psychologically it emphasizes conquest of the self and self-realization and, ultimately, mobilization of one's ideal self.

The fourth style links nationalism to organizational skills, attitude to profes-

55 Some of the studies which provide empirical Carstairs, op tit.; Rudolph and Rudolph, up. cit.; basis of the observations made in this section are Hitchcock and Mintern, op. cit.

79 T H E CULTURE OF INDIAN POLITICS

sionalization and specialization, competitiveness, and to bargaining. It demands from the individual a sense of interpersonal competence and appeals to his needs for achievement, profit, or gain. It taps a relatively more modern stratum of Indian personality which is yet unacceptable to the individual. It is basically nonbrahminic in content and it rejects both ideological purism and social inflexibility. The chal- lenge of this phase, it seems, is to legitimize these aspects of national character with reference to traditional ideals and to make them part of more conscious perceptions in the elites.