i

THE PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT OF MINUSTAH IN

HAITI

THESIS

Written By

RIZKA KHAIRANI

NIM 071012079

BACHELOR PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA

ii

THE PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT OF MINUSTAH IN HAITI

THESIS

Written for one of the requirements to complete Bachelor Degree

in International Relations at Faculty of Social and Political

Sciences, Universitas Airlangga

Written by

RIZKA KHAIRANI

NIM 071012079

BACHELOR PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA

Even Semester 2013/2014

iii

PAGE OF APPROVAL

Thesis with the title:

The Peacekeeping Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti

Written by :

Rizka Khairani

071012079

Agreed to be submitted for

Thesis Defense

Even Semester 2013/2014

Surabaya, 21 May 2014

Supervisor,

Sartika Soesilowati, Ph.D

NIP. 196407301995122001

Acknowledging,

Head of Bachelor Program of International Relations

M. Muttaqien, S.IP, MA, Ph.D

NIP. 197301301999031001

iv

PAGE OF ENDORESEMENT BOARD OF EXAMINERS

This thesis has been defended before the Board of Examiners

on Wednesday, 21 May 2014, at 13.00 WIB in the Cakra Court-room

Faculty of Social and Political Science

Universitas Airlangga

Commission examiners

Chairman,

I Basis Susilo, M.A

NIP: 19540808 198103 1 007

Member I, Member II,

Vinsensio Dugis, Ph.D IGede Wahyu Wicaksana, Ph.D

NIP:19650113 199101 1 001 NIP: 19790602 200710 1001

v

NO PLAGIARISM STATEMENT PAGE

Some parts or all of the contents of this thesis with the title

The Peacekeeping Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti

was never submitted to obtain an academic degree in the field of study and / or other

university and never published / written by individuals other than the author except

when written with the format of the quote in contents of the thesis. If it is found that

my statement is not true, then I am willing to accept sanctions in accordance with

applicable provisions of Universitas Airlangga Surabaya

Surabaya, 28 May 2014

Rizka Khairani

NIM: 071012079

vi

DEDICATION PAGE

I dedicate this writing to my mother and father, Umi dan Ayah

Fikriyati Hapsari and Adi Susilo

The two most inspirational people in my life,

And to my loveable yet annoying little brother and sister

Ahmad Afifuddin and Salsabila Yasmin

You are all my everything.

Always and forever.

Your proud daughter and sister.

vii

INSPIRATIONAL PAGE

Work Hard, Play Hard, Pray Hard

viii

FOREWORD

Security has always been at the front and foremost of any political policies

made by states. Although the concept of security has changed through time, the media

to intercept and give the sense of security has mostly been dominated by the actions

of the United Nations especially through the deployment of peace enforcement

troops. Some states view that it should be the goal of all states to give this sense of

security, especially to others less fortunate than some. Some states view this as a

power struggle to reassure their position in the global world through their role as

contributor or leader of such troops. It is in these assumptions of altruims and alter-

ego of states and their reasonings of peacekeeping deployment that the writer takes

great curiosity. The great difference between the usual place of deployment and Haiti

is also a great concern when writing this thesis.

Of course, in writing this thesis, the writer could not have done it alone. This

thesis is a special dedication towards the parents of the writers, who have, for the last

22 years have taken great care and patience when dealing with the writer. Through all

the advice, through all the understanding, there really is no better set of parents that

can truly help and lead the writer though life. To my little brother and sister, know

that no matter what I do, I can only hope that I can be a good example for you. This

also would not be complete without the help of Dra. Sartika Soesilowati, M.A, Ph.D,

in supervising this thesis.

Also for my first family in Surabaya, HITEN, you guys rawwk. Thank you for

being my trash can for when it feels like I would just give up in writing this thesis.

ix

My second family, DJAMBOELS, you guys truly have been there for me when I was

just down and wanted to thrown everything up. A special shout out to Elsa, my best

friend, seems like we see each other everyday but we always manage to talk our ears

off at night. Another shout out to Dije, Angga, Wede, Cesar, Adis, Vida, Tegar.

Seems like those late night outings and venting helped me clear my head. You guys

also helped me to find a new perspective when dealing with things. A huge hug is

also necessary for my Wrong Family that makes me feel so right. Those 3 weeks

together just truly made us a big family that is spread out across Indonesia: Ano,

Adis, Acha, Oliv, Tegar, Papih Yos, Mamih Venty, Indra dan Yoyo. Thanks for

always making me laugh, smile and giving support through this process, sometimes

people think Ive gone insane becuase I laugh at my cellphone. But of course, without

the guidance of Allah SWT, this thesis would truly be hard to complete.

Last but not least, the writer knows that this thesis is far from perfect. There are

many faults, mistakes and problems might be left unanswered but hopefully the little

knowledge given through this writing would be beneficial for future writings to

come.

Writer,

RIZKA KHAIRANI

E-mail: rizka.khairani24@gmail.com

x

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COVER .....................................................................................................................................i

TITLE ......................................................................................................................................ii

PAGE OF APPROVAL ........................................................................................................ iii

PAGE OF ENDORESEMENT ................................................................................... ..........iv

NO PLAGIARISM STATEMENT PAGE ............................................................... ...........v

DEDICATION PAGE ................................................................................................. ..........vi

MOTTO ........................................................................................................................ ........ vii

FOREWORD................................................................................................................ ........viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ .........x

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. .........xii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1

I.1 Background ..................................................................................................... 1

I.2 Research Problem ......................................................................................... 9

I.3 Aim of Research ............................................................................................ 10

I.4 Theoretical Framework................................................................................ .... 10

I.4.1 Humanitarian Intervention ................................................................ 10

I.4.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2P).. ...................................................... 12

I.4.3 Peacekeeping and Conflict Escalation .............................................. 14

I.4.4 English School Theory of International Relations .......................... 16

1.5 Theoretical Synthesis ...................................................................................... 17

I.5 Hypothesis........................................................................................................19

I.6 Method of Analysis ...................................................................................... ...19

I.6.1 Concept Operationalization ............................................. ............. ..19

I.6.1.1 Human Security.. .... ..19 I.6.1.2 Mandate of the UNSC ....................................................... ..22

I.6.1.3 Civil War ..............................................................................22

I.6.2 Research Approach ....................................................................... ...23

I.6.3 Scope of Research ............................................................. ............. ..24

I.6.4 Data Collection Technique ............................................................ ..24

I.6.5 Data Analysis Technique.. .. ..24 I.6.6 Research Overview. .... ..25

CHAPTER II LEGAL BACKGROUND OF INTERVENTION OF

MINUSTAH IN HAITI .. ............ 26 II.1 United Nations Charter as the source of International Law in

intervention ..................... ................................................................................... 26

II.2 Peacekeeping in the UN Charter . 29 II.2.1 History of Peacekeeping Opearation ................................................30

xi

II.2.2MINUSTAH as a Peacekeeping Operation ..................................... 33

CHAPTER III MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF MINUSTAH IN HAITI .. .. 37

III.1 Socio-Historical Background of Haiti before MINUSTAH 37 III.2 Conflict Escalation of Haiti .............. ....................................................... .....47

CHAPTER IV POLITICAL PROCESS OF UNSC RESOLUTION 1542 ..49

IV.1 Interest of Powers in the UNSC ........... ..................................................... ... 49

IV.1.1 Power of the P5 members in the UNSC ...........................................49

IV.1.2 Middle Power in the UNSC ..............................................................51

IV.2 Mission in Haiti before MINUSTAH ................ ........................................ ..53

IV.3 Statements by UNSC members in meetings .................................................54

IV.4 Significant actors in the making of the MINUSTAH mandate in 2004 ........61

IV.4.1 Brazils interest in MINUSTAH .....................................................62 IV.4.2 United States interest in MINUSTAH ...........................................63

BAB V CONCLUSION .................................................................................. .. 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................xiii

ATTACHMENT

Attachment 1Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya...........................................xxv Attachment 2United Nation Charter ...........xxxiii

Attachment 3Resolution 1542 (2004) on Haiti ..........................................................liii

Attachment 4 Statement by the President of the Security Council at the 4917th

meeting of the Security Council ..............................................................................lvi

xii

The Peacekeeping Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti in 2004

ABSTRACT

United Nations role of deploying peace enforcement troops in the world is

critically important in maintaining international peace and stability. Whether or not a

conflict is regarded as an emergency and be given mandate of peacekeeping has a lot

of determining factors. This can be analyzed through the legitimacy in terms of the

moral justification, the legality and the political process. The long and rigorous

process in authorizing a peacekeeping operation has also been seen as a playing arena

for other states to put their interest at play. Between 1993 and 2001, six different

United Nations Peacekeeping Missions were deployed to Haiti but each was then

pulled back with an urgency to exit rapidly. It was only from 2004, that the

international community through the resolution of the United Nation Security Council

(UNSC), legalized resolution number 1542 from the UNSC as a long-term

commitment in order to secure the future of Haiti. The lack of history of a civil war or

any peace settlements to observe or implement are some of the differences between

MINUSTAH and other peacekeeping forces in the world. Haitis domestic problem is

a multidimensional in terms that it is caused by social-economic disparity and its lack

of institutional stability thus supporting violence in the slum areas of the capital to

develop. This research aims to analyze the reasoning, from the legality, moral

justification and the political process from the UNSC in the deployment of the

MINUSTAH operation in Haiti. In giving the example, the writer will also attempt to

analyze the political process through one non-permanent member of the UNSC,

Brazil and one permanent member of the UNSC, and also the United States. This

research uses the descriptive approach in describing the factors contributing to the

deployment with the results being the UN Charter as a whole has articles that trumps

others making the notion of sovereignty and peaceful means as conflict resolution

absolete. The moral justification and domestic problems were deemed as being

eligable to be intervened becuase MINUSTAH is a fourth geeneration peacekeeping

and the political process of the deployment showing a large political interest of the

contirbutors.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Haiti, MINUSTAH, Humanitarian Intervention,

Responsibility to protect, conflict.

1

Chapter I

Introduction

I.1 Background

The United Nation (UN), responds to different conflicts and crisis arising in

the world in different manners. Some are deemed dangerous enough and deserve a

peace enforcement troops whilst others are seen by the UN as being small enough

to be handled by the host state itself thus desiring no intervention. The reason of

deployment therefore can be varied depending on the situation and context and the

deciding actors. Political interest in peacekeeping that can be seen later on in the

political process of the making of the mandate,gives meaning and values to

humanitarian crises, making a definition of what is worthy enough to be deployed

a peacekeeping troops or not.

One example of the veto power of the deciding powerbetween the

permanent 5 members (P5) of the Security Council, is the case of the deployment

of troops under NATO in Libya, under the UNSC Resolution number 19731

established in 2011 stating the No-Fly-Zone in Libya, and the lack thereof in the

humanitarian crisis in Syria. This is especially strange since the situations of both

countries in regards to its humanitarian crisis and the governments response to

protesters are greatly similar. Both Syria and Libya seems to have similar causes

and effects and which both government thoroughly push and oppress the

demonstration done by the civilians resulting in many lives lost. Civil uprising

1United Nations, UN Resolution 1973 (2011) Nato,

http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf

accessed on 1st May 2014

2

and mass protests were spreading everywhere, but the interesting thing is how

both cases do not receive the same treatment in terms of humanitarian intervention

mandated by the UN. In response to Gaddafis ruthless oppression of his own

people, the UN passed the resolution that gives the mandate for military

involvement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO began its

military attacks against Gaddafi forces with the objective of protecting civilians in

Libya. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon held up the historic Resolution

number 1973 by stating that the justification for the use of force in Libya was

based on humanitarian grounds. 2 Syria on the other hand, has had no international

intervention made against the al-Assad regime. The humanitarian crisis in Syria,

although receiving similar condemnation from the international community has

not passed the UNSC decision making process due to the veto of both Russia and

China. They claimed that the Syrian crisis did not meet the definition of a threat to

global peace and security. The reasoning, according to opponents, was the lack of

prioritizing on the part of the UNSC to set up a dialogue with the Syrian

government, as well as concerns over previous implementation of the UNSC

resolution in Libya.3

The Charter of the UN4, especially Article 24 of the Charter states how

peacekeeping is the deployment of troops into a host state that has violated

humanitarian rights of its citizens, endorsed by the mandate from the UNSC to

help the parties to a conflict to resolve a conflict peacefully. The presence of these

2 UN News Center. Libya: Ban welcomes Security Council authorization of measures to

protect civilians,2011,http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37809&Cr=libya&Cr1.

Accessed on 20th March 2014. 3 Luis Peral, R2P in Syria How to Surmount the Inaction of the UN Security Council?,

European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2011. 4United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statue of the International Court of Justice,San

Franciso, 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf accessed at 14 March 2014

3

people, soldiers, military observers or civilian police, encourage warring parties

not to use arms but rather keep negotiating for peaceful settlement of disputes.

International intervention is thus deemed as being legitimate if they were

deployed for the sake of saving lives in humanitarian crisis.

The Security Council has 15 members. The United Nations Charter

designates five States as permanent members and the General Assembly elects 10

other members for two-year terms. Besides having the 5 permanent members in

the UNSC, the council also have 10 other non-permanent members with the

duration of 2 years in the council. The 10 members are chosen in the goal of

having regional balance and some are middle powers. In order for a resolution to

pass, it has to be agreed by the 5 permanent members of the UNSC, and at a

minimal agreement by 4 of the 10 non-permanent members, thus all in all it has to

be agreed upon by 9 of the UNSC members. 5

The post-Cold War era has resulted in the increasing number of the

conduct of belligerent non-governmental actors within a state, most likely in the

form of intra-state war and domestic civil war. It is in conditions of internal chaos

that these actors flourish. Intra-state conflicts and humanitarian catastrophes

constitutes as threats to international peace and security and is one of the major

sources of instability throughout a region. The end of the cold war also meant that

the UN Security Council, once paralyzed by US and USSR vetoes, was finally

able to make intervention policies once it can be seen that the two superpowers

were not polarized anymore. This led to the concept of the Responsibility to

5 Christian Stock, New Horizons and Old Problems for UN Peacekeeping. University Erlangen-

Nrnberg, 2011.

4

Protect (R2P), established in 2001, which asserts that if a state is failing to protect

its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures are not working, the

international community has the responsibility to intervene: first diplomatically,

then more coercively, and as a last resort with military force. 6

Unlike in the Cold War era, where the main goal of the peacekeepers

would be to resolves disputes and conflicts between states, the post-Cold-War not

only forces the peacekeepers to have the role of traditional peacekeeping but also

assist in the rebuilding of the civil infrastructure, administer humanitarian aid and

supervise elections and ensure fair and peaceful transitions of power, like in the

case of the peacekeeping troops in Haiti, Mission des Nations Unies pour la

Stabilisation en Hati (MINUSTAH) or in English : UN Stabilization Mission in

Haiti.

Picture I.1: Map of Haiti7

6 James D Fearon, and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." The American

Political Science Review 97.1 (2003): 75 7http://blog.education.nationalgeographic.com/ accessed on 3 January 2014

5

Haiti, a country locating in Central America, ever since the early years of

its independence has been on an instable state, from economic, political, social

sector and has become the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, with the

highest levels of income inequality.8 Even though, the problems are domestic,

these intrastate conflicts are not just dangerous in its domestic realms itself but

also be in danger of disrupting other national interest of neighboring states like

economic activities, in terms of companies, traders and investors. It can also cause

huge migration flows, as Haiti's borders are near the US and other American

states, it may create instability. The combination of poverty and violence has

resulted in waves of refugees fleeing the country and large numbers of internal

displacements. For example, following the 1991 coup in which 1,500 died, 40,000

fled the country and 20,000 to 30,000 fled the capital.9There may also be a strong

possibility that these conflicts create border instabilities and in international

politics, diverting governments from constructive cooperation in the region and

internationally.

International interventions started in Haiti in 1990, after the coup of

Aristidewhere Haiti has requested the UN to observe the presidential election, the

result of this election was the appointment Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the head of

state.10

This did not last long as the 1991 coup headed by General Cdras ended

the democratic rule. After some diplomatic arrangements, in 1993, General

Cdras agreed that Mr. Aristide would return to Haiti in October. The United

8 Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Haiti, 2006.

9Robert Fatton Jr., Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy, Lynne

Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002. 10

Morris, J. Force and Democracy: UN/US Intervention in Haiti, International Peacekeeping, 2(3): (1995): 391-412.

6

Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), led by the US, was established to assist in

modernizing the armed forces and in creating a new police force. After the

mandate ended, the UNMIH took over in 1995 to assist the Government in

maintaining the secure and stable environment established by the force, and to

help create a national civil police force. In June 1996, UNMIH was replaced

in its functions by the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH),

which was followed by other operations like the United Nations Transition

Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) in July 1997 the United Nations Civilian

Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) in November 1997 and the Civilian

Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) in March 2000 and terminated in 2001. In

2004, escalating violence came to a head, with armed gangs and former police and

soldiers taking the town of Gonaves.As a result, then President Jean-Bertrand

Aristide left the country, a UN-sanctioned Multinational Interim Force was

deployed (succeeded on 1 June 2004 by MINUSTAH), and a transitional

government was installed. 11

One of the most important distinctions is the fact that Haiti is not a war

zone. There is not a situation like in Darfur or in Somalia where there is

constant fighting and a lack of a government, resulting in gross act of violation of

humanitarian right. Haitis instability stem from the many small neighborhood

gangs and there is not a usual post-conflict agreement to supervise and control.

What is happening in Haiti is a series of fighting between gangs and supporters

from the government clamoring for political power. Haitis other sources of

insecurity are related to its low economic development which in turns causes state

11

Damrosch, L. F. (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (Council

on Foreign Relations Press: New York,(1993):127

7

led forces including the Haiti National Police (HNP) to not function maximally,

and Haitis lack of political institution that can causes anarchy of power to thrive

in society.12

The parties at conflict in Haiti are the various urban gangs and armed

political groups operating in the capital and other cities. Some urban gangs are

mainly political in nature fighting in support of various powerful individuals or

factions while some are criminal organizations engaged in inter-gang fighting,

clashes with the HNP and MINUSTAH and at times partake in politically-related

fighting out of personal gain.13

Haiti does indeed have its problems, but it can be

seen as a domesticlingering political and governance crisis which results

degradation of the economy and the safety of the society. The origins of the crisis

go back to the troubled past of Haiti that was filled with dictatorship history and

coups. Ordinarily UN peacekeeping missions get deployed in a post conflict or a

conflict situation. Haiti cannot really be described as either.14

According to the UN Peacekeeping Year in Review 2013, the total number

of troops that are stationed in Haiti is 12.5% (12,552 troops out of 99,329

peacekeeping troops across the World), which makes it the third largest

peacekeeping troops in terms of size worldwide after Darfur and Sudan15

. This is

interesting considering that it only has an area of just 27,750 sq km (which is

slightly smaller than Maryland). Violence and murder rates of the population, as

one of the considerations when deploying PKO, are also particular low in Haiti in

12

Lopez-Claros, A. 2007. The humanitarian response index 2007. Palgrave MacMillan: New

York. 13

Spoiling Security in Haiti: LatinAmerica/Caribbean Report No. 13, International Crisis Group,

May 31, 2005

14 Human Security Report, Oxford University Press, 2005.

15MINUSTAH by the Numbers, Center for Economic and Policy Research

http://hcvanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/12/12/minustah-by-the-numbers-haiti-occupied-by-third-

largest-un-peacekeeping-contingent-in-the-world-and-it-is-not-even-a-war-zone/ accessed on 2

January 2014

8

comparison with other neighboring states. Haiti's homicide rate in 2003 was 6.9

per 100,000 people. That compares to Jamaica at 52, Trinidad at 35, and the

Bahamas at 28 and Brazil at 23. The rate for the U.S. colonies of Puerto Rico and

U.S. Virgin Islands (2007 statistics) is 26 and 39, respectively16

. In no other

country has the UN made so many efforts to keep peace. Throughout the 1990s, 5

peacekeeping operations were deployed to Haiti.17

A peacekeeping operation (PKO) on the other hand has to go through a

few considerations before they can be agreed upon and deployed to the host

country. It has to be able to claim legal justification and moral legitimacy for

humanitarian intervention from the international community.18

Legal justification

can be seen through the analysis of the international law regarding humanitarian

intervention, especially in the UN Charter whilst moral legitimacy is seen to be

fulfilled when genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic

cleansing occurs.19

The question of the reasoning of deployment then comes to

mind when addressing MINUSTAH. It is worth noting that in the political

process, we not only analyze the states of the permanent 5 but also the other states

that have a significant role in the deployment of the PKO. In this case the writer

believe that Brazil is a good example of how political interest might be a variable

since Brazil is the leader and one of the biggest contributor of troops to

MINUSTAH With more than 2,000 troops Brazil also constitutes the largest

16

2003 Global Study on Homicide by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODP). 17

Malone, D. Decision Making in the UN Security Council. The Case of Haiti. 1990-1997, 1998. 18

Holzgrefe, J. L. and Robert O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political

Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 19

UN Document A/59/2005, United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development

and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Decision by

Heads of State and Government in September 2005, http://www.un.org/largerfreedomaccessed on

3 March 2014

9

troop contributor to MINUSTAH. Aside from that, the writer will also analyze the

dynamic inside the permanent 5 members of the UNSC whilst making the

mandate of MINUSTAH.

1.2 Research Problem

Based on the brief background above, Haiti has therefore not fulfilled the

normal criteria for a state to be intervened but on the other hand was deployed a

large number of troops, thus the main problem of this research is, what is the

reasoning of the United Nation Security Council to intervene in Haiti?

1.3 Aim of Research

This thesis seeks to pinpoint and analyzethe reasoning of deployment that

correlates to MINUSTAHs intervention in Haiti, from legality, moral

justification and the political interest of some states in MINUSAH, from some of

the most significant actors in thenon-permanent member and the dynamics of the

permanent 5 members in making this mandate for MINUSTAH in 2004.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

To analyze reasoning behind the reasoning of the deployment of the

humanitarian interventionof MINUSTAH in Haiti, the writer will analyze the

legality through the articles in the UN Charter, the moral justificationthrough the

means of pinpointing the particular stage of conflict escalation in the domestic

scale of Haiti and the political process that coincides with the political interest of

the members of the UNSC in 2004 using the theories below:

1.4.1 Humanitarian Intervention

10

The UN in upholding its responsibility of protecting international actors

not only has a responsibility towards state actors, but also non-state actors,

particularity individuals. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights makes individualsat the center of protection and are provided international-

legal protection. This responsibility falls first and foremost into the hands of the

states, but occurrences may occur when a state is well beyond is capabilities to

ensure peace and security towards its citizen. Although sovereignty is at the

upmost center of international relations, when a state flagrantly violated human

rights throughgenocide or ethnic cleansing, there is a need to stop those things, it

is during those times that some kind of intervention is thus needed and is deemed

legitimate.

Humanitarian intervention is thus the justifiable use of force across state

borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread

and violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its

own citizens from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the

limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reasons and justice and

who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive

government, without the permission of the state within whose territory force

is applied. 20

Other than those internal factors of the potentially-intervened states,

in order for an international intervention to take place there are a few criteria that

need to be fulfilled before external actors are deployed. They are: a legitimate

authority has to conduct the war, usually sanctioned by the UN, force has to be the

last resort and has to be proportional to the injuries and crimes perpetrated,

20

Holzgrefe and Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention.

11

intervention should be in the intention to make things better for the civilians, the

interveners has to assume the responsibility for the welfare of the people and for

establishing peace and have to end the intervention after completing their

humanitarian mission there has to be an exit strategy. 21It is basically the theory

of intervention on the ground of humanity that recognizes the right of one state to

exercise an international control by military force over the acts of another in

regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the law of humanity.22

Humanitarian intervention is thus an activity taken by a state, or other actor,

which interferes in the domestic affairs of another state for moral reasons

concerning human rights.

1.4.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The Concept of Responsibility to Protect has a wide variety of definitions,

From the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty, the High-Level Panel report, the Report of the Secretary-General,

and the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit23

, the writer adopts the

conclusion by Carsten Stahn in stating that the most comprehensive definition can

be taken from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

(ICISS). The ICISS shifted the focus from the right to intervene to the

responsibility to protect. Here, R2P views that the

responsibility to protect implies an evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those seeking or needing support, rather than those

who may be considering intervention; secondly, the responsibility to

21

Anthony Oberschall, Conflict and Peace Building in Divided societies: Responses to ethnic

Violence. Routledge: Oxon, 2007. 22

Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 1993.

23CarstenStahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? The

American Journal of International Law, Vol.101.No.1, 2007.

12

protect acknowledges that the primary responsibility rests with the

state concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable or unwilling

to fulfill this responsibility , or is itself the perpetrator, that it

becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in

its place; thirdly, the responsibility to protect means not just the

responsibility to react , but the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild as well24.

From the quote above most can agree that the responsibility to protect the

sole responsibility to protect its people lie on the host state and only when a state

is unable to protect the right of life of its citizen then can external forces be

allowed to come. The responsibilities of the forces does not only finish at getting

the parties in conflict in agreement but also getting the parties to stop potential

conflicts and also the rebuilding of the infrastructures and human capital that

might have been lost in the conflict process. Morally, R2P can only be applied

when A state has done 4 humanitarian crimes, there are four R2P crimes,

genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 25

Here, the

military intervention is the last resorttobetaken by the international world.

This concept emerged in 1996, which assumes that the international

community should have the right to intervene when a state cannot fulfill and give

the people its essential needs. A states responsibility towards its people. In 2001,

the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released a

key report entitled The Responsibility to Protect, affirms that the international

community, through the legitimacy of UNSC, has the right to intervene militarily

24

Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the

Responsibility to Protect, December 2001. 25

the World Summit High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the United

Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2005.

13

when a population is suffering from serious harm due to insurgency or to state

failure. 26

R2P is basically the idea that a state should protect its citizens from mass

atrocities. State sovereignty implies responsibility, not a license to kill27 and

when that state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, the responsibility

becomes that of others --neighboring countries or the international

community, not excluding use of force in extreme cases28

. For international

organizations such as the UN, R2P means 'the responsibility to warn, to

generate effective prevention strategies, and when necessary to mobilize

effective reaction'29

. R2P therefore suggests interplay and an attempt to include all

actors who are willing and able to prevent a situation to become grave and

destabilize a whole region from happening again. Whether or not to send a

peacekeeping mission is decided in the arena of international politics, and in

the case of UN missions in the UN Security Council, where the mandate is

designed and discussed 30

.

This norm can be analyzed in this research paper on whether it really is

within the responsibility of the international community in contributing the

peacekeeping force in Haiti that the international community claim is committing

mass atrocities and other severe acts of humanities towards its people. This

26

International Development Research Centre, International Commission on Intervention and

State Sovereignty,: The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa, 2001. 27

Evans,G. The responsibility to protect, 2008,

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5667&l=1&m=1accessed on 28 December 2013 28

Weiss, T. The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007. 29

International Crisi Group, The Responsibility to Protect, 2008.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521&l=1&gclid=CKzontWbzJYCFQ86EAo

dUDPxwQ Accessed on 28 December 2013 30

Pouligny, Peace operations seen from below: UN missions and local people, C. Hurst & Co:

London, 2006.

14

perspective can also be used in this research as a tool to analyze the compatibility

of the deployment of MINUSTAH to Haiti in 2004.

1.4.3 Peacekeeping and Conflict Escalation

The United Nation itself never clearly states peacekeeping in its charter

but the definition offered by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

(UNDPKO) seems the most appropriate: peace-keeping operation; PKO

[noncombat military operations undertaken by outside forces with the consent of

all major belligerent parties and designed to monitor and facilitate the

implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to

reach a political settlement].31

Picture I.2: The position of Peacekeeping in the escalation of conflict32

31

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/accessedon 3 January 2014 32

http://bookstore.usip.org/books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=51314

15

The difference between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding

thus depends on the position of the conflict at hand in each country. Although the

three task of peace troops cannot be clearly separated because it is synergized and

integrated into 1 cycle, there are clear mandates for each peacemaking,

peacekeeping and peacebuilding troops at hand. Peacemaking refers to the efforts

to bring hostile parties to agreementby peaceful means, through diplomatic

negotiations and with their consent.Peace making addresses conflicts in progress,

attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation.33

Whilst peacekeeping is in the fear that domestic situation could threaten peace and

international security. Peacekeeping is a noncombat military operations

undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties and

designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce

agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement. It is

done when conflict has broken out and the UN intervenes to assist in keeping

peace.34

The third stage is peacebuilding which occurs after both a ceasefire and a

political settlement have been reached. Includes building institutions of

governance, building a civil service and the judiciary, and strengthening the rule

of law Includes improving respect for human rights through the monitoring of,

education on, and investigation of past and existing abuses and providing

technical assistance for democratic transition.35

Peacebuilding on the other hand is

a political process requiring ongoing political mediation, the strengthening of

national capacities at several levels for conflict management, and sensitivity to the

33

Lindenmayer, Elisabet & Kaye, Josie Lianna, A Choice for Peace?: The Story of Forty-one days

of Meditation in Kenya, 2009. 34

United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations Training. UN Peacekeeping Training

Manual. Nd 35

U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/25354 (March 3, 1993).

16

political, historical, economic and cultural context and dynamics.36 It entails a

range of activities aimed at making peace self-sustaining and reducing the risk of

relapse into conflict.37

Since this research will be mainly focused on the

peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Haiti, it is worth noting that indeed

peacekeeping troops will be mainly deployed in the event that there has been a

truce between warring parties which is mainly done after a certain civil war or

internal conflict has finished. 38

The conflict escalation process in this case will be used in determining the

situation and what kind of stage in the conflict escalation that entails the PKO to

take action in that specific country.

1.4.4 English School of International Relations

The English School theory was established in the 1960s and 1970s with

Martin Wight and Hedley Bull being some of the most prominent writers. The

English School examines the emergence, character, and effects of international

society, particularly its importance to world order.39

In Wights words, the English School has its origins of the rationalist

conception of international society. This conception was the middle bridge

between the realism doctrine and revolutionism doctrine. Relism states that states

especially the great powers are always in a competition for power which

makes everyday society provide for their own security. Revolutionism on the

36

Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, 13,

www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/. Accesed on 29 December 2013 37

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/accessedon 3 January 2014 38

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 39

Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: MacMillan.

Palgrave MacMillan. 1977

17

other hand refers the belief that humanity has the capacity to move beyond

geopolitics to a condition in which all communities can co-exist amicably without

the threat or use of force. Rationalism, according to Wight, rejects both

perspectives while recognising that they have their respective strengths and have

left a distinctive mark on world politics. The essence of the doctrine is that states

may never succeed in eliminating war but they have reached important

agreements about how to control the use of force. States are not condemned to

compete for power and security; indeed, they form a society that preserves a

remarkably high level of order in the context of anarch. Political communities

have mitigated the effects of that struggle by agreeing on principles that provide

some measure of security for the parties involved. But achievements in that

domain are always precarious and they are unlikely to survive indefinitely.40

English School therefore uses rationalism as the media that rejects the optimism

of revolutionism and the pessimism of realism and occupying the middle ground

between them.

1.5 Theoretical Synthesis

Based on the proposed theories above, it can be assumed that MINUSTAH

is considered to be a peacekeeping operation and thus falls under the law of and

the legal process of peacekeeping. The English School Theory of International

Relations explains how the law and regulations are able to control states when

implementing their foreign policies. The middle ground between the vying

powerful states and the altruistic reasoning for policies are the main brunt of the

40

Wight, M., International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

1991.

18

theory and will be used throughout this thesis. The application of humanitarian

intervention and responsibility to protect goes hand in hand when a state justifies

its actions of intervention into another state and thus the criteria used in

determining the deployment can be used in terms of its legality and moral

justification. The theory of peacekeeping itself is common when determining what

kind of generation and mandates is to be applied into a specific peace keeping

operation mission. A specific mission may have different terms and mandates

according to its generation.

Picture I.3: Theoretical Thinking of the writer

19

I.6 Hypothesis

Based on the above explanation and proposed use of theory, it is that in

some events of the deployment of peacekeeping, there are more than just

liberalistic and altruistic (for the greater good of the international stability) views

of its deployment, rather some sort of national interest are existent and are

influencing in the development and mechanism of MINUSTAH.

If we are to look into the legality of the situation, the United Nations

Charter as the main source of international law in regards to the deployment of

MINUSTAH in Haiti would see that the peacekeeping intervention is based on the

Chapter VII of the Charter. Even though the Charter of the UN states that

intervention into another state is very much frowned upon in the international

world, there would come a time when humanitarian crisis and other violations of

human right is deemed as a justification of intervention. The basic assumption of

non-intervention of a state into another state thus not rigid, there are other articles

in the charter that would trump another article.

If we are to look into the moral justification of Haiti before 2004, even

though that Haiti is not a typical situation in which an intervention is deemed

necessary, there is a unique situation in Haiti. This uniqueness may stem from that

fact of how MINUSTAH is different in terms of its mandates and its generation of

peacekeeping.

Another hypothesis in the deployment of MINUSTAH if we are too

analyze the political process of the situation would suggest that the moral

justification of a states, in this case Haiti, is not solely for thesole purpose of

20

humanitarian. The writer suspects that there are other political interests at stake,

whether they are the non-permanent members of the UNSC at the time or one of

the permanent 5 members in 2004 at the time of the MINUSTAH deployment.

I.7Method of Analysis

I.7.1 Concept Operationalization

I.7.1.1Human security

The changing nature of the international world has made some significant

changes in the concept of security ashas been stipulated by the UNSC. Before the

Cold War, a threat to the international world might only be seen through the

reflection of inter-state wars, but now Council has broadened its concept of

security and with it the issues that are deemed to be threats to international peace

andsecurity. It is now more common for the UNSC to declare armed intra-state

conflict as threats to international peace and security under Article 39.41

The concept of Human security puts the fulfillment of individuals right at

the center of its goal but,does not undermine the role that state plays in its part,

thus is inseparable from the state. Human security means the security of such

chronic threats as from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human

trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and

sudden economic and financial downturns and repressions. Although the

definition of repression itself is in some ways clouded by many perspectives,

ultimately it is some sort of situation where a state prevents its citizens from

enjoying all human rights. In this sense, the basic goal of any outside actions done

41

UN Charter Chapter VII article 39

21

from something other than that respective state itself, it has to have the goal of

ensuring human security towards the citizen of that state42

. Human security is also

based on a multi-sectorial understanding of insecurities. Therefore, human

security entails a broadened understanding of threats and includes causes of

insecurity relating for instance to economic, food, health, environmental, personal,

community and political security.

Thus in essence, human security aims on giving human a state of peace of

mind in all sectors of their life. Individuals can attempt to secure themselves, but

when it comes to matters of national security, border invasion, and loss of

territory only states have the capacity and the authority to provide crucial

protection.

1.7.1.2Mandate of United Nation Security Council

A mandate is a result of a series of negotiation and compromises between

relevant actors, in the case of a peacekeeping mandate, the members of the

Security Council, regional bodies and other actors have put their most basic

interests into the mandate. A mandate is therefore the basic benchmark that allows

for one party to determine whether the peacekeeping operation (PKO) is of

success or failure, usually if there are changes in the future years, it can be seen

that the previous mandate has not achieved its maximal target or that the domestic

situation at hand has changed considerably. Due to its significant role, it is thus

necessary to look at how the goals of the mission are formulated.

42

Jorge Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of

Development and Underdevelopment, Second Edition, Ottawa: IDRC Books, 1999

22

Failed mandates can be the cause of points in the articles in the mandates

being too vague.43

Several actors might have different perspective on that goal

depending on their interpretations, as what happened in UNOSOM mandate in

Somalia (1993-1995). It is hence extremely important to not only state the need

for a mission, but also clear limitations and goals. 44

1.7.1.3 Civil War

In defining the definition, the writer draws upon the definition from

Fearon and Laitins 2003 paper which states that a civil war is : (1) fighting

between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups who

sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use

violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over

its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on

both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels).45

It can also be called to have a characteristic of havinghumanitarian

suffering on an enormous scale, numerous armed factions, collapse of the civil

infrastructure, absence of governance and a legal system, absence of individual

security, possibility of ethnic cleansing and genocide, large numbers of displaced

civilians and refugees and unchallenged criminal activities in the host

nation.46

After the 1994 IASC conference working paper, another term was coined

in favor of conflict zone and that is complex emergencies.47

Because these

43

Jett, Dennis C. 1999 Why Peacekeeping Fails. New York: St. Martins Press. 44

D. JChristie, R. VWagner, & D. A. Winter, (Eds.). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace

Psychology for the 21st Century. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 2001. 45

Fearon andLaitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." The American 46

MaryKaldor, New and Old Wars, Organized violence in a Global Era. Polity Press,1999. 47AlexSchmid, Thesaurus and glossary for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms. Fewer And Ramsbotham and Woodhouse. (1998): 46

23

symptoms are so multidimensional, it will not only take one part of an

international organization, mainly the UN, to solve this crises but several different

areas and. A complex emergency is therefore is not just ahumanitarian or a

military problem, its containment requires more than the individual capability of a

single element of the response.

I.7.2 Research Approach

The approach of the research used will be the descriptive approach. In this

sense, the writer will attempt to describe and explain the relation between the

factors, in this how the variables of the Legality of the International law, the moral

justification in terms of domestic situation in Haiti and the political process in the

making of the mandate.

I.7.3 Scope of Research

For the purposes of this paper, peacekeeping operations will refer to those

operations that are defined as such by the UN organization, in

particularlyMINUSTAH. In explaining the historical situation in Haiti, the writer

will talk about the situation after the last PKO beforeMINUSTAH took over

(before 2004).

I.7.4 Data Collection Techniques

Data collecting according to Neuman can be defined into two types,

quantative data collecting and qualitative data collecting. Quantative data

collection will mostly use tools like, survey, and questionnaire and other things

that will result in a number that will be used in the research. Whilst qualitative

data colleting stresses on the importance of interpretation through interviews,

24

observation, focus discussion groups and literature study. In this case, the writer

will use qualitative data collecting, and due to the lack of resources and means to

go to Haiti and see first-hand interviews and observation, data collecting will

consists of mainly literature review,through books, printed media, and credible

online media.

I.7.5 Data Analysis Techniques

Data analysis technique is grouped into qualitative and quantitative

technique. Qualitative technique is the process of putting data coming from

interviews, field observation and other literature data, systematically. According

to Miles and Huberman, the activity of qualitative technique includes data

reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/ verification. 48

In this thesis. The

writer uses the technique of qualitative.

I.6.6 Research Overview

Chapter II Provide the legal background of the intervention in Haiti and how

it has catapulted the deployment of MINUSTAH, particularly from

the international laws from the UN Charter.

Chapter III Explain the legitimacy and moral justification of the intervention

of MINUSTAH in Haiti by analyzing its social and domestic

problems.

48

SingarimbunIrawati,PemanfaatanPerpustakaan. MetodePenelitianSurvei. Jakarta: LP3ES

(1995): 311

25

Chapter IV Explain the relation of the political process and moral justification

of the MINUSTAH deployment with the national interest that is at

stake with some of the members of the UNSC in 2004.

Chapter V Concludes the research and pinpoints the factors contributing to

deployment of MINUSTAH.

26

Chapter II

Legal Background of Humanitarian Intervention of MINUSTAH

The explanations in this chapter provides the correlations of the concept of

humanitarian intervention, the concept of responsibility to protect and

peacekeeping deployment in the events of domestic crisis that are deemed by the

UNSC as being a threat to international peace. The UN Charter, as the main

source of legal coding in defining the actions of the UN is used by the writer to

explain the legal justification in the deployment of MINUSTAH.

II.1 United Nations Charter as the main Source of International Law in

Humanitarian Intervention

The UN Charter49

delegates to the Council the primary responsibility for

the maintenance of international peace and security.50 The UN Charter itself

outlaws the use of force on the part of individual states, and it empowers the

Security Council to make all decisions on collective measures that involve

military force. Article 2(4) states that:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The article stresses the prohibition of using force to intervene another

state, also goes along with Article 2(3), which insists that UN members settle their

interstate disputes by peaceful means. This is later reinforced in Article 2(7)

prohibits the UN from intervening in domestic affairs of states while

49

UN Charter 50

UN Charter

27

allowing for the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.51 Even

though this article outlaws the right of states to use force, article 24, 39, 42 deliver

the power to the Security Council. These sections of the Charter establish that the

Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace

and security (Article 24) and that it can take what measures it deems necessary in

that pursuit, including military action against states or other threats (Article 24).52

Whilst in article 51 in regards to self-defense and the right of the UNSC to impose

coercive measures to maintain peace, according to article 39 and 42 of the UN

Charter. It can be concluded therefore, that the UN may interfere in the domestic

problems of a state if the establishment of the mission is based under Chapter

VII.53

One of the body that has a lot of authoritative in realizing the goals is the

United Nation Security Council (UNSC). The decision in the UNSC has a high

global significance. According to the UN Charter54

, the Council acts on

behalf of all member states and its decisions are binding on all member states

and to some extent, non-members. UNSC in this case can issue

recommendations to disputing parties, recommendations to the General Assembly

as well as make mandatory decisions. It is in the council also that the power to

determine what constitutes a threat to international peace and security are very

much in the hands of the UNSC. The UNSC has many roles to be played by the

member states.

51

UN Charter 52

Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, Foreign Affairs 81 , no. 6 ( 2002 ), (2002): 99 110 . 53

This chapter states the UNs powers to preserve international peace and security, and the measures that it can take to maintain it. 54

UN Charter

28

Authorization for the use of force for humanitarian purposes is one of the

important functions that the UNSC has and does not want to lose, because it

shows that the UN is capable of addressing significant issues regarding security of

the international society.55

The United Nations is established for the purpose

of providing and maintaining of international peace and security, so authorization

of the use of force is an important function of the UN for the fulfilling its main

objective.

One of the first thing that will be done in response to this international norm

was to set down some specific parameters and circumstances in which

international society should assume responsibility for preventing, halting, and

rebuilding after a humanitarian emergency of the intervened. As stated in the

previous chapter, based on the World Summit High Level Meeting in 2005,

humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine should

be upheld when facing four crimes against humanity, and they are genocide,

ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 56

If those four things

were to happen then the responsibility to intervene and stop those humanitarian

crimes would fall on international society generally and the Security Council in

particular.

In deciding what constitutes threats to international peace and security, the

concept of security is very crucial. Throughout the years, the definition of

international threat has also evolved. Now, the UN Security Council includes

civil war, intrastate conflicts and the possession of weapons of mass

55

Jennifer M.Welsh,Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention, in United Nations and Global Security, ed. Richard Price. Gordonsville, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 56

World Summit High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the United Nations

General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2005.

29

destruction and humanitarian crisis into its interpretation of what constitutes

threats to international peace and security.57

II. 2 Peacekeeping in the UN Charter

Commonly referred to as Chapter VI-and-a-half activity, traditional

peacekeeping is seen to lie somewhere between Chapter VI of the UN Charter,

Pacific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII which provides for use of force

by the United Nations to uphold international peace and security. Since the end of

the Cold War, broader interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter resulted

in the rise of the number of humanitarian interventions. The Security

Council started to decide what constitutes a threat to international peace and

security in a more flexible manner than during the Cold War. In Chapter

VII of the UN Charter the limits to state sovereignty are recognized. These limits

are at the points at which the UN Security Council determines a threat to

international peace and security under Chapter VII. Article II (VII) which sets

down the principal of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states also gives

the limits to this principle: This principle shall not prejudice the application of

enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

MINUSTAH was authorized under article 7 of the UN Charter. This

article directly corresponds with article 41 and 42 which states that:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,

and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply

such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of

economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and

other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic

57

Welsh, Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention

30

relations58

. Should the Security Council consider that measures

provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be

inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may

be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other

operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United

Nations.59

The article above basically states that although the council has the right to

intervene in another state in crisis situations, military intervention should be the

last resort and prioritizing other options first and foremost. Mandates given under

the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter suggests that there is a possible

need to not only address the problems in non-militaristic way but also address the

problems at hand in a military way to reduce the instability in Haiti. It combines

assistance and the use of force owing due to its two roles as a peacekeeping and

peace enforcement mission and it also integrates many humanitarian actors, both

military and civilian.

II.2.1 History of Peacekeeping Operation

Based on Segals60 identification of peacekeeping evolutions, it can be seen

that throughout the years the basic concept of peacekeeping, like the situation and

condition of the international world itself, has progressed.

The first of these phases, labelled by Segal as observer missions, or first

generation peacekeeping,61 is conducted between 1946 and 1955. These

operations are characterized by the unarmed and impartial observer deploying in

small numbers to supervise a truce or monitor an armistice and the consent of the

58

Article 41, Chapter 7 UN Charter 59

Article 42, Chapter 7 UN Charter 60

Segal, The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures Australian International Law Journal ,(2000):182. 61

H McCoubrey, and N.D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulations of United Nations

Military Operations, 1996.

31

host country. In other words, the peacekeeping operations done at that time would

have no action in a political level and were merely a passive tool.

Phase two operations ran from 1956 to 1965 and saw a change from small,

unarmed groups to the deployment of armed forces but the arms carried were

strictly to be used in self-defense only but consent of the host country was still

needed. The principles of consent and impartiality and prohibition on the use of

force except in self-defense was also used. Phase three ran from 1966 to 1985 but

saw a decline in the deployment of the peacekeeping forces due to the Cold War.

Here it can be seen that these first generation peacekeeping troops were mainly

deployed in a warring state. 62

The fourth phase of peacekeeping from 1985 to 1990 also known as the

second generation peacekeeping, still relied upon consent of both the warring

parties. However, the operations were now not only focusing on subduing the

military violence but also took time to focus with elements of nation building.

Peacekeepers were also being used to implement and not merely monitor,

comprehensive settlements. This phase saw the transitions of the peacekeeping

troops as not only a passive tool, but taking on a more active role. 63

The advent of third generation peacekeeping, saw the consent of the state

being diminished. It also represents a period of time, a loss of impartiality. This

change was caused due to the fact that the nature of conflict in that time was

different. Increasingly peacekeepers are inserted into internal armed conflicts

rather than as a buffer between hostile States. Their missions are to disarm

62

Segal, The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures 63

Segal, The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures

32

belligerents, rebuild infrastructure, physically as well as organizationally, in

addition to providing security and basic administration for the State. Some

scholars even go as far as saying that missions with extensive civilian functions,

including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight

signicantly improve the chances of peacebuilding success whilst observer and

enforcement missions improve the chance for peace but of course not as

significantly as integrated missions.64

The most recent type of UN peacekeeping is represented by the UN

administrations in Kosovo and East Timor. Unlike earlier experiences of the

United Nations in governing a territory the United Nations Transitional

Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999-2002) and the United Nations

Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999-to date) were both established

under chapter VII by the Security Council which meant that the Security Council

has two forms of enforcement actions available to it.65

According to article 41,

actions not involving the use of armed force and according to article 42 military

actions by air, sea and land forces. Article 42 serves as the legal basis for the

military component of each administration but a closer analyses is required to see

whether article 41 is the legal basis of the civilian component.66

These kinds of missions have never been deployed in the history of United

Nations peacekeeping. In Kosovo and East-Timor, the UN took over the functions

of a state due to the fragility of the state. The UN then began to exercise all

legislative and executive powers of both territories. The administrations have been

64

M.W. Doyle, VN peacekeeping in Cambodia, UNTAC's civil mandate,Boulder London, 1995. 65

Multi-disciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent UN Experience, 1999 66

UN Charter Article 41 and 42

33

called by some new trusteeships, protectorate style forces or the fourth generation

of peacekeeping67

. It can be seen that neither resolution 1244 in regard to

UNMIK, nor resolution 1272 in connection with UNTAET, specified which

article of the Charter authorized the Security Council to establish the missions.

Based on the above description, the writer concludes that MINUSTAH is

part of the fourth generation of peacekeeping which is characterized by

challenging goals and a complex mandates. These operations may be deployed

without the consent of warring parties and seek to provide assistance and

protection to civilians, force hostile groups to abandon violence, and collaborate

on state creation and-or reconstruction. Though it falls short of formally

exercising sovereignty, the Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en

Haiti (MINUSTAH) has typical fourth-generation tasks. 68

II.2.2 MINUSTAH as a form of Peacekeeping Operation

MINUSTAH is considered to be a humanitarian intervention and is part of

the responsibility to protect and is done through a mandate of the UNSC. Below is

a diagram which shows the correlation of humanitarian intervention, the

responsibility to protect and the deployment of MINUSTAH.

67

Multi-disciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent UN Experience, 1999. 68

Fishel, John T. & SANZ, Andrs, eds. Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti.

Washington: National Defense University Press, 2007

34

Picture II: Relations of Peacekeeping with Humanitarian Intervention

and Responsibility to Protect.

Like previously stated, there are a few criteria in order for a mission to be

considered legitimate to be deployed. Consent of the parties; Impartiality; No use

of force except in self-defense and in defense of the mandate. In terms of consent

of the parties, here, the official government are defined by the United Nation

but no one really knows what are the parties involved, since Haiti has not declared

any armed conflict beyond the political conflict between the ruling political class,

the opposition and the masses which also intricate the problem of impartiality.

MINUSTAH was established to support the transitional government of Haiti

(TGOH) and the Haitian national police (HNP), recognized as the only legally

35

armed group in the country at the time.69

In the sense of impartiality, it is thus

questionable since a mandate that only recognized TGOH and HNP, without

recognizing any other party, can hardly be considered completely impartial.

As for the consent of the parties although the president was nominated in

accordance with the Haitian Constitution, the prime minister who at that time was

responsible for running the government, was selected by a Conseil des Sages

(Council of the Wise) and imported from the Haitian diaspora. This process was

considered illegitimate by part of the population, since, according to Haitian

legislation, the prime minister should have been chosen by the president and

approved by the parliament.70

Haitis security challenges did not fit conventional approaches or doctrines

developed for international peace operations. Especially missions under Chapter

VI of the UN Charter. UN missions in Haiti, including MINUSTAH, did not

directly derive from an armed conflict between organized opposing forces. As

identified by the Center of International Cooperation, in one of its latest papers on

Haiti, the most salient political violence of the past three decades has involved

not well-organized combat operations, but mobilization of crowds from

among the millions of extremely poor, on short notice by murky political

interests. Violent political activity often reflects intertwined criminal and political

insecurity.71

69

Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson (eds.), Haitis Governance Challenges and the International Community. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation/Wilfrid

Laurier Press, 2010. 70

Haitian Constitution 1987 71

Kjeksrud, Stian. "Using Force to Stabilize: Implications for the Integrated Mission in Haiti and

Beyond" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and

36

The United Nation, in this case represented by MINUSTAH needs to

realize the extent of its relationship with the Government and other related

political institutions of the State that has been collapsing for decades. In Haiti,

this problem is readily apparent as acting government at that time and the

absence national political will or capacity were mostly responsible for the

withdrawal of previous the international missions. The pride of being the first

nation to be independent by a slave rebellion made them distrustful of foreign

interventions that were to take part.72

Haiti was neither at war nor in a typical post-

conict situation. There was no need for peacekeeping forces to act as a buffer

between two warring sides since the context in Haiti in 2004 was primarily one of

social insecurity, gang warfare and violent crime.

Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans,

2010, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p414339_index.htmlaccessed on 14 February 2014 72

Mani, Rama. Dj vu or Something New? Lessons for Future Peacebuilding from Haiti in

Sicherheit und Frieden, Security and Peace, vol 1/2006, Jan 2006. http://www.sicherheit-und-

frieden.nomos.de/fileadmin/suf/doc/SuF_06_01.pdf accessed on 15 April 2014

37

Chapter III

Moral Justification of MINUSTAH in Haiti

The domestic situation are one thing that really affects whether or not a

peacekeeping operation is deployed. The moral justification of MINUSTAH

intervention Haiti is seen in how the domestic circumstances of Haiti are in

correlations with the principles of the responsibilities to protect.

3.1 Socio-Historical Background of Haiti before the Peacekeeping in 2004

Haiti proclaimed its independence on January 1, 1804 making it the second

nation in the Americas to gain independence and the first nation governed by the

people of African descent. The fact that the Haitians overthrew the French and got

succeeded in fighting for their freedom would eventually affect in how the

Haitians view the interventions in the future, it also shows how tied they feel to

their roots in Africa. 73

Haiti is categorized as fragile, failing and failed in international

humanitarian and development circles.74

Foreign Policy magazine ranks 59 failed

states against 12 indicators in its Failed State Index. Haiti ranks seventh worse

among failed states just behind Somalia, Congo, Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe

and Afghanistan. In 2012 in a composite measure of human wellbeing, Haiti

ranked 161 worse off of 187 countries. No Latin American or Caribbean country

fell into this low development category.75 Also the are a major indicator of

73

R. Muggah, The perils of changing donor priorities: the Haiti case. In J. Welsh and N. Woods (eds.) Exporting Good Governance. Chapter 8. Wilfred Laurier Press, Waterloo, 2008 74

Muggah, The perils of changing donor priorities: the Haiti case 75

The human development index (HDI). United Nation. UN Development Programme (UNDP),

2012

38

how well a country is governed. World Banks Worldwide Governance

Indicators reports six indexes compiled from composite scores derived from

multiple sources.

World Bank Governance Indicators Percentage of countries worse than Haiti

Voice & accountability 30%

Political stability & absence of

violence 20%

Government effectiveness 5%

Regulatory quality 20%

Rule of law 5%

Corruption controls 8%

Picture III.1: World Banks Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)

for1996-2011

Even though Haiti's economy in GDP increased during the 1970s, its

economy declined by an annual average of 1.5 in the 1980s and by 3.2 in the

1990s and declined again from 2000 to 2003 by 2%, Haiti's GDP was also

only US $346 in 2003, way below the average of US $3,273. 76In the graphic

below, it also maps out the HDI of Haiti, which is one of the closes

measurement for poverty worldwide. Interestingly enough, the HDI has seen

some improvement from 1995-2003. By 2005, Haiti was ranked 153rd out of

177 countries by the UNDP Human Development Index, the lowest ranking

country in the Western hemisphere. Public services, such as health, sanitation

and education, are extremely weak.77

76

International Crisis Group. A New Chance for Haiti?, ICG Latin America/Caribbean Report

No10, Port-au-Prince/Brussels. 2004. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-

caribbean/haiti/010-a-new-chance-for-haiti.aspx accessed on 10 February 2014 77

The human development index (HDI). United Nation.

39

Picture III.2: GDP per capita and HDI trends in Haiti 1970-200478

The Haitian Institute of Statistics and Information Technology estimated

that in 2001, 56 percent of the population was living on less than a dollar a day

and 76 percent on less than US$2, which is the international standard for

poverty.The World Bank estimated that GNI per capita in 2005 was US$450.

UNICEF estimated the 2005 under-five infant mortality rate at 120 per 1,000, as

compared to 43 in Guatemala.79

Amnesty International reports that the efforts of the UN and the Police

Force of Haiti has mostly failed from curbing the violent crime in Haiti. It states

that on average, 100 people were murdered in 2004 but not all were processed due

to the corrupt and ineffective police and courts of Haiti.80

Aside from that, Haiti

itself has a large and organized crime network, some member of the former armed

forces have joined together and formed armed brigades and claim that the

78

UNDP report 2005, World Bank Report 2005 79

United Nations Development Programme. 2006. Human Development Report 2006. Beyond

scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis. New York. World Bank. Haiti Data Profile.

Available at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/ external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=HTI

accessed on 24 January 2014 80

Amnesty International Report 2005.

40

governmentowes them in ousting President Arisitde. Haiti is also a bridge for drug

trafficking, especially into the U.S, officials in the US estimates that around 8% of

the cocaine entering the US travels through Haiti.

Based on Haitis constitution, it guarantees the freedom of speech and

press which the government generally respect, but in some cases,like during the

second Aristide administration in 2000-2004, some members of the press were

killed for supporting opposition movements. Although the governments does not

censor radio, television or internet, it has so far in frequent times ignored the right

to assembly and organize.81

In the political sector, the governmental and political stability in the early

years of its independence in the nineteenth century was not apparent. The

constitution was never finalized and being treated as just a political game toy for

most political candidates, economic stagnation was everywhere and social

injustice was still apparent. The United States (US) seeing this violent instability,

intervened militarily. Here, the US occupation set the political conditions that

were in favor for the rise of the Duvaliers (Papa Doc and Baby Doc) who

ruled through a brutal dictatorship from 1957 through 1986. In ruling duration of

Duvalier, like their predecessors, the Duvaliers